

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Nov. 1880

Great Captains with their Guns & Drums
Disturb our judgment for the hour;
But at last Silence comes:
These all are gone, & standing like a Tower,
Our children shall behold his fame,
The kindly-earnest, brave, foreseeing man,
Sagacious, patient, dreading praise not blame,
New birth of our new soil, the first American.

J. R. Lowell.



Photographed about 1860 by Hesler, Chicago. Engraved by T. Johnson, from the original negative owned by George B. Ayres, Esq., Philadelphia.

A. Lincoln

THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.

VOL. XXXIII. NOVEMBER, 1886. NO. 1.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

EDITORIAL PREFACE.

THE CENTURY MAGAZINE has never entered upon a more important enterprise, nor one in which we have been surer of the sympathy and support of the public, than in engaging to present in these pages the first full and authoritative biography of Abraham Lincoln, together with a history of the times in which he lived. It is hardly necessary to explain that this long-expected history is by no means solely a sifting and re-editing of already printed records and memorials. Its originality is, however, especially notable in its account of Lincoln's administration, in dealing with which will be given to the world important details that have hitherto remained unrevealed, in order that they might first appear in their proper connection in this monumental work.

The advantages enjoyed by the writers of this history are not only incomparably greater than those possessed by any predecessors, but they are also beyond the reach of any future historian. Both of these biographers grew up in the same region with Mr. Lincoln; they were intimate from boyhood with his friends and companions. Mr. Nicolay took charge of his correspondence before his election to the Presidency, and the very first commission Lincoln signed as President was that of Mr. Nicolay to be his official Private Secretary. He held this position throughout Mr. Lincoln's term of office, and enjoyed his closest intimacy and confidence. Mr. Hay, like Mr. Nicolay, accompanied the President from Springfield to Washington, where he remained several years as Assistant Secretary; he then entered the army as an Assistant Adjutant-General of Volunteers, and after a brief period of staff service was ordered back to Washington and assigned to duty as aide-de-camp to the President, where he remained till the war ended. One of them, and generally both, were on duty at Mr. Lincoln's side every day from 1860 to 1865; Mr. Nicolay was his official medium of communication with Congress and the Cabinet; both were continually employed by him in delicate and important missions to every part of the country; both stood beside him at his two inaugurations; one saw him die.

During all these years of official service at the Executive Mansion, the authors cherished the idea of writing this history. At an age when the faculties of memory and observation are at their best, they made frequent notes and memoranda of important events occurring about them. The President was himself aware of their intention, and encouraged and assisted them in their work. Some of his most precious manuscripts were given them by his own hand. Their notes and memoranda taken during the war fill several manuscript volumes, the value of which, from an historical point of view, is inestimable.

After the war was over, and the triumph of the national arms had received its pathetic

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and tragical consecration in the martyrdom of the President, they did not take advantage of the excitement of the hour to throw upon the world a hasty and ill-digested compilation to meet the temporary demand. After spending five years in Europe in the public service, they returned to this country with their impression of the magnitude of the work, which they regarded as assigned to them, broadened and deepened by larger acquaintance with the world. For the last sixteen years they have given most of their time to the collection and arrangement of the enormous material at their disposition. In the first place, all the manuscripts, of whatever nature, belonging to the estate of Mr. Lincoln were absolutely and unreservedly placed in their hands by the Honorable Robert T. Lincoln, the only surviving member of the President's family. In addition to this, they sought and obtained access to the private papers and correspondence of most of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. Being on terms of intimacy with all the leading statesmen and generals of the time, they were afforded by them every possible assistance in the elucidation of difficult points. Their residence in Washington, Mr. Nicolay as Marshal of the Supreme Court, and Mr. Hay as Assistant Secretary of State, brought them into constant contact with the most authoritative and valuable sources of information. They have used all these opportunities with the utmost assiduity. They have also profited by the vast quantity of reminiscences, letters, and newspaper articles which have recently been printed in regard to Lincoln and his times. They have considered no chapter of their work completed until it should be printed, and have held themselves ready to accept and use every new fact of importance, from whatever source it might come, whether it confirmed or conflicted with opinions previously entertained.

In the course of their work, besides the mass of manuscript archives in all the departments, they have consulted thousands of printed volumes. Through the kindness of four successive Secretaries of War, they have had free and constant access to the vast accumulation of military reports, from both Union and Confederate officers, in the War Department, and Colonel Robert N. Scott has given them the benefit of his friendly and intelligent coöperation.

In determining the scope and character of their work, the authors were governed by two simple ideas. The first, which was biographical, was to draw the portrait and character of the man Abraham Lincoln, and in doing this succinctly to narrate his actions. The second was historical, and required them to relate the national events of which he was the personal and official center and the inspiring and directing leader. These chapters, therefore, are not mere books of anecdote and reminiscence; they are blended biography and history, written with all the literary skill of which the authors are capable (a skill abundantly proved in their other writings), and compiled with all the historical accuracy which their unusual command of facilities and opportunities made possible. Their field embraced that picturesque period of Western pioneer life in which Mr. Lincoln was born and grew to manhood; then the stirring ten years' agitation during which the nation went through the severe and bitter struggle over the slavery question, and which brought on the rebellion; finally, the intensely moving drama of the American civil war. When, however, the military portion of this history is reached in magazine publication, care will be taken to avoid as much as possible the repetition of details already given in THE CENTURY'S war series, while fully presenting that part of the military narrative in which is explained the relation of the President to these events.

Giving their plan ample breadth to cover this entire field, the authors have, nevertheless, been careful to confine it to such principal personages and events as might find place in a single historical picture, composed with entire dramatic unity, with related and dependent incidents, and with continuity and proper sequence of narrative. Under their lucid statement and explanation, the great historical drama of the American rebellion becomes coherent and intelligible, permitting the reader to understand its beginnings and to follow its development through sectional rivalry and jealousy to conspiracy, disunion, and insurrection; to civil war; to the mighty conflict of the greatest of modern armies in march, manœuvre, siege, and battle. Finally, at the moment when the Union armies triumph, and their victory ordains that the Constitution shall stand and the nation remain one, the story comes back to that crowning catastrophe of the drama which, with a climax as emotional as any creation of fancy, once more lifts the personal above the historic interest and records a sorrow extending far beyond the boundaries of the nation, and touching the civilized world not alone with regret at the loss of a benefactor to humanity, but as if with the bereavement of a near and dear friend.

EDITOR OF THE CENTURY.

AUTHORS' PREFACE.

A GENERATION born since Abraham Lincoln died has already reached manhood and womanhood. Yet there are millions still living who sympathized with him in his noble aspirations, who labored with him in his toilsome life, and whose hearts were saddened by his tragic death. It is the almost unbroken testimony of his contemporaries that by virtue of certain high traits of character, in certain momentous lines of purpose and achievement, he was incomparably the greatest man of his time. The deliberate judgment of those who knew him has hardened into tradition; for although but twenty-one years have passed since he fell by the bullet of the assassin, the tradition is already complete. The voice of hostile faction is silent, or unheeded; even criticism is gentle and timid. If history had said its last word, if no more were to be known of him than is already written, his fame, however lacking in definite outline, however distorted by fable, would survive undiminished to the latest generations. The blessings of an enfranchised race would forever hail him as their liberator; the nation would acknowledge him as the mighty counselor whose patient courage and wisdom saved the life of the Republic in its darkest hour; and illuminating his proud eminence as orator, statesman, and ruler, there would forever shine around his memory the halo of that tender humanity and Christian charity in which he walked among his fellow-countrymen as their familiar companion and friend.

It is not, therefore, with any thought of materially adding to his already accomplished renown that we have written the work which we now offer to our fellow-citizens. But each age owes to its successors the truth in regard to its own annals. The young men who have been born since Sumter was fired on have a right to all their elders know of the important events they came too late to share in. The life and the fame of Lincoln will not have their legitimate effect of instruction and example unless the circumstances among which he lived and found his opportunities are placed in their true light before the men who never saw him.

To write the life of this great American in such a way as to show his relations to the times in which he moved, the stupendous issues he controlled, the remarkable men by whom he was surrounded, has been the purpose which the authors have diligently pursued for many years. We can say nothing of the result of our labor; only those who have been similarly employed can appreciate the sense of inadequate performance with which we regard what we have accomplished. We can only claim for our work that we have devoted to it sixteen years of almost unremitting assiduity; that we have neglected no means in our power to ascertain the truth; that we have rejected no authentic facts essential to a candid story; that we have had no theory to establish, no personal grudge to gratify, no unavowed objects to subserve. We have aimed to write a sufficiently full and absolutely honest history of a great man and a great time; and although we take it for granted that we have made mistakes, that we have fallen into such errors and inaccuracies as are unavoidable in so large a work, we promise there shall not be found a line in all these chapters dictated by malice or unfairness.

Our desire to have this work placed under the eyes of the greatest possible number of readers induced us to accept the generous offer of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE to print it first in these pages. In this way it will receive the intelligent criticism of a million people, contemporaries of the events narrated, and we expect to profit by the suggestions and corrections which such a method of publication invites. Moreover, as we have endeavored to write this history with a purpose of absolute fairness to every party and every section of the country, we ardently desire that, by its wide dissemination, it may contribute to the growth and maintenance throughout all our borders of that spirit of freedom and nationality for which Abraham Lincoln lived and died.



LINCOLN AS PIONEER.

I.

LINEAGE.

IN 1780 Abraham Lincoln, a member of a respectable and well-to-do family in Rockingham County, Virginia, started westward to establish himself with his wife and five children in the newly explored country of Kentucky. He was a man of some substance, possessing at one time a large and fertile tract of land about eight miles north of Harrisonburg. It seemed for many years impossible to ascertain how he lost, or what were the motives which induced him to abandon, this valuable property. The records belonging to that portion of the family which remained in Virginia were destroyed in the civil war, and the branch which moved to Kentucky passed through a period of illiteracy which, though it was brief, interrupted the memory and record of their descent. There are hundreds of families in the West, bearing historic names and probably descended from well-known houses in the East or in England, which, by passing through one or two generations of ancestors who could not read or write, have lost their connection with the past as effectually as if a deluge had intervened between the last century and this. Even the patronymic is frequently distorted beyond recognition by slovenly pronunciation during the years when reading and writing were lost arts, and by the phonetic spelling of the first boy in the family who learned the use of the pen. There are Lincolns in Kentucky and Tennessee belonging to the same stock with the President whose names are spelled "Linkhorn" and "Linkhern."

All that was known of this emigrant Abraham Lincoln by his immediate descendants was that his progenitors, who were Quakers, came from Berks County, Pennsylvania, into Virginia, and there throve and prospered. But the investigations of several eager genealogists have since established a strong probability that he was descended from the Massachusetts family of the same name, who settled about the year 1638 at Hingham, and who came originally from the county of Norfolk in the old country. The first ancestor of this line of whom we have knowledge was Samuel Lincoln, of Norwich, England; he, dying in Hingham, Massachusetts, left a son, Mordecai, whose son, of the same name, removed to Monmouth, New Jersey, and thence to Amity township, now a part of Berks County, Pennsylvania, where he died about 1735, fifty years old. From a copy of his will, recorded in the office of the Register in Philadelphia, we gather that he was a man of considerable property. In the inventory of his effects, made after his death, he is styled by the appraisers "Mordecai Lincoln, Gentleman." His son John received by his father's will "a certain piece of land lying in the Jerseys, containing three hundred acres," the other sons and daughters having been liberally provided for from the Pennsylvania property. This John Lincoln established himself in Rockingham County, Virginia, and had a family of sons, to whom he gave the names which continually recur in the history of the tribe, Abraham, the pioneer mentioned above, Isaac, Jacob, Thomas, and John. Jacob and John remained in Virginia;* the former was a soldier in the War of the Revolution, and took part as lieutenant in a Virginia regiment at the siege of Yorktown.† Isaac went to a place on the Holston River in Tennessee; Thomas followed his brother to Kentucky, lived and died there, and his children then emigrated to Missouri. But with the one memorable exception, none of the brothers or their descendants achieved the slightest distinction. Even the great fame and conspicuousness of the President brought none of his kindred to the light, except his cousin, Robert Lincoln, of Hancock County, Illinois, who became a captain and quartermaster of volunteers. The rest sank into obscurity, where it is impossible, and would be useless, to follow them.

* Soon after Mr. Lincoln arrived in Washington in 1861, he received the following letter from one of his Virginia kinsmen, the only communication which ever came from them. It was written on paper adorned with a portrait of Jefferson Davis, and was inclosed in an envelope emblazoned with the Confederate flag:

TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ESQ., *President of the Northern Confederacy:*

SIR,— Having just returned from a trip through Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, permit me to inform you that you will get whipped out of your boots. To-day I met a gentleman from Anna, Illinois, and although he voted for you he says that the moment your troops leave Cairo they will get the spots knocked out of them. My dear sir, these are facts which time will prove to be correct.

I am, sir, with every consideration, yours respectfully,

MINOR LINCOLN,
Of the Staunton stock of Lincolns.

† Lamon, page 8.



BOONE MONUMENT IN CEMETERY AT FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY.

VIEW OF THE KENTUCKY FROM BOONE'S GRAVE.

It was ten years after the death of the President that his son learned the probable circumstances under which the pioneer Lincoln removed to the West, and the intimate relations which subsisted between his family and the most celebrated man in early Western annals. There is little doubt that it was on account of his association with the famous Daniel Boone that Abraham Lincoln went to Kentucky. The families had for a century been closely allied. By the will of Mordecai Lincoln, to which reference has been made, his "loving friend and neighbor" George Boone was made a trustee to assist his widow in the care of the property. Squire Boone, the father of Daniel, was one of the appraisers who made the inventory of Mordecai Lincoln's estate. One of the numerous Abraham Lincolns married a Miss Anna Boone in 1760.* The intercourse between the families was kept up after the Boones had removed to North Carolina and John Lincoln had gone to Virginia. Abraham Lincoln, son of John, and grandfather of the President, was married in North Carolina. The inducement which led him to leave Virginia, where his standing and his fortune were assured, was, in all probability, his intimate family relations with the great explorer, the hero of the new country of Kentucky, the land of fabulous richness and unlimited adventure. At a time when the Eastern States were ringing with the fame of the mighty hunter

* A letter from David J. Lincoln, of Birdsboro, Berks County, Pennsylvania, to the writers, says, "My grandfather, Abraham Lincoln, was married to Anna Boone, a first cousin of Daniel Boone, July 10, 1760."



DANIEL BOONE: ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON FROM THE PAINTING BY SULLY, IN POSSESSION OF FRANK M. ETTING, ESQ., PHILADELPHIA.

Abraham Lincoln Enters 500 acres of Land on a
treasury warrant No 5994 begining opposite Charle
yances upper Line on the South Side of the River
Runing South 200 poles then up the River for
Quantity. 11th December 1782

Daniel Boone

[FAC-SIMILE FROM THE FIELD-BOOK OF DANIEL BOONE RECORDING THE LINCOLN CLAIM ON LICKING RIVER. FROM THE ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF LYMAN C. DRAPER, ESQ., MADISON, WIS.]

who was then in the prime of his manhood, and in the midst of those achievements which will forever render him one of the most picturesque heroes in all our annals, it is not to be wondered at that his own circle of friends should have caught the general enthusiasm and felt the desire to emulate his career.

Boone's exploration of Kentucky had begun some ten years before Lincoln set out to follow his trail. In 1769 he made his memorable journey to that virgin wilderness of whose beauty he always loved to speak even to his latest breath. During all that year he hunted, finding everywhere abundance of game. "The buffalo," he says, "were more frequent than I have seen cattle in the settlements, browsing on the leaves of the cane, or cropping the herbage on these extensive plains, fearless because ignorant of the violence of man. Sometimes we saw hundreds in a drove, and the numbers about the salt springs were amazing." In the course of the winter, however, he was captured by the Indians while hunting with a comrade, and when they had contrived to escape they never found again any trace of the rest of their party. But a few days later they saw two men approaching and hailed them with the hunter's caution, "Hullo, strangers; who are you?" They replied, "White men and friends." They proved to be Squire Boone and another adventurer from North Carolina. The young Boone had made that long pilgrimage through the trackless woods, led by an instinct of doglike affection, to find his elder brother and share his sylvan pleasures and dangers. Their two companions were soon waylaid and killed, and the Boones spent the long winter in that mighty solitude undisturbed. In the spring their ammunition, which was to them the only necessary of life, ran low, and one of them must return to the settlements to replenish the stock. It need not be said which assumed this duty; the cadet went uncomplaining on his way, and Daniel spent three months in absolute loneliness, as he himself expressed it, "by myself, without bread, salt, or sugar, without company of my fellow-creatures, or even a horse or dog." He was not insensible to the dangers of his situation. He never came to his camp without the utmost precaution, and always slept in the canebrakes if the signs were unfavorable. But he makes in his memoirs this curious reflection, which would seem like affectation in one less perfectly and simply heroic: "How unhappy such a situation for a man tormented with fear, which is vain if no danger comes, and if it does, only augments the pain. It was my happiness to be destitute of this afflicting passion, with which I had the greatest reason to be afflicted." After his brother's return, for a year longer they hunted in these lovely wilds, and then returned to Yadkin to bring their families to the new domain. They made the long ride back, five hundred miles, in peace and safety.

For some time after this Boone took no conspicuous part in the settlement of Kentucky. The expedition with which he left the Yadkin in 1773 met with a terrible disaster near Cumberland Gap, in which his eldest son and five more young men were killed by Indians, and the whole party, discouraged by the blow, retired to the safer region of the Clinch River. In the mean time the dauntless speculator Henderson had begun his occupation with all the pomp of viceroyalty. Harrodsburg had been founded, and corn planted, and a flourishing colony established at the Falls of the Ohio. In 1774 Boone was called upon by the Governor of Virginia to escort a party of surveyors through the State, and on his return was given the command of three garrisons; and for several years thereafter the history of Kentucky is the record of his feats of arms. No one ever equaled him in his knowledge of Indian character, and his influence with the savages was a mystery to him and to themselves. Three times he fell into their hands and they did not harm him. Twice they adopted him into their tribes while they were still on the war-path. Once they took him to Canada, to show the Long-Knife chieftains of King George that they could also exhibit trophies of memorable prowess, but they refused to give him up even to their British allies. In no quality of wise woodcraft was he wanting. He could outrun a dog or a deer; he could thread the woods without food day and night; he could find his way as easily as the panther could. Although a great athlete and a tireless warrior, he hated fighting and only fought for peace. In council and in war he was equally valuable. His advice was never rejected without disaster, nor followed but with advantage; and when the fighting once began there was not a rifle in Kentucky which could rival his. At the nine days' siege of Boonesborough he took deliberate aim and killed a negro renegade who was harassing the garrison from a tree five hundred and twenty-five feet away, and whose head only was visible from the fort. The mildest and the quietest of men, he had killed dozens of enemies with his own hand, and all this without malice and, strangest of all, without incurring the hatred of his adversaries. He had self-respect enough, but not a spark of vanity. After the fatal battle of the Blue Licks,—where the only point of light in the day's terrible work was the wisdom and valor with which he had partly retrieved a disaster he foresaw



Land-Office Treasury WARRANT, N°3334

To the principal Surveyor of any County within the Commonwealth of Virginia.

THIS shall be your WARRANT to Survey and lay off in one or more Surveys, for Abraham Linkhorn his Heirs or Assigns, the Quantity of four hundred Acres of Land, due unto the said Abraham Linkhorn in Consideration of the Sum of one hundred & Sixty pounds current Money paid into the publick Treasury; the Payment whereof to the Treasurer hath been duly certified by the Auditors of publick Accounts, and their Certificate received into the Land Office. GIVEN under my Hand, and the Seal of the said Office, on this fourth Day of March in the Year One Thousand Seven Hundred and eighty

B. Harrison

LAND WARRANT ISSUED TO ABRAHAM LINKHORN (LINCOLN), SLIGHTLY REDUCED. ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF R. T. DURRETT, ESQ., LOUISVILLE, KY. (SEE OPPOSITE PAGE.)

but was powerless to prevent,—when it became his duty, as senior surviving officer of the forces, to report the affair to Governor Harrison, his dry and naked narrative gives not a single hint of what he had done himself, nor mentions the gallant son lying dead on the field, nor the wounded brother whose gallantry might have justly claimed some notice. He was thinking solely of the public good, saying, "I have encouraged the people in this country all that I could, but I can no longer justify them or myself to risk our lives here under such extraordinary hazards." He therefore begs his Excellency to take immediate measures for relief. During the short existence of Henderson's legislature, he was a member of it, and not the least useful one. Among his measures was one for the protection of game.

Everything we know of the emigrant Abraham Lincoln goes to show that it was under the auspices of this most famous of our pioneers that he set out from Rockingham County to make a home for himself and his young family in that wild region which Boone was wresting from its savage holders. He was not without means of his own. He took with him funds enough to enter an amount of land which would have made his family rich if they had retained it. The county records show him to have been the possessor of a domain of some seventeen hundred acres. There is still in existence* the original warrant,

* In the possession of Colonel Reuben T. Durrett, of Louisville, Kentucky, a gentleman who has made the early history of his State a subject of careful and intelligent study, and to whom we are greatly indebted for valuable information in regard to the settlement of the Lincolns in Kentucky. He gives the following list of lands in that State owned by Abraham Lincoln:

1. Four hundred acres on Long Run, a branch of Floyd's Fork, in Jefferson County, entered May 29th, 1780, and surveyed May 7th, 1785.

2. Eight hundred acres on Green River, near Green River Lick, entered June 7th, 1780, and surveyed October 12th, 1784.

3. Five hundred acres in Campbell County, date of entry not known, but surveyed September 27th, 1798, and patented June 30th, 1799 — the survey and patent evidently following his entry after his death. It is possible that this was the five-hundred-acre tract found in Boone's field-book, in the possession of Lyman C. Draper, Esq., Secretary of the Wisconsin Historical Society, and erroneously supposed by some to have been in Mercer County. Boone was a deputy of Colonel Thomas Marshall, Surveyor of Fayette County.

dated March 4th, 1780, for four hundred acres of land, for which the pioneer had paid "into the publick Treasury one hundred and sixty pounds current money," and a copy of the surveyor's certificate,* giving the metes and bounds of the property on Floyd's Fork, which remained for many years in the hands of Mordecai Lincoln, the pioneer's eldest son and heir. The name was misspelled "Linkhorn" Washington had acquired claims and patents to the amount of thirty or forty thousand acres of land in the West; Franklin and the Lees were also large owners of these speculative titles. They formed, it is true, rather an airy and unsubstantial sort of possession, the same ground being often claimed by a dozen different persons or companies under various grants from the crown or from legislatures,



Surveyed for Abraham Linkhorn 400 acres of Land in Jefferson County by virtue of a Treasury Warrant No. 3334 on the Fork of Floyds Fork now Called the Long Run beginning about two Miles up the said Fork from the Mouth of a Fork of the same formerly Called Twis Fork at a Sugar Tree standing on the side of the same marked S D B and extending theme East 300 poles to a Poplar and Sugar Tree North 213⅓ poles to a Beech and Dogwood West 300 poles to a White Oak and Hickory South 213⅓ poles to the Beginning. May 7th 1785 William Shanon D S J C
Abraham Linkhorn and Josiah Lincoln C C J
William May S J C
Abraham Linkhorn Markers Ex^d

SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE (SLIGHTLY REDUCED), TAKEN FROM RECORD BOOK "B," PAGE 60, IN THE OFFICE OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY.

by a blunder of the clerk in the land-office, and the error was perpetuated in the subsequent record.

Kentucky had been for many years the country of romance and fable for Virginians. Twenty years before Governor Spottswood had crossed the Alleghanies and returned to establish in a Williamsburg tavern that fantastic order of nobility which he called the Knights of the Golden Horseshoe,† and, with a worldly wisdom which was scarcely consistent with these mediæval affectations, to press upon the attention of the British Government the building of a line of frontier forts to guard the Ohio River from the French. Many years after him the greatest of all Virginians crossed the mountains again, and became heavily interested in those schemes of emigration which filled the minds of many of the leading men in America until they were driven out by graver cares and more imperative duties.

* Jefferson County Records.

† Their motto was *Sic jurat transcendere montes.*

or through purchase from adventurers or Indian councils. But about the time of which we are speaking the spirit of emigration had reached the lower strata of colonial society, and a steady stream of pioneers began pouring over the passes of the mountains into the green and fertile valleys of Kentucky and Tennessee. They selected their homes in the most eligible spots to which chance or the report of earlier explorers directed them, with little knowledge or care as to the rightful ownership of the land, and too often cleared their corner of the wilderness for the benefit of others. Even Boone, to whose courage, forest lore, and singular intuitions of savage character the State of Kentucky owed more than to any other man, was deprived in his old age of his hard-earned homestead through his ignorance of legal forms, and removed to Missouri to repeat in that new territory his labors and his misfortunes.

The period at which Lincoln came west was one of note in the history of Kentucky.

The labors of Henderson and the Transylvania Company had begun to bear fruit in extensive plantations and a connected system of forts. The land laws of Kentucky had reduced to something like order the chaos of conflicting claims arising from the various grants and the different preëmption customs under which settlers occupied their property. The victory of Boone at Boonesborough against the Shawnees, and the capture of Kaskaskia and Vincennes by the brilliant audacity of George Rogers Clarke, had brought the region prominently before the attention of the Atlantic States, and had turned in that



LONG RUN BAPTIST MEETING-HOUSE, BUILT ABOUT 1797 ON THE LAND OF ABRAHAM LINKHORN (LINCOLN). DRAWING FROM MEMORY, IN POSSESSION OF R. T. DURRETT, ESQ.

direction the restless and roving spirit which is always found in communities at periods when great emigrations are a need of civilization. Up to this time few persons had crossed the mountains except hunters, trappers, and explorers,—men who came merely to kill Indians or game, or to spy out the fertility of the land for the purpose of speculation. But in 1780 and 1781 a large number of families took up their line of march, and in the latter year a considerable contingent of women joined the little army of pioneers, impelled by an instinct which they themselves probably but half comprehended. The country was to be peopled, and there was no other way of peopling it but by the sacrifice of many lives and fortunes; and the history of every country shows that these are never lacking when they are wanted. The number of those who came at about the same time with the pioneer Lincoln was sufficient to lay the basis of a sort of social order. Early in the year 1780 three hundred "large family boats" arrived at the Falls of the Ohio, where the land had been surveyed by Captain Bullitt seven years before, and in May the Legislature of Virginia passed a law for the incorporation of the town of Louisville, then containing some six hundred inhabitants. At the same session a law was passed confiscating the property of certain British subjects for the endowment of an institution of learning in Kentucky, "it being the interest of this commonwealth," to quote the language of the philosophic Legislature, "always to encourage and promote every design which may tend to the improvement of the mind and the diffusion of useful knowledge even among its remote citizens, whose situation in a barbarous neighborhood and a savage intercourse might otherwise render them unfriendly to science." This was the origin of the Transylvania University of Lexington, which rose and flourished for many years on the utmost verge of civilization.

The "barbarous neighborhood" and the "savage intercourse" undoubtedly had their effect upon the manners and morals of the settlers; but we should fall into error if we took it for granted that the pioneers were all of one piece. The ruling motive which led most of them to the wilds was that Anglo-Saxon lust of land which seems inseparable from the race. The prospect of possessing a four-hundred-acre farm by merely occupying it, and the privilege of exchanging a basketful of almost worthless continental currency for an unlimited estate at the nominal value of forty cents per acre, were irresistible to thousands of land-loving Virginians and Carolinians whose ambition of proprietorship was larger than their means. Accompanying this flood of emigrants of good faith was the usual froth and scum of shiftless idlers and adventurers, who were either drifting with a current they were too worthless to withstand, or in pursuit of dishonest gains in fresher and simpler regions. The vices and virtues of the pioneers were such as proceeded from their environment. They were careless of human life because life was worth comparatively little in that hard struggle for existence; but they had a remarkably clear idea of the value of property, and visited theft not only with condign punishment, but also with the severest social proscription. Stealing a horse was punished more swiftly and with more feeling than homicide. A man might be replaced more easily than the other animal. Sloth was the worst of weaknesses. A habitual drunkard was more welcome at "raisings" and "log-rollings" than a known *fainéant*. The man who did not do a man's share where work was to be done was christened "Lazy Lawrence," and that was the end of him socially. Cowardice was punished by inexorable disgrace. The point of honor was as strictly observed as it ever has been in the idlest and most artificial society. If a man accused another of falsehood, the ordeal by fisticuffs was instantly resorted to. Weapons were rarely employed in these chivalrous encounters, being kept for more serious use with Indians and wild beasts, though fists, teeth, and the

gouging thumb were often employed with fatal effect. Yet among this rude and uncouth people there was a genuine and remarkable respect for law. They seemed to recognize it as an absolute necessity of their existence. In the territory of Kentucky, and afterwards in that of Illinois, it occurred at several periods in their transition from counties to territories and states that the country was without any organized authority. But the people were a law unto themselves. Their improvised courts and councils administered law and equity; contracts were enforced, debts were collected, and a sort of order was maintained.

It may be said, generally, that the character of this people was far above their circumstances. In all the accessories of life, by which we are accustomed to rate communities and races in the scale of civilization, they were little removed from primitive barbarism. They dressed in the skins of wild beasts killed by themselves, and in linen stuffs woven by from freezing too stiff to be put on. The children grew inured to misery like this, and played barefoot in the snow. It is an error to suppose that all this could be undergone with impunity. They suffered terribly from malarial and rheumatic complaints, and the instances of vigorous and painless age were rare among them. The lack of moral and mental sustenance was still more marked. They were inclined to be a religious people, but a sermon was an unusual luxury, only to be enjoyed at long intervals and by great expense of time. There were few books or none, and there was little opportunity for the exchange of opinion. Any variation in the dreary course of events was welcome. A murder was not without its advantages as a stimulant to conversation; a capital trial was a kind of holiday to a county. It was this poverty of life, this famine of social gratification, from which sprang their fondness for the grosser forms of excitement, and their tendency to rough and brutal practical joking.



MAP SHOWING VARIOUS LOCALITIES CONNECTED WITH EARLY EVENTS IN THE LINCOLN FAMILY.

themselves. They hardly knew the use of iron except in their firearms and knives. Their food consisted almost exclusively of game, fish, and roughly ground corn-meal. Their exchanges were made by barter; many a child grew up without ever seeing a piece of money. Their habitations were hardly superior to those of the savages with whom they waged constant war. Large families lived in log huts, put together with wooden pegs, and far more open to the inclemencies of the skies than the pig-styes of the careful farmer of to-day. An early schoolmaster says that the first place where he went to board was the house of one Lucas, consisting of a single room, sixteen feet square, and tenanted by Mr. and Mrs. Lucas, ten children, three dogs, two cats, and himself. There were many who lived in hovels so cold that they had to sleep on their shoes to keep them In a life like theirs a laugh seemed worth having at any expense.

But near as they were to barbarism in all the circumstances of their daily existence, they were far from it politically. They were the children of a race which had been trained in government for centuries in the best school the world has ever seen, and wherever they went they formed the town, the county, the court, and the legislative power with the ease and certainty of nature evolving its results. And this they accomplished in the face of a savage foe, always alert and hostile, surrounding their feeble settlements, invisible and dreadful as the visionary powers of the air. Until the treaty of Greenville, in 1795, closed the long and sanguinary history of the old Indian wars, there was no day in which the pioneer could leave his cabin with the certainty of not finding it in ashes when he

returned, and his little flock murdered on his threshold, or carried into a captivity worse than death. Whenever nightfall came with the man of the house away from home, the anxiety and care of the women and children were none the less bitter because so common.

The life of the pioneer Abraham Lincoln soon came to a disastrous close. He had settled in Jefferson County, on the land he had bought from the Government, and cleared a small farm in the forest. One morning, in the year 1786, he started with his three sons, Mordecai, Josiah, and Thomas, to the edge of the clearing, and began the day's work. A shot from the brush killed the father; Mordecai, the eldest son, ran instinctively to the house, Josiah to the neighboring fort (Hughes Station) for assistance, and Thomas, the youngest, a child of seven, was left with the corpse of his father. Mordecai, reaching the cabin, seized the rifle, and saw through the loop-hole an Indian in his war-paint stooping to raise the child from the ground. He took deliberate aim at a white ornament on the breast of the savage and brought him down. The little boy, thus released, ran to the cabin, and Mordecai, from the loft, renewed his fire upon the savages, who began to show themselves from the thicket, until Josiah returned with assistance from the stockade, and the assailants fled. This tragedy made an indelible impression on the mind of Mordecai. Either a spirit of revenge for his murdered father, or a sportsmanlike pleasure in his successful shot, made him a determined Indian-stalker, and he rarely stopped to inquire whether the red man who came in range of his rifle was friendly or hostile.

The head of the family being gone, the widow Lincoln soon removed to a more thickly settled neighborhood in Washington County. There her children grew up. Mordecai and Josiah became reputable citizens; the two daughters married two men named Crume and Bromfield. Thomas, to whom were reserved the honors of an illustrious paternity, learned the trade of a carpenter. He was an easy-going man, entirely without ambition, but not without self-respect. Though the friendliest and most jovial of gossips, he was not insensible to affronts; and when his slow anger was roused, he was a formidable adversary. Several border bullies, at different times, crowded him indiscreetly, and were promptly and thoroughly whipped. He was strong, well knit, and sinewy; but little over the medium height, though in other respects he seems to have resembled his son in appearance.

On the 12th of June, 1806,* while learning his trade in the carpenter shop of Joseph Hanks, in Elizabethtown, he married Nancy Hanks, a niece of his employer, near Beechland, in Washington County.† She was one of a large family who had emigrated from Virginia with the Lincolns and with another family called Sparrow. They had endured together the trials of pioneer life, and their close relations continued for many years after, and were cemented by frequent intermarriage.

Mrs. Lincoln's mother was named Lucy Hanks; her sisters were Betty, Polly, and Nancy; they married Thomas Sparrow, Jesse Friend, and Levi Hall. The childhood of Nancy was passed with the Sparrows, and she was oftener called by their name than by her own. The whole family connection was composed of people so little given to letters that it is hard to determine the proper names and relationships of the younger members amid the tangle of traditional cousinships. Those who went to Indiana with Thomas Lincoln, and grew up with his children, are the only ones which need demand our attention.

There was no hint of future glory in the wedding or the bringing home of Nancy Lincoln. All accounts represent her as a handsome young woman of twenty-three, of appearance and intellect superior to her lowly fortunes. She could read and write,—a remarkable accomplishment in her circle,—and even taught her husband to form the letters of his name. He had no such valuable wedding gift to bestow upon her; he brought her to a little house in Elizabethtown, where he and she and want dwelt together in fourteen feet square. The next year a daughter was born to them, and the next the young carpenter, not finding his work remunerative

* All previous accounts give the date of this marriage as September 23d. This error arose from a clerical blunder in the county record of marriages. The minister, the Reverend Jesse Head, in making his report, wrote the dates before the names; the clerk, in copying it, lost the proper sequence of the entries, and gave to the Lincolns the date which belonged to the next couple on the list.

† The following is a copy of the marriage bond of Thomas Lincoln:

"Know all men by these presents, that we, Thomas Lincoln and Richard Berry, are held and firmly bound unto his Excellency, the Governor of Kentucky, in the just and full sum of fifty pounds current money, to the payment of which well and truly to be made to the said Governor and his successors, we bind ourselves, our heirs, etc., jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals and dated this 10th day of June, 1806. The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas there is a marriage shortly intended between the above bound Thomas Lincoln and Nancy Hanks, for which a license has issued, now if there be no lawful cause to obstruct the said marriage, then this obligation to be void, else to remain in full force and virtue in law.

THOMAS LINCOLN [Seal]
RICHARD BERRY [Seal]

"*Witness*, JOHN H. PARROTT, Guardian."

Washington Co Ky

I do hereby certify that the following
is a true list of Marriages Solemnized by me the Sub
scriber ~~from the first June~~ the 28th of April 1806 until
the date hereof

June 26th 1806 Joined together in the Holy estate of
Matrimony agreeable to the Rules of the M.E.C.

Morris Berry & Peggy Simms

Nov 27th 1806 David Mize & Hannah Xtes

March 5th 1807 Charles Ridge & Anna Davis

march 24th 1807 John Head & Sally Clark

march 27th Benjamin Clark & Polly Head

Jan 14th Edward Dyle & Rosanah McMahon

Dec 22nd 1806 Silas Chamberlin & Betsey West

June 19th 1806 John Spronger & Elizabeth Inyum

June 19th 1806 Thomas Lincoln & Nancy Hanks

~~June 19th 1806~~ ~~to~~ John Comb[illegible] & Hannah White

September 23 1806

October 2nd 1806 Anthony Lipsey & Keziah Bettle

octobr 23rd 1806 Aron Harding & Hanah Bottet

april 5th 1807 Daniel Bayne & Elizabeth Pierce

July 24th 1806 Benjamin Clark & Polly Clark

May - 1806 Hugh Haskins & Betsey Dyer

September 24th 1806 John Graham & Catherine Jones

Given under my hand the 22nd day of April
1807

Jesse Head D.M.E.C.

This certificate, or marriage list, written by Jesse Head, was lost sight of for many years, and has only recently been discovered through the efforts of W. F. Booker, Esq., present Clerk of Washington County, Kentucky. This fac-simile is the first ever published.

enough for his growing budget, removed to a little farm which he had bought on the easy terms then prevalent in Kentucky, on the Big South Fork of Nolin Creek, in what was then Hardin and is now La Rue County, three miles from Hodgensville. The ground had nothing attractive about it but its cheapness. It was hardly more grateful than the rocky hill-slopes of New England. It required full as earnest and intelligent industry to persuade a living out of those barren hillocks and weedy hollows covered with stunted and scrubby underbrush, as it would amid the rocks and sands of the northern coast.

Thomas Lincoln settled down in this dismal solitude to a deeper poverty than any of his name had ever known; and there, in the midst of the most unpromising circumstances that ever witnessed the advent of a hero into this world, Abraham Lincoln was born on the 12th day of February, 1809.

Four years later, Thomas Lincoln purchased a fine farm of two hundred and thirty-eight acres on Knob Creek, near where it flows into the Rolling Fork, and succeeded in getting a portion of it into cultivation. The title, however, remained in him only a little while, and after his property had passed out of his control he looked about for another place to establish himself.

Of all these years of Abraham Lincoln's early childhood we know almost nothing.* He lived a solitary life in the woods, returning from his lonesome little games to his cheerless home. He never talked of these days to his most intimate friends. Once, when asked what he remembered about the war with Great Britain, he replied: "Nothing but this. I had been fishing one day and caught a little fish which I was taking home. I met a soldier in the road, and having been always told at home that we must be good to the soldiers, I gave him my fish." This is only a faint glimpse, but what it shows is rather pleasant — the generous child and the patriotic household. But there is no question that these first years of his life had their lasting effect upon the temperament of this great mirthful and melancholy man. He had little schooling. He accompanied his sister Sarah† to the only schools that existed in their neighborhood, one kept by Zachariah Riney, and another by Caleb Hazel, where he learned his alphabet and a little more. But of all those advantages for the cultivation of a young mind and spirit which every home now offers to its children, the books, toys, ingenious games, and daily devotion of parental love, he knew absolutely nothing.

II.

INDIANA.

By the time the boy Abraham had attained his seventh year, the social condition of Kentucky had changed considerably from the early pioneer days. Life had assumed a more settled and orderly course. The old barbarous equality of the earlier time was gone; a difference of classes began to be seen. Those who held slaves assumed a distinct social superiority over those who did not. Thomas Lincoln, concluding that Kentucky was no country for a poor man, determined to seek his fortune in Indiana. He had heard of rich and unoccupied lands in Perry County in that State, and thither he determined to go. He built a rude raft, loaded it with his kit of tools and four hundred gallons of whisky, and trusted his fortunes to the winding water-courses. He met with only one accident on his way; his raft capsized in the Ohio River, but he fished up his kit of tools and most of the ardent spirits, and arrived safely at the place of a settler named Posey, with whom he left his odd invoice of household goods for the wilderness, while he started on foot to look for a home in the dense forest. He selected a spot which pleased him in his first day's journey. He then walked back to Knob Creek and brought his family on to their new home. No humbler cavalcade ever invaded the Indiana timber. Besides his wife and two children, his earthly possessions were of the slightest, for the backs of two borrowed horses sufficed for the load. Insufficient bedding and clothing, a few pans and kettles, were their sole movable wealth. They relied on Lincoln's kit of tools for their furniture, and on his rifle for their food. At Posey's they hired a wagon and literally hewed a path through the wilderness to their new habitation, near Little Pigeon Creek, a mile and a half east of Gentryville, in a rich and fertile forest country.

* There is still living near Knob Creek in Kentucky, at the age of eighty, a man, of whom a portrait is given on page 19, who claims to have known Abraham Lincoln in his childhood — Austin Gollaher. He says he used to play with Abe Lincoln in the shavings of his father's carpenter shop. He tells a story which, if accurate, entitles him to the civic crown which the Romans used to give to one who saved the life of a citizen. When Gollaher was eleven and Lincoln eight the two boys were in the woods in pursuit of partridges; in trying to "coon" across Knob Creek on a log, Lincoln fell in, and Gollaher fished him out with a sycamore branch — a service to the Republic, the value of which it fatigues the imagination to compute.

† This daughter of Thomas Lincoln is sometimes called Nancy and sometimes Sarah. She seems to have borne the former name during her mother's lifetime, and to have taken her stepmother's name after Mr. Lincoln's second marriage.

Drawn by Henry Farny. Engraved by J. H. E. Whitney.

THE KILLING OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE PIONEER, 1786.

Thomas Lincoln, with the assistance of his wife and children, built a temporary shelter of the sort called in the frontier language "a half-faced camp"; merely a shed of poles, which defended the inmates on three sides from the foul weather, but left them open to its inclemency in front. For a whole year his family lived in this wretched fold, while he was clearing a little patch of ground for planting corn and building a rough cabin for a permanent residence. They moved into the latter before it was half completed; for by this time the Sparrows had followed the Lincolns from Kentucky, and the half-faced camp was given up to them. But the rude material for breeches or shoes. His cabin was like that of other pioneers. A few three-legged stools; a bedstead made of poles stuck between the logs in the angle of the cabin, the outside corner supported by a crotched stick driven into the ground; the table, a huge hewed log standing on four legs; a pot, kettle, and skillet, and a few tin and pewter dishes, were all the furniture. The boy Abraham climbed at night to his bed of leaves in the loft, by a ladder of wooden pins driven into the logs.

This life has been vaunted by poets and romancers as a happy and healthful one. Even Dennis Hanks, speaking of his youthful days

HOUSE NEAR BEECHLAND, KENTUCKY, IN WHICH THOMAS LINCOLN AND NANCY HANKS WERE MARRIED JUNE 12TH, 1806. (NOW OCCUPIED BY H. F. REED.)

cabin seemed so spacious and comfortable after the squalor of "the camp," that Thomas Lincoln did no further work on it for a long time. He left it for a year or two without doors, or windows, or floor. The battle for existence allowed him no time for superfluities like these. He raised enough corn to support life; the dense forest around him abounded in every form of feathered game; a little way from his cabin an open glade was full of deer-licks, and an hour or two of idle waiting was generally rewarded by a shot at a fine deer, which would furnish meat for a week, and when his only home was the half-faced camp, says, "I tell you, Billy, I enjoyed myself better then than I ever have since." But we may distrust the reminiscences of old settlers, who see their youth through a rosy mist of memory. The life was neither enjoyable nor wholesome. The rank woods were full of malaria, and singular epidemics from time to time ravaged the settlements. In the autumn of 1818 the little community of Pigeon Creek was almost exterminated by a frightful pestilence called the milk-sickness, or in the dialect of the country "the milk-sick." It is a mys-

terious disease which has been the theme of endless wrangling among Western physicians, and the difficulty of ascertaining anything about it has been greatly increased by the local sensitiveness which forbids any one to admit that any well-defined case has ever been seen in his neighborhood, "although just over the creek, or in the next county, they have had it bad." It seems to have been a malignant form of fever — attributed variously to malaria and to the eating of poisonous herbs by the cattle — attacking cattle as well as human beings, attended with violent retching and a burning sensation in the stomach, often terminating fatally on the third day. In many cases those who apparently recovered lingered for years with health seriously impaired. Among the pioneers of Pigeon Creek, so ill-fed, ill-housed, and uncared for, there was little prospect of recovery from such a grave disorder. The Sparrows, husband and wife, died early in October, and Nancy Hanks Lincoln followed them after an interval of a few days. Thomas Lincoln made the coffins for his dead "out of green lumber cut with a whip-saw," and they were all buried, with scant ceremony, in a little clearing of the forest. It is related of little Abraham, that he sorrowed most of all that his mother should have been laid away with such maimed rites, and that he contrived several months later to have a wandering preacher named David Elkin brought to the settlement, to deliver a funeral sermon over her grave, already stiff and white with the early winter snows.*



Jesse Head D. M. E. C.

PORTRAIT OF JESSE HEAD, DEACON METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, WHO MARRIED THOMAS LINCOLN AND NANCY HANKS. (AFTER A SILHOUETTE BY RUDOLPH BOCCOSSINI, IN POSSESSION OF R. T. DURRETT, ESQ.)

AUSTIN GOLLAHER. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY WYBRANT.)

This was the dreariest winter of his life, for before the next December came his father had brought from Kentucky a new wife, who was to change the lot of all the desolate little family very much for the better. Sarah Bush had been an acquaintance of Thomas Lincoln before his first marriage; she had, it is said, rejected him to marry one Johnston, the jailer at Elizabethtown, who had died, leaving her with three children, a boy and two girls. When Lincoln's widowhood had lasted a year, he went down to Elizabethtown to begin again the wooing broken off so many years before. He wasted no time in preliminaries, but promptly made his wishes known, and the next morning they were married. It was growing late in the autumn, and the pioneer probably dreaded another lonely winter on Pigeon Creek. Mrs. Johnston was not altogether portionless. She had a store of household goods which filled a four-horse wagon, borrowed of Ralph Krume, Thomas Lincoln's brother-in-law, to transport the bride to In-

* A stone has been placed over the site of the grave by Mr. P. E. Studebaker of South Bend, Indiana. The stone bears the following inscription: "Nancy Hanks Lincoln, mother of President Lincoln, died October 5th, A. D. 1818, aged 35 years. Erected by a friend of her martyred son, 1879."

diana. It took little time for this energetic and honest Christian woman to make her influence felt, even in these discouraging surroundings, and Thomas Lincoln and the children were the better for her coming all the rest of their lives. The lack of doors and floors was at once corrected. Her honest pride inspired her husband to greater thrift and industry. The goods she brought with her compelled some effort at harmony in the other fittings of the house. She dressed the children in warmer clothing and put them to sleep in comfortable beds. With this little addition to their resources the family were much improved in appearance, behavior, and self-respect.

Thomas Lincoln joined the Baptist church at Little Pigeon in 1823; his oldest child, Sarah, followed his example three years later. They were known as active and consistent members of that communion. Lincoln was himself a good carpenter when he chose to work at his trade; a walnut table made by him is still preserved as part of the furniture of the church to which he belonged.*

Such a woman as Sarah Bush could not be careless of so important a matter as the education of her children, and they made the best use of the scanty opportunities the neighborhood afforded. "It was a wild region," writes Mr. Lincoln, in one of those rare bits of autobiography which he left behind him, "with many bears and other wild animals still in the woods. There were some schools so called, but no qualification was ever required of a teacher beyond 'readin', writin', and cypherin' to the Rule of Three.' If a straggler supposed to understand Latin happened to sojourn in the neighborhood, he was looked upon as a wizard. There was absolutely nothing to excite ambition for education." But in the case of this ungainly boy there was no necessity of any external incentive. A thirst for knowledge as a means of rising in the world was innate in him. It had

VIEW OF THOMAS LINCOLN'S FARM, WHERE PRESIDENT LINCOLN WAS BORN. (FARM NOW OCCUPIED BY MRS. RICHARD CREAL.) THE HOUSE STOOD BACK OF GROUP OF TREES NEAR RIGHT CENTER OF PICTURE; ROCK SPRING AT END OF PATH UNDER GROUP OF TREES IN LEFT CENTER.



HOUSE WHERE PRESIDENT LINCOLN WAS BORN. (FROM A SKETCH FROM MEMORY, IN POSSESSION OF R. T. DURRETT, ESQ.)

* MS. letter from Rev. T. V. Robertson, pastor of the Little Pigeon Baptist church.

nothing to do with that love of science for its own sake which has been so often seen in lowly savants, who have sacrificed their lives to the pure desire of knowing the works of God. All the little learning he ever acquired he seized as a tool to better his condition. He learned his letters that he might read books and see how men in the great world outside of his woods had borne themselves in logs, as distinguished from the more aristocratic "split logs," with earthen floors, and small holes for windows, sometimes illuminated by as much light as could penetrate through panes of paper greased with lard. The teachers were usually in keeping with their primitive surroundings. The profession offered no rewards sufficient to attract men of education or capacity. After a few months of

VIEW OF ROCK SPRING ON THE THOMAS LINCOLN FARM NEAR THE HOUSE WHERE THE PRESIDENT WAS BORN.

the fight for which he longed. He learned to write, first, that he might have an accomplishment his playmates had not; then that he might help his elders by writing their letters, and enjoy the feeling of usefulness which this gave him; and finally that he might copy what struck him in his reading and thus make it his own for future use. He learned to cipher certainly from no love of mathematics, but because it might come in play in some more congenial business than the farm-work which bounded the horizon of his contemporaries. Had it not been for that interior spur which kept his clear spirit at its task, his schools could have done little for him; for, counting his attendance under Riney and Hazel in Kentucky, and under Dorsey, Crawford, and Swaney in Indiana, it amounted to less than a year in all. The schools were much alike. They were held in deserted cabins of round desultory instruction young Abraham knew all that these vagrant literati could teach him. His last school-days were passed with one Swaney in 1826, who taught at a distance of four and a half miles from the Lincoln cabin. The nine miles of walking doubtless seemed to Thomas Lincoln a waste of time, and the lad was put at steady work and saw no more of school.

But it is questionable whether he lost anything by being deprived of the ministrations of the backwoods dominies. When his tasks ended, his studies became the chief pleasure of his life. In all the intervals of his work — in which he never took delight, knowing well enough that he was born for something better than that — he read, wrote, and ciphered incessantly. His reading was naturally limited by his opportunities, for books were among the rarest of luxuries in that region and time. But he read everything he could lay his hands

upon, and he was certainly fortunate in the few books of which he became the possessor. It would hardly be possible to select a better handful of classics for a youth in his circumstances than the few volumes he turned with a nightly and daily hand — the Bible, Æsop's Fables, Robinson Crusoe, The Pilgrim's Progress, a History of the United States, and Weems's Life of Washington. These were the best, and these he read over and over till he knew them almost by heart. But his voracity for anything printed was insatiable. He would sit in the twilight and read a dictionary as long as he could see. He used to go to David Turnham's, the town constable, and devour the Revised Statutes of Indiana, as boys in our day do the Three Guardsmen. Of the books he did not own he took voluminous notes, filling his copy-book with choice extracts, and poring over them until they were fixed in his memory. He could not afford to waste paper upon his own original compositions. He would sit by the fire at night and cover the wooden shovel with essays and arithmetical exercises, which he would shave off and begin again. It is touching to think of this great-spirited child, battling year after year against his evil star, wasting his ingenuity upon devices and makeshifts, his high intelligence starving for want of the simple appliances of education which are now offered gratis to the poorest and most indifferent. He did a man's work from the time he left school; his strength and stature were already far beyond those of ordinary men. He wrought his appointed tasks ungrudgingly, though without enthusiasm; but when his employer's day was over, his own began.

John Hanks says: "When Abe and I returned to the house from work he would go to the cupboard, snatch a piece of corn-bread, take down a book, sit down, cock his legs up as high as his head, and read." * The picture may be lacking in grace, but its truthfulness is beyond question. The habit remained with him always. Some of his greatest work in later years was done in this grotesque Western fashion,—"sitting on his shoulder-blades."

Otherwise his life at this time differed little from that of ordinary farm-hands. His great strength and intelligence made him a valu-

HODGEN'S MILL AND DAM ON MAIN NOLIN CREEK, THREE MILES FROM LINCOLN'S BIRTHPLACE; TOWN OF HODGENSVILLE IN THE BACKGROUND.

* Lamon, p. 37.



CABIN WHICH FORMERLY STOOD ON RACE STREET, NORTH OF THE BRIDGE OVER VALLEY CREEK, ELIZABETHTOWN. (DRAWN BY GEORGE L. FRANKENSTEIN FROM NATURE, IN 1865, WHEN TRADITION SAID IT WAS THE DWELLING OF THOMAS LINCOLN AFTER HIS FIRST MARRIAGE.)

able laborer, and his unfailing good temper and flow of rude rustic wit rendered him the most agreeable of comrades. He was always ready with some kindly act or word for others. Once he saved the life of the town drunkard, whom he found freezing by the roadside, by carrying him in his strong arms to the tavern, and working over him until he revived. It is a curious fact that this act of common humanity was regarded as something remarkable in the neighborhood; the grateful sot himself always said "it was mighty clever of Abe to tote me so far that cold night." It was also considered an eccentricity that he hated and preached against cruelty to animals. Some of his comrades remember still his bursts of righteous wrath, when a boy, against the wanton murder of turtles and other creatures. He was evidently of better and finer clay than his fellows, even in those wild and ignorant days. At home he was the life of the singularly assorted household, which consisted, besides his parents and himself, of his sister, Mrs. Lincoln's two girls and boy, Dennis Hanks, the

Town of Lincoln.

Grave of Lincoln's Mother.





THOMAS LINCOLN FARM, SPENCER COUNTY, INDIANA, NEAR THE TOWN OF LINCOLN AND GENTRYVILLE. THE FIGURE OF A MAN STANDS ON THE SITE OF THE CABIN.

Engraved by T. Johnson. After a photograph in possession of William H. Herndon, Esq.

SARAH BUSH LINCOLN AT THE AGE OF SEVENTY-SIX, STEPMOTHER OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

legacy of the dying Sparrow family, and John Hanks (son of the carpenter Joseph with whom Thomas Lincoln learned his trade), who came from Kentucky several years after the others. It was probably as much the inexhaustible good nature and kindly helpfulness of young Abraham which kept the peace among all these heterogeneous elements, effervescing with youth and confined in a one-roomed cabin, as it was the Christian sweetness and firmness of the woman of the house. It was a happy and united household: brothers and sisters and cousins living peacefully under the gentle rule of the good stepmother, but all acknowledging from a very early period the supremacy in goodness and cleverness of their big brother Abraham. Mrs. Lincoln, not long before her death, gave striking testimony of his winning and loyal character. She said to Mr. Herndon:* "I can

* Lamon, p. 39.

say, what scarcely one mother in a thousand can say, Abe never gave me a cross word or look, and never refused in fact or appearance to do anything I asked him. His mind and mine — what little I had — seemed to run together. . . . I had a son John, who was raised with Abe. Both were good boys, but I must say, both now being dead, that Abe was the best boy I ever saw or expect to see." Such were the beginnings of this remarkable career, sacred, as we see, from childhood to duty and to human kindliness.

We are making no claim of early saintship for him. He was merely a good boy, with sufficient wickedness to prove his humanity. One of his employers, undazzled by recent history, faithfully remembers that young Abe liked his dinner and his pay better than his work: there is surely nothing alien to ordinary mortality in this. It is also reported that he sometimes impeded the celerity of harvest operations by making burlesque speeches, or worse than that, comic sermons, from the top of some tempting stump, to the delight of the hired hands and the exasperation of the farmer. His budding talents as a writer were not always used discreetly. He was too much given to scribbling coarse satires and chronicles, in prose, and in something which had to him and his friends the air of verse. From this arose occasional heart-burnings and feuds, in which Abraham bore his part according to the custom of the country. Despite his Quaker ancestry and his natural love of peace, he was no non-resistant, and when he once entered upon a quarrel the opponent usually had the worst of it. But he was generous and placable, and some of his best friends were those with whom he had had differences, and had settled them in the way then prevalent,— in a ring of serious spectators, calmly and critically chewing their cuds under the shade of some spreading oak, at the edge of the timber.

Before we close our sketch of this period of Lincoln's life, it may not be amiss to glance for a moment at the state of society among the people with whom his lot was cast in these important years.

In most respects there had been little moral or material improvement since the early settlement of the country. Their houses were usually of one room, built of round logs with the bark on. We have known a man to gain the sobriquet of "Split-log Mitchell" by indulging in the luxury of building a cabin of square-hewn timbers. Their dress was still mostly of tanned deer-hide, a material to the last degree uncomfortable when the wearer was caught in a shower. Their shoes were of the same, and a good Western authority calls a wet moccasin "a decent way of going barefoot." About the time, however, when Lincoln grew to manhood, garments of wool and of tow began to be worn, dyed with the juice of the butternut or white walnut, and the hides of neat-cattle began to be tanned. But for a good while it was only the women who indulged in these novelties. There was little public worship. Occasionally an itinerant preacher visited a county, and the settlers for miles around would go nearly in mass to the meeting. If a man was possessed of a wagon, the family rode luxuriously; but as a rule the men walked and the women went on horseback with the little children in their arms. It was considered no violation of the sanctities of the occasion to carry a rifle and take advantage of any game which might be stirring during the long walk. Arriving at the place of meeting, which was some log cabin if the weather was foul, or the shade of a tree if it was fair, the assembled worshipers threw their provisions into a common store and picnicked in neighborly companionship. The preacher would then take off his coat, and go at his work with an energy unknown to our days.

There were few other social meetings. Men came together for "raisings," where a house was built in a day; for "log-rollings," where tons of excellent timber were piled together and wastefully burned; for wolf-hunts, where a tall pole was erected in the midst of a prairie or clearing, and a great circle of hunters formed around it, sometimes of miles in diameter, which, gradually contracting with shouts and yells, drove all the game in the woods together at the pole for slaughter; and for horse-races, which bore little resemblance to those magnificent exhibitions which are the boast of Kentucky at this time. In these affairs the women naturally took no part; but weddings, which were entertainments scarcely less rude and boisterous, were their own peculiar province. These festivities lasted rarely less than twenty-four hours. The guests assembled in the morning. There was a race for the whisky bottle; a midday dinner; an afternoon of rough games and outrageous practical jokes; a supper and dance at night, interrupted by the successive withdrawals of the bride and groom, attended with ceremonies and jests of more than Rabelaisian crudeness; and a noisy dispersal next day.

The one point at which they instinctively clung to civilization was their regard for law and reverence for courts of justice. Yet these were of the simplest character and totally devoid of any adventitious accessories. An early jurist of the country writes:* "I was Circuit Prosecuting Attorney at the time of the trials at the falls of Fall Creek, where

* O. H. Smith, "Early Indiana Trials," p. 285.

Pendleton now stands. Four of the prisoners were convicted of murder, and three of them hung for killing Indians. The court was held in a double log cabin, the grand jury sat upon a log in the woods, and the foreman signed the bills of indictment, which I had prepared, upon his knee; there was not a petit juror that had shoes on; all wore moccasins, and were belted around the waist, and carried side-knives used by the hunters." Yet amidst all this apparent savagery we see justice was done, and the law vindicated even against the bitterest prejudices of these pioneer jurymen.

They were full of strange superstitions. The belief in witchcraft had long ago passed away with the smoke of the fagots from old and New England, but it survived far into this century in Kentucky and the lower halves of Indiana and Illinois,—touched with a peculiar tinge of African magic. The pioneers believed in it for good and evil. Their veterinary practice was mostly by charms and incantations; and when a person believed himself bewitched, a shot at the image of the witch with a bullet melted out of a half-dollar was the favorite curative agency. Luck was an active divinity in their apprehension, powerful for blessing or bane, announced by homely signs, to be placated by quaint ceremonies. A dog crossing the hunter's path spoiled his day, unless he instantly hooked his little fingers together, and pulled till the animal disappeared.* They were familiar with the ever-recurring mystification of the witch-hazel, or divining-rod; and the "cure by faith" was as well known to them as it has since become in a more sophisticated state of society. The commonest occurrences were heralds of death and doom. A bird lighting in a window, a dog baying at certain hours, the cough of a horse in the direction of a child, the sight, or worse still, the touch of a dead snake, heralded domestic woe. A wagon driving past the house with a load of baskets was a warning of atmospheric disturbance. A vague and ignorant astronomy governed their plantings and sowings, the breeding of their cattle, and all farm-work. They must fell trees for fence-rails before noon, and in the waxing of the moon. Fences built when there was no moon† would give way; but that was the proper season for planting potatoes and other vegetables whose fruit grows underground; those which bear their product in the air must be planted when the moon shone. The magical power of the moon was wide in its influence; it extended to the most minute details of life.

Among these people, and in all essential respects one of them, Abraham Lincoln passed his childhood and youth. He was not remarkably precocious. His mind was slow in acquisition, and his powers of reasoning and rhetoric improved constantly to the end of his life, at a rate of progress marvelously regular and sustained. But there was that about him, even at the age of nineteen years, which might well justify his admiring friends in presaging for him an unusual career. He had read every book he could find, and could "spell down" the whole county at their orthographical contests. By dint of constant practice he had acquired an admirably clear and serviceable handwriting. He occasionally astounded his companions by such glimpses of occult science as that the world is round and that the sun is relatively stationary. He wrote, for his own amusement and edification, essays on politics, of which gentlemen of standing who had been favored with a perusal said with authority, at the cross-roads grocery, "The world can't beat it." One or two of these compositions got into print and vastly increased the author's local fame. He was also a magnanimous boy, with a larger and kindlier spirit than common. His generosity, courage, and capability of discerning two sides to a dispute, were remarkable even then, and won him the admiration of those to whom such qualities were unknown. But perhaps after all the thing which gained and fixed his mastery over his fellows was to a great degree his gigantic stature and strength. He attained his full growth, six feet and four inches, two years before he came of age. He rarely met with a man he could not easily handle. His strength is still a tradition in Spencer County.‡ One aged man says that he has seen him "pick up and carry away a chicken-house weighing six hundred pounds." At another time, seeing some men preparing a contrivance for lifting some large posts, Abe quickly shouldered the posts and took them where they were needed. One of his employers says, "He could sink an axe deeper into wood than any man I ever saw." With strength like this and a brain to direct it, a man was a born leader in that country and at that time.

There are, of course, foolish stories extant that Abraham used to boast, and that others used to predict, that he should be President some day. The same thing is daily said of thousands of boys who will never be constables. But there is evidence that he felt too large for the life of a farm-hand on Pigeon Creek, and his thoughts naturally turned, after the manner of restless boys in the West, to the river, as the avenue of escape from the narrow life of the woods. He once asked an old friend to give him a recommendation to some steamboat on the Ohio, but desisted

* Lamon, p. 44. † Ib. ‡ Lamon, p. 52.

from his purpose on being reminded that his father had the right to dispose of his time for a year or so more. But in 1828 an opportunity offered for a little glimpse of the world outside, and the boy gladly embraced it. He was hired by Mr. Gentry, the proprietor of the neighboring village of Gentryville, to accompany his son with a flat-boat of produce to New Orleans and intermediate landings. The voyage was made successfully, and Abraham gained great credit for his management and sale of the cargo. The only important incident of the trip occurred at the plantation of Madame Duchesne, a few miles below Baton Rouge. The young merchants had tied up for the night and were asleep in the cabin, when they were aroused by shuffling footsteps, which proved to be a gang of marauding negroes, coming to rob the boat. Abraham instantly attacked them with a club, knocked several overboard and put the rest to flight; flushed with battle, he and Allen Gentry carried the war into the enemy's country, and pursued the retreating Africans some distance in the darkness. They then returned to the boat, bleeding but victorious, and hastily swung into the stream and floated down the river till daylight. Lincoln's exertions in later years for the welfare of the African race showed that this night battle had not led him to any hasty and hostile generalizations.

The next autumn, John Hanks, the steadiest and most trustworthy of the family, went to Illinois. Though an illiterate and rather dull man, he had a good deal of solidity of character and consequently some influence and consideration in the household. He settled in Macon County, and was so well pleased with the country, and especially with its admirable distribution into prairie and timber, that he sent repeated messages to his friends in Indiana to come out and join him. Thomas Lincoln was always ready to move. He had probably by this time despaired of ever owning any unencumbered real estate in Indiana, and the younger members of the family had little to bind them to the place where they saw nothing in the future but hard work and poor living. Thomas Lincoln handed over his farm to Mr. Gentry, sold his crop of corn and hogs, packed his household goods and those of his children and sons-in-law into a single wagon, drawn by two yoke of oxen, the combined wealth of himself and Dennis Hanks, and started for the new State. His daughter Sarah or Nancy, for she was called by both names, who married Aaron Grigsby a few years before, had died in childbirth. The emigrating family consisted of the Lincolns, John Johnston, Mrs. Lincoln's son, and her daughters, Mrs. Hall and Mrs. Hanks, with their husbands.

Two weeks of weary tramping through forest roads and muddy prairie, and the dangerous fording of streams swollen by the February thaws, brought the party to John Hanks's place near Decatur. He met them with a frank and energetic welcome. He had already selected a piece of ground for them a few miles from his own, and had the logs ready for their house. They numbered men enough to build without calling in their neighbors, and immediately put up a cabin on the north fork of the Sangamon River. The family thus housed and sheltered, one more bit of filial work remained for Abraham before assuming his virile independence. With the assistance of John Hanks, he plowed fifteen acres, and split, from the tall walnut-trees of the primeval forest, enough rails to surround them with a fence. Little did either dream, while engaged in this work, that the day would come when the appearance of John Hanks in a public meeting, with two of these rails on his shoulder, would electrify a State convention, and kindle throughout the country a contagious and unreasoning enthusiasm, whose results would reach to endless generations.

III.

ILLINOIS IN 1830.

THE Lincolns arrived in Illinois just in time to entitle themselves to be called pioneers. When, in after years, associations of "Old Settlers" began to be formed in Central Illinois, the qualification for membership agreed upon by common consent was a residence in the country before "the winter of the deep snow." This was in 1830–31, a season of such extraordinary severity that it has formed for half a century a recognized date in the middle counties of Illinois, among those to whom in those days diaries and journals were unknown. The snowfall began in the Christmas holidays and continued until the snow was three feet deep on level ground. Then came a cold rain, freezing as it fell until a thick crust of ice gathered over the snow. The weather became intensely cold, the mercury sinking to twelve degrees below zero, Fahrenheit, and remaining there for two weeks.* The storm came on with such suddenness that all who were abroad had great trouble in reaching their homes, and many perished. One man† relates that he and a friend or two were out in a hunting party with an ox-team. They had

* Rev. J. M. Sturtevant, "Address to Old Settlers of Morgan County."

† Thomas Buckles, of McLean County.

collected a wagon-load of game and were on their way home when the storm struck them. After they had gone four miles they were compelled to abandon their wagon; the snow fell in heavy masses "as if thrown from a scoop-shovel"; arriving within two miles of their habitation, they were forced to trust to the instinct of their animals and reached home hanging to the tails of their steers. Not all were so fortunate. Some were found weeks afterwards in the snow-drifts, their flesh gnawed by famished wolves; and the fate of others was unknown until the late spring sunshine revealed their resting-places. To those who escaped, the winter was tedious and terrible. It is hard for us to understand the isolation to which such weather condemns the pioneer. For weeks they remained in their cabins hoping for some mitigation of the frost. When at last they were driven out by the fear of famine, the labor of establishing communications was enormous. They finally made roads by "wallowing through the snow," as an Illinois historian expresses it,* and going patiently over the same track until the snow was trampled hard and rounded like a turnpike. These roads lasted far into the spring, when the snow had melted from the plains, and wound for miles like threads of silver over the rich black loam of the prairies. After that winter game was never again so plentiful in the State. Much still remained, of course, but it never recovered entirely from the rigors of that season and the stupid enterprise of the pioneer hunters, who, when they came out of their snow-beleaguered cabins, began chasing and killing the starved deer by herds. It was easy work; the crust of the snow was strong enough to bear the weight of men and dogs, but the slender hoofs of the deer would after a few bounds pierce the treacherous surface. This destructive slaughter went on until the game grew too lean to be worth the killing. All sorts of wild animals grew scarce from that winter. Old settlers say that the slow cowardly breed of prairie wolves, which used to be caught and killed as readily as sheep, disappeared about that time and none but the fleeter and stronger survived.†

Only once since then has nature shown such extravagant severity in Illinois, and that was on a day in the winter of 1836, known to Illinoisans as "the sudden change." At noon on the 20th of December, after a warm and rainy morning, the ground being covered with mud and slush, the temperature fell instantly forty degrees. A man riding into Springfield for a marriage license says a roaring and crackling wind came upon him and the rain drops dripping from his bridle-reins and beard changed in a second into jingling icicles. He rode hastily into the town and arrived in a few minutes at his destination; but his clothes were frozen like sheet iron, and man and saddle had to be taken into the house together to be thawed apart. Geese and chickens were caught by the feet and wings and frozen to the wet ground. A drove of a thousand hogs, which were being driven to St. Louis, rushed together for warmth, and became piled in a great heap. Those inside smothered and those outside froze, and the ghastly pyramid remained there on the prairie for weeks: the drovers barely escaped with their lives. Men killed their horses, disemboweled them, and crept into the cavity of their bodies to escape the murderous wind.‡

The pioneer period of Illinois was ending as Thomas Lincoln and his tall boy drove their ox-cart over the Indiana line. The population of the State had grown to 157,447. It still clung to the wooded borders of the water-courses; scattered settlements were to be found all along the Mississippi and its affluents, from where Cairo struggled for life in the swamps of the Ohio to the bustling and busy mining camps which the recent discovery of lead had brought to Galena. A line of villages from Alton to Peoria dotted the woodland which the Illinois River had stretched, like a green baldric, diagonally across the bosom of the State. Then there were long reaches of wilderness before you came to Fort Dearborn, where there was nothing as yet to give promise of that miraculous growth which was soon to make Chicago a proverb to the world. There were a few settlements in the fertile region called the Military Tract; the southern part of the State was getting itself settled here and there. People were coming in freely to the Sangamon country. But a grassy solitude stretched from Galena to Chicago, and the upper half of the State generally was a wilderness. The earlier emigrants, principally of the poorer class of Southern farmers, shunned the prairies with something of a superstitious dread. They preferred to pass the first years of their occupation in the wasteful and laborious work of clearing a patch of timber for corn, rather than enter upon those rich savannas which were ready to break into fertility at the slightest provocation of culture. Even so late as 1835, writes Mr. J. F. Speed, "no one dreamed the prairies would ever be occupied." It was thought they would be

*Power, "Early Settlers of Sangamon County," p. 62.
†"Old Times in McLean County," p. 414.

‡Although all inhabitants of Sangamon County are acquainted with these facts, and we have often heard them and many others like them from the lips of eye-witnesses, we have preferred to cite only those which are given in the careful and conscientious compilation entitled "The Early Settlers of Sangamon County," by the Rev. John Carroll Power.

used perpetually as grazing-fields for stock. For years the long processions of "movers" wound over those fertile and neglected plains, taking no hint of the wealth suggested by the rank luxuriance of vegetable growth around them, the carpet of brilliant flowers spread over the verdant knolls, the strong, succulent grass that waved in the breeze, full of warm and vital odor, as high as the waist of a man. In after years, when the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States began to pour in, the prairies were rapidly taken up, and the relative growth and importance of the two sections of the State were immediately reversed. Governor Ford, writing about 1847, attributes this result to the fact that the best class of Southern people were slow to emigrate to a State where they could not take their slaves; while the settlers from the North, not being debarred by the State Constitution from bringing their property with them, were of a different class. "The northern part of the State was settled in the first instance by wealthy farmers, enterprising merchants, millers, and manufacturers. They made farms, built mills, churches, school-houses, towns, and cities, and constructed roads and bridges as if by magic; so that although the settlements in the southern part of the State are from twenty to fifty years in advance on the score of age, yet are they ten years behind in point of wealth and all the appliances of a higher civilization." *

At the time which we are specially considering, however, the few inhabitants of the south and the center were principally from what came afterwards to be called the border slave States. They were mostly a simple, neighborly, unambitious people, contented with their condition, living upon plain fare, and knowing not much of anything better. Luxury was, of course, unknown; even wealth, if it existed, could procure few of the comforts of refined life. But there was little or no money in circulation. Exchanges were effected by the most primitive forms of barter, and each family must rely chiefly upon itself for the means of living. The neighbors would lend a hand in building a cabin for a newcomer; after that he must in most cases shift for himself. Many a man coming from an old community, and imperfectly appreciating the necessities of pioneer life, has found suddenly, on the approach of winter, that he must learn to make shoes or go barefoot. The furniture of their houses was made with an axe from the trees of the forest. Their clothing was all made at home. The buckskin days were over to a great extent, though an occasional hunting-shirt and pair of moccasins were still seen. But flax and hemp had begun to be cultivated, and as the wolves were killed off the sheep-folds increased, and garments resembling those of civilization were spun and woven, and cut and sewed, by the women of the family. When a man had a suit of jeans colored with butternut-juice, and his wife a dress of linsey, they could appear with the best at a wedding or a quilting frolic. The superfluous could not have been said to exist in a community where men made their own buttons, where women dug roots in the woods to make their tea with, where many children never saw a stick of candy until after they were grown. The only sweetmeats known were those a skillful cook could compose from the honey plundered from the hollow oaks where the wild bees had stored it. Yet there was withal a kind of rude plenty; the woods swarmed with game, and after swine began to be raised, there was the bacon and hoe-cake which any south-western farmer will say is good enough for a king. The greatest privation was the lack of steel implements. His axe was as precious to the pioneer as his sword to the knight errant. Governor Reynolds speaks of the panic felt in his father's family when the axe was dropped into a stream. A battered piece of tin was carefully saved and smoothed, and made into a grater for green corn.

They had their own amusements, of course; no form of society is without them, from the anthropoid apes to the Jockey Club. As to the grosser and ruder shapes taken by the diversions of the pioneers, we will let Mr. Herndon speak — their contemporary annalist and ardent panegyrist: "These men could shave a horse's mane and tail, paint, disfigure, and offer it for sale to the owner. They could hoop up in a hogshead a drunken man, they themselves being drunk, put in and nail fast the head, and roll the man down hill a hundred feet or more. They could run down a lean and hungry wild pig, catch it, heat a ten-plate stove-furnace hot, and putting in the pig, could cook it, they dancing the while a merry jig." Wild oats of this kind seem hardly compatible with a harvest of civilization, but it is contended that such of these roysterers as survived their stormy beginnings became decent and serious citizens. Indeed, Mr. Herndon insists that even in their hot youth they showed the promise of goodness and piety. "They attended church, heard the sermon, wept and prayed, shouted, got up and fought an hour, and then went back to prayer, just as the spirit moved them." † The camp-meeting may be said, with no irreverent intention, to have been their principal means of intellectual

* "History of Illinois," p. 280.

† William H. Herndon's speech at Old Settlers' Meeting, Menard County.

excitement. The circuit preachers were for a long time the only circulating medium of thought and emotion that kept the isolated settlements from utter spiritual stagnation. They were men of great physical and moral endurance, absolutely devoted to their work, which they pursued in the face of every hardship and discouragement. Their circuits were frequently so great in extent that they were forced to be constantly on the route; what reading they did was done in the saddle. They received perhaps fifty dollars from the missionary fund and half as much more from their congregations, paid for the most part in necessaries of life.* Their oratory was suited to their longitude, and was addressed exclusively to the emotions of their hearers. It was often very effective, producing shouts and groans and genuflections among the audience at large, and terrible convulsions among the more nervous and excitable. We hear sometimes of a whole congregation prostrated as by a hurricane, flinging their limbs about in furious contortions, with wild outcries. To this day some of the survivors of that period insist that it was the spirit of the Almighty, and nothing less, that thus manifested itself. The minister, however, did not always share in the delirium of his hearers. Governor Reynolds tells us of a preacher in Sangamon County, who, before his sermon, had set a wolf-trap in view of his pulpit. In the midst of his exhortations his keen eyes saw the distant trap collapse, and he continued in the same intonation with which he had been preaching, "Mind the text, brethren, till I go kill that wolf!" With all the failings and eccentricities of this singular class of men, they did a great deal of good, and are entitled to especial credit among those who conquered the wilderness. The emotions they excited did not all die away in the shouts and contortions of the meeting. Not a few of the cabins in the clearings were the abode of a fervent religion and an austere morality. Many a traveler, approaching a rude hut in the woods in the gathering twilight, distrusting the gaunt and silent family who gave him an unsmiling welcome, the bare interior, the rifles and knives conspicuously displayed, has felt his fears vanish when he sat down to supper, and the master of the house, in a few fervent words, invoked the blessing of heaven on the meal.

There was very little social intercourse; a visit was a serious matter, involving the expenditure of days of travel. It was the custom among families, when the longing for the sight of kindred faces was too strong to withstand, to move in a body to the distant settlement where their relatives lived and remain with them for a month at a time. The claims of consanguinity were more regarded than now. Almost the only festivities were those which accompanied weddings, and these were, of course, of a primitive kind. The perils and adventures through which the young pioneers went to obtain their brides furnish forth thousands of tales by Western firesides. Instead of taking the rosy daughter of a neighbor, the enterprising bachelor would often go back to Kentucky, and pass through as many adventures in bringing his wife home as a returning crusader would meet between Beirut and Vienna. If she was a young woman who respected herself, the household gear she would insist on bringing would entail an Iliad of embarrassments. An old farmer of Sangamon County still talks of a feather-bed weighing fifty-four pounds with which his wife made him swim six rivers under penalty of desertion.

It was not always easy to find a competent authority to perform the ceremony. A justice in McLean County lived by the bank of a river, and his services were sometimes required by impatient lovers on the other bank when the waters were too torrential to cross. In such cases, being a conscientious man, he always insisted that they should ride into the stream far enough for him to discern their features, holding torches to their faces by night and by storm. The wooing of those days was prompt and practical. There was no time for the gradual approaches of an idler and more conventional age. It is related of one Stout, one of the legendary Nimrods of Illinois, who was well and frequently married, that he had one unfailing formula of courtship. He always promised the ladies whose hearts he was besieging that "they should live in the timber where they could pick up their own firewood."

Theft was almost unknown; property, being so hard to get, was jealously guarded, as we have already noticed in speaking of the settlement of Kentucky. The pioneers of Illinois brought with them the same rigid notions of honesty which their environment maintained. A man in Macoupin County left his wagon, loaded with corn, stuck in the prairie mud for two weeks near a frequented road. When he returned he found some of his corn gone, but there was money enough tied in the sacks to pay for what was taken. Men carrying bags of silver from the towns of Illinois to St. Louis rather made a display of it, as it enhanced their own importance, and there was no fear of robbery. There were of course no locks on the cabin doors, and the early merchants sometimes left their stores unprotected for days together when they went to the nearest city to replenish their

* "Old Times in McLean County," p. 194.

stocks. Of course there were rare exceptions to this rule, but a single theft alarmed and excited a whole neighborhood. When a crime was traced home, the family of the criminal were generally obliged to remove.

There were still, even so late as the time to which we are referring, two alien elements in the population of the State — the French and the Indians. The French settlements about Kaskaskia retained much of their national character, and the pioneers from the South who visited them or settled among them never ceased to wonder at their gayety, their peaceable industry and enterprise, and their domestic affection, which they did not care to dissemble and conceal like their shy and reticent neighbors. It was a daily spectacle, which never lost its strangeness for the Tennesseeans and Kentuckians, to see the Frenchman returning from his work greeted by his wife and children with embraces of welcome "at the gate of his door-yard, and in view of all the villagers."* The natural and kindly fraternization of the Frenchmen with the Indians was also a cause of wonder to the Americans. The friendly intercourse between them, and their occasional intermarriages, seemed little short of monstrous to the ferocious exclusiveness of the Anglo-Saxon.† The Indians in the central part of Illinois cut very little figure in the reminiscences of the pioneers; they occupied much the same relation to them as the tramp to the housewife of to-day. The Winnebago war in 1827 and the Black Hawk war in 1831 disturbed only the northern portions of the State. A few scattered and vagrant lodges of Pottawatomies and Kickapoos were all the pioneers of Sangamon and neighboring counties ever met. They were spared the heroic struggle of the advance-guard of civilization in other States. A woman was sometimes alarmed by a visit from a drunken savage; poultry and pigs occasionally disappeared when they were in the neighborhood; but life was not darkened by the constant menace of massacre. A few years earlier, indeed, the relations of the two races had been more strained, as may be inferred from an act passed by the territorial Legislature in 1814, offering a reward of fifty dollars to any citizen or ranger who should kill or take any depredating Indian.‡ As only two dollars was paid for killing a wolf, it is easy to see how the pioneers regarded the forest folk in point of relative noxiousness. But ten years later a handful only of the Kickapoos remained in Sangamon County, the specter of the vanished people. A chief named Machina came one day to a family who were clearing a piece of timber, and issued an order of eviction in these words: "Too much come white man. T'other side Sangamon." He threw a handful of dried leaves in the air to show how he would scatter the pale faces, but he never fulfilled his threats further than to come in occasionally and ask for a drink of whisky. That such trivial details are still related, only shows how barren of incident was the life of these obscure founders of a great empire. Any subject of conversation, any cause of sensation, was a godsend. When Vannoy murdered his wife in Springfield, whole families put on their best clothes and drove fifty miles through bottomless mud and swollen rivers to see him hanged.

It is curious to see how naturally in such a state of things the fabric of political society developed itself from its germ. The county of Sangamon was called by an act of the Legislature in 1821 out of a verdant solitude of half a million acres, inhabited by a few families. An election for county commissioners was ordered; three men were chosen; they came together at the cabin of John Kelly, at Spring Creek. He was a roving bachelor from North Carolina, devoted to the chase, who had built his hut three years before on the margin of this green-bordered rivulet, where the deer passed by in hundreds, going in the morning from the shady banks of the Sangamon to feed on the rich green grass of the prairie, and returning in the twilight. He was so delighted with this hunters' paradise § that he sent for his brothers to join him. They came and brought their friends, and so it came about that in this immense county of over eight hundred square miles in extent the settlement of John Kelly at Spring Creek was the only place where there was shelter for the commissioners; and thus it became the temporary county-seat, duly described in the official report of the commissioners as "a certain point in the prairie near John Kelly's field, on the waters of Spring Creek, at a stake marked Z and D (the initials of the commissioners) to be the temporary seat of justice for said county; and we do further agree that the said county-seat be called and known by the name of Springfield"; and in this manner the future capital received that hackneyed title, when the distinctive and musical name of Sangamon was ready to their hands. The same day they agreed with John Kelly to build them a court-house, for which they paid him

* Hall's "Sketches of the West."

† Michelet notices this exclusiveness of the English, and inveighs against it in his most lyric style. "Crime contre la nature! Crime contre l'humanité! Il sera expié par la stérilité de l'esprit."

‡ "Life and Times of Ninian Edwards," p. 163.

§ Power, "Early Settlers of Sangamon County," p. 33.

forty-two dollars and fifty cents. In twenty-four days the house was built — one room of rough logs, the jury retiring to any sequestered glade they fancied for their deliberation. They next ordered the building of a jail, which cost just twice as much money as the court-house, for obvious reasons. Constables and overseers of the poor were appointed, and all the machinery of government prepared for the population which was hourly expected. It was taken for granted that malefactors would come and the constables have employment, and the poor they would have always with them, when once they began to arrive. This was only a temporary arrangement, but when, a year or two later, the time came to fix upon a permanent seat of justice for the county, the resources of the Spring Creek men were equal to the emergency. When the commissioners came to decide on the relative merits of Springfield and another site a few miles away, they led them through brake, through brier, by mud knee-deep and by water-courses so exasperating that the wearied and baffled officials declared they would seek no further, and Springfield became the county-seat for all time; and greater destinies were in store for it through means not wholly dissimilar. Nature had made it merely a pleasant hunting-ground; the craft and the industry of its first settlers made it a capital.

The courts which were held in these log huts were as rude as might be expected; yet there is evidence that although there was no superfluity of law or of learning, justice was substantially administered. The lawyers came mostly from Kentucky, though an occasional New Englander confronted and lived down the general prejudice against his region and obtained preferment. The profits of the profession were inconceivably small. One early State's Attorney* describes his first circuit as a tour of shifts and privations not unlike the wanderings of a mendicant friar. In his first county he received a fee of five dollars for prosecuting the parties to a sanguinary affray. In the next he was equally successful, but barely escaped drowning in Spoon River. In the third there were but two families at the county-seat, and no cases on the docket. Thence he journeyed across a trackless prairie sixty miles, and at Quincy had one case and gained five dollars. In Pike County our much-enduring jurist took no cash, but found a generous sheriff who entertained him without charge. "He was one of nature's noblemen, from Massachusetts," writes the grateful prosecutor. The lawyers in what was called good practice earned less than a street-sweeper to-day. It is related that the famous S. A. Douglas once traveled from Springfield to Bloomington and made an extravagant speech, and having gained his case received a fee of five dollars.† In such a state of things it was not to be wondered at that the technicalities of law were held in somewhat less veneration than what the pioneer regarded as the essential claims of justice. The infirmities of the jury system gave them less annoyance than it gives us. Governor Ford mentions a case where a gang of horse-thieves succeeded in placing one of their confederates upon a jury which was to try them; but he was soon brought to reason by his eleven colleagues making preparations to hang him to the rafters of the jury room. The judges were less hampered by the limitations of their legal lore than by their fears of a loss of popularity as a result of too definite charges in civil suits, or too great severity in criminal cases. They grew very dexterous in avoiding any commitment as to the legal or moral bearings of the questions brought before them. They generally refused to sum up, or to comment upon evidence; when asked by the counsel to give instructions they would say, "Why, gentlemen, the jury understand this case as well as you or I. They will do justice between the parties."‡ One famous judge, who was afterwards governor, when sentencing a murderer, impressed it upon his mind, and wished him to inform his friends, that it was the jury and not the judge who had found him guilty, and then asked him on what day he would like to be hanged. It is needless to say that the bench and bar were not all of this class. There were even at that early day lawyers, and not a few, who had already won reputation in the older States, and whose names are still honored in the profession. Cook, McLean, Edwards, Kane, Thomas, Reynolds, and others, the earliest lawyers of the State, have hardly been since surpassed for learning and ability.

In a community where the principal men were lawyers, where there was as yet little commerce, and industrial enterprise was unknown, it was natural that one of the chief interests of life should be the pursuit of politics. The young State swarmed with politicians; they could be found chewing and whittling at every cross-roads inn; they were busy at every horse-race, arranging their plans and extending their acquaintance; around the burgoo-pot of the hunting party they discussed measures and candidates; they even invaded the camp-meeting and did not disdain the pulpit as a tribune. Of course there was no such thing as organization in the pioneer

* "History of Sangamon County," p. 83.

† "The Good Old Times in McLean County," p. 255.

‡ Ford's "History of Illinois," p. 83.

days. Men were voted for, to a great extent, independently of partisan questions affecting the nation at large, and in this way the higher offices of the State were filled for many years by men whose personal character compelled the respect and esteem of the citizens. The year 1826 is generally taken as the date which witnessed the change from personal to partisan politics, though several years more elapsed before the rule of conventions came in, which put an end to individual candidacy. In that year Mr. Cook, who had long represented the State in Congress with singular ability and purity, was defeated by Governor Duncan, the candidate of the Jackson men, on account of the vote given by Cook which elected John Quincy Adams to the Presidency. The bitter intolerance of the Jackson party naturally caused their opponents to organize against them, and there were two parties in the State from that time forward. The change in political methods was inevitable, and it is idle to deplore it; but the former system gave the better men in the new State a power and prominence which they have never since enjoyed. Such men as Governor Edwards, who came with the prestige of a distinguished family connection, a large fortune, a good education, and a distinction of manners and of dress,—ruffles, gold buttons, and fair-topped boots,— which would hardly have been pardoned a few years later; and Governor Coles, who had been private secretary to Madison, and was familiar with the courts of Europe, a man as notable for his gentleness of manners as for his nobility of nature, could never have come so readily and easily to the head of the government after the machine of the caucus had been perfected. Real ability then imposed itself with more authority upon the ignorant and unpretending politicians from the back timber; so that it is remarked by those who study the early statutes of Illinois that they are far better drawn up, better edited, than those of a later period,* when illiterate intriguants, conscious of the party strength behind them, insisted on shaping legislation according to their own fancy. The men of cultivation wielded an influence in the Legislature entirely out of proportion to their numbers, as the ruder sort of pioneers were naturally in a large majority. The type of a not uncommon class in Illinois tradition was a member from the South who could neither read nor write, and whose apparently ironical patronymic was Grammar. When first elected he had never worn anything but leather; but regarding his tattered buckskin as unfit for the garb of a lawgiver, he and his sons gathered hazelnuts enough to barter at the nearest store for a few yards of blue strouding such as the Indians used for breech-clouts. When he came home with his purchase and had called together the women of the settlement to make his clothes, it was found that there was only material enough for a very short coat and a long pair of leggins, and thus attired he went to Kaskaskia, the territorial capital. Uncouth as was his appearance, he had in him the raw material of a politician. He invented a system — which was afterwards adopted by many whose breeches were more fashionably cut — of voting against every measure which was proposed. If it failed, the responsibility was broadly shared; if it passed and was popular, no one would care who voted against it; if it passed and did not meet the favor of the people, John Grammar could vaunt his foresight. Between the men like Coles and the men like Grammar there was a wide interval, and the average was about what the people of the State deserved and could appreciate. A legislator was as likely to suffer for doing right as for doing wrong. Governor Ford, in his admirable sketch of the early history of the State, mentions two acts of the Legislature, both of them proper and beneficial, as unequaled in their destructive influence upon the great folks of the State. One was a bill for a loan to meet the honest obligations of the commonwealth, commonly called "the Wiggins loan"; and the other was a law to prevent bulls of inferior size and breed from running at large. This latter set loose all the winds of popular fury: it was cruel, it was aristocratic; it was in the interest of rich men and pampered foreign bulls; and it ended the career of many an aspiring politician in a blast of democratic indignation and scorn. The politician who relied upon immediate and constant contact with the people certainly earned all the emoluments of office he received. His successes were hardly purchased by laborious affability. "A friend of mine," says Ford, "once informed me that he intended to be a candidate for the Legislature, but would not declare himself until just before the election, and assigned as a reason that it was so very hard to be clever for a long time at once." Before the caucus had eliminated the individual initiative, there was much more of personal feeling in elections. A vote against a man had something of offense in it, and sometimes stirred up a defeated candidate to heroic vengeance. In 1827 the Legislature elected a State treasurer after an exciting contest, and before the members had left the house the unsuccessful aspirant came in and soundly thrashed, one after the other, four of the representatives who had voted against him.† Such energy was sure

* Ford's "History of Illinois," p. 31.

† Ford, p. 81.

to meet its reward, and he was soon after made clerk of the Circuit Court. It is related by old citizens of Menard County, as a circumstance greatly to the credit of Abraham Lincoln, that when he was a candidate for the Legislature a man who wanted his vote for another place walked to the polls with him and ostentatiously voted for him, hoping to receive his vote in return. Lincoln voted against him, and the act was much admired by those who saw it.

One noticeable fact is observed in relation to the politicians of the day — their careers were generally brief. Superannuation came early. In the latter part of the last century and the first half of this, men were called old whom we should regard as in the prime of life. When the friends of Washington were first pressing the Presidency upon him in 1788, he urged his "advanced age" as an imperative reason for declining it: he was fifty-six years old. When Ninian Edwards was a candidate for Governor of Illinois in 1826, he was only fifty-one, and yet he considered it necessary in his published addresses to refer to the charge that he was too old for the place, and, while admitting the fact that he was no longer young, to urge in extenuation that there are some old things,— like old whisky, old bacon, and old friends,— which are not without their merits. Even so late as 1848, we find a remarkable letter from Mr. Lincoln, who was then in Congress, bearing upon the same point. His partner, William H. Herndon, had written him a letter, complaining that the old men in Sangamon County were unwilling to let the young ones have any opportunity to distinguish themselves. To this Lincoln answers in his usual tone of grave kindness:

"The subject of your letter is exceedingly painful to me; and I cannot but think there is some mistake in your impression of the motives of the old men. I suppose I am now one of the old men, and I declare on my veracity, which I think is good with you, that nothing could afford me more satisfaction than to learn that you and others of my young friends at home were doing battle in the contest and endearing themselves to the people and taking a stand far above any I have ever been able to reach in their admiration. I cannot conceive that other old men feel differently. Of course I cannot demonstrate what I say; but I was young once, and I am sure I was never ungenerously thrust back."

The man who thus counsels petulant youth with the experienced calmness of age was thirty-nine years old. A state of society where one could at that age call himself or be called by others an old man, is proved by that fact alone to be one of wearing hardships and early decay of the vital powers. The survivors of the pioneers stoutly insist upon the contrary view. "It was a glorious life," says one old patriarch; "men would fight for the love of it, and then shake hands and be friends; there is nothing like it now." Another says, "I never enjoy my breakfast now as I used to, when I got up and ran down a deer before I could have anything to eat." But they see the past through a rosy mist of memory, transfigured by the eternal magic of youth. The sober fact is that the life was a hard one, with few rational pleasures, few wholesome appliances. The strong ones lived, and some even attained great length of years; but to many age came early and was full of infirmity and pain. If we could go back to what our forefathers endured in clearing the Western wilderness, we could then better appreciate our obligations to them. It is detracting from the honor which is their due to say that their lives had much of happiness or comfort, or were in any respect preferable to our own.

IV.

NEW SALEM.

DURING the latter part of "the winter of the deep snow," Abraham became acquainted with one Denton Offutt, an adventurous and discursive sort of merchant, with more irons in the fire than he could well manage. He wanted to take a flat-boat and cargo to New Orleans, and having heard that Hanks and Lincoln had some experience of the river, he insisted on their joining him. John Johnston was afterwards added to the party, probably at the request of his foster-brother, to share in the golden profits of the enterprise; for fifty cents a day, and a contingent dividend of twenty dollars apiece, seemed like a promise of immediate opulence to the boys. In the spring, when the rivers broke up and the melting snows began to pour in torrents down every ravine and gully, the three young men paddled down the Sangamon in a canoe to the point where Jamestown now stands; whence they walked five miles to Springfield, where Offutt had given them rendezvous. They met him at Elliott's tavern and far from happy. Amid the multiplicity of his engagements he had failed to procure a flat-boat, and the first work his new hands must do was to build one. They cut the timber, with frontier innocence, from "Congress land,"* and soon had a serviceable craft afloat, with which they descended the current of the Sangamon to New Salem, a little village which seems to have been born for the occasion, as it came into existence just before the arrival of Lincoln, flourished for seven years while he remained one of its citizens, and died soon after

* Lamon, p. 79.



MODEL OF LINCOLN'S INVENTION IN THE PATENT OFFICE, WASHINGTON.



REDUCED FAC-SIMILES OF DRAWINGS IN PATENT OFFICE.

he went away. His introduction to his fellow-citizens was effected in a peculiar and somewhat striking manner. Offutt's boat had come to serious embarrassment on Rutledge's mill-dam, and the unwonted incident brought the entire population to the water's edge. They spent a good part of the day watching the hapless flat-boat, resting midships on the dam, the forward end in the air and the stern taking in the turbid Sangamon water. Nobody knew what to do with the disaster except "the bow-oar," who is described as a gigantic youth "with his trousers rolled up some five feet," who was wading about the boat and rigging up some undescribed contrivance by which the cargo was unloaded, the boat tilted and the water let out by boring a hole through the bottom, and everything brought safely to moorings below the dam. This exploit gained for young Lincoln the enthusiastic admiration of his employer, and turned his own mind in the direction of an invention which he afterwards patented "for lifting vessels over shoals." The model on which he obtained this patent,— a little boat whittled by his own hand in 1849, after he had become prominent as a lawyer and politician,—is still shown to visitors at the Department of the Interior. We have never learned that it has served any other purpose.

They made a quick trip down the Sangamon, the Illinois, and the Mississippi rivers. Although it was but a repetition in great part of the trip young Lincoln had made with Gentry, it evidently created a far deeper impression on his mind than the former one. The simple and honest words of John Hanks leave no doubt of this. At New Orleans, he said, they saw for the first time "negroes chained, maltreated, whipped, and scourged. Lincoln saw it; his heart bled; said nothing much, was silent, looked bad. I can say, knowing it, that it was on this trip that he formed his opinions of slavery. It run its iron in him

then and there, May, 1831. I have heard him say so often."* The sight of men in chains was intolerable to him. Ten years after this he made another journey by water with his friend Joshua Speed, of Kentucky. Writing to Speed about it after the lapse of fourteen years, he says:

"In 1841 you and I had together a tedious low-water trip on a steamboat from Louisville to St. Louis. You may remember, as I well do, that from Louisville to the mouth of the Ohio there were on board ten or a dozen slaves shackled together with irons. That sight was a continual torment to me, and I see something like it every time I touch the Ohio or any other slave border. It is not fair for you to assume that I have no interest in a thing which has, and which continually exercises, the power of making me miserable."

There have been several ingenious attempts to show the origin and occasion of Mr. Lincoln's anti-slavery convictions. They seem to us an idle waste of labor. These sentiments came with the first awakening of his mind and conscience, and were roused into active life and energy by the sight of fellow-creatures in chains on the wharf at New Orleans.

The party went up the river in the early summer, and separated in St. Louis. Abraham walked in company with John Johnston from St. Louis to Coles County, and spent a few weeks there with his father, who had made another migration the year before. His final move was to Goose Nest Prairie, where he died in 1851,† at the age of seventy-three years, after a life which, though not successful in any material or worldly point of view, was probably far happier than that of his illustrious son, being unvexed by enterprise or ambition. Abraham never lost sight of his parents. He continued to aid and befriend them in every way, even when he could ill afford it, and when his benefactions were imprudently used. He not only comforted their declining years with every aid his affection could suggest, but he did everything in his power to assist his stepbrother Johnston, a hopeless task enough. The following rigidly truthful and yet kindly letters will show how mentor-like and masterful, as well as generous, were the relations that Mr. Lincoln held to these friends and companions of his childhood:

"DEAR JOHNSTON: Your request for eighty dollars I do not think it best to comply with now. At the various times when I have helped you a little, you have said to me, 'We can get along very well now,' but in a very short time I find you in the same difficulty again. Now this can only happen by some defect in your conduct. What that defect is I think I know. You are not *lazy* and still you are an *idler*. I doubt whether, since I saw you, you have done a good whole day's work in any one day. You do not very much dislike to work, and still you do not work much, merely because it does not seem to you that you could get much for it. This habit of uselessly wasting time is the whole difficulty, and it is vastly important to you, and still more so to your children, that you should break the habit. It is more important to them because they have longer to live, and can keep out of an idle habit before they are in it easier than they can get out after they are in.

"You are now in need of some money; and what I propose is that you shall go to work 'tooth and nail' for somebody who will give you money for it. Let father and your boys take charge of things at home, prepare for a crop, and make the crop; and you go to work for the best money wages, or in discharge of any debt you owe, that you can get; and to secure a fair reward for your labor, I now promise you that for every dollar you will, between this and the first of next May, get for your own labor, either in money or as discharging your own indebtedness, I will then give you one other dollar. By this, if you hire yourself at ten dollars a month, from me you will get ten more, making twenty dollars a month for your work. In this I do not mean that you shall go off to St. Louis, or the lead mines, or the gold mines in California; but I mean for you to go at it for the best wages you can get close to home, in Coles County. Now, if you will do this you will soon be out of debt, and, what is better, you will have a habit that will keep you from getting in debt again. But if I should now clear you out of debt, next year you would be just as deep in as ever. You say you would almost give your place in heaven for seventy or eighty dollars. Then you would value your place in heaven very cheap, for I am sure you can, with the offer I make, get the seventy or eighty dollars for four or five months' work. You say if I will furnish you the money you will deed me the land, and if you don't pay the money back you will deliver possession. Nonsense. If you can't live now with the land, how will you then live without it? You have always been kind to me, and I do not mean to be unkind to you. On the contrary, if you will but follow my advice, you will find it worth more than eighty times eighty dollars to you."

Here is a later epistle, still more graphic and terse in statement, which has the unusual merit of painting both confessor and penitent to the life:

"SHELBYVILLE, Nov. 4, 1851.

"DEAR BROTHER: When I came into Charleston, day before yesterday, I learned that you are anxious to sell the land where you live and move to Missouri. I have been thinking of this ever since, and cannot but think such a notion is utterly foolish. What can you do in Missouri better than here? Is the land any richer? Can you there, any more than here, raise corn and wheat and oats without work? Will anybody there, any more than here, do your work for you? If you intend to go to work, there is no better place than right where you are; if you do not intend to go to work, you cannot get along anywhere. Squirming and crawling about from place to place can do no good. You have raised no crop this year, and what you really want is to sell the land, get the money, and spend it. Part with the land you have, and, my life upon it, you will never after own a spot big enough to bury you in. Half you will get for the land you will spend in moving to Missouri, and the other half you will eat and drink and wear out, and no foot of land will be bought. Now, I feel it is my duty to have no hand in such a piece

* Lamon, p. 83.

† His grave, a mile and a half west of the town of Farmington, Illinois, is surmounted by an appropriate monument erected by his grandson, the Hon. Robert T. Lincoln.

of foolery. I feel that it is so even on your own account, and particularly on mother's account. The eastern forty acres I intend to keep for mother while she lives; if you will not cultivate it, it will rent for enough to support her; at least, it will rent for something. Her dower in the other two forties she can let you have, and no thanks to me. Now, do not misunderstand this letter. I do not write it in any unkindness. I write it in order, if possible, to get you to face the truth, which truth is, you are destitute because you have idled away all your time. Your thousand pretenses deceive nobody but yourself. Go to work is the only cure for your case."

A volume of disquisition could not put more clearly before the reader the difference between Abraham Lincoln and the common run of Southern and Western rural laborers. He had the same disadvantages that they had. He grew up in the midst of poverty and ignorance; he was poisoned with the enervating malaria of the Western woods, as all his fellows were, and the consequences of it were seen in his character and conduct to the close of his life. But he had, what very few of them possessed any glimmering notion of, a fixed and inflexible will to succeed. He did not love work, probably, any better than John Johnston; but he had an innate self-respect, and a consciousness that his self was worthy of respect, that kept him from idleness as it kept him from all other vices, and made him a better man every year that he lived.

(To be continued.)

ON THE LIFE-MASK OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

THIS bronze doth keep the very form and mold
Of our great martyr's face. Yes, this is he:
That brow all wisdom, all benignity;
That human, humorous mouth; those cheeks that hold
Like some harsh landscape all the summer's gold;
That spirit fit for sorrow, as the sea
For storms to beat on; the lone agony
Those silent, patient lips too well foretold.
Yes, this is he who ruled a world of men
As might some prophet of the elder day,—
Brooding above the tempest and the fray
With deep-eyed thought and more than mortal ken.
A power was his beyond the touch of art
Or armèd strength: It was his mighty heart.

R. W. Gilder.

THE QUESTIONER OF THE SPHINX.

BEHOLD me! with swift foot across the land,
Where desert winds are sleeping, I am come
To wrest a secret from thee; O thou, dumb,
And careless of my puny lips' command.
Cold orbs! *mine* eyes a weary world have scanned.
Slow ear! in *mine* rings ever a vexèd hum
Of sobs and strife. Of joy, mine earthly sum
Is buried as thy form in burning sand.
The wisdom of the nations thou hast heard;
The circling courses of the stars hast known.
Awake! Thrill! By my feverish presence stirred,
Open thy lips to still my human moan,
Breathe forth one glorious and mysterious word,
Though I should stand, in turn, transfixed,— a stone!

M. Virginia Donaghe.

THE MINISTER'S CHARGE;

OR, THE APPRENTICESHIP OF LEMUEL BARKER.*

BY W. D. HOWELLS,

Author of "Venetian Life," "A Modern Instance," "The Rise of Silas Lapham," etc.

XXVIII.

LEMUEL went through the next day in that license of revolt which every human soul has experienced in some measure at some time. We look back at it afterwards, and see it a hideous bondage. But for the moment Lemuel rejoiced in it; and he abandoned himself boldly to thoughts that had hitherto been a furtive and trembling rapture.

In the afternoon, when he was most at leisure, he walked down to the Public Garden, and found a seat on a bench near the fountain where the Venus had shocked his inexperience the first time he saw her; he remembered that simple boy with a smile of pity, and then went back into his cloud of revery. There, safely hid from trouble and wrong, he told his ideal how dear she was to him, and how she had shaped and governed his life, and made it better and nobler from the first moment they had met. The fumes of the romances which he had read mixed with the love-born delirium in his brain: he was no longer low, but a hero of lofty line, kept from his rightful place by machinations that had failed at last, and now he was leading her, his bride, into the ancient halls which were to be their home, and the source of beneficence and hope to all the poor and humbly-born around them. His eyes were so full of this fantastic vision, the soul of his youth dwelt so deeply within this dream-built tabernacle, that it was with a shock of anguish he saw coming up the walk towards him the young girl herself. His airy structure fell in ruins around him; he was again common and immeasurably beneath her; she was again in her own world, where, if she thought of him at all, it must be as a squalid vagabond and the accomplice of a thief. If he could have escaped, he would, but he could not move; he sat still and waited, with fallen eyes, for her to pass him.

At sight of him she hesitated and wavered; then she came towards him, and at a second impulse held out her hand, smiling with a radiant pleasure.

"I didn't know it was you, at first," she said. "It seems so strange to see any one that I know!"

"I didn't expect to see you, either," he stammered out, getting somehow upon his feet and taking her hand, while his face burned, and he could not keep his eyes on hers; "I — didn't know you were here."

"I've only been here a few days. I'm drawing at the Museum. I've just got back. Have you been here all summer?"

"Yes — all summer. I hope you've been well — I suppose you've been away ——"

"Yes, I've just got back," she repeated.

"Oh, yes! I meant that!"

She smiled at his confusion, as kindly as the ideal of his day-dream. "I've been spending the summer with Madeline, and I've spent most of it out-of-doors, sketching. Have you been well?"

"Yes — not very; oh, yes, I'm well ——" She had begun to move forward with the last question, and he found himself walking with her. "Did she — has Miss Swan come back with you?" he asked, looking her in the eyes with more question than he had put into his words.

"No, I don't think she'll come back this winter," said the girl. "You know," she went on, coloring a little, "that she's married now?"

"No," said Lemuel.

"Yes. To Mr. Berry. And I have a letter from him for you."

"Was he there with you, this summer?" asked Lemuel, ignoring alike Berry's marriage and the letter from him.

"Oh, yes; of course! And I liked him better than I used to. He is very good, and if Madeline didn't have to go so far West to live! He will know how to appreciate her, and there are not many who can do that! Her father thinks he has a great deal of ability. Yes, if Madeline *had* to get married!"

She talked as if convincing and consoling herself, and there was an accent of loneliness in it all that pierced Lemuel's preoccupation; he had hardly noted how almost pathetically glad she was to see him. "You'll miss her here," he ventured.

"Oh, I don't dare to think of it!" cried the girl. "I don't know what I shall do! When I first saw you, just now, it brought up Madeline

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fold, the ratio to the square mile being a little less than twenty in this country and one hundred and sixty in Europe.

This area is divided into fifteen empires, kingdoms, or states, omitting the petty states of eastern Europe, which are separated from each other by differences of race, creed, and language. Their commerce is obstructed among themselves by as many different systems of duties upon imports as there are states. The natural outlet for the crowded population of central Europe might be in southern Russia and in the fertile sections of Asiatic Turkey, were the relations of these several states to the eastern country the same as those of the Eastern States of this country to those of the West. There is land enough, and to spare; but the armies of Europe are sustained in order to prevent this very expansion of the people; and the misgovernment of the Turk, which renders Asia Minor almost a howling wilderness, is protected by the mutual jealousies of these very states, which are thus being destroyed by their own standing armies.

As war becomes more scientific, it becomes more costly. Victory rests not only on powder and iron, but yet more on bread and beef. It may have been the German sausage by which France was beaten, quite as much as the German rifle.

The food question in Europe may be one of possible revolution and repudiation of national debts, and of the disruption of nations as they now exist; and to this branch of the victualing department attention may well be called, because its conditions are so greatly in contrast to those of the United States; but this phase of the question will be treated separately in a subsequent article. May we not find in these costly armies, excessive debts, and excessive taxes not only the cause of pauper wages, but also the cause of the ineffectual and costly quality of so-called "pauper labor"? May there not also be found in these figures the incentives to socialism, to communism, and to anarchy? What hope for men and women, the whole of whose product would barely suffice for subsistence, when ten, twenty, and perhaps even thirty per cent. is diverted from their own use, and even food is denied them sufficient to maintain health and strength, in order that these great armies may be sustained?

The victualing department is therefore presented in these three phases:

First. In our own country the only question is how to save the waste of our abundance, and how to teach not only the working people, but even the prosperous, the right methods of obtaining a good and wholesome subsistence at less cost in money than they now spend for a poor and dyspeptic one.

Second. In Great Britain and Ireland the victualing department underlies a system of land tenure which is now on its trial, and which has led to such artificial conditions that great areas of good land have been thrown entirely out of cultivation, while half the people are being fed from fields from five thousand to fifteen thousand miles distant.

Third. Upon the continent of Europe the victualing department stands face to face with a forced method of distributing and wasting a food-product which, as a whole, is insufficient to maintain the whole population in vigor and health even if it were evenly distributed, as food must be equally distributed by weight if not by quality, in order that men and women may be equally well nourished.

When a famished democracy becomes conscious of its power, what will be the end of privileges which are not founded on rights, and of national debts which have been incurred by dynasties without the consent of the people who are now oppressed by them? How will standing armies be disbanded, which now seem to be as incapable of being sustained as they are impossible of being disarmed?

Such are some of the appalling questions to which we are led when we attempt to analyze the way in which men, women, and children now obtain the modicum of meat and bread which they must have every day in order to exist, and that daily ration of dairy products, of fruit, of sugar, and of spice which is needed for common comfort.

There is but one element of life which all have in common, and that is Time. Who can teach us how to use our time so as to obtain the substantially even weight of food which is necessary to the adequate nutrition and to the common welfare of rich and poor alike?

The writer can only put these questions, and report the facts and figures which he has given. Some of them may be already familiar to the readers of THE CENTURY; but their true significance he himself hardly comprehended until they had been grouped together under the title of "The Food Question."

Edward Atkinson.



The Hand of Lincoln.

Look on this cast and know the hand
That bore a nation in its hold;
From this mute witness understand
What Lincoln was — how large of mould

The man who led the woodman's team,
And deepest sunk the ploughman's share,
And pushed the laden raft astream,
Of fate before him unaware.

× × × × ×

Lo, as I gaze, the statured man,
Built up from yon large hand, appears:
A type that Nature wills to plan
But once in all a people's years.

What better than this voiceless cast
To tell of such a one as he,
Since through its living semblance passed
The thought that bade a race be free!

Edmund C. Stedman.

DRAWN FROM THE CAST
BY J. ALDEN WEIR 1886
CAST FROM THE RIGHT HAND OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN MADE BY
LEONARD W VOLK 1860
R.C. COLLINS, Sc.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN AS SOLDIER, SURVEYOR, AND POLITICIAN.

NEW SALEM CONTINUED.—THE VOYAGE OF THE *TALISMAN*.

WE have anticipated a score of years in speaking of Mr. Lincoln's relations to his family. It was in August of the year 1831 that he finally left his father's roof, and swung out for himself into the current of the world to make his fortune in his own way. He went down to New Salem again to assist Offutt in the business that lively speculator thought of establishing there. He was more punctual than either his employer or the merchandise, and met with the usual reward of punctuality in being forced to waste his time in waiting for the tardy ones. He seemed to the New Salem people to be "loafing"; several of them have given that description of him. He did one day's work, acting as clerk of a local election, a lettered loafer being pretty sure of employment on such an occasion.† He

† Mrs. Lizzie H. Bell writes of this incident: "My father, Menton Graham, was on that day, as usual, appointed to be a clerk, and Mr. McNamee, who was to be the other, was sick and failed to come. They were looking around for a man to fill his place when my father noticed Mr. Lincoln and asked if he could write. He answered that 'he could make a few rabbit tracks.'"



RUTLEDGE'S DAM AND MILL, NEW SALEM, ILLINOIS.

* Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

also piloted a boat down the Sangamon for one Dr. Nelson, who had had enough of New Salem and wanted to go to Texas. This was probably a task not requiring much pilot-craft, as the river was much swollen, and navigators had in most places two or three miles of channel to count upon. But Offutt and his goods He said that Abe knew more than any man in the United States; and he was certainly not warranted in making such an assertion, as his own knowledge of the actual state of science in America could not have been exhaustive. He also said that Abe could beat any man in the county running, jumping, or

CABIN ON GOOSE-NEST PRAIRIE, NEAR FARMINGTON, ILLINOIS, WHERE THOMAS LINCOLN LIVED AND DIED.

arrived at last, and Lincoln and he got them immediately into position, and opened their doors to what commerce could be found in New Salem. There was clearly not enough to satisfy the volatile mind of Mr. Offutt, for he soon bought Cameron's mill at the historic dam, and made Abraham superintendent also of that branch of the business.

It is to be surmised that Offutt never inspired his neighbors and customers with any deep regard for his solidity of character. One of them says of him, with injurious pleonasm, that he "talked too much with his mouth." A natural consequence of his excessive fluency was soon to be made disagreeably evident to his clerk. He admired Abraham beyond measure, and praised him beyond prudence. "wrastling." This proposition, being less abstract in its nature, was more readily grasped by the local mind, and was not likely to pass unchallenged.

Public opinion at New Salem was formed by a crowd of ruffianly young fellows who were called the "Clary's Grove Boys." Once or twice a week they descended upon the village and passed the day in drinking, fighting, and brutal horse-play. If a stranger appeared in the place, he was likely to suffer a rude initiation into the social life of New Salem at the hands of these jovial savages. Sometimes he was nailed up in a hogshead and rolled down hill; sometimes he was insulted into a fight and then mauled black and blue; for despite their pretensions to chivalry they had no



MENTON GRAHAM. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE IN POSSESSION OF HIS DAUGHTER, MRS. LIZZIE H. BELL.)

scruples about fair play or any such superstitions of civilization. At first they did not seem inclined to molest young Lincoln. His appearance did not invite insolence; his reputation for strength and activity was a greater protection to him than his inoffensive good-nature. But the loud admiration of Offutt gave them umbrage. It led to dispute, contradictions, and finally to a formal banter to a wrestling-match. Lincoln was greatly averse to all this "wooling and pulling," as he called it. But Offutt's indiscretion had made it necessary for him to show his mettle. Jack Armstrong, the leading bully of the gang, was selected to throw him, and expected an easy victory. But he soon found himself in different hands from any he had heretofore engaged with. Seeing he could not manage the tall stranger, his friends swarmed in, and by kicking and tripping nearly succeeded in getting Lincoln down. At this, as has been said of another hero, "the spirit of Odin entered into him," and putting forth his whole strength, he held the pride of Clary's Grove in his arms like a child, and almost choked the exuberant life out of him. For a moment a general fight seemed inevitable; but Lincoln, standing undismayed with his back to the wall, looked so formidable in his defiance that an honest admiration took the place of momentary fury, and his initiation was over. As to Armstrong, he was Lincoln's friend and sworn brother as soon as he recovered the use of his larynx, and the bond thus strangely created lasted through life. Lincoln had no further occasion to fight his own battle while Armstrong was there to act as his champion. The two friends, although so widely different, were helpful to each other afterwards in many ways, and Lincoln made ample amends for the liberty his hands had taken with Jack's throat, by saving, in a memorable trial, his son's neck from the halter.

This incident, trivial and vulgar as it may seem, was of great importance in Lincoln's life. His behavior in this ignoble scuffle did the work of years for him, in giving him the position he required in the community where his lot was cast. He became from that moment, in a certain sense, a personage, with a name and standing of his own. The verdict of Clary's Grove was unanimous that he was "the cleverest fellow that had ever broke into the settlement." He did not have to be constantly scuffling to guard his self-respect, and at the same time he gained the good-will of the better sort by his evident peaceableness and integrity.

He made on the whole a satisfactory clerk for Mr. Offutt, though his downright honesty must have seemed occasionally as eccentric in that position as afterwards it did to his



MAP OF NEW SALEM AND VICINITY.

associates at the bar. Dr. Holland has preserved one or two incidents of this kind, which have their value. Once, after he had sold a woman a little bill of goods and received the money, he found on looking over the account again that she had given him six and a quarter cents too much. The money burned in his hands until he locked the shop and started on a walk of several miles in the night to make restitution before he slept. On another occasion, after weighing and delivering a pound of tea, he found a small weight on the scales. He immediately weighed out the quantity of tea of which he had innocently defrauded his customer and went in search of her, his sensitive conscience not permitting any delay. To show that the young merchant was not too good for this world, the same writer gives an incident of his shop-keeping experience of a different character. A rural bully having made himself especially offensive one day, when women were present, by loud profanity, Lincoln requested him to be silent. This was of course a cause of war, and the young clerk was forced to follow the incensed ruffian into the street, where the combat was of short duration. Lincoln threw him at once to the ground, and gathering a handful of the dog-fennel with which the roadside was plentifully bordered, he rubbed the ruffian's face and eyes with it until he howled for mercy. He did not howl in vain, for the placable giant, when his discipline was finished, brought water to bathe the culprit's smarting face, and doubtless improved the occasion with quaint admonition.

A few passages at arms of this sort gave Abraham a redoubtable reputation in the neighborhood. But the principal use he made of his strength and his prestige was in the capacity of peacemaker, an office which soon devolved upon him by general consent. Whenever old feuds blossomed into fights by Offutt's door, or the chivalry of Clary's Grove attempted in its energetic way to take the conceit out of some stranger, or a canine duel spread contagion of battle among the masters of the beasts, Lincoln usually appeared upon the scene, and with a judicious mixture of force and reason and invincible good-nature restored peace.

While working with Offutt his mind was turned in the direction of English grammar. From what he had heard of it he thought it a matter within his grasp, if he could once fall in with the requisite machinery. Consulting with Menton * Graham, the schoolmaster, in regard to it, and learning the whereabouts of a vagrant "Kirkham's Grammar," he set off at once and soon returned from a walk of a dozen miles with the coveted prize. He devoted himself to the new study with that peculiar intensity of application which always remained his most valuable faculty, and soon knew all that can be known about it from rules. He seemed surprised, as others have been, at the meager dimensions of the science he had acquired and the ease with which it yielded all there was of it to the student. But it seemed no slight achievement to the New Salemites,



LEAF REDUCED IN SIZE FROM ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S EXERCISE BOOK, WRITTEN ABOUT HIS SEVENTEENTH YEAR. PRESENTED BY WILLIAM H. HERNDON, ESQ., TO KEYES LINCOLN MEMORIAL COLLECTION.

and contributed not a little to the impression prevalent of his learning.

His name is prominently connected with an event which just at this time caused an excitement and interest in Salem and the neighboring towns entirely out of proportion to its importance. It was one of the articles of faith of most of the settlers on the banks of the Sangamon River that it was a navigable stream, and the local politicians found that they could in no way more easily hit the fancy of their hearers than by discussing this assumed fact, and the logical corollary derived from it, that it was the duty of the State or the nation to

* This name has been always written in Illinois "Minter," but a letter from Mr. Graham's daughter, Mrs. Bell, says that her father's name is as given in the text.

GRAVE OF THOMAS LINCOLN, NEAR FARMINGTON, ILLINOIS.

clear out the snags and give free course to the commerce which was waiting for an opportunity to pour along this natural highway. At last one Captain Vincent Bogue, of Springfield, determined to show that the thing could be done by doing it. The first promise of the great enterprise appears in the "Sangamon Journal" of January 26, 1832, in a letter from the Captain, at Cincinnati, saying he would ascend the Sangamon by steam on the breaking up of the ice. He asked that he might be met at the mouth of the river by ten or twelve men, having axes with long handles, to cut away the overhanging branches of the trees on the banks. From this moment there was great excitement,—public meetings, appointment of committees, appeals for subscriptions, and a scattering fire of advertisements of goods and freight to be bargained for,—which sustained the prevailing interest. It was a day of hope and promise when the advertisement reached Springfield from Cincinnati that "the splendid upper-cabin steamer *Talisman*" would positively start for the Sangamon on a given day. As the paper containing this joyous intelligence also complained that no mail had reached Springfield from the east for three weeks, it is easy to understand the desire for more rapid and regular communications. From week to week the progress of the *Talisman*, impeded by bad weather and floating ice, was faithfully recorded, until at last the party with long-handled axes went down to Beardstown to welcome her. It is needless to state that Lincoln was one of the party. His standing as a scientific citizen of New Salem would have been enough to insure his selection even if he had not been known as a bold navigator. He piloted the *Talisman* safely through the windings of the Sangamon, and Springfield gave itself up to extravagant gayety on the event that proved she "could no longer be considered an inland town." Captain Bogue announced "fresh and seasonable goods just received per steamboat *Talisman*," and the local poets illuminated the columns of the "Journal" with odes on her advent. The joy was short-lived. The *Talisman* met the natural fate of steamboats a few months later, being burned at the St. Louis wharf. Neither State nor nation has ever removed the snags from the Sangamon, and no subsequent navigator of its waters has been found to eclipse the fame of those earliest ones.

LINCOLN IN THE BLACK HAWK WAR.

A NEW period in the life of Lincoln begins with the summer of 1832. He then obtained his first public recognition, and entered upon the course of life which was to lead him to a position of prominence and great usefulness.

The business of Offutt had gone to pieces, and his clerk was out of employment, when Governor Reynolds issued his call for volunteers to move the tribe of Black Hawk across the Mississippi. For several years the raids of the old Sac chieftain upon that portion of his patrimony which he had ceded to the United States had kept the settlers in the neighborhood of Rock Island in terror, and menaced the peace of the frontier. In the spring of 1831 he came over to the east side of the river with a considerable band of warriors, having been encouraged by secret promises of coöperation from several other tribes. These failed him, however, when the time of trial arrived, and an improvised force of State volunteers, assisted by General Gaines and his detachment, had little difficulty in compelling the Indians to recross the Mississippi, and to enter into a solemn treaty on the 30th of June by which the former treaties were ratified and Black Hawk and his leading warriors bound themselves never again to set foot on the east side of the river, without express permission from the President or the Governor of Illinois.

But Black Hawk was too old a savage to learn respect for treaties or resignation under fancied wrongs. He was already approaching the allotted term of life. He had been king of his nation for more than forty years. He had scalped his first enemy when scarcely more than a child, having painted on his blanket the blood-red hand which marked his



EBENEZER PECK. (SEE PAGE 269.) FROM A PAINTING BY HEALY, IN 1864, IN POSSESSION OF CHARLES F. PECK, ESQ.

nobility at fifteen years of age. Peace under any circumstances would doubtless have been irksome to him, but a peace which forbade him free access to his own hunting-grounds and to the graves of his fathers was more than he could now school himself to endure. He had come to believe that he had been foully wronged by the treaty which was his own act; he had even convinced himself that "land cannot be sold,"* a proposition in political economy which our modern socialists would be puzzled to accept or confute. Besides this, the tenderest feelings of his heart were outraged by this exclusion from his former domain. He had never passed a year since the death of his daughter without making a pilgrimage to her grave at Oquawka and spending hours in mystic ceremonies and contemplation.† He was himself prophet as well as king, and had doubtless his share of mania, which is the strength of prophets. The promptings of his own broken heart readily seemed to him the whisperings of attendant spirits; and day by day these unseen incitements increased around him, until they could not be resisted even if death stood in the way.

He made his combinations during the winter, and had it not been for the loyal attitude of Keokuk, he could have brought the entire nation of the Sacs and Foxes to the war-path. As it was, the flower of the young men came with him when, with the opening spring, he

* Governor Reynolds's "Life and Times," p. 325.

† Ford's "History of Illinois," p. 110.

Engraved by T. Johnson, after a portrait by Charles B. King. From McKenney and Hall's "Indian Tribes of North America."

BLACK HAWK.

crossed the river once more. He came this time, he said, "to plant corn," but as a preliminary to this peaceful occupation of the land he marched up the Rock River, expecting to be joined by the Winnebagoes and Pottawatomies. But the time was past for honorable alliances among the Indians. His oath-bound confederates gave him little assistance, and soon cast in their lot with the stronger party.

This movement excited general alarm in the State. General Atkinson, commanding the United States troops, sent a formal summons to Black Hawk to return; but the old chief was already well on his way to the lodge of his friend, the prophet Wabokishick, at Proph-

etstown, and treated the summons with contemptuous defiance. The Governor immediately called for volunteers, and was himself astonished at the alacrity with which the call was answered. Among those who enlisted at the first tap of the drum was Abraham Lincoln, and equally to his surprise and delight he was elected captain of his company. The volunteer organizations of those days were conducted on purely democratic principles. The company assembled on the green, an election was suggested, and three-fourths of the men walked over to where Lincoln was standing; most of the small remainder joined themselves to one Kirkpatrick, a man of some substance and standing from Spring Creek. We have the word of Mr. Lincoln for it, that no subsequent success ever gave him such unmixed pleasure as this earliest distinction. It was a sincere, unsought tribute of his equals to those physical and moral qualities which made him the best man of his hundred, and as such was accepted and prized.

At the Beardstown rendezvous, Captain Lincoln's company was attached to Colonel Samuel Thompson's regiment, the Fourth Illinois, which was organized at Richland, Sangamon County, on the 21st of April, and moved on the 27th, with the rest of the command under General Whiteside, for Yellow Banks, where the boats with provisions had been ordered to meet them. It was arduous marching. There were no roads and no bridges, and the day's work included a great deal of labor. The third day out they came to the Henderson River, a stream some fifty yards wide, swift and swollen with the spring thaws, with high and steep banks. To most armies this would have seemed a serious obstacle, but these backwoodsmen swarmed to the work like beavers, and in less than three hours* the river was crossed with the loss of only one or two horses and wagons. When they came to Yellow Banks, on the Mississippi, the provision-boats had not arrived, and for three days they waited there literally without food; very uncomfortable days for Governor Reynolds, who accompanied the expedition, and was forced to hear the outspoken comments of two thousand hungry men on his supposed inefficiency. But on the 6th of May the *William Wallace* arrived, and "this sight," says the Governor with characteristic sincerity, "was, I presume, the most interesting I ever beheld." From there they marched to the mouth of Rock River, and thence General Whiteside proceeded with his volunteers up the river some ninety miles to Dixon, where they halted to await the arrival of General Atkinson with the regular troops and provisions. There they found two battalions of fresh horsemen, under Majors Stillman and Bailey, who had as yet seen no service and were eager for the fray. Whiteside's men were tired with their forced march, and besides, in their ardor to get forward, they had thrown away a good part of their provisions and left their baggage behind. It pleased the Governor, therefore, to listen to the prayers of Stillman's braves, and he gave them orders to "proceed to the head of Old Man's Creek, where it was supposed there were some hostile Indians, and coerce them into submission." "I thought," says the Governor in his memoirs, "they might discover the enemy."

The supposition was certainly well founded. They rode merrily away, came to Old Man's Creek, thereafter to be called Stillman's Run, and encamped for the night. By the failing light a small party of Indians was discovered on the summit of a hill a mile away, and a few courageous gentlemen hurriedly saddled their horses, and, without orders, rode after them. The Indians retreated, but were soon overtaken, and two or three of them killed. The volunteers were now strung along a half mile of hill and valley, with no more order or care than if they had been chasing rabbits. Black Hawk, who had been at supper when the running fight began, hastily gathered a handful of warriors and attacked the scattered whites. The onset of the savages acted like an icy bath on the red-hot valor of the volunteers; they turned and ran for their lives, stampeding the camp as they fled. There was very little resistance — so little that Black Hawk, fearing a ruse, tried to recall his warriors from the pursuit, but in the darkness and confusion could not enforce his orders. The Indians killed all they caught up with; but the volunteers had the fleeter horses, and only eleven were overtaken. The rest reached Dixon by twos and threes, rested all night, and took courage. General Whiteside marched out to the scene of the disaster the next morning, but the Indians were gone. They had broken up into small parties, and for several days they reaped the bloody fruit of their victory in the massacre of the peaceful settlements in the adjacent districts.

The time of enlistment of the volunteers had now come to an end, and the men, seeing no prospect of glory or profit, and weary of the work and the hunger which were the only certain incidents of the campaign, refused in great part to continue in service. But it is hardly necessary to say that Captain Lincoln was not one of these homesick soldiers. Not even the trammels of rank, which are usually so strong among the trailers of the saber, could restrain him from what he considered his sim-

* Reynolds's "Life and Times," p. 356.

I CERTIFY, That Lewis M Kamer volunteered and served as a Private in the Company of Mounted Volunteers under my command, in the Regiment commanded by Col. SAMUEL M. THOMPSON, in the Brigade under the command of Generals S. WHITESIDE and H. ATKINSON, called into the service of the United States by the Commander-in-Chief of the Militia of the State, for the protection of the North Western Frontier against an Invasion of the British Band of Sac and other tribes of Indians,—that he was enrolled on the 21st day of April 1832, and was HONORABLY DISCHARGED on the 7th day of June thereafter, having served 48 days

Given under my hand, this 21st day of September 1832.

A Lincoln Capt.

This discharge is the property of George Carpenter of Springfield Ill. being found among the papers of his father Col. Wm Carpenter paymaster of the above regt

A SOLDIER'S DISCHARGE FROM THE BLACK HAWK WAR, SIGNED BY A. LINCOLN, CAPTAIN.
(IN POSSESSION OF O. H. OLDROYD, ESQ., SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS.)

ple duty. As soon as he was mustered out of his captaincy, he reënlisted on the same day, May 27, as a private soldier. Several other officers did the same, among them General Whiteside and Major Stuart. Lincoln became a member of Captain Elijah Iles's company of mounted volunteers, sometimes called the "Independent Spy Battalion," an organization unique of its kind, if we may judge from the account given by one of its troopers. It was not, says Mr. George W. Harrison, "under the control of any regiment or brigade, but received orders directly from the Commander-in-Chief, and always, when with the army, camped within the lines, and had many other privileges, such as having no camp duties to perform and drawing rations as much and as often as we pleased," which would seem to liken this battalion as nearly as possible to the fabled "regiment of brigadiers." With this *élite* corps Lincoln served through his second enlistment, though it was not his fortune to take part in either of the two engagements in which General Henry broke and destroyed forever the power of Black Hawk and the British band of Sacs and Foxes at the Wisconsin Bluffs and the Bad Axe.

After Lincoln was relieved of the weight of dignity involved in his captaincy, the war became a sort of holiday, and the tall private from New Salem enjoyed it as much as any one. He entered with great zest into the athletic sports with which soldiers love to beguile the tedium of camp. He was admitted to be the strongest man in the army, and, with one exception, the best wrestler. Indeed his friends never admitted the exception, and severely blamed Lincoln for confessing himself defeated on the occasion when he met the redoubtable Thompson, and the two fell together on the turf. His popularity increased from the beginning to the end of the campaign, and those of his comrades who still survive always speak with hearty and affectionate praise of his character and conduct in those rough yet pleasantly remembered days.

The Spy Battalion formed no part of General Henry's forces when, by a disobedience of orders as prudent as it was audacious, he started with his slender force on the fresh trail which he was sure would lead him to Black Hawk's camp. He found and struck the enemy at bay on the bluffs of the Wisconsin River on the 21st of July, and inflicted upon them a signal defeat. The broken remnant of Black Hawk's power then fled for the Mississippi River, the whole army following in close pursuit — General Atkinson in front and General Henry bringing up the rear. Fortune favored the latter once more, for while Black Hawk with a handful of men was engaging and drawing away the force under Atkinson, General Henry struck the main trail, and brought on the battle of the Bad Axe, if that could be called a battle which was an easy slaughter of the weary and discouraged sav-

ages, fighting without heart or hope, an army in front and the great river behind. Black Hawk escaped the fate of his followers, to be captured a few days later through the treachery of his allies. He was carried in triumph to Washington and presented to President Jackson, to whom he made this stern and defiant speech, showing how little age or disaster could do to tame his indomitable spirit: "I am a man, and you are another. I did not expect to conquer the white people. I took up the hatchet to avenge injuries which could no longer be borne.* Had I borne them longer my people would have said: 'Black Hawk is a squaw; he is too old to be a chief; he is no Sac.' This caused me to raise the war-whoop. I say no more of it; all is known to you." He returned to Iowa, and lived to a great age. When he died he received the supreme honors paid only to mighty men of war among his people, and was buried on the high bank of the Mississippi, in arms and in war-paint, facing the rising sun.

It was on the 16th of June, a month before the slaughter of the Bad Axe, that the battalion to which Lincoln belonged was finally mustered out, at Whitewater, Wisconsin. His final release from the service was signed by a young lieutenant of artillery, Robert Anderson, who, twenty-nine years later, in one of the most awful crises in our annals, was to sustain to Lincoln relations of prodigious importance, on a scene illuminated by the flash of the opening guns of the civil war.† The men started home the next day in high spirits, like school-boys for their holidays. Lincoln had need, like Horatio, of his good spirits, for they were his only outfit for the long journey to New Salem, he and his mess-mate Harrison‡ having had their horses stolen the day before by some patriot over-anxious to reach home. But, as Harrison says, "I laughed at our fate, and he joked at it, and we all started off merrily. The generous men of our company walked and rode by turns with us, and we fared about equal with the rest. But for this generosity our legs would have had to do the better work; for in that day this dreary route furnished no horses to buy or to steal; and whether on horse or afoot, we always had company, for many of the horses' backs were too sore for riding." It is not hard to imagine with what quips and quirks of native fancy Lincoln and his friends beguiled the way through forest and prairie. With youth, good health, and a clear conscience, and even then the dawn of a young and undefiled ambition in his heart, nothing was wanting to give zest and spice to this long, sociable walk of a hundred leagues. One joke is preserved, and this one is at the expense of Lincoln. One chilly morning he complained of being cold. "No wonder," said some facetious cavalier, "there is so much of you on the ground."§ We hope Lincoln's contributions to the fun were better than this, but of course the prosperity of these jests lay rather in the liberal ears that heard them than in the good-natured tongues that uttered them.

Lincoln and Harrison could not have been

*It is a noteworthy coincidence that President Lincoln's proclamation at the opening of the war calls for troops "to redress wrongs already long enough endured."

† A story to the effect that Lincoln was mustered into service by Jefferson Davis has for a long time been current, but the strictest search in the records fails to confirm it. We are indebted to General R. C. Drum, Adjutant-General of the Army, for an interesting letter giving all the known facts in relation to this story. General Drum says: "The company of the Fourth Regiment Illinois Mounted Volunteers, commanded by Mr. Lincoln, was with others called out by Governor Reynolds, and was organized at Richland, Sangamon County, Illinois, April 21, 1832. The muster-in roll is not on file, but the records show that the company was mustered out at the mouth of Fox River, May 27, 1832, by Nathaniel Buckmaster, Brigade-Major to General Samuel Whiteside, Illinois Volunteers. On the muster-roll of Captain Elijah Iles's company, Illinois Mounted Volunteers, A. Lincoln (Sangamon County) appears as a private from May 27, 1832, to June 16, 1832, when the company was mustered out of service by Lieutenant Robert Anderson, Third United States Artillery and Colonel (Assistant Inspector-General) Illinois volunteers. Brigadier-General Henry Atkinson, in his report of May 30, 1832, stated that the Illinois Volunteers were called out by the Governor of that State, but in haste and for no definite period of service. On their arrival at Ottawa they became clamorous for their discharge, which the Governor granted, retaining — of those who were discharged and volunteered for a further period of twenty days — a sufficient number of men to form six companies, which General Atkinson found at Ottawa on his arrival there from Rock River. General Atkinson further reports that these companies and some three hundred regular troops, remaining in position at Rock River, were all the force left him to keep the enemy in check until the assemblage of the three thousand additional Illinois militia called out by the Governor upon his (General A.'s) requisition, to rendezvous at Ottawa, June 12–15, 1832.

"There can be no doubt that Captain Iles's company, mentioned above, was one of the six which served until June 16, 1832, while the fact is fully established that the company of which Mr. Lincoln was a member was mustered out by Lieutenant Robert Anderson, who, in April, 1861, was in command of Fort Sumter. There is no evidence to show that it was mustered in by Lieutenant Jefferson Davis. Mr. Davis's company (B, First United States Infantry) was stationed at Fort Crawford, Wisconsin, during the months of January and February, 1832, and he is borne on the rolls as 'absent on detached service at the Dubuque mines by order of Colonel Morgan.' From March 26 to August 18, 1832, the muster-rolls of his company report him as absent on furlough."

‡ George W. Harrison, who gives an entertaining account of his personal experiences in Lamon, p. 116.

§ Dr. Holland gives this homely joke, p. 71, but transfers it to a time four years later, when Lincoln had permanently assumed shoes and had a horse of his own.

altogether penniless, for at Peoria they bought a canoe and paddled down to Pekin. Here the ingenious Lincoln employed his hereditary talent for carpentry by making an oar for the frail vessel while Harrison was providing the commissary stores. The latter goes on to say: "The river, being very low, was without current, so that we had to pull hard to make half the speed of legs on land; in fact, we let her float all night, and on the next morning always found the objects still visible that were beside us the previous evening. The water was remarkably clear for this river of plants, and the fish appeared to be sporting with us as we moved over or near them. On the next day after we left Pekin we overhauled a raft of saw-logs, with two men afloat on it to urge it on with poles and to guide it in the channel. We immediately pulled up to them and went on the raft, where we were made welcome by various demonstrations, especially by an invitation to a feast on fish, corn-bread, eggs, butter, and coffee, just prepared for our benefit. Of these good things we ate almost immoderately, for it was the only warm meal we had made for several days. While preparing it, and after dinner, Lincoln entertained them, and they entertained us for a couple of hours very amusingly." Kindly human companionship was a luxury in that green wilderness, and was readily appreciated and paid for.

The returning warriors dropped down the river to the village of Havana — from Pekin to Havana in a canoe! The country is full of these geographical nightmares, the necessary result of freedom of nomenclature bestowed by circumstances upon minds equally destitute of taste or education. There they sold their boat,— no difficult task, for a canoe was a staple article in any river-town,— and again set out "the old way, over the sand-ridges, for Petersburg. As we drew near home, the impulse became stronger and urged us on amazingly. The long strides of Lincoln, often slipping back in the loose sand six inches every step, were just right for me; and he was greatly diverted when he noticed me behind him stepping along in his tracks to keep from slipping." Thus the two comrades came back from their soldierings to their humble homes, from which Lincoln was soon to start on the way marked out for him by Providence, with strides which no comrade, with whatever good-will, might hope to follow.

He never took his campaigning seriously. The politician's habit of glorifying the petty incidents of a candidate's life always seemed absurd to him, and in his speech, made in 1848, ridiculing the effort on the part of General Cass's friends to draw some political advantage from that gentleman's respectable but obscure services on the frontier in the war with Great Britain, he estopped any future eulogist from painting his own military achievements in too lively colors. "Did you know, Mr. Speaker," he said, "I am a military hero? In the days of the Black Hawk war I fought, bled, and came away. I was not at Stillman's defeat, but I was about as near it as General Cass was to Hull's surrender; and, like him, I saw the place very soon afterwards. It is quite certain I did not break my sword, for I had none to break, but I bent my musket pretty badly on one occasion. If General Cass went in advance of me picking whortleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges on the wild onions. If he saw any live fighting Indians, it was more than I did, but I had a good many bloody struggles with the mosquitoes; and although I never fainted from loss of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry. Mr. Speaker, if ever I should conclude to doff whatever our Democratic friends may suppose there is of black-cockade Federalism about me, and thereupon they shall take me up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest that they shall not make fun of me, as they have of General Cass, by attempting to write me into a military hero."

AN UNSUCCESSFUL CANVASS.

THE discharged volunteer arrived in New Salem only ten days before the August election, in which he had a deep personal interest. Before starting for the wars he had announced himself, according to the custom of the time, by a handbill circular, as a candidate for the Legislature from Sangamon County.* He had done this in accordance with his own natural bent for public life and desire for usefulness and distinction, and not without strong encouragement from friends whose opinion he valued. He had even then considerable experience in speaking and thinking on his feet. He had begun his practice in that direction before leaving Indiana, and continued it everywhere he had gone. Mr. William Butler tells us that on one occasion, when Lincoln was a farm-hand at Island Grove, the famous circuit-rider, Peter Cart-

* We are aware that all former biographers have stated that Lincoln's candidacy for the Legislature was subsequent to his return from the war, and a consequence of his service. But his circular is dated March 9, 1832, and the "Sangamon Journal" mentions his name among the candidates in July, and apologizes for having accidentally omitted it in May.



A. LINCOLN'S SURVEYING INSTRUMENTS AND SADDLE-BAG. (IN POSSESSION OF LINCOLN MONUMENT COLLECTION.)

wright, came by, electioneering for the Legislature, and Lincoln at once engaged in a discussion with him in the cornfield, in which the great Methodist was equally astonished at the close reasoning and the uncouth figure of Mr. Brown's extraordinary hired man. At another time, after one Posey, a politician in search of office, had made a speech in Macon, John Hanks, whose admiration of his cousin's oratory was unbounded, said that "Abe could beat it." He turned a keg on end, and the tall boy mounted it and made his speech. "The subject was the navigation of the Sangamon, and Abe beat him to death," says the loyal Hanks. So it was not with all the tremor of a complete novice that the young man took the stump during the few days left him between his return and the election.

He ran as a Whig. As this has been denied on authority which is generally trustworthy, it is well enough to insist upon the fact. In one of the few speeches of his which, made at this time, have been remembered and reported, he said: "I am in favor of a national bank; I am in favor of the internal improvement system, and of a high protective tariff. These are my sentiments and political principles." Nothing could be more unqualified or outspoken than this announcement of his adhesion to what was then and for years afterwards called "the American System" of Henry Clay. Other testimony is not wanting to the same effect. Both Major Stuart and Judge Logan* say that Lincoln ran in 1832 as a Whig, and that his speeches were unevasively in defense of the principles of that party. Without discussing the merits of the party or its purposes, we may insist that his adopting them thus openly at the outset of his career was an extremely characteristic act, and marks thus early the scrupulous conscientiousness which shaped every action of his life. The State of Illinois was by a large majority Democratic, hopelessly attached to the person and policy of Jackson. Nowhere had that despotic leader more violent and unscrupulous partisans than there. They were proud of their very servility, and preferred the name of "whole-hog Jackson men" to that of Democrats. The Whigs embraced in their scanty ranks the leading men of the State, those who have since been most distinguished in its history, such as S. T. Logan, Stuart, Browning, Dubois, Hardin, Breese, and many others. But they were utterly unable to do anything except by dividing the Jackson men, whose very numbers made their party unwieldy, and by throwing their votes with the more decent and conservative portion of them. In this way, in the late election, they had secured the success of Governor Reynolds — the Old Ranger — against Governor Kinney, who represented the vehement and proscriptive spirit which Jackson had just breathed into the party. He had visited the General in Washington, and had come back giving out threatenings and slaughter against the Whigs in the true Tennessee style, declaring that "all Whigs should be whipped out of office like dogs out of a meat-house"; the force of south-western simile could no farther go.† But the great popularity of Reynolds and the adroit management of the Whigs carried him through successfully. A single fact will show on which side the people who could read were enlisted. The "whole-hog" party had one newspaper, the opposition five. Of course it would have been impossible for Reynolds to poll a respectable vote if his loyalty to Jackson had been seriously doubted. As it was, he lost many votes through a report that he had been guilty of saying that "he was as strong for Jackson as any reasonable man should be." The Governor himself, in his naïve account of the canvass, acknowledges the damaging nature of this accusation, and comforts himself with quoting an indiscretion of Kinney's, who opposed a projected canal on the ground that "it would flood the country with Yankees."

It showed some moral courage, and certainly an absence of the shuffling politician's fair-weather policy, that Lincoln, in his friendless and penniless youth, at the very beginning of his career, when he was not embarrassed by antecedents or family connections, and when, in fact, what little social influence he knew would have led him the other way, chose to oppose a furiously intolerant majority,

* The Democrats of New Salem worked for Lincoln out of their personal regard for him. That was the general understanding of the matter here at the time. In this he made no concession of principle whatever. He was as stiff as a man could be in his Whig doctrines. They did this for him simply because he was popular — because he was Lincoln.

July 6, 1875. STEPHEN T. LOGAN.

† Reynolds's "My Own Times," p. 291.

and to take his stand with the party which was doomed to long-continued defeat in Illinois. The motives which led him to take this decisive course are not difficult to imagine. The better sort of people in Sangamon County were Whigs, though the majority were Democrats, and he preferred through life the better sort to the majority. The papers he read were the Louisville "Journal" and the "Sangamon Journal," both Whig. Reading the speeches and debates of the day, he sided with Webster against Calhoun, and with Clay against anybody. Though his notions of politics, like those of any ill-educated young man of twenty-two, must have been rather crude, and not at all sufficient to live and to die by, he had adopted them honestly and sincerely, with no selfish regard to his own interests; and though he ardently desired success, he never abated one jot or tittle of his convictions for any possible personal gain, then or thereafter.

In the circular in which he announced his candidacy he made no reference to national politics, but confined himself mainly to a discussion of the practicability of improving the navigation of the Sangamon, the favorite hobby of the place and time. He had no monopoly of this "issue." It formed the burden of nearly every candidate's appeal to the people in that year. The excitement occasioned by the trip of the *Talisman* had not yet died away, although the little steamer was now dust and ashes, and her bold commander had left the State to avoid an awkward meeting with the sheriff. The hope of seeing Springfield an emporium of commerce was still lively among the citizens of Sangamon County, and in no one of the handbills of the political aspirants of the season was that hope more judiciously encouraged than in the one signed by Abraham Lincoln. It was a well-written circular, remarkable for its soberness and reserve when we consider the age and the limited advantages of the writer. It concluded in these words:

"Upon the subjects of which I have treated, I have spoken as I have thought. I may be wrong in regard to any or all of them; but holding it a sound maxim that it is better only sometimes to be right than at all times wrong, so soon as I discover my opinions to be erroneous, I shall be ready to renounce them. . . . Every man is said to have his peculiar ambition. Whether it be true or not, I can say, for one, that I have no other so great as that of being truly esteemed of my fellow-men, by rendering myself worthy of their esteem. How far I shall succeed in gratifying this ambition is yet to be developed. I am young, and unknown to many of you. I was born and have ever remained in the most humble walks of life. I have no wealthy or powerful relations or friends to recommend me. My case is thrown exclusively upon the independent voters of the county; and, if elected, they will have conferred a favor upon me, for which I shall be unremitting in my labors to compensate. But if the good people in their wisdom shall see fit to keep me in the background, I have been too familiar with disappointments to be very much chagrined."

This is almost precisely the style of his later years. The errors of grammar and construction which spring invariably from an effort to avoid redundancy of expression remained with him through life. He seemed to grudge the space required for necessary parts of speech. But his language was at twenty-two, as it was thirty years later, the simple and manly attire of his thought, with little attempt at ornament and none at disguise. There was an intermediate time when he sinned in the direction of fine writing; but this ebullition soon passed away, and left that marvelously strong and transparent style in which his two inaugurals were written.

Of course, in the ten days left him after his return from the field, a canvass of the county, which was then some thousands of square miles in extent, was out of the question. He made a few speeches in the neighborhood of New Salem, and at least one in Springfield. He was wholly unknown there except by his few comrades in arms. We find him mentioned in the county paper only once during the summer, in an editorial note adding the name of Captain Lincoln to those candidates for the Legislature who were periling their lives on the frontier and had left their reputations in charge of their generous fellow-citizens at home. On the occasion of his speaking at Springfield, most of the candidates had come together to address a meeting there to give their electors some idea of their quality. These were severe ordeals for the rash aspirants for popular favor. Besides those citizens who came to listen and judge, there were many whose only object was the free whisky provided for the occasion, and who, after potations pottle-deep, became not only highly unparliamentary but even dangerous to life and limb. This wild chivalry of Lick Creek was, however, less redoubtable to Lincoln than it might be to an urban statesman unacquainted with the frolic brutality of Clary's Grove. Their gambols never caused him to lose his self-possession. It is related that once, while he was speaking, he saw a ruffian attack a friend of his in the crowd, and the rencontre not resulting according to the orator's sympathies, he descended from the stand, seized the objectionable fighting man by the neck, "threw him some ten feet," then calmly mounted to his place, and finished his speech, the course of his logic undisturbed by this athletic parenthesis. Judge Logan saw Lincoln for the first time on the day when he came up to Spring-

field on his canvass this summer. He thus speaks of his future partner: "He was a very tall, gawky, and rough-looking fellow then; his pantaloons didn't meet his shoes by six inches. But after he began speaking I became very much interested in him. He made a very sensible speech. His manner was very much the same as in after life; that is, the same peculiar characteristics were apparent then, though of course in after years he evinced more knowledge and experience. But he had then the same novelty and the same peculiarity in presenting his ideas. He had the same individuality that he kept through all his life."

There were two or three men at the meeting whose good opinion was worth more than all the votes of Lick Creek to one beginning life: Stephen T. Logan, a young lawyer who had recently come from Kentucky with the best equipment for a *nisi prius* practitioner ever brought into the State; Major Stuart, whom we have met in the Black Hawk war, once commanding a battalion and then marching as a private; and William Butler, afterwards prominent in State politics, at that time a young man of the purest Western breed in body and character, clear-headed and courageous, and ready for any emergency where a friend was to be defended or an enemy punished. We do not know whether Lincoln gained any votes that day, but he gained what was far more valuable, the active friendship of these able and honorable men, all Whigs and all Kentuckians like himself.

The acquaintances he made in his canvass, the practice he gained in speaking, and the added confidence which this experience of measuring his abilities with those of others gave, were all the advantages which Lincoln derived from this attempt. He was defeated, for the only time in his life, in a contest before the people. The fortunate candidates were E. D. Taylor, J. T. Stuart, Achilles Morris, and Peter Cartwright, the first of whom received 1127 votes and the last 815.* Lincoln's position among the eight defeated candidates was a very respectable one. He had 657 votes, and there were five who fared worse, among them his old adversary Kirkpatrick. What must have been especially gratifying to him was the fact that he received the almost unanimous vote of his own neighborhood, the precinct of New Salem, 277 votes against 3, a result which showed more strongly than any words could do the extent of the attachment and the confidence which his genial and upright character had inspired among those who knew him best.

* "Sangamon Journal," August 11, 1832.

STOREKEEPER, POSTMASTER AND SURVEYOR.

Having been, even in so slight a degree, a soldier and a politician, he was unfitted for a day laborer; but being entirely without means of subsistence, he was forced to look about for some suitable occupation. It is said by Dr. Holland that he thought seriously at this time of learning the trade of a blacksmith, and using in that honest way the sinew and brawn which nature had given him. But an opening for another kind of business occurred, which prevented his entering upon any merely mechanical occupation. Two of his most intimate friends were the brothers Herndon, called, according to the fashion of the time, which held it unfriendly to give a man his proper name, and arrogant for him to claim it, "Row" and "Jim." They kept one of those grocery stores in which everything salable on the frontier was sold, and which seem to have changed their occupants as rapidly as sentry-boxes. "Jim" sold his share to an idle and dissolute man named Berry, and "Row" soon transferred his interest to Lincoln. It was easy enough to buy, as nothing was ever given in payment but a promissory note. A short time afterwards, one Reuben Radford, who kept another shop of the same kind, happened one evening to attract the dangerous attention of the Clary's Grove boys, who, with their usual prompt and practical facetiousness, without a touch of malice in it, broke his windows and wrecked his store. The next morning, while Radford was ruefully contemplaing the ruin, and doubtless concluding that he had had enough of a country where the local idea of neighborly humor found such eccentric expression, he hailed a passer-by named Greene, and challenged him to buy his establishment for four hundred dollars. This sort of trade was always irresistible to these Western speculators, and Greene at once gave his note for the amount. It next occurred to him to try to find out what the property was worth, and doubting his own skill, he engaged Lincoln to make an invoice of it. The young merchant, whose appetite for speculation had just been whetted by his own investment, undertook the task, and finding the stock of goods rather tempting, offered Greene two hundred and fifty dollars for his bargain, which was at once accepted. Not a cent of money changed hands in all these transactions. By virtue of half a dozen signatures, Berry and Lincoln became proprietors of the only mercantile establishment in the village, and the apparent wealth of the community was increased by a liberal distribution of their notes among the Herndons, Radford, Greene, and a Mr. Rutledge whose business they had also bought.



PLAN OF ROAD SURVEYED

Fortunately for Lincoln and for the world, the enterprise was not successful. It was entered into without sufficient reflection, and from the very nature of things was destined to fail. To Berry the business was merely the refuge of idleness. He spent his time in gossip and drank up his share of the profits, and it is probable that Lincoln was far more interested in politics and general reading than in the petty traffic of his shop. In the spring of the next year, finding that their merchandise was gaining them little or nothing, they concluded to keep a tavern in addition to their other business, and the records of the County Court of Sangamon County show that Berry took out a license for that purpose on the 6th of March, 1833.* But it was even then too late for any expedients to save the

* The following is an extract from the court record: "March 6, 1833. Ordered that William F. Berry, in the name of Berry and Lincoln, have license to keep a tavern in New Salem, to continue twelve months from this date, and that they pay one dollar in addition to six dollars heretofore prepaid as per Treasurer's receipt, and that they be allowed the following rates, viz.: French brandy, per pint, 25; Peach, 18¾; Apple, 12; Holland gin, 18¾; Domestic, 12½; Wine, 25; Rum, 18¾; Whisky, 12½; Breakfast, dinner, or supper, 25; Lodging for night, 12½; Horse for night, 25; Single feed, 12½; Breakfast, dinner, or supper, for stage passengers, 37½.

"Who gave bond as required by law."

To the County commissioners court for the County of Sangamon at its June term 1834.

We the undersigned being appointed to view and locate a road. Beginning at Musick's ferry on Salt creek. (Via) New Salem to the County line in the direction to Jacksonville. respectfully report that we have performed the duties of said view and location as required by law and that we have made the location on good ground. and believe the establishment of the same to be necessary and proper.

The enclosed Map gives the courses and distances as required by law.

Michael Killion
Hugh Armstrong
A. Lincoln

[SURVEYOR'S REPORT OF ABOVE.]



BY A. LINCOLN AND OTHERS.

moribund partnership. The tavern was never opened, for about this time Lincoln and Berry were challenged to sell out to a pair of vagrant brothers named Trent, who, as they had no idea of paying, were willing to give their notes to any amount. They soon ran away, and Berry expired, extinguished in rum. Lincoln was thus left loaded with debts, and with no assets except worthless notes of Berry and the Trents. It is greatly to his credit that he never thought of doing by others as others had done by him. The morality of the frontier was deplorably loose in such matters, and most of these people would have concluded that the failure of the business expunged its liabilities. But Lincoln made no effort even to compromise the claims against him. He promised to pay when he could, and it took the labor of years to do it; but he paid at last every farthing of the debt, which seemed to him and his friends so large that it was called among them "the national debt."

He had already begun to read elementary books of law, borrowed from Major Stuart and other kindly acquaintances. Indeed, it is quite possible that Berry and Lincoln might have succeeded better in business if the junior member of the firm had not spent so much of his time reading Blackstone and Chitty in the shade of a great oak just outside the door, while the senior quietly fuddled himself within. Eye-witnesses still speak of the grotesque youth, habited in homespun tow, lying on his back with his feet on the trunk of the tree, and poring over his book by the hour, "grinding around with the shade," as it shifted from north to east. After his store, to use his own expression, had "winked out," he applied himself with more continuous energy to his reading, doing merely what odd jobs came to his hand to pay his current expenses, which were of course very slight. He sometimes helped his friend Ellis in his store; sometimes went into the field and renewed his exploits as a farm-hand, which had gained him a traditional fame in Indiana; sometimes employed his clerkly hand in straightening up a neglected ledger. It is probable that he worked for his board oftener than for any other compensation, and his hearty friendliness and vivacity, as well as his industry in the field, made him a welcome guest in any farmhouse in the county. His strong arm was always at the disposal of the poor and needy; it is said of him, with a graphic variation of a well-known text, "that he visited the fatherless and the widow and chopped their wood."

In the spring of this year, 1833, he was appointed Postmaster of New Salem, and held the office for three years. Its emoluments were slender and its duties light, but there was in all probability no citizen of the village who could have made so much of it as he. The mails were so scanty that he was said to carry them in his hat, and he is also reported to have read every newspaper that arrived; it is altogether likely that this formed the leading inducement to his taking the office. His incumbency lasted until New Salem ceased to be populous enough for a post-station and the mail went by to Petersburg. Dr. Holland relates a sequel to this official experience which illustrates the quaint honesty of the man. Several years later, when he was a practicing lawyer, an agent of the Post-office Department called upon him, and asked for a balance due from the New Salem office, some seventeen dollars. Lincoln rose, and opening a little trunk which lay in a corner of the room, took from it a cotton rag in which was tied up the exact sum required. "I never use any man's money but my own," he quietly remarked. When we consider the pinching poverty in which these years had been passed, we may appreciate the self-denial which had kept him from making even a temporary use of this little sum of government money.

John Calhoun, the Surveyor of Sangamon County, was at this time overburdened with work. The principal industry then was speculation in land. Every settler of course wanted his farm surveyed and marked out for him, and every community had its syndicate of leading citizens who cherished a scheme of laying out a city somewhere. In many cases the city was plotted, the sites of the principal buildings, including a court-house and a university, were determined, and a sonorous

name was selected out of Plutarch, before its location was even considered. For this latter office the intervention of an official surveyor was necessary, and therefore Mr. Calhoun had more business than he could attend to without assistance. Looking about for a young man of good character, intelligent enough to learn surveying at short notice, his attention was soon attracted to Lincoln. He offered young Abraham a book containing the elements of the art, and told him when he had mastered it he should have employment. The offer was a flattering one, and Lincoln, with that steady self-reliance of his, accepted it, and armed with his book went out to the schoolmaster's (Menton Graham), and in six weeks' close application made himself a surveyor.*

It will be remembered that Washington in


Know all men by these presents that we Thomas Lincoln and Richard Berry are held and firmly bound unto his Excellency the Governor of Kentucky in the just and full sum of fifty pounds lawful money to the payment of which well and truly to be made to the said governor and his successors we bind ourselves our heirs &c jointly and severally firmly by these presents sealed with our seals and dated this 10th day of June 1806. The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas there is a marriage shortly intended between the above bound Thomas Lincoln and Nancy Hanks for which license has issued now if there be no lawful cause to obstruct the said Marriage then this obligation to be void or else to remain in full force & virtue in Law

Thomas Lincoln [seal]

Richard Berry [seal]

John H Parrott

Jesse Garden

MARRIAGE BOND OF THOMAS LINCOLN.

* There has been some discussion as to whether Lincoln served as deputy under Calhoun or Neale. The truth is that he served under both of them. Calhoun was surveyor in 1833, when Lincoln first learned the business. Neale was elected in 1835, and immediately appointed Lincoln and Calhoun as his deputies. The "Sangamon Journal" of Sept. 12, 1835, contains the following official advertisement:

SURVEYOR'S NOTICE.— I have appointed John B. Watson, Abram Lincoln, and John Calhoun deputy surveyors for Sangamon County. In my absence from town, any persons wishing their lands surveyed will do well to call at the Recorder's office and enter his or their names in a book left for that purpose, stating township and range in which they respectively live, and their business shall be promptly attended to.

T. M. NEALE.

An article by Colonel G. A. Pierce, printed April 21, 1881, in the Chicago "Inter-Ocean," describes an interview held in that month with W. G. Green, of Menard County, in which this matter is referred to. But Mr. Green relies more on the document in his possession than on his recollection of what took place in 1833. "'Where did Lincoln learn his surveying?' I asked. 'Took it up himself,' replied Mr. Green, 'as he did a hundred things, and mastered it too. When he acted as surveyor here he was a deputy of T. M. Neale, and not of Calhoun, as has often been said. There was a dispute about this, and many sketches of his life gave Calhoun (Candle-box Calhoun, as he was afterwards known during the Kansas troubles and election frauds) as the surveyor, but it was Neale.' Mr. Green turned to his desk and drew out an old certificate, in the handwriting of Lincoln, giving the boundaries of certain lands, and signed, 'T. M. Neale, Surveyor, by A. Lincoln, Deputy,' thus settling the question. Mr. Green was a Democrat, and has leaned towards that party all his life, but what he thought and thinks of Lincoln can be seen by an indorsement on the back of the certificate named, which is as follows:

> Preserve this, as it is from the noblest of God's creation — A. Lincoln, the 2d preserver of his country. May 3, 1865.— Penned by W. G. Green, who taught Lincoln the English grammar in 1831.

his youth adopted the same profession, but there were few points of similarity in the lives of the two greatest of our Presidents, in youth or later manhood. The Virginian had every social advantage in his favor, and was by nature a man of more thrift and greater sagacity in money matters. He used the knowledge gained in the practice of his profession so wisely that he became rather early in life a large land-holder, and continually increased his possessions until his death. Lincoln, with almost unbounded opportunities for the selection and purchase of valuable tracts, made no use whatever of them. He employed his skill and knowledge merely as a bread-winner, and made so little provision for the future that when Mr. Van Bergen, who had purchased the Radford note, sued and got judgment on it, his horse and his surveying instruments were taken to pay the debt, and only by the generous intervention of a friend was he able to redeem these invaluable means of living. He was, nevertheless, an excellent surveyor. His portion of the public work executed under the directions of Mr. Calhoun and his successor, T. M. Neale, was well performed, and he soon found his time pretty well employed with private business which came to him from Sangamon and the adjoining counties. Early in the year 1834 we find him appointed one of three "viewers" to locate a road from Salt Creek to the county line in the direction of Jacksonville. The board seems to have consisted mainly of its chairman, as Lincoln made the deposit of money required by law, surveyed the route, plotted the road, and wrote the report.*

Though it is evident that the post-office and the surveyor's level were not making a rich man of him, they were sufficient to enable him to live decently, and during the year he greatly increased his acquaintance and his influence in the county. The one followed the other naturally; every acquaintance he made became his friend, and even before the end of his unsuccessful canvass in 1832 it had become evident to the observant politicians of the district that he was a man whom it would not do to leave out of their calculations. There seemed to be no limit to his popularity nor to his aptitudes, in the opinion of his admirers. He was continually called on to serve in the most incongruous capacities. Old residents say he was the best judge at a horse-race the county afforded; he was occasionally second in a duel of fisticuffs, though he usually contrived to reconcile the adversaries on the turf before any damage was done; he was the arbiter on all controverted points of literature, science, or woodcraft among the disputatious denizens of Clary's Grove, and his decisions were never appealed from. His native tact and humor were invaluable in his work as a peacemaker, and his enormous physical strength, which he always used with a magnanimity rare among giants, placed his off-hand decrees beyond the reach of contemptuous question. He composed differences among friends and equals with good-natured raillery, but he was as rough as need be when his wrath was roused by meanness and cruelty. We hardly know whether to credit some of the stories, apparently well-attested by living witnesses, of his prodigious muscular powers. He is said to have lifted, at Rutledge's mill, a box of stones weighing over half a ton. It is also related that he could raise a barrel of whisky from the ground and drink from the bung—but the narrator adds that he never swallowed the whisky. Whether these traditions are strictly true or not, they are evidently founded on the current reputation he enjoyed among his fellows for extraordinary strength, and this was an important element in his influence. He was known to be capable of handling almost any man he met, yet he never sought a quarrel. He was everybody's friend, and yet used no liquor or tobacco. He was poor and had scarcely ever been at school, yet he was the best-informed young man in the village. He had grown up on the frontier, the utmost

* As this is probably the earliest public document extant written and signed by Lincoln, we give it in full:

March 3, 1834. Reuben Harrison presented the following petition: We, the undersigned, respectfully request your honorable body to appoint viewers to view and locate a road from Musick's ferry on Salt Creek, via New Salem, to the county line in the direction of Jacksonville.

And Abram Lincoln deposited with the clerk $10, as the law directs. Ordered, that Michael Killion, Hugh Armstrong, and Abram Lincoln be appointed to view said road, and said Lincoln to act as surveyor.

To the County Commissioners' Court for the county of Sangamon, at its June term, 1834. We, the undersigned, being appointed to view and locate a road, beginning at Musick's ferry on Salt Creek, via New Salem, to the county line in the direction to Jacksonville, respectfully report that we have performed the duties of said view and location, as required by law, and that we have made the location on good ground, and believe the establishment of the same to be necessary and proper.

The inclosed map gives the courses and distances as required by law. Michael Killion, Hugh Armstrong, A. Lincoln.

(Indorsement in pencil, also in Lincoln's handwriting:)

A. Lincoln, 5 days at $3.00, $15.00. John A. Kelsoe, chain-bearer, for 5 days, at 75 cents, $3.75. Robert Lloyd, at 75 cents, $3.75. Hugh Armstrong, for services as axeman, 5 days at 75 cents, $3.75. A. Lincoln, for making plot and report, $2.50.

(On Map.)

Whole length of the road, 26 miles and 70 chains. Scale, 2 inches to the mile.

fringe of civilization, yet he was gentle and clean of speech, innocent of blasphemy or scandal. His good qualities might have excited resentment if displayed by a well-dressed stranger from an Eastern State, but the most uncouth ruffians of New Salem took a sort of proprietary interest and pride in the decency and the cleverness and the learning of their friend and comrade, Abe Lincoln.

It was regarded, therefore, almost as a matter of course that Lincoln should be a candidate for the Legislature at the next election, which took place in August, 1834. He was sure of the united support of the Whigs, and so many of the Democrats also wanted to vote for him that some of the leading members of that party came to him and proposed they should give him an organized support. He was too loyal a partisan to accept their overtures without taking counsel from the Whig candidates. He laid the matter before Major Stuart, who at once advised him to make the canvass. It was a generous and chivalrous action, for by thus encouraging the candidacy of Lincoln he was endangering his own election. But his success two years before, in the face of a vindictive opposition led by the strongest Jackson men in the district, had made him somewhat confident, and he perhaps thought he was risking little by giving a helping hand to his comrade in the Spy Battalion. Before the election Lincoln's popularity developed itself in rather a portentous manner, and it required some exertion to save the seat of his generous friend. At the close of the poll, the four successful candidates held the following relative positions: Lincoln, 1376; Dawson, 1370; Carpenter, 1170; and Stuart, at that time probably the most prominent young man in the district, and the one marked out by the public voice for an early election to Congress, 1164.

LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE.— MEETING WITH STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS.— THE "LONG NINE."

THE election of Mr. Lincoln to the Legislature may be said to have closed the pioneer portion of his life. He was done with the wild carelessness of the woods, with the jolly ruffianism of Clary's Grove, with the petty chaffering of grocery stores, with odd jobs for daily bread, with all the uncouth squalor of the frontier poverty. It was not that his pecuniary circumstances were materially improved. He was still, and for years continued to be, a very poor man, harassed by debts which he was always working to pay, and sometimes in distress for the means of decent subsistence. But from this time forward his associations were with a better class of men than he had ever known before, and a new feeling of self-respect must naturally have grown up in his mind from his constant intercourse with them — a feeling which extended to the minor morals of civilized life. A sophisticated reader may smile at the mention of anything like social ethics in Vandalia in 1834; but, compared with Gentryville and New Salem, the society which assembled in the winter at that little capital was polished and elegant. The State then contained nearly two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, and the members of the Legislature, elected purely on personal grounds, nominated by themselves or their neighbors without the intervention of party machinery, were necessarily the leading men, in one way or another, in their several districts. Among the colleagues of Lincoln at Vandalia were young men with destinies only less brilliant than his own. They were to become governors, senators, and judges; they were to organize the Whig party of Illinois, and afterwards the Republican; they were to lead brigades and divisions in two great wars. Among the first persons he met there — not in the Legislature proper, but in the lobby, where he was trying to appropriate an office then filled by Colonel Hardin — was his future antagonist, Stephen A. Douglas. Neither seemed to have any presentiment of the future greatness of the other. Douglas thought little of the raw youth from the Sangamon timber, and Lincoln said the dwarfish Vermonter was "the least man he had ever seen." To all appearance, Vandalia was full of better men than either of them — clever lawyers, men of wit and standing, some of them the sons of provident early settlers, but more who had come from older States to seek their fortunes in these fresh fields.

During his first session Lincoln occupied no especially conspicuous position. He held his own respectably among the best. One of his colleagues tells us he was not distinguished by any external eccentricity; that he wore, according to the custom of the time, a decent suit of blue jeans; that he was known simply as a rather quiet young man, good-natured and sensible. Before the session ended he had made the acquaintance of most of the members, and had evidently come to be looked upon as possessing more than ordinary capacity. His unusual common-sense began to be recognized. His name does not often appear in the records of the year. He introduced a resolution in favor of securing to the State a part of the proceeds of the sales of public lands within its limits; he took part in the organization of the ephemeral "White"

party, which was designed to unite all the anti-Jackson elements under the leadership of Hugh L. White, of Tennessee; he voted with the minority in favor of Young against Robinson for senator, and with the majority that passed the Bank and Canal bills, which were received with such enthusiasm throughout Illinois, and which were only the precursors of those gigantic and ill-advised schemes that came to maturity two years later, and inflicted such incalculable injury upon the State.

Lincoln returned to New Salem, after this winter's experience of men and things at the little capital, much firmer on his feet than ever before. He had had the opportunity of measuring himself with the leading men of the community, and had found no difficulty whatever in keeping pace with them. He continued his studies of the law and surveying together, and became quite indispensable in the latter capacity — so much so that General Neale, announcing in September, 1835, the names of the deputy surveyors of Sangamon County, places the name of Lincoln before that of his old master in the science, John Calhoun. He returned to the Legislature in the winter of 1835–6, and one of the first important incidents of the session was the election of a senator to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Elias Kent Kane. There was no lack of candidates. A journal of the time says: "This intelligence reached Vandalia on the evening of the 26th December, and in the morning nine candidates appeared in that place, and it was anticipated that a number more would soon be in, among them 'the lion of the North,' who, it is thought, will claim the office by preëmption."* It is not known who was the roaring celebrity here referred to, but the successful candidate was General William L. D. Ewing, who was elected by a majority of one vote. Lincoln and the other Whigs voted for him, not because he was a "White" man, as they frankly stated, but because "he had been proscribed by the Van Buren party." Mr. Semple, the candidate of the regular Democratic caucus, was beaten simply on account of his political orthodoxy.

A minority is always strongly in favor of independent action and bitterly opposed to caucuses, and therefore we need not be surprised at finding Mr. Lincoln, a few days later in the session, joining in hearty denunciation of the convention system, which had already become popular in the East, and which General Jackson was then urging upon his faithful followers. The missionaries of this new system in Illinois were the shifty young lawyer from Morgan County, who had just succeeded in having himself made circuit attorney in place of John J. Hardin, Stephen A. Douglas, recently from Vermont, and a man who was then regarded in Vandalia as a far more important and dangerous person than Douglas, Ebenezer Peck, of Chicago. He was looked upon with distrust and suspicion for several reasons, all of which seemed valid to the rural legislators assembled there. He came from Canada, where he had been a member of the provincial parliament, and was therefore imagined to be permeated with secret hostility to republican institutions; his garb, his furs, were of the fashion of Quebec; and he passed his time indoctrinating the Jackson men with the theory and practice of party organization, teachings which they eagerly absorbed, and which seemed sinister and ominous to the Whigs. He was showing them, in fact, the way in which elections were to be won; and though the Whigs denounced his system as subversive of individual freedom and private judgment, it was not long before they were also forced to adopt it, or be left alone with their virtue. The organization of political parties in Illinois really takes its rise from this time, and in great measure from the work of Mr. Peck with the Vandalia Legislature. There was no man more dreaded and disliked than he was by the stalwart young Whigs against whom he was organizing that solid and disciplined opposition. But a quarter of a century brings wonderful changes. Twenty-five years later Mr. Peck stood shoulder to shoulder with these very men who then reviled him as a Canadian emissary of tyranny and corruption,— with S. T. Logan, Browning, and Dubois,— organizing a new party for victory under the name of Abraham Lincoln.

The Legislature adjourned on the 23d of January, having made a beginning, it is true, in the work of improving the State by statute, though its modest work, incorporating canal and bridge companies and providing for public roads, bore no relation to the ambitious essays of its successor. Among the bills passed at this session was an Apportionment act, by which Sangamon County became entitled to seven representatives and two senators, and early in the spring nine statesmen of the county were ready for the field. It seems singular to us of a later day that just nine prominent men should have offered themselves for these places, without the intervention of any primary meetings. Such a thing, if we mistake not, was never known again in Illinois. The convention system was afterwards seen to be an absolute necessity to prevent the disorganization of parties through the restless vanity of obscure and insubordinate aspirants. But the nine who "took the stump" in San-

* "Sangamon Journal," January 2.

gamon in the summer of 1836 were supported as loyally and as energetically as if they had been nominated with all the solemnity of modern days. They became famous in the history of the State, partly for their stature and partly for their influence in legislation. They were called the "Long Nine"; their average height was over six feet, and their aggregate altitude was said to have been fifty-five feet. Their names were Abraham Lincoln, John Dawson, Dan Stone, Ninian W. Edwards, William F. Elkin, R. L. Wilson, Andrew McCormick: these were candidates for the House of Representatives, and Job Fletcher and Archer Herndon for the State Senate.

Mr. Lincoln began his canvass with the following circular:

"NEW SALEM, June 13, 1836.

"To the Editor of the 'Journal.'

"In your paper of last Saturday I see a communication over the signature 'Many Voters' in which the candidates who are announced in the 'Journal' are called upon to 'show their hands.' Agreed. Here's mine.

"I go for all sharing the privileges of the Government who assist in bearing its burdens. Consequently I go for admitting all whites to the right of suffrage who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excluding females).

"If elected, I shall consider the whole people of Sangamon my constituents, as well those that oppose as those that support me.

"While acting as their representative I shall be governed by their will on all subjects upon which I have the means of knowing what their will is, and upon all others I shall do what my own judgment teaches me will best advance their interests. Whether elected or not, I go for distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands to the several States, to enable our State, in common with others, to dig canals and construct railroads without borrowing money and paying interest on it.

"If alive on the first Monday in November, I shall vote for Hugh L. White for President.*

"Very respectfully,

"A. LINCOLN."

It would be hard to imagine a more audacious and unqualified declaration of principles and intentions. But it was the fashion of the hour to promise exact obedience to the will of the people, and the two practical questions touched by this circular were the only ones then much talked about. The question of suffrage for aliens was a living problem in the State, and Mr. Lincoln naturally took liberal ground on it; and he was also in favor of getting from the sale of public lands a portion of the money he was ready to vote for internal improvements. This was good Whig doctrine at that time, and the young politician did not fancy he could go wrong in following in such a matter the lead of his idol, Henry Clay.

* This phrase seems to have been adopted as a formula by the anti-Jackson party. The "cards" of several candidates contain it.

He made an active canvass, and spoke frequently during the summer. He must have made some part of the campaign on foot, for we find in the county paper an advertisement of a horse which had strayed or been stolen from him while on a visit to Springfield. It was not an imposing animal, to judge from the description; it was "plainly marked with harness," and was "believed to have lost some of his shoes"; but it was a large horse, as suited a cavalier of such stature, and "trotted and paced" in a serviceable manner. In July a rather remarkable discussion took place at the county seat, in which many of the leading men on both sides took part. Mr. Ninian Edwards, son of the late Governor, is said to have opened the debate with much effect. Mr. Early, who followed him, was so roused by his energetic attack that he felt his only resource was a flat contradiction, which in those days meant mischief. In the midst of great and increasing excitement Dan Stone and John Calhoun made speeches which did not tend to pour oil on the waters of contention, and then it came to Mr. Lincoln's turn. An article in the "Journal" states that he seemed embarrassed in his opening, for this was the most important contest in which he had ever been engaged. But he soon felt his easy mastery of his powers come back to him, and finished by making what was universally regarded as the strongest speech of the day. One of his colleagues says that on this occasion he used in his excitement for the first time that singularly effective clear tenor tone of voice which afterwards became so widely known in the political battles of the West.

The canvass was an energetic one throughout, and excited more interest in the district than even the presidential election which occurred some months later. Mr. Lincoln was elected at the head of the poll by a majority greatly in excess of the average majority of his friends, which shows conclusively how his influence and popularity had increased. The Whigs in this election effected a revolution in the politics of the county. By force of their ability and standing they had before managed to divide the suffrages of the people, even while they were unquestionably in the minority; but this year they completely defeated their opponents and gained that control of the county which they never lost as long as the party endured.

BEDLAM LEGISLATION.

IF Mr. Lincoln had no other claims to be remembered than his services in the Legislature of 1836–7, there would be little to say in his favor. Its history is one of disaster to the

State. Its legislation was almost wholly unwise and hurtful. The most we can say for Mr. Lincoln is that he obeyed the will of his constituents, as he promised to do, and labored with singular skill and ability to accomplish the objects desired by the people who gave him their votes. The especial work intrusted to him was the subdivision of the county, and the project for the removal of the capital of the State to Springfield.* In both of these he was successful. In the account of errors and follies committed by the Legislature to the lasting injury of the State, he is entitled to no praise or blame beyond the rest. He shared in that sanguine epidemic of financial and industrial quackery which devastated the entire community, and voted with the best men of the country in favor of schemes which appeared then like a promise of an immediate millennium, and seem now like midsummer madness.

He entered political life in one of those eras of delusive prosperity which so often precede great financial convulsions. The population of the State was increasing at the enormous rate of two hundred per centum in ten years. It had extended northward along the lines of the wooded valleys of creeks and rivers in the center to Peoria; on the west by the banks of the Mississippi to Galena; on the east with wide intervals of wilderness to Chicago.† The edge of the timber was everywhere pretty well occupied, though the immigrants from the forest States of Kentucky and Tennessee had as yet avoided the prairies. The rich soil and equable climate were now attracting an excellent class of settlers from the older States, and the long-neglected northern counties were receiving the attention they deserved. The war of Black Hawk had brought the country into notice; the utter defeat of his nation had given the guarantee of a permanent peace; the last lodges of the Pottawatomies had disappeared from the country in 1833.‡ The money spent by the General Government during the war, and paid to the volunteers at its close, added to the common prosperity. There was a brisk trade in real estate, and there was even a beginning in Chicago of that passion for speculation in town lots which afterwards became a frenzy.

It was too much to expect of the Illinois Legislature that it should understand that the best thing it could do to forward this prosperous tendency of things was to do nothing; for this is a lesson which has not yet been learned by any legislature in the world. For several years they had been tinkering, at first modestly and tentatively, at a scheme of internal improvements which should not cost too much money. In 1833 they began to grant charters for railroads, which remained in embryo, as the stock was never taken. Surveys for other railroads were also proposed, to cross the State in different directions; and the project of uniting Lake Michigan with the Illinois River by a canal was of too evident utility to be overlooked. In fact, the route had been surveyed, and estimates of cost made, companies incorporated, and all preliminaries completed many years before, though nothing further had been done, as no funds had been offered from any source. But at the special session of 1835 a law was passed authorizing a loan of half a million dollars for this purpose; the loan was effected by Governor Duncan the following year, and in June a board of canal commissioners having been appointed, a beginning was actually made with pick and shovel.

A restless feeling of hazardous speculation seemed to be taking possession of the State. "It commenced," says Governor Ford, in his admirable chronicle,§ "at Chicago, and was the means of building up that place in a year or two from a village of a few houses to be a city of several thousand inhabitants. The story of the sudden fortunes made there excited at first wonder and amazement; next, a gambling spirit of adventure; and lastly, an all-absorbing desire for sudden and splendid wealth. Chicago had been for some time only one great town-market. The plots of towns for a hundred miles around were carried there to be disposed of at auction. The Eastern people had caught the mania. Every vessel coming west was loaded with them, their money and means, bound for Chicago, the great fairy-land of fortunes. But as enough did not come to satisfy the insatiable greediness of the Chicago sharpers and speculators, they frequently consigned their wares to Eastern markets. In fact, lands and town lots were the staple of the country, and were the only articles of export." The contagion spread so rapidly, towns and cities were laid out so profusely, that it was a standing joke that before long there would be no land left in the State for farming purposes.

The future of the State for many years to come was thus discounted by the fervid imaginations of its inhabitants. "We have every requisite of a great empire," they said, "except enterprise and inhabitants," and they thought that a little enterprise would bring the inhabitants. Through the spring and summer of 1836 the talk of internal improve-

* Lincoln was at the head of the project to remove the seat of government to Springfield; it was entirely intrusted to him to manage. The members were all elected on one ticket, but they all looked to Lincoln as the head.—STEPHEN T. LOGAN.

† Ford, p. 102.

‡ Reynolds's "Life and Times."

§ Ford, p. 181.

ments grew more general and more clamorous. The candidates for office spoke about little else, and the only point of emulation among the parties was which should be the more reckless and grandiose in its promises. When the time arrived for the assembling of the Legislature, the members were not left to their own zeal and the recollection of their campaign pledges, but meetings and conventions were everywhere held to spur them up to the fulfillment of their mandate. The resolutions passed by the principal body of delegates who came together in December directed the Legislature to vote a system of internal improvements "commensurate with the wants of the people," a phrase which is never lacking in the mouth of the charlatan or the demagogue.

These demands were pressed upon a not reluctant Legislature. They addressed themselves at once to the work required of them, and soon devised, with reckless and unreasoning haste, a scheme of railroads covering the vast uninhabited prairies as with a gridiron. There was to be a railroad from Galena to the mouth of the Ohio River; from Alton to Shawneetown; from Alton to Mount Carmel; from Alton to the eastern State boundary — by virtue of which lines Alton was to take the life of St. Louis without further notice; from Quincy to the Wabash River; from Bloomington to Pekin; from Peoria to Warsaw; — in all, one thousand three hundred and fifty miles of railway. Some of these terminal cities were not in existence except upon neatly designed surveyors' maps. The scheme provided also for the improvement of every stream in the State on which a child's shingle-boat could sail; and to the end that all objections should be stifled on the part of those neighborhoods which had neither railroads nor rivers, a gift of two hundred thousand dollars was voted to them, and with this sop they were fain to be content and not trouble the general joy. To accomplish this stupendous scheme, the Legislature voted eight million dollars, to be raised by loan.* Four millions were also voted to complete the canal. These sums, monstrous as they were, were still ridiculously inadequate to the purpose in view. But while the frenzy lasted there was no consideration of cost or of possibilities. These vast works were voted without estimates, without surveys, without any rational consideration of their necessity. The voice of reason seemed to be silent in the Assembly; only the utterances of fervid prophecy found listeners. Governor Ford speaks of one orator who insisted, amid enthusiastic plaudits, that the State could well afford to borrow one hundred millions for internal improvements. The process of reasoning, or rather predicting, was easy and natural. The roads would raise the price of land; the State could enter large tracts and sell them at a profit; foreign capital would be invested in land, and could be heavily taxed to pay bonded interest; and the roads, as they were built, could be operated at a great profit to pay for their own construction. The climax of the whole folly was reached by the provision of law directing that work should be begun at once at the termini of all the roads and the crossings of all rivers.

It is futile and disingenuous to attempt, as some have done, to fasten upon one or the other of the political parties of the State the responsibility of this bedlam legislation. The Governor and a majority of the Legislature were elected as Jackson Democrats, but the Whigs were as earnest in passing these measures as their opponents; and after they were adopted, the superior wealth, education, and business capacity of the Whigs had their legitimate influence, and they filled the principal positions upon the boards and commissions which came into existence under the acts. The bills were passed by a large majority, and the news was received by the people of the State with the most extravagant demonstrations of delight. The villages were illuminated; bells were rung in the rare steeples of the churches; "fire-balls," bundles of candle-wick soaked in turpentine, were thrown by night all over the country. The day of payment was far away, and those who trusted the assurances of the sanguine politicians thought that in some mysterious way the scheme would pay for itself.

Mr. Lincoln is continually found voting with his friends in favor of this legislation, and there is nothing to show that he saw any danger in it. He was a Whig, and as such in favor of internal improvements in general and a liberal construction of constitutional law in such matters. As a boy, he had interested himself in the details of local improvements of rivers and roads, and he doubtless went with the current in Vandalia in favor of this enormous system. He took, however, no prominent part in the work by which these railroad bills were passed. He considered himself as specially commissioned to procure the removal of the State capital from Vandalia to Springfield, and he applied all his energies to the accomplishment of this work. The enterprise was hedged around with difficulties; for although it was everywhere agreed, except at Vandalia, that the capital ought to be moved, every city in the State, and several which existed only on paper, demanded to be made the seat of government. The ques-

* Ford's "History," p. 184.

tion had been submitted to a popular vote in 1834, and the result showed about as many cities desirous of opening their gates to the Legislature as claimed the honor of being the birthplace of Homer. Of these Springfield was only third in popular estimation, and it was evident that Mr. Lincoln had need of all his wits if he were to fulfill the trust confided to him. It is said by Governor Ford that the "Long Nine" were not averse to using the hopes and fears of other members in relation to their special railroads to gain their adherence to the Springfield programme, but this is by no means clear. We are rather inclined to trust the direct testimony of Mr. Jesse K. Dubois, that the success of the Sangamon County delegation in obtaining the capital was due to the adroit management of Mr. Lincoln — first in inducing all the rival claimants to unite in a vote to move the capital from Vandalia, and then in carrying a direct vote for Springfield through the joint convention by the assistance of the southern counties. His personal authority accomplished this in great part. Mr. Dubois says, "He made Webb and me vote for the removal, though we belonged to the southern end of the State. We defended our vote before our constituents by saying that necessity would ultimately force the seat of government to a central position. But in reality we gave the vote to Lincoln because we liked him, because we wanted to oblige our friend, and because we recognized him as our leader." To do this, they were obliged to quarrel with their most intimate associates, who had bought a piece of waste land at the exact geographical center of the State and were striving to have the capital established there in the interest of their own pockets and territorial symmetry.

The bill was passed only a short time before the Legislature adjourned, and the "Long Nine" came back to their constituents, wearing their well-won laurels. They were complimented in the newspapers, at public meetings, and even at subscription dinners. We read of one at Springfield, at the "Rural Hotel," to which sixty guests sat down, where there were speeches by Browning, Lincoln, Douglas (who had resigned his seat in the Legislature to become Register of the Land Office at the new capital), S. T. Logan, Baker, and others, whose wit and wisdom were lost to history through the absence of reporters. Another dinner was given them at Athens a few weeks later. Among the toasts on these occasions were two which we may transcribe: "Abraham Lincoln: He has fulfilled the expectations of his friends, and disappointed the hopes of his enemies"; and "A. Lincoln: One of Nature's noblemen."



HON. O. H. BROWNING. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY WAIDE.)

THE LINCOLN-STONE PROTEST.

On the 3d of March, the day before the Legislature adjourned, Mr. Lincoln caused to be entered upon its records a paper which excited but little interest at the time, but which will probably be remembered long after the good and evil actions of the Vandalia Assembly have faded away from the minds of men. It was the authentic record of the beginning of a great and momentous career.

The following protest was presented to the House, which was read and ordered to be spread on the journals, to wit:

"Resolutions upon the subject of domestic slavery having passed both branches of the General Assembly at its present session, the undersigned hereby protest against the passage of the same.

"They believe that the institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy, but that the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends rather to increase than abate its evils.

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has no power under the Constitution to interfere with the institution of slavery in the different States.

"They believe that the Congress of the United States has the power, under the Constitution, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but that the



JUDGE STEPHEN T. LOGAN. (FROM THE PORTRAIT IN POSSESSION OF HIS DAUGHTER, MRS. L. H. COLEMAN.)

power ought not to be exercised, unless at the request of the people of the District.

"The difference between these opinions and those contained in the above resolutions is their reason for entering this protest.

(Signed) "DAN STONE,
"A. LINCOLN,
"Representatives from the county of Sangamon."

It may seem strange to those who shall read these pages that a protest so mild and cautious as this should ever have been considered either necessary or remarkable. We have gone so far away from the habits of thought and feeling prevalent at that time that it is difficult to appreciate such acts at their true value. But if we look a little carefully into the state of politics and public opinion in Illinois in the first half of this century, we shall see how much of inflexible conscience and reason there was in this simple protest.

The whole of the North-west Territory had, it is true, been dedicated to freedom by the ordinance of 1787, but in spite of that famous prohibition slavery existed in a modified form throughout that vast territory wherever there was any considerable population. An act legalizing a sort of slavery by indenture was passed by the Indiana territorial Legislature in 1807,* and this remained in force in the Illinois country after its separation. Another act providing for the hiring of slaves from Southern States was passed in 1814, for the ostensible reason that "mills could not be successfully operated in the territory for want of laborers, and that the manufacture of salt could not be successfully carried on by white laborers."† Yet, as an unconscious satire upon such pretenses, from time to time the most savage acts were passed to prohibit the immigration of free negroes into the territory which was represented as pining for black labor. Those who held slaves under the French domination, and their heirs, continued to hold them and their descendants in servitude after Illinois had become nominally a free territory and a free State, on the ground that their vested rights of property could not have been abrogated by the ordinance, and under the rule of the civil law *partus sequitur ventrem*.

But this quasi-toleration of the institution

* Edwards, p. 179.
† Edwards, p. 180.

was not enough for the advocates of slavery. Soon after the adoption of the State Constitution, which prohibited slavery "hereafter," it was evident that there was a strong undercurrent of desire for its introduction into the State. Some of the leading politicians, exaggerating the extent of this desire, imagined they saw in it a means of personal advancement, and began to agitate the question of a convention to amend the Constitution. At that time there was a considerable emigration setting through the State from Kentucky and Tennessee to Missouri. Day by day the teams of the movers passed through Illinois settlements, and wherever they halted for rest and refreshment they would affect to deplore the short-sighted policy which, by prohibiting slavery, had prevented their settling in that beautiful country. When young bachelors came from Kentucky on trips of business or pleasure, they dazzled the eyes of the women and excited the envy of their male rivals with their black retainers. The early Illinoisians were perplexed with a secret and singular sense of inferiority to even so new and raw a community as Missouri, because of its possession of slavery. Governor Edwards, complaining so late as 1829 of the superior mail facilities afforded to Missouri, says: "I can conceive of no reason for this preference, unless it be supposed that because the people of Missouri have negroes to work for them they are to be considered as gentlefolks entitled to higher consideration than us plain 'free-State' folks who have to work for ourselves."

The attempt was at last seriously made to open the State to slavery by the Legislature of 1822–3. The Governor, Edward Coles of Virginia, a strong anti-slavery man, had been



(FROM SILHOUETTE IN POSSESSION OF HIS SISTER.)

elected by a division of the pro-slavery party, but came in with a Legislature largely against him. The Senate had the requisite pro-slavery majority of two-thirds for a convention. In the House of Representatives there was a contest for a seat upon the result of which the two-thirds majority depended. The seat was claimed by John Shaw and Nicholas Hanson, of Pike County. The way in which the contest was decided affords a curious illustration of the moral sense of the advocates of slavery. They wanted at this session to elect a senator and provide for the convention. Hanson would vote for their senator and not for the convention. Shaw would vote for the convention, but



LOVEJOY'S PRINTING-OFFICE, ALTON, ILLINOIS. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE LOVEJOY MONUMENT ASSOCIATION.)

HON. JOHN T. STUART.
(FROM THE DAGUERREOTYPE IN POSSESSION OF HIS WIFE.)

not for Thomas, their candidate for senator. In such a dilemma they determined not to choose, but impartially to use both. They gave the seat to Hanson, and with his vote elected Thomas; they then turned him out, gave the place to Shaw, and with his vote carried the act for submitting the convention question to a popular vote. They were not more magnanimous in their victory than scrupulous in the means by which they had gained it. The night after the vote was taken they formed in a wild and drunken procession, and visited the residences of the Governor and the other free-State leaders, with loud and indecent demonstrations of triumph.

They considered their success already assured; but they left out of view the value of the moral forces called into being by their insolent challenge. The better class of people in the State, those heretofore unknown in politics, the schoolmasters, the ministers, immediately prepared for the contest, which became one of the severest the State has ever known. They established three newspapers, and sustained them with money and contributions. The Governor gave his entire salary for four years to the expenses of this contest, in which he had no personal interest whatever. The anti-slavery members of the Legislature made up a purse of a thousand dollars. They spent their money mostly in printer's ink and in the payment of active and zealous colporteurs. The result was an overwhelming defeat for the slave party. The convention was beaten by eighteen hundred majority, in a total vote of 11,612, and the State saved forever from slavery.

But these supreme efforts of the advocates of public morals, uninfluenced by considerations of personal advantage, are of rare occurrence, and necessarily do not survive the exigencies that call them forth. The apologists of slavery, beaten in the canvass, were more successful in the field of social opinion. In the reaction which succeeded the triumph of the anti-slavery party, it seemed as if there had never been any anti-slavery sentiment in the State. They had voted, it is true, against the importation of slaves from the South, but they were content to live under a code of Draconian ferocity, inspired by the very spirit of slavery, visiting the immigration of free negroes with penalties of the most savage description. Even Governor Coles, the public-spirited and popular politician, was indicted and severely fined for having brought his own freedmen into the State and having assisted them in establishing themselves around him upon farms of their own. The Legislature remitted the fine, but the Circuit Court declared it had no constitutional power to do so, though the Supreme Court afterwards overruled this decision. Any mention of the subject of slavery was thought in the worst possible taste, and no one could avow himself opposed to it without the risk of social ostracism. Every town had its one or two abolitionists, who were regarded as harmless or dangerous lunatics, according to the energy with which they made their views known.

From this arose a singular prejudice against New England people. It was attributable partly to the natural feeling of distrust of strangers which is common to ignorance and provincialism, but still more to a general suspicion that all Eastern men were abolitionists. Mr. Cook, who so long represented the State in Congress, used to relate with much amusement how he once spent the night in a farmer's cabin, and listened to the honest man's denunciations of that —— Yankee Cook. Cook was a Ken-

tuckian, but his enemies could think of no more dreadful stigma to apply to him than that of calling him a Yankee. Senator McDougal once told us that although he made no pretense of concealing his Eastern nativity, he never could keep his ardent friends in Pike County from denying the fact and fighting any one who asserted it. The great preacher, Peter Cartwright, used to denounce Eastern men roundly in his sermons, calling them "imps who lived on oysters" instead of honest corn-bread and bacon. The taint of slavery, the contagion of a plague they had not quite escaped, was on the people of Illinois. They were strong enough to rise once in their might and say they would not have slavery among them. But in the petty details of every day, in their ordinary talk, and in their routine legislation, their sympathies were still with the slave-holders. They would not enlist with them, but they would fight their battles in their own way.

Their readiness to do what came to be called later, in a famous speech, the "dirty work" of the South was seen in the tragic death of Lovejoy, which occurred in this very year of 1837. He had for some years been publishing a religious newspaper in St. Louis, but finding the atmosphere of that city becoming dangerous to him on account of the freedom of his comments upon their institutions, he moved to Alton, in Illinois, a few miles further up the river. His arrival excited an immediate tumult in that place; a mob gathered there on the day of his arrival — it was Sunday, and the good people were at leisure — and threw his press into the Mississippi. Having thus expressed their determination to vindicate the law, they held a meeting, and cited him before it to declare his intentions. He said they were altogether peaceful and legal; that he intended to publish a religious newspaper and not meddle with politics. This seemed satisfactory to the people, and he was allowed to fish out his press, buy new types, and set up his paper. But Mr. Lovejoy was a predestined martyr. He felt there was a "woe" upon him if he held his peace against the wickedness across the river. He wrote and published what was in his heart to say, and Alton was again vehemently moved. A committee appointed itself to wait upon him; for this sort of outrage is usually accomplished with a curious formality which makes it seem to the participants legal and orderly. The preacher met them with an undaunted front and told them he must do his duty as it appeared to him; that he was amenable to law, but nothing else; he even spoke in condemnation of mobs. Such language "from a minister of the gospel" shocked and infuriated the committee and those whom they represented. "The people assembled," says Governor Ford, "and quietly took the press and types and threw them into the river." We venture to say that the word "quietly" never before found itself in such company. It is not worth while to give the details of the bloody drama that now rapidly ran to its close. There was a futile effort at compromise, which to Lovejoy meant merely surrender, and which he firmly rejected. The threats of the mob were answered by defiance from the little band that surrounded the abolitionist. A new press was ordered, and arrived, and was stored in a warehouse, where Lovejoy and his friends shut themselves up, determined to defend it with their lives. They were there besieged by the infuriated crowd, and after a short interchange of shots Lovejoy was killed, his friends dispersed, and the press once more — and this time finally — thrown into the turbid flood.

These events took place in the autumn of 1837, but they indicate sufficiently the temper of the people of the State in the earlier part of the year. There was no sympathy nor even toleration for any public expression of hostility to slavery. The zeal of the followers of Jackson, although he had ceased to be President, had been whetted by his public denunciations of the anti-slavery propaganda; little more than a year before he had called upon Congress to take measures to "prohibit under severe penalties" the further progress of such incendiary proceedings as were "calculated to stimulate the slaves to insurrection and to produce all the horrors of civil war." But in spite of all this, the people with uneasy consciences continued to write and talk and petition Congress against slavery, and most of the State Legislatures began to pass resolutions denouncing them. Those passed by the Illinois Legislature have not been recorded, but they were doubtless as vehement as possible, for a Legislature so deeply engaged in financial legerdemain as this never fails to denounce with especial energy anything likely to injure the prospects of trade. The resolutions went the way of all buncombe; the sound and fury of them have passed away into silence; but they woke an echo in one sincere heart which history will be glad to perpetuate.

There was no reason that Abraham Lincoln should take especial notice of these resolutions, more than another. He had done his work at this session in effecting the removal of the capital. He had only to shrug his shoulders at the violence and untruthfulness of the majority, vote against them, and go back to his admiring constituents, to his dinners and his toasts. But his conscience

and his reason forbade him to be silent; he felt a word must be said on the other side to redress the distorted balance. He wrote his protest, saying not one word he was not ready to stand by then and thereafter, wasting not a syllable in rhetoric or feeling, keeping close to law and truth and justice. When he had finished it he showed it to some of his colleagues for their adhesion; but one and all refused, except Dan Stone, who was not a candidate for reëlection, having retired from politics to a seat on the bench. The risk was too great for the rest to run. Lincoln was twenty-eight years old; after a youth of singular privations and struggles he had arrived at an enviable position in the politics and the society of the State. His intimate friends, those whom he loved and honored, were Browning, Butler, Logan, and Stuart,—Kentuckians all, and strongly averse to any discussion of the question of slavery. The public opinion of his county, which was then little less than the breath of his life, was all the same way. But all these considerations could not withhold him from performing a simple duty—a duty which no one could have blamed him for leaving undone. The crowning grace of the whole act is in the closing sentence: "The difference between these opinions and those contained in the said resolutions is their reason for entering this protest." Reason enough for the Lincolns and Luthers.

He had many years of growth and development before him. There was a long distance to be traversed between the guarded utterances of this protest and the heroic audacity which launched the proclamation of emancipation. But the young man who dared declare, in the prosperous beginning of his political life, in the midst of a community imbued with slave-State superstitions, that "he believed the institution of slavery was founded both on injustice and bad policy,"—attacking thus its moral and material supports, while at the same time recognizing all the constitutional guarantees which protected it,—had in him the making of a statesman and, if need be, a martyr. His whole career was to run in the lines marked out by these words, written in the hurry of a closing session, and he was to accomplish few acts, in that great history which God reserved for him, wiser and nobler than this.

Dec 1886



THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

BY THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

ON June 30th General Meade at Taneytown received information that the enemy was advancing on Gettysburg, and corps commanders were at once instructed to hold their commands in readiness to march against him. The next day, July 1st, Meade wrote to Reynolds that telegraphic intelligence from Couch, and the movements reported by Buford, indicated a concentration of the enemy's army either at Chambersburg, or at some point on a line drawn from that place through Heidlersburg to York. Under these circumstances, Meade informed Reynolds that he had not yet decided whether it was his best policy to move to attack before he knew more definitely Lee's point of concentration. He seems, however, soon to have determined not to advance until the movements or position of the enemy gave strong assurance of success; and that if the enemy took the offensive, he would withdraw his own army from its actual positions and form line of battle behind Pipe Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester. The considerations probably moving him to this are not difficult to divine. Examination of the map [see the November CENTURY]

"ADJIEU."

face fixed in unconscious reverie, it was full of a grim, unhappy satisfaction.

"Self is winning or dying hard. I wish no ill to 'Thanase; but if there is to be any bad news of him, I hope, for the sake of this boy's soul, it will come quickly." So spoke the curé alone, to his cards.

George W. Cable.

(To be concluded.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN IN SPRINGFIELD.

MR. LINCOLN had made thus far very little money — nothing more, in fact, than a bare subsistence of the most modest character. But he had made some warm friends, and this meant very much among the early Illinoisians. He had become intimately acquainted, at Vandalia, with William Butler, who was greatly interested in the removal of the capital to Springfield, and who urged the young legislator to take up his residence at the new seat of government. Lincoln readily fell in with this suggestion, and accompanied his friend home when the Legislature adjourned, sharing the lodging of Joshua F. Speed, a young Kentucky merchant, and taking his meals at the house of Mr. Butler for several years.

WILLIAM BUTLER. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN ABOUT 1850, IN POSSESSION OF HIS DAUGHTER, MISS SALOME BUTLER.)

In this way began Mr. Lincoln's residence in Springfield, where he was to remain until called to one of the highest of destinies intrusted to men, and where his ashes were to rest forever in monumental marble. It would have seemed a dreary village to any one accustomed to the world, but in a letter written about this time, Lincoln speaks of it as a place where there was a "good deal of flourishing about in carriages" — a town of some pretensions to elegance. It had a population of fifteen hundred. The county contained nearly eighteen thousand souls, of whom seventy-eight were free negroes, twenty registered indentured servants, and six slaves. Scarcely a perceptible trace of color, one would say, yet we find in the Springfield paper a leading article† beginning with the startling announcement, "Our State is threatened to be run over with free negroes." The county was one of the richest in Illinois, possessed of a soil of inexhaustible fertility, and divided to the best advantage between prairie and forest. It was settled early in the history of the State, and the country was held in high esteem by the aborigines. The name of Sangamon is said to mean in the Pottawatomie language "land of plenty."‡ Its citizens were of an excellent class of people, a large majority of them from Kentucky, though representatives were not wanting from the Eastern States, men of education and character. There had been very little of what might be called pioneer life in Springfield. Civilization came in with a reasonably full equipment at the beginning. The Edwardses in fair top-boots and ruffled shirts; the Ridgelys brought their banking business from Maryland; the Logans and Conklings were good lawyers before they arrived; another family came with a cotton manufactory from Kentucky, which proved its aristocratic character by never doing any work. With a population like this, the town had, from the beginning, a more settled and orderly type than was usual in the South and West. A glance at the advertising columns of the newspaper will show how much

† "Sangamon Journal," November 7, 1835.
‡ Reynolds's "Life and Times," p. 237.

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JOSHUA SPEED AND WIFE. (FROM A PAINTING BY HEALY, ABOUT 1864.)

attention to dress was paid in the new capital. "Cloths, cassinetts, cassimeres, velvet, silk, satin, and Marseilles vestings, fine calf boots, seal and morocco pumps, for gentlemen," and for the sex which in barbarism dresses less and in civilization dresses more than the male, "silks, barèges, crêpe lisse, lace veils, thread lace, Thibet shawls, lace handkerchiefs, fine prunella shoes, etc." It is evident that the young politician was confronting a social world more formidably correct than anything he had as yet seen.

Governor Ford began some years before this to remark with pleasure the change in the dress of the people of Illinois: the gradual disappearance of leather and linsey-woolsey, the hunting-knife and tomahawk, from the garb of men; the deer-skin moccasin supplanted by the leather boot and shoe; the leather breeches tied around the ankle replaced by the modern pantaloons; and the still greater improvement in the adornment of women, the former bare feet decently shod, and homespun frocks giving way to gowns of calico and silk, and the heads tied up in red cotton turbans disappearing in favor of those surmounted by pretty bonnets of silk or straw. We admit that these changes were not unattended with the grumbling ill-will of the pioneer patriarchs; they predicted nothing but ruin to a country that thus forsook the old ways "which were good enough for their fathers." But with this change in dress came other alterations which were all for the better — a growing self-respect among the young; an industry and thrift by which they could buy good clothes; a habit of attending religious service, where they could show them; a progress in sociability, civility, trade, and morals.*

The taste for civilization had sometimes a whimsical manifestation. Mr. Stuart said the members of the Legislature bitterly complained of the amount of game — venison and grouse of the most delicious quality — which was served them at the taverns in Vandalia; they clamored for bacon — they were starving, they said, "for something civilized." There was plenty of civilized nourishment in Springfield. Wheat was fifty cents a bushel, rye thirty-three; corn and oats were twenty-five, potatoes twenty-five; butter was eight cents a pound, and eggs were eight cents a dozen; pork was two and a half cents a pound.

The town was built on the edge of the

* Ford's "History," p. 94.

MRS. LUCY G. SPEED, MOTHER OF JOSHUA SPEED. (FROM A PAINTING BY JOSEPH BUSH, ABOUT 1834.)

woods, the north side touching the timber, the south encroaching on the prairie. The richness of the soil was seen in the mud of the streets, black as ink, and of an unfathomable depth in time of thaw. There were, of course, no pavements or sidewalks; an attempt at crossings was made by laying down large chunks of wood. The houses were almost all of wood, and were disposed in rectangular blocks. A large square had been left in the middle of the town, in anticipation of future greatness, and there, when Lincoln began his residence, the work of clearing the ground for the new State-house was already going forward. In one of the largest houses looking on the square, at the north-west corner, the county court had its offices, and other rooms in the building were let to lawyers. One of these was occupied by Stuart and Lincoln, for the friendship formed in the Black Hawk war and strengthened at Vandalia induced "Major" Stuart to offer a partnership to "Captain" Lincoln.*

Lincoln did not gain any immediate eminence at the bar. His preliminary studies had been cursory and slight, and Stuart was then too much engrossed in politics to pay the unremitting attention to law which that jealous mistress requires. He had been a candidate for Congress the year before, and had been defeated by W. L. May. He was a candidate again in 1838, and was elected over so agile an adversary as Stephen Arnold Douglas. His paramount interest in these canvasses necessarily prevented him from setting to his junior partner the example, which Lincoln so greatly needed, of close and steady devotion to their profession. It was only several years later that Lincoln found with Judge Logan the companionship and inspiration which he required, and began to be really a lawyer. During the first year or two he is

* It is not unworthy of notice that in a country where military titles were conferred with ludicrous profusion and borne with absurd complacency, Lincoln, who had actually been commissioned, and had served as captain, never used the designation after he laid down his command.

principally remembered in Springfield as an excellent talker, the life and soul of the little gatherings about the county offices, a story-teller of the first rank, a good-natured, friendly fellow whom everybody liked and trusted. He relied more upon his influence with a jury than upon his knowledge of law in the few cases he conducted in court, his acquaintance with human nature being far more extensive than his legal lore.

LINCOLN AND STUART'S LAW-OFFICE, SPRINGFIELD.

THE COLLAPSE OF "THE SYSTEM."

LINCOLN was not yet done with Vandalia, its dinners of game, and its political intrigue. The archives of the State were not removed to Springfield until 1839, and Lincoln remained a member of the Legislature by successive reëlections from 1834 to 1842. He was called down to Vandalia in the summer of 1837, by a special session of the Legislature. The magnificent schemes of the foregoing winter required some repairing. The banks throughout the United States had suspended specie payments in the spring, and as the State banks in Illinois were the fiscal agents of the railroads and canals, the Governor called upon the law-makers to revise their own work, to legalize the suspension, and bring their improvement system within possible bounds. They acted as might have been expected: complied with the former suggestion, but flatly refused to touch their masterpiece. They had been glorifying their work too energetically to destroy it in its infancy. It was said you could recognize a legislator that year in any crowd by his automatic repetition of the phrase, "Thirteen hundred — fellow-citizens! — and fifty miles of railroad!" There was nothing to be done but go on with the stupendous folly. Loans were effected with surprising and fatal facility, and "before the end of the year, work had begun at many points on the railroads. The whole State was excited to the highest pitch of frenzy and expectation. Money was as plenty as dirt. Industry, instead of being stimulated, actually languished. We exported nothing," says Governor Ford, "and everything from abroad was paid for by the borrowed money expended among us." Not only upon the railroads, but on the canal as well, the work was begun on a magnificent scale. Nine millions of dollars were thought to be a mere trifle in view of the colossal sum expected to be realized from the sale of canal lands, three hundred thousand acres of which had been given by the General Government. There were rumors of coming trouble, and of an unhealthy condition of the banks; but it was considered incivism to look too curiously into such matters. One frank patriot, who had been sent as one of a committee to examine the bank at Shawneetown, when asked what he found there, replied with winning candor, "Plenty of good whisky and sugar to sweeten it."*

OFFICE CHAIR USED IN LINCOLN AND STUART'S OFFICE.
(IN POSSESSION OF O. H. OLDROYD.)

But a year of baleful experience destroyed a great many illusions, and in the election of 1838 the subject of internal improvements was treated with much more reserve by candidates. The debt of the State, issued at a continually increasing discount, had already attained enormous proportions; the delirium of the last few years was ending, and sensible people began to be greatly disquieted. Nevertheless, Mr. Cyrus Edwards boldly made his canvass for Governor as a supporter of the system of internal improvements, and his opponent, Thomas Carlin, was careful not to

* Ford's "History," p. 197.

LINCOLN'S INKSTAND.
(FROM THE KEYES LINCOLN MEMORIAL COLLECTION, CHICAGO.)

commit himself strongly on the other side. Carlin was elected, and finding that a majority of the Legislature was still opposed to any steps backward, he made no demonstration against the system at the first session. Lincoln was a member of this body, and, being by that time the unquestioned leader of the Whig minority, was nominated for Speaker, and came within one vote of an election. The Legislature was still stiff-necked and perverse in regard to the system. It refused to modify it in the least, and voted, as if in bravado, another eight hundred thousand dollars to extend it.

But this was the last paroxysm of a fever that was burnt out. The market was glutted with Illinois bonds; one banker and one broker after another, to whose hands they had been recklessly confided in New York and London, failed, or made away with the proceeds of sales. The system had utterly failed; there was nothing to do but repeal it, stop work upon the visionary roads, and endeavor to invent some means of paying the enormous debt. This work taxed the energies of the Legislature in 1839, and for some years after. It was a dismal and disheartening task. Blue Monday had come after these years of intoxication, and a crushing debt rested upon a people who had been deceiving themselves with the fallacy that it would somehow pay itself by acts of the Legislature. Many were the schemes devised for meeting these oppressive obligations without unduly taxing the voters; one of them, not especially wiser than the rest, was contributed by Mr. Lincoln. It provided for the issue of bonds for the payment of the interest due by the State, and for the appropriation of a special portion of State taxes to meet the obligations thus incurred. He supported his bill in a perfectly characteristic speech, making no effort to evade his share of the responsibility for the crisis, and submitting his views with diffidence to the approval of the Assembly. His plan was not adopted; it was too simple and straightforward, even if it had any other merits, to meet the approval of an assembly intent only upon getting out of immediate embarrassment by means which might save them trouble on the stump hereafter. There was even an undercurrent of sentiment in favor of repudiation. But the payment of the interest for that year was provided for by an ingenious expedient, which shifted upon the Fund Commissioners the responsibility of deciding what portion of the debt was legal, and how much interest was therefore to be paid. Bonds were sold for this purpose at a heavy loss.

This session of the Legislature was enlivened by a singular contest between the Whigs and Democrats in relation to the State banks. Their suspension of specie payments had been legalized up to "the adjournment of the next session of the Legislature." They were not now able to resume, and it was held by the Democrats that if the special session adjourned *sine die* the charter of the banks would be forfeited, a purpose the party was eager to accomplish. The Whigs, who were defending the banks, wished to prevent the adjournment of the



LINCOLN'S BOOKCASE.
(FROM THE KEYES LINCOLN MEMORIAL COLLECTION, CHICAGO.)



MILTON HAY, 1886. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY W. F. TRUESDELL.)

special session until the regular session should begin, during the course of which they expected to renew the lease of life now held under sufferance by the banks—in which, it may be here said, they were finally successful. But on one occasion, being in the minority, and having exhausted every other parliamentary means of opposition and delay, and seeing the vote they dreaded imminent, they tried to defeat it by leaving the house in a body, and, the doors being locked, a number of them, among whom Mr. Lincoln's tall figure was prominent, jumped from the windows of the church where the Legislature was then holding its sessions. "I think," says Mr. Gillespie, who was one of those who performed this feat of acrobatic politics, "Mr. Lincoln always regretted it, as he deprecated everything that savored of the revolutionary."

Two years later the persecuted banks, harried by the demagogues and swindled by the State, fell with a great ruin, and the financial misery of the State was complete. Nothing was left of the brilliant schemes of the historic Legislature of 1836 but a load of debt which crippled for many years the energies of the people, a few miles of embankments which the grass hastened to cover, and a few abutments which stood for years by the sides of leafy rivers, waiting for the bridges and the trains which were never to come.

During the winter of 1840–1 occurred the first clash of opinion and principle between Mr. Lincoln and his life-long adversary, Mr. Douglas. There are those who can see only envy and jealousy in that strong dislike and disapproval with which Mr. Lincoln always regarded his famous rival, and we regret that one of his biographers has taken this injurious view of the matter. But we think that few men have ever lived who were more free from those degrading passions than Abraham Lincoln, and the personal reprobation with which he always visited the public acts of Douglas arose from his sincere conviction that the man was essentially without fixed political morals. They had met for the first time in 1834 at Vandalia, where Douglas was busy in getting the circuit attorneyship away from John J. Hardin. He held it only long enough to secure a nomination to the Legislature in 1836. He went there to endeavor to have the capital moved to Jacksonville, where he lived, but he gave up the fight for the purpose of having himself appointed Register of the Land Office at Springfield. He held this place as a means of being nominated for Congress the next year; he was nominated and defeated. In 1840 he was engaged in another scheme



WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, 1841. (FROM A PAINTING BY HENRY INMAN, IN POSSESSION OF BENJAMIN HARRISON.)

to which we will give a moment's attention, which resulted in giving him a seat on the Supreme Bench of the State, which he used merely as a perch from which to get into Congress.

There had been a difference of opinion in Illinois for some years as to whether the Constitution, which made voters of all white male inhabitants of six months' residence, meant to include aliens in that category. As the aliens were nearly all Democrats, that party insisted on their voting, and the Whigs objected. The best lawyers in the State were Whigs, and so it happened that most of the judges were of that complexion. A case was made up for decision and decided adversely to the aliens, who appealed it to the Supreme Court. This case was to come on at the June term in 1840, and the Democratic counsel, chief among whom was Mr. Douglas, were in some anxiety, as an unfavorable decision would lose them about ten thousand alien votes in the Presidential election in November. In this conjuncture one Judge Smith, of the Supreme Court, an ardent Democrat, willing to enhance his value in his party, communicated to Mr. Douglas two important facts: first, that a majority of the court would certainly decide against the aliens; and, secondly, that there was a slight imperfection in the record by which counsel might throw the case over to the December term, and save the alien vote for Van Buren and the Democratic ticket. This was done, and when the Legislature came together with its large Democratic majority, Mr. Douglas handed in a bill "reforming" the Judiciary — for they had learned that serviceable word already. The circuit judges were turned out of office, and five new judges were added to the Supreme Court, who were to perform circuit duty also. It is needless to say that Judge Douglas was one of these, and he had contrived also in the course of the discussion to disgrace his friend Smith so thoroughly by quoting his treacherous communication of matters which took place within the court, that Smith was no longer a possible rival for political honors.

It was useless for the Whigs to try to prevent this degradation of the bench. There was no resource but a protest, and here again Lincoln uttered the voice of the conscience of the party. He was joined on this occasion by Colonel E. D. Baker * and some others, who protested against the act because

"1st. It violates the principles of free government by subjecting the Judiciary to the Legislature.

* The same who was afterwards senator from Oregon, killed at Ball's Bluff.

"2d. It is a fatal blow at the independence of the judges and the constitutional term of their offices.

"3d. It is a measure not asked for or wished for by the people.

"4th. It will greatly increase the expense of our courts or else greatly diminish their utility.

"5th. It will give our courts a political and partisan character, thereby impairing public confidence in their decisions.

"6th. It will impair our standing with other States and the world.

"7th. It is a party measure for party purposes from which no practical good to the people can possibly arise, but which may be the source of immeasurable evils.

"The undersigned are well aware that this protest will be altogether unavailing with the majority of this body. The blow has already fallen; and we are compelled to stand by, the mournful spectators of the ruin it will cause."

It will be easy to ridicule this indignant protest as the angry outcry of beaten partisans; but fortunately we have evidence which cannot be gainsaid of the justice of its sentiments and the wisdom of its predictions. Governor Ford,* himself a Democratic leader as able as he was honest, writing seven years after these events, condemns them as wrong and impolitic, and adds, "Ever since this reforming measure the Judiciary has been unpopular with the Democratic majorities. Many and most of the judges have had great personal popularity — so much so as to create complaint of so many of them being elected or appointed to other offices. But the Bench itself has been the subject of bitter attacks by every Legislature since." It had been soiled by unclean contact and could not be respected as before.



LAW IN SPRINGFIELD.

During all the years of his service in the Legislature, Lincoln was practicing law in Springfield in the dingy little office at the corner of the square. A youth named Milton Hay, who afterwards became one of the foremost lawyers of the State, had become acquainted with Lincoln at the County Clerk's office and proposed to study law with him. He was at once accepted as a pupil, and as his days were otherwise employed he gave his nights to reading, and as his vigils were apt to be prolonged he furnished a bedroom adjoining the office, where Lincoln often passed the night with him. Mr. Hay gives this interesting account of the practice of law in those days:



HARRISON AND TYLER CAMPAIGN BADGE. (IN POSSESSION OF BENJAMIN HARRISON.)

"In forming our ideas of Lincoln's growth and development as a lawyer, we must remember that in those early days litigation was very simple as compared with that of modern times. Population was sparse and society scarcely organized, land was plentiful and employment abundant. There was an utter absence of the abstruse questions and complications which now beset the law. There was no need of that close and searching study into principles and precedents which keeps the modern law-student buried in his office. On the contrary, the very character of this simple litigation drew the lawyer into the street and neighborhood, and into close and active intercourse with all classes of his fellow-men. The suits consisted of actions of tort and assumpsit. If a man had an uncollectible debt, the current phrase was, 'I'll take it out of his hide.' This would bring on an action for assault and battery. The free comments of the neighbors on the fracas or the character of the parties would be productive of slander suits. A man would for his convenience lay down an irascible neighbor's fence, and indolently forget to put it up again, and an action of trespass would grow out of it. The suit would lead to a free fight, and sometimes furnish the bloody incidents for a murder trial.

"Occupied with this class of business, the half-legal, half-political lawyers were never found plodding in their offices. In that case they would have waited long for the recognition of their talents or a demand for their services. Out of this characteristic of the times also grew the street discussions I have adverted to. There was scarcely a day or hour when a knot of men might not have been seen near the door of some prominent store, or about the steps of the court-house, eagerly discussing a current political topic — not as a question of news, for news was not then received quickly or frequently, as it is now, but rather for the sake of debate; and the men from the country, the pioneers and farmers, always gathered eagerly about these groups and listened with open-mouthed interest, and frequently manifested their approval or dissent in strong words, and carried away to their neighborhoods a report of the debaters' wit and skill. It was in these street talks that the rising and aspiring young lawyer found his daily and hourly forum. Often by good luck or prudence he had the field entirely to himself, and so escaped the dangers and discouragements of a decisive conflict with a trained antagonist."

Mr. Stuart was either in Congress or engaged in actively canvassing his district a great part of the time that his partnership with Lincoln continued, so that the young lawyer was thrown a good deal on his own



PORTION OF BORDER OF HARRISON CAMPAIGN POSTER. (IN POSSESSION OF BENJAMIN HARRISON.)

*Ford's "History," p. 221.



COVER OF SONG BOOK USED IN HARRISON CAMPAIGN.
(IN POSSESSION OF BENJAMIN HARRISON.)

resources for occupation. There was not enough business to fill up all his hours, and he was not at that time a close student, so that he soon became as famous for his racy talk and good-fellowship at all the usual lounging-places in Springfield as he had ever been in New Salem. Mr. Hay says, speaking of the youths who made the County Clerk's office their place of rendezvous, "It was always a great treat when Lincoln got amongst us. We were sure to have some of those stories for which he already had a reputation, and there was this peculiarity about them, that they were not only entertaining in themselves, but always singularly illustrative of some point he wanted to make." After Mr. Hay entered his office, and was busily engaged with his briefs and declarations, the course of their labors was often broken by the older man's wise and witty digressions. Once an interruption occurred which affords an odd illustration of the character of discussion then prevalent. We will give it in Mr. Hay's words:

"The custom of public political debate, while it was sharp and acrimonious, also engendered a spirit of equality and fairness. Every political meeting was a free fight open to every one who had talent and spirit, no matter to which party the speaker belonged. These discussions used often to be held in the court-room, just under our office, and through a trap-door, made there when the building was used for a store-house, we could hear everything that was said in the hall below. One night there was a discussion in which Baker took part. He was a fiery fellow, and when his impulsiveness was let loose among the rough element that composed his audience, there was a fair prospect of trouble at any moment. Lincoln was lying on the bed, apparently paying no attention to what was going on. Lamborn was talking, and we suddenly heard Baker interrupting him with a sharp remark, then a rustling and uproar. Lincoln jumped from the bed and down the trap, lighting on the platform between Baker and the audience, and quieted the tumult as much by the surprise of his sudden apparition as by his good-natured and reasonable words."

He was often unfaithful to the Quaker traditions in those days of his youth. Those who witnessed his wonderful forbearance and self-restraint in later manhood would find it difficult to believe how promptly and with what pleasure he used to resort to measures of repression against a bully or brawler. On the day of election in 1840, word came to him that one Radford, a Democratic contractor, had taken possession of one of the polling-places with his workmen, and was preventing the Whigs from voting. Lincoln started off at a gait which showed his interest in the matter in hand. He went up to Radford and persuaded him to leave the polls without a moment's delay. One of his candid remarks is remembered and recorded: "Radford! you'll spoil and blow, if you live much longer." Radford's prudence prevented an actual collision, which, it must be confessed, Lincoln regretted. He told his friend Speed he wanted Radford to show fight so that he might "knock him down and leave him kicking."*

Early in the year 1840 it seemed possible that the Whigs might elect General Harrison to the Presidency, and this hope lent added energy to the party even in the States where the majority was so strongly against them as in Illinois. Lincoln was nominated for Presidential Elector and threw himself with ardor into the canvass, traversing a great part of the State and speaking with remarkable effect. Only one of the speeches he made during the year has been preserved entire: this was an address delivered in Springfield as one of a series — a sort of oratorical tournament participated in by Douglas, Calhoun, Lamborn and Thomas, on the part of the Democrats, and Logan, Baker, Browning, and Lincoln on the part of the Whigs. The discussion began with great enthusiasm and with crowded houses, but by the time it came to Lincoln's duty to close the debate the fickle public had tired of the intellectual jousts, and he spoke to a comparatively thin house. But his speech was considered the best of the series, and there was such a demand for it that he wrote it out, and it was printed and circulated in the

* Lamon, p. 230.

spring as a campaign document. It was a remarkable speech in many respects — and in none more than in this, that it represented the highest expression of what might be called his "first manner." It was the most important and the last speech of its class which he ever delivered — not destitute of sound and close reasoning, yet filled with boisterous fun and florid rhetoric. It was, in short, a rattling stump speech of the sort then universally popular in the West, and which is still considered a very high grade of eloquence in the South. But it is of no kindred with his Inaugural addresses, and resembles the Gettysburg speech no more than "The Comedy of Errors" resembles "Hamlet." One or two extracts will give some idea of its humorous satire and its lurid fervor. Attacking the corruptions and defalcations of the administration party he said, "Mr. Lamborn insists that the difference between the Van Buren party and the Whigs is that, although the former sometimes err in practice they are always correct in principle, whereas the latter are wrong in principle; and the better to impress this proposition he uses a figurative expression in these words, 'The Democrats are vulnerable in the heel, but they are sound in the heart and head.' The first branch of the figure — that is, the Democrats are vulnerable in the heel — I admit is not merely figuratively but literally true. Who that looks but for a moment at their Swartwouts, their Prices, their Harringtons, and their hundreds of others scampering away with the public money to Texas, to Europe, and to every spot of the earth where a villain may hope to find refuge from justice, can at all doubt that they are most distressingly affected in their heels with a species of running itch. It seems that this malady of their heels operates on the sound-headed and honest-hearted creatures very much as the cork leg in the comic song did on its owner, which, when he once got started on it, the more he tried to stop it the more it would run away. At the hazard of wearing this point threadbare, I will relate an anecdote which seems to be too strikingly in point to be omitted. A witty Irish soldier who was always boasting of his bravery when no danger was near, but who invariably retreated without orders at the first charge of the engagement, being asked by his captain why he did so, replied, 'Captain, I have as brave a heart as Julius Cæsar ever had, but somehow or other whenever danger approaches, my cowardly legs will run away with it.' So with Mr. Lamborn's party — they take the public money into their hands for the most laudable purpose that wise heads and honest hearts can dictate; but before they can possibly get it out again, their rascally vulnerable heels will run away with them."

The speech concludes with these swelling words:

"Mr. Lamborn refers to the late elections in the States, and from their results confidently predicts every State in the Union will vote for Mr. Van Buren at the next Presidential election. Address that argument to cowards and knaves: with the free and the brave it will affect nothing. It may be true; if it must, let it. Many free countries have lost their liberty, and ours may lose hers; but if she shall, be it my proudest plume, not that I was the last to desert, but that I never deserted her. I know that the great volcano at Washington, aroused and directed by the evil spirit that reigns there, is belching forth the lava of political corruption in a current broad and deep, which is sweeping with frightful velocity over the whole length and breadth of the land, bidding fair to leave unscathed no green spot or living thing; while on its bosom are riding, like demons on the wave of Hell, the imps of the Evil Spirit, and fiendishly taunting all those who dare to resist its destroying course with the hopelessness of



COVER OF SONG BOOK USED IN HARRISON CAMPAIGN.
(IN POSSESSION OF BENJAMIN HARRISON.)

their efforts; and knowing this, I cannot deny that all may be swept away. Broken by it I, too, may be; bow to it, I never will. The probability that we may fall in the struggle ought not to deter us from the support of a cause we believe to be just. It shall not deter me. If ever I feel the soul within me elevate and expand to those dimensions not wholly unworthy of its almighty architect, it is when I contemplate the cause of my country, deserted by all the world beside, and I standing up boldly alone, hurling defiance at her victorious oppressors. Here, without contemplating consequences, before Heaven, and in face of the world, I swear eternal fealty to the just cause, as I deem it, of the land of my life, my liberty, and my love. And who that thinks with me will not fearlessly adopt that oath that I take? Let none falter who thinks he is right, and we may succeed. But if after all we should fail, be it so. We still shall have the proud consolation of saying to our consciences, and to the departed shade of our country's freedom, that the cause approved of our judgment, and adored of our hearts, in disaster, in chains, in torture, in death, we never faltered in defending."

These perfervid and musical metaphors of devotion and defiance have often been quoted as Mr. Lincoln's heroic challenge to the slave power, and Bishop Simpson gave them that lofty significance in his funeral oration. But they were simply the utterances of a young and ardent Whig, earnestly advocating the election of "old Tippecanoe" and not unwilling, while doing this, to show the people of the capital a specimen of his eloquence. The whole campaign was carried on in a tone somewhat shrill. The Whigs were recovering from the numbness into which they had fallen during the time of Jackson's imperious predominance, and in the new prospect of success they felt all the excitement of prosperous rebels. The taunts of the party in power, when Harrison's nomination was first mentioned, their sneers at "hard cider" and "log-cabins," had been dexterously adopted as the slogan of the opposition, and gave rise to the distinguishing features of that extraordinary campaign. Log-cabins were built in every Western county, tuns of hard cider were filled and emptied at all the Whig mass meetings; and as the canvass gained momentum and vehemence, a curious kind of music added its inspiration to the cause; and after the Maine election was over, with its augury of triumph, every Whig who was able to sing, or even to make a joyful noise, was roaring the inquiry, "Oh, have you heard how old Maine went?" and the profane but powerfully accented response, "She went, hell-bent, for Governor Kent, and Tippecanoe, and Tyler too."

It was one of the busiest and most enjoyable seasons of Lincoln's life. He had grown by this time thoroughly at home in political controversy, and he had the pleasure of frequently meeting Mr. Douglas in rough-and-tumble debate in various towns of the State as they followed Judge Treat on his circuit. If we may trust the willing testimony of his old associates, Lincoln had no difficulty in holding his own against his adroit antagonist, and it was even thought that the recollection of his ill success in these encounters was not without its influence in inducing Douglas and his followers, defeated in the nation, though victorious in the State, to wreak their vengeance on the Illinois Supreme Court.

In Lincoln's letters to Major Stuart,* then in Washington, we see how strongly the subject of politics overshadows all others in his mind. Under date of November 14, 1839, he writes:

"I have been to the Secretary's office within the last hour, and find things precisely as you left them; no new arrivals of returns on either side. Douglas has not been here since you left. A report is in circulation here now that he has abandoned the idea of going to Washington; but the report does not come in very authentic form so far as I can learn. Though, speaking of authenticity, you know that if we had heard Douglas say that he had abandoned the contest, it would not be very authentic. There is no news here. Noah,† I still think, will be elected very easily. I am afraid of our race for representative. Dr. Knapp has become a candidate; and I fear the few votes he will get will be taken from us. Also some one has been tampering with old squire Wyckoff, and induced him to send in his name to be announced as a candidate. Francis refused to announce him without seeing him, and now I suppose there is to be a fuss about it. I have been so busy that I have not seen Mrs. Stuart since you left, though I understand she wrote you by to-day's mail, which will inform you more about her than I could. The very moment a speaker is elected, write me who he is. Your friend, as ever."

Again he writes, on New Year's Day, 1840, a letter curiously destitute of any festal suggestions:

"There is a considerable disposition on the part of both parties in the Legislature to reinstate the law bringing on the Congressional elections next summer. What motive for this the Locos have, I cannot tell. The Whigs say that the canal and other public works will stop, and consequently we shall then be clear of the foreign votes, whereas by another year they may be brought in again. The Whigs of our district say that everything is in favor of holding the election next summer, except the fact of your absence; and several of them have requested me to ask your opinion on the matter. Write me immediately what you think of it.

"On the other side of this sheet I send you a copy of my Land Resolutions, which passed both branches of our Legislature last winter. Will you show them to Mr. Calhoun, informing him of the fact of their passage through our Legislature? Mr. Calhoun suggested a similar proposition last winter; and perhaps if he finds himself backed by one of the States he may be induced to take it up again."

After the session opened, January 20th, he wrote to Mr. Stuart, accurately outlining the work of the winter:

"The following is my guess at what will be done. The Internal Improvement System will be put down in a lump without benefit of clergy. The Bank will be resuscitated with some trifling modifications."

* Copied from the MS. in Major Stuart's possession.
† Noah Matheny, County Clerk.

State affairs have evidently lost their interest, however, and his soul is in arms for the wider fray. "Be sure to send me as many Lives of Harrison as you can spare. Be very sure to send me the Senate Journal of New York for September, 1814,"—he had seen in a newspaper a charge of disloyalty made against Mr. Van Buren during the war with Great Britain, but, as usual, wanted to be sure of his facts,—"and in general," he adds, "send me everything you think will be a good war-club. The nomination of Harrison takes first-rate. You know I am never sanguine; but I believe we will carry the State. The chance for doing so appears to me twenty-five per cent. better than it did for you to beat Douglas. A great many of the grocery sort of Van Buren men are out for Harrison. Our Irish blacksmith Gregory is for Harrison. You have heard that the Whigs and Locos had a political discussion shortly after the meeting of the Legislature. Well, I made a big speech [the one from which we have just quoted] which is in progress of printing in pamphlet form. To enlighten you and the rest of the world, I shall send you a copy when it is finished."

The sanguine mood continues in his next letter, March 1st:

"I have never seen the prospects of our party so bright in these parts as they are now. We shall carry this county by a larger majority than we did in 1836 when you ran against May. I do not think my prospects individually are very flattering, for I think it probable I shall not be permitted to be a candidate; but the party ticket will succeed triumphantly. Subscriptions to the 'Old Soldier' pour in without abatement. This morning I took from the post-office a letter from Dubois, inclosing the names of sixty subscribers, and on carrying it to Francis [Simeon Francis, editor of the 'Sangamon Journal'] I found he had received one hundred and forty more from other quarters by the same day's mail. Yesterday Douglas, having chosen to consider himself insulted by something in the 'Journal,' undertook to cane Francis in the street. Francis caught him by the hair and jammed him back against a market-cart, where the matter ended by Francis being pulled away from him. The whole affair was so ludicrous that Francis and everybody else, Douglas excepted, have been laughing about it ever since."

Douglas seems to have had a great propensity to such rencontres, of which the issue was ordinarily his complete discomfiture, as he had the untoward habit of attacking much bigger and stronger men than himself. He weighed at that time little, if anything, over a hundred pounds, yet his heart was so valiant that he made nothing of assaulting men of ponderous flesh like Francis, or of great height and strength like Stuart. He sought a quarrel with the latter, during their canvass in 1838, in a grocery, with the usual result. A bystander who remembers the incident says that Stuart "jest mopped the floor with him."

In the same letter Mr. Lincoln gives a long list of names to which he wants documents to be sent. It shows a remarkable personal acquaintance with the minutest needs of the canvass: this one is a doubtful Whig; that one is an inquiring Democrat; that other a zealous young fellow who would be pleased by the attention; three brothers are mentioned who "fell out with us about Early and are doubtful now"; and finally he tells Stuart that Joe Smith is an admirer of his, and that a few documents had better be mailed to the Mormons, and he must be sure, the next time he writes, to send Evan Butler his compliments.

It would be strange, indeed, if such a politician as this were slighted by his constituents, and in his next letter we find how groundless were his forebodings in that direction. The convention had been held; the rural delegates took all the nominations away from Springfield except two, Baker for the Senate, and Lincoln for the House of Representatives. "Ninian," he says, meaning Ninian W. Edwards, "was very much hurt at not being nominated, but he has become tolerably well reconciled. I was much, very much, wounded myself, at his being left out. The fact is, the country delegates made the nominations as they pleased, and they *pleased* to make them all from the country, except Baker and me, whom they supposed necessary to make stump speeches. Old Colonel Elkin is nominated for Sheriff—that's right."

Harrison was elected in November, and the great preoccupation of most of the Whigs was, of course, the distribution of the offices which they felt belonged to them as the spoils of battle. This demoralizing doctrine had been promulgated by Jackson, and acted upon for so many years that it was too much to expect of human nature that the Whigs should not adopt it, partially at least, when their turn came. But we are left in no doubt as to the way in which Lincoln regarded the unseemly scramble. It is probable that he was asked to express his preference among applicants, and he writes under date of December 17:

"This affair of appointments to office is very annoying—more so to you than to me doubtless. I am, as you know, opposed to removals to make places for our friends. Bearing this in mind, I express my preference in a few cases as follows: for Marshal, first, John Dawson, second, B. F. Edwards; for postmaster here, Dr. Henry; at Carlinville, Joseph C. Howell."

The mention of this last post-office rouses his righteous indignation, and he calls for justice upon a wrong-doer.

"There is no question of the propriety of removing the postmaster at Carlinville. I have been told by so

many different persons as to preclude all doubt of its truth, that he boldly refused to deliver from his office during the canvass all documents franked by Whig members of Congress."

Once more, on the 23d of January, 1841, he addresses a letter to Mr. Stuart, which closes the correspondence, and which affords a glimpse of that strange condition of melancholia into whose dark shadow he was then entering, and which lasted, with only occasional intervals of healthy cheerfulness, to the time of his marriage. We give this remarkable letter entire, from the manuscript submitted to us by the late John T. Stuart:

"DEAR STUART: Yours of the 3d instant is received, and I proceed to answer it as well as I can, though from the deplorable state of my mind at this time I fear I shall give you but little satisfaction. About the matter of the Congressional election, I can only tell you that there is a bill now before the Senate adopting the general ticket system; but whether the party have fully determined on its adoption is yet uncertain. There is no sign of opposition to you among our friends, and none that I can learn among our enemies; though of course there will be if the general ticket be adopted. The Chicago 'American,' Peoria 'Register,' and Sangamon 'Journal' have already hoisted your flag upon their own responsibility; and the other Whig papers of the district are expected to follow immediately. On last evening there was a meeting of our friends at Butler's, and I submitted the question to them and found them unanimously in favor of having you announced as a candidate. A few of us this morning, however, concluded that as you were already being announced in the papers, we would delay announcing you, as by your authority, for a week or two. We thought that to appear too keen about it might spur our opponents on about their general ticket project. Upon the whole I think I may say with certainty that your reëlection is sure, if it be in the power of the Whigs to make it so.

"For not giving you a general summary of news, you *must* pardon me; it is not in my power to do so. I am now the most miserable man living. If what I feel were equally distributed to the whole human family, there would not be one cheerful face on earth. Whether I shall ever be better I cannot tell; I awfully forebode I shall not. To remain as I am is impossible; I must die or be better, it appears to me. The matter you speak of on my account you may attend to as you say, unless you shall hear of my condition forbidding it. I say this because I fear I shall be unable to attend to any business here, and a change of scene might help me. If I could be myself, I would rather remain at home with Judge Logan. I can write no more. Your friend as ever.

(Signed) "A. LINCOLN."

LINCOLN'S MARRIAGE.

THE foregoing letter brings us to the consideration of a remarkable passage in Lincoln's life. It has been the cause of much profane and idle discussion among those who were constitutionally incapacitated from appreciating ideal sufferings, and we would be tempted to refrain from adding a word to what has already been said if it were possible to omit all reference to an experience so important in the development of his character.

In the year 1840 he became engaged to be married to Miss Mary Todd, of Lexington, Kentucky, a young lady of good education and excellent connections, who was visiting her sister, Mrs. Ninian W. Edwards, at Springfield.* The engagement was not in all respects a happy one, as both parties doubted their mutual compatibility, and a heart so affectionate and a conscience so sensitive as Lincoln's found material for exquisite self-torment in these conditions. His affection for his betrothed, which he thought was not strong enough to make happiness with her secure; his doubts, which yet were not convincing enough to induce him to break off all relations with her; his sense of honor, which was wounded in his own eyes by his own act; his sense of duty, which condemned him in one course and did not sustain him in the opposite one — all combined to make him profoundly and passionately miserable. To his friends and acquaintances, who were unacquainted with such finely wrought and even fantastic sorrows, his trouble seemed so exaggerated that they could only account for it on the ground of insanity. But there is no necessity of accepting this crude hypothesis; the coolest and most judicious of his friends deny that his depression ever went to such an extremity. Orville H. Browning, who was constantly in his company, says that his worst attack lasted only about a week; that during this time he was incoherent and distraught; but that in the course of a few days it all passed off, leaving no trace whatever. "I think," says Mr. Browning, "it was only an intensification of his constitutional melancholy; his trials and embarrassments pressed him down to a lower point than usual."

This taint of constitutional sadness was not peculiar to Lincoln; it may be said to have been endemic among the early settlers of the West. It had its origin partly in the circumstances of their lives, the severe and dismal loneliness in which their struggle for existence for the most part went on. Their summers

* Mrs. Lincoln was the daughter of the Hon. Robert S. Todd of Kentucky. Her great-uncle, John Todd, accompanied General George Rogers Clark to Illinois, and was present at the capture of Kaskaskia and Vincennes. In December, 1778, he was appointed by Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, to be lieutenant of the county of Illinois, then a part of Virginia. He was killed at the battle of Blue Licks, in 1782. His brother Levi, Mrs. Lincoln's grandfather, was also at that battle, and was one of the few survivors of it.

Colonel John Todd was one of the original proprietors of the town of Lexington, Ky. While encamped on the site of the present city, he heard of the opening battle of the Revolution, and named his infant settlement in its honor.— Arnold's "Life of Lincoln," p. 68.

were passed in the solitude of the woods; in the winters they were often snowed up for months in the more desolate isolation of their own poor cabins. Their subjects of conversation were limited, their range of thoughts and ideas narrow and barren. There was as little cheerfulness in their manners as there was incentive to it in their lives. They occasionally burst out into wild frolic, which easily assumed the form of comic outrage, but of the sustained cheerfulness of social civilized life they knew very little. One of the few pioneers who have written their observations of their own people, Mr. John McConnell,* says, "They are at the best not a cheerful race; though they sometimes join in festivities, it is but seldom, and the wildness of their dissipation is too often in proportion to its infrequency. There is none of that serene contentment which distinguishes the tillers of the ground in other lands.... Acquainted with the character [of the pioneer,] you do not expect him to smile much, but now and then he laughs."

Besides this generic tendency to melancholy, very many of the pioneers were subject in early life to malarial influences, the effect of which remained with them all their days. Hewing out their plantations in the primeval woods amid the undisturbed shadow of centuries, breaking a soil thick with ages of vegetable decomposition, sleeping in half-faced camps, where the heavy air of the rank woods was in their lungs all night, or in the fouler atmosphere of overcrowded cabins, they were especially subject to miasmatic fevers. Many died, and of those who survived a great number, after they had outgrown the more immediate manifestations of disease, retained in nervous disorders of all kinds the distressing traces of the maladies which afflicted their childhood. In the early life of Lincoln these unwholesome physical conditions were especially prevalent. The country about Pigeon Creek was literally devastated by the terrible malady called "milk-sickness," which carried away his mother and half her family. His father left his home in Sangamon County also, on account of the frequency and severity of the attacks of fever and ague which were suffered there; and, in general, Abraham was exposed through all the earlier part of his life to those malarial influences which made, during the first half of this century, the various preparations of Peruvian bark a part of the daily food of the people of Indiana and Illinois. In many instances this miasmatic poison did not destroy the strength or materially shorten the lives of those who absorbed it in their youth; but the effects remained in periodical attacks of gloom and depression of spirits which would seem incomprehensible to thoroughly healthy organizations, and which gradually lessened in middle life, often to disappear entirely in old age.

Upon a temperament thus predisposed to look at things in their darker aspect, it might naturally be expected that a love-affair which was not perfectly happy would be productive of great misery. But Lincoln seemed especially chosen to the keenest suffering in such a conjuncture. The pioneer, as a rule, was comparatively free from any troubles of the imagination. To quote Mr. McConnell† again: "There was no romance in his [the pioneer's] composition. He had no dreaminess; meditation was no part of his mental habit; a poetical fancy would, in him, have been an indication of insanity. If he reclined at the foot of a tree, on a still summer day, it was to sleep; if he gazed out over the waving prairie, it was to search for the column of smoke which told of his enemies' approach; if he turned his eyes towards the blue heaven, it was to prognosticate to-morrow's rain or sunshine. If he bent his gaze towards the green earth, it was to look for 'Indian sign' or buffalo trail. His wife was only a helpmate; he never thought of making a divinity of her." But Lincoln could never have claimed this happy immunity from ideal trials. His published speeches show how much the poet in him was constantly kept in check; and at this time of his life his imagination was sufficiently alert to inflict upon him the sharpest anguish. His reverence for women was so deep and tender that he thought an injury to one of them was a sin too heinous to be expiated. No Hamlet, dreaming amid the turrets of Elsinore, no Sidney creating a chivalrous Arcadia, was fuller of mystic and shadowy fancies of the worth and dignity of woman than this backwoods politician. Few men ever lived more sensitively and delicately tender towards the sex.

Besides his step-mother, who was a plain, God-fearing woman, he had not known many others until he came to live in New Salem. There he had made the acquaintance of the best people the settlement contained, and among them had become much attached to a young lady named Ann Rutledge, the daughter of one of the proprietors of the place. She died in her girlhood, and though there does not seem to have been any engagement between them, he was profoundly affected by her death. But the next year a young lady from Kentucky appeared in the village, to whom he paid such attentions as in his opinion fully committed him as a suitor for her hand. He admired her, and she seems to have merited the admiration of all the manhood

* "Western Characters," p. 134.

† "Western Characters," p. 126.

there was in New Salem. She was handsome and intelligent and of an admirable temper and disposition. While they were together he was constant in his attentions, and when he was at Vandalia or at Springfield, he continued his assiduities in some of the most singular love-letters ever written. They are filled mostly with remarks about current politics, and with arguments going to show that she had better not marry him! At the same time he clearly intimates that he is at her disposition if she is so inclined. At last, feeling that his honor and duty were involved, he made a direct proposal to her, and received an equally direct, kind, and courteous refusal. Not knowing but that this indicated merely a magnanimous desire to give him a chance for escape, he persisted in his offer, and she in her refusal. When the matter had ended in this perfectly satisfactory manner to all parties, he sat down and wrote, by way of epilogue to the play, a grotesquely comic account of the whole affair to a lady with whom and her husband he had contracted an intimate friendship at Vandalia. This letter has been published and severely criticised as showing a shocking lack of gentleman-like feeling. But those who take this view forget that he was writing to an intimate friend of a matter which had greatly occupied his own mind for a year; that he mentioned no names, and that he threw such an air of humorous unreality about the whole story that the lady who received it never dreamed that it recorded an actual occurrence until twenty-five years afterwards, when, having been asked to furnish it to a biographer, she was warned against doing so by the President himself, who said there was too much truth in it for print. The only significance the episode possesses is in showing this almost abnormal development of conscience in the young man who was perfectly ready to enter into a marriage which he dreaded simply because he thought he had given a young lady reason to think that he had such intentions. While we admit that this would have been an irremediable error, we cannot but wonder at the nobleness of the character to which it was possible.

In this vastly more serious matter, which was, we may say at once, the crucial ordeal of his life, the same invincible truthfulness, the same innate goodness, the same horror of doing a wrong, are combined with an exquisite sensibility and a capacity for suffering which mark him as a man "picked out among ten thousand." His habit of relentless self-searching reveals to him a state of feeling which strikes him with dismay; his simple and inflexible veracity communicates his trouble and his misery to the woman whom he loves; his freedom, when he has gained it, yields him nothing but an agony of remorse and humiliation. He could not shake off his pain, like men of cooler heads and shallower hearts. It



The State of Illinois,
SANGAMON COUNTY, SS.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS,---GREETING:

Know Ye, that License and Permission has been granted to any Minister of the Gospel authorized to marry by the Church or Society, to which he belongs; any Justice of the Supreme Court; Justice of any Inferior Court, or any Justice of the Peace, to Celebrate and Ratify the Marriage of

Abraham Lincoln & Mary Todd

now both of this county, according to the usual custom and laws of the State of Illinois.

Witness, N. W. Matheny, Clerk of the County Court, in and for the County of Sangamon, and the Seal of said Court hereunto affixed at SPRINGFIELD, this 4th day of November A. D. 1842

N. W. Matheny Clerk.

State of Illinois, } ss.
Sangamon County,

I Certify that, on the 4th day of November A. D. 1842 I joined in the Holy State of Matrimony Abraham Lincoln and Mary Todd according to the custom and laws of Illinois

Given under my Hand and Seal this 4th day of November A. D. 1842

Charles Dresser M. G. [L. S.]

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
(IN POSSESSION OF KEYES LINCOLN MEMORIAL COLLECTION, CHICAGO.)



PHOTOGRAPH SENT TO MRS. LUCY G. SPEED. (IN POSSESSION OF J. B. SPEED.)

took fast hold of him and dragged him into awful depths of darkness and torture. The letter to Stuart, which we have given, shows him emerging from the blackest period of that time of gloom. Immediately after this, he accompanied his close friend and confidant, Joshua F. Speed, to Kentucky, where, in a way so singular that no writer of fiction would dare to employ the incident, he became almost cured of his melancholy, and came back to Illinois and his work again.

Mr. Speed was a Kentuckian, carrying on a general mercantile business in Springfield — a brother of the distinguished lawyer, James Speed, of Louisville, who afterwards became Attorney-General of the United States. He was one of those men who seem to have to a greater extent than others the genius of friendship, the Pythias, the Pylades, the Horatios of the world. It is hardly too much to say that he was the only — as he was certainly the last — intimate friend that Lincoln ever had. He was his closest companion in Springfield, and in the evil days when the letter to Stuart was written he took him with brotherly love and authority under his special care. He closed up his affairs in Springfield, and went with Lincoln to Kentucky, and, introducing him to his own cordial and hospitable family circle, strove to soothe his perturbed spirit by every means which unaffected friendliness could suggest. That Lincoln found much comfort and edification in that genial companionship is shown by the fact that after he became President he sent to Mr. Speed's mother a photograph of himself, inscribed, "For Mrs. Lucy G. Speed, from whose pious hand I accepted the present of an Oxford Bible twenty years ago." But the principal means by which the current of his thoughts was changed was never dreamed of by himself or by his friend when they left Illinois. During this visit Speed himself fell in love, and became engaged to be married; and either by a singular chance or because the maladies of the soul may be propagated by constant association, the feeling of despairing melancholy, which he had found so morbid and so distressing an affliction in another, took possession of himself, and threw him into the same slough of despondency from which he had been laboring to rescue Lincoln. Between friends so intimate there were no concealments, and from the moment Lincoln found his services as

nurse and consoler needed, the violence of his own sorrow seemed to diminish. The two young men were in Springfield together in the autumn, and Lincoln seems by that time to have laid aside his own peculiar besetments, in order to minister to his friend. They knew the inmost thoughts of each other's hearts and each relied upon the honesty and loyalty of the other to an extent rare among men. When Speed returned to Kentucky, to a happiness which awaited him there, so bright that it dazzled and blinded his moral vision, Lincoln continued his counsels and encouragements in letters which are remarkable for their tenderness and delicacy of thought and expression. Like another poet, he looked into his own heart and wrote. His own deeper nature had suffered from these same fantastic sorrows and terrors; of his own grief he made a medicine for his comrade.

While Speed was still with him, he wrote a long letter, which he put into his hands at parting, full of wise and affectionate reasonings, to be read when he should feel the need of it. He predicts for him a period of nervous depression — first, because he will be "exposed to bad weather on his journey, and, secondly, because of the absence of all business and conversation of friends which might divert his mind and give it occasional rest from the intensity of thought which will sometimes wear the sweetest idea threadbare, and turn it to the bitterness of death." The third cause, he says, "is the rapid and near approach of that crisis on which all your thoughts and feelings concentrate." If in spite of all these circumstances he should escape without a "twinge of the soul," his friend will be most happily



GOV. NINIAN EDWARDS (ABOUT 1822).
FROM AN ENGRAVING BY H. B. HALL & SONS.

deceived; but, he continues, "if you shall, as I expect you will at some time, be agonized and distressed, let me, who have some reason to speak with judgment on such a subject, beseech you to ascribe it to the causes I have mentioned, and not to some false and ruinous suggestion of the Devil." This forms the prelude to an ingenious and affectionate argument in which he labors to convince Speed of the loveliness of his betrothed and of the integrity of his own heart; a strange task, one would say, to undertake in behalf of a young and ardent lover. But the two men understood each other, and the service thus rendered was gratefully received and remembered by Speed all his life. Lincoln wrote again on the 3d of February, 1842, congratulating Speed upon a recent severe illness of his destined bride, for the reason that "your present distress and anxiety about her health must forever banish those horrid doubts which you feel as to the truth of your affection for her." As the period of Speed's marriage drew near, Lincoln's letters betray the most intense anxiety. He cannot wait to hear the news from his friend, but writes to him about the time of the wedding, admitting that he is writing in the dark, that words from a bachelor may be worthless to a Benedick, but still unable to keep silence. He hopes he is happy with his wife, "but should I be mistaken in this, should excessive pleasure still be accompanied with a painful counterpart at times, still let me urge you, as I have ever done, to remember in the



REV. CHARLES DRESSER, WHO MARRIED ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND MARY TODD. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE.)

depth and even agony of despondency, that very shortly you are to feel well again." Further on he says, "If you went through the ceremony calmly, or even with sufficient composure not to excite alarm in any present, you are safe beyond question," seeking by every device of subtle affection to lift up the heart of his friend.

With a solicitude apparently greater than that of the nervous bridegroom, he awaited the announcement of the marriage, and when it came he wrote (February 25th), "I opened the letter with intense anxiety and trepidation; so much that, although it turned out better than I expected, I have hardly yet, at the distance of ten hours, become calm. I tell you, Speed, our forebodings, for which you and I are peculiar, are all the worst sort of nonsense. I fancied from the time I received your letter of Saturday that the one of Wednesday was never to come, and yet it did come, and, what is more, it is perfectly clear, both from its tone and handwriting, that . . . you had obviously improved at the very time I had so much fancied you would have grown worse. You say that something indescribably horrible and alarming still haunts you. You will not say that three months from now, I will venture." The letter goes on in the same train of sympathetic cheer, but there is one phrase which strikes the keynote of all lives whose ideals are too high for fulfillment: "It is the peculiar misfortune of both you and me to dream dreams of Elysium far exceeding all that any-



HOUSE IN WHICH LINCOLN WAS MARRIED, THEN OWNED BY NINIAN W. EDWARDS, NOW OCCUPIED AS ST. AGATHA'S SCHOOL.

thing earthly can realize." But before long a letter came from Speed, who had settled with his black-eyed Kentucky wife upon a well-stocked plantation, disclaiming any further fellowship of misery and announcing the beginnings of that life of uneventful happiness which he led ever after. His peace of mind has become a matter of course; he dismisses the subject in a line, but dilates, with a new planter's rapture, upon the beauties and attractions of his farm. Lincoln frankly answers that he cares nothing about his farm. "I can



GLOBE TAVERN, SPRINGFIELD, WHERE LINCOLN LIVED AFTER HIS MARRIAGE.

only say that I am glad *you* are satisfied and pleased with it. But on that other subject, to me of the most intense interest whether in joy or sorrow, I never had the power to withhold my sympathy from you. It cannot be told how it now thrills me with joy to hear you say you are 'far happier than you ever expected to be.' . . . I am not going beyond the truth when I tell you that the short space it took me to read your last letter gave me more pleasure than the total sum of all I have enjoyed since the fatal 1st of January, 1841. Since then it seems to me I should have been entirely happy, but for the never-absent idea that there is *one* still unhappy whom I have contributed to make so. That still kills my soul. I cannot but reproach myself for even wishing myself to be happy while she is otherwise."

During the summer of 1842 the letters of the friends still discuss, with waning intensity, however, their respective affairs of the heart. Speed, in the ease and happiness of his home, thanks Lincoln for his important part in his welfare, and gives him sage counsel for himself. Lincoln replies (July 4th, 1842), "I could not have done less than I did. I always was superstitious; I believe God made me one of the instruments of bringing your Fanny and you together, which union I have no doubt he foreordained. Whatever he designs, he will do for me yet." A better name than "superstition" might properly be applied to this frame of mind. He acknowledges Speed's kindly advice, but says, "Before I resolve to do the one thing or the other, I must gain my confidence in my own ability to keep my resolves when they are made. In that ability you know I once prided myself, as the only or chief gem of my character; that gem I lost, how and where you know too well. I have not yet regained it; and until I do I cannot trust myself in any matter of much importance. I believe now, that had you understood my case at the time as well as I understood yours afterwards, by the aid you would have given me I should have sailed through clear; but that does not afford me confidence to begin that, or the like of that, again." Still, he was nearing the end of his doubts and self-torturing sophistry. A last glimpse of his imperious curiosity, kept alive by saucy hopes and fears, is seen in his letter to Speed of the 5th of October. He ventures, with a genuine timidity, to ask a question which we may believe has not often been asked by one civilized man of another, with the hope of a candid answer, since marriages were celebrated with ring and book. "I want to ask you a close question — Are you now, in *feeling* as well as *judgment*, glad you are married as you are? From anybody but me this would be an impudent question, not to be tolerated; but I know you will pardon it in me. Please answer it quickly, as I am impatient to know." It is probable that Mr. Speed replied promptly in the way in which such questions must almost of necessity be answered. On the 4th of November, 1842, a marriage license was issued to Lincoln, and on the same day he was married, the ceremony being performed by the Rev. Charles Dresser.

In this way Abraham Lincoln met and passed through one of the most important crises of his life. There was so much of idiosyncrasy in it, that it has been, and will continue to be for years to come, the occasion of endless gossip in Sangamon County and elsewhere. Because it was not precisely like the experience of other people, who are married and given in marriage every day without any ado, a dozen conflicting stories have grown up, more or less false and injurious to both contracting parties. But it may not be fanciful to suppose that characters like that of Lincoln, elected for great conflicts and trials, are fashioned by different processes from those of ordinary men, and pass their stated ordeals in a different way. By circumstances which seem commonplace enough to commonplace people, he was thrown for more than a year into a sea of perplexities and sufferings beyond the reach of

the common run of souls. It is as useless as it would be indelicate to seek to penetrate in detail the incidents and special causes which produced in his mind this darkness as of the valley of the shadow of death. There was probably nothing worth recording in them; we are only concerned with their effect upon a character which was to be hereafter for all time one of the possessions of the nation. It is enough for us to know that a great trouble came upon him, and that he bore it nobly after his kind. That the manner in which he confronted this crisis was strangely different from that of most men in similar circumstances need surely occasion no surprise. Neither in this nor in other matters was he shaped in the average mold of his contemporaries. In many respects he was doomed to a certain loneliness of excellence. Few men that ever lived have had his stern and tyrannous sense of duty, his womanly tenderness of heart, his wakeful and inflexible conscience, which was so easy towards others and so merciless towards himself. Therefore when the time came for all of these qualities at once to be put to the most strenuous proof, the whole course of his development and tendency of his nature made it inevitable that his suffering should be of the keenest and his final triumph over himself should be of the most complete and signal character. In that struggle his youth of reveries and day-dreams passed away. Such furnace-blasts of proof, such pangs of transformation, seem necessary for the exceptional natures.

HALLWAY OF THE SPEED HOMESTEAD.



BRIG.-GEN. JAMES SHIELDS (1851).
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF DAVID DELANY, ESQ.)

The bread eaten in tears, of which Goethe speaks, the sleepless nights of sorrow, are required for a clear vision of the celestial powers. Fortunately the same qualities that occasion the conflict insure the victory also. From days of gloom and depression, such as we have been considering, no doubt came precious results in the way of sympathy, self-restraint, and that sober reliance on the final triumph of good over evil peculiar to those who have been greatly tried but not destroyed. The late but splendid maturity of Lincoln's mind and character dates from this time, and, although he grew in strength and knowledge to the end, from this year we observe a steadiness and sobriety of thought and purpose, as discernible in his life as in his style. He was like a blade forged in fire and tempered in the ice-brook, ready for battle whenever the battle might come.

THE SHIELDS DUEL.

An incident which occurred during the summer preceding Mr. Lincoln's marriage, and which in the opinion of many had its influence in hastening that event, deserves some atten-

THE SPEED HOMESTEAD AT FARMINGTON, THREE MILES FROM LOUISVILLE, WHERE LINCOLN VISITED IN 1841.

political parties more than disgrace. The currency of the State banks was well-nigh worthless, but it constituted nearly the only circulating medium in the State. In the middle of August the Governor, Auditor, and Treasurer issued a circular forbidding the payment of State taxes in this depreciated paper. This order was naturally taken by the Whigs as indicating on the part of these officers a keener interest in the integrity of their salaries than in the public welfare, and it was therefore severely attacked in all the opposition newspapers of the State. The sharpest

tion, if only from its incongruity with the rest of his history. This was the farce — which aspired at one time to be a tragedy — of his first and last duel. Among the officers of the State Government was a young Irishman named James Shields, who owed his post as Auditor, in great measure, to that alien vote which the Democrats had overturned the Supreme Court to gain. The finances of the State were in a deplorable condition: the treasury was empty; auditor's warrants were selling at half their nominal value; no more money was to be borrowed, and taxation was dreaded by both

assault it had to endure, however, was in a communication, dated August 27th, and printed in the "Sangamon Journal" of September 2d, not only dissecting the administration circular with the most savage satire, but covering the Auditor with merciless personal ridicule. It was written in the dialect of the country, dated from the "Lost Townships," and signed "Rebecca," and purported to come from a farmer widow of the county, who expressed in this fashion her discontent with the evil course of affairs.

Shields was a man of inordinate vanity

and a corresponding irascibility. He was for that reason an irresistible mark for satire. Through a long life of somewhat conspicuous public service, he never lost a certain tone of absurdity which can only be accounted for by the qualities we have mentioned. Even his honorable wounds in battle, while they were productive of great public applause and political success, gained him scarcely less ridicule than praise. He never could refrain from talking of them himself, having none of Coriolanus's repugnance in that respect, and for that reason was a constant target for newspaper wits. Mr. Prentice of Louisville once gravely said of him: "It is really wonderful that Shields survived that shot through his bowels. Now, if it had been through his head no one would have expected any serious result." After he returned from the Mexican war, with his laurels still green, and at the close of the canvass which had made him Senator, he wrote an incredible letter to Judge Breese, his principal competitor, in which he committed the gratuitous folly of informing him that "he had sworn in his heart [if Breese had been elected] that he should never have profited by his success; and depend upon it," he added, in the amazing and useless impudence of triumph, "I would have kept that vow, regardless of consequences. That, however, is now past, and the vow is canceled by your defeat." He then went on, with threats equally indecent, to make certain demands which were altogether inadmissible, and which Judge Breese only noticed by sending this preposterous letter to the press.*

It may easily be imagined that a man who, after being elected a Senator of the United States, was capable of the insane insolence of signing his name to a letter informing his defeated competitor that he would have killed him if the result had been different, would not have been likely, when seven years younger, to bear newspaper ridicule with equanimity. His fury against the unknown author of the satire was the subject of much merriment in Springfield, and the next week another letter appeared, from a different hand, but adopting the machinery of the first, in which the widow offered to make up the quarrel by marrying the Auditor, and this in time was followed by an epithalamium, in which this happy compromise was celebrated in very bad verses. In the change of hands all the humor of the thing had evaporated, and nothing was left but feminine mischief on one side and the exasperation of wounded vanity on the other. Shields, however, had talked so much about the matter that he now felt imperatively called upon to act, and he therefore sent General Whiteside to demand from the "Journal" the name of its contributor. Mr. Francis, the editor, was in a quandary. Lincoln had written the first letter, and the antic fury of Shields had induced two young ladies who took a lively interest in Illinois politics — and with good reason, for one was to be the wife of a Senator and the other of a President — to follow up the game with attacks in prose and verse which, however deficient in wit and meter, were not wanting in pungency. In his dilemma he ap-



WILLIAM H. HERNDON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY INGMIRE.)

plied to Lincoln, who, as he was starting to attend court at Tremont, told him to give his name and withhold those of the ladies. As soon as Whiteside received this information, he and his fiery principal set out for Tremont, and as Shields did nothing in silence, the news came to Lincoln's friends, two of whom, William Butler and Dr. Merryman, one of those combative medical men who have almost disappeared from American society, went off in a buggy in pursuit. They soon came in sight of the others, but loitered in the rear until evening, and then drove rapidly to Tremont, arriving there some time in advance of Shields; so that in the ensuing negotiations Lincoln had the assistance of friends whose fidelity and whose nerve were equally beyond question. It would be useless to recount all the tedious preliminaries of the affair. Shields

* "National Intelligencer," Feb. 28, 1849.

HOUSE IN WHICH LINCOLN LIVED WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT.

opened the correspondence, as might have been expected, with blustering and with threats; his nature had no other way of expressing itself. His first letter was taken as a bar to any explanation or understanding, and he afterwards wrote a second, a little less offensive in tone, but without withdrawing the first. At every interview of the seconds General Whiteside deplored the bloodthirsty disposition of his principal, and urged that Mr. Lincoln should make the concessions which alone would prevent lamentable results. These representations seemed to avail nothing, however, and the parties, after endless talk, went to Alton and crossed the river to the Missouri shore. It seemed for a moment that the fight must take place. The terms had been left by the code, as then understood in the West, to Lincoln, and he certainly made no grudging use of his privilege. The weapons chosen were "cavalry broadswords of the largest size"; and the combatants were to stand on either side of a board placed on the ground, each to fight in a limit of six feet on his own side of the board. It was evident that Lincoln did not desire the death of his adversary, and did not intend to be materially injured himself. The advantage morally was altogether against him. He felt intensely the stupidity of the whole affair, but thought he could not avoid it without degradation; while to Shields such a fracas was a delight. It came to its natural end by the intervention of the usual "gods out of a machine," the gods being John J. Hardin and one Dr. English, and the machine a canoe in which they had hastily paddled across the Mississippi. Mr. Shields suffered himself to be persuaded to withdraw his offensive challenge. Lincoln then made the explanation he had been ready to make from the beginning; avowing the one letter he had written, and saying that it had been printed solely for political effect, and without any intention of injuring Shields personally.

One would think that, after a week passed in such unprofitable trifling, the parties, principal and secondary, would have been willing to drop the matter forever. We are sure that Lincoln would have been glad to banish it, even from his memory; but to men like Shields and Whiteside the peculiar relish and enjoyment of such an affair is its publicity. On the 3d of October, therefore, eleven days after the meeting, as public attention seemed to be flagging, Whiteside wrote an account of it to the "Sangamon Journal," for which he does not forget to say, "I hold myself responsible!" Of course he seizes the occasion to paint a heroic portrait of himself and his principal. It was an excellent story until the next week, when Dr. Merryman, who seems to have wielded a pen like a scalpel, gave a much fuller history of the matter, which he substantiated by printing all the documents, and,

not content with that, gave little details of the negotiations which show, either that Whiteside was one of the most grotesque braggarts of the time, or that Merryman was an admirable writer of comic fiction. Among the most amusing facts he brought forward was that Whiteside, being a Fund Commissioner of the State, ran the risk of losing his office by engaging in a duel; and his anxiety to appear reckless and dangerous, and yet keep within the statute and save his salary, was depicted by Merryman with a droll fidelity. He concluded by charging Whiteside plainly with "inefficiency and want of knowledge of those laws which govern gentlemen in matters of this kind," and with "trying to wipe out his fault by doing an act of injustice to Mr. Lincoln."

The town was greatly diverted by these pungent echoes of the bloodless fight, and Shields and Whiteside felt that their honor was still out of repair. A rapid series of challenges succeeded among the parties, principals and seconds changing places as deftly as dancers in a quadrille. The Auditor challenged Mr. Butler, who had been very outspoken in his contemptuous comments on the affair. Butler at once accepted, and with a grim sincerity announced his conditions — "to fight next morning at sunrising in Bob Allen's meadow, one hundred yards' distance, with rifles." This was instantly declined, with a sort of horror, by Shields and Whiteside, as such a proceeding would have proved fatal to their official positions and their means of livelihood. They probably cared less for the chances of harm from Butler's Kentucky rifle than for the certainty of the Illinois law which cut off all duelists from holding office in the State. But, on the other hand, so unreasonable is human nature as displayed among politicians, General Whiteside felt that if he bore patiently the winged words of Merryman, his availability as a candidate was greatly damaged; and he therefore sent to the witty doctor what Mr. Lincoln called "a quasi-challenge," hurling at him a modified defiance, which should be enough to lure him to the field of honor, and yet not sufficiently explicit to lose Whiteside the dignity and perquisites of Fund Commissioner. Merryman, not being an office-holder and having no salary to risk, responded with brutal directness, which was highly unsatisfactory to Whiteside, who was determined not to fight unless he could do so lawfully; and Lincoln, who now acted as second to the doctor in his turn, records the cessation of the correspondence amid the agonized explanations of Whiteside and the scornful hootings of Merryman, "while the town was in a ferment and a street fight somewhat anticipated." In respect to the last diversion the town was disappointed.

Shields lost nothing by the hilarity which this burlesque incident created. He was reserved for a career of singular luck and glory mingled with signal misfortunes. With little discernible merit or availability about him except his nationality, he continued throughout a long lifetime to be selected at intervals for the highest positions, because he was an Irishman. After he ceased to be Auditor he was elected a judge of the Supreme Court of Illinois; while still holding that position he applied for the place of Commissioner of the General Land Office, and his application was successful. When the Mexican war broke out he asked for a commission as brigadier-general, although he still held his civil appointment, and, to the amazement of the whole army, he was given that important command before he had ever seen a day's service. At the battle of Cerro Gordo he was shot through the lungs, and this wound made him a Senator as soon as he returned from the war. After he had served one term in the Senate, he removed from Illinois, and was soon sent back to the same body from Minnesota. In the war of the rebellion he was again appointed a brigadier-general by his old adversary, for the same cogent ethnological reasons to which he owed all his honors, and was again wounded in a battle in which he defeated the redoubtable Stonewall Jackson; and many years after Lincoln was laid to sleep beneath a mountain of marble at Springfield, Shields was made the shuttlecock of contending demagogues in Congress — each striving to gain Irish votes by giving public money to the battered veteran — until in the impulse of that transient controversy, the State of Missouri, finding the gray-headed adventurer in her borders, for the third time sent him to the Senate of the United States for a few weeks — a history unparalleled even in America.

We have reason to think that the whole affair was excessively distasteful to Lincoln. He did not even enjoy the ludicrousness of it, as might have been expected. He never — so far as we can learn — alluded to it afterward, and the recollection of it died away so completely from the minds of people in the State, that during the heated canvass of 1860 there was no mention of this disagreeable episode in the opposition papers of Illinois. It had been absolutely forgotten.

This was Mr. Lincoln's last personal quarrel. Although the rest of his life was passed in hot and earnest debate, he never again descended to the level of his adversaries, who would gladly enough have resorted to unseemly wrangling. In later years it became

his duty to give an official reprimand to a young officer who had been court-martialed for a quarrel with one of his associates. The reprimand is probably the gentlest recorded in the annals of penal discourses, and it shows in few words the principles which ruled the conduct of this great and peaceable man. It has never before been published, and it deserves to be written in letters of gold on the walls of every gymnasium and college.

"The advice of a father to his son, 'Beware of entrance to a quarrel, but being in, bear it that the opposed may beware of thee!' is good, but not the best. Quarrel not at all. No man resolved to make the most of himself can spare time for personal contention. Still less can he afford to take all the consequences, including the vitiating of his temper and the loss of self-control. Yield larger things to which you can show no more than equal right; and yield lesser ones though clearly your own. Better give your path to a dog than be bitten by him in contesting for the right. Even killing the dog would not cure the bite."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1844.

In the letter to Stuart which we have quoted, Lincoln announced his intention to form a partnership with Judge Logan, which was soon carried out. His connection with Stuart was formally dissolved in April, 1841, and one with Logan formed which continued for four years. It may almost be said that Lincoln's practice as a lawyer begins from this time. Stuart, though even then giving promise of the distinction at which he arrived in his profession later in life, was at that period so entirely devoted to politics that the business of the office was altogether a secondary matter to him; and Lincoln, although no longer in his first youth, being now thirty-two years of age, had not yet formed those habits of close application which are indispensable to permanent success at the bar. He was not behind the greater part of his contemporaries in this respect. Among all the lawyers of the circuit who were then, or who afterwards became, eminent practitioners,* there were few indeed who in those days applied themselves with any degree of persistency to the close study of legal principles. One of these few was Stephen T. Logan. He was more or less a politician, as were all his compeers at the bar, but he was always more a lawyer than anything else. He had that love for his profession which it jealously exacts as a condition of succeeding. He possessed few books, and it used to be said of him long afterwards that he carried his library in his hat. But the books which he had he never ceased to read and ponder, and we heard him say when he was sixty years old, that once every year since he came of age he had read "Blackstone's Commentaries" through. He had that old-fashioned, lawyer-like morality which was keenly intolerant of any laxity or slovenliness of mind or character. His former partner had been Edward D. Baker, but this brilliant, mercurial, irascible spirit was not congenial to Logan; Baker's carelessness in money matters was intolerable to him, and he was glad to escape from an associate so gifted and so exasperating.† Needing some one, however, to assist him in his practice, which was then considerable, he invited Lincoln into partnership. He had, as we have seen, formed a favorable opinion of the young Kentuckian the first time they had met. In his subsequent acquaintance with him he had come to recognize and respect his abilities, his unpretending common sense, and his innate integrity. The partnership continued about four years, but the benefit Lincoln derived from it lasted all his life. The example of Judge Logan's thrift, order, and severity of morals; his straightforward devotion to his profession; his close and careful study of his cases, together with the larger and more important range of practice to which Lincoln was introduced by this new association, confirmed all those salutary tendencies by which he had been led into the profession, and corrected those less desirable ones which he shared with most of the lawyers about him. He began for the first time to study his cases with energy and patience; to resist the tendency, almost universal at that day, to supply with florid rhetoric the attorney's deficiency in law; in short, to educate, discipline, and train the enormous faculty, hitherto latent in him, for close and severe intellectual labor. Logan, who had expected that Lincoln's chief value to him would be as a talking advocate before the jury, was surprised and pleased to find his new partner rapidly becoming a lawyer. "He would study out his case and make about as much of it as anybody," said Logan, many years afterwards. "His ambition as a lawyer increased; he grew constantly. By close study of each case, as it came up, he got to be quite a formidable lawyer." The character of the man is in these words. He had vast concerns intrusted to him in the

* They were Dan Stone, Jesse B. Thomas, Cyrus Walker, Schuyler Strong, A. T. Bledsoe, George Forquer, S. H. Treat, Ninian W. Edwards, Josiah Lamborn, John J. Hardin, E. D. Baker, and others.

† Logan's office was, in fact, a nursery of statesmen. Three of his partners, William L. May, Baker, and Lincoln, left him in rapid succession to go to Congress, and finally the contagion gained the head of the firm, and the Judge was himself the candidate of his party, when it was no longer able to elect one. After he had retired from practice, the office, under his son-in-law and successor, Milton Hay, retained its prestige for cradling public men. Palmer and Cullom left it to be Governors of the State, and the latter to be a Congressman and Senator.

course of his life, and disposed of them one at a time as they were presented. At the end of four years the partnership was dissolved. Judge Logan took his son David — afterwards a well-known politician and lawyer of Oregon — into his office, and Lincoln opened one of his own, into which he soon invited a young, bright, and enthusiastic man named William Henry Herndon, who remained his partner as long as he lived.

The old partners remained close and intimate friends. They practiced at the same bar for twenty years, often as associates, and often as adversaries, but always with relations of mutual confidence and regard. They had the unusual honor, while they were still comparatively young men, of seeing their names indissolubly associated in the map of their State as a memorial to future ages of their friendship and their fame, in the county of Logan, of which the city of Lincoln is the county seat.

They both prospered, each in his way. Logan rapidly gained a great reputation and accumulated an ample fortune. Lincoln, while he did not become rich, always earned a respectable livelihood, and never knew the care of poverty or debt from that time forward. His wife and he suited their style of living to their means, and were equally removed from luxury and privation. They went to live, immediately after their marriage, at a boarding-house* called "The Globe," which was "very well kept by a widow lady of the name of Beck," and there their first child was born, who was one day to be Secretary of War, and for whom was reserved the strange experience of standing by the death-bed of two assassinated Presidents. Lincoln afterwards built a comfortable but unpretending house of wood on the corner of Eighth and Jackson streets, where he lived until he removed to the Executive Mansion.

Neither his marriage nor his new professional interests, however, put an end to his participation in politics. Even that period of gloom and depression of which we have spoken, and which has been so much exaggerated by the chroniclers and the gossip of Springfield, could not have interrupted for any length of time his activity as a member of the Legislature. Only for a few days was he absent from his place in the House. On the 19th of January, 1841, John J. Hardin apologized for the delay in some committee business, alleging Mr. Lincoln's indisposition as an excuse. On the 23d the letter to Stuart was written; but on the 26th Lincoln had so far recovered his self-possession as to resume his place in the House and the leadership of his party. The journals of the next month show his constant activity and prominence in the routine business of the Legislature until it adjourned. In August Stuart was re-elected to Congress. Lincoln made his visit to Kentucky with Speed, and returned to find himself generally talked of for Governor of the State. This idea did not commend itself to the judgment of himself or his friends, and accordingly we find in the "Sangamon Journal" one of those semi-official announcements so much in vogue in early Western politics, which, while disclaiming any direct inspiration from Mr. Lincoln, expresses the gratitude of his friends for the movement in his favor, but declines the nomination.

"His talents and services endear him to the Whig party; but we do not believe he desires the nomination. He has already made great sacrifices in maintaining his party principles, and before his political friends ask him to make additional sacrifices, the subject should be well considered. The office of Governor, which would of necessity interfere with the practice of his profession, would poorly compensate him for the loss of four of the best years of his life."

He served this year as a member of the Whig Central Committee, and bore a prominent part in the movement set on foot at that time to check intemperance in the use of spirits. It was a movement in the name and memory of Washington, and the orators of the cause made effective rhetorical use of its august associations. A passage from the close of a speech made by Lincoln, in March, 1842, shows the fervor and feeling of the hour:

"Washington is the mightiest name of earth — long since mightiest in the cause of civil liberty; still mightiest in moral reformation. On that name no eulogy is expected. It cannot be. To add brightness to the sun or glory to the name of Washington is alike impossible. Let none attempt it. In solemn awe pronounce the name, and in its naked, deathless splendor leave it shining on."

A mass meeting of the Whigs of the district was held at Springfield on the 1st of March, 1843, for the purpose of organizing the party for the elections of the year. On this occasion Lincoln was the most prominent figure. He called the meeting to order, stated its object, and drew up the platform of principles, which embraced the orthodox Whig tenets of a protective tariff, national bank, the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands, and, finally, the tardy conversion of the party to the convention system, which had been forced upon them by the example of the Democrats, who had shown them that victory could not be organized without it. Lincoln was also chairman of the committee which was charged with the address to the people, and a paragraph from this document is worth quoting, as showing the use which he made

* This house is still standing, opposite St. Paul's church.

at that early day of a pregnant text which was hereafter to figure in a far more momentous connection, and exercise a powerful influence upon his career. Exhorting the Whigs to harmony, he says: "That union is strength is a truth that has been known, illustrated, and declared in various ways and forms in all ages of the world. That great fabulist and philosopher, Æsop, illustrated it by his fable of the bundle of sticks; and he whose wisdom surpasses that of all philosophers has declared that 'a house divided against itself cannot stand.'" He calls to mind the victory of 1840, the overwhelming Whig majority of that year, the ill success of the party since, and the necessity of unity and concord that the party may make its entire strength felt.

Lincoln was at this time a candidate for the Whig nomination to Congress; but he was confronted by formidable competition. The adjoining county of Morgan was warmly devoted to one of its own citizens, John J. Hardin, a man of an unusually gallant and chivalrous strain of character; and several other counties, for reasons not worth considering, were pledged to support any one whom Morgan county presented. If Lincoln had carried Sangamon county, his strength was so great in Menard and Mason, where he was personally known, that he could have been easily nominated. But Edward D. Baker had long coveted a seat in Congress, and went into the contest against Lincoln with many points in his favor. He was of about the same age, but had resided longer in the district, had a larger personal acquaintance, and was a much readier and more pleasing speaker. In fact, there are few men who have ever lived in this country with more of the peculiar temperament of the orator than Edward Dickinson Baker. It is related of him that on one occasion when the circumstances called for a policy of reserve, he was urged by his friends to go out upon a balcony and address an impromptu audience which was calling for him. "No," he replied, mistrusting his own fluency; "if I go out there, I'll make a better speech than I want to." He was hardly capable of the severe study and care by which great parliamentary speakers are bred; but before a popular audience, and on all occasions where brilliant and effective improvisation is called for, he was almost unequaled. His funeral oration over the dead body of Senator Broderick in California, his thrilling and inspiriting appeal in Union Square, New York, at the great meeting of April, 1861, and his reply to Breckinridge in the Senate delivered upon the impulse of the moment, conceived as he listened to the Kentuckian's peroration, leaning against the doorway of the Chamber in full uniform, booted and spurred, as he had ridden into Washington from the camp, are among the most remarkable specimens of absolutely improvised and thrilling eloquence which our annals contain. He was also a man of extremely prepossessing appearance. Born in England of poor but educated parents, and brought as a child to this country, his good looks and brightness had early attracted the attention of prominent gentlemen in the State, especially of Governor Edwards, who had made much of him and assisted him to a good education. He had met with considerable success as a lawyer, though he always relied rather upon his eloquence than his law, and there were few juries which could resist the force and fury of his speech, and not many lawyers could keep their own equanimity in the face of his witty persiflage and savage sarcasm. To all this add a genuine love of every species of combat, physical and moral, and we may understand the name Charles Sumner — paraphrasing a well-known epigram — applied to him in the Senate, after his heroic death at Ball's Bluff, "the Prince Rupert of battle and debate."

If Baker had relied upon his own unquestionable merits he would have been reasonably sure of succeeding in a community so well acquainted with him as Sangamon county. But to make assurance doubly sure his friends resorted to tactics which Lincoln, the most magnanimous and placable of men, thought rather unfair. Baker and his wife belonged to that numerous and powerful sect which has several times played so important a part in Western politics — the Disciples. They all supported him energetically, and used as arguments against Lincoln that his wife was a Presbyterian, that most of her family were Episcopalians, that Lincoln himself belonged to no church and that he had been suspected of deism, and, finally, that he was the candidate of the aristocracy. This last charge so amazed Lincoln that he was unable to frame any satisfactory answer to it. The memory of his flatboating days, of his illiterate youth, even of his deer-skin breeches shrunken by rain and exposure, appeared to have no power against this unexpected and baleful charge. When the county convention met, the delegates to the district convention were instructed to cast the vote of Sangamon for Baker. It showed the confidence of the convention in the imperturbable good-nature of the defeated candidate that they elected him a delegate to the Congressional convention charged with the cause of his successful rival. In a letter to Speed, he humorously refers to his situation as that of a rejected suitor who is asked to act as groomsman at the wedding of his sweetheart.

It soon became evident that Baker could not get strength enough outside of the county to nominate him. Lincoln in a letter to Speed, written in May, said: "In relation to our Congress matter here, you were right in supposing I would support the nominee. Neither Baker nor I, however, is the man, but Hardin, so far as I can judge from present appearances. We shall have no split or trouble about the matter; all will be harmony." A few days later this prediction was realized. The convention met at Pekin, nominated Hardin with all the customary symptoms of spontaneous enthusiasm. He was elected in August,* after a short but active canvass, in which Lincoln bore his part as usual. Hardin took his seat in December. The next year the time of holding elections was changed, and always afterwards the candidates were elected the year before vacancies were to occur. In May, 1844, therefore, Baker attained the desire of his heart by being nominated, and in August he was elected, defeating John Calhoun, while Lincoln had the laborious and honorable post of Presidential Elector.

It was not the first nor the last time that he acted in this capacity. The place had become his by a sort of prescription. His persuasive and convincing oratory was thought so useful to his party that every four years he was sent, in the character of electoral canvasser, to the remotest regions of the State to talk to the people in their own dialect, with their own habits of thought and feeling, in favor of the Whig candidate. The office had its especial charm for him: if beaten, as generally happened, the defeat had no personal significance; if elected, the functions of the place were discharged in one day, and the office passed from existence. But there was something more than the orator and the partisan concerned in this campaign of 1844. The whole heart of the man was enlisted in it — for the candidate was the beloved and idolized leader of the Whigs, Henry Clay. It is probable that we shall never see again in this country another such instance of the personal devotion of a party to its chieftain as that which was shown by the long and wonderful career of Mr. Clay. He became prominent in the politics of Kentucky near the close of the last century at twenty-three years of age. He was elected first to the Senate at twenty-nine. He died a Senator at seventy-five, and for the greater part of that long interval he was the most considerable personal influence in American politics. As Senator, Representative, Speaker of the House, and diplomatist, he filled the public eye for half a century, and although he twice peremptorily retired from office, and although he was the mark of the most furious partisan hatred all his days, neither his own weariness nor the malice of his enemies could ever keep him for any length of time from that commanding position for which his temperament and his nature designed him. He was beloved, respected, and served by his adherents with a single-hearted allegiance which seems impossible to the more complex life of a later generation. In 1844, it is true, he was no longer young, and his power may be said to have been on the decline. But there were circumstances connected with this his last candidacy which excited his faithful followers to a peculiar intensity of devotion. He had been, as many thought, unjustly passed over in 1840, and General Harrison, a man of greatly inferior capacity, preferred to him on grounds of prudence and expediency, after three days of balloting had shown that the eloquent Kentuckian had more friends and more enemies than any other man in the Republic. He had seemed to regain all his popularity by the prompt and frank support which he gave to the candidacy of Harrison; and after the President's death and the treachery of Tyler had turned the victory of the Whigs into dust and ashes, the entire party came back to Clay with passionate affection and confidence, to lead them in the desperate battle which perhaps no man could have won. The Whigs, however, were far from appreciating this. There is evident in all their utterances of the spring and early summer of 1844, an ardent and almost furious conviction, not only of the necessity but the certainty of success. Mr. Clay was nominated long before the convention met in Baltimore. The convention of the 1st of May only ratified the popular will; no other name was mentioned. Mr. Watkins Leigh had the honor of presenting his name, "a word," he said "that expressed more enthusiasm, that had in it more eloquence, than the names of Chatham, Burke, Patrick Henry, and," he continued, rising to the requirements of the occasion, "to us more than any other and all other names together." Nothing was left to be said, and Clay was nominated without a ballot; and Mr. Lumpkin of Georgia then nominated Theodore Frelinghuysen for Vice-President, not hesitating to avow, in the warmth and expansion of the hour, that he believed the baptismal name of the New Jersey gentleman had a mystical appropriateness to the occasion.

In the Democratic convention Mr. Van Buren had a majority of delegates pledged to support him; but it had already been resolved

* The opposing candidate was James A. McDougal, who was afterwards, as Senator from California, one of the most remarkable and eccentric figures in Washington life.

in the inner councils of the party that he should be defeated. The Southern leaders had determined upon the immediate and unconditional annexation of Texas, and Mr. Van Buren's views upon this vital question were too moderate and conservative to suit the adventurous spirits who most closely surrounded President Tyler. During the whole of the preceding year a steady and earnest propaganda of annexation had been on foot, starting from the immediate *entourage* of the President and embracing a large number of Southern Congressmen. A letter had been elicited from General Jackson* declaring with his usual vehemence in favor of the project, and urging it upon the ground that Texas was absolutely necessary to us, as the most easily defensible frontier against Great Britain. Using the favorite argument of Southerners of his school, he said: "Great Britain has already made treaties with Texas; and we know that far-seeing nation never omits a circumstance in her extensive intercourse with the world which can be turned to account in increasing her military resources. May she not enter into an alliance with Texas? And, reserving, as she doubtless will, the North-western boundary question as the cause of war with us whenever she chooses to declare it — let us suppose that, as an ally with Texas, we are to fight her. Preparatory to such a movement she sends her 20,000 or 30,000 men to Texas; organizes them on the Sabine, where supplies and arms can be concentrated before we have even notice of her intentions; makes a lodgment on the Mississippi; excites the negroes to insurrection; the lower country falls, with it New Orleans; and a servile war rages through the whole South and West." These fanciful prophecies of evil were privately circulated for a year among those whom they would be most likely to influence, and the entire letter was printed in 1844, with a result never intended by the writer. It contributed greatly, in the opinion of many,† to defeat Van Buren, whom Jackson held in great esteem and regard, and served the purposes of the Tyler faction, which he detested. The argument based on imaginary British intrigues was the one most relied upon by Mr. Tyler's successive secretaries of state. Mr. Calhoun in his dispatch of the 12th of August, 1844, instructed our minister in Paris to impress upon the Government of France the nefarious character of the English diplomacy, which was seeking, by defeating the annexation of Texas, to accomplish the abolition of slavery first in that region, and afterwards throughout the United States, "a blow calamitous to this continent beyond description." No denials on the part of the British Government had any affect; it was a fixed idea of Calhoun and his followers that the designs of Great Britain against American slavery could only be baffled by the annexation of Texas. Van Buren was not in principle opposed to the admission of Texas into the Union at the proper time and with the proper conditions, but the more ardent Democrats of the South were unwilling to listen to any conditions or any suggestion of delay. They succeeded in inducing the convention to adopt the two-thirds rule, after a whole day of stormy debate, and the defeat of Van Buren was secured. The nomination of Mr. Polk was received without enthusiasm, and the exultant hopes of the Whigs were correspondingly increased.

Contemporary observers differ as to the causes which gradually, as the summer advanced, changed the course of public opinion to such an extent as to bring defeat in November upon a party which was so sure of victory in June. It has been the habit of the anti-slavery Whigs who have written upon the subject to ascribe the disaster to an indiscretion of the candidate himself. At the outset of the campaign Mr. Clay's avowed opinion as to the annexation of Texas was that of the vast majority of his party, especially in the North. While not opposing an increase of territory under all circumstances, he said, — in a letter written from Raleigh, N. C., two weeks before his nomination, — "I consider the annexation of Texas, at this time, without the consent of Mexico, as a measure compromising the national character, involving us certainly in war with Mexico, probably with other foreign powers, dangerous to the integrity of the Union, inexpedient in the present financial condition of the country, and not called for by any expression of public opinion." He supported these views with temperate and judicious reasons which were received with much gratification throughout the country. Of course they were not satisfactory to every one, and Mr. Clay became so disquieted by letters of inquiry and of criticism from the South, that he was at last moved, in an unfortunate hour, to write another letter to a friend in Alabama, which was regarded as seriously modifying the views he had expressed in the letter from Raleigh. He now said, "I have no hesitation in saying that, far from having any personal objections to the annexation of Texas, I should be glad to see it — without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms. . . . I do not think the subject of slavery ought to affect the question one way or the other, whether Texas be indepen-

* This letter is dated at the Hermitage, Feb. 13, 1843, and was printed a year later in the "National Intelligencer," with the date altered to 1844.

† Benton: "Thirty Years' View."

dent or incorporated in the United States. I do not believe it will prolong or shorten the duration of that institution. It is destined to become extinct, at some distant day, in my opinion, by the operation of the inevitable laws of population. It would be unwise to refuse a permanent acquisition, which will exist as long as the globe remains, on account of a temporary institution." Mr. Clay does not in this letter disclaim or disavow any sentiments previously expressed. He says, as any one might say, that provided certain impossible conditions were complied with, he would be glad to see Texas in the Union, and that he was so sure of the ultimate extinction of slavery that he would not let any consideration of that transitory system interfere with a great national advantage. It might naturally have been expected that such an expression would have given less offense to the opponents than to the friends of slavery. But the contrary effect resulted, and it soon became evident that a grave error of judgment had been committed in writing the letter. The principal opposition to annexation in the North had been made expressly upon the ground that it would increase the area of slavery, and the comparative indifference with which Mr. Clay treated that view of the subject cost him heavily in the canvass. Mr. Greeley, who should be regarded as an impartial witness in such a case, says,* "The 'Liberty Party,' so called, pushed this view of the matter beyond all justice and reason, insisting that Mr. Clay's antagonism to annexation, not being founded in anti-slavery conviction, was of no account whatever, and that his election should, on that account, be opposed." It availed nothing that Mr. Clay, alarmed at the defection in the North, wrote a third and final letter, reiterating his unaltered objections to any such annexation as was at that time possible. The damage was irretrievable. It is not probable that his letters gained or saved him a vote in the South among the advocates of annexation. They cared for nothing short of their own unconditional scheme of immediate action. They forgot the services rendered by Mr. Clay in bringing about the recognition of Texan independence a few years before.

They saw that Mr. Polk was ready to risk everything — war, international complications, even the dishonor of broken obligations — to accomplish their purpose, and nothing the Whig candidate could say would weigh anything in the balance against this blind and reckless readiness. On the other hand, Mr. Clay's cautious and moderate position did him irreparable harm among the ardent opponents of slavery. They were not willing to listen to the counsels of caution and moderation. More than a year before, thirteen of the Whig anti-slavery Congressmen, headed by the illustrious John Quincy Adams, had issued a fervid address to the people of the free States, declaiming in language of passionate force against the scheme of annexation as fatal to the country, calling it, in fact, "identical with dissolution," and saying that "it would be a violation of our national compact, its objects, designs, and the great elementary principles which centered in its formation of a character so deep and fundamental, and would be an attempt to eternize an institution and a power of nature so unjust in themselves, so injurious to the interests and abhorrent to the feelings of the people of the free States, as in our opinion, not only inevitably to result in a dissolution of the Union, but fully to justify it; and we not only assert that the people of the free States ought not to submit to it, but we say with confidence they would not submit to it." To men in a temper like that indicated by these words, no arguments drawn from consideration of political expediency could be expected to have any weight, and it was of no use to say to them that in voting for a third candidate they were voting to elect Mr. Polk, the avowed and eager advocate of annexation. If all the votes cast for Mr. Birney, the "Liberty" candidate, had been cast for Clay, he would have been elected, and even as it was the contest was close and doubtful to the last. Birney received 62,270 votes, and the popular majority of Polk over Clay was only 38,801.

The attitude of the two parties in relation to this question was perhaps inevitable, and the result was also sure, whatever the subordinate events or incidents which may have led to it. It was impossible to defeat or greatly delay the annexation of Texas, and it showed a certain lack of sagacity on the part of the Whigs not to recognize this fact. Here was a great empire offering itself to us — a state which had gained its independence, and built itself into a certain measure of order and thrift through American valor and enterprise. She offered us a magnificent estate of 376,000 square miles of territory, all of it valuable, and much of it of unsurpassed richness and fertility. Even those portions of it once condemned as desert now contribute to the markets of the world vast stores of wool and cotton, herds of cattle and flocks of sheep. Not only were these material advantages of great attractiveness to the public mind, but many powerful sentimental considerations reënforced the claim of Texas. The Texans were not an alien people. The few inhabitants of that vast realm were mostly Americans, who had occupied and subdued a vacant wilderness. The heroic defense of the Alamo had been made by Travis and David

* "American Conflict," I. p. 167.

Crockett, whose exploits and death form one of the most brilliant pages of our border history. Fannin and his men, four hundred strong, when they laid down their lives at Goliad * had carried mourning into every South-western State; and when, a few days later, Houston and his eight hundred raw levies defeated and destroyed the Mexican army at San Jacinto, captured Santa Anna, the Mexican president, and with American thrift, instead of giving him the death he merited for his cruel murder of unarmed prisoners, saved him to make a treaty with, the whole people recognized something of kinship in the unaffected valor with which these borderers died and the humorous shrewdness with which they bargained, and felt as if the victory over the Mexicans were their own. Under these conditions, the annexation, sooner or later, was inevitable. No man and no party could oppose it except at serious cost. It is not true that schemes of annexation are always popular. Several administrations have lost heavily by proposing them. Grant failed with Santo Domingo; Seward with St. Thomas; and it required all his skill and influence to accomplish the ratification of the Alaska purchase. There is no general desire among Americans for acquiring outlying territory, however intrinsically valuable it may be; their land-hunger is confined within the limits of that of a Western farmer once quoted by Mr. Lincoln, who used to say, "I am not greedy about land; I only want what jines mine." Whenever a region contiguous to the United States becomes filled with Americans, it is absolutely certain to come under the American flag. Texas was as sure to be incorporated into the Union as are two drops of water touching each other to become one; and this consummation would not have been prevented for any length of time if Clay or Van Buren had been elected in 1844. The honorable scruples of the Whigs, the overheated consciences of the "Liberty" men, could never permanently have prevailed against a tendency so natural and so irresistible.

Everything that year seemed to work against the Whigs. At a most unfortunate time for them, there was an outbreak of that "native" fanaticism which reappears from time to time in our politics with the periodicity of malarial fevers, and always to the profit of the party against which its efforts are aimed. It led to great disturbances in several cities, and to riot and bloodshed in Philadelphia. The Clay party were, of course, free from any complicity with these outrages, but the foreigners, in their alarm, huddled together almost as one man on the side where the majority of them always voted, and this occasioned a heavy loss to the Whigs in several States. The first appearance of Lincoln in the canvass was in a judicious attempt to check this unreasonable panic. At a meeting held in Springfield, June 12th, he introduced and supported resolutions, declaring that "the guarantee of the rights of conscience as found in our Constitution is most sacred and inviolable, and one that belongs no less to the Catholic than the Protestant, and that all attempts to abridge or interfere with these rights either of Catholic or Protestant, directly or indirectly, have our decided disapprobation, and shall have our most effective opposition." Several times afterwards in his life Lincoln was forced to confront this same proscriptive spirit among the men with whom he was more or less affiliated politically, and he never failed to denounce it as it deserved, whatever might be the risk of loss involved.

Beginning with this manly protest against intolerance and disorder, he went into the work of the campaign and continued in it with unabated ardor to the end. The defeat of Clay affected him, as it did thousands of others, as a great public calamity and a keen personal sorrow. It is impossible to mistake the accent of sincere mourning which we find in the journals of the time. The addresses which were sent to Mr. Clay from every part of the country indicate a depth of affectionate devotion which rarely falls to the lot of a political chieftain. An extract from the one sent by the Clay Clubs of New York will show the earnest attachment and pride with which the young men of that day still declared their loyalty to their beloved leader, even in the midst of irreparable disaster.

"We will remember you, Henry Clay, while the memory of the glorious or the sense of the good remains in us, with a grateful and admiring affection which shall strengthen with our strength and shall not decay with our decline. We will remember you in all our future trials and reverses as him whose name honored defeat and gave it a glory which victory could not have brought. We will remember you when patriotic hope rallies again to successful contest with the agencies of corruption and ruin; for we will never know a triumph which you do not share in life, whose glory does not accrue to you in death."*

* This massacre inspired one of the most remarkable poems of Walt Whitman, "Now I tell you what I knew of Texas in my early youth," in which occurs his description of the rangers:

"They were the glory of the race of rangers,
Matchless with horse, rifle, song, supper, courtship,
Large, turbulent, generous, handsome, proud, and affectionate,
Bearded, sunburnt, drest in the free costume of hunters,
Not a single one over thirty years of age."

* For assistance in obtaining illustrations to accompany this History, we are especially indebted, among others, to General Fayette Hewitt, of Frankfort, Ky., Judge A. M. Brown, of Elizabethtown, Ky., Mr. John W. Keyes, of the Lincoln Memorial Collection of Chicago, and to Colonel Reuben T. Durrett, of Louisville, Ky. — EDITOR CENTURY.

Jan 1887

Feb. 1887

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN IN CONGRESS.



ENGRAVED BY G. KRUELL. PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY.

JOHN TYLER, PRESIDENT, 1841–45.

CAMPAIGN FOR CONGRESS.

IN the months that remained of his term, after the election of his successor, President Tyler pursued with much vigor his purpose of accomplishing the annexation of Texas, regarding it as the measure which was specially to illustrate his administration and to preserve it from oblivion. The state of affairs, when Congress came together in December, 1844, was propitious to the project. Dr. Anson Jones had been elected as President of Texas; the republic was in a more thriving condition than ever before. Its population was rapidly increasing under the stimulus of its probable change of flag; its budget presented a less

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

ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON. FROM DAGUERREOTYPE, ABOUT 1866, IN POSSESSION OF L. C. PITNER.

REV. PETER CARTWRIGHT AND HIS WIFE.

unwholesome balance; its relations with Mexico, while they were no more friendly, had ceased to excite alarm. The Tyler Government, having been baffled in the spring by the rejection of the treaty for annexation which they had submitted to the Senate, chose to proceed this winter in a different way. Early in the session a joint resolution providing for annexation was introduced in the House of Representatives, which, after considerable discussion and attempted amendment by the antislavery members, passed the House by a majority of twenty-two votes. In the Senate it encountered more opposition, as might have been

expected in a chamber which had overwhelmingly rejected the same scheme only a few months before. It was at last amended by inserting a section called the Walker amendment, providing that the President, if it were in his judgment advisable, should proceed by way of negotiation, instead of submitting the resolutions as an overture on the part of the United States to Texas. This amendment eased the conscience of a few shy supporters of the Administration who had committed themselves very strongly against the scheme, and saved them from the shame of open tergiversation. The President, however, treated this subterfuge with the contempt which it deserved, by utterly disregarding the Walker amendment, and by dispatching a messenger to Texas to bring about annexation on the basis of the resolutions, the moment he had signed them, when only a few hours of his official existence remained.



GENERAL JOHN J. HARDIN.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE, LENT BY MRS. E. H. WALWORTH.)

The measures initiated by Tyler were, of course, carried out by Polk. The work was pushed forward with equal zeal at Washington and at Austin. A convention of Texans was called for the 4th of July to consider the American propositions; they were promptly accepted and ratified, and in the last days of 1845 Texas was formally admitted into the Union as a State.



COLONEL E. D. BAKER. (ABOUT 1861.)
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Besides the general objections which the antislavery men of the North had to the project itself, there was something especially offensive to them in the pretense of fairness and compromise held out by the resolutions committing the Government to annexation. The third section provided that four new States might hereafter be formed out of the Territory of Texas; that such States as were formed out of the portion lying south of 36° 30′, the Missouri Compromise line, might be admitted with or without slavery, as the people might desire; and that slavery should be prohibited in such States as might be formed out of the portion lying north of that line. The opponents of slavery regarded this provision, with good reason, as derisory. Slavery already existed in the entire territory by the act of the early settlers from the South who had brought their slaves with them, and the State of Texas had no valid claim to an inch of ground north of the line of 36° 30′ nor anywhere near it; so that this clause, if it had any force whatever, would have authorized the establishment of slavery in a portion of New Mexico, where it did not exist, and where it had been expressly prohibited by the Mexican law. Another serious

objection was that the resolutions were taken as committing the United States to the adoption and maintenance of the Rio Grande del Norte as the western boundary of Texas. All mention of this was avoided in the instrument, and it was



ENGRAVED BY H. VELTEN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.

JAMES K. POLK. (1845.) PRESIDENT, 1845–49.

expressly stated that the State was to be formed "subject to the adjustment by this Government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments," but the moment the resolutions were passed the Government assumed, as a matter beyond dispute, that all the territory east of the Rio Grande was the rightful property of Texas, to be defended by the military power of the United States.

Even if Mexico had been inclined to submit to the annexation of Texas, it is nevertheless certain that the occupation of the left bank of the Rio Grande, without an attempt at an understanding, would bring about a collision. The country lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was then entirely uninhabited, and was thought uninhabitable, though subsequent years have shown the fallacy of that belief. The occupation of the country of Texas extended no farther than the Nueces, and the Mexican farmers cultivated their corn and cotton in peace in the fertile fields opposite Matamoras.

It is true that Texas claimed the eastern bank of the Rio Grande from its source to its mouth · and while the Texans held Santa



GENERAL D. MARIANO ARISTA. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF JOHN W. FOSTER, ESQ.)

GENERAL D. JUAN N. ALMONTE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF JOHN W. FOSTER, ESQ.)

Anna prisoner, under duress of arms and the stronger pressure of his own conscience, which assured him that he deserved death as a murderer, "he solemnly sanctioned, acknowledged, and ratified" their independence with whatever boundaries they chose to claim; but the Bustamente administration lost no time in repudiating this treaty, and at once renewed the war, which had been carried on in a fitful way ever since.

But leaving out of view this special subject of admitted dispute, the Mexican government had warned our own in sufficiently formal terms that annexation could not be peacefully effected. When Mr. Upshur first began his negotiations with Texas, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the earliest rumors of what was afoot, addressed a note* to Waddy Thompson, our Minister in Mexico, referring to the reported intention of Texas to seek admission to the Union, and formally protesting against it as "an aggression unprecedented in the annals of the world," and adding, "if it be indispensable for the Mexican nation to seek security for its rights at the expense of the disasters of war, it will call upon God, and rely on its own efforts for the defense of its just cause." A little while later General Almonte renewed this notification at Washington, saying in so many words that the annexation of Texas would terminate his mission, and that Mexico would declare war as soon as it received intimation of such an act. In June, 1845, Mr. Donelson, in charge of the American Legation in Mexico, assures the Secretary of State that war is inevitable, though he adopts the fiction of Mr. Calhoun, that it is the result of the abolitionist intrigues of Great Britain, which he credited with the intention "of depriving both Texas and the United States of all claim to the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande."

No one, therefore, doubted that war would follow, and it soon came. General Zachary Taylor had been sent during the summer to Corpus Christi, where a considerable portion of the small army of the nation was placed under his command. It was generally understood to be the desire of the Administration that hostilities should begin without orders, by a species of spontaneous combustion; but the coolness and prudence of General Taylor made futile any such hopes, if they were entertained, and it required a positive order to induce him, in March, 1846, to advance

GENERAL PEDRO DE AMPUDIA. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF JOHN W. FOSTER, ESQ.)

*August 23, 1843.



ENGRAVED BY C. A. POWELL. PAINTING BY VANDERLYN, IN THE CORCORAN GALLERY.

ZACHARY TAYLOR. (1852.) PRESIDENT, 1849–50.

towards the Rio Grande and to cross the disputed territory. He arrived at a point opposite Matamoras on the 28th of March, and immediately fortified himself, disregarding the summons of the Mexican commander, who warned him that such action would be considered as a declaration of war. In May General Arista crossed the river and attacked General Taylor on the field of Palo Alto, where Taylor won the first of that remarkable series of victories, embracing Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, and Buena Vista, all gained over superior forces of the enemy, which made the American commander for the brief day which was left him the idol alike of soldiers and voters.

After Baker's election in 1844, it was generally taken as a matter of course in the district that Lincoln was to be the next candidate of the Whig party for Congress. It was charged at the time, and some recent writers have repeated the charge, that there was a bargain made in 1840 between Hardin, Baker, Lincoln, and Logan to succeed each other in the order named. This sort of fiction is the commonest

known to American politics. Something like it is told, and more or less believed, in half the districts in the country every year. It arises naturally from the fact that there are always more candidates than places, that any one who is a candidate twice is felt to be defrauding his neighbors, and that all candidates are too ready to assure their constituents that they only want one term, and too ready to forget these assurances when their terms are ending. There is not only no evidence of any such bargain among the men we have mentioned, but there is the clearest proof of the contrary. Two or more of them were candidates for the nomination at every election from the time when Stuart retired until the Whigs lost the district. At the same time it is not to be denied that there was a tacit understanding among the Whigs of the district that whoever should, at each election, gain the honor of representing the one Whig constituency of the State, should hold himself satisfied with that privilege, and not be a candidate for reëlection. The retiring member was not always convinced of the propriety of this arrangement. In the early part of January, 1846, Hardin was the only one whose name was mentioned in opposition to Lincoln. He was reasonably sure of his own county, and he tried to induce Lincoln to consent to an arrangement that all candidates should confine themselves to their own counties in the canvass; but Lincoln, who was very strong in the outlying counties of the district, declined the proposition, alleging, as a reason for refusing, that Hardin was so much better known than he, by reason of his service in Congress, that such a stipulation would give him a great advantage. There was fully as much courtesy as candor in this plea, and Lincoln's entire letter was extremely politic and civil. "I have always been in the habit," he says, "of acceding to almost any proposal that a friend would make, and I am truly sorry that I cannot to this." A month later Hardin saw that his candidacy was useless, and he published a card withdrawing from the contest, which was copied and commended in the kindest terms by papers friendly to Lincoln, and the two men remained on terms of intimate friendship.

The convention was held at Petersburg on the 1st of May. Judge Logan placed the name of Lincoln before it, and he was nominated unanimously. The Springfield "Journal," giving the news the week after, said, "This nomination was of course anticipated, there being no other candidate in the field. Mr. Lincoln, we all know, is a good Whig, a good man, an able speaker, and richly deserves, as he enjoys, the confidence of the Whigs of this district and of the State."

The Democrats gave Mr. Lincoln a singular competitor — the famous Methodist preacher, Peter Cartwright. It was not the first time they had met in the field of politics. When Lincoln ran for the Legislature on his return from the Black Hawk war, in 1832, one of the successful candidates of that year was this indefatigable circuit-rider. He was now over sixty years of age, in the height of his popularity, and in all respects an adversary not to be despised. His career as a preacher began at the beginning of the century and continued for seventy years. He was the son of one of the pioneers of the West, and grew up in the rudest regions of the border land between Tennessee and Kentucky. He represents himself, with the usual inverted pride of a class-leader, as having been a wild, vicious youth; but the catalogue of his crimes embraces nothing less venial than card-playing, horse-racing, and dancing, and it is hard to see what different amusements could have been found in southern Kentucky in the year 1801. This course of dissipation did not continue long, as he was "converted and united with the Ebenezer Methodist Episcopal Church" in June of that year, when only sixteen years old, and immediately developed such zeal and power in exhortation that less than a year later he was licensed "to exercise his gifts as an exhorter so long as his practice is agreeable to the gospel." He became a deacon at twenty-one, an elder at twenty-three, a presiding elder at twenty-seven, and from that time his life is the history of his church in the West for sixty years. He died in 1872, eighty-seven years of age, having baptized twelve thousand persons and preached fifteen thousand sermons. He was, and will always remain, the type of the backwoods preacher. Even in his lifetime the simple story of his life became so overgrown with a net-work of fable that there is little resemblance between the simple, courageous, prejudiced itinerant of his "Autobiography" and the fighting, brawling, half-civilized, Protestant Friar Tuck of bar-room and newspaper legend. It is true that he did not always discard the weapons of the flesh in his combats with the ungodly, and he was more than once compelled to leave the pulpit to do carnal execution upon the disturbers of the peace of the sanctuary; but two or three incidents of this sort in three-quarters of a century do not turn a parson into a pugilist. He was a fluent, self-confident speaker, who, after the habit of his time, addressed his discourses more to the emotions than to the reason of his hearers. His system of future rewards and punishments was of the most simple and concrete character, and formed the staple of his sermons. He had no patience with the refinements and reticences of modern theology, and in his later years observed with scorn and

sorrow the progress of education and scholarly training in his own communion. After listening one day to a prayer from a young minister which shone more by its correctness than its unction, he could not refrain from saying, "Brother —, three prayers like that would freeze hell over!"—a consummation which did not commend itself to him as desirable. He often visited the cities of the Atlantic coast, but saw little in them to admire. His chief pleasure on his return was to sit in a circle of his friends and pour out the phials of his sarcasm upon all the refinements of life which he had witnessed in New York or Philadelphia, which he believed, or affected to believe, were tenanted by a species of beings altogether inferior to the manhood that filled the cabins of Kentucky and Illinois. An apocryphal story of one of these visits was often told of him, which pleased him so that he never contradicted it: that becoming bewildered in the vastness of a New York hotel, he procured a hatchet, and in pioneer fashion "blazed" his way along the mahogany staircases and painted corridors from the office to his room. With all his eccentricities, he was a devout man, conscientious and brave. He lived in domestic peace and honor all his days, and dying, he and his wife, whom he had married almost in childhood, left a posterity of one hundred and twenty-nine direct descendants to mourn them.*

With all his devotion to the cause of his church, Peter Cartwright was an ardent Jackson politician, with probably a larger acquaintance throughout the district than any other man in it, and with a personal following which, beginning with his own children and grandchildren and extending through every precinct, made it no holiday task to defeat him in a popular contest. But Lincoln and his friends went energetically into the canvass, and before it closed he was able to foresee a certain victory.

An incident is related to show how accurately he could calculate political results in advance—a faculty which remained with him all his life. A friend, who was a Democrat, had come to him early in the canvass and had told him he wanted to see him elected, but did not like to vote against his party; still he would vote for him, if the contest was to be so close that every vote was needed. A short time before the election Lincoln said to him, "I have got the preacher, and I don't want your vote."

The campaign was carried on almost entirely without expense. Mr. Joshua Speed told the writers that some of the Whigs contributed a purse of $200, which Speed handed to Lincoln to pay his personal expenses in the canvass. After the election was over the successful candidate handed Speed $199.25, with the request that he return it to the subscribers. "I did not need the money," he said. "I made the canvass on my own horse; my entertainment, being at the houses of friends, cost me nothing; and my only outlay was 75 cents for a barrel of cider, which some farm-hands insisted I should treat them to."

The election was held in August, and the Whig candidate's majority was very large—1511 in the district, where Clay's majority had been only 914, and where Taylor's, two years later, with all the glamour of victory about him, was ten less. Lincoln's majority in Sangamon County was 690, which, in view of the standing of his competitor, was the most remarkable proof which could be given of his personal popularity;† it was the highest majority ever given to any candidate in the county during the entire period of Whig ascendency until Yates's triumphant campaign of 1852.

This large vote was all the more noteworthy because the Whigs were this year upon the unpopular side. The annexation of Texas was generally approved throughout the West, and those who opposed it were regarded as rather lacking in patriotism, even before actual hostilities began. But when General Taylor and General Ampudia confronted each other with hostile guns across the Rio Grande, and still more after the brilliant feat of arms by which the Americans opened the war on the plain of Palo Alto, it required a good deal of moral courage on the part of the candidates and voters alike to continue their attitude of disapproval of the policy of the Government, at the same time that they were shouting pæans over the exploits of our soldiers. They were assisted, it is true, by the fact that the leading Whigs of the State volunteered with the utmost alacrity and promptitude in the military service. On the 11th of May, Congress authorized the raising of fifty thousand volunteers, and as soon as the intelligence reached Illinois, the daring and restless spirit of Hardin leaped forward to the fate which was awaiting him, and he instantly issued a call to his brigade of

* The impressive manner of Mrs. Cartwright's death, who survived her husband a few years, is remembered in the churches of Sangamon County. She was attending a religious meeting at Bethel Chapel, a mile from her house. She was called upon "to give her testimony," which she did with much feeling, concluding with the words, "the past three weeks have been the happiest of all my life; I am waiting for the chariot." When the meeting broke up, she did not rise with the rest. The minister solemnly said, "The chariot has arrived."—"Early Settlers of Sangamon County," by John Carroll Power.

† Stuart's maj. over May in '36 in Sangamon Co. was 543
" " " Douglass " '38 " " " " 295
" " " Ralston " '40 " " " " 575
Hardin's " " McDougal " '43 " " " " 504
Baker's " " Calhoun " '44 " " " " 373
Lincoln's " " Cartwright " '46 " " " " 690
Logan's " " Harris " '48 " " " " 263
Yates's " " Harris " '50 " " " " 336

militia, in which he said: "The general has already enrolled himself as the first volunteer from Illinois under the requisition. He is going whenever ordered. Who will go with him? He confidently expects to be accompanied by many of his brigade." The quota assigned to Illinois was three regiments; these were quickly raised,* and an additional regiment offered by Baker was then accepted. The sons of the prominent Whigs enlisted as private soldiers; David Logan was a sergeant in Baker's regiment. A public meeting was held in Springfield on the 29th of May, at which Mr. Lincoln delivered what was considered a thrilling and effective speech on the condition of affairs, and the duty of citizens to stand by the flag of the nation until an honorable peace was secured. It was thought probable, and would have been altogether fitting, that either Colonel Hardin, Colonel Baker, or Colonel Bissell, all of them men of intelligence and distinction, should be appointed general of the Illinois Brigade, but the Polk administration was not inclined to waste so important a place upon men who might hereafter have views of their own in public affairs. The coveted appointment was given to a man already loaded to a grotesque degree with political employment — Mr. Lincoln's old adversary, James Shields. He had left the position of Auditor of State to assume a seat on the Bench; leaving this, he had just been appointed Commissioner of the General Land Office. He had no military experience, and so far as known no capacity for the service; but his fervid partisanship and his nationality commended him to Mr. Polk as a safe servant, and he received his commission, to the surprise and derision of the State. His bravery in action and his honorable wounds at Cerro Gordo and Chapultepec saved him from contempt and made his political fortune.

He had received the recommendation of the Illinois Democrats in Congress, and it is altogether probable that he owed his appointment in great measure to the influence of Douglas, who desired to have as few Democratic statesmen as possible in Springfield that winter. A Senator was to be elected, and Shields had acquired such a habit of taking all the offices that fell vacant that it was only prudent to remove him as far as convenient from such a temptation. The election was held in December, and Douglas was promoted from the House of Representatives to that seat in the Senate which he held the rest of his life.

The session of 1846–7 opened with the Sangamon district of Illinois unrepresented in Congress. Baker had gone with his regiment to Mexico. It did not have the good fortune to participate in any of the earlier actions of the campaign, and his fiery spirit chafed in this enforced idleness of camp and garrison. He seized an occasion which was offered him to go to Washington as bearer of dispatches, and while there he made one of those sudden and dramatic appearances in the Capitol which were so much in harmony with his tastes and his character. He went to his place on the floor,† and there delivered a bright, interesting speech in his most attractive vein, calling attention to the needs of the army, disavowing on the part of the Whigs any responsibility for the war or its conduct, and adroitly claiming for them a full share of the credit for its prosecution. He began by thanking the House for its kindness in allowing him the floor, protesting at the same time that he had done nothing to deserve such courtesy. "I could wish," he said, "that it had been the fortune of the gallant Davis‡ to now stand where I do and to receive from gentlemen on all sides the congratulations so justly due to him, and to listen to the praises of his brave compeers. For myself, I have, unfortunately, been left far in the rear of the war, and if now I venture to say a word in behalf of those who have endured the severest hardships of the struggle, whether in the blood-stained streets of Monterey, or in a yet sterner form on the banks of the Rio Grande, I beg you to believe that while I feel this a most pleasant duty, it is in other respects a duty full of pain; for I stand here, after six months' service as a volunteer, having seen no actual warfare in the field." Yet even this disadvantage he turned with great dexterity to his service. He reproached Congress for its apathy and inaction in not providing for the wants of the army by reënforcements and supplies; he flattered the troops in the field, and paid a touching tribute to those who died of disease and exposure, without ever enjoying the sight of a battlefield, and rising to lyric enthusiasm, he repeated a poem of his own, which he had written in camp to the memory of the dead of the Fourth Illinois. He could not refrain from giving his own party all the credit which could be claimed for it, and it is not difficult to imagine how exasperating it must have been to the majority to hear so calm an assumption of superior patriotism on the part of the opposition as the following: "As a Whig I still occupy a place on this floor; nor do I think it worth while to reply to such a charge as that the Whigs are not friends of their country because many of them doubt the justice or expediency of the present war. Surely there was all the more evidence of the patriotism of the man who, doubting the expediency

* The colonels were Hardin, Bissell, and Freeman.
† December 28, 1846.
‡ Jefferson Davis, who was with the army in Mexico.

and even the entire justice of the war, nevertheless supported it, because it was the war of his country. In the one it might be mere enthusiasm and an impetuous temperament; in the other it was true patriotism, a sense of duty. Homer represents Hector as strongly doubting the expediency of the war against Greece. He gave his advice against it; he had no sympathy with Paris, whom he bitterly reproached, much less with Helen; yet, when the war came, and the Grecian forces were marshaled on the plain, and their crooked keels were seen cutting the sands of the Trojan coast, Hector was a flaming fire, his beaming helmet was seen in the thickest of the fight. There are in the American army many who have the spirit of Hector; who strongly doubt the propriety of the war, and especially the manner of its commencement; who yet are ready to pour out their hearts' best blood like water, and their lives with it, on a foreign shore, in defense of the American flag and American glory." *



THE BOUNDARIES OF TEXAS.

This map gives the boundary between Mexico and the United States as defined by the treaty of 1828; the westerly bank of the Sabine River from its mouth to the 32d degree of latitude; thence due north to the Red River, following the course of that stream to the 100th degree of longitude west from Greenwich; thence due north to the Arkansas River, and running along its south bank to its source in the Rocky Mountains, near the place where Leadville now stands; thence due north to the 42d parallel of latitude, which it follows to the Pacific Ocean.

On the west will be seen the boundaries claimed by Mexico and the United States after the annexation of Texas. The Mexican authorities considered the western boundary of Texas to be the Nueces River, from mouth to source; thence by an indefinite line to the Rio Pecos, and through the elevated and barren Llano Estacado to the source of the main branch of the Red River, and along that river to the 100th meridian. The United States adopted the Texan claim of the Rio Grande del Norte as their western limit. By the treaty of peace of 1848, the Mexicans relinquished to the United States the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande del Norte; also the territory lying between the last-named river and the Pacific Ocean, and north of the Gila River and the southern boundary of New Mexico, which was a short distance above the town of El Paso.—J. W.

Immediately after making this speech, Baker increased the favorable impression created by it by resigning his seat in Congress and hurrying as fast as steam could carry him to New Orleans, to embark there for Mexico. He had heard of the advance of Santa Anna upon Saltillo, and did not wish to lose any opportu-

* We give a copy of these lines, not on account of their intrinsic merit, but as illustrating the versatility of the lawyer, orator, and soldier who wrote them.

Where rolls the rushing Rio Grande,
How peacefully they sleep!
Far from their native Northern land,
Far from the friends who weep.
No rolling drums disturb their rest
Beneath the sandy sod;
The mold lies heavy on each breast,
The spirit is with God.

They heard their country's call, and came
To battle for the right;
Each bosom filled with martial flame,
And kindling for the fight.
Light was their measured footstep when
They moved to seek the foe;
Alas that hearts so fiery then
Should soon be cold and low!

They did not die in eager strife
Upon a well-fought field;
Nor from the red wound poured their life
Where cowering foemen yield.
Death's ghastly shade was slowly cast
Upon each manly brow,
But calm and fearless to the last,
They sleep securely now.

Yet shall a grateful country give
Her honors to their name;
In kindred hearts their memory live,
And history guard their fame.
Not unremembered do they sleep
Upon a foreign strand,
Though near their graves thy wild waves sweep,
O rushing Rio Grande!

nity of fighting which might fall in the way of his regiment. He arrived to find his troops transferred to the Department of General Scott; and although he missed Buena Vista, he took part in the capture of Vera Cruz, and greatly distinguished himself at Cerro Gordo. When Shields was wounded, Baker took command of his brigade, and by a gallant charge on the Mexican guns gained possession of the Jalapa road, an act by which a great portion of the fruits of that victory were harvested.

His resignation left a vacancy in Congress, and a contest, characteristic of the politics of the time, at once sprang up over it. The rational course would have been to elect Lincoln, but, with his usual overstrained delicacy, he declined to run, thinking it fair to give other aspirants a chance for the term of two months. The Whigs nominated a respectable man named Brown, but a short while before the election John Henry, a member of the State Senate, announced himself as a candidate, and appealed for votes on the sole ground that he was a poor man and wanted the place for the mileage. Brown, either recognizing the force of this plea, or smitten with a sudden disgust for a service in which such pleas were possible, withdrew from the canvass, and Henry got his election and his mileage.

THE THIRTIETH CONGRESS.

THE Thirtieth Congress organized on the 6th of December, 1847. Its roll contained the names of many eminent men, few of whom were less known than his which was destined to a fame more wide and enduring than all the rest together. It was Mr. Lincoln's sole distinction that he was the only Whig member from Illinois. He entered upon the larger field of work which now lay before him without any special diffidence, but equally without elation. Writing to his friend Speed soon after his election he said, "Being elected to Congress, though I am very grateful to our friends for having done it, has not pleased me as much as I expected,"— an experience not unknown to most public men, but probably intensified in Lincoln's case by his constitutional melancholy. He went about his work with little gladness, but with a dogged sincerity and an inflexible conscience.

It soon became apparent that the Whigs were to derive at least a temporary advantage from the war which the Democrats had brought upon the country, although it was destined in its later consequences to sweep the former party out of existence and exile the other from power for many years. The House was so closely divided that Lincoln, writing on the 5th, expressed some doubt whether the Whigs could elect all their caucus nominees, and Mr. Robert C. Winthrop was chosen Speaker the next day by a majority of one vote. The President showed in his message that he was doubtful of the verdict of Congress and the country upon the year's operations, and he argued with more solicitude than force in defense of the proceedings of the Administration in regard to the war with Mexico. His anxiety was at once shown to be well founded. The first attempt made by his friends to indorse the conduct of the Government was met by a stern rebuke from the House of Representatives, which passed an amendment proposed by George Ashmun that "the war had been unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President." This severe declaration was provoked and justified by the persistent and disingenuous assertion of the President that the preceding Congress had "with virtual unanimity" declared that "war existed by the act of Mexico"— the truth being that a strong minority had voted to strike out those words from the preamble of the supply bill, but being outvoted in this, they were compelled either to vote for preamble and bill together, or else refuse supplies to the army. It was not surprising that the Whigs and other opponents of the war should take the first opportunity to give the President their opinion of such a misrepresentation. The position of the opposition had been greatly strengthened by the very victories upon which Mr. Polk had confidently relied for his vindication. Both our armies in Mexico were under command of Whig generals, and among the subordinate officers who had distinguished themselves in the field, a full share were Whigs, who, to an extent unusual in wars of political significance, retained their attitude of hostility to the administration under whose orders they were serving. Some of them had returned to their places on the floor of Congress brandishing their laurels with great effect in the faces of their opponents who had talked while they fought.* When we number the names which leaped into sudden fame in that short but sanguinary war, it is surprising to find how few of them sympathized with the party which brought it on, or

* The following extract from a letter of Lincoln to his partner, Mr. Herndon, gives the names of some of the Whig soldiers who persisted in their faith throughout the war: "As to the Whig men who have participated in the war, so far as they have spoken to my hearing, they do not hesitate to denounce as unjust the President's conduct in the beginning of the war. They do not suppose that such denunciation is directed by undying hatred to them, as 'the Register' would have it believed. There are two such Whigs on this floor (Colonel Haskell and Major James). The former fought as a colonel by the side of Colonel Baker, at Cerro Gordo, and stands side by side with me in the vote that you seem dissatisfied with. The latter, the

with the purposes for which it was waged. The earnest opposition of Taylor to the scheme of the annexationists did not hamper his movements or paralyze his arm, when with his little band of regulars he beat the army of Arista on the plain of Palo Alto, and again in the precipitous Resaca de la Palma; took by storm the fortified city of Monterey, defended by a greatly superior force; and finally, with a few regiments of raw levies, posted among the rocky spurs and gorges about the farm of Buena Vista, met and defeated the best-led and best-fought army the Mexicans ever brought into the field, outnumbering him more than four to one. It was only natural that the Whigs should profit by the glory gained by Whig valor, no matter in what cause. The attitude of the opposition — sure of their advantage and exulting in it — was never perhaps more clearly and strongly set forth than in a speech made by Mr. Lincoln near the close of this session. He said:

"As General Taylor is *par excellence* the hero of the Mexican War, and as you Democrats say we Whigs have always opposed the war, you think it must be very awkward and embarrassing for us to go for General Taylor. The declaration that we have always opposed the war is true or false accordingly as one may understand the term 'opposing the war.' If to say 'the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President' be opposing the war, then the Whigs have very generally opposed it. Whenever they have spoken at all they have said this; and they have said it on what has appeared good reason to them; the marching of an army into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening the inhabitants away, leaving their growing crops and other property to destruction, to *you* may appear a perfectly amiable, peaceful, unprovoking procedure; but it does not appear so to *us*. So to call such an act, to us appears no other than a naked, impudent absurdity, and we speak of it accordingly. But if when the war had begun, and had become the cause of the country, the giving of our money and our blood, in common with yours, was support of the war, then it is not true that we have always opposed the war. With few individual exceptions, you have constantly had our votes here for all the necessary supplies. And, more than this, you have had the services, the blood, and the lives of our political brethren in every trial, and on every field. The beardless boy and the mature man, the humble and the distinguished,— you have had them. Through suffering and death, by disease and in battle, they have endured and fought and fallen with you. Clay and Webster each gave a son, never to be returned. From the State of my own residence, besides other worthy but less-known Whig names, we sent Marshall, Morrison, Baker, and Hardin; they all fought, and one fell, and in the fall of that one we lost our best Whig man. Nor were the Whigs few in number or laggard in the day of battle. In that fearful, bloody, breathless struggle at Buena Vista, where each man's hard task was to beat back five foes or die himself, of the five high officers who perished, four were Whigs."

history of whose capture with Cassius Clay you well know, had not arrived here when that vote was given; but, as I understand, he stands ready to give just such a vote whenever an occasion shall present. Baker, too, who is now here, says the truth is undoubtedly that way; and whenever he shall speak out, he will say

There was no other refuge for the Democrats after the Whigs had adopted Taylor as their especial hero, as Scott was also a Whig and an original opponent of the war. His victories have never received the credit justly due them on account of the apparent ease with which they were gained. The student of military history will rarely meet with accounts of battles in any age where the actual operations coincide so exactly with the orders issued upon the eve of conflict, as in the official reports of the wonderfully energetic and successful campaign in which General Scott with a handful of men renewed the memory of the conquest of Cortes, in his triumphant march from Vera Cruz to the capital. The plan of the battle of Cerro Gordo was so fully carried out in action that the official report is hardly more than the general orders translated from the future tense to the past. The story of Chapultepec has the same element of the marvelous in it. The general commands apparent impossibilities in the closest detail on one day, and the next day reports that they have been accomplished. These successes were not cheaply attained. The Mexicans, though deficient in science and in military intelligence, fought with bravery and sometimes with desperation. The enormous percentage of loss in his army proves that Scott was engaged in no light work. He marched from Pueblo with about ten thousand men, and his losses in the basin of Mexico were 2703, of whom 383 were officers. But neither he nor Taylor was a favorite of the Administration, and their brilliant success brought no gain of popularity to Mr. Polk and his Cabinet.

During the early part of the session little was talked about except the Mexican war, its causes, its prosecution, and its probable results. In these wordy engagements the Whigs, partly for the reasons we have mentioned, partly through their unquestionable superiority in debate, and partly by virtue of their stronger cause, usually had the advantage. There was no distinct line of demarcation, however, between the two parties. There was hardly a vote, after the election of Mr. Winthrop as Speaker, where the two sides divided according to their partisan nomenclature. The question of slavery, even where its presence was not avowed, had its secret influence upon every trial of strength in Congress, and Southern Whigs were continually found sustaining the President, and New England Democrats voting against his most cherished plans. Not

so. Colonel Doniphan, too, the favorite Whig of Missouri, and who overran all northern Mexico, on his return home, in a public speech at St. Louis, condemned the Administration in relation to the war, if I remember. G. T. M. Davis, who has been through almost the whole war, declares in favor of Mr. Clay;" etc.

even all the Democrats of the South could be relied on by the Administration. The most powerful leader of them all denounced with bitter earnestness the conduct of the war, for which he was greatly responsible. Mr. Calhoun, in an attack upon the President's policy, January 4, 1848, said, "I opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue, but from high considerations of policy; because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country and greatly endanger its free institutions." It was probably not so much the free institutions of the country that the South Carolina Senator was disturbed about as some others. He perhaps felt that the friends of slavery had set in motion a train of events whose result was beyond their ken. Mr. Palfrey of Massachusetts a few days later said with as much sagacity as wit that "Mr. Calhoun thought that he could set fire to a barrel of gunpowder and extinguish it when half-consumed." In his anxiety that the war should be brought to an end, Calhoun proposed that the United States army should evacuate the Mexican capital, establish a defensive line, and hold it as the only indemnity possible to us. He had no confidence in treaties, and believed that no Mexican government was capable of carrying one into effect. A few days later,* in a running debate, Mr. Calhoun made an important statement which still further strengthened the contention of the Whigs. He said that in making the treaty of annexation he did not assume that the Rio del Norte was the western boundary of Texas; on the contrary, he assumed that the boundary was an unsettled one between Mexico and Texas; and that he had intimated to our *chargé d'affaires* that we were prepared to settle the boundary on the most liberal terms! This was perfectly in accordance with the position held by most Democrats before the Rio Grande boundary was made by the President an article of faith. Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, one of the leading men upon that side in Congress, in a speech three years before had said, "The stupendous deserts between the Nueces and the Bravo rivers are the natural boundaries between the Anglo-Saxon and the Mauritanian races"; a statement which, however faulty from the point of view of ethnology and physical geography, shows clearly enough the view then held of the boundary question.

* January 13, 1848.

The discipline of both parties was more or less relaxed under the influence of the slavery question. It was singular to see Mr. McLane of Baltimore rebuking Mr. Clingman of North Carolina for mentioning that forbidden subject on the floor of the House; Mr. Reverdy Johnson, a Whig from Maryland, administering correction to Mr. Hale, an insubordinate Democrat from New Hampshire, for the same offense, and at the same time screaming that the "blood of our glorious battle fields in Mexico rested on the hands of the President"; Mr. Clingman challenging the House with the broad statement that "it is a misnomer to speak of our institution at the South as peculiar; ours is the general system of the world, and the *free* system is the peculiar one," and Mr. Palfrey dryly responding that slavery was natural just as barbarism was; just as fig-leaves and bare skins were a natural dress. When the time arrived, however, for leaving off grimacing and posturing, and the House went to voting, the advocates of slavery usually carried the day, as the South, Whigs and Democrats together, voted solidly, and the North was divided. Especially was this the case after the arrival of the treaty of peace between the United States and Mexico, which was signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo on the 2d of February and was in the hands of the Senate only twenty days later. It was ratified by that body on the 10th of March, with a series of amendments which were at once accepted by Mexico, and the treaty of peace was officially promulgated on the national festival of the Fourth of July. From the hour when the treaty was received in Washington, however, the discussion as to the conduct of the war naturally languished; the ablest speeches of the day before became obsolete in the presence of accomplished facts; and the interest of Congress promptly turned to the more important subject of the disposition to be made of the vast domain which our arms had conquered and the treaty confirmed to us. No one in America then realized the magnitude of this acquisition. Its stupendous physical features were as little appreciated as the vast moral and political results which were to flow from its entrance into our commonwealth. It was only known, in general terms, that our new possessions covered ten degrees of latitude and fifteen of longitude; that we had acquired, in short, six hundred and thirty thousand square miles of desert, mountain, and wilderness. There was no dream, then, of that portentous discovery which, even while the Senate was wrangling over the treaty, had converted Captain Suttar's farm at Coloma into a mining camp — for his ruin and the sudden up-building of many colossal fortunes. The name of California, which

conveys to-day such opulent suggestions, then meant nothing but barrenness, and Nevada was a name as yet unknown — some future Congressman, innocent of taste and of Spanish, was to hit upon the absurdity of calling that land of silver and cactus, of the orange and the sage-hen, the land of snow. But imperfect as was the appreciation, at that day, of the possibilities which lay hidden in these sunset regions, there was still enough of instinctive greed in the minds of politicians to make them a subject of lively interest and intrigue.* At the first showing of hands, the South was successful.

In the twenty-ninth Congress this contest had begun over the spoils of a victory not yet achieved. President Polk, foreseeing the probability of an acquisition of territory by treaty, had asked Congress to make an appropriation for that purpose. A bill was at once reported in that sense, appropriating $30,000 for the expenses of the negotiation and $2,000,000 to be used in the President's discretion. But before it passed, a number of Northern Democrats† had become alarmed as to the disposition that might be made of the territory thus acquired, which was now free soil by Mexican law. After a hasty consultation they agreed upon a proviso to the bill, which was presented by Mr. David Wilmot of Pennsylvania. He was a man of respectable abilities, who then, and long afterwards, held a somewhat prominent position among the public men of his State; but his sole claim to a place in history rests upon these few lines which he moved to add to the first section of the bill under discussion:

"*Provided*, That as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty that may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted."

This condition seemed so fair, when first presented to the Northern conscience, that only three members from the free States voted No in committee. The amendment was adopted — 80 to 64 — and the bill reported to the House. A desperate effort was then made by the pro-slavery members to kill the bill for the purpose of destroying the amendment with it. This failed,‡ and the bill, as amended, passed the House, but going to the Senate a few hours before the close of the session, it lapsed without a vote.

As soon as the war was ended and the treaty of peace was sent to the Senate, this subject assumed a new interest and importance, and a resolution embodying the principle of the Wilmot proviso was brought before the House by Mr. Harvey Putnam of New York, but no longer with the same success. The South was now solid against it, and such a disintegration of conscience among Northern Democrats had set in, that whereas only three of them in the last Congress had seen fit to approve the introduction of slavery into free territory, twenty-five now voted with the South against maintaining the existing conditions there. The fight was kept up during the session in various places; if now and then a temporary advantage seemed gained in the House, it was lost in the Senate, and no permanent progress was made.

What we have said in regard to the general discussion provoked by the Mexican war appeared necessary to explain the part taken by Mr. Lincoln on the floor. He came to his place unheralded and without any special personal pretensions. His first participation in debate can best be described in his own quaint and simple words: § "As to speech-making, by way of getting the hang of the House, I made a little speech two or three days ago on a post-office question of no general interest. I find speaking here and elsewhere about the same thing. I was about as badly scared, and no worse, as I am when I speak in court. I expect to make one within a week or two in which I hope to succeed well enough to wish you to see it." He evidently had the orator's temperament — the mixture of dread and eagerness which all good speakers feel before facing an audience, which

* To show how crude and vague were the ideas of even the most intelligent men in relation to this great empire, we give a few lines from the closing page of E. D. Mansfield's "History of the Mexican War." "But will the greater part of this vast space ever be inhabited by any but the restless hunter and the wandering trapper? Two hundred thousand square miles of this territory, in New California, has been trod by the foot of no civilized being. No spy or pioneer or vagrant trapper has ever returned to report the character and scenery of that waste and lonely wilderness. Two hundred thousand square miles more are occupied with broken mountains and dreary wilds. But little remains then for civilization."

† Some of the more conspicuous among them were Hamlin of Maine, Preston King of New York, Wilmot of Pennsylvania, Brinckerhoff of Ohio, McClelland of Michigan, etc.

‡ In this important and significant vote all the Whigs but one and almost all the Democrats, from the free States, together with Wm. P. Thomasson and Henry Grider, Whigs from Kentucky, voted against killing the amended bill, in all 93. On the other side were all the members from slave-holding States, except Thomasson and Grider, and the following from free States, Douglas and McClernand from Illinois, Petit from Indiana, and Schenck, a Whig, from Ohio, in all 79.—Greeley's "American Conflict," I. p. 189.

§ Letter to Wm. H. Herndon, January 8, 1848.

made Cicero tremble and turn pale when rising in the Forum. The speech he was pondering was made only four days later, on the 12th of January, and few better maiden speeches — for it was his first formal discourse in Congress — have ever been made in that House. He preceded it, and prepared for it, by the introduction, on the 22d of December, of a series of resolutions referring to the President's persistent assertions that the war had been begun by Mexico, "by invading our territory and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own soil," and calling upon him to give the House more specific information upon these points. As these resolutions became somewhat famous afterwards, and were relied upon to sustain the charge of a lack of patriotism made by Mr. Douglas against their author, it may be as well to give them here, especially as they are the first production of Mr. Lincoln's pen after his entry upon the field of national politics. We omit the preamble, which consists of quotations from the President's message.

Resolved by the House of Representatives. That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to inform this House:

First. Whether the spot on which the blood of our citizens was shed, as in his messages declared, was or was not within the territory of Spain, at least after the treaty of 1819, until the Mexican revolution.

Second. Whether that spot is or is not within the territory which was wrested from Spain by the revolutionary government of Mexico.

Third. Whether that spot is or is not within a settlement of people, which settlement has existed ever since long before the Texas revolution and until its inhabitants fled before the approach of the United States army.

Fourth. Whether that settlement is or is not isolated from any and all other settlements by the Gulf and the Rio Grande on the south and west, and by wide uninhabited regions in the north and east.

Fifth. Whether the people of that settlement, or a majority of them, or any of them, have ever submitted themselves to the government or laws of Texas or of the United States, by consent or by compulsion, either by accepting office, or voting at elections, or paying tax, or serving on juries, or having process served upon them, or in any other way.

Sixth. Whether the people of that settlement did or did not flee from the approach of the United States army, leaving unprotected their homes and their growing crops, *before* the blood was shed, as in the messages stated; and whether the first blood so shed was or was not shed within the inclosure of one of the people who had thus fled from it.

Seventh. Whether our citizens whose blood was shed, as in his message declared, were or were not at that time armed officers and soldiers, sent into that settlement by the military order of the President, through the Secretary of War.

Eighth. Whether the military force of the United States was or was not so sent into that settlement after General Taylor had more than once intimated to the War Department that in his opinion no such movement was necessary to the defense or protection of Texas.

It would have been impossible for the President to answer these questions, one by one, according to the evidence in his possession, without surrendering every position he had taken in his messages for the last two years. An answer was probably not expected; the resolutions were never acted upon by the House, the vote on the Ashmun proposition having sufficiently indicated the view which the majority held of the President's precipitate and unconstitutional proceeding. But they served as a text for the speech which Lincoln made in Committee of the Whole, which deserves the attentive reading of any one who imagines that there was anything accidental in the ascendency which he held for twenty years among the public men of Illinois. The winter was mostly devoted to speeches upon the same subject from men of eminence and experience, but it is within bounds to say there was not a speech made in the House that year superior to this, in clearness of statement, severity of criticism combined with soberness of style, or, what is most surprising, finish and correctness. In its close, clear argument, its felicity of illustration, its restrained yet burning earnestness, it belongs to precisely the same class of addresses as those which he made a dozen years later. The ordinary Congressman can never conclude inside the limits assigned him; he must beg for unanimous consent for an extension of time to come to his sprawling peroration. But this masterly speech covered the whole ground of the controversy, and so intent was Lincoln on not exceeding his hour that he finished his task, to his own surprise, in forty-five minutes. It is an admirable discourse, and the oblivion which overtook it, along with the other volumes of speeches made at the same time, can only be accounted for by remembering that the Guadalupe Treaty came suddenly in upon the debate, with its immense consequences sweeping forever out of view all consideration of the causes and the processes which led to the momentous result.

Lincoln's speech and his resolutions were alike inspired with one purpose: to correct what he considered an error and a wrong; to rectify a misrepresentation which he could not, in his very nature, permit to go uncontradicted. It gratified his offended moral sense to protest against the false pretenses which he saw so clearly, and it pleased his fancy as a lawyer to bring a truth to light which somebody, as he thought, was trying to conceal. He certainly got no other reward for his trouble. His speech was not particularly well received in Illinois. His own partner, Mr. Herndon, a young and ardent man, with more heart than learning, more feeling for the flag than for international justice, could not, or would not, understand Mr. Lincoln's

position, and gave him great pain by his letters. Again and again Lincoln explained to him the difference between approving the war and voting supplies to the soldiers, but Herndon was obstinately obtuse, and there were many of his mind. Lincoln's convictions were so positive in regard to the matter that any laxity of opinion among his friends caused him real suffering. In a letter to the Rev. J. M. Peck, who had written a defense of the Administration in reference to the origin of the war, he writes: this "disappoints me, because it is the first effort of the kind I have known, made by one appearing to me to be intelligent, right-minded, and impartial." He then reviews some of the statements of Mr. Peck, proving their incorrectness, and goes on to show that our army had marched under orders across the desert of the Nueces into a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening away the inhabitants; that Fort Brown was built in a Mexican cotton-field, where a young crop was growing; that Captain Thornton and his men were captured in another cultivated field. He then asks, how under any law, human or divine, this can be considered "no aggression," and closes by asking his clerical correspondent if the precept, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is obsolete, of no force, of no application? This is not the anxiety of a politician troubled about his record. He is not a candidate for reëlection, and the discussion has passed by; but he must stop and vindicate the truth whenever assailed. He perhaps does not see, certainly does not care, that this stubborn devotion to mere justice will do him no good at an hour when the air is full of the fumes of gunpowder; when the returned volunteers are running for constable in every county; when so good a Whig as Mr. Winthrop gives, as a sentiment, at a public meeting in Boston, "Our country, however bounded," and the majority of his party are preparing—unmindful of Mr. Polk and all his works—to reap the fruits of the Mexican war by making its popular hero President.

It was fortunate for Mr. Lincoln and for Whigs like him, with consciences, that General Taylor had occupied so unequivocal an attitude in regard to the war. He had not been in favor of the march to the Rio Grande, and had resisted every suggestion to that effect until his peremptory orders came. In regard to other political questions, his position was so undefined, and his silence generally so discreet, that few of the Whigs, however exacting, could find any difficulty in supporting him. Mr. Lincoln did more than tolerate his candidacy. He supported it with energy and cordiality. He was at last convinced that the election of Mr. Clay was impossible, and he thought he could see that the one opportunity of the Whigs was in the nomination of Taylor. So early as April he wrote to a friend:* "Mr. Clay's chance for an election is just no chance at all. He might get New York, and that would have elected in 1844, but it will not now, because he must now, at the least, lose Tennessee, which he had then, and in addition the fifteen new votes of Florida, Texas, Iowa, and Wisconsin." Later he wrote to the same friend that the nomination took the Democrats "on the blind side. It turns the war thunder against them. The war is now to them the gallows of Haman, which they built for us, and on which they are doomed to be hanged themselves."

At the same time he bated no jot of his opposition to the war, and urged the same course upon his friends. To Linder of Illinois he wrote:† "In law, it is good policy to never plead what you need not, lest you oblige yourself to prove what you cannot." He then counsels him to go for Taylor, but to avoid approving Polk and the war, as in the former case he will gain Democratic votes and in the latter he would lose with the Whigs. Linder answered him, wanting to know if it would not be as easy to elect Taylor without opposing the war, which drew from Lincoln the angry response that silence was impossible; the Whigs must speak, "and their only option is whether they will, when they speak, tell the truth or tell a foul and villainous falsehood."

When the Whig Convention came together in Philadelphia,‡ the differences of opinion on points of principle and policy were almost as numerous as the delegates. The unconditional Clay men rallied once more and gave their aged leader ninety-seven votes to one hundred and eleven which Taylor received on the first ballot. Scott and Webster had each a few votes; but on the fourth ballot the soldier of Buena Vista was nominated, and Millard Fillmore placed in the line of succession to him. It was impossible for a body so heterogeneous to put forward a distinctive platform of principles. An attempt was made to force an expression in regard to the Wilmot proviso, but it was never permitted to come to a vote. The convention was determined that "Old Rough and Ready," as he was now universally nicknamed, should run upon his battle-flags and his name of Whig—although he cautiously called himself "not an ultra Whig." The nomination was received with great and noisy demonstrations of adhesion from every

* Archibald Williams of Quincy, Illinois. Lamon, p. 294.

† Holland, p. 118.

‡ June 7, 1848.

quarter. Lincoln, writing a day or two after his return from the convention, says: "Many had said they would not abide the nomination of Taylor; but since the deed has been done they are fast falling in, and in my opinion we shall have a most overwhelming, glorious triumph. One unmistakable sign is that all the odds and ends are with us,—Barnburners, native Americans, Tyler men, disappointed office-seeking Loco-focos, and the Lord knows what. This is important, if in nothing else, in showing which way the wind blows."

General Taylor's chances for election had been greatly increased by what had taken place at the Democratic Convention, a fortnight before. General Cass had been nominated for the Presidency, but his militia title had no glamour of carnage about it, and the secession of the New York Antislavery "Barnburners" from the convention was a presage of disaster which was fulfilled in the following August by the assembling of the recusant delegates at Buffalo, where they were joined by a large number of discontented Democrats and "Liberty" men, and the Free-soil party was organized for its short but effective mission. Martin Van Buren was nominated for President, and Charles Francis Adams was associated with him on the ticket. The great superiority of caliber shown in the nominations of the mutineers over the regular Democrats was also apparent in the roll of those who made and sustained the revolt. When Salmon P. Chase, Charles Sumner, Preston King, the Van Burens and Adamses, John P. Hale, Henry Wilson, William Cullen Bryant, David Wilmot, and their like went out of their party, they left a vacancy which was never to be filled. It was perhaps an instinct rather than any clear spirit of prophecy which drove the antislavery Democrats out of their party and kept the Whigs together. So far as the authorized utterances of their conventions were concerned, there was little to choose between them. They had both evaded any profession of faith in regard to slavery. The Democrats had rejected the resolution offered by Yancey committing them to the doctrine of "non-interference with the rights of property in the territories," and the Whigs had never allowed the Wilmot proviso to be voted upon. But nevertheless those Democrats who felt that the time had come to put a stop to the aggression of slavery, generally threw off their partisan allegiance, and the most ardent of the antislavery Whigs, with not many exceptions, thought best to remain with their party. General Taylor was a Southerner and a slaveholder. In regard to all questions bearing upon slavery, he observed a discretion in the canvass which was almost ludicrous.* Yet there was a well-nigh universal impression among the antislavery Whigs that his administration would be under influences favorable to the restriction of slavery. Clay, Webster, and Seward, all of whom were agreed at that time against any extension of the area of that institution, heartily supported him. Webster insisted upon it that the Whigs were themselves the best "Free-soilers," and for them to join the party called by that distinctive name would be merely putting Mr. Van Buren at the head of the Whig party. Mr. Seward, speaking for Taylor at Cleveland,† took still stronger ground, declaring that slavery "must be abolished"; that "freedom and slavery are two antagonistic elements of society in America"; that "the party of freedom seeks complete and universal emancipation." No one then seems to have foreseen that the Whig party—then on the eve of a great victory—was so near its dissolution, and that the bolting Democrats and the faithful Whigs were alike engaged in laying the foundations of a party which was to illustrate the latter half of the century with achievements of such colossal and enduring importance.

There was certainly no doubt or misgiving in the mind of Lincoln as to that future, which, if he could have foreseen it, would have presented so much of terrible fascination. He went into the campaign with exultant alacrity. He could not even wait for the adjournment of Congress to begin his stump-speaking. Following the bad example of the rest of his colleagues, he obtained the floor on the 27th of July, and made a long, brilliant, and humorous speech upon the merits of the two candidates before the people. As it is the only one of Lincoln's popular speeches of that period which has been preserved entire, it should be read by those who desire to understand the manner and spirit of the politics of 1848. Whatever faults of taste or of method may be found in it, considering it as a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, with no more propriety or pertinence than hundreds of others which have been made under like circumstances, it is an extremely able speech, and it is by itself enough to show how remarkably effective he must have been as a canvasser in the remoter districts of his State where means

* It is a tradition that a planter once wrote to him: "I have worked hard and been frugal all my life, and the results of my industry have mainly taken the form of slaves, of whom I own about a hundred. Before I vote for President I want to be sure that the candidate I support will not so act as to divest me of my property." To which the general, with a dexterity that would have done credit to a diplomatist, and would have proved exceedingly useful to Mr. Clay, responded, "Sir: I have the honor to inform you that *I* too have been all my life industrious and frugal, and that the fruits thereof are mainly invested in slaves, of whom I own *three* hundred. Yours, etc."—Greeley's "American Conflict," I. p. 199.

† October 26, 1848.

of intellectual excitement were rare and a political meeting was the best-known form of public entertainment. He begins by making a clear, brief, and dignified defense of the position of Taylor upon the question of the proper use of the veto; he then avows with characteristic candor that he does not know what General Taylor will do as to slavery; he is himself "a Northern man, or rather a Western free-State man, with a constituency I believe to be, and with personal feelings I know to be, against the extension of slavery" (a definition in which his caution and his honesty are equally displayed), and he hopes General Taylor would not, if elected, do anything against its restriction; but he would vote for him in any case, as offering better guarantees than Mr. Cass. He then enters upon an analysis of the position of Cass and his party which is full of keen observation and political intelligence, and his speech goes on to its rollicking close with a constant succession of bright, witty, and striking passages in which the orator's own conviction and enjoyment of an assured success is not the least remarkable feature. A few weeks later Congress adjourned, and Lincoln, without returning home, entered upon the canvass in New England,* and then going to Illinois, spoke night and day until the election. When the votes were counted, the extent of the defection among the Northern Democrats who voted for Van Buren and among the Southern Democrats who had been beguiled by the epaulets of Taylor, was plainly seen. The "Free-soilers" had given several important Northern States, by small pluralities, to the Whigs, carrying no electors, but having more votes than Cass in New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont. The entire popular vote (exclusive of South Carolina, which chose its electors by the Legislature) was for Taylor 1,360,752; for Cass 1,219,962; for Van Buren 291,342. Of the electors, Taylor had 163 and Cass 137.

A FORTUNATE ESCAPE.

When Congress came together again in December, there was such a change in the temper of its members that no one would have imagined, on seeing the House divided, that it was the same body which had assembled there a year before. The election was over; the Whigs were to control the Executive Department of the government for four years to come; the members themselves were either reëlected or defeated; and there was nothing to prevent the gratification of such private feelings as they might have been suppressing during the canvass in the interest of their party. It was not long before some of the Northern Democrats began to avail themselves of this new liberty. They had returned burdened with a sense of wrong. They had seen their party beaten in several Northern States by reason of its fidelity to the South, and they had seen how little their Southern brethren cared for their labors and sacrifices, in the enormous gains which Taylor had made in the South, carrying eight out of fifteen slave States. They were in the humor to avenge themselves by a display of independence on their own account, at the first opportunity. The occasion was not long in presenting itself. A few days after Congress opened, Mr. Root of Ohio introduced a resolution instructing the Committee on Territories to bring in a bill "with as little delay as practicable" to provide territorial governments for California and New Mexico, which should "exclude slavery therefrom." This resolution would have thrown the same House into a panic twelve months before, but now it passed by a vote of 108 to 80—in the former number were all the Whigs from the North and all the Democrats but eight, and in the latter the entire South and the eight referred to.

The Senate, however, was not so susceptible to popular impressions, and the bill, prepared in obedience to the mandate of the House, never got farther than the desk of the Senate Chamber. The pro-slavery majority in that body held firmly together till near the close of the session, when they attempted to bring in the new territories without any restriction as to slavery, by attaching what is called "a rider" to that effect, to the Civil Appropriation Bill. The House resisted, and returned the bill to the Senate with the rider unhorsed. A committee of conference failed to agree. Mr. McClernand, a Democrat from Illinois, then moved that the House recede from its disagreement, which was carried by a few Whig votes, to the dismay of those who were not in the secret, when Richard W. Thompson (who was thirty years afterwards Secretary of the Navy) instantly moved that the House do concur with the Senate, with this amendment, that the existing laws of those

* Thurlow Weed says in his Autobiography, Vol. I. p. 603: "I had supposed, until we now met, that I had never seen Mr. Lincoln, having forgotten that in the fall of 1848, when he took the stump in New England, he called upon me at Albany, and that we went to see Mr. Fillmore, who was then the Whig candidate for Vice-President." The New York "Tribune," September 14, 1848, mentions Mr. Lincoln as addressing a great Whig meeting in Boston, September 12. The Boston "Atlas" refers to speeches made by him at Dorchester, September 16; at Chelsea, September 17; by Lincoln and Seward at Boston, September 22, on which occasion the report says: "Mr. Lincoln of Illinois next came forward, and was received with great applause. He spoke about an hour and made a powerful and convincing speech which was cheered to the echo."

territories be for the present and until Congress should amend them, retained. This would secure them to freedom, as slavery had long ago been abolished by Mexico. This amendment passed, and the Senate had to force the many-pronged dilemma, either to defeat the Appropriation Bill, to consent that the territories should be organized as free communities, or to swallow their protestations that the territories were in sore need of government and adjourn, leaving them in the anarchy they had so feelingly depicted. They chose the last as the least dangerous course, and passed the Appropriation Bill in its original form.

Mr. Lincoln took little part in the discussions incident to these proceedings; he was constantly in his seat, however, and voted generally with his party, and always with those opposed to the extension of slavery. He used to say that he had voted for the Wilmot proviso, in its various phases, forty-two times. He left to others, however, the active work on the floor. His chief preoccupation during this second session was a scheme which links itself characteristically with his first protest against the proscriptive spirit of slavery ten years before in the Illinois Legislature and his immortal act fifteen years afterwards in consequence of which American slavery ceased to exist. He had long felt in common with many others that the traffic in human beings under the very shadow of the Capitol was a national scandal and reproach. He thought that Congress had the power under the Constitution to regulate or prohibit slavery in all regions under its exclusive jurisdiction, and he thought it proper to exercise that power with due regard to vested rights and the general welfare. He therefore resolved to test the question whether it were possible to remove from the seat of government this stain and offense. He proceeded carefully and cautiously about it, after his fashion. When he had drawn up his plan, he took counsel with some of the leading citizens of Washington and some of the more prominent members of Congress before bringing it forward. His bill obtained the cordial approval of Colonel Seaton, the Mayor of Washington, whom Mr. Lincoln had consulted as the representative of the intelligent slave-holding citizens of the District, and of Joshua F. Giddings,* whom he regarded as the leading abolitionist in Congress, a fact which sufficiently proves the practical wisdom with which he had reconciled the demands of right and expediency. In the mean time, however, Mr. Gott, a member from New York, had introduced a resolution with a rhetorical preamble directing the proper committee to bring in a bill prohibiting the slave-trade in the District. This occasioned great excitement, much caucusing and threatening on the part of the Southern members, but nothing else. In the opinion of the leading antislavery men, Mr. Lincoln's bill, being at the same time more radical and more reasonable, was far better calculated to effect its purpose. Giddings says in his diary: "This evening (January 11), our whole mess remained in the dining-room after tea, and conversed upon the subject of Mr. Lincoln's bill to abolish slavery. It was approved by all; I believe it as good a bill as we could get at this time, and was willing to pay for slaves in order to save them from the Southern market, as I suppose every man in the District would sell his slaves if he saw that slavery was to be abolished." Mr. Lincoln therefore moved, on the 16th of January, as an amendment to Gott's proposition, that the committee report a bill for the total abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, the terms of which he gave in full. They were in substance the following:

The first two sections prohibit the bringing of slaves into the district or selling them out of it, provided, however, that officers of the Government, being citizens of slave-holding States, may bring their household servants with them for a reasonable time and take them away again. The third provides a temporary system of apprenticeship and eventual emancipation for children born of slave-mothers after January 1st, 1850. The fourth provides for the manumission of slaves by the Government on application of the owners, the latter to receive their full cash value. The fifth provides for the return of fugitive slaves from Washington and Georgetown. The sixth submits this bill itself to a popular vote in the District as a condition of its promulgation as law.

These are the essential points of the measure, and the success of Mr. Lincoln in gaining the adhesion of the abolitionists in the House is more remarkable than that he should have induced the Washington Conservatives to approve it. But the usual result followed as soon as it was formally introduced to the notice of Congress. It was met by that violent and excited opposition which greeted any measure, however intrinsically moderate and reasonable, which was founded on the assumption that slavery was not in itself a good and desirable thing. The social influences of Washington were brought to bear against a proposition which the Southerners contended would vulgarize society, and the genial and liberal mayor was forced to withdraw his approval as gracefully or as awkwardly as he might. The prospects of the bill were seen to be hopeless, as the session was to end on the 4th of March, and

* Giddings's diary, January 8, 9, and 11, 1849: published in "Cleveland Post," March 31, 1878.

no further effort was made to carry it through. Fifteen years afterwards, in the stress and tempest of a terrible war, it was Mr. Lincoln's strange fortune to sign a bill sent him by Congress for the abolition of slavery in Washington; and perhaps the most remarkable thing about the whole transaction was that while we were looking politically upon a new heaven and a new earth — for the vast change in our moral and economic condition might justify so audacious a phrase — when there was scarcely a man on the continent who had not greatly shifted his point of view in a dozen years, there was so little change in Mr. Lincoln. The same hatred for slavery, the same sympathy with the slave, the same consideration for the slaveholder as the victim of a system he had inherited, the same sense of divided responsibility between the South and the North, the same desire to effect great reforms with as little individual damage and injury, as little disturbance of social conditions as possible, were equally evident when the raw pioneer signed the protest with Dan Stone at Vandalia, when the mature man moved the resolution in 1849 in the Capitol, and when the President gave the sanction of his bold signature to the act which swept away the slave-shambles from the city of Washington.

His term in Congress ended on the 4th of March, and he was not a candidate for reëlection. A year before he had contemplated the possibility of entering the field again. He then wrote to his friend and partner Herndon: "It is very pleasant for me to learn from you that there are some who desire that I should be reëlected. I most heartily thank them for the kind partiality; and I can say, as Mr. Clay said of the annexation of Texas, that 'personally I would not object' to a reëlection, although I thought at the time (of his nomination), and still think, it would be quite as well for me to return to the law at the end of a single term. I made the declaration that I would not be a candidate again, more from a wish to deal fairly with others, to keep peace among our friends, and keep the district from going to the enemy, than for any cause personal to myself, so that, if it should so happen that nobody else wishes to be elected, I could not refuse the people the right of sending me again. But to enter myself as a competitor of others, or to authorize any one so to enter me, is what my word and honor forbid." But before his first session ended he gave up all idea of going back, and heartily concurred in the nomination of Judge Logan to succeed him. The Sangamon district was the one which the Whigs of Illinois had apparently the best prospect of carrying, and it was full of able and ambitious men, who were nominated successively for the only place which gave them the opportunity of playing a part in the national theater at Washington. They all served with more or less distinction, but for ten years no one was ever twice a candidate. A sort of tradition had grown up, through which a perverted notion of honor and propriety held it discreditable in a member to ask for reëlection. This state of things was not peculiar to that district, and it survives with more or less vigor throughout the country to this day, to the serious detriment of Congress. This consideration, coupled with what is called the claim of locality, must in time still further deteriorate and degrade the representatives of the States at Washington. To ask in a nominating convention who is best qualified for service in Congress is always regarded as an impertinence; but the question "what county in the district has had the Congressman oftenest" is always considered in order. For such reasons as these Mr. Lincoln refused to allow his name to go before the voters again, and the next year he again refused, writing an emphatic letter for publication, in which he said that there were many Whigs who could do as much as he "to bring the district right side up."

Colonel Baker had come back from the wars with all the glitter of Cerro Gordo about him, but did not find the prospect of political preferment flattering in Sangamon County, and therefore, with that versatility and sagacity which was more than once to render him signal service, he removed to the Galena district, in the extreme north-western corner of the State, and almost immediately on his arrival there received a nomination to Congress. He was doubly fortunate in this move, as the nomination he was unable to take away from Logan proved useless to the latter, who was defeated after a hot contest. Baker therefore took the place of Lincoln as the only Whig member from Illinois, and their names occur frequently together in the arrangements for the distribution of "Federal patronage" at the close of the Administration of Polk and the beginning of that of Taylor. During the period while the President elect was considering the appointment of his Cabinet, Lincoln used all the influence he could bring to bear, which was probably not very much, in favor of Baker for a place in the Government. The Whig members of the Legislatures of Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin joined in this effort, which came to nothing.* The recommendations to office which Lincoln made after the inauguration of General Taylor are probably unique of their kind. Here is a specimen which is short enough to give entire. It is addressed to the Secretary of the Interior:

* MS. letter from Lincoln to Schooler, Feb. 2, 1849.

"I recommend that William Butler be appointed Pension Agent for the Illinois agency when the place shall be vacant. Mr. Hurst, the present incumbent, I believe has performed the duties very well. He is a decided partisan, and I believe expects to be removed. Whether he shall be, I submit to the Department. This office is not confined to my district, but pertains to the whole State; so that Colonel Baker has an equal right with myself to be heard concerning it. However, the office is located here (at Springfield); and I think it is not probable any one would desire to remove from a distance to take it." We have examined a large number of his recommendations — for with a complete change of administration there would naturally be great activity among the office-seekers — and they are all in precisely the same vein. He nowhere asks for the removal of an incumbent; he never claims a place as subject to his disposition; in fact, he makes no personal claim whatever; he simply advises the Government, in case a vacancy occurs, who, in his opinion, is the best man to fill it. When there are two applicants, he indicates which is on the whole the better man, and sometimes adds that the weight of recommendations is in favor of the other! In one instance he sends forward the recommendations of the man whom he does not prefer, with an indorsement emphasizing the importance of them, and adding: "From personal knowledge I consider Mr. Bond every way worthy of the office and qualified to fill it. Holding the individual opinion that the appointment of a different gentleman would be better, I ask especial attention and consideration for his claims, and for the opinions expressed in his favor by those over whom I can claim no superiority." The candor, the fairness and moderation, together with the respect for the public service which these recommendations display, are all the more remarkable when we reflect that there was as yet no sign of a public conscience upon the subject. The patronage of the Government was scrambled for, as a matter of course, in the mire into which Jackson had flung it.

For a few weeks in the spring of 1849 Mr. Lincoln appears in a character which is entirely out of keeping with all his former and subsequent career. He became, for the first and only time in his life, an applicant for an appointment at the hands of the President. His bearing in this attitude was marked by his usual individuality. In the opinion of many Illinoisans it was important that the place of Commissioner of the General Land Office should be given to a citizen of their State, one thoroughly acquainted with the land law in the West and the special needs of that region. A letter to Lincoln was drawn up and signed by some half-dozen of the leading Whigs of the State asking him to become an applicant for that position. He promptly answered, saying that if the position could be secured for a citizen of Illinois only by his accepting it, he would consent; but he went on to say that he had promised his best efforts to Cyrus Edwards for that place, and had afterwards stipulated with Colonel Baker that if J. L. D. Morrison, another Mexican hero, and Edwards could come to an understanding with each other as to which should withdraw, he would join in recommending the other; that he could not take the place, therefore, unless it became clearly impossible for either of the others to get it. Some weeks later, the impossibility referred to having become apparent, Mr. Lincoln applied for the place; but a suitor for office so laggard and so scrupulous as he stood very little chance of success in a contest like those which periodically raged at Washington during the first weeks of every new administration. The place came, indeed, to Illinois, but to neither of the three we have mentioned. The fortunate applicant was Justin Butterfield of Chicago, a man well and favorably known among the early members of the Illinois bar* and an intimate friend of Lincoln. He possessed, however, too practical a mind to permit the claims of friendship to interfere with the business of office-seeking, which he practiced with fair success all his days.

It was in this way that Abraham Lincoln met and escaped one of the greatest dangers of his life. In after days he recognized the error he had committed, and congratulated himself upon the happy deliverance he had obtained through no merit of his own. The loss of at

* Butterfield had a great reputation for ready wit and was suspected of deep learning. Some of his jests are still repeated by old lawyers in Illinois, and show at least a well-marked humorous intention. On one occasion he appeared before Judge Pope to ask the discharge of the famous Mormon Prophet Joe Smith, who was in custody surrounded by his church dignitaries. Bowing profoundly to the court and the ladies who thronged the hall, he said, "I appear before you under solemn and peculiar circumstances. I am to address the Pope, surrounded by angels, in the presence of the holy apostles, in behalf of the Prophet of the Lord." We once heard Lincoln say of Butterfield that he was one of the few Whigs in Illinois who approved the Mexican War. His reason, frankly given, was that he had lost an office in New York by opposing the war of 1812. "Henceforth," he said with cynical vehemence, "I am for war, pestilence, and famine." He was once defending the Shawneetown Bank and advocating the extension of its charter; an opposing lawyer contended that this would be creating a new bank. Butterfield brought a smile from the court and a laugh from the bar by asking "whether when the Lord lengthened the life of Hezekiah he made a new man, or whether it was the same old Hezekiah?"

least four years of the active pursuit of his profession would have been irreparable, leaving out of view the strong probability that the singular charm of Washington life to men who have a passion for politics might have kept him there forever. It has been said that a residence in Washington leaves no man precisely as it found him. This is an axiom which may be applied to most cities in a certain sense, but it is true in a peculiar degree of our capital. To the men who come there from small rural communities in the South and the West, the bustle and stir, the intellectual movement, such as it is, the ordinary subjects of conversation, of such vastly greater importance than anything they have previously known, the daily and hourly combats on the floor of both houses, the intrigue and the struggle of office-hunting, which interest vast numbers besides the office-seekers, the superior piquancy and interest of the scandal which is talked at a Congressional boarding-house over that which seasons the dull days at a village-tavern,—all this gives a savor to life in Washington, the memory of which doubles the tedium of the sequestered vale to which the beaten legislator returns when his brief hour of glory is over. It is this which brings to the State Department, after every general election, that crowd of specters, with their bales of recommendations from pitying colleagues who have been reëlected, whose diminishing prayers run down the whole gamut of supplication from St. James to St. Paul of Loando, and of whom at the last it must be said, as Mr. Evarts once said after an unusually heavy day, "Many called, but few chosen." Of those who do not achieve the ruinous success of going abroad to consulates that will not pay their board, or missions where they only avoid daily shame by hiding their penury and their ignorance away from observation, a great portion yield to their fate and join that fleet of wrecks which floats forever on the pavement of Washington.

It is needless to say that Mr. Lincoln received no damage from his term of service in Washington, but we know of nothing which shows so strongly the perilous fascination of the place as the fact that a man of his extraordinary moral and mental qualities could ever have thought for a moment of accepting a position so insignificant and incongruous as that which he was more than willing to assume when he left Congress. He would have filled the place with honor and credit—but at a monstrous expense. We do not so much refer to his exceptional career and his great figure in history; these momentous contingencies could not have suggested themselves to him. But the place he was reasonably sure of filling in the battle of life should have made a subordinate office in Washington a thing out of the question. He was already a lawyer of skill and reputation; an orator upon whom his party relied to speak for them to the people. An innate love of combat was in his heart; he loved discussion like a medieval schoolman. The air was already tremulous with faint bugle-notes that heralded a conflict of giants on a field of moral significance to which he was fully alive and awake, where he was certain to lead at least his hundreds and his thousands. Yet if Justin Butterfield had not been a more supple, more adroit, and less scrupulous suitor for office than himself, Abraham Lincoln would have sat for four inestimable years at a bureau-desk in the Interior Department, and when the hour of action sounded in Illinois, who would have filled the place which he took as if he had been born for it? Who could have done the duty which he bore as lightly as if he had been fashioned for it from the beginning of time?

His temptation did not even end with Butterfield's success. The administration of General Taylor, apparently feeling that some compensation was due to one so earnestly recommended by the leading Whigs of the State, offered Mr. Lincoln the governorship of Oregon. This was a place more suited to him than the other, and his acceptance of it was urged by some of his most judicious friends* on the ground that the new Territory would soon be a State, and that he could come back as a senator. This view of the matter commended itself favorably to Lincoln himself, who, however, gave it up on account of the natural unwillingness of his wife to remove to a country so wild and so remote.

This was all as it should be. The best place for him was Illinois, and he went about his work there until his time should come.

SIX YEARS OF LAW PRACTICE.

In that briefest of all autobiographies, which Mr. Lincoln wrote for Jesse Fell upon three pages of note-paper, he sketched the period at which we have arrived in these words: "From 1849 to 1854, both inclusive, I practiced law more assiduously than ever before. . . . I was losing interest in politics, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused me again." His service in Congress had made him more generally known than formerly, and had increased his practical value as a member of any law firm. He was offered a partnership on favorable terms by a lawyer in good practice in Chicago; but he declined it on the

* Among others John T. Stuart, who is our authority for this statement.

ROBERT C. WINTHROP. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

ground that his health would not endure the close confinement necessary in a city office. He went back to Springfield, and resumed at once his practice there and in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, where his occupations and his associates were the most congenial that he could anywhere find. For five years he devoted himself to his work with more energy and more success than ever before.

It was at this time that he gave a notable proof of his unusual powers of mental discipline. His wider knowledge of men and things, acquired by contact with the great world, had shown him a certain lack in himself of the power of close and sustained reasoning. To remedy this defect, he applied himself, after his return from Congress, to such works upon logic and mathematics as he fancied would be serviceable. Devoting himself with dogged energy to the task in hand, he soon learned by heart six books of the propositions of Euclid, and he retained through life an intimate knowledge of the principles they contain.

The outward form and fashion of every institution change rapidly in growing communities like our Western States, and the practice of the law had already assumed a very different degree of dignity and formality from that which it presented only twenty years before. The lawyers in hunting-shirts and moccasins had long since passed away; so had the judges who apologized to the criminals that they sentenced, and charged them "to let their friends on Bear Creek understand it was the law and jury who were responsible." Even the easy familiarity of a later date would no longer be tolerated. No successor of Judge Douglas had been known to follow his example by coming down from the bench, taking a seat in the lap of a friend, throwing an arm around his neck, and in that intimate attitude discussing, *coram publico*, whatever interested him.* David Davis — afterwards of the Supreme Court and of the Senate — was for many years the presiding judge of this circuit, and neither under him nor his predecessor, S. H. Treat, was any lapse of dignity or of propriety possible. Still there was much less of form and ceremony insisted upon than is considered proper and necessary in older communities. The bar in great measure was composed of the same men who used to follow the circuit on horseback, over roads impossible to wheels, with their scanty wardrobes, their law-books, and their documents crowding each other in their leather saddle-bags. The improvement of roads which made carriages a possibility had effected a great change, and the coming of the railway had completed the sudden development of the manners and customs of the modernized community. But they could not all at once take from the bar of the Eighth Circuit its raciness and its individuality. The men who had lived in log-cabins, who had hunted their way through untrodden woods and prairies, who had thought as much about the chances of swimming over swollen fords as of their cases, who had passed their nights — a half-dozen together — on the floors of wayside hostelries, could never be precisely the same sort of

* I. N. Arnold, in "History of Sangamon County," p. 94.

DAVID DAVIS. (1862-66.) (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

practitioners as the smug barristers of a more conventional age and place. But they were not deficient in ability, in learning, or in that most valuable faculty which enables really intelligent men to get their bearings and sustain themselves in every sphere of life to which they may be called. Some of these very colleagues of Lincoln at the Springfield bar have sat in Cabinets, have held their own on the floor of the Senate, have led armies in the field, have governed States, and all with a quiet self-reliance which was as far as possible removed from either undue arrogance or undue modesty.*

Among these able and energetic men Lincoln assumed and held the first rank. This is a statement which ought not to be made without authority, and rather than give the common repute of the circuit, we prefer to cite the opinion of those lawyers of Illinois who are entitled to speak as to this matter, both by the weight of their personal and professional character and by their eminent official standing among the jurists of our time. We shall quote rather fully from addresses delivered by Justice David Davis, of the Supreme Court of the United States, and by Judge Drummond, the United States District Judge for Illinois.

Judge Davis says:

"I enjoyed for over twenty years the personal friendship of Mr. Lincoln. We were admitted to the bar about the same time and traveled for many years what is known in Illinois as the Eighth Judicial Circuit. In 1848, when I first went on the bench, the circuit embraced fourteen counties, and Mr. Lincoln went with the court to every county. Railroads were not then in use, and our mode of travel was either on horseback or in buggies.

"This simple life he loved, preferring it to the practice of the law in a city, where, although the remuneration would be greater, the opportunity would be less for mixing with the great body of the people, who loved

* A few of the lawyers who practiced with Lincoln, and have held the highest official positions, are Douglas, Shields, Logan Stuart, Baker, Treat, Bledsoe, Browning, Hardin, Trumbull, McClernand, etc.



ENGRAVED BY T. JOHNSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.

MARTIN VAN BUREN, PRESIDENT FROM 1837–41.

him, and whom he loved. Mr. Lincoln was transferred from the bar of that circuit to the office of the President of the United States, having been without official position since he left Congress in 1849. In all the elements that constitute the great lawyer he had few equals. He was great both at *nisi prius* and before an appellate tribunal. He seized the strong points of a cause, and presented them with clearness and great compactness. His mind was logical and direct, and he did not indulge in extraneous discussion. Generalities and platitudes had no charms for him. An unfailing vein of humor never deserted him; and he was able to claim the attention of court and jury, when the cause was the most uninteresting, by the appropriateness of his anecdotes.

"His power of comparison was large, and he rarely failed in a legal discussion to use that mode of reasoning. The framework of his mental and moral being was honesty, and a wrong cause was poorly defended by him. The ability which some eminent lawyers possess, of explaining away the bad points of a cause by ingenious sophistry, was denied him. In order to bring into full activity his great powers, it was necessary that he should be convinced of the right and justice of the matter which he advocated. When so convinced, whether the cause was great or small, he was usually successful. He read law-books but little, except when the cause in hand made it necessary; yet he was usually self-reliant, depending on his own resources, and rarely consulting his brother lawyers,

either on the management of his case or on the legal questions involved.

"Mr. Lincoln was the fairest and most accommodating of practitioners, granting all favors which were consistent with his duty to his client, and rarely availing himself of an unwary oversight of his adversary.

"He hated wrong and oppression everywhere, and many a man whose fraudulent conduct was undergoing review in a court of justice has writhed under his terrific indignation and rebukes. He was the most



COLONEL W. W. SEATON. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

simple and unostentatious of men in his habits, having few wants, and those easily supplied. To his honor be it said that he never took from a client, even when his cause was gained, more than he thought the services were worth and the client could reasonably afford to pay. The people where he practiced law were not rich, and his charges were always small. When he was elected President, I question whether there was a lawyer in the circuit, who had been at the bar so long a time, whose means were not larger. It did not seem to be one of the purposes of his life to accumulate a fortune. In fact, outside of his profession, he had no knowledge of the way to make money, and he never even attempted it.

"Mr. Lincoln was loved by his brethren of the bar, and no body of men will grieve more at his death, or pay more sincere tributes to his memory. His presence on the circuit was watched for with interest, and never failed to produce joy or hilarity. When casually absent, the spirits of both bar and people were depressed. He was not fond of litigation, and would compromise a lawsuit whenever practicable."

No clearer or more authoritative statement of Lincoln's rank as a lawyer can ever be made than is found in these brief sentences, in which the warmth of personal affection is not permitted to disturb the measured appreciation, the habitual reserve of the eminent jurist. But, as it may be objected that the friendship which united Davis and Lincoln rendered the one incapable of a just judgment upon the merits of the other, we will also give an extract from the address delivered in Chicago by one of the ablest and most impartial lawyers who have ever honored the bar and the bench in the West. Judge Drummond says:

"With a probity of character known to all, with an intuitive insight into the human heart, with a clearness of statement which was in itself an argument, with uncommon power and felicity of illustration,—often, it is true, of a plain and homely kind,—and with that sincerity and earnestness of manner which carried conviction, he was perhaps one of the most successful jury lawyers we ever had in the State. He always tried a case fairly and honestly. He never intentionally misrepresented the evidence of a witness nor the argument of an opponent. He met both squarely, and if he could not explain the one or answer the other, substantially admitted it. He never misstated the law, according to his own intelligent view of it. Such was the transparent candor and integrity of his nature, that he could not well or strongly argue a side or a cause that he thought wrong. Of course he felt it his duty to say what could be said, and to leave the decision to others; but there could be seen in such cases the inward struggle of his own mind. In trying a case he might occasionally dwell too long upon, or give too much importance to, an inconsiderable point; but this was the exception, and generally he went straight to the citadel of the cause or question, and struck home there, knowing if that were won the outworks would necessarily fall. He could hardly be called very learned in his profession, and yet he rarely tried a cause without fully understanding the law applicable to it; and I have no hesitation in saying he was one of the ablest lawyers I have ever known. If he was forcible before a jury, he was equally so with the court. He detected with unerring sagacity the weak points of an opponent's argument, and pressed his own views with overwhelming strength. His efforts were quite unequal, and it might happen that he would not, on some occasions, strike one as at all remarkable. But let him be thoroughly roused, let him feel that he was right, and that some principle was involved in his cause, and he would come out with an earnestness of conviction, a power of argument, a wealth of illustration, that I have never seen surpassed."

This is nothing less than the portrait of a great lawyer, drawn by competent hands, with the life-long habit of conscientious accuracy. If we chose to continue we could fill this volume with the tributes of his professional associates, ranging all the way from the commonplaces of condolence to the most extravagant eulogy. But enough has been quoted to justify the tradition which Lincoln left behind him at the bar of Illinois. His weak as well as his strong qualities have been indicated. He never learned the technicalities, what some would call the tricks, of the profession. The sleight of plea and demurrer, the legerdemain by which justice is balked and a weak case is made to gain an unfair advantage, was too subtle and shifty for his strong and straightforward intelligence. He met these manœuvres sufficiently well, when



ENGRAVED BY R. G. TIETZE. AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.

JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS.

practiced by others, but he never could get in the way of handling them for himself. On the wrong side he was always weak. He knew this himself, and avoided such cases when he could consistently with the rules of his profession. He would often persuade a fair-minded litigant of the injustice of his case and induce him to give it up. His partner,

DAVID WILMOT. (AFTER A LITHOGRAPH BY M. H. TRAUBEL.)

Mr. Herndon, relates a speech in point* which Lincoln once made to a man who offered him an objectionable case: "Yes, there is no reasonable doubt but that I can gain your case for you. I can set a whole neighborhood at loggerheads; I can distress a widowed mother and her six fatherless children, and thereby get for you six hundred dollars, which rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as much to them as it does to you. I shall not take your case, but I will give a little advice for nothing. You seem a sprightly, energetic man. I would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other way." Sometimes, after he had entered upon a criminal case, the conviction that his client was guilty would affect him with a sort of panic. On one occasion he turned suddenly to his associate and said, "Swett, the man is guilty; you defend him, I can't," and so gave up his share of a large fee. The same thing happened at another time when he was engaged, with Judge S. C. Parks, in defending a man accused of larceny. He said, "If you can say anything for the man, do it, I can't; if I attempt it, the jury will see I think he is guilty, and convict him." Once he was prosecuting a civil suit, in the course of which evidence was introduced showing that his client was attempting a fraud. Lincoln rose and went to his hotel in deep disgust. The judge sent for him; he refused to come. "Tell the judge," he said, "my hands are dirty; I came over to wash them." We are aware that these stories detract something from the character of the lawyer; but this inflexible, inconvenient, and fastidious morality was to be of vast service hereafter to his country and the world.

The Nemesis which waits upon men of extraordinary wit or humor has not neglected Mr. Lincoln, and the young lawyers of Illinois, who never knew him, have an endless store of jokes and pleasantries in his name; some of them as old as Howleglass or Rabelais.† But the fact is that with all his stories and jests, his frank companionable humor, his gift of easy accessibility and welcome, he was, even while he traveled the Eighth Circuit, a man of grave and serious temper and of an unusual innate dignity and reserve. He had few or no special intimates, and there was a line beyond which no one ever thought of passing. Besides, he was too strong a man in the court-room to be regarded with anything but respect in a community in which legal ability was the only especial mark of distinction. Few of his forensic speeches have been preserved, but his contemporaries all agree as to their singular ability and power. He seemed absolutely at home in a court-room; his great stature did not encumber him there; it seemed like a natural symbol of superiority. His bearing and gesticulation had no awkwardness about them; they were simply striking and original. He assumed at the start a frank and friendly relation with the jury which was extremely effective. He usually began, as the phrase ran, by "giving away his case"; by allowing to the opposite side every possible advantage that they could honestly and justly

* Lamon, p. 317.

† As a specimen of these stories we give the following, well vouched for, as apocrypha generally are: Lincoln met one day on the court-house steps a young lawyer who had lost a case — his only one — and looked very disconsolate. "What has become of your case?" Lincoln asked. "Gone to h——," was the gloomy response. "Well, don't give it up," Lincoln rejoined cheerfully; "you can try it again there"— a quip which has been attributed to many wits in many ages, and will doubtless make the reputation of jesters yet to be.

claim. Then he would present his own side of the case, with a clearness, a candor, an adroitness of statement which at once flattered and convinced the jury, and made even the bystanders his partisans. Sometimes he disturbed the court with laughter by his humorous or apt illustrations; sometimes he excited the audience by that florid and exuberant rhetoric which he knew well enough how and when to indulge in; but his more usual and more successful manner was to rely upon a clear, strong, lucid statement, keeping details in proper subordination and bringing forward, in a way which fastened the attention of court and jury alike, the essential point on which he claimed a decision. "Indeed," says one of his colleagues, "his statement often rendered argument unnecessary, and often the court would stop him and say, 'if that is the case, we will hear the other side.'" *

Whatever doubts might be entertained as to whether he was the ablest lawyer on the circuit, there was never any dissent from the opinion that he was the one most cordially and universally liked. If he did not himself enjoy his full share of the happiness of life, he certainly diffused more of it among his fellows than is in the power of most men. His arrival was a little festival in the county-seats where his pursuits led him to pass so much of his time. Several eye-witnesses have described these scenes in terms which would seem exaggerated if they were not so fully confirmed. The bench and bar would gather at the tavern where he was expected, to give him a cordial welcome; says one writer,† "He brought light with him." This is not hard to understand. Whatever his cares, he never inflicted them upon others. He talked singularly well, but never about himself. He was full of wit which never wounded, of humor which mellowed the harshness of that new and raw life of the prairies. He never asked for help, but was always ready to give it. He received everybody's confidence, and rarely gave his own in return. He took no mean advantages in court or in conversation, and, satisfied with the respect and kindliness which he everywhere met, he sought no quarrels and never had to decline them. He did not accumulate wealth; as Judge Davis said, "he seemed never to care for it." He had a good income from his profession, though the fees he received would bring a smile to the well-paid lips of the great attorneys of to-day. The largest fee he ever got was one of five thousand dollars from the Illinois Central Railway, and he had to bring suit to compel them to pay it. He spent what he received in the education of his children, in the care of his family, and in a plain and generous way of living. One‡ who often visited him writes, referring to "the old-fashioned hospitality of Springfield," "Among others I recall with a sad pleasure, the dinners and evening parties given by Mrs. Lincoln. In her modest and simple home, where everything was so orderly and refined, there was always on the part of both host and hostess a cordial and hearty Western welcome which put every guest perfectly at ease. Their table was famed for the excellence of many rare Kentucky dishes, and for the venison, wild turkeys, and other game, then so abundant. Yet it was her genial manner and ever-kind welcome, and Mr. Lincoln's wit and humor, anecdote and unrivaled conversation, which formed the chief attraction."

Here we leave him for a while, in this peaceful and laborious period of his life; engaged in useful and congenial toil; surrounded by the love and respect of the entire community; in the fullness of his years and strength; the struggles of his youth, which were so easy to his active brain and his mighty muscles, all behind him, and the titanic struggles of his manhood yet to come. We shall now try to sketch the beginnings of that tremendous controversy which he was in a few years to take up, to guide and direct to its wonderful and tragical close.

* Raymond's "Life of Lincoln," p. 32.
† I. N. Arnold, Speech before State Bar Association, January 7, 1881.
‡ *Ibid.*

Feb 1887

THE STRONG.

DOST deem him weak that owns his strength is tried?
Nay, we may safest lean on him that grieves:
The pine has immemorially sighed,
Th' enduring poplar's are the trembling leaves.
To feel and bow the head is not to fear;
To cheat with jest — that is the coward's art.
Beware the laugh that battles back the tear;
He's false to all that's traitor to his heart.

He of great deeds does grope amid the throng
Like him whose steps toward Dagon's temple bore;
There's ever something sad about the strong —
A look, a moan, like that on ocean's shore.

John Vance Cheney.



DRAWN BY E. W. KEMBLE. ENGRAVED BY T. SCHUSSLER.

"MAKES A FIDDLE THESS TALK AN' CRY?" (SEE PAGE 548.)

mar. 1887

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MOVEMENT FOR SLAVERY EXTENSION.

THE BALANCE OF POWER.

E shall see in the course of the present work how the life of Abraham Lincoln divides itself into three principal periods, with corresponding stages of his intellectual development: the first, of about forty years, ending with his term in Congress; the second, of about ten years, concluding with his final campaign of political speech-making in New York and New England, shortly before the presidential nominations of 1860; and the last, of about five years, terminating at his death. We have thus far traced his career through the first period of forty years. In the several stages of frontier experience through which he had passed, and which in the main but repeated the trials and vicissitudes of thousands of other boys and youths in the West, only so much individuality had been developed in him as brought him into the leading class of his contemporaries. He had risen from laborer to student, from clerk to lawyer, from politician to legislator. That he had lifted himself by healthy ambition and unaided industry out of the station of a farm-hand, whose routine life begins and ends in a backwoods log-cabin, to that representative character and authority which seated him in the national Capitol to aid in framing laws for his country, was already an achievement that may well be held honorably to crown a career of forty years.

Such achievement and such distinction, however, were not so uncommon as to appear phenomenal. Hundreds of other boys born in log-cabins had won similar elevation in the manly, practical school of western public life. Even in ordinary times there still remained within the reach of average intellects several higher grades of public service. It is quite probable that the superior talents of Lincoln would have made him Governor of Illinois or given him a term in the United States Senate. But the story of his life would not have commanded, as it now does, the unflagging attention of posterity had there not fallen upon his generation the unusual conditions and opportunities brought about by a series of remarkable convulsions in national politics. If we would correctly understand how Lincoln became, first a conspicuous actor, and then a chosen leader, in a great strife of national parties for supremacy and power, we must briefly study the origin and development of the great slavery controversy in American legislation which found its highest activity and decisive culmination in the single decade from 1850 to 1860. We should greatly err, however, if we attributed the new events in Lincoln's career to the caprice of fortune. The conditions and opportunities of which we speak were broadly national, and open to all without restriction of rank or locality. Many of his contemporaries had seemingly overshadowing advantages, by prominence and training, to seize and appropriate them to their own advancement. It is precisely this careful study of the times which shows us by what inevitable process of selection honors and labors of which he did not dream fell upon him; how, indeed, it was not the individual who gained the prize, but the paramount duty which claimed the man.

It is now universally understood, if not conceded, that the Rebellion of 1861 was instigated, begun, and carried on for the sole purpose of defending and preserving to the seceding States the institution of African slavery and making them the nucleus of a great slave empire, which in their ambitious dreams they hoped would include Mexico, Central America, and the West India Islands, and perhaps even the tropical States of South America. Both a real and pretended fear that slavery was in danger lay at the bottom of this design. The real fear arose from the palpable fact, impossible to conceal, that the slave system was a reactionary obstacle in the pathway of modern civilization and its political, material, philosophical, and religious development. The pretended danger was the permanent loss of political power by the slave States of the Union, as shown in the election of Lincoln to the presidency, which they averred would necessarily throw all the forces of the national life against the "peculiar institution," and crush it under forms of law. It was by magnifying this danger from a remote into an immediate consequence that they excited the population

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of the cotton States to resistance and rebellion. Seizing this opportunity, it was their present purpose to establish a slave Confederacy, consisting of the cotton States, which should in due time draw to itself, by an irresistible gravitation of sympathy and interest, first, the border slave States, and, in the further progress of events, the tropical countries towards the equator.

The popular agitation, or war of words between the North and the South on the subject of slavery, which led to the armed insurrection was threefold: First, the economic effort to prevent the destruction of the monetary value of four millions of human beings held in bondage, who were bought and sold as chattels, and whose aggregate valuation, under circumstances existing at the outbreak of the civil war, was computed at $400,000,000; second, a moral debate as to the abstract righteousness or iniquity of the system; and, third, a political struggle for the balance of power in government and public policy, by which the security and perpetuity of the institution might be guaranteed.

This sectional controversy over the institution of slavery in its threefold aspect had begun with the very birth of the nation, had continued with its growth, and become intensified with its strength. The very same year which saw the *Mayflower* land the Pilgrims on Plymouth Rock also saw a Dutch ship land a cargo of African slaves at Jamestown, in Virginia. During the long colonial period the English Government fostered and forced the importation of slaves to America equally with English goods. In the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson invoked the reprobation of mankind upon the British King for his share in this inhuman traffic. On reflection, however, this was discovered to be but another case of Satan rebuking sin. The blood money which reddened the hands of English royalty stained equally those of many an American rebel. The public opinion of the colonies was already too much debauched to sit in unanimous moral judgment on this crime against humanity. The objections of South Carolina and Georgia sufficed to cause the erasure and suppression of the obnoxious paragraph. Nor were the Northern States guiltless: Newport was yet a great slave-mart, and the commerce of New England drew more advantage from the traffic than did the agriculture of the South. All the elements of the later controversy already existed. Slave codes and fugitive-slave laws,* abolition societies and emancipation bills, are older than our Constitution; and negro troops fought in the Revolutionary War for American independence.† Liberal men could be found in South Carolina who hated slavery, and narrow men in Massachusetts who defended it. But these individual instances of prejudice or liberality were submerged and lost in the current of popular opinion springing from prevailing interests in the respective localities, and institutions molded principles, until in turn principles should become strong enough to reform institutions. In short, slavery was one of the many "relics of barbarism" — like the divine right of kings, religious persecution, torture of the accused, imprisonment and enslavement for debt, witch-burning, and kindred "institutions" — which were transmitted to that generation from former ages as so many burdens of humanity, for help in the removal of which the new nation was in the providence of God perhaps called into existence. The whole matter in its broader aspects is part of that persistent struggle of the centuries between despotism and individual freedom; between arbitrary wrong, consecrated by tradition and law, and the unfolding recognition of private rights; between the thralldom of public opinion and the liberty of conscience; between the greed of gain and the Golden Rule of Christ. Whoever, therefore, chooses to trace the remote origin of the American Rebellion will find the germ of the Union armies of 1861–5 in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, and the inception of the Secession forces between the decks of that Dutch slaver which planted the fruit of her avarice and piracy in the James River colonies in 1620.

So elaborate and searching a study, however, is not necessary to the purposes of this work. A very brief mention of the principal landmarks of the long contest will serve to show the historical relation, and explain the phraseology, of its final issues.

The first of these great landmarks was the ordinance of 1787. All the States tolerated slavery and permitted the slave-trade during the Revolution. But in most of them the morality of the system was strongly drawn in question, especially by the abolition societies, which embraced many of the most prominent patriots. A public opinion, not indeed unanimous, but largely in the majority, demanded that the "necessary evil" should cease. When the Continental Congress came to the practical work of providing a government for the "Western lands," which the financial pressure and the absolute need of union compelled New York and Virginia to cede to the General Government, Thomas Jefferson, of pronounced anti-slavery views, proposed, among other features

* Hurd, "Law of Freedom and Bondage," Vol. I., pp. 228 to 311.

† Williams, "Hist. Negro Race in America," Vol. I., pp. 333 to 369.

in his plan and draft of 1784, to add a clause prohibiting slavery in all the North-west territory after the year 1800. A North Carolina member, however, moved to strike out this clause. The form of the question put by the chairman was, "Shall the clause stand?" Sixteen members voted aye, and seven members voted no; but under the clumsy legislative machinery of the confederation these seven noes carried the question, since a majority of States had failed to vote in the affirmative.

Three years later, July 13, 1787, this first ordinance was repealed by a second, establishing our more modern form of territorial government. It is justly famed for many of its provisions; but its chief value is conceded to have been its sixth article, ordaining the immediate and perpetual prohibition of slavery. Upon this all the States present in Congress — three Northern and five Southern — voted in the affirmative; five States were absent, four Northern and one Southern. This piece of legislation is remarkable in that it was an entirely new bill, substituted for a former and altogether different scheme containing no prohibition whatever, and that it was passed through all the forms and stages of enactment in the short space of four days.* History sheds little light on the official transaction, but contemporary evidence points to the influence of a powerful lobby. Several plausible reasons are assigned why the three slave States of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina voted for this prohibition. First, the West was competing with the territory of Maine for settlers; second, the whole scheme was in the interest of the "Ohio Company," a newly formed Massachusetts emigrant aid society which immediately made a large purchase of lands; third, the unsettled regions south of the Ohio River had not yet been ceded to the General Government, and were therefore open to slavery from the contiguous Southern States; fourth, little was known of the extent or character of the great West; and, therefore, fifth, the Ohio River was doubtless thought to be a fair and equitable dividing line. The ordinance itself provided for the formation of not less than three nor more than five States, and under its shielding provisions Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin were added to the Union with free constitutions.

It does not appear that sectional motives operated for or against the foregoing enactment; they were probably held in abeyance by other considerations. But it must not be inferred therefrom that the slavery question was absent or dormant in the country. There was already a North and a South. At that very time the constitutional convention was in session in Philadelphia. George Washington and his illustrious fellow-delegates were grappling with the novel problems of government which the happy issue of the Revolution and the lamentable failure of the Confederation forced upon the country. One of these problems was the presence of over half a million of slaves, nearly all in five Southern States. Should they be taxed? Should they be represented? Should the power to regulate commerce be allowed to control or terminate their importation? Vital questions these, which went not merely to the incidents but the fundamental powers of government. The slavery question seemed for months an irreconcilable element of discord in the convention. The slave-trade not only, but the domestic institution itself, was characterized in language which Southern politicians of later times would have denounced as "fanatical" and "incendiary." Pinckney wished the slaves to be represented equally with the whites, since they were the Southern peasantry. Gouverneur Morris declared that as they were only property they ought not to be represented at all. Both the present and the future balance of power in national legislation, as resulting from slaves already in, and hereafter to be imported into, old and new States, were debated under various possibilities and probabilities. Out of these divergent views grew the compromises of the Constitution. 1. The slaves were to be included in the enumeration for representation, *five* blacks to be counted as *three* whites. 2. Congress should have the right to prohibit the slave-trade, but not till the lapse of twenty years. 3. Fugitive slaves should be returned to their owners. Each State, large or small, was allowed two senators; and the apportionment of representatives gave to the North thirty-five members and fourteen senators, to the South thirty members and twelve senators. But since the North was not yet free from slavery, but only in process of becoming so, and as Virginia was the leading State of the Union, the real balance of power remained in the hands of the South.

The newly formed Constitution went into successful operation. Under legal provisions already made and the strong current of abolition sentiment then existing, all the Eastern and Middle States down to Delaware became free. This gain, however, was perhaps more than numerically counterbalanced by the active importation of captured Africans, especially into South Carolina and Georgia, up to the time the traffic ceased by law in 1808. Jefferson had meanwhile purchased of France the immense country west of the Mississippi known as the Louisiana

* Journals of Congress, 1787, p. 63.

Territory. The free navigation of that great river was assured, and the importance of the West immeasurably increased. The old French colonies at New Orleans and Kaskaskia were already strong outposts of civilization and the nuclei of spreading settlements. Attracted by the superior fertility of soil, by the limitless opportunities for speculation, by the enticing spirit of adventure, and pushed by the restless energy inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character, the older States now began to pour a rising stream of emigration into the West and the South-west.

In this race the free States, by reason of their greater population, wealth, and commercial enterprise, would have outstripped the South, but for the introduction of a new and powerful influence which operated exclusively in favor of the latter. This was the discovery of the peculiar adaptation of the soil and climate of portions of the Southern States, combined with cheap slave-labor, to the cultivation of cotton. Half a century of experiment and invention in England had brought about the concurrent improvement of machinery for spinning and weaving, and of the high-pressure engine to furnish motive power. The Revolutionary War was scarcely ended when there came from the mother-country a demand for the raw fiber, which promised to be almost without limit. A few trials sufficed to show Southern planters that with their soil and their slaves they could supply this demand, not only with a quality of cotton which would defy competition, but at a profit to themselves far exceeding that of any other product of agriculture. An insurmountable obstacle, however, seemed now to interpose itself between them and their golden harvest. The tedious work of cleaning the fiber from the seed apparently made its cheap preparation for export in large quantities impossible. A negro woman working the whole day could only clean a single pound.

It so happened that at this juncture, November, 1792, an ingenious Yankee student from Massachusetts was boarding in the house of friends in Savannah, Georgia, occupying his leisure in reading law. A party of Georgia gentlemen from the interior, making a visit to this family, fell into conversation on the prospects and difficulties of cotton-culture and the imperative need of a rapidly working cleaning-machine. Their hostess, an intelligent and quick-witted woman, at once suggested an expedient. "Gentlemen," said Mrs. Greene, "apply to my young friend, Mr. Eli Whitney; he can make anything."* The Yankee student was sought, introduced, and had the mechanical problem laid before him. He modestly disclaimed his hostess's extravagant praises, and told his interviewers that he had never seen either cotton or cotton-seed in his life. Nevertheless, he went to work with such earnestness and success, that in a few months Mrs. Greene had the satisfaction of being able to invite a gathering of gentlemen from different parts of the State to behold with their own eyes the working of the newly invented cotton-gin, with which a negro man turning a crank could clean fifty pounds of cotton per day. This solution of the last problem in cheap cotton-culture made it at once the leading crop of the South. That favored region quickly drove all competitors out of the market; and the rise of English imports of raw cotton, from thirty million pounds in 1790 to over one thousand million pounds in 1860, shows the development and increase of that special industry, with all its related interests.† It was not till sixteen years after the invention of the cotton-gin that the African slave-trade ceased by limitation of law. Within that period many thousands of negro captives had been added to the population of the South by direct importation, and nearly thirty thousand slave inhabitants added by the acquisition of Louisiana,‡ and the formation of new slave States south of the Ohio River hastened in due proportion.§

It is a curious historical fact that, under

* Memoir of Eli Whitney, American Journal Science, 1832.

† The Virginia price of a male "field hand" in 1790 was two hundred and fifty dollars; in 1860 his value in the domestic market had risen to sixteen hundred dollars.— SHERRARD CLEMENS, in H. R. App. Globe, 1860–61, 104–5.

‡ Compendium, 8th census, p. 13.

§ No word of the authors could add to the force and eloquence of the following from a recent letter of the son of the inventor of the cotton-gin (to the Art Superintendent of THE CENTURY), stating the claims of his father's memory to the gratitude of the South, hitherto apparently unfelt, and certainly unrecognized:

"NEW HAVEN, CONN., Dec. 4, 1886.

". . . I send you a photograph taken from a portrait of my father, painted about the year 1821, by King, of Washington, when my father, the inventor of the cotton-gin, was fifty-five years old. He died January 25th, 1825. The cotton-gin was invented in 1793; and though it has been in use for nearly one hundred years, it is virtually unimproved. . . . Hence the great merit of the original invention. It has made the South, financially and commercially. It has made England rich, and changed the commerce of the world. Lord Macaulay said of Eli Whitney: 'What Peter the Great did to make Russia dominant, Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin has more than equaled in its relation to the power and progress of the United States.' He has been the greatest benefactor of the South, but it never has, to my knowledge, acknowledged his benefaction in a public manner to the extent it deserves — no monument has been erected to his memory, no town or city named after him, though the force of his genius has caused many towns and cities to rise and flourish in the South. . . .

"Yours very truly, E. W. WHITNEY."

the very remarkable material growth of the United States which now took place, the political influence remained so very evenly balanced between the North and the South for more than a generation. Other grave issues indeed absorbed the public attention, but the abeyance of the slavery question is due rather to the fact that no considerable advantage as yet fell to either side. Eight new States were organized, four north and four south of the Ohio, and admitted in nearly alternate order: Vermont in 1791, *free;* Kentucky in 1792, *slave;* Tennessee in 1796, *slave;* Ohio in 1802, *free;* Louisiana in 1812, *slave;* Indiana in 1816, *free;* Mississippi in 1817, *slave;* Illinois in 1818, *free.* Alabama was already authorized to be admitted with slavery, and this would make the number of free and slave States equal, giving eleven States to the North and eleven to the South.

The territory of Missouri, containing the old French colonies at and near St. Louis, had attained a population of 60,000, and was eager to be admitted as a State. She had made application in 1817, and now in 1819 it was proposed to authorize her to form a constitution. Arkansas was also being nursed as an applicant, and the prospective loss by the North and gain by the South of the balance of power caused the slavery question suddenly to flare up as a national issue. There were hot debates in Congress, emphatic resolutions by State legislatures, deep agitation among the whole people, and open threats by the South to dissolve the Union. Extreme Northern men insisted upon a restriction of slavery to be applied to both Missouri and Arkansas; radical Southern members contended that Congress had no power to impose any conditions on new States. The North had control of the House, the South of the Senate. A middle party thereupon sprang up, proposing to divide the Louisiana purchase between freedom and slavery by the line of 36° 30′, and authorizing the admission of Missouri with slavery out of the northern half. Fastening this proposition upon the bill to admit Maine as a free State, the measure was, after a struggle, carried through Congress (in a separate act approved March 6, 1820), and became the famous Missouri Compromise. Maine and Missouri were both admitted. Each section thereby not only gained two votes in the Senate, but also asserted its right to spread its peculiar polity without question or hindrance within the prescribed limits; and the motto, "No extension of slavery," was postponed forty years, to the Republican campaign of 1860.

From this time forward, the maintenance of this balance of power,—the numerical equality of the slave States with the free,—though not announced in platforms as a party doctrine, was nevertheless steadily followed as a policy by the representatives of the South. In pursuance of this system, Michigan and Arkansas, the former a *free* and the latter a *slave* State, were, on the same day, June 15, 1836, authorized to be admitted. These tactics were again repeated in the year 1845, when, on the 3d of March, Iowa, a *free* State, and Florida, a *slave* State, were authorized to be admitted by one act of Congress, its approval being the last official act of President Tyler. This tacit compromise, however, was accompanied by another very important victory of the same policy. The Southern politicians saw clearly enough that with the admission of Florida the slave territory was exhausted, while an immense untouched portion of the Louisiana purchase still stretched away northwestwardly toward the Pacific above the Missouri Compromise line, which consecrated it to freedom. The North, therefore, still had an imperial area from which to organize future free States, while the South had not a foot more of territory from which to create slave States.

Sagaciously anticipating this contingency, the Southern States had been largely instrumental in setting up the independent State of Texas, and were now urgent in their demand for her annexation to the Union. Two days before the signing of the Iowa and Florida bill, Congress passed, and President Tyler signed, a joint resolution, authorizing the acquisition, annexation, and admission of Texas. But even this was not all. The joint resolution contained a guarantee that "new States, of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said State of Texas," and to be formed out of her territory, should hereafter be entitled to admission—the Missouri Compromise line to govern the slavery question in them. The State of Texas was, by a later resolution, formally admitted to the Union, December 29, 1845. At this date, therefore, the slave States gained an actual majority of one, there being fourteen free States and fifteen slave States, with at least equal territorial prospects for the future.

If the North was alarmed at being thus placed in a minority, there was ample reason for still further disquietude. The annexation of Texas had provoked the Mexican war, and President Polk, in anticipation of further important acquisition of territory to the South and West, asked of Congress an appropriation of two millions to be used in negotiations to that end. An attempt to impose a condition to these negotiations that slavery should never exist in any territory to be thus acquired was the famous Wilmot Proviso. This particular measure failed, but the war ended, and New Mexico

and California were added to the Union as unorganized territories. Meanwhile the admission of Wisconsin in 1848 had once more restored the equilibrium between the free and the slave States, there being now fifteen of each.

It must not be supposed that the important political measures and results thus far summarized were accomplished by quiet and harmonious legislation. Rising steadily since 1820, the controversy over slavery became deep and bitter, both in Congress and the country. Involving not merely a policy of government, but a question of abstract morals, statesmen, philanthropists, divines, the press, societies, churches, and legislative bodies joined in the discussion. Slavery was assailed and defended in behalf of the welfare of the State, and in the name of religion. In Congress especially it had now been a subject of angry contention for a whole generation. It obtruded itself into all manner of questions, and clung obstinately to numberless resolutions and bills. Time and again it had brought members into excited discussion, and to the very verge of personal conflict in the legislative halls. It had occasioned numerous threats to dissolve the Union, and in one or more instances caused members actually to retire from the House of Representatives. It had given rise to resolutions of censure, to resignations, and had been the occasion of some of the greatest legislative debates of the nation. It had virtually created and annexed the largest State in the Union. In several States it had instigated abuse, intolerance, persecutions, trials, mobs, murders, destruction of property, imprisonment of freemen, retaliatory legislation, and one well-defined and formidable attempt at revolution. It originated party factions, political schools, and constitutional doctrines, and made and marred the fame of great statesmen.

New Mexico, when acquired, contained one of the oldest towns on the continent, and a considerable population of Spanish origin. California, almost simultaneously with her acquisition, was peopled in the course of a few months by the world-renowned gold discoveries. Very unexpectedly, therefore, to politicians of all grades and opinions, the slavery question was once more before the nation in the year 1850, over the proposition to admit both to the Union as States. As the result of the long conflict of opinion hitherto maintained, the beliefs and desires of the contending sections had by this time become formulated in distinct political doctrines. The North contended that Congress might and should prohibit slavery in all the territories of the Union, as had been done in the Northern half by the ordinance of 1787 and by the Missouri Compromise. The South declared that any such exclusion would not only be unjust and impolitic, but absolutely unconstitutional, because property in slaves might go and must be protected in the territories in common with all other property. To the theoretical dispute was added a practical contest. By the existing Mexican laws slavery was already prohibited in New Mexico, and California promptly formed a free State constitution. Under these circumstances the North now sought to organize the former as a territory, and admit the latter as a State, while the South resisted and endeavored to extend the Missouri Compromise line, which would place New Mexico and the southern half of California under the tutelage and influence of slavery.

These were the principal points of difference which caused the great slavery agitation of 1850. The whole country was convulsed in discussion; and again more open threats and more ominous movements towards disunion came from the South. The most popular statesman of that day, Henry Clay of Kentucky, a slaveholder opposed to the extension of slavery, now, however, assumed the leadership of a party of compromise, and the quarrel was adjusted and quieted by a combined series of Congressional acts. 1. California was admitted as a free State. 2. The territories of New Mexico and Utah were organized, leaving the Mexican prohibition of slavery in force. 3. The domestic slave-trade in the District of Columbia was abolished. 4. A more stringent fugitive-slave law was passed. 5. For the adjustment of her State boundaries Texas received ten millions of dollars. These were the famous compromise measures of 1850. It has been gravely asserted that this indemnity of ten millions, suddenly trebling the value of the Texas debt, and thereby affording an unprecedented opportunity for speculation in the bonds of that State, was "the propelling force whereby these acts were pushed through Congress in defiance of the original convictions of a majority of its members."* But it must also be admitted that the popular desire for tranquillity, concord, and union in all sections never exerted as much influence upon Congress as then. This compromise was not at first heartily accepted by the people; Southern opinion being offended by the abandonment of the "property" doctrine, and Northern sentiment irritated by certain harsh features of the fugitive-slave law. But the rising Union feeling quickly swept away all ebullitions of discontent, and during two or three years people and politicians fondly dreamed they had, in current phraseology, reached a "finality" on this vexed quarrel. Grave doubts, however, found occa-

* Greeley, "Am. Conflict," Vol. I., p. 208.

sional expression and none perhaps more forcibly than in the following newspaper epigram describing "Finality":

"To kill twice dead a rattlesnake,
And off his scaly skin to take,
And through his head to drive a stake,
And every bone within him break,
And of his flesh mincemeat to make,
To burn, to sear, to boil, and bake,
Then in a heap the whole to rake,
And over it the besom shake,
And sink it fathoms in the lake —
Whence after all, quite wide awake,
Comes back that very same old snake!"

Little did the country think how soon the absurd prediction would find its fulfillment.

THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE.

THE long contest in Congress over the compromise measures of 1850, and the reluctance of a minority, alike in the North and the South, to accept them, had in reality seriously demoralized both the great political parties of the country. The Democrats especially, defeated by the fresh military laurels of General Taylor in 1848, were much exercised to discover their most available candidate as the presidential election of 1852 approached. The leading names, Cass, Buchanan, and Marcy, having been long before the public, were becoming a little stale. In this contingency, a considerable following grouped itself about an entirely new man, Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. Emigrating from Vermont to the West, Douglas had run a career remarkable for political success. Only in his thirty-ninth year, he had served as member of the legislature, as Attorney-General, as Secretary of State, and as judge of the Supreme Court in Illinois, and had since been three times elected to Congress and once to the Senate of the United States. Nor did he owe his political fortunes entirely to accident. Among his many qualities of leadership were strong physical endurance, untiring industry, a persistent boldness, a ready facility in public speaking, unfailing political shrewdness, an unusual power in running debate, with liberal instincts and progressive purposes. It was therefore not surprising that he should attract the admiration and support of the young, the ardent, and especially the restless and ambitious members of his party. His career in Congress was sufficiently conspicuous. As chairman of the Committee on Territories in the Senate, he had borne a prominent part in the enactment of the compromise measures of 1850, and had just met and overcome a threatened party schism in his own State, which that legislation had there produced.

In their zeal to push his claims to the presidency, the partisans of Douglas now committed a great error. Rightly appreciating the growing power of the press, they obtained control of the "Democratic Review," a monthly magazine then enjoying prominent repute as a party organ, and published in it a series of articles attacking the rival Democratic candidates in very flashy rhetoric. These were stigmatized as "old fogies," who must give ground to a nominee of "Young America." They were reminded that the party expects a "new man." "Age is to be honored, but senility is pitiable"; "statesmen of a previous generation must get out of the way"; the Democratic party was owned by a set of "old clothes-horses"; "they couldn't pay their political promises in four Democratic administrations"; and the names of Cass and Marcy, Buchanan and Butler, were freely mixed in with such epithets as "pretenders," "hucksters," "intruders," and "vile charlatans."

Such characterization of such men soon created a flagrant scandal in the Democratic party, which was duly aired both in the newspapers and in Congress. It definitely fixed the phrases "old fogy," and "Young America" in our slang literature. The personal friends of Douglas hastened to explain and assert his innocence of any complicity with this political raid, but they were not more than half believed; and the war of factions, begun in January, raged with increasing bitterness till the Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore in June, and undoubtedly exerted a decisive influence over the deliberations of that body.

The only serious competitors for the nomination were the "old fogies" Cass, Marcy, and Buchanan on the one hand, and Douglas, the pet of "Young America," on the other. It soon became evident that opinion was so divided among these four that a nomination could only be reached through long and tedious ballotings. Beginning with some twenty votes, Douglas steadily gained adherents till on the thirtieth ballot he received ninety-two. From this point, however, his strength fell away. Unable to succeed himself, he was nevertheless sufficiently powerful to defeat his adversaries. The exasperation had been too great to permit a concentration or compromise on any of the "seniors." Cass reached only one hundred and thirty-one votes; Marcy, ninety-eight; Buchanan, one hundred and four; and finally, on the forty-ninth ballot, occurred the memorable nearly unanimous selection of Franklin Pierce — not because of any merit of his own, but to break the insurmountable dead-lock of factional hatred. Young America gained a nominal triumph, old fogydom a real revenge, and the South a serviceable Northern ally.

The country was the only sufferer, for in due time Pierce was overwhelmingly elected, and the nation burdened with that costly luxury, an administration without either personal or party responsibility. Douglas and his friends were discomfited but not dismayed. Their management had been exceedingly maladroit, as a more modest championship would without doubt have secured him the coveted nomination. Yet sagacious politicians foresaw that on the whole he was strengthened by his defeat. From that time forward he was a recognized presidential aspirant and competitor, young enough patiently to bide his time, and of sufficient prestige to make his flag the rallying-point of all the free-lances in the Democratic party.

It is to this presidential aspiration of Mr. Douglas that we must look as the key or explanation of his agency in bringing about the repeal of the Missouri Compromise — perhaps the most momentous legislative act in American history. As already said, after some factious opposition the measures of 1850 had been accepted by the people as a finality of the slavery questions. Around this alleged settlement, distasteful as it was to many, public opinion gradually crystallized. Both the National Conventions of 1852 solemnly resolved that they would discountenance and resist, in Congress or out of it, whenever, wherever, or however, or under whatever color or shape, any further renewal of the slavery agitation. This determination was echoed and reëchoed, affirmed and reaffirmed, by the recognized organs of the public voice — from the village newspaper to the presidential message, from the country debating school to the measured utterances of Senatorial discussion. In support of this alleged "finality" no one had taken a more decided stand than Senator Douglas himself. Said he, "In taking leave of this subject I wish to state that I have determined never to make another speech upon the slavery question; and I will now add the hope that the necessity for it will never exist. . . . So long as our opponents do not agitate for repeal or modification, why should we agitate for any purpose? We claim that the compromise [of 1850] is a final settlement. Is a final settlement open to discussion and agitation and controversy by its friends? What manner of settlement is that which does not settle the difficulty and quiet the dispute? Are not the friends of the compromise becoming the agitators, and will not the country hold us responsible for that which we condemn and denounce in the abolitionists and Free-soilers? These are matters worthy of our consideration. Those who preach peace should not be the first to commence and reopen an old quarrel." * In his Senate speeches, during the compromise debates of 1850, while generally advocating his theory of "non-intervention," he had sounded the whole gamut of the slavery discussion, defending the various measures of adjustment against the attacks of the Southern extremists, and specifically defending the Missouri Compromise. Nay, more; he had declared in distinct words that the principle of territorial prohibition was no violation of Southern rights; and denounced the proposition of Calhoun to put a "balance of power" clause into the Constitution as "a retrograde movement in an age of progress that would astonish the world." † These repeated affirmations, taken in connection with his famous description of the Missouri Compromise in 1849, in which he declared it to have had "an origin akin to the Constitution," and to have become "canonized in the hearts of the American people as a sacred thing which no ruthless hand would ever be reckless enough to disturb," ‡ all seemed, in the public mind, to put it beyond the reach of possibility that their author would so soon become the subject of his own anathemas.

The personal details of this most remarkable of all our political intrigues are forever lost to history. We have only a faint and shadowy outline of isolated movements of a few chief actors, a few vague suggestions and fragmentary steps in the formation and unfolding of the ill-omened plot.

As the avowed representative of the restless and ambitious elements of the country, as the champion of "Young America," Douglas had so far as possible in his Congressional career made himself the apostle of modern "progress." He was a believer in "manifest destiny" and a zealous advocate of the Monroe doctrine. He desired — so the newspapers averred — that the Carribbean Sea should be declared an American lake, and nothing so delighted him as to pull the beard of the British lion. These topics, while they furnished themes for campaign speeches, for the present led to no practical legislation. In his position as chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, however, he had control of kindred measures of present and vital interest to the people of the West; namely, the opening of new routes of travel and emigration, and of new territories for settlement. An era of wonder had just dawned, connecting itself directly with these subjects. The acquisition of California and the discovery of gold had turned the eyes of the whole civilized world to the Pacific coast. Plains and

* App. Globe of 1851–2, p. 68.

† Douglas, Senate speech, March 13, 1850. App. Globe, Vol. XXII., pt. I., pp. 369 to 372.

‡ Douglas, Springfield speech, October 23, 1849. Illinois "Register."



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH, AFTER A PORTRAIT BY KING.

ELI WHITNEY (1821), AGED FIFTY-FIVE.

mountains were swarming with adventurers and emigrants. Oregon, Utah, New Mexico, and Minnesota had just been organized, and were in a feeble way contesting the sudden fame of the Golden State. The Western border was astir, and wild visions of lands and cities and mines and wealth and power were disturbing the peaceful dreams of the pioneer in his frontier cabin, and hurrying him off on the long, romantic quest across the continent.

Hitherto, stringent Federal laws had kept settlers and unlicensed traders out of the Indian territory, which lay beyond the western boundaries of Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa, and which the policy of our early Presidents fixed upon as the final asylum of the red men retreating before the irresistible advance of white settlers. But now the uncontrollable stream of emigration had broken into and through this reservation, creating in a few years well-defined routes of travel to New Mexico, Utah, California, and Oregon. Though from the long march there came constant cries of danger and distress, of starvation and Indian massacre, there was neither halting nor delay. The courageous pioneers pressed forward all the more earnestly, and to such purpose that in less than twenty-five years the Pacific Railroad followed Frémont's first exploration through the South Pass.

Douglas, himself a migratory child of fortune, was in thorough sympathy with this somewhat premature Western longing of the people; and as chairman of the Committee on Territories was the recipient of all the letters, petitions, and personal solicitations from the various interests which were seeking their advantage in this exodus toward the setting sun. He was the natural center for all the embryo mail contractors, office-holders, Indian traders, land-sharks, and railroad visionaries whose coveted opportunities lay in the Western territories. It is but just to his fame, however, to say that he comprehended equally well the true philosophical and political necessities which now demanded the opening of Kansas and Nebraska as a secure highway and protecting bridge to the Rocky Mountains and our new-found El Dorado, no less than as a bond of union between the older States and the improvised "Young America" on the Pacific coast. The subject was not yet ripe for action during the stormy politics of 1850–51, and had again to be postponed for the presidential campaign of 1852. But now Pierce was triumphantly elected, with a Democratic Congress to sustain him, and the legislative calm which both parties had adjured in their platforms seemed propitious for pushing measures of local interest. The control of the territories was for the moment completely in the hands of Douglas. He was himself chairman of the Committee of the Senate; and his special personal friend and political lieutenant in his own State, Richardson of Illinois, was chairman of the Territorial Committee of the House. He could therefore choose his own time and mode of introducing measures of this character in either house of Congress, under the majority control of his party — a fact to be constantly borne in mind when we consider the origin and progress of "the three Nebraska bills."



LEWIS CASS. (PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY.)

The journal discloses that Richardson of Illinois, chairman of the Committee on Territories of the House of Representatives, on February 2, 1853, introduced into the House "A bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska."* After due reference, and some desultory debate on the 8th,† it was taken up and passed by the House on the 10th.‡ From the discussion we learn that the boundaries were the Missouri River on the east, the Rocky Mountains on the west, the line of 36° 30′ or southern line of Missouri on the south, and the line of 43°, or near the northern line of Iowa, on the north. Several members opposed it, because the Indian title to the lands was not yet extinguished, and because it embraced reservations pledged to Indian occupancy in perpetuity; also on

* Globe, p. 474. † Ib., pp. 542–4. ‡ Ib., p. 565.



PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY. ENGRAVED BY G. KRUELL.

FRANKLIN PIERCE, PRESIDENT, 1853–57.

the general ground that it contained but few white inhabitants, and its organization was therefore a useless expense. Howard of Texas made the most strenuous opposition, urging that since it contained but about six hundred souls, its southern boundary should be fixed at 39° 30′, not to trench upon the Indian reservations. Hall of Missouri replied in support of the bill: "We want the organization of the Territory of Nebraska not merely for the protection of the few people who reside there, but also for the protection of Oregon and California in time



WILLIAM A. RICHARDSON. (PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY.)

of war, and the protection of our commerce and the fifty or sixty thousand emigrants who annually cross the plains."* He added that its limits were purposely made large to embrace the great lines of travel to Oregon, New Mexico, and California; since the South Pass is in 42° 30′, the territory has to extend to 43° north.

The incident, however, of special historical significance had occurred in the debate of the 8th, when a member rose and said: "I wish to inquire of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Giddings], who, I believe, is a member of the Committee on Territories, why the ordinance of 1787 is not incorporated in this bill? I should like to know whether he or the committee were intimidated on account of the platforms of 1852?"† To which Mr. Giddings replied that the south line of the territory was 36° 30′, and was already covered by the Missouri Compromise prohibition. "This law stands perpetually, and I do not think that this act would receive any increased validity by a reënactment. There I leave the matter. It is very clear that the territory included in this treaty [ceding Louisiana] must be forever free unless the law be repealed." With this explicit understanding from a member of the committee, apparently accepted as conclusive by the whole House, and certainly not objected to by the chairman, Mr. Richardson, who was carefully watching the current of debate, the bill passed on the 10th,‡ ninety-eight yeas to forty-three nays. Led by a few members from that region, in the main the West voted for it and the South against it; while the greater number, absorbed in other schemes, were wholly indifferent, and probably cast their votes upon personal solicitation.

On the following day the bill was hurried over to the Senate, referred to Mr. Douglas's committee, and by him reported back without amendment, on February 17th; but the session was almost ended before he was able to gain the attention of the Senate for its discussion. Finally, on the night before the inauguration of President Pierce, in the midst of a fierce and protracted struggle over the appropriation bills, while the Senate was without a quorum and impatiently awaiting the reports of a number of conference committees, Douglas seized the opportunity of the lull to call up his Nebraska bill. Here again, as in the House, Texas stubbornly opposed it. Houston undertook to talk it to death in a long speech; Bell protested against robbing the Indians of their guaranteed rights. The bill seemed to have no friend but its author when, perhaps to his surprise, Senator D. R. Atchison of Missouri threw himself into the breach.



SAM HOUSTON.

* Globe, p. 559. † Ib., p. 543. ‡ Ib., p. 565.

Prefacing his remarks with the statement that he had formerly been opposed to the measure, he continued: "I had two objections to it. One was that the Indian title in that territory had not been extinguished, or at least a very small portion of it had been. Another was the Missouri Compromise, or, as it is commonly called, the Slavery Restriction. It was my opinion at that time — and I am not now very clear on that subject — that the law of Congress, when the State of Missouri was admitted into the Union, excluding slavery from the territory of Louisiana north of 36° 30′, would be enforced in that territory unless it was specially rescinded; and whether that law was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States or not, it would do its work, and that work would be to preclude slaveholders from going into that territory. But when I came to look into that question, I found that there was no prospect, no hope, of a repeal of the Missouri Compromise excluding slavery from that territory. . . . I have always been of opinion that the first great error committed in the political history of this country was the ordinance of 1787, rendering the North-west territory free territory. The next great error was the Missouri Compromise. But they are both irremediable. There is no remedy for them. We must submit to them. I am prepared to do it. It is evident that the Missouri Compromise cannot be repealed. So far as that question is concerned, we might as well agree to the admission of this territory now as next year, or five or ten years hence." *



DAVID R. ATCHISON. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE.)

Mr. Douglas closed the debate, advocating the passage of the bill for general reasons, and by his silence accepting Atchison's conclusions; but as the morning of the 4th of March was breaking, an unwilling Senate laid the bill on the table by a vote of twenty-three to seventeen, here, as in the House, the West being for and the South against the measure. It is not probable, however, that in this course the South acted with any mental reservation or sinister motive. The great breach of faith was not yet even meditated. Only a few hours afterward, in a dignified and stately national ceremonial, in the midst of foreign ministers, judges, senators, and representatives, the new President of the United States delivered to the people his inaugural address. High and low were alike intent to discern the opening political currents of the new administration, but none touched or approached this particular subject. The aspirations of "Young America" were not toward a conquest of the North, but the enlargement of the South. A freshening breeze filled the sails of "annexation" and "manifest destiny." In bold words the President said: "The policy of my administration will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion. Indeed, it is not to be disguised that our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world." † Reaching the slavery question, he expressed unbounded devotion to the Union, and declared slavery recognized by the Constitution, and his purpose to enforce the compromise measures of

* Globe, p. 1113.

† Pierce, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1853.



WILLIAM AIKEN. (PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY.)

1850; adding, "I fervently trust that the question is at rest, and that no sectional or ambitious or fanatical excitement may again threaten the durability of our institutions, or obscure the light of our prosperity."

When Congress met again in the following December (1853), the annual message of President Pierce was, upon this subject, but an echo of his inaugural, as his inaugural had been but an echo of the two party platforms of 1852. Affirming that the compromise measures of 1850 had given repose to the country, he declared, "That this repose is to suffer no shock during my official term, if I have the power to avert it, those who placed me here may be assured." In this spirit, undoubtedly, the Democratic party and the South began the session of 1853–4; but unfortunately it was very soon abandoned. The people of the Missouri and Iowa border were becoming every day more impatient to enter upon an authorized occupancy of the new lands which lay a day's journey to the west. Handfuls of squatters here and there had elected two territorial delegates, who hastened to Washington with embryo credentials. The subject of organizing the West was again broached; an Iowa Senator introduced a territorial bill. Under the ordinary routine it was referred to the Committee on Territories, and on the 4th day of January Douglas reported back his second Nebraska bill, still without any repeal of the Missouri Compromise. His elaborate report, accompanying this second bill, shows that the subject had been most carefully examined in committee. The discussion was evidently exhaustive, going over the whole history, policy, and constitutionality of prohibitory legislation. Two or three sentences are quite sufficient to present the substance of the long and wordy report. First, that there were differences and doubts; second, that these had been finally settled by the compromise measures of 1850; and, therefore, third, the committee had adhered not only to the spirit but to the very phraseology of that adjustment, and refused either to affirm or repeal the Missouri Compromise.

This was the public and legislative agreement announced to the country. Subsequent revelations show the secret and factional bargain which that agreement covered. Not only was this territorial bill searchingly considered in committee, but repeated caucuses were held by the Democratic leaders to discuss the party results likely to grow out of it. The Southern Democrats maintained that the Constitution of the United States recognized their right and guaranteed them protection to their slave property, if they chose to carry it into Federal territories. Douglas and other Northern Democrats contended that slavery was subject to local law, and that the people of a territory, like those of a State, could establish or prohibit it. This radical difference, if carried into party action, would lose them the political ascendency they had so long maintained, and were then enjoying. To avert a public rupture of the party, it was agreed "that the territories should be organized with a delegation by Congress of all the power of Congress in the territories, and that the extent of the power of Congress should be determined by the courts."* If the courts should decide against the South, the Southern Democrats would accept the Northern theory; if the courts should decide in favor of the South, the Northern Democrats would defend the Southern view. Thus harmony would be preserved, and party power prolonged. Here we have the shadow of the coming Dred Scott decision already projected into political history, though the speaker protests that "none of us knew of the existence of a controversy

* Senator Benjamin, Senate debate, May 8, 1860. Globe, p. 1966.

then pending in the Federal courts that would lead almost immediately to the decision of that question."* This was probably true; for a "peculiar provision" † was expressly inserted in the committee's bill, allowing appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States in all questions involving title to slaves, without reference to the usual limitations in respect to the value of the property, thereby paving the way to an early adjudication by the Supreme Court.

Thus the matter rested till the 16th of January, when Senator Dixon of Kentucky, apparently acting for himself alone, offered an amendment in effect repealing the Missouri Compromise. Upon this provocation, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts the next day offered another amendment affirming that it was not repealed by the bill. Commenting on these propositions two days later, the administration organ, the "Washington Union," declared they were both "false lights," to be avoided by all good Democrats. By this time, however, this subject of "repeal" had become bruited about the Capitol corridors, the hotels, and the caucus rooms of Washington, and newspaper correspondents were on the *qui vive* to obtain the latest developments concerning the intrigue. The secrets of the Territorial Committee leaked out, and consultations multiplied. Could a repeal be carried? Who would offer it and lead it? What divisions or schisms would it carry into the ranks of the Democratic party, especially in the pending contest between the "Hards" and "Softs" in New York? What effect would it have upon the presidential election of 1856? Already the "Union" suggested that it was whispered that Cass was willing to propose and favor such a "repeal." ‡ It was given out in the "Baltimore Sun" that Cass intended to "separate the sheep from the goats." Both statements were untrue; but they perhaps had their intended effect, to arouse the jealousy and eagerness of Douglas. The political air of Washington was heavy with clouds and mutterings, and clans were gathering for and against the ominous proposition.



ARCHIBALD DIXON. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE.)

So far as history has been allowed a glimpse into these secret communings, three principal personages were at this time planning a movement of vast portent. These were Stephen A. Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories; Archibald Dixon, Whig Senator from Kentucky; and David R. Atchison of Missouri, then president *pro tempore* of the Senate, and acting Vice-President of the United States. "For myself," said the latter in explaining the transaction, "I am entirely devoted to the interests of the South, and I would sacrifice everything but my hope of heaven to advance her welfare." He thought the Missouri Compromise ought to be repealed; he had pledged himself in his public addresses to vote for no territorial organization that would not virtually annul it; and with this feeling in his heart, he desired to be the chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories when a bill was introduced. With this object in view, he had a private interview with Mr. Douglas, and informed him of what he desired — the introduction of a bill for

* Benjamin, Globe, May 8, 1860, p. 1966.

† Douglas, pamphlet in reply to Judge Black, October, 1859, p. 6.

‡ "Washington Union," January 19, 1854.



NATHANIEL P. BANKS. (PHOTOGRAPHED BY BRADY.)

Nebraska like what [*sic*] he had promised to vote for, and that he would like to be the chairman of the Committee on Territories in order to introduce such a measure; and if he could get that position, he would immediately resign as president of the Senate. Judge Douglas requested twenty-four hours to consider the matter, and if at the expiration of that time he could not introduce such a bill as he (Mr. Atchison) proposed, he would resign as chairman of the Territorial Committee in Democratic caucus, and exert his influence to get him (Atchison) appointed. At the expiration of the given time, Senator Douglas signified his intention to introduce such a bill as had been spoken of."*

Senator Dixon is no less explicit in his description of these political negotiations. "My amendment seemed to take the Senate by surprise, and no one appeared more startled than Judge Douglas himself. He immediately came to my seat and courteously remonstrated

* Speech at Atchison City, September, 1854, reported in the "Parkville Luminary."

against my amendment, suggesting that the bill which he had introduced was almost in the words of the territorial acts for the organization of Utah and New Mexico; that they being a part of the compromise measures of 1850, he had hoped that I, a known and zealous friend of the wise and patriotic adjustment which had then taken place, would not be inclined to do anything to call that adjustment in question or weaken it before the country.

"I replied that it was precisely because I had been and was a firm and zealous friend of the compromise of 1850, that I felt bound to persist in the movement which I had originated; that I was well satisfied that the Missouri Restriction, if not expressly repealed, would continue to operate in the territory to which it had been applied, thus negativing the great and salutary principle of *non-intervention*, which constituted the most prominent and essential feature of the plan of settlement of 1850. We talked for some time amicably, and separated. Some days afterwards Judge Douglas came to my lodgings, whilst I was confined by physical indisposition, and urged me to get up and take a ride with him in his carriage. I accepted his invitation, and rode out with him. During our short excursion we talked on the subject of my proposed amendment, and Judge Douglas, to my high gratification, proposed to me that I should allow him to take charge of the amendment and ingraft it on his territorial bill. I acceded to the proposition at once, whereupon a most interesting interchange occurred between us.

"On this occasion Judge Douglas spoke to me in substance thus: 'I have become perfectly satisfied that it is my duty, as a fair-minded national statesman, to coöperate with you as proposed in securing the repeal of the Missouri Compromise restriction. It is due to the South; it is due to the Constitution, heretofore palpably infracted; it is due to that character for consistency which I have heretofore labored to maintain. The repeal, if we can effect it, will produce much stir and commotion in the free States of the Union for a season. I shall be assailed by demagogues and fanatics there without stint or moderation. Every opprobrious epithet will be applied to me. I shall be probably hung in effigy in many places. It is more than probable that I may become permanently odious among those whose friendship and esteem I have heretofore possessed. This proceeding may end my political career. But, acting under the sense of the duty which animates me, I am prepared to make the sacrifice. I will do it.'

"He spoke in the most earnest and touching manner, and I confess that I was deeply affected. I said to him in reply: 'Sir, I once recognized you as a demagogue, a mere party manager, selfish and intriguing. I now find you a warm-hearted and sterling patriot. Go forward in the pathway of duty as you propose, and though all the world desert you, I never will.'" *

Such is the circumstantial record of this most remarkable political intrigue left by two prominent and principal instigators, and never denied nor repudiated by the third. Gradually, as the plot was developed, the agreement embraced the leading elements of the Democratic party in Congress, reënforced by a majority of the Whig leaders from the slave States. A day or two before the final introduction of the repeal, Douglas and others held an interview with President Pierce,† and obtained from him in writing an agreement to adopt the movement as an administration measure. Fortified with this important adhesion, he took the fatal plunge, and on January 23d introduced his third Nebraska bill, organizing two territories instead of one, and declaring the Missouri Compromise "inoperative." But the amendment — monstrous Caliban of legislation as it was — needed to be still further licked into shape to satisfy the grasping rapacity of the South and appease the alarmed conscience of the North. Two weeks later, after the first outburst of debate, the following phraseology was substituted: "Which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and territories, as recognized

* Archibald Dixon to H. S. Foote, October 1, 1858. "Louisville Democrat" of October 3, 1858.

† Jefferson Davis, who was a member of President Pierce's Cabinet (Secretary of War), thus relates the incident: "On Sunday morning, the 22d of January, 1854, gentlemen of each committee [House and Senate Committees on Territories] called at my house, and Mr. Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee, fully explained the proposed bill, and stated their purpose to be, through my aid, to obtain an interview on that day with the President, to ascertain whether the bill would meet his approbation. The President was known to be rigidly opposed to the reception of visits on Sunday for the discussion of any political subject; but in this case it was urged as necessary, in order to enable the committee to make their report the next day. I went with them to the executive mansion, and, leaving them in the reception-room, sought the President in his private apartments, and explained to him the occasion of the visit. He thereupon met the gentlemen, patiently listened to the reading of the bill and their explanations of it, decided that it rested upon sound constitutional principles, and recognized in it only a return to that rule which had been infringed by the compromise of 1820, and the restoration of which had been foreshadowed by the legislation of 1850. This bill was not, therefore, as has been improperly asserted, a measure inspired by Mr. Pierce or any of his Cabinet."— Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. I., p. 28.

by the legislation of 1850 (commonly called the Compromise measures), is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution"—a change which Benton truthfully characterized as "a stump speech injected into the belly of the Nebraska bill."

The storm of agitation which this measure aroused dwarfed all former ones in depth and intensity. The South was nearly united in its behalf, the North sadly divided in opposition. Against protest and appeal, under legislative whip and spur, with the tempting smiles and patronage of the administration, after nearly a four-months' struggle, the plighted faith of a generation was violated, and the repealing act passed — mainly by the great influence and example of Douglas, who had only five years previously so fittingly described the Missouri Compromise as being "akin to the Constitution," and "canonized in the hearts of the American people as a sacred thing which no ruthless hand would ever be reckless enough to disturb."

THE DRIFT OF POLITICS.

THE repeal of the Missouri Compromise made the slavery question paramount in every State of the Union. The boasted finality was a broken reed; the life-boat of compromise a hopeless wreck. If the agreement of a generation could be thus annulled in a breath, was there any safety even in the Constitution itself? This feeling communicated itself to the Northern States at the very first note of warning, and every man's party fealty was at once decided by his toleration of or opposition to slavery. While the fate of the Nebraska bill hung in a doubtful balance in the House, the feeling found expression in letters, speeches, meetings, petitions, and remonstrances. Men were for or against the bill — every other political subject was left in abeyance. The measure once passed, and the Compromise repealed, the first natural impulse was to combine, organize, and agitate for its restoration. This was the ready-made, common ground of coöperation.

It is probable that this merely defensive energy would have been overcome and dissipated, had it not just at this juncture been inspirited and led by the faction known as the Free-soil party of the country, composed mainly of men of independent antislavery views, who had now during four presidential campaigns been organized as a distinct political body, with no near hope of success, but animated mainly by the desire to give expression to their deep personal convictions. If there were demagogues here and there among them, seeking merely to create a balance of power for bargain and sale, they were unimportant in number, and only of local influence, and soon became deserters. There was no mistaking the earnestness of the body of this faction. A few fanatical men, who had made it the vehicle of violent expressions, had kept it under the ban of popular prejudice. It had long been held up to public odium as a revolutionary band of "abolitionists." All the abolitionists were doubtless in this party, but the party was not all composed of abolitionists. Despite all objurgation and contempt, however, it had become since 1840 a constant factor and a growing influence in politics. It had operated as a negative balance of power in the last two presidential elections, causing, by its diversion of votes, and more especially by its relaxing influence upon parties, the success of the Whig candidate, General Taylor, in 1848, and the Democratic nominee, Franklin Pierce, in 1852.

This small army of antislavery veterans, over one hundred and fifty-eight thousand voters in the aggregate, and distributed in detachments of from three thousand to thirty thousand in twelve of the free States, now came to the front with spirit and alacrity, and with its newspapers and speakers trained in the discussion of the subject, and its committees and affiliations already in action and correspondence, bore the brunt of the fight against the repeal. Hitherto its aims had appeared Utopian, and its resolves had been denunciatory and exasperating. Now, however, combining wisdom with opportunity, it became conciliatory, and, abating something of its abstractions, made itself the exponent of a demand for a present and practical reform — a simple return to the ancient faith and landmarks. It labored specially to bring about the dissolution of the old party organizations and the formation of a new one, based upon the general policy of resisting the extension of slavery. Since, however, the repeal had shaken but not obliterated old party lines, this effort succeeded only in favorable localities.

For the present, party disintegration was slow; men were reluctant to abandon their old-time principles and associations. The united efforts of Douglas and the administration held the body of the Northern Democrats to his fatal policy, though protests and defections became alarmingly frequent. On the other hand, the great mass of Northern Whigs promptly opposed the repeal, and now formed the bulk of


HISTORICAL MAP
OF THE
UNITED STATES
IN 1854
SHOWING THE VARIOUS ACCESSIONS OF TERRITORY ETC
SCALE OF MILES
NOTE. The number under the name of a State indicates the date of its admission into the Union
The Boundary between the United States and Mexico previous to 1845 & 1846 is indicated thus + - + +
BRITISH AMERICA
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
MEXICO
OREGON TERRITORY
WASHINGTON TERRITORY
NEBRASKA TERRITORY
UTAH TERRITORY
NEW MEXICO TERRITORY
INDIAN TERRITORY
TEXAS
MINNESOTA TERRITORY
LOUISIANA
FLORIDA
CALIFORNIA
LINE OF 36° 30'
LINE OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE
GADSDEN PURCHASE 1853
Longitude West from Greenwich
Longitude from Washington West East

the opposition, nevertheless losing perhaps as many pro-slavery Whigs as they gained anti-slavery Democrats. The real and effective gain, therefore, was the more or less thorough alliance of the Whig party and the Free-soil party of the Northern States: wherever that was successful it gave immediate and available majorities to the opposition, which made their influence felt even in the very opening of the popular contest following the congressional repeal.

It happened that this was a year for electing congressmen. The Nebraska bill did not pass till the end of May, and the political excitement was at once transferred from Washington to every district of the whole country. It may be said with truth that the year 1854 formed one continuous and solid political campaign from January to November, rising in interest and earnestness from first to last, and engaging in the discussion more fully than had ever occurred in previous American history all classes and constituent elements of our whole population.

In the Southern States the great majority of people welcomed, supported, and defended the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, it being consonant with their pro-slavery feelings, and apparently favorable to their pro-slavery interests. The Democratic party in the South, controlling a majority of slave States, was of course a unit in its favor. The Whig party, however, having carried two slave States for Scott in 1852, and holding a strong minority in the remainder, was not so unanimous. Seven Southern Representatives and two Southern Senators had voted against the Nebraska bill, and many individual voters condemned it as an act of bad faith — as the abandonment of the accepted "finality," and as the provocation of a dangerous antislavery reaction. But public opinion in that part of the Union was fearfully tyrannical and intolerant; and opposition dared only to manifest itself to Democratic party organization — not to these Democratic party measures. The Whigs of the South were therefore precipitately driven to division. Those of extreme pro-slavery views, like Dixon of Kentucky,—who, when he introduced his amendment, declared, "Upon the question of slavery I know no Whiggery and no Democracy,"— went boldly and at once over into the Democratic camp, while those who retained their traditional party name and flag were sundered from their ancient allies in the Northern States by the impossibility of taking up the latter's antislavery war-cry.

At this juncture the political situation was further complicated by the sudden rise of an entirely new factor in politics, the American party, popularly called the "Know-Nothings." Essentially, it was a revival of the extinct "Native-American" faction of 1835–7, based upon a jealousy of and discrimination against foreign-born voters, desiring an extension of their period of naturalization, and their exclusion from the franchise of office; also upon a certain hostility to the Roman Catholic religion. It had been reorganized as a secret order in the year 1853; and seizing upon the political disappointments following General Scott's overwhelming defeat for the presidency in 1852, and profiting by the disintegration caused by the Nebraska bill, it rapidly gained recruits both North and South. Operating and organizing in entire secrecy, the country was startled by the sudden appearance in one locality after another, on election day, of a potent and unsuspected political power, which in many instances pushed both the old organizations not only to disastrous but even to ridiculous defeat. Both North and South its forces were recruited mainly from the Whig party, though malcontents from all quarters rushed to group themselves upon its narrow platform, and to participate in the exciting but delusive triumphs of its temporary and local ascendency.

When, in the opening of the anti-Nebraska contest, the Free-soil leaders undertook the formation of a new party to supersede the old, they had, because of their generally democratic antecedents, with great unanimity proposed that it be called the "Republican" party, thus reviving the distinctive appellation by which the followers of Jefferson were known in the early days of the republic. Considering the fact that Jefferson had originated the policy of slavery restriction in his draft of the ordinance of 1784, the name became singularly appropriate, and wherever the Free-soilers succeeded in forming a coalition it was adopted without question. But the refusal of the Whigs in many States to surrender their name and organization, and more especially the abrupt appearance of the Know-Nothings on the field of parties, retarded the general coalition between the Whigs and the Free-soilers which so many influences favored. As it turned out, a great variety of party names were retained or adopted in the congressional and State campaigns of 1854, the designation of "anti-Nebraska" being perhaps the most common, and certainly for the moment the most serviceable, since denunciation of the Nebraska bill was the one all-pervading bond of sympathy and agreement among men who differed very widely on almost all other political topics. This affiliation, however, was confined exclusively to the free States. In the slave States, the opposition to the administration dared not raise the anti-Nebraska banner, nor

could it have found followers; and it was not only inclined but forced to make its battle either under the old name of Whigs, or, as became more popular, under the new appellation of "Americans," which grew into a more dignified synonym for Know-Nothings.

Thus confronted, the Nebraska and anti-Nebraska factions, or, more philosophically speaking, the pro-slavery and antislavery sentiment of the several American States, battled for political supremacy with a zeal and determination only manifested on occasions of deep and vital concern to the welfare of the republic. However languidly certain elements of American society may perform what they deem the drudgery of politics, they no longer shrink from it when they hear warning of real danger. The alarm of the nation by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was serious and startling. All ranks and occupations therefore joined with a new energy in the contest it provoked. Particularly was the religious sentiment of the North profoundly moved by the moral question involved. Perhaps for the first time in our modern politics, the pulpit vied with the press, and the Church with the campaign club, in the work of debate and propagandism.

The very inception of the struggle had provoked bitter words. Before the third Nebraska bill had yet been introduced into the Senate, the then little band of "Independent Democrats" in Congress — Chase, Sumner, Giddings, and three others — had issued a newspaper address calling the repeal "a gross violation of a sacred pledge"; "a criminal betrayal of precious rights"; "an atrocious plot," "designed to cover up from public reprehension meditated bad faith," etc. Douglas, seizing only too gladly the pretext to use denunciation instead of argument, replied in his opening speech, in turn stigmatizing them as "abolition confederates" "assembled in secret conclave" "on the holy sabbath while other Senators were engaged in divine worship" — "plotting," "in the name of holy religion"; "perverting," and "calumniating the committee"; "appealing with a smiling face to his courtesy to get time to circulate their document before its infamy could be exposed,"etc.* The key-notes of the discussion thus given were well sustained on both sides, and crimination and recrimination increased with the heat and intensity of the campaign. The gradual disruption of parties, and the new and radical attitudes assumed by men of independent thought, gave ample occasion to indulge in such epithets as "apostates," "renegades," and "traitors." Unusual acrimony grew out of the zeal of the Church and its ministers. The clergymen of the Northern States not only spoke against the repeal from their pulpits, but forwarded energetic petitions against it to Congress, three thousand and fifty clergymen of New England of different denominations joining their signatures in one protest. "We protest against it," they said, "as a great moral wrong, as a breach of faith eminently unjust to the moral principles of the community, and subversive of all confidence in national engagements; as a measure full of danger to the peace and even the existence of our beloved Union, and exposing us to the righteous judgment of the Almighty." † In return, Douglas made a most virulent onslaught on their political action. "Here we find," he retorted, "that a large body of preachers, perhaps three thousand, following the lead of a circular which was issued by the abolition confederates in this body, calculated to deceive and mislead the public, have here come forward with an atrocious falsehood, and an atrocious calumny against this Senate, desecrated the pulpit, and prostituted the sacred desk to the miserable and corrupting influence of party politics." All his newspapers and partisans throughout the country caught the style and spirit of his warfare, and boldly denied the moral right of the clergy to take part in politics otherwise than by a silent vote. But they, on the other hand, persisted all the more earnestly in justifying their interference in moral questions wherever they appeared, and were clearly sustained by the public opinion of the North.

Though the repeal was forced through Congress under party pressure, and by the sheer weight of a large Democratic majority in both branches, it met from the very first a decided and unmistakable popular condemnation in the free States. While the measure was yet under discussion in the House in March, New Hampshire led off by an election completely obliterating the eighty-nine Democratic majority in her Legislature. Connecticut followed in her footsteps early in April. Long before November it was evident that the political revolution among the people of the North was thorough, and that election day was anxiously awaited merely to record the popular verdict long since decided.

The influence of this result upon parties, old and new, is perhaps best illustrated in the organization of the Thirty-fourth Congress, chosen at these elections during the year 1854, which witnessed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Each Congress, in ordinary course, meets for the first time about one year after its members are elected by the people, and the influence of politics during the interim needs always to be taken into account.

* Sheahan's "Life of Douglas," p. 194.

† Globe, March 14, 1854, p. 617.

In this particular instance this effect had, if anything, been slightly reactionary, and the great contest for the Speakership during the winter of 1855–6 may therefore be taken as a fair manifestation of the spirit of politics in 1854.

The strength of the preceding House of Representatives, which met in December, 1853, had been: Whigs, 71; Free-soilers, 4; Democrats, 159—a clear Democratic majority of 84.* In the new Congress there were in the House, as nearly as the classification could be made, about 108 anti-Nebraska members, nearly 40 Know-Nothings, and about 75 Democrats; the remaining members were undecided.† The proud Democratic majority of the Pierce election was therefore annihilated.

But as yet the new party was merely inchoate, its elements distrustful, jealous, and discordant; the feuds and battles of a quarter of a century were not easily forgotten or buried. The Democratic members, boldly nominating Mr. Richardson, the House leader on the Nebraska bill, as their candidate for Speaker, made a long and determined push for success. But his highest range of votes was about 74 to 76; while through 121 ballotings, having continued from December 3d to January 23d, the opposition remained divided, Mr. Banks, the anti-Nebraska favorite, running at one time up to 106 — within seven votes of an election. At this point, Richardson, finding it a hopeless struggle, withdrew his name as a candidate, and the Democratic strength was transferred to another, but with no better prospects. Finally, seeing no chance of otherwise terminating the contest, the House yielded to the inevitable domination of the slavery question, and resolved, on February 2d, by a vote of 113 to 104, to elect under the plurality rule after the next three ballotings. Under this rule, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts to rescind it, Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts was chosen Speaker by 103 votes, against 100 votes for William Aiken of South Carolina, with 30 scattering. The "ruthless" repeal of the Missouri Compromise had effectually broken the legislative power of the Democratic party.

* Whig Almanac, 1854, p. 4.
† "Tribune" Almanac, 1857, p. 29.

[We wish to note our obligation to Mr. J. Smith Speed (since deceased) and to Mr. Thomas Speed and Mr. R. J. Menefee for valuable assistance in illustrating early chapters of the Life of Lincoln.— EDITOR.]

Century Mch 1887

IN THE LANE.

AND art thou then, my heart, too old
Ever to leap with love again,
To feel the strong blood-torrent rolled
Through heaving breast and teeming brain?
Is it no more, my heart, for thee
Life's one unquestioned ecstasy?

Are faded quite those dim, far days
When music mothered every sound,
When up and down youth's happy ways
Fared glories on eternal round?
Has chill of years killed every joy
That blossomed for the wandering boy?

These are the trees once known so well
We felt to them all but beknown;
Their very shadow we could tell
From others by the forest thrown.
The same glad songs from bush and bough—
As once we heard, we hear them now.

And these sweet flowers beneath my feet,
Their young eyes greet us as of yore.
The hope, there! Still they think to meet
Her glance that shall not answer more:
To us alone it cannot be
They're looking up so tenderly.

This is the same gray path we took
Behind the slowly going day;
As they do now, the light leaves shook
When evening breezes blew this way;
And there's the glow upon the dome,
And here the cows are coming home.

Ah, no, good heart, thou still canst stir,
Still lives the love first bid thee leap:
Still are we at the side of her
They laid away 'neath yonder steep.
Though clods be on her and a stone,
In the dear old lane we're not alone.

John Vance Cheney.

ent 1887

[BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE TERRITORIAL EXPERIMENT.



N. B. JUDD.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY H. ROCHER.

LINCOLN AND TRUMBULL.

THE repeal of the Missouri Compromise at Douglas's instigation, and the consequent loss of the Democratic majority in Congress, have been described. To follow closely the chain of events, we must now examine its effect upon the political fortunes of that powerful leader in his own State of Illinois. In this the reader will be materially aided by a preliminary glance at some of the characteristics and sentiments of the people of that State.

The extreme length of Illinois from north to south is three hundred and eighty-five miles; in geographical situation it extends from the latitude of Massachusetts and New York to that of Kentucky and Virginia. The great westward stream of emigration in the United States has generally followed the parallels of latitude. The pioneers planted their new homes as nearly as might be in a climate like the one they had left. In process of time, therefore, northern Illinois became peopled with settlers from northern or free States, bringing their antislavery traditions and feelings; southern Illinois, with those from southern or slave States, who were as naturally proslavery. The Virginians and Kentuckians readily became converts to the thrift and order of free society; but as a class they never gave up or conquered their intense hatred of antislavery convictions based on merely moral grounds, and which they comprehensively and somewhat indiscriminately stigmatized as "abolitionism." Impelled by this hatred the lawless elements of the community were often guilty of persecution and violence in minor forms, and in 1837, as already related, it prompted the murder of Lovejoy in the city of Alton by a mob, for persisting in his right to publish his antislavery convictions. This is its gravest crime. But a narrow spirit of intolerance extending even down to the Rebellion kept on the statute books a series of acts prohibiting the settlement of free blacks in the State.

It was upon this field of radically diverse sentiment that in the year 1854 Douglas's sudden project of repeal fell like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. A Democratic governor had been chosen two years before; a Democratic Legislature, called together to consider merely local and economic questions, was sitting in extra session at Springfield. There was doubt and consternation over the new issue. The governor and other prudent partisans avoided a public committal. But the silence could not be long maintained. Douglas was a despotic party leader, and President Pierce had made the Nebraska bill an administration question. Above all, in Illinois, as elsewhere, the people at once took up the discussion, and reluctant politicians were compelled to avow themselves. The Nebraska bill with its repealing clause had been before the country some three weeks and was yet pending in Congress when a member of the Illinois Legislature introduced resolutions indorsing it. Three Democratic State senators, two from northern and one from central Illinois, had the courage to rise and oppose the resolutions in vigorous and startling speeches. They were N. B. Judd of Chicago, B. C. Cook of La Salle, and John M. Palmer of Macoupin. This was an unusual party phenomenon and had its share in hastening the general agitation throughout the State. Only two or three other members took

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B. C. COOK.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY A. GARDNER.

part in the discussion; the Democrats avoided the issue; the Whigs hoped to profit by the dissension. There was the usual rush of amendments and of parliamentary strategy, and the indorsing resolutions which finally passed in both Houses in ambiguous language and by diminished vote were therefore shorn of much of their political significance.

Party organization was strong in Illinois, and for the greater part, as the popular discussion proceeded, the Democrats sustained and the Whigs opposed the new measure. In the northern counties, where the antislavery sentiment was general, there were a few successful efforts to disband the old parties and create a combined opposition under the new name of Republicans. This, it was soon apparent, would make serious inroads on the existing Democratic majority. But an alarming counter-movement in the central counties, which formed the Whig stronghold, soon began to show itself. Douglas's violent denunciation of "abolitionists" and "abolitionism" appealed with singular power to Whigs from slave States. The party was without a national leader; Clay had died two years before, and Douglas made skillful quotations from the great statesman's speeches to bolster up his new propagandism. In Congress only a little handful of Southern Whigs opposed the repeal, and even these did not dare place their opposition on antislavery grounds. And especially the familiar voice and example of the neighboring Missouri Whigs were given unhesitatingly to the support of the Douglas scheme. Under these combined influences one or two erratic but rather prominent Whigs in central Illinois declared their adherence to Nebraskaism, and raised the hope that the Democrats would regain in the center and south all they might lose in the northern half of the State.

One additional circumstance had its effect on public opinion. As has been stated, in the opposition to Douglas's repeal the few avowed abolitionists and the many pronounced Free-soilers, displaying unwonted activity, came suddenly into the foreground to rouse and organize public opinion, making it seem for the moment that they had really assumed leadership and control in politics. This class of men had long been held up to public odium. Some of them had, indeed, on previous occasions used intemperate and offensive language; but more generally they were denounced upon a gross misrepresentation of their utterance and purpose. It so happened that they were mostly of Democratic antecedents, which gave them great influence among antislavery Democrats, but made their advice and argument exceedingly distasteful in strong Whig counties and communities. The fact that they now became more prudent, conciliatory, and practical in their speeches and platforms did not immediately remove existing prejudice against them. A few of these appeared in Illinois. Cassius M. Clay published a letter in which he advocated the fusion of anti-Nebraska voters upon "Benton, Seward, Hale, or any other good citizen," and afterwards made a series of speeches in Illinois. When he came to Springfield, the Democratic officers in charge refused him the

CASSIUS M. CLAY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.

use of the rotunda of the State House, a circumstance, however, which only served to draw him a larger audience in a neighboring grove. Later in the summer Giddings and Chase of Ohio made a political tour through the State, and at Springfield the future Secretary and Chief-Justice addressed an unsympathetic audience of a few hundreds in the dingy little courthouse, almost unheralded, save by the epithets of the Democratic newspapers. A few local speakers of this class, of superior address and force, now also began to signalize themselves by a new-born zeal and an attractive eloquence. Conspicuous among these was Owen Lovejoy of northern Illinois, brother of the man who for opinion's sake had been so shamefully murdered at Alton.

While thus in the northern half of Illinois the public condemnation of Douglas's repeal was immediate and sweeping, the formation of opposition to it was tentative and slow in the central and southern counties, where among Whigs of southern birth it proceeded rather upon party feeling than upon moral conviction. The new question struck through party lines in such a manner as to confuse and perplex the masses. But the issue would not be postponed. This was the year for electing Congressmen, and the succession of events rather than the leadership of politicians gradually shaped the campaign.

After a most exciting parliamentary struggle the repeal was carried through Congress in May. Encouraged by this successful domination over Representatives and Senators, Douglas prepared to force its unquestioned acceptance by the people. "I hear men now say," said he, "that they are willing to acquiesce in it. . . . It is not sufficient that they shall not seek to disturb Nebraska and Kansas; but they must acquiesce also in the principle."* In the slave States this was an easy task. The most prominent Democrat who had voted against the Nebraska bill was Thomas H. Benton. The election in Missouri was held in August, and Benton was easily beaten by a Whig who was as fierce for repeal as Douglas himself. In the free States the case was altogether different. In Illinois the Democrats gradually, but at last with a degree of boldness, shouldered the dangerous dogma. The main body of the party rallied under Douglas, excepting a serious defection in the north; on the other hand, the Whigs in a body declared against him, but were weakened by a scattering desertion in the center and south. Meanwhile both retained their distinctive party names and organizations.

Congress adjourned early in August, but Douglas delayed his return to Illinois. The first of September had come, when it was announced he would return to his home in Chicago. This was an antislavery city, and the current of popular condemnation and exasperation was running strongly against him. Public meetings of his own former party friends had denounced him. Street rowdies had burned him in effigy. The opposition papers charged him with skulking and being afraid to meet his constituents. On the afternoon of his coming many flags in the city and on the shipping in the river and harbor were hung at half-mast. At sunset sundry city bells were tolled for an hour to signify the public mourning at his downfall. When he mounted the platform at night to address a crowd of some five thousand listeners he was surrounded by a little knot of personal friends, but the audience before him was evidently cold if not actively hostile.

THOMAS H. BENTON.

He began his speech, defending his course as well as he could. He claimed that the slavery question was forever settled by his great principle of popular sovereignty, which took it out of Congress and gave it to the people of the territories to decide as they pleased. The crowd heard him in sullen silence for three-quarters of an hour, when their patience gave out, and they began to ply him with questions. He endured their fire of interrogatory for a little while till he lost his own temper. Excited outcry followed angry repartee. Thrust and rejoinder were mingled

* Douglas's speech before the Union Democratic Club of New York, June 3d, 1854. New York "Herald," June 5th, 1854.

with cheers and hisses. The mayor, who presided, tried to calm the assemblage, but the passions of the crowd would brook no control. Douglas, of short, sturdy build and imperious and controversial nature, stood his ground courageously, with flushed and lowering countenance hurling defiance at his interrupters, calling them a mob, and shaking his fist in their faces; in reply the crowd groaned, hooted, yelled, and made the din of Pandemonium. The tumultuous proceeding continued until half-past ten o'clock at night, when the baffled orator was finally but very reluctantly persuaded by his friends to give up the contest and leave the stand. It was trumpeted abroad by the Democratic newspapers that "in the order-loving, law-abiding abolition-ridden city of Chicago, Illinois's great statesman and representative in the United States Senate was cried down and refused the privilege of speaking"; * and as usual the indecent intolerance produced its natural reaction.

But now a new actor came forward on the political stage in central Illinois; or rather, an old favorite reappeared. This was Abraham Lincoln. Since his return to Springfield from his single term of service in Congress, 1847 to 1849, though by no means entirely withdrawn from politics, his active work had been greatly diminished. His congressional life had largely increased the horizon of his observation. Perhaps it had also extended the bounds of his ambition. He had doubtless discovered many of his own defects, and not unlikely had diligently sought to remedy them. The period following had for him been years of work, study, and reflection. His profession of law had become a deeper science

* "State Register," Sept. 4th, 1854.

LYMAN TRUMBULL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.

OWEN LOVEJOY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF HIS WIFE.

and a higher responsibility. His practice, receiving his undivided attention, brought him more important and more remunerative cases. Losing nothing of his genial humor, his character took on the dignity of a graver manhood. He was still the center and the idol of every social group he encountered, whether on the street or in the parlor. Serene and buoyant of temper, cordial and winning of language, charitable and tolerant of opinion, his very presence diffused a glow of confidence and kindness. Wherever he went he left an ever-widening ripple of smiles, jests, and laughter. His radiant good fellowship was beloved and sought alike by political opponents and partisan friends. His sturdy and delicate integrity, recognized far and wide, had long since won him the blunt but hearty sobriquet of "Honest Old Abe." But it became noticeable that of late years he was less among the crowd and more in the solitude of his office or his study, and that he seemed ever in haste to leave the eager circle he was entertaining.

It was in the midsummer of 1854 that we find him reappearing upon the stump in central Illinois. The rural population always welcomed his oratory, made up of ready wit, apt illustration, simple statement, forcible logic. His diction was familiar to the ear, his stories were racy of the soil. He never lacked for invitations to address the public. His first speeches on the new and all-absorbing topic were made in the neighboring towns, and in the counties adjoining his own. Towards the end of August the candidates for Congress in that district were, in Western phrase, "on the track." Yates, afterwards one of the famous "war governors," sought a reëlection as a

Whig. Harris as a Douglas-Democrat strove to supplant him. Local politics became active, and Lincoln was sent for in all directions to address the people. When he went, however, he distinctly announced that he did not purpose to take up his time with this personal and congressional controversy. His intention was to discuss the principles of the Nebraska bill.

Once launched upon this theme, men were surprised to find him imbued with a new and unwonted seriousness. They heard from his lips fewer anecdotes and more history. Careless listeners who came to laugh at his jokes sat spell-bound by the strong current of his reasoning and the flashes of his earnest eloquence, and were lifted up by the range and tenor of his argument into a fresher and purer political atmosphere. The new discussion was fraught with deeper questions than the improvement of the Sangamon, protective tariffs, or the origin of the Mexican war. Down through incidents of legislation, through history of government, even underlying cardinal maxims of political philosophy, it touched the very bed-rock of primary human rights. Such a subject furnished material for the inborn gifts of the speaker, his intuitive logic, his impulsive patriotism, his pure and poetical conception of legal and moral justice.

Douglas, since his popular rebuff at Chicago on September 1st, had begun, after a few days of delay and rest, a tour of speech-making southward through the State. At these meetings he had at least a respectful hearing, and as he neared central Illinois the reception accorded him became more enthusiastic. The chief interest of the campaign finally centered in a sort of political tournament which took place at the capital, Springfield, during the first week of October; the State Agricultural Fair having called together great crowds, and among them the principal politicians of Illinois. This was Lincoln's home, in a strong Whig county, and in a part of the State where that party had hitherto found its most compact and trustworthy forces. As yet Lincoln had made but a single speech here on the Nebraska question. Of the Federal appointments under the Nebraska bill, Douglas secured two for Illinois, one of which, the office of surveyor-general, he had caused to be given to John Calhoun, the same man who, in the pioneer days twenty years before, was county surveyor in Sangamon and had employed Abraham Lincoln as his deputy. He was also the same who three years later received the sobriquet of "John Candlebox Calhoun," having acquired unenviable notoriety from his reputed connection with the "Cincinnati Directory" and "Candlebox" election frauds in Kansas, and with the famous Lecompton Constitution. Calhoun was still in Illinois doing campaign work in propagating the Nebraska faith. He was recognized as a man of considerable professional and political talent, and had made a speech in Springfield to which Lincoln had replied. It was, however, merely a casual and local affair and was not described or reported by the newspapers.

The meetings at the State Fair were of a different character. The audiences were composed of leading active men from nearly all the counties of the State. Though the discussion of party questions had been going on all the summer with more or less briskness, yet such was the general confusion in politics that many honest and intelligent voters and even leaders were still undecided in their opinions. The fair continued nearly a whole week. Douglas made a speech on the first day, Tuesday, October 3d. Lincoln replied to him on the following day, October 4th. Douglas made a rejoinder, and on that night and the succeeding day and night a running fire of debate ensued, in which John Calhoun, Judge Trumbull, Judge Sidney Breese, Colonel E. D. Taylor, and perhaps others took part.

Douglas's speech was doubtless intended by him and expected by his friends to be the principal and the conclusive argument of the occasion. But by this time the Whig party of the central counties, though shaken by the disturbing features of the Nebraska question, had nevertheless re-formed its lines, and assumed the offensive to which its preponderant numbers entitled it, and resolved not to surrender either its name or organization. In Sangamon county, its strongest men, Abraham Lincoln and Stephen T. Logan, were made candidates for the Legislature. The term of Douglas's colleague in the United States Senate, General James Shields, was about to expire, and the new Legislature would choose his successor. To the war of party principles was therefore added the incentive of a brilliant official prize. The Whigs were keenly alive to this chance and its influence upon their possible ascendency in the State.

Lincoln's Whig friends had therefore seen his reappearance in active discussion with unfeigned pleasure. Of old they knew his peculiar hold and influence upon the people and his party. His few speeches in the adjoining counties had once more shown them his maturing intellect, his expanding power in debate. Acting upon himself, this renewed practice on the stump crystallized his thoughts and brought method to his argument. The opposition newspapers had accused him of

"mousing about the libraries in the State House." The charge was true. Where others were content to take statements at second hand, he preferred to verify citations as well as to find new ones. His treatment of his theme was therefore not only bold but original.

By a sort of common consent he was looked to, to answer Douglas's speech. This was no light task, and no one knew it better than Lincoln. Douglas's real ability was, and remains, unquestioned. In many qualities of intellect he was truly the "Little Giant" which popular fancy nicknamed him. It was no mere chance that raised the Vermont cabinet-maker's apprentice from a penniless stranger in Illinois in 1833 to a formidable competitor for supreme leadership in the great Democratic party of the nation in 1852. When after the lapse of a quarter of a century we measure him with the veteran chiefs whom he aspired to supplant, we see the substantial basis of his confidence and ambition. His great error of statesmanship aside, he stands forth more than the peer of associates who underrated his power and looked askance at his pretensions. In the six years of perilous party conflict which followed, every conspicuous party rival disappeared in obscurity, disgrace, or rebellion. Battling while others feasted, sowing where others reaped, abandoned by his allies and persecuted by his friends, Douglas alone emerged from the fight with loyal faith and unshaken courage, bringing with him through treachery, defeat, and disaster the unflinching allegiance and enthusiastic admiration of nearly three-fifths of the rank and file of the once victorious army of Democratic voters. He had not only proved himself its most trustworthy guide and most gallant chief, but as a final crown of merit he led his still powerful contingent of followers to a patriotic defense of the Constitution and government which some of his unworthy compeers put into such mortal jeopardy.

We find him here at the beginning of this severe conflict in the full flush of hope and ambition. He was winning in personal manner, brilliant in debate, aggressive in party strategy. To this he added an adroitness in evasion and false logic perhaps never equaled, and in his defense of the Nebraska measure this questionable but convenient gift was ever his main reliance. Besides, his long official career gave to his utterances the stamp and glitter of oracular statesmanship. But while Lincoln knew all Douglas's strong points he was no less familiar with his weak ones. They had come to central Illinois about the same time, and had in a measure grown up together. Socially they were on friendly terms; politically they had been opponents for twenty years. At the bar, in the Legislature, and on the stump they had often met and measured strength. Each therefore knew the temper of the other's steel no less than every joint in his armor.

It was a peculiarity of the early West — perhaps it pertains to all primitive communities — that the people retained a certain fragment of the chivalric sentiment, a remnant of the instinct of hero-worship. As the ruder athletic sports faded out, as shooting-matches, wrestling-matches, horse-races, and kindred games fell into disuse, political debate became, in a certain degree, their substitute. But the principle of championship, while it yielded high honor and consideration to the victor, imposed upon him the corresponding obligation to recognize every opponent and accept every challenge. To refuse any contest, to plead any privilege, would be instant loss of prestige. This supreme moment in Lincoln's career, this fateful turning of the political tide, found him fully prepared for the new battle, equipped by reflection and research to permit himself to be pitted against the champion of Democracy — against the very author of the raging storm of parties; and it displays his rare self-confidence and consciousness of high ability to venture to attack such an antagonist at such a time.

Douglas made his speech, according to notice, on the first day of the fair, Tuesday October 3d. "I will mention," said he in his opening remarks, "that it is understood by some gentlemen that Mr. Lincoln, of this city, is expected to answer me. If this is the understanding, I wish that Mr. Lincoln would step forward and let us arrange some plan upon which to carry out this discussion." Mr. Lincoln was not there at the moment, and the arrangement could not then be made. Unpropitious weather had brought the meeting to the Representative's Hall in the State House, which was densely packed. The next day found the same hall filled as before to hear Mr. Lincoln. Douglas occupied a seat just in front of him and in his rejoinder he explained that "my friend Mr. Lincoln expressly invited me to stay and hear him speak to-day, as he heard me yesterday, and to answer and defend myself as best I could. I here thank him for his courteous offer." The occasion greatly equalized the relative standing of the champions. The familiar surroundings, the presence and hearty encouragement of his friends, put Lincoln in his best vein. His bubbling humor, his perfect temper, and above all the overwhelming current of his historical arraignment extorted the admiration of even his political enemies. "His speech was four hours

in length," wrote one of these,* "and was conceived and expressed in a most happy and pleasant style, and was received with abundant applause. At times he made statements which brought Senator Douglas to his feet, and then good-humored passages of wit created much interest and enthusiasm." All reports plainly indicate that Douglas was astonished and disconcerted at this unexpected display of oratorical power, and that he struggled vainly through a two hours' rejoinder to break the force of Lincoln's victory in the debate. Lincoln had hitherto been the foremost man in his district. That single effort made him the leader in his State.

The fame of this success brought Lincoln urgent calls from all the places where Douglas was advertised or expected to make a speech. Accordingly, twelve days afterwards, October 16th, they once more met in debate, at Peoria. Lincoln, as before, gave Douglas the opening and closing speech, explaining that he was willing to yield this advantage in order to secure a hearing from the Democratic portion of his listeners. The audience was a large one, but not so representative in its character as that at Springfield. The occasion is made memorable, however, by the fact that when Lincoln returned home he wrote out and published his speech. We have therefore the exact and revised text of his argument, and are able to estimate its character and value. Marking as it does with unmistakable precision a step in the second period of his intellectual development, it deserves the careful attention of the student of his life.

After the lapse of a quarter of a century the critical reader still finds it a model of brevity, directness, terse diction, exact and lucid historical statement, and full of logical propositions so short and so strong as to resemble mathematical axioms. Above all it is pervaded by an elevation of thought and aim that lifts it out of the commonplace of mere party controversy. Comparing it with his later speeches, we find it to contain not only the argument of the hour, but the premonition of the broader issues into which the new struggle was destined soon to expand.

The main, broad current of his reasoning was to vindicate and restore the policy of the fathers of the country in the restriction of slavery; but running through this like a thread of gold was the demonstration of the essential injustice and immorality of the system.

"This declared indifference," said he, "but, as I must think, covert zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world; enables the enemies of free institutions with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity; and especially because it forces so many really good men among ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty, criticising the Declaration of Independence and insisting that there is no right principle of action but self-interest.

. . . . . .

"The doctrine of self-government is right,—absolutely and eternally right,— but it has no just application as here attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it has such just application, depends upon whether a negro is not, or is, a man. If he is not a man, in that case he who is a man may as a matter of self-government do just what he pleases with him. But if the negro is a man, is it not to that extent a total destruction of self-government to say that he too shall not govern himself? When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs another man, that is more than self-government — that is despotism.

. . . . . .

"What I do say is, that no man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent.

. . . . . .

"The master not only governs the slave without his consent, but he governs him by a set of rules altogether different from those which he prescribes for himself. Allow all the governed an equal voice in the government; that, and that only, is self-government.

. . . . . .

"Slavery is founded in the selfishness of man's nature — opposition to it in his love of justice. These principles are an eternal antagonism; and when brought into collision so fiercely as slavery extension brings them, shocks and throes and convulsions must ceaselessly follow. Repeal the Missouri Compromise — repeal all compromise — repeal the Declaration of Independence — repeal all past history — still you cannot repeal human nature.

. . . . . .

"I particularly object to the new position which the avowed principle of this Nebraska law gives to slavery in the body politic. I object to it because it assumes that there can be moral right in the enslaving of one man by another. I object to it as a dangerous dalliance for a free people,— a sad evidence that feeling prosperity, we forget right,— that liberty as a principle we have ceased to revere.

. . . . . .

"Little by little, but steadily as man's march to the grave, we have been giving up the old for the new faith. Near eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have run down to the other declaration that for some men to enslave others is a 'sacred right of self-government.' These principles cannot stand together. They are as opposite as God and mammon.

. . . . . .

"Our Republican robe is soiled and trailed in the dust. Let us repurify it. Let us turn and wash it white, in the spirit if not the blood of the Revolution. Let us turn slavery from its claims of 'moral right' back upon its existing legal rights, and its arguments of 'necessity.' Let us return it to the position our fathers gave it, and there let it rest in peace. Let us readopt the Declaration of Independence, and the practices and policy which harmonize with it. Let North and South — let all Americans — let all lovers of liberty everywhere — join in the great and good work. If we do this, we shall not only have saved the Union, but we shall have so saved it, so as to make and to keep it forever worthy of the saving. We shall have so saved it that the succeeding millions of free, happy people, the world over, shall rise up and call us blessed to the latest generations."

* Correspondence "Missouri Republican," October 6th, 1854.

The election which occurred November 7th resulted disastrously for Douglas. It was soon found that the Legislature on joint ballot would probably give a majority for Senator against Shields, the incumbent, or any other Democrat who had supported the Nebraska bill. Who might become his successor was more problematical. The opposition majority was made up of anti-Nebraska Democrats, of what were then called "abolitionists" (Lovejoy had been elected among these), and finally of Whigs, who numbered by far the largest portion. But these elements, except on one single issue, were somewhat irreconcilable. In this condition of uncertainty a host of candidates sprang up. There was scarcely a member of Congress from Illinois — indeed, scarcely a prominent man in the State of any party — who did not conceive the flattering dream that he himself might become the lucky medium of compromise and harmony.

Among the Whigs, though there were other aspirants, Lincoln, whose speeches had contributed so much to win the election, was the natural and most prominent candidate. According to Western custom, he addressed a short note to most of the Whig members elect and to other influential members of the party asking their support. Generally the replies were not only affirmative but cordial and even enthusiastic. But a dilemma now arose. Lincoln had been chosen one of the members from Sangamon county by some six hundred and fifty majority. The Constitution of Illinois contained a clause disqualifying members of the Legislature and certain other designated officials from being elected to the Senate. Good lawyers generally believed this provision repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the qualifications of Senators and Representatives therein prescribed could be neither increased nor diminished by a State. But the opposition had only a majority of one or two. If Lincoln resigned his membership in the Legislature this might destroy the majority. If he refused to resign, such refusal might carry some member to the Democrats.

At last, upon full deliberation, Lincoln resigned his seat, relying upon the six or seven hundred majority in Sangamon county to elect another Whig. It was a delusive trust. A reaction in the Whig ranks against "abolitionism" suddenly set in. A listless apathy succeeded the intense excitement and strain of the summer's canvass. Local rivalries forced the selection of an unpopular candidate. Shrewdly noting all these signs the Democrats of Sangamon now organized what is known in Western politics as a "still-hunt." They made a feint of allowing the special election to go by default. They made no nomination. They permitted an independent Democrat, known under the sobriquet of "Steamboat Smith," to parade his own name. Up to the very day of election they gave no public sign, although they had in the utmost secrecy instructed and drilled their precinct squads. On the morning of election the working Democrats appeared at every poll, distributing tickets bearing the name of a single candidate not before mentioned by any one. They were busy all day long spurring up the lagging and indifferent, and bringing the aged, the infirm, and the distant voters in vehicles. Their ruse succeeded. The Whigs were taken completely by surprise, and in a remarkably small total vote, McDaniels, Democrat, was chosen by some sixty majority. The Whigs in other parts of the State were furious at the unlooked-for result, and the incident served greatly to complicate the senatorial canvass.

Nevertheless it turned out that even after this loss the opposition to Douglas would have a majority on joint ballot. But how unite this opposition made up of Whigs, of Democrats, and of so-called abolitionists? It was just at that moment in the impending revolution of parties when everything was doubt, distrust, uncertainty. Only these abolitionists, ever aggressive on all slavery issues, were ready to lead off in new combinations, but nobody was willing to encounter the odium of acting with them. They, too, were present at the State Fair, and heard Lincoln reply to Douglas. At the close of that reply, and just before Douglas's rejoinder, Lovejoy had announced to the audience that a Republican State Convention would be immediately held in the Senate Chamber, extending an invitation to delegates to join in it. But the appeal fell upon unwilling ears. Scarcely a corporal's guard left the discussion. The Senate Chamber presented a discouraging array of empty benches. Only some twenty-six delegates were there to represent the great State of Illinois. Nothing daunted, they made their speeches and read their platform to each other.* Particularly, however, in their addresses they praised Lincoln's great speech

* Their resolutions were radical for that day but not so extreme as was generally feared. On the slavery question they declared their purpose: to restore Kansas and Nebraska to the position of free territories; that as the Constitution of the United States vests in the States and not in Congress the power to legislate for the rendition of fugitives from labor, to repeal and entirely abrogate the fugitive slave law; to restrict slavery to those States in which it exists; to prohibit the admission of any more slave States; to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; to exclude slavery from all territories over which the General Government has exclusive jurisdiction, and finally to resist the acquirement of any more territories unless slavery shall have been therein forever prohibited.

which they had just heard, notwithstanding his declarations differed so essentially from their new-made creed. "Ichabod raved," said the Democratic organ in derision, "and Lovejoy swelled, and all indorsed the sentiments of that speech." Not content with this, without consent or consultation, they placed Lincoln's name in the list of their State Central Committee.

Matters remained in this attitude until their chairman called a meeting and notified Lincoln to attend. In reply he sent the following letter of inquiry:

"While I have pen in hand allow me to say that I have been perplexed some to understand why my name was placed on that committee. I was not consulted on the subject, nor was I apprised of the appointment until I discovered it by accident two or three weeks afterwards. I suppose my opposition to the principle of slavery is as strong as that of any member of the Republican party; but I had also supposed that the extent to which I feel authorized to carry that opposition practically was not at all satisfactory to that party. The leading men who organized that party were present on the 4th of October at the discussion between Douglas and myself at Springfield and had full opportunity to not misunderstand my position. Do I misunderstand them?" *

Whether this letter was ever replied to is uncertain, though improbable. No doubt it led to conferences during the meeting of the Legislature, early in the year 1855, when the senatorial question came on for decision. It has been suggested that Lincoln made dishonorable concessions of principle to get the votes of Lovejoy and his friends. The statement is too absurd to merit serious contradiction. The real fact is that Mr. Giddings, then in Congress, wrote to Lovejoy and others to support Lincoln. Various causes delayed the event, but finally, on February 8th, 1855, the Legislature went into joint ballot. A number of candidates were put in nomination, but the contest narrowed itself down to three. Abraham Lincoln was supported by the Whigs and Free-soilers; James Shields by the Douglas-Democrats. As between these two, Lincoln would have easily succeeded, had not five anti-Nebraska Democrats refused under any circumstances to vote for him or any other Whig,† and steadily voted during six ballots for Lyman Trumbull. The first vote stood: Lincoln, forty-five; Shields, forty-one; Trumbull, five; scattering, eight. Two or three Whigs had thrown away their votes on this first ballot, and though they now returned and adhered to him, the demoralizing example was imitated by various members of the coalition. On the sixth ballot the vote stood: Lincoln, thirty-six; Shields, forty-one; Trumbull, eight; scattering, thirteen.

At this stage of the proceedings the Douglas-Democrats executed a change of front, and, dropping Shields, threw nearly their full strength, forty-four votes, for Governor Joel A. Matteson. The maneuver was not unexpected, for though the governor and the party newspapers had hitherto vehemently asserted he was no candidate, the political signs plainly contradicted such statement. Matteson had assumed a quasi-independent position; kept himself non-committal on Nebraska, and opposed Douglas's scheme of tonnage duties to improve Western rivers and harbors. Like the great majority of Western men he had risen from humble beginnings, and from being a gold-hunter, emigrant, farmer, contractor, and speculator had become governor. In office he had devoted himself specially to the economical and material questions of Illinois, and in this rôle had a certain popularity with all classes and parties.

The substitution of his name proved a shrewd and promising device. The ninth ballot gave him forty-seven votes. The opposition under the excitement of non-partisan appeals began to break up. Of the remaining votes Lincoln received fifteen, Trumbull thirty-five, scattering one. In this critical moment Lincoln exhibited a generosity and a sagacity above the range of the mere politician's vision. He urged upon his Whig friends and supporters to drop his own name and join without hesitation or conditions in the election of Trumbull.‡ This was putting their fidelity to a bitter trial. Upon every issue but the Nebraska bill Trumbull still avowed himself an uncompromising Democrat. The faction

* Lincoln to Codding, Nov. 27th, 1854. MS.

† "All that remained of the anti-Nebraska force, excepting Judd, Cook, Palmer, Baker, and Allen of Madison, and two or three of the secret Matteson men, would go into caucus, and I could get the nomination of that caucus. But the three Senators and one of the two Representatives above named 'could never vote for a Whig,' and this incensed some twenty Whigs to 'think' they would never vote for the man of the five." —[Lincoln to Hon. E. B. Washburne, February 9th, 1855. MS.]

‡ "In the mean time our friends, with a view of detaining our expected bolters, had been turning from me to Trumbull till he had risen to thirty-five and I had been reduced to fifteen. These would never desert me except by my direction; but I became satisfied that if we could prevent Matteson's election one or two ballots more, we could not possibly do so a single ballot after my friends should begin to return to me from Trumbull. So I determined to strike at once; and accordingly advised my remaining friends to go for him, which they did, and elected him on that, the tenth ballot. Such is the way the thing was done. I think you would have done the same under the circumstances, though Judge Davis, who came down this morning, declares he never would have consented to the forty-seven [opposition] men being controlled by the five. I regret my defeat moderately, but am not nervous about it."—[Lincoln to Washburne, February 9th, 1855. MS.]

of five had been stubborn to defiance and disaster. They would compel the mountain to go to Mahomet. It seemed an unconditional surrender of the Whig party. But such was Lincoln's influence upon his adherents that at his request they made the sweeping sacrifice, though with the lingering sorrow of men at the burial of a near and dear friend. The proceedings had wasted away a long afternoon of most tedious suspense. Evening had come; the gas was lighted in the hall, the galleries were filled with beautiful and eager women, the lobbies were packed with restless and nervously anxious men. All had forgotten the lapse of hours, their fatigue and their hunger, in the absorption of the fluctuating contest. The roll-call of the tenth ballot still showed fifteen votes for Lincoln, thirty-six for Trumbull, forty-seven for Matteson. Amid an excitement which was becoming painful, and in a silence where spectators scarcely breathed, Judge Stephen T. Logan, Lincoln's nearest and warmest friend, arose and announced the purpose of the remaining Whigs to decide the contest, whereupon the entire fifteen changed their votes to Trumbull. This gave him the necessary number of fifty-one, and elected him a Senator of the United States.

At that early day an election to the United States Senate must have seemed to Lincoln a most brilliant political prize, the highest, perhaps, to which he then had any hopes of ever attaining. To school himself to its loss with becoming resignation, to wait hopefully during four years for another opportunity, to engage in the dangerous and difficult task of persuading his friends to leave their old and join a new political party only yet dimly foreshadowed, to study the chances of maintaining his party leadership, furnished sufficient occupation for the leisure afforded by the necessities of his law practice. It is interesting to know that he did more; that amid the consideration of mere personal interests, he was vigilantly pursuing a study of the higher phases of the great moral and political struggle on which the nation was just entering. A letter of his written to a friend in Kentucky in the following year shows us that he had nearly reached a maturity of conviction on the nature of the slavery conflict — his belief that the nation could not permanently endure half slave and half free — which he did not publicly express until the beginning of his famous senatorial campaign of 1858:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILLS., August 15, 1855.

"HON. GEO. ROBERTSON, Lexington, Ky.

"MY DEAR SIR: The volume you left for me has been received. I am really grateful for the honor of your kind remembrance, as well as for the book. The partial reading I have already given it has afforded me much of both pleasure and instruction. It was new to me that the exact question which led to the Missouri Compromise had arisen before it arose in regard to Missouri, and that you had taken so prominent a part in it. Your short but able and patriotic speech on that occasion has not been improved upon since by those holding the same views; and, with all the lights you then had, the views you took appear to me as very reasonable.

"You are not a friend of slavery in the abstract. In that speech you spoke of 'the peaceful extinction of slavery' and used other expressions indicating your belief that the thing was, at some time, to have an end. Since then we have had thirty-six years of experience; and this experience has demonstrated, I think, that there is no peaceful extinction of slavery in prospect for us. The signal failure of Henry Clay and other good and great men, in 1849, to effect anything in favor of gradual emancipation in Kentucky, together with a thousand other signs, extinguishes that hope utterly. On the question of liberty, as a principle, we are not what we have been. When we were the political slaves of King George, and wanted to be free, we called the maxim that 'all men are created equal' a self-evident truth; but now when we have grown fat, and have lost all dread of being slaves ourselves, we have become so greedy to be *masters* that we call the same maxim 'a self-evident lie.' The Fourth of July has not quite dwindled away; it is still a great day for burning *fire-crackers!*

"That spirit which desired the peaceful extinction of slavery has itself become extinct with the *occasion* and the *men* of the Revolution. Under the impulse of that occasion, nearly half the States adopted systems of emancipation at once; and it is a significant fact that not a single State has done the like since. So far as peaceful, voluntary emancipation is concerned, the condition of the negro slave in America, scarcely less terrible to the contemplation of a free mind, is now so fixed and hopeless of change for the better as that of the lost souls of the finally impenitent. The Autocrat of all the Russias will resign his crown and proclaim his subjects free republicans, sooner than will our American masters voluntarily give up their slaves.

"Our political problem now is, 'Can we as a nation continue together *permanently* — *forever* — half slaves, and half free?' The problem is too mighty for me. May God in his mercy superintend the solution. Your much obliged friend, and humble servant,

"A. LINCOLN."

The reader has doubtless already noted in his mind the curious historical coincidence which so soon followed the foregoing speculative affirmation. On the day before Lincoln's first inauguration as President of the United States, the "Autocrat of all the Russias," Alexander II., by imperial decree emancipated his serfs; while six weeks after the inauguration, the "American masters," headed by Jefferson Davis, began the greatest war of modern times, to perpetuate and spread the institution of slavery.

THE BORDER RUFFIANS.

THE passage of the Nebraska bill and the hurried extinction of the Indian title opened nearly fifteen million acres of public lands to settlement and purchase. The whole of this vast area was yet practically tenantless. In

all of Kansas there were only three military posts, eight or ten missions or schools attached to Indian reservations, and some scores of roving hunters and traders or squatters in the vicinity of a few well-known camping stations on the two principal emigrant and trading routes, one leading southward to New Mexico, the other northward toward Oregon. But such had been the interest created by the political excitement, and so favorable were the newspaper reports of the location, soil, and climate of the new country, that a few months sufficed to change Kansas from a closed and prohibited Indian reserve to the emigrant's land of promise.

Douglas's oracular "stump speech" in the Nebraska bill transferred the struggle for slavery extension from Congress to the newly organized territories. "Come on, then, gentlemen of the slave States," said Seward in a Senate discussion; "since there is no escaping your challenge, I accept it in behalf of Freedom. We will engage in competition for the virgin soil of Kansas, and God give the victory to the side that is stronger in numbers as it is in right." With fifteen millions in the North against ten millions in the South, the result could not be in doubt.

Feeling secure in the evident advantage, the North, in general, trusted implicity to the ordinary and natural movement of emigration. To the rule, however, there were a few exceptions. Some members of Congress, incensed at the tactics of the Nebraska leaders, formed a Kansas Aid Society in Washington City and contributed money to assist emigrants.* Beyond this initiatory step they do not seem to have had any personal participation in it, and its office and working operations were soon transferred to New York. Sundry similar organizations were also formed by private individuals. The most notable of these was a Boston company chartered in March, named "The Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Company." The charter was soon abandoned, and the company reorganized June 13th, under private articles of association; † and in this condition it became virtually the working agency of philanthropic citizens of New England, headed by Hon. Eli Thayer. There were several auxiliary societies and a few independent associations.‡ But from what then and afterwards came to light, it appears that Mr. Thayer's society was the only one whose operations reached any degree of success deserving historical notice. This company gave publicity, through newspaper advertisements and pamphlets, of its willingness to organize emigrants into companies, to send them to Kansas in charge of trustworthy agents, and to obtain transportation for them at reduced rates. It also sent the machinery for a few saw-mills, and the types and presses for two or three newspapers, and erected a hotel or boarding-house to accommodate new-comers. It purchased and held only the land necessary to locate these business enterprises. It engaged in no speculation, paid no fare of any emigrants, and expressly disavowed the requirement of any oath or pledge of political sentiment or conduct. All these transactions were open, honest, and lawful, carefully avoiding even the implication of moral or political wrong.

Under the auspices of this society a pioneer company of about thirty persons arrived in Kansas in July, 1854, and founded the town of Lawrence.§ Other parties followed from time to time, sending out offshoots, but mainly increasing the parent settlement, until next to Fort Leavenworth, the principal military post, Lawrence became the leading town of the territory. The erection of the society hotel, the society saw-mills, and the establishment of a newspaper also gave it leadership in business and politics as well as population. This humane and praiseworthy enterprise has been gravely charged with the origin and responsibility of the political disorders which followed in Kansas. Nothing could be further from the truth. Before it had assisted five hundred persons to their new homes, the territory had by regular and individual immigration, mainly from the Western States, acquired a population of 8501 souls, as disclosed by the official census taken after the first summer's arrivals, and before those of the second had begun. It needs only this mere statement to refute the political slander so industriously repeated in high places against the Lawrence immigrants.

Deeper causes than the philanthropy or zeal of a few Boston enthusiasts were actively at work. The balance of power between the free and the slave States had been destroyed by the admission of California. To restore that balance the South had consummated the repeal of the Missouri Compromise as a first and indispensable step. The second equally indispensable step was to seize the political control of the new territory.

Kansas lay directly west of the State of Missouri. For a frontier State, the pro-slavery sentiment of Missouri was very pronounced and ultra, especially along the Kansas border. The establishment of slavery in this new region had formed the subject of public and local discussion before the Nebraska bill, and Senator Atchison had promised his western Missouri constituents to labor for such a result.

* Testimony of Hon. Daniel Mace.

† Hale's "Kansas and Nebraska," p. 229.

‡ "Tribune" Almanac, 1856, p. 28.

§ Phillips's "Conquest of Kansas," p. 27.

From the time the unlooked-for course of Senator Douglas made it a practical possibility, Atchison was all zeal and devotion to this object, which he declared was almost as dear to him as his hope of heaven. When it finally became a question to be decided perhaps by a single frontier election, his zeal and work in that behalf were many times multiplied.

Current reports and subsequent developments leave no doubt that this Senator, being then acting Vice-President of the United States,* immediately after the August adjournment of Congress hurried away to his home in Platte county, Missouri, and from that favorable situation personally organized a vast conspiracy, running through nearly all the counties of his State adjoining the Kansas border, to decide the slavery question for Kansas by Missouri votes. Secret societies under various names, such as "Blue Lodges," "Friends Society," "Social Band," "Sons of the South," were organized and affiliated, with all the necessary machinery of oaths, grips, signs, passwords, and badges. The plan and object of the movement were in general kept well concealed. Such publicity as could not be avoided served rather to fan the excitement, strengthen the hesitating, and frown down all dissent and opposition. Long before the time for action arrived, the idea that Kansas must be a slave State had grown into a fixed and determined public sentiment.

The fact is not singular if we remember the peculiar situation of that locality. It was before the great expansion of railroads, and western Missouri could only be conveniently approached by the single commercial link of steamboat travel on the turbid and dangerous Missouri River. Covering the rich alluvial lands along that majestic but erratic stream lay the heavy slave counties of the State, wealthy from the valuable slave products of hemp and tobacco. Slave tenure and slavery traditions in Missouri dated back a full century, to the remote days when the American Bottom opposite St. Louis was one of the chief bread and meat producing settlements of New France, sending supplies northward to Mackinaw, southward to New Orleans, and eastward to Fort Duquesne. When in 1763 "the Illinois" country passed by treaty under the British flag, the old French colonists, with their slaves, almost in a body crossed the Mississippi into then Spanish territory, and with fresh additions from New Orleans founded St. Louis and its outlying settlements; and these, growing with a steady thrift, extended themselves up the Missouri River. Slavery was thus identified with the whole history and also with the apparent prosperity of the State; and it had in recent times made many of these Western counties rich. The free State of Iowa lay a hundred miles to the north, and the free State of Illinois two hundred to the east; a wall of Indian tribes guarded the west. Should all this security be suddenly swept away, and their runaways find a free route to Canada by simply crossing the county line? Should the price of their personal "chattels" suddenly fall one-half for want of a new market? With nearly fifteen million acres of fresh land to choose from for the present outlay of a trifling preëmption fee, should not the poor white compel his single "black boy" to follow him a few miles west, and hoe his tobacco for him on the new fat bottom-lands of the Kaw River? Even such off-hand reasoning was probably confined to the more intelligent. For the greater part these ignorant but stubborn and strong-willed frontiersmen were moved by a bitter hatred of "abolitionism," because the word had now been used for half a century by partisans high and low,—Governors, Senators, Presidents,—as a term of opprobrium and a synonym of crime. With these as fathers of the faith and the Vice-President of the United States as an apostle to preach a new crusade, is it astonishing that there was no lack of listeners, converts, and volunteers? Senator Atchison spoke in no ambiguous words.

"When you reside in one day's journey of the territory," said he, "and when your peace, your quiet, and your property depend upon your action, you can without an exertion send five hundred of your young men who will vote in favor of your institutions. Should each county in the State of Missouri only do its duty, the question will be decided quietly and peaceably at the ballot-box. If we are defeated, then Missouri and the other Southern States will have shown themselves recreant to their interests and will deserve their fate."†

Western water transportation found its natural terminus where the Kaw or Kansas river empties itself into the Missouri. From this circumstance that locality had for years been the starting-point for the overland caravans or wagon-trains. Fort Leavenworth was the point of rendezvous for those going to California and Oregon; Independence the place of outfit for those destined to Santa Fe. Grouped about these two points were half a dozen heavy slaveholding counties of Missouri,—Platte, Clay, Ray, Jackson, Lafayette, Saline, and others. Platte county, the home of Senator Atchison, was their western outpost, and lay like an outspread fan in the great bend

* By virtue of his office as President *pro tempore* of the United States Senate. The Vice-Presidency was vacant; Mr. King, chosen with President Pierce, had died.

† Speech in Platte county. Phillips's "Conquest of Kansas," p. 43.

of the Missouri, commanding from thirty to fifty miles of river front. Nearly all of Kansas attainable by the usual water transportation and travel lay immediately opposite. A glance at the map will show how easily local sentiment could influence or dominate commerce and travel on the Missouri River. In this connection the character of the population must be taken into account.

The spirit of intolerance which once pervaded all slaveholding communities, in whatever State of the Union, was here rampant to an unusual degree. The rural inhabitants were marked by the strong characteristics of the frontier,—fondness of adventure, recklessness of exposure or danger to life, a boastful assertion of personal right, privilege, or prowess, a daily and hourly familiarity with the use of fire-arms. These again were heightened by two special influences,—the presence of Indian tribes whose reservations lay just across the border, and the advent and preparation of each summer's emigration across the great plains. The "Argonauts of '49" were not all gamblers and cut-throats of border song and story. Generally, however, they were men of decision and will, all mere drift-wood in the great current of gold-seekers being soon washed ashore and left behind. Until they finished their last dinner at the Planter's House in St. Louis, the fledgelings of cities, the lawyers, doctors, merchants, and speculators, were in or of civilization. Perhaps they even resisted the contamination of cards and drink, profanity and revolver salutations, while the gilded and tinseled Missouri River steamboat bore them for three days against its muddy current and boiling eddies to meet their company and their outfit. But once landed at Independence or Leavenworth, they were of the frontier, of the wilderness, of the desert. Here they donned their garments of red flannel and coarse cloth or buckskin, thrust the legs of their trousers inside the tops of their heavy boots, and wore their bowie-knife or revolver in their outside belt. From this departure all were subject to the inexorable equality of the camp. Eating, sleeping, standing guard, tugging at the wheel or defending life and property,—there was no rank between captain or cook, employer or employed, savant or ignoramus, but the distribution of duty and the assignment of responsibility. Toil and exposure, hunger and thirst, wind and storm, danger in camp quarrel or Indian ambush, were the familiar and ordinary vicissitudes of a three months' journey in a caravan of the plains. To the common hazards of the frontier was thus added the recklessness of a doubtful, often a desperate, throw in the game of life.

All this movement created business for these Missouri River towns. Their few inhabitants drove a brisk trade in shirts and blankets, guns and powder, hard-bread and bacon, wagons and live stock. Petty commerce busies itself with the art of gain rather than with the labor of reform. Indian and emigrant traders did not too closely scan their sources of profit. The precepts of the divine and the penalties of the human law sat lightly upon them. As yet many of these frontier towns were small hamlets, without even a pretext of police regulations. Passion, therefore, ran comparatively a free course, and the personal redress of private wrongs was only held in check by the broad and acknowledged right of self-defense. Since 1849 and 1850, when the gold fever was at its height, emigration across the plains had slackened, and the eagerness for a revival of this local traffic undoubtedly exerted its influence in procuring the opening of the territories in 1854. The noise and excitement created by the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act awakened the hope of frontier traders and speculators, who now greedily watched all the budding opportunities of gain. Under such circumstances these opportunities to the shrewd, to the bold, and especially to the unscrupulous, are many. Cheap lands, unlimited town lots, eligible trading sites, the multitude of franchises and privileges within the control of a territorial legislature, the offices to be distributed under party favoritism, offer an abundant lure to enterprise and far more to craft. It was to such a population and under such a condition of things that Senator Atchison went to his home in Platte county in the summer of 1854 to preach his pro-slavery crusade against Kansas. His personal convictions, his party faith, his senatorial reëlection, and his financial fortunes, were all involved in the scheme. With the help of the Stringfellows and other zealous co-workers, the town of Atchison was founded and named in his honor, and the "Squatter Sovereign" newspaper established, which displayed his name as a candidate for the Presidency. The good-will of the Administration was manifested by making one of the editors postmaster at the new town.

President Pierce appointed as Governor of Kansas territory Andrew H. Reeder, a member of his own party, from the free State of Pennsylvania. He had neither prominent reputation nor conspicuous ability, though under trying circumstances he afterwards showed diligence, judgment, integrity, and more than ordinary firmness and independence. It is to be presumed that his fitness in a partisan light had been thoroughly scrutinized by both President and Senate. Upon the vital point the investigation was deemed conclusive. "He was appointed," the "Washington Union" naïvely



THE GILLIS HOUSE; LANDING-PLACE AND HEADQUARTERS OF THE EMIGRANT AID COMPANY ON THE MISSOURI RIVER, ON THE SITE OF KANSAS CITY.

FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.

stated when the matter was first called in question, "under the strongest assurance that he was strictly and honestly a national man. We are able to state further, on very reliable authority, that whilst Governor Reeder was in Washington, at the time of his appointment, he conversed with Southern gentlemen on the subject of slavery, and assured them that he had no more scruples in buying a slave than a horse, and regretted that he had not money to purchase a number to carry with him to Kansas." With him were appointed three Federal judges, a secretary, a marshal, and an attorney for the territory, all doubtless considered equally trustworthy on the slavery question. The organic act invested the governor with very comprehensive powers to initiate the organization of the new territory. Until the first legislature should be duly constituted, he had authority to fix election days, define election districts, direct the mode of returns, take a census, locate the temporary seat of government, declare vacancies, order new elections to fill them, beside other usual and permanent powers of an executive.

ELI THAYER (1860).

Arriving at Leavenworth in October, 1854, Governor Reeder was not long in discovering the designs of the Missourians. He was urged to order the immediate election of a territorial legislature.* The conspirators had already spent some months in organizing their "Blue Lodges," and now desired to be promptly put in possession of the political power of the territory. But the Governor had too much manliness to become the mere pliant tool they wished to make him. He resented their dictatorship; made a tour of inspection through the new settlements; and acting on his own proper judgment, on his return issued a proclamation for a simple election of a delegate to Congress. At the appearance of this proclamation Platte county took the alarm, and held a meeting on the Kansas side of the river, to intimidate him with violent speeches and a significant memorial. The governor retorted in a letter that the meeting was composed of Missourians, and that he should resist outside interference from friend,

*Reports of Committee H. R. 1st and 2d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II. Reeder Deposition, "Howard Report," pp. 933–935.



PREËMPTION HOUSE BUILT ON THE TOWN SITE OF LAWRENCE IN 1854.
FROM PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

foe, or faction.* Pocketing this rebuff as best they might, Senator Atchison and his "Blue Lodges" nevertheless held fast to their purpose. Paper proclamation and lectures on abstract rights counted but little against the practical measures they had matured. November 29th, the day of election for delegate, finally arrived, and with it a formidable invasion of Missouri voters at more than half the polling places appointed in the governor's proclamation.

In frontier life it was an every-day experience to make excursions for business or pleasure, singly or in parties, requiring two or three consecutive days, perhaps a night or two of camping out, and for which saddle-horses and farm-wagons furnished ready transportation; and nothing was more common than concerted neighborhood efforts for improvement, protection, or amusement. On such occasions neighborly sentiment and comity required every man to drop his axe, or unhitch from the plow in the furrow, to further the real or imaginary weal of the community. In urgent instances non-compliance was fatal to the peace and comfort and sometimes to the personal safety of the settler. The movement described above had been in active preparation for weeks, controlled by strong and secret combinations, and many unwilling participants were doubtless swept into it by an excited public opinion they dared not resist.

A day or two before the election the whole Missouri border was astir. Horses were saddled, teams harnessed, wagons loaded with tents, forage, and provisions, bowie-knives buckled on, revolvers and rifles loaded, and flags and inscriptions flung to the breeze by the more demonstrative and daring. Crossing the river-ferries from the upper counties, and passing unobstructed over the State line by the prairie-roads and trails from the lower, many of them camped that night at the nearest polls, while others pushed on fifty or a hundred miles to the sparsely settled election districts of the interior. As they passed along, the more scrupulous went through the empty form of an imaginary settlement, by nailing a card to a tree, driving a stake into the ground, or inscribing their names in a claim register, prepared in haste by the invading party. The more indifferent satisfied themselves with a mere mental resolve to become a settler. The utterly reckless silenced all scruples in profanity and drunkenness. On election morning the few real squatters of Kansas, endowed with Douglas's delusive boon of "popular sovereignty," witnessed with mixed indignation and terror acts of summary usurpation. Judges of election were dispossessed and set aside by intimidation or stratagem, and pro-slavery judges substituted without the slightest regard to regularity or law; judges' and voters' oaths were declared unnec-

* Reeder to Gwiner and others, Nov. 21, 1854; copied into "National Era," Jan. 4, 1855.

PREËMPTION HOUSE BUILT BY W. R. LYKINS, LAWRENCE, 1854.—FROM PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.
IN MARCH, 1855, THIS HOUSE WAS THE POLLING-PLACE AT THE ELECTION OF THE FIRST TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE, WHEN A THOUSAND ARMED MISSOURIANS VOTED.

FERRYING MISSOURI VOTERS TO THE KANSAS SHORE.

essary, or explained away upon newly-invented phrases and absurd subtleties. "Where there's a will, there's a way," in wrong and crime, as well as in honest purpose and deed; and by more dishonest devices than history can stop fully to record the ballot-boxes were filled, through invasion, false swearing, riot, and usurpation, with ballots for Whitfield, the pro-slavery candidate for delegate to Congress, at nine out of the seventeen polling places — showing, upon a careful scrutiny afterward made by a committee of Congress, an aggregate of 1729 illegal votes, and only 1114 legal ones. This mockery of an election completed, the valiant Knights of the Blue Lodge, the fraternal members of the Social Band, the philanthropic groups of the Friends Society, and the chivalric Sons of the South mounted their horses and wagons, and with cheers, and salvos from revolver and rifle, returned to their axe and plow, society lodge and bar-room haunt, to exult in a victory for Missouri and slavery over the "Abolition hordes and nigger thieves of the Emigrant Aid Society." The "Border Ruffians" of Missouri had written their preliminary chapter in the annals of Kansas. The published statements of the Emigrant Aid Society show that up to the date of election it had sent only a few hundred men, women, and children to the territory. Why such a prodigious effort was deemed necessary to control the votes and influence of this paltry handful of "paupers who had sold themselves to Eli Thayer and Co." was never explained.

THE BOGUS LAWS.

As THE event turned out, the invasion of border ruffians to decide the first election in Kansas had been entirely unnecessary. Even without counting the illegal votes, the pro-slavery candidate for delegate was chosen by a plurality. He had held the office of Indian Agent, and his acquaintance, experience, and the principal fact that he was the favorite of the conspirators gave him an easy victory. Governor Reeder issued his certificate of election without delay, and Whitfield hurried away to Washington to enjoy his new honors, taking his seat in the House of Representatives within three weeks after his election. Atchison, however, did not follow his example. Congress met on the first Monday of December, and the ser-

vices of the Acting Vice-President were needed in the Senate Chamber. But of such importance did he deem the success of the conspiracy in which he was the leader, that a few weeks before the session he wrote a short letter to the Senate, giving notice of his probable absence and advising the appointment of a new presiding officer.

As a necessary preliminary to organizing the government of the territory, Governor Reeder, under the authority of the organic "popular sovereignty." But his short experience with Atchison's Border Ruffians had already rudely shaken his partisanship. The events of the November election exposed the designs of the pro-slavery conspiracy beyond all doubt or concealment, and no course was left him but to become either its ally or its enemy. In behalf of justice, as well as to preserve what he still fondly cherished as a vital party principle, he determined by every



ANDREW H. REEDER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY R. KNECHT.

act, proceeded to take a census of its inhabitants.* This work, carried on and completed in the months of January and February, 1855, disclosed a total population of 8601 souls, of whom 2905 were voters. With this enumeration as a definite guide, the governor made an apportionment, established election districts, and, appointing the necessary officers to conduct it, fixed upon the 30th of March, 1855, as the day for electing the territorial legislature. Governor Reeder had come to Kansas an ardent Democrat, a firm friend of the Pierce administration, and an enthusiastic disciple of the new Democratic dogma of means in his power to secure a fair election. Party lines in the territory had become sharply defined upon the single issue of "free State" and "slave State." In his appointment of election officers, census-takers, justices of the peace, and constables, he was careful to make his selections from both factions as fairly as possible, excepting that, as a greater and necessary safeguard against another invasion, he designated in the several election districts along the Missouri border two "free-State" men and one pro-slavery man to act as judges at each poll. † He prescribed distinct and rigid rules for the conduct of the election; ordering

* Reeder Testimony, "Howard Report," p. 934.

† Reeder Instructions, "Howard Report," pp. 107, 935.

FIRST HOUSE AT SHAWNEE MISSION.



strong to control the election; and by these misrepresentations the whole border was wrought up into the fervor of a pro-slavery crusade. When the 30th of March, election day, finally arrived, the conspiracy had once more mustered its organized army of invasion, and five thousand Missouri Border Ruffians, in different camps, bands, and squads, held practical possession of nearly every election district in the territory.* Riot, violence, intimidation, destruction of ballot-boxes, expulsion and substitution of judges, neglect or refusal



RESIDENCE OF GOVERNOR REEDER AND STAFF, 1855.

among other things that the judges should be sworn, that constables should attend and preserve order, and that voters must be actual inhabitants to the exclusion of any other home.



OLD SCHOOL BUILDING OCCUPIED BY FIRST TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE.

All his precautions came to nought. This election of a territorial legislature, which, as then popularly believed, might determine by the enactment of laws whether Kansas should become a free or a slave State, was precisely the coveted opportunity for which the Border Ruffian conspiracy had been organized. Its interference in the November election served as a practical experiment to demonstrate its efficiency and to perfect its plans. The alleged doings of the Emigrant Aid Societies furnished a convenient and plausible pretext; wild and extravagant assertions were now circulated as to the plans and numbers of the Eastern emigrants; it was industriously reported that they were coming twenty thousand to administer the prescribed oaths, *vivâ voce* voting, repeated voting on one side, and obstruction and dispersion of voters on the other, were common incidents; no one dared to resist the assertions or acts of the invaders, since they were armed and equipped and commanded in frontier if not in military fashion, in many cases by men whose names then or afterwards were prominent or notorious. Of the votes cast, 1410 were upon a subse-

*"Howard Report," pp. 9 to 44.

quent examination found to have been legal, while 4908 were illegal.* Of the total number, 5427 votes were given to the pro-slavery and only 791 to the free-State candidates. At such an election the candidates of the conspiracy claimed to have been chosen a legislature for the territory of Kansas. Upon a careful collation of evidence the investigating committee of Congress was of the opinion that the vote would have returned a free-State legislature if the election had been confined to the actual settlers;† as conducted, however, it showed a nominal majority for every pro-slavery candidate but one.

Governor Reeder had feared a repetition of the November frauds; but it is evident that he had no conception of so extensive an invasion. It is probable, too, that information of its full enormity did not immediately reach him. Meanwhile the five days prescribed in his proclamation for receiving notices of contest elapsed. The governor had removed his executive office to Shawnee Mission. At this place, and at the neighboring town of Westport, Missouri, only four miles distant, a majority of the persons claiming to have been elected now assembled and became clamorous for their certificates.‡ A committee of their number presented a formal written demand for the same; they strenuously denied his right to question the legality of the election, and threats against the governor's life in case of his refusal to issue them became alarmingly frequent. Their regular consultations, their open denunciations, and their hints at violence, while they did not entirely overawe the governor, so far produced their intended effect upon him that he assembled a band of his personal friends for his own protection. On the 6th of April, one week after election, the governor announced his decision upon the returns. On one side of the room were himself and his armed adherents; on the other side the would-be members in superior numbers, with their pistols and bowie-knives equally ready. Under this virtual duress the governor issued certificates of election to all but about one-third of the claimants; and the returns in these cases he rejected, not because of alleged force or fraud, but on account of palpable defects in the papers.§

This issue of certificates under a virtual



REV. THOMAS JOHNSON (1860, AGED 59).
FROM AN AMBROTYPE IN POSSESSION OF HIS SON, A. MONROE JOHNSON.

* Ibid, p. 30.

† Ibid, p. 34.

‡ Reeder's testimony, "Howard Report," pp. 935–9; also Stringfellow's testimony, p. 355.

§ Namely, because of a *vivâ voce* vote certified instead of a ballot, and because the prescribed oath and the words 'lawful resident voters" had been openly erased from the printed forms. In six districts the governor ordered a supplementary election, which was duly held on the 22d of May following. When that day arrived, the Border Ruffians, proclaiming the election to be illegal, by their default allowed free-State men to be chosen in all the districts except that of Leavenworth, where the invasion and tactics of the March election were repeated now for the third time and the same candidates voted for. "Howard Report," pp. 35–36. Indeed, the Border Ruffian habit of voting in Kansas had become chronic, and did not cease for some years, and sometimes developed the grimmest humors. In the autumn of that same year an election for county-seat took place in Leavenworth county by the accidental failure of the legislature to designate one. Leavenworth city aspired to this honor and polled six hundred votes to obtain it; but it had an enterprising rival in Kickapoo city, ten miles up the river, and another, Delaware city, eight miles down stream. Both

FOUNDATION OF THE OLD TERRITORIAL CAPITAL, LECOMPTON — LANE UNIVERSITY IN THE BACKGROUND. (SEE PAGE 880.)

compulsion was a fatal error in Governor Reeder's action. It endowed the notoriously illegal legislature with a technical authority, and a few weeks later, when he went to Washington City to invoke the help of the Pierce administration against the usurpation, it enabled Attorney-General Cushing (if current report was true) to taunt him with the reply, "You state that this legislature is the creature of force and fraud; which shall we believe —your official certificate under seal, or your subsequent declarations to us in private conversation?"

The question of the certificates disposed of, the next point of interest was to determine at what place the legislature should assemble. Under the organic act the governor had authority to appoint the first meeting, and it soon became known that his mind was fixed upon the embryo town of Pawnee, adjoining the military post of Fort Riley, situated on Kansas River, a hundred and ten miles from the Missouri line. Against this exile, however, Stringfellow and his Border Ruffian law-makers protested in an energetic memorial, asking to be called together at the Shawnee Mission, supplemented by the private threat that even if they convened at Pawnee, they would adjourn and come back the day after.* If the governor harbored any remaining doubt that this bogus legislature intended to assume and maintain the mastery, it speedily vanished. Their hostility grew open and defiant; they classed him as a free-State man, an "abolitionist," and it became only too evident that he would gradually be shorn of power and degraded from the position of territorial executive to that of a mere puppet. Having nothing to gain by further concession, he adhered to his original plan, issued his proclamation† convening the legislature at Pawnee on the first Monday in July, and immediately started for Washington to make a direct appeal to President Pierce.

were paper towns — "cottonwood towns," in border slang — of great expectations; and both having more unscrupulous enterprise than voters, appealed to Platte county to "come over." This was an appeal Platte county could never resist, and accordingly a chartered ferry-boat brought voters all election day from the Missouri side, until the Kickapoo tally-lists scored eight hundred and fifty. Delaware city, however, was not to be thus easily crushed. She too not only had her chartered ferry-boat, but kept her polls open for three days in succession, and not until her boxes contained nine hundred ballots (of which only fifty were probably legal) did the steam whistle scream victory! When the "returning board" had sufficiently weighed this complicated electoral contest, it gravely decided that keeping the polls open for three days was "an unheard of irregularity." (Holloway's "History of Kansas," pp. 192–4). This was exquisite irony; but a local court on appeal seriously giving a final verdict for Delaware, the transaction became a perennial burlesque on "Squatter Sovereignty."

* "Squatter Sovereign," June 5th, 1855.

† April 16th, 1855.

How Governor Reeder failed in this last hope of redress and support, how he found the Kansas conspiracy as strong at Washington as on the Missouri border, will appear further along. On the second of July the governor and the legislature met at the town of Pawnee, where he had convoked them — a magnificent prairie site, but containing as yet only three buildings, one to hold sessions in, and two to furnish food and lodging. The governor's friends declared the accommodations ample; the Missourians on the contrary made affidavit that they were compelled to camp out and cook their own rations. The actual facts had little to do with the predetermination of the members. Stringfellow had written in his paper, the "Squatter Sovereign," three weeks before, "We hope no one will be silly enough to suppose the governor has power to compel us to stay at Pawnee during the entire session. We will, of course, have to 'trot' out at the bidding of his Excellency,— but we will trot him back next day at our bidding." *

The prediction was literally fulfilled. Both branches organized without delay, the House choosing John H. Stringfellow its Speaker. Before the governor's message was delivered on the following day, the House had already passed, under suspended rules, "An act to remove the seat of government temporarily to the Shawnee Manual Labor School," † which act the council as promptly concurred in.‡ The governor vetoed the bill, but it was at once passed over his veto.§ By the end of the week the legislature had departed from the budding capital, to return no more. ||

The governor was perforce obliged to follow his migratory Solons, who adhered to their purpose despite his public or private protests, and who reassembled at Shawnee Mission, or more correctly the Shawnee Manual Labor School, on the 16th of July. Shawnee Mission was one of our many national experiments in civilizing Indian tribes. This philanthropic institution, nourished by the Federal treasury, was presided over by the Rev. Thomas Johnson. The town of Westport, which could boast of a post-office, lay only four miles to the eastward, on the Missouri side of the State line, and was a noted pro-slavery stronghold. There were several large brick buildings at the Mission capable of accommodating the legislature with halls and lodging rooms; its nearness to an established post-office and its contiguity to Missouri pro-slavery sentiment were elements probably not lost sight of. Mr. Johnson, who had formerly been a Missouri slaveholder, was at the March election chosen a member of the Territorial Council, which in due time made him its presiding officer; and the bogus legislature at Shawnee Mission was therefore in a certain sense under its own "vine and fig-tree."

The two branches of the legislature, the Council with the Rev. Thomas Johnson as President, and the House with Stringfellow of the "Squatter Sovereign" as Speaker, now turned their attention seriously to the pro-slavery work before them. The conspirators were shrewd enough to realize their victory. "To have intimated one year ago," said the Speaker in his address of thanks, "that such a result would be wrought out, one would have been thought a visionary; to have predicted that to-day a legislature would assemble, almost unanimously pro-slavery, and with myself for Speaker, I would have been thought mad." ¶ The programme had already been announced in the "Squatter Sovereign" some weeks before. "The South must and will prevail. If the Southern people but half do their duty, in less than nine months from this day Kansas will have formed a constitution and be knocking at the door for admission. . . . In the session of the United States Senate in 1856, two Senators from the slaveholding State of Kansas will take their seats, and abolitionism will be forever driven from our halls of legislation." ** Against this triumphant attitude Governor Reeder was despondent and powerless. The language of his message †† plainly betrayed the political dilemma in which he found himself caught. He strove as best he might to couple together the prevailing cant of office-holders against "the destructive spirit of abolitionism" and a comparatively mild rebuke of the Missouri usurpation.‡‡

Nevertheless, the governor stood reasonably firm. He persisted in declaring that the legislature could pass no valid laws at any other place than Pawnee, and returned the first bill sent him with a veto message to that effect. To this the legislature replied by passing the bill over his veto, and in addition formally

* "Squatter Sovereign," June 5th, 1855.
† "Kansas Territory House Journal," 1855, p. 12.
‡ "Journal of Council," p. 12.
§ "Kansas House Journal," 1855, p. 29.
|| Ibid, p. 30.
¶ "Squatter Sovereign," July 17th, 1855.
** Ibid, June 19th, 1855.
†† "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855, p. 12.
‡‡ Its phraseology was adroit enough to call forth a sneering compliment from Speaker Stringfellow, who wrote to the "Squatter Sovereign": "On Tuesday the governor sent in his message, which you will find is very well calculated to have its effect with the Pennsylvania Democracy. If he was trustworthy I would be disposed to compliment the most of it, but knowing how corrupt the author is, and that it is only designed for political effect in Pennsylvania, he not expecting to remain long with us, I will pass it by." — "Squatter Sovereign," July 17th, 1855.

raising a joint committee "to draw up a memorial to the President of the United States respectfully demanding the removal of A. H. Reeder from the office of governor";* and, as if this indignity were not enough, holding a joint session for publicly signing it. The memorial was promptly dispatched to Washington by special messenger; but on the way this envoy read the news of the governor's dismissal by the President.

This event appeared definitely to sweep away the last obstacle in the path of the conspirators. The office of acting governor now devolved upon the Secretary of the Territory, Daniel Woodson, a man who shared their views and was allied in their schemes. With him to approve their enactments, the parliamentary machinery of the "bogus" legislature was complete and effective. They had at the very beginning summarily ousted the free-State members chosen at the supplementary election of May 22d, and seated the pro-slavery claimants of March 30th; and the only two remaining free-State members resigned in utter disgust and despair, and to avoid giving countenance to the flagrant usurpation by their presence. No one was left even to enter a protest.

This, then, was the perfect flower of Douglas's vaunted experiment of "popular sovereignty,"—a result they professed fully to appreciate. "Hitherto," said the Judiciary Committee of the House in a long and grandiloquent report,† "Congress have retained to themselves the power to mold and shape all the territorial governments according to their own peculiar notions, and to restrict within very limited and contracted bounds both the natural as well as the political rights of the bold and daring pioneer and the noble, hard-fisted squatter." But by this course, the argument of the committee continued, "the pillars which uphold this glorious union of States were shaken until the whole world was threatened with a political earthquake," and "the principle that the people are capable of self-government would have been forever swallowed up by anarchy and confusion," had not the Kansas-Nebraska bill "delegated to the people of these territories the right to frame and establish their own form of government."

What might not be expected of law-makers who begin with so ambitious an exordium, and who lay the corner-stone of their edifice upon the solid rock of political principle? The anti-climax of performance which followed this philosophical promise would be laughably absurd, indeed, were it not marked by the cunning of a well-matured political plot. Their first step was to recommend the repeal of "all laws whatsoever, which may have been considered to have been in force" in this territory on the 1st day of July, 1855, thus forever quieting any doubt "as to what is and what is not law in this territory";‡ secondly, to substitute a code about which there should be no question, by the equally ingenious expedient of copying and adopting the Revised Statutes of Missouri.§

These enactments were made in due form; but the "bogus" legislature did not seem content to let its fame rest on this single monument of self-government. Casting their eyes once more upon the broad expanse of American politics, the Judiciary Committee reported:

> "The question of slavery is one that convulses the whole country, from the boisterous Atlantic to the shores of the mild Pacific. This state of things has been brought about by the fanaticism of the North and East, while up to this time the people of the South, and those of the North who desire the perpetuation of this Union and are devoted to the laws, have been entirely conservative. But the time is coming—yea, it has already arrived—for the latter to take a bold and decided stand that the Union and law may not be trampled in the dust,"‖ etc., etc.

The "Revised Statutes of Missouri," recommended in bulk, and adopted with hasty clerical modifications,¶ already contained the usual slave-code peculiar to Southern States. But in the plans and hopes of the conspirators, this of itself was insufficient. In order to "take a bold stand that the Union and law might not be trampled in the dust," they with great painstaking devised and passed "an act to punish offenses against slave property."**

It prescribed the penalty of death, not merely for the grave crime of inciting or aiding an insurrection of slaves, free negroes, or mulattoes, or circulating printed matter for such an object, but also the same extreme punishment for the comparatively mild offense of enticing or decoying away a slave

* "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 10.

† Report Judiciary Com., "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 14.

‡ Report Judiciary Com., "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 18.

§ Report Judiciary Com., "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 18.

‖ Report Judiciary Com., "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 14.

¶ To guard more effectually against clerical errors, the legislature enacted: "Sec. 1. Wherever the word 'State' occurs in any act of the present legislative assembly, or any law of this territory, in such construction as to indicate the locality of the operation of such act or laws, the same shall in every instance be taken and understood to mean 'territory,' and shall apply to the territory of Kansas."—"Statutes of Kansas," 1855, p. 718.]

** "Statutes Territory of Kansas," 1855, p. 715.

or assisting him to escape; for harboring or concealing a fugitive slave, ten years' imprisonment; for resisting an officer arresting a fugitive slave, two years' imprisonment.

If such inflictions as the foregoing might perhaps be tolerated upon the plea that a barbarous institution required barbarous safeguards, what ought to be said of the last three sections of the act which, in contempt of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, annulled the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, and invaded even the private sanctity of individual conscience?

To write, print, or circulate "any statements, arguments, opinions, sentiment, doctrine, advice, or innuendo, calculated to produce a disorderly, dangerous, or rebellious disaffection among the slaves of the territory, or to induce such slaves to escape from the service of their masters, or to resist their authority," was pronounced a felony and punishable by five years' imprisonment. To deny the right of holding slaves in the territory, by speaking, writing, printing, or circulating books or papers, was likewise made a felony, punishable by two years' imprisonment. Finally it was enacted that "no person who is conscientiously opposed to holding slaves, or who does not admit the right to hold slaves in this territory, shall sit as a juror on the trial of any prosecution for any violation of any of the sections of this act." Also, all officers were, in addition to their usual oath, required to swear to support and sustain the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Fugitive-Slave Law.*

The spirit which produced these despotic laws also governed the methods devised to enforce them. The legislature proceeded to elect the principal officers of each county, who in turn were empowered by the laws to appoint the subordinate officials. All administration, therefore, emanated from that body, reflected its will, and followed its behest. Finally, the usual skeleton organization of a territorial militia was devised, whose general officers were in due time appointed by the acting governor from prominent and serviceable pro-slavery members of the Legislature.†

Having made their present domination secure, they did not omit to provide as well as lay in their power to perpetuate their political ascendency in the territory. They ingeniously prolonged the tenure of their various appointees, and to render their success at future elections easy and certain they provided that candidates to be eligible, and judges of election, and voters when challenged, must swear to support the Fugitive-Slave Law.‡ This they knew would virtually disfranchise many conscientious antislavery men; while, on the other hand, they enacted that each inhabitant who had paid his territorial tax should be a qualified voter for all elective officers. Under so lax a provision Missouri invaders could in the future, as they had done in the past, easily give an apparent majority at the ballot-box for all their necessary agents and ulterior schemes.

In a technical sense the establishment of slavery in Kansas was complete. There were by the census of the previous February already some two hundred slaves in the territory. Under the sanction of these laws, and before they could by any possibility be repealed, some thousands might be expected, especially by such an organized and united effort as the South could make to maintain the vantage ground already gained. Once there, the aggressiveness of the institution might be relied on to protect itself, since all experience had shown that under similar conditions it was almost ineradicable.

After so much patriotic endeavor on the part of these Border Ruffian legislators "that the Union and law may not be trampled in the dust," it cannot perhaps be wondered at that they began to look around for their personal rewards. These they readily found in the rich harvest of local monopolies and franchises which lay scattered in profusion on this virgin field of legislation, ready to be seized and appropriated without dispute by the first occupants. There were charters for railroads, insurance companies, toll-bridges, ferries, coal mines, plank roads, and numberless privileges and honors of present or prospective value out of which, together with the county, district and military offices, the ambitious members might give and take with generous liberality. One-sixth of the printed laws of the first session attest their modest attention to this incidental squatter's dowry.§ One of the many favorable opportunities in this category was the establishment of the permanent territorial capital, authorized by the organic act, where the liberal Federal appropriation for public buildings should be expended. For this purpose, competition from the older towns yielding gracefully after the first ballot, an entirely new site on the open prairie overlooking the Kansas River some miles west of Lawrence was agreed upon. The proceedings do not show any unseemly scramble over the selection, and no tangible record remains of the whispered distribution of corner lots and

* Ibid, 1855, p. 516.

† "Kansas Territory Journal of Council," 1855, p. 248.

‡ "Statutes Territory of Kansas," 1855, p. 332.

§ Colfax, Speech in H. R. June 21st, 1856.

contracts. It is only the name which rises into historical notice.

One of the actors in the political drama of Kansas was Samuel Dexter Lecompte, Chief-Justice of the territory. He had been appointed from the border State of Maryland, and is represented to have been a diligent student, a respectable lawyer, a prominent Democratic politician, and possessed of the personal instincts and demeanor of a gentleman. Moved by a pro-slavery sympathy none the less objectionable that it may have been sincere, Judge Lecompte lent his high authority to the interests of the conspiracy against Kansas. He had already rendered the bogus legislature the important service of publishing an extra-judicial opinion, sustaining their adjournment from Pawnee to Shawnee Mission.* Probably because they valued his official championship and recognized in him a powerful ally in politics, they made him a member of several of their private corporations, and gave him the conspicuous honor of naming their newly-founded capital Lecompton. But the intended distinction was transitory. Before the lapse of a single decade, the town for which he stood sponsor was no longer the capital of Kansas.

THE TOPEKA CONSTITUTION.

THE bogus legislature adjourned late on the night of the 30th of August, 1855. They had elaborately built up their legal despotism, commissioned trusty adherents to administer it, and provided their principal and undoubted partisans with military authority to see that it was duly executed. Going still a step further, they proposed so to mold and control public opinion as to prevent the organization of any party or faction to oppose their plans. In view of the coming Presidential campaign, it was the fashion in the States for Democrats to style themselves "National Democrats"; and a few newspapers and speakers in Kansas had adopted the prevailing political name. To stifle any such movement, both houses of the legislature on the last night of their session adopted a concurrent resolution declaring that the proposition to organize a National Democratic party, having already misled some of their friends, would divide pro-slavery Whigs from Democrats and weaken their party one-half; that it was the duty of the pro-slavery, Union-loving men of Kansas "to know but one issue, slavery; and that any party making or attempting to make any other should be held as an ally of abolitionism and disunion." †

Had the conspiracy been content to prosecute its designs through moderate measures, it would have inevitably fastened slavery upon Kansas. The organization of the invasion in western Missouri, carried on under pre-acknowledged leadership, in populous counties, among established homes, amid well-matured confidence growing out of long personal and political relationship, would have been easy even without the powerful bond of secret association. On the other hand, the union of the actual inhabitants of Kansas, scattered in sparse settlements, personal strangers to each other, coming from widely separated States, and comprising radically different manners, sentiments, and traditions, and burdened with the prime and unyielding necessity of protecting themselves and their families against cold and hunger, was in the very nature of the case slow and difficult. But the course of the Border Ruffians created a powerful and determined opposition, which now became united in support of what is known to history as the Topeka Constitution; or, in other words, the free-State party of Kansas.

It is a noteworthy historic incident that this free-State movement originated in Democratic circles, under Democratic auspices. The Republican party did not yet exist. The opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act were demoralized and scattered among the Whigs, Know-Nothings, and Free-soilers in the States, and had no national affiliation, although they had won overwhelming triumphs in a majority of the Congressional districts in the fall elections of 1854. It so happened that nearly if not quite all the free-State leaders originally went to Kansas as friends of President Pierce, and as believers in the dogma of "popular sovereignty."

Now that this usurping legislature had met, contemptuously expelled the free-State members, defied the governor's veto, set up its ingeniously contrived legal despotism, and commissioned its partisan followers to execute and administer it, the situation became sufficiently grave to demand defensive action. The real settlers were Democrats, it was true; they had voted for Pierce, shouted for the platform of '52, applauded the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and emigrated to the territory to enjoy the new political gospel of popular sovereignty. But the practical Democratic beatitudes of Kansas were not calculated to strengthen the saints or confirm them in the faith. A Democratic invasion had elected a Democratic legislature, which enacted Democratic laws, under whose practical "non-intervention" a

* "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855. Appendix, p. 3.

† "House Journal Kansas Territory," 1855, p. 380; "Council Journal," 1855, p. 253.

Democratic marshal bringing a writ from a Democratic judge might fasten a ball and chain to their ankles if they should happen to read the Declaration of Independence to a negro, or carry Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia" in their carpet-bags. Neither Kansas Democrats nor Northern State Democrats could tolerate or defend such open outrages upon right and decency.

The official resolution which the bogus legislature now proclaimed as a final political test left no middle ground between those who were for slavery and those who were against slavery — those who were for the bogus laws in all their enormity, and those who were against them. Before this pressure, doubt, hesitation, party bias, and personal jealousy gradually melted away, and all who were not willing to become active co-workers with the conspiracy were forced to combine in self-defense.

It was in the town of Lawrence that the free-State movement naturally found its beginning. The settlers of the Emigrant Aid Society were comparatively few in number; but supported by money, saw-mills, printing-presses, boarding-houses, they became from the very first a compact, self-reliant governing force. A few preliminary meetings, instigated by the disfranchised free-State members of the legislature, brought together a large mass convention. The result of its two days' deliberations was a regularly chosen delegate convention held at Big Springs, a few miles west of Lawrence, on the 5th of September, 1855. All doubt and hesitation on the part of the leaders had by this time vanished. More important than all, perhaps, was the presence and active participation of Ex-Governor Reeder himself, who wrote the resolutions, addressed the convention in a stirring and defiant speech, and received by acclamation their nomination for territorial delegate. The platform adopted repudiated in strong terms the bogus legislature and its tyrannical enactments, and declared "that we will endure and submit to these laws no longer than the best interests of the territory require, as the least of two evils, and will resist them to a bloody issue as soon as we ascertain that peaceable remedies shall fail," etc. It also recommended the formation of volunteer companies and the procurement of arms. The progressive and radical spirit of the convention is illustrated in its indorsement of the free-State movement, against the report of its own committee. The strongest point, however, made by the convention was a determination, strictly adhered to for more than two years, to take no part in any election under the bogus territorial laws. As a result Whitfield received, without competition, the combined pro-slavery and Border Ruffian vote for delegate on the first of October, a total of 2721 ballots. Measures had meanwhile been perfected by the free-State men to elect delegates to a constitutional convention. On the 9th of October, at a separate election, held by the free-State party alone, under self-prescribed formalities and regulations, these were duly chosen by an aggregate vote of 2710, Ex-Governor Reeder receiving at the same polls 2849 votes for delegate.

By this series of political movements, carried out in quiet and orderly proceedings, the free-State party was not only fully constituted and organized, but was demonstrated to possess a decided majority in the territory. Still following out the policy agreed upon, the delegates chosen met at Topeka on the 23d of October, and with proper deliberation and decorum framed a State Constitution, which was in turn submitted to a vote of the people. Although this election was held near midwinter (Dec. 15th, 1855), and in the midst of serious disturbances of the peace arising from other causes, it received an affirmative vote of 1731, showing a hearty popular indorsement of it. Of the document itself no extended criticism is necessary. It prohibited slavery, but made reasonable provision for existing property-rights in slaves actually in the territory. In no sense a radical, subversive, or "abolition" production, the Topeka Constitution was remarkable only as being the indignant protest of the people of the territory against the Missouri usurpation.* The new constitution was transmitted to Congress and was formally presented as a petition to the Senate † by General Cass, on March 24, 1856, ‡ and to the House some days later.

The Republican Senators in Congress (the

* Still another election was held by the free-State party on January 15th, 1856, to choose State officers to act under the new organization, at which Charles Robinson received 1296 votes for governor, out of a total of 1706, and Mark W. Delahay for Representative in Congress, 1628. A legislature elected at the same time, met, according to the terms of the newly framed constitution, on the 4th of March, organized, and elected A. H. Reeder and Jas. H. Lane United States Senators.

† "Congressional Globe," 1856, March 24th, p. 698.

‡ Later, on April 7th, General Cass presented to the Senate another petition, purporting to be the Topeka Constitution, which had been handed him by J. H. Lane, president of the convention which framed it and Senator-elect under it ("Cong. Globe," 1856, April 7, p. 826). This paper proved to be a clerk's copy, with erasures and interlineations and signatures in one handwriting, which being questioned as probably spurious, Lane afterward supplied the original draft prepared by the committee and adopted by the convention, though without signatures; also adding his

Republican party had been definitely organized a few weeks before at Pittsburg)* now urged the immediate reception of the Topeka Constitution and the admission of Kansas as a free State, citing the cases of Michigan, Arkansas, Florida, and California as justifying precedents.† For the present, however, there was no hope of admission to the Union with the Topeka Constitution. The Pierce administration, under the domination of the Southern States, had deposed Governor Reeder. Both in his annual message and again in a special message, the President denounced the Topeka movement as insurrectionary. In the Senate, too, the application was already prejudged; the Committee on Territories through Douglas himself as chairman, in a long partisan report, dismissed it with the assertion "that it was the movement of a political party instead of the whole body of the people of Kansas, conducted without the sanction of law, and in defiance of the constituted authorities, for the avowed purpose of overthrowing the territorial government established by Congress."‡ In the mouth of a consistent advocate of "popular sovereignty" this argument might have had some force; but it came with a bad grace from Douglas, who in the same report indorsed the bogus legislature and sustained the bogus laws upon purely technical assumptions. Congress was irreconcilably divided in politics. The Democrats had an overwhelming majority in the Senate; the opposition, through the election of Speaker Banks, possessed a working control of the House. Some months later, after prolonged debate, the House passed a bill for the admission of Kansas under the Topeka Constitution; but as the Senate had already rejected it, the movement remained without practical result.§

The staple argument against the Topeka free-State movement, that it was a rebellion against constitutional authority, though perhaps correct as a mere theory was utterly refuted by the practical facts of the case. The Big Springs resolutions, indeed, counseled resistance to a "bloody issue"; but this was only to be made after "peaceable remedies shall fail." History must credit the free-State leaders with the high renown of pursuing their peaceable remedies and forbearing to exercise their asserted right to resistance with a patience unexampled in American annals. The bogus territorial laws were defied by the newspapers and treated as a dead letter by the mass of the free-State men; as much as possible they stood aloof from the civil officers appointed by and through the bogus legislature, recorded no title papers, began no lawsuits, abstained from elections, and denied themselves privileges which required any open recognition of the alien Missouri statutes. Lane and others refused the test oath, and were excluded from practice as attorneys in the courts; free-State newspapers were thrown out of the mails as incendiary publications; sundry petty persecutions were evaded or submitted to as special circumstances dictated. But throughout their long and persistent non-conformity, for more than two years, they constantly and cheerfully acknowledged the authority of the organic act, and of the laws of Congress, and even counseled and endured every forced submission to the bogus laws. Though they had defiant and turbulent spirits in their own ranks, who often accused them of imbecility and cowardice, they maintained a steady policy of non-resistance, and, under every show of Federal authority in support of the bogus laws, they submitted to obnoxious searches and seizures, to capricious arrest and painful imprisonment, rather than by resistance to place themselves in the attitude of deliberate outlaws.‖

They were destined to have no lack of

explanatory affidavit ("Cong. Globe," App., 1856, pp. 378–9), to the effect that the committee had devolved upon him the preparation of the formal copy, but that the original signatures had been mislaid. The official action of the Senate appears to have concerned itself exclusively with the copy presented by General Cass on March 24th. Lane's copies served only as texts for angry debate. As the Topeka Constitution had no legal origin or quality, technical defects were of little consequence, especially in view of the action by the free-State voters of Kansas at their voluntary elections for delegates on October 9th, and to ratify it on December 15th, 1856.

* February 22d, 1856.

† They based their appeal specially upon the opinion of the Attorney-General in the case of Arkansas, that citizens of territories possess the constitutional right to assemble and petition Congress for the redress of grievances; that the form of the petition is immaterial; and that 'as the power of Congress over the whole subject is plenary, they may accept any constitution, however framed, which in their judgment meets the sense of the people to be affected by it."

‡ Douglas, Senate Report of March 12th, 1856, p. 32.

§ Nevertheless, the efforts of the free-State party under this combination were not wholly barren. The contest between Whitfield and Reeder for a seat in the House as territorial delegate not only provoked searching discussion, but furnished the occasion for sending an investigating committee to Kansas, attended by the contestants in person. This committee with a fearless diligence collected in the territory, as well as from the border counties of Missouri, a mass of sworn testimony amounting to some twelve hundred printed pages, and which exposed the Border Ruffian invasions and the Missouri usurpation in all their monstrous iniquity, and officially revealed to the astounded North, for the first time and nearly two years after its beginning, the full proportions of the conspiracy.

‖ See Governor Robinson's message to free-State Legislature, March 4th, 1856. Mrs. Robinson's "Kansas," pp. 352 and 364.

provocation. Since the removal of Reeder, all the Federal officials of the territory were affiliated with the pro-slavery Missouri cabal. Both to secure the permanent establishment of slavery in Kansas, as well as to gratify the personal pride of their triumph, they were determined to make these recusant free-State voters "bow down to the cap of Gessler." Despotism is never more arrogant than in resenting all insults to its personal vanity. As a first and necessary step, the cabal had procured, through its powerful influence at Washington, a proclamation from the President commanding "all persons engaged in unlawful combinations against the constituted authority of the territory of Kansas or of the United States to disperse," etc.* The language of the proclamation was sufficiently comprehensive to include Border Ruffians and emigrant aid societies, as well as the Topeka movement, and thus presented a show of impartiality; but under dominant political influences the latter was its evident and certain object.

With this proclamation as a sort of official fulcrum, Chief-Justice Lecompte delivered at the May term of his court a most extraordinary charge to the grand jury. He instructed them that the bogus legislature, being an instrument of Congress, and having passed laws, "those laws are of United States authority and making." Persons resisting these laws must be indicted for high treason. If no resistance has been made, but combinations formed for the purpose of resisting them, "then must you still find bills for constructive treason, as the courts have decided that the blow need not be struck, but only the intention be made evident."† Indictments, writs, and the arrest of many prominent free-State leaders followed as a matter of course. All these proceedings, too, seem to have been a part of the conspiracy. Before the indictments were found, and in anticipation of the writs, Robinson, the free-State governor-elect, then on his way to the East, was arrested while traveling on a Missouri River steamboat, at Lexington in that State, detained, and finally sent back to Kansas under the governor's requisition. Upon this frivolous charge of constructive treason he and others were held in military custody nearly four months, and finally, at the end of that period, discharged upon bail, the farce of longer imprisonment having become useless through other events.

Apprehending fully that the Topeka movement was the only really serious obstacle to their success, the pro-slavery cabal, watching its opportunity, matured a still more formidable demonstration to suppress and destroy it. The provisional free-State legislature had, after organizing on the 4th of March, adjourned, to reassemble on the 4th of July, 1856, in order to await in the mean time the result of their application to Congress. As the national holiday approached, it was determined to call together a mass meeting at the same time and place, to give both moral support and personal protection to the members. Civil war, of which further mention will be made in the next chapter, had now been raging for months, and had in its general results gone against the free-State men. Their leaders were imprisoned or scattered, their presses destroyed, their adherents dispirited with defeat. Nevertheless, as the day of meeting approached, the remnant of the legislature and some six to eight hundred citizens gathered at Topeka, though without any definite purpose or pre-arranged plan. Governor Shannon, the second of the Kansas executives, had by this time resigned his office, and Secretary Woodson was again acting governor. Here was a chance to put the free-State movement pointedly under the ban of federal authority which the cabal determined not to neglect. Reciting the President's proclamation of February, Secretary Woodson now issued his own proclamation forbidding all persons claiming legislative power and authority as aforesaid from assembling, organizing, or acting in any legislative capacity whatever. At the hour of noon on the 4th of July several companies of United States dragoons, which were brought into camp near town in anticipation of the event, entered Topeka in military array, under command of Colonel Sumner. A line of battle was formed in the street; cannon were planted, and the machinery of war prepared for instant action. Colonel Sumner, a most careful and conscientious officer and a free-State man at heart, with due formality, with decision and firmness, but at the same time openly expressing the painful nature of his duty, commanded the legislature, then about to assemble, to disperse. The members, not yet organized, immediately obeyed the order, having neither the will nor the means to resist it. There was no tumult, no violence, but little protest even in words. It might have been, instead of a real event, merely a holiday parade enacting a travesty of the Declaration of Independence. There were cheers for Sumner, cheers for Robinson, cheers for liberty, from the free-State men assembled; but the despotic purpose, clothed in forms of law, made a none the less profound impression upon the assem-

* February 11th, 1856. "Statutes at Large," Vol. XI., p. 791.

† "Governor Geary's Administration," Gihon, p. 77; also compare copies of indictments, Phillips's "Conquest of Kansas," pp. 351–4.

bled citizens, and later, when the newspapers spread the report of the act, upon the indignant public mind of the Northern States of the Union.

From this time onward, other events of paramount historical importance supervene to crowd the Topeka Constitution out of view. In a feeble way the organization still held together for a considerable length of time. About a year later the legislature again went through the forms of assembling, and although Governor Walker was present in Topeka, there were no proclamations, no dragoons, no cannon, because the cabal was for the moment defeated and disconcerted and bent upon other and still more desperate schemes. The Topeka Constitution was never received nor legalized; its officers never became clothed with official authority; its scrip was never redeemed; yet in the fate of Kansas and in the annals of the Union at large it was a vital and pivotal transaction, without which the great conflict between freedom and slavery, though perhaps neither avoided nor delayed, might have assumed altogether different phases of development.

April 1887



April 1887

THE ENCHANTRESS.

IN a land beyond the ocean,
In the ages long ago,
Lived a lady like a lily,
With a breast and brow of snow.
From far countries, kings and princes
To behold her beauty came;
And it pleased her that they loved her,
To whom love was but a name.

Gallant knights with plumes and pennons,
Pallid beggars at the door —
On whomever fell her glances
They were lost forevermore.
And they died of hopeless passion,
Or they lived her abject slaves;
So the air was full of sighing,
And the hilltops thick with graves.

But one day unto the gateway
Of her palace came a youth,
With a length of golden tresses
And a face as fair as truth.
Not to pay her beauty homage,
And to fall beneath its spell,
Did he come; but he was weary,
So he rested by the well.

Riding forth that summer morning
With a merry cavalcade,
The enchantress saw him sleeping
By the fountain, in the shade.
As she passed with tinkling harness,
She looked down in sweet surprise,
And he lifted silken lashes
From his blue and starry eyes.

All that day with knights and maidens,
Through the forest arches dim,
Rode she in a happy silence
And a blissful dream of him.
And at eve returning, eager
Leaning forward from her place,
Sought the gleam of golden tresses
At the crystal fountain's base.

But its waters sparkled coldly
In the moonbeams, chill and wan,
And a nightingale sung near it,
But the youth — the youth was gone!
Yet upon his stony pillow
He had carved in letters deep
"Love" — his name — and to her chamber
The enchantress passed to weep.

Nevermore beneath the eagles
O'er the gateway carven bold,
Rode she forth to pain or pleasure,
Rode she forth in heat or cold.
But she paced the narrow limits
Of her marble courts by day,
And upon a restless pillow
Wept the weary night away.

Travelers passing by the portal
Used to tell in after years
Of a wan and white-haired woman
Wasted with a life of tears.
Aged crones would wisely whisper:
"Through the land her praises rung,
And men called her the enchantress,
In the days when we were young."

Minna Irving.



LOUIS BLANC. (FROM A PORTRAIT BY A. GILBEN.)

Louis Blanc felt keenly the manner in which he was neglected when his old friend Grévy became President of the Republic. He was placed under the ban of the Opportunists who now are prepared to crowd flowers upon his tomb. Being fond of England he wished to be sent to London as ambassador. When Challemel Lacour was gazetted to that post, Louis Blanc turned his face to the wall to die. He ceased to struggle against terrible infirmities. The painful illness and death of his brother Charles was a blow from which he never recovered. Death, as Victor Hugo said, was, in the case of Louis Blanc, a deliverance.

Charles Blanc had died early in 1882. The two brothers were known to be bound up by a fraternal love of extraordinary warmth. It is said that when Louis Blanc, before the Revolution of 1848, was the object of a murderous attack, Charles, living far away in another part of France, exclaimed almost at the same hour that some dreadful accident must have happened to his brother — which indeed turned out to be true. Whatever the explanation of this occurrence may be, Dumas made use of the oft-repeated story in his "Corsican Brothers"; the Blancs being, as before stated, of Corsican descent from the mother's side.

Karl Blind.

[BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE BORDER CONFLICT.



WILSON SHANNON. (AFTER AN ENGRAVING BY T. DONEY.)

KANSAS IN CIVIL WAR.

OUT of the antagonistic and contending factions mentioned in the last two chapters, the bogus legislature and its Border-Ruffian adherents on the one hand, and the framers and supporters of the Topeka Constitution on the other, grew the civil war in Kansas. The bogus legislature numbered thirty-six members. These had only received, all told, 619 legal *bonâ fide* Kansas votes; but, what answered their purposes just as well, 4408 Missourians had cast their ballots for them, making their total constituency (if by discarding the idea of a State line we use the word in a somewhat strained sense) 5427. This was at the March election, 1855. Of the remaining 2286 actual Kansas voters disclosed by Reeder's census, only 791 cast their ballots. That summer's emigration, however, being mainly from the free States, greatly changed the relative strength of the two parties. At the election of October 1st, 1855, in which the free-State men took no part, Whitfield, for delegate, received 2721 votes, Border Ruffians included. At the election for members of the Topeka Constitutional Convention, a week later, from which the pro-slavery men abstained, the free-State men cast 2710 votes, while Reeder, their nominee for delegate, received 2849. For general service, therefore, requiring no special effort, the numerical strength of the factions was about equal; while on extraordinary occasions the two thousand Border-Ruffian reserve lying a little farther back from the State line could at any time easily turn the scale. The free-State men had only their convictions, their intelligence, their courage, and the moral support of the North; the conspiracy had its secret combination, the territorial officials, the legislature, the bogus laws, the courts, the militia officers, the President, and the army. This was a formidable array of advantages; slavery was playing with loaded dice.

With such a radical opposition of sentiment, both factions were on the alert to seize every available vantage ground. The bogus laws having been enacted, and the free-State men having, at the Big Springs Convention, resolved

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on the failure of peaceable remedies to resist them to a "bloody issue," the conspiracy was not slow to cover itself and its projects with the sacred mantle of authority. Opportunely for them, about this time Governor Shannon, appointed to succeed Reeder, arrived in the territory. Coming by way of the Missouri River towns, he fell first among Border-Ruffian companionship and influences; and perhaps having his inclinations already molded by his Washington instructions, his early impressions were decidedly adverse to the free-State cause. His reception speech at Westport, in which he maintained the legality of the legislature, and his determination to enforce their laws, delighted his pro-slavery auditors. To enlist further his zeal in their behalf, a few weeks later they formally organized a "law-and-order party" by a large public meeting held at Leavenworth. All the territorial dignitaries were present; Governor Shannon presided; John Calhoun, the Surveyor-General, made the principal speech, a denunciation of the "abolitionists" supporting the Topeka movement; Chief-Justice Lecompte dignified the occasion with approving remarks. With public opinion propitiated in advance, and the governor of the territory thus publicly committed to their party, the conspirators felt themselves ready to enter upon the active campaign to crush out opposition, for which they had made such elaborate preparations.

Faithful to their legislative declaration they knew but one issue, slavery. All dissent, all non-compliance, all hesitation, all mere silence even, were in their stronghold towns, like Leavenworth, branded as "abolitionism," declared to be hostility to the public welfare, and punished with proscription, personal violence, expulsion, and frequently death. Of the lynchings, the mobs, and the murders, it would be impossible, except in a very extended work, to note the frequent and atrocious details. The present chapters can only touch upon the more salient movements of the civil war in Kansas, which happily were not sanguinary; if, however, the individual and more isolated cases of bloodshed could be described, they would show a startling aggregate of barbarity and loss of life for opinion's sake. Some of these revolting crimes, though comparatively few in number, were committed, generally in a spirit of lawless retaliation, by free-State men.

Among other instrumentalities for executing the bogus laws, the bogus legislature had appointed one Samuel J. Jones sheriff of Douglas county, Kansas Territory, although that individual was at the time of his appointment, and long afterwards, United States postmaster of the town of Westport, Missouri. Why this Missouri citizen and Federal official should in addition be clothed with a foreign territorial shrievalty of a county lying forty or fifty miles from his home is a mystery which was never explained outside a Missouri Blue Lodge. A partial solution is afforded in the fact that Jones was apparently a born persecutor, overflowing with zeal for slavery. Whether chosen by accident or design, his fitness to become the active agent of the conspiracy gives his name and acts a lamentable prominence in Kansas history.

A few days after the "law-and-order" meeting in Leavenworth, there occurred a murder in a small settlement thirteen miles west of the town of Lawrence. The murderer, a pro-slavery man, first fled to Missouri, but returned to Shawnee Mission and sought the official protection of Sheriff Jones; no warrant, no examination, no commitment followed, and the criminal remained at large. Out of this incident, the officious sheriff managed most ingeniously to create an embroilment with the town of Lawrence. Buckley, who was alleged to have been accessory to the crime, obtained a peace-warrant against Branson, a neighbor of the victim. With this peace-warrant in his pocket, but without showing or reading it to his prisoner, Sheriff Jones and a posse of twenty-five Border Ruffians proceeded to Branson's house at midnight and arrested him. Alarm being given, Branson's free-State neighbors, already exasperated at the murder, rose under the sudden instinct of self-protection and rescued Branson from the sheriff and his posse that same night, though without other violence than harsh words.*

Burning with the thirst of personal revenge, Sheriff Jones now charged upon the town of Lawrence, because that was the stronghold of the free-State men of the territory, the violation of law involved in this rescue, though Lawrence immediately and earnestly disavowed the act. But for Sheriff Jones and his superiors the pretext was all-sufficient. A Border-Ruffian foray against the town was hastily organized. The murder occurred November 21st, the rescue November 26th. November 27th, upon the brief report of Sheriff Jones, demanding a force of three thousand men "to carry out the laws," Governor Shannon issued his order to the two major-generals of the skeleton militia, "to collect together as large a force as you can in your division, and repair without delay to Lecompton, and report yourself to S. J. Jones, sheriff of Douglas county."† The Kansas militia was a myth; but the Bor-

* Phillips, "Conquest of Kansas," p. 152, *et. seq.*

† Shannon, order to Richardson, Nov. 27th, 1855. Same order to Strickler, same date. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 53.



UNITED STATES ARSENAL, LIBERTY. (REDRAWN FROM PHOTOGRAPHS IN POSSESSION OF COLONEL NATHANIEL GRANT.)

der Ruffians, with their backwoods rifles and shot-guns, were a ready resource. To these an urgent appeal for help was made; and the leaders of the conspiracy in prompt obedience placarded the frontier with inflammatory hand-bills, and collected and equipped companies, and hurried them forward to the rendezvous without a moment's delay. The United States Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, was broken into and stripped of its contents to supply cannon, small arms, and ammunition. In two days after notice a company of fifty Missourians made the first camp on Wakarusa Creek, near Franklin, four miles from Lawrence. In three or four days more an irregular army of fifteen hundred men, claiming to be the sheriff's posse, was within striking distance of the town. Three or four hundred of these were nominal residents of the territory;* all the remainder were citizens of Missouri. They were not only well armed and supplied, but wrought up to the highest pitch of partisan excitement. While the governor's proclamation spoke of serving writs,† the notices of the conspirators sounded the note of the real contest. "Now is the time to show game, and if we are defeated this time, the territory is lost to the South," said the leaders.‡ There was no doubt of the earnestness of their purpose. Ex-Vice-President Atchison came in person, leading a battalion of two hundred Platte county riflemen.

News of this proceeding came to the people of Lawrence little by little, and finally, becoming alarmed, they began to improvise means of defense. Two abortive imitations of the Missouri Blue Lodges, set on foot during the summer by the free-State men, provoked by the election invasion in March, furnished them a starting-point for military organization. A committee of safety, hurriedly instituted, sent a call for help from Lawrence to other points in the territory "for the purpose of defending it from threatened invasion by armed men now quartered in its vicinity." Several hundred free-State men promptly responded to the summons. The Free-State Hotel served as barracks. Governor Robinson and Colonel Lane were appointed to command. Four or five small redoubts, connected by rifle-pits, were hastily thrown up; and by a clever

*Shannon, dispatch, Dec. 11th, 1855, to President Pierce. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 63.

†Shannon, proclamation, Nov. 29th, 1855. Ibid., p. 56.

‡Phillips, p. 168.

artifice they succeeded in bringing a twelve-pound brass howitzer from its storage at Kansas City. Meantime the committee of safety, earnestly denying any wrongful act or purpose, sent an urgent appeal for protection to the commander of the United States forces at Fort Leavenworth, another to Congress, and a third to President Pierce.

Amid all this warlike preparation to keep the peace, no very strict military discipline



JAMES H. LANE. (BY PERMISSION OF THE STROWBRIDGE LITHOGRAPHING CO.)

could be immediately enforced. The people of Lawrence without any great difficulty obtained daily information concerning the hostile camps. They, on the other hand, professing no purpose but that of defense and self-protection, were obliged to permit free and constant ingress to their beleaguered town. Sheriff Jones made several visits unmolested on their part, and without any display of writs or demand for the surrender of alleged offenders on his own. One of the rescuers even accosted him, conversed with him, and invited him to dinner. These free visits, however, had the good effect to restrain imprudence and impulsiveness on both sides. They could see with their own eyes that a conflict meant serious results. With the advantage of its defensive position, Lawrence was as strong as the sheriff's mob.

On one point especially the Border Ruffians had a wholesome dread. Yankee ingenuity had invented a new kind of breech-loading gun called "Sharpe's rifle." It was, in fact, the best weapon of its day. The free-State volunteers had some months before obtained a partial supply of them from the East, and their range, rapidity, and effectiveness had been not only duly set forth but highly exaggerated by many marvelous stories throughout the territory and along the border. The Missouri backwoodsmen manifested an almost incredible interest in this wonderful gun. They might be deaf to the "equalities" proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence or blind to the moral sin of slavery, but they comprehended a rifle which could be fired ten times a minute and kill a man at a thousand yards.

The arrivals from Missouri finally slackened and ceased. The irregular Border-Ruffian squads were hastily incorporated into the skeleton "Kansas militia." The "posse" became some two thousand strong, and the defenders of Lawrence perhaps one thousand.

Meanwhile a sober second thought had come to Governor Shannon. To retrieve somewhat the precipitancy of his militia orders and proclamations, he wrote to Sheriff Jones, De-

cember 2d, to make no arrests or movements unless by his direction. The firm defensive attitude of the people of Lawrence had produced its effect. The leaders of the conspiracy became distrustful of their power to crush the town. One of his militia generals suggested that the governor should require the "outlaws at Lawrence and elsewhere" to surrender the Sharpe's rifles;* another wrote asking him to call out the Government troops at Fort Leavenworth. The governor, on his part, becoming doubtful of the legality of employing Missouri militia to enforce Kansas laws, was also eager to secure the help of Federal troops. Sheriff Jones began to grow importunate. In the Missouri camp while the leaders became alarmed the men grew insubordinate. "I have reason to believe," wrote one of their prominent men, "that before to-morrow morning the black flag will be hoisted, when nine out of ten will rally around it, and march without orders upon Lawrence. The forces of the Lecompton camp fully understand the plot and will fight under the same banner."†

After careful deliberation Colonel Sumner, commanding the United States troops at Fort Leavenworth, declined to interfere without explicit orders from the War Department.‡ These failing to arrive in time, the governor was obliged to face his own dilemma. He hastened to Lawrence, which now invoked his protection. He directed his militia generals to repress disorder and check any attack on the town. Interviews were held with the free-State commanders, and the situation was fully discussed. A compromise was agreed upon, and a formal treaty written out and signed. The affair was pronounced to be a "misunderstanding"; the Lawrence party disavowed the Branson rescue, denied any previous, present, or prospective organization for resistance, and under sundry provisos agreed to aid in the execution of "the laws" when called upon by "proper authority." Like all compromises, the agreement was half necessity, half trick. Neither party was willing to yield honestly or ready to fight manfully. The free-State men shrank from forcible resistance to even bogus laws. The Missouri cabal, on the other hand, having three of their best men constantly at the governor's side, were compelled to recognize their lack of justification. They did not dare to ignore upon what a ridiculously shadowy pre-



SHARPE'S RIFLE.
(ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)



COLONEL E. V. SUMNER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY KEET & GEMMILL.)

text the Branson peace-warrant had grown into an army of two thousand men, and how, under manipulation of Sheriff Jones, a questionable affidavit of a pro-slavery criminal had been expanded into the *casus belli* of a free-State town. They consented to a compromise "to cover a retreat."

When Governor Shannon announced that the difficulties were settled, the people of Lawrence were suspicious of their leaders, and John Brown manifested his readiness to head a revolt. But his attempted speech was hushed down, and the assurance of Robinson and Lane that they had made no dishonorable concession finally quieted their followers. There were similar murmurs in the pro-slavery camps. The governor was denounced as a traitor, and Sheriff Jones declared that "he would have wiped out Lawrence." Atchison, on the contrary, sustained the bargain, explaining that to attack Lawrence under the circumstances would ruin the Democratic cause. "But," he added with a significant oath, "boys, we will fight some time!" Thirteen of the captains in the Wakarusa camp were called together, and the situation was duly explained. The treaty was accepted, though the governor confessed "there was a silent dissatisfaction"§ at the result. He ordered the forces to disband; prisoners were liberated, and with the opportune aid of a furious rain-storm the Border-Ruffian army gradually melted away. Nevertheless the

* Richardson to Shannon, December 3d, 1855; Phillips, "Conquest of Kansas," p. 185.

† Anderson to Richardson; Phillips, "Conquest of Kansas," p. 210.

‡ Sumner to Shannon, December 1st, 1855; Phillips, p. 184.

§ Shannon to President Pierce, December 11th, 1855. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 63.

"Wakarusa war" left one bitter sting to rankle in the hearts of the defenders of Lawrence, a free-State man having been killed by a pro-slavery scouting party.

The truce patched up by this Lawrence treaty was of comparatively short duration. The excitement which had reigned in Kansas during the whole summer of 1855, first about the enactments of the bogus legislature, and then in regard to the formation of the Topeka Constitution, was now extended to the American Congress, where it raged for two long months over the election of Speaker Banks. In Kansas during the same period the vote of the free-State men upon the Topeka Constitution and the election for free-State officers under it kept the territory in a ferment. During and after the contest over the speakership at Washington, each State legislature became a forum of Kansas debate. The general public interest in the controversy was shown by discussions carried on by press, pulpit, and in the daily conversation and comment of the people of the Union in every town, hamlet, and neighborhood. No sooner did the spring weather of 1856 permit, than men, money, arms, and supplies were poured into the territory of Kansas from the North. In the Southern States also this propagandism was active, and a number of guerilla leaders with followers recruited in the South, and armed and sustained by Southern contributions and appropriations, found their way to Kansas in response to urgent appeals of the Border chiefs. Buford of Alabama, Titus of Florida, Wilkes of Virginia, Hampton of Kentucky, Treadwell of South Carolina, and others, brought not only enthusiastic leadership, but substantial assistance. Both the factions which had come so near to actual battle in the "Wakarusa war," though nominally disbanded, in reality preserved and continued their military organization,—the free-State men through apprehension of danger, the Border Ruffians because of their purpose to crush out opposition. Strengthened on both sides with men, money, arms, and supplies, the contest was gradually resumed with the opening spring.



A FREE-STATE BATTERY (1856). (REDRAWN FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

The vague and double-meaning phrases of the Lawrence agreement furnished the earliest causes of a renewal of the quarrel. "Did you not pledge yourselves to assist me as sheriff in the arrest of any person against whom I might have a writ?" asked Sheriff Jones of Robinson and Lane in a curt note. "We may have said that we would assist any proper official in the service of any legal process," they replied, standing upon their interpretation.* This was, of course, the original controversy — slavery burning to enforce her usurpation, freedom determined to defend her birthright. Sheriff Jones had his pockets always full of writs issued in the spirit of persecution, though often baffled by the sharp wits and ready resources of the free-State people, and sometimes defied outright. Little by little, however, the latter became hemmed and bound in the meshes of the various devices and proceedings which the territorial officials evolved by hook and crook out of the bogus laws. President Pierce, in his special message of January 24th, declared what had been done by the Topeka movement to be "of a revolutionary character" which would "become treasonable insurrection if it reach the length of organized resistance."

Following this came his proclamation of February 11th, leveled against "combinations formed to resist the execution of the territorial laws." Early in May Chief-Justice Lecompte held a term of his court, during which he delivered to the grand jury his famous instructions on constructive treason. Indictments were found, writs issued, and the principal free-State leaders arrested or forced to flee from the territory. Governor Robinson was arrested without warrant on the Missouri River, and brought back to be held in military custody till September. Lane went East and recruited additional help for the contest. Meanwhile



CANNON USED IN THE ATTACK ON LAWRENCE. (ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

* Holloway, pp. 275, 276.



GOVERNOR CHARLES ROBINSON IN CUSTODY OF CAPTAIN MARTIN, OF THE KICKAPOO RANGERS.*
(FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE IN POSSESSION OF MRS. ROBINSON.)

* Governor Robinson being on his way East, the steamboat on which he was traveling stopped at Lexington, Missouri. An unauthorized mob induced the governor, with that gentle persuasiveness in which the Border Ruffians had become adepts, to leave the boat, detaining him at Lexington on the accusation that he was fleeing from an indictment. In a few days an officer came with a requisition from Governor Shannon, and took the prisoner by land to Westport, and afterwards from there to Kansas City and Leavenworth. Here he was placed in the custody of Captain Martin, of the Kickapoo Rangers, who proved a kind jailer, and materially assisted in protecting him from the dangerous intentions of the mob which at that time held Leavenworth under a reign of terror.

Mrs. Robinson, who has kindly sent us a sketch of the incident, writes: "On the night of the 28th [of May] for greater security General Richardson of the militia slept in the same bed with the prisoner, while Judge Lecompte and Marshal Donaldson slept just outside of the door of the prisoner's room. Captain Martin said, 'I shall give you a pistol to help protect yourself with if worse comes to worst!' In the early morning of the next day, May 29th, a company of

Sheriff Jones, sitting in his tent at night, in the town of Lawrence, had been wounded by a rifle or pistol ball, in the attempt of some unknown person to assassinate him. The people of Lawrence denounced the deed; but the sheriff hoarded up the score for future revenge. One additional incident served to precipitate the crisis. The House of Representatives at Washington, presided over by Speaker Banks, and under control of the opposition, sent an investigating committee to Kansas, consisting of Wm. A. Howard of Michigan, John Sherman of Ohio, and Mordecai Oliver of Missouri, which, by the examination of numerous witnesses, was probing the Border-Ruffian invasions, the illegality of the bogus legislature, and the enormity of the bogus laws to the very bottom. Ex-Governor Reeder was in attendance on this committee, supplying data, pointing out from personal knowledge sources of information, cross-examining witnesses to elicit the hidden truth. To embarrass this damaging exposure, Judge Lecompte issued a writ against the ex-governor on a frivolous charge of contempt. Claiming but not receiving exemption from the committee, Reeder on his personal responsibility refused to permit the deputy marshal to arrest him. The incident was not violent, nor even dramatic. No posse was summoned, no further effort made, and Reeder, fearing personal violence, soon fled in disguise. But the affair was magnified as a crowning proof that the free-State men were insurrectionists and outlaws.

It must be noted in passing that by this time the territory had by insensible degrees drifted into the condition of civil war. Both parties were zealous, vigilant, and denunciatory. In nearly every settlement suspicion led to apprehension, apprehension to combination for defense, combination to some form of oppression or insult, and so on by easy transitions to arrest and concealment, attack and reprisal, expulsion, theft, house-burning, capture, murder, and massacre. From these, again, sprang barricaded and fortified dwellings, camps and scouting parties, finally culminating in roving guerilla bands, half partisan, half predatory. Their distinctive characters, however, display one broad and unfailing difference. The free-State men clung to their prairie towns and prairie ravines with all the obstinacy and courage of true defenders of their homes and firesides. The pro-slavery parties, unmistakable aliens and invaders, always came from or retired across the Missouri line. Organized and sustained in the beginning by voluntary contributions from that and distant States, they ended by levying forced contributions, by "pressing" horses, food, or arms from any neighborhood they

ANDREW H. REEDER IN DISGUISE. (FROM PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

chanced to visit. Their assumed character changed with their changing opportunities or necessities. They were squads of Kansas militia, companies of "peaceful emigrants," or gangs of irresponsible outlaws, to suit the chance, the whim, or the need of the moment.

Since the unsatisfactory termination of the "Wakarusa war," certain leaders of the conspiracy had never given up their project of punishing the town of Lawrence. A propitious moment for carrying it out seemed now to have arrived. The free-State officers and leaders were, thanks to Judge Lecompte's doctrine of constructive treason, under indict-

dragoons with one empty saddle came down from the fort, and while the pro-slavery men still slept, the prisoner and his escort were on their way across the prairies to Lecompton in the charge of officers of the United States Army. The governor and other prisoners were kept on the prairie near Lecompton until the 10th of September, 1856, when all were released."—THE AUTHORS.

It will interest our readers to know that the former editor-in-chief of THE CENTURY, Dr. J. G. Holland, formed a partnership with Dr. Robinson in 1845, and opened with him a hospital in Springfield, Massachusetts. Circumstances, however, soon led to the discontinuance of this enterprise.—EDITOR CENTURY.

WM. BLAIR LORD, STENOGRAPHER. JOHN UPTON, SERGEANT-AT-ARMS.

MORDECAI OLIVER. WM. A. HOWARD, CHAIRMAN. JOHN SHERMAN.

KANSAS INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE. (FROM PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

ment, arrest, or in flight; the settlers were busy with their spring crops; while the pro-slavery guerillas, freshly arrived and full of zeal, were eager for service and distinction. The former campaign against the town had failed for want of justification; therefore they now took pains to provide a pretext which would not shame their assumed character as defenders of law and order. In the shooting of Sheriff Jones in Lawrence, and in the refusal of ex-Governor Reeder to allow the deputy-marshal to arrest him, they discovered grave offenses against the territorial and United States laws. Determined also no longer to trust Governor Shannon, lest he might again make peace, United States Marshal Donaldson issued a proclamation on his own responsibility, on May 11th, 1856, commanding "law-abiding citizens of the territory" "to be and appear at Lecompton, as soon as possible and in numbers sufficient for the execution of the law." * Moving with all the promptness and celerity of preconcert, ex-Vice-President Atchison, with his Platte County Rifles and two brass cannon, the Kickapoo Rangers from Leavenworth and Weston, Wilkes, Titus, Buford, and all the rest of the free lances in the territory began to concentrate against Lawrence, giving the marshal in a very few days a "posse" of from five hundred to eight hundred men, † armed for the greater part with United States muskets, some stolen from the Liberty arsenal on their former raid, others distributed to them as Kansas militia by the territorial officers. The governor refused to interfere to protect the threatened town, ‡ though urgently appealed to do so by its citizens, who after somewhat stormy and divided councils resolved on a policy of non-resistance.

They next made application to the marshal, who tauntingly replied that he could not rely on their pledges, and must take the liberty to execute his process in his own time and manner. § The help of Colonel Sumner, command-

* Memorial, Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 74.

† Phillips, "Conquest of Kansas," p. 289–290.

‡ Memorial, Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 75.

§ Ibid., p. 77.



THE FREE-STATE HOTEL, LAWRENCE, KANSAS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

ing the United States troops, was finally invoked, but his instructions only permitted him to act at the call of the governor or marshal.* Private parties who had leased the Free-State Hotel vainly besought the various authorities to prevent the destruction of their property. Ten days were consumed in these negotiations; but the spirit of vengeance refused to yield. When the citizens of Lawrence rose on the 21st of May they beheld their town invested by a formidable military force.

During the forenoon the deputy marshal rode leisurely into the town attended by less than a dozen men, being neither molested nor opposed. He summoned half a dozen citizens to join his posse, who followed, obeyed, and assisted him. He as leisurely continued his pretended search and, to give color to his errand, made two arrests. The Free-State Hotel, a stone building in dimensions fifty by seventy feet, three stories high, and handsomely furnished, previously occupied only for lodging-rooms, on that day for the first time opened its table accommodations to the public, and had provided a free dinner in honor of the occasion. The marshal and his posse, including Sheriff Jones, went among other invited guests and enjoyed the proffered hospitality. As he had promised to protect the hotel, the reassured citizens began to laugh at their own fears. To their sorrow they were soon undeceived. The military force, partly rabble, partly organized, had meanwhile moved into the town. To save his official skirts from stain, the deputy marshal now went through the farce of dismissing his entire posse of citizens and Border Ruffians, at which juncture Sheriff Jones made his appearance, claiming the "posse" as his own. He planted a company before the hotel, and demanded a surrender of the arms belonging to the free-State military companies. Refusal or resistance being out of the question, half a dozen small cannon were solemnly dug up from their buried concealment and, together with a few Sharpe's rifles, formally delivered. Half an hour later, turning a deaf ear to all remonstrance, he gave the proprietors until five o'clock to remove their families and personal property from the Free-State Hotel. Atchison, who had been haranguing the mob, planted his two guns before the building and trained them upon it. The inmates being removed, at the appointed hour a few cannon-balls were fired through the stone walls. This mode of destruction being slow and undramatic, and an attempt to blow it up with gunpowder having proved equally unsatisfactory, the torch was deliberately applied, and the structure given to the flames.† Other squads had during the same time been sent to the several printing-offices, where they broke the presses, scattered the type, and demolished the furniture. The house of Governor Robinson was also robbed and burned. Very soon the mob was beyond all control, and spreading itself over the town engaged in pillage till the darkness of night arrested it. Meanwhile the chiefs sat on their horses and viewed the work of destruction with open delight.



CANNON SURRENDERED AT LAWRENCE, MAY 21ST, 1856. (ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

If we would believe the chief actors, this was the "law-and-order party," executing the mandates of justice. Part and parcel of the affair was the pretense that this exploit of prairie buccaneering had been authorized by Judge Lecompte's court, the officials citing in their defense a presentment of his grand jury, declaring the free-State newspapers seditious



RUINS OF THE FREE-STATE HOTEL. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

* Sumner to Shannon, May 12th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3rd Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. V.

† Memorial, Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., pp. 73–85.



BREAKING UP A PRO-SLAVERY CAMP.

publications, and the Free-State Hotel a rebellious fortification, and recommending their *abatement* as nuisances.* The travesty of American government involved in the transaction is too serious for ridicule. In this incident, contrasting the creative and the destructive spirit of the factions, the Emigrant Aid Society of Massachusetts finds its most honorable and triumphant vindication. The whole proceeding was so childish, the miserable plot so transparent, the outrage so gross, as to bring disgust to the better class of Border Ruffians themselves who were witnesses and accessories. The free-State men have recorded the honorable conduct of Colonel Zadock Jackson of Georgia, and Buford of Alabama, as well as of the prosecuting attorney of the county, each of whom denounced the proceedings on the spot.†

JEFFERSON DAVIS ON REBELLION.

WHILE the town of Lawrence was yet undergoing burning and pillage, Governor Shannon wrote to Colonel Sumner to say that as the marshal and sheriff had finished making their arrests, and he presumed had by that time dismissed the posse, he required a company of United States troops to be stationed at Lawrence to secure "the safety of the citizens in both persons and property,"‡ asking also a like company for Lecompton and Topeka. The next day the citizens of Lawrence had the opportunity to smother their indignation when they saw the smoldering embers of the Free-State Hotel and the scattered fragments of their printing-presses patrolled and "protected" by the Federal dragoons whose presence they had so vainly implored a few days before.§ It was high time the governor should move. The sack of Lawrence had unchained the demon of civil war in good earnest. The guerilla bands with their booty spread over the country, and the free-State men rose in a spirit of fierce retaliation. Assassinations, house-burnings, expulsions, and skirmishes broke out with frightful speed in all quarters. The sudden shower of lawlessness fell on the just and the unjust; and, forced at last to deal out

* Holloway, p. 334.
† Memorial to the President.
‡ Shannon to Sumner, May 21st, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 38.
§ Sumner to Howard, May 16th, 1856. Ibid., p. 37.

equal protection, the governor (June 4th) issued his proclamation directing military organizations to disperse, "without regard to party, names, or distinctions,"* and empowering Colonel Sumner to enforce the order.† That careful and discreet officer, who had from the first counseled this policy, at once proceeded to execute the command with his characteristic energy. He disarmed and dispersed the free-State guerillas,—John Brown's among the earliest,—liberated prisoners, drove the Missourians, including delegate Whitfield and General Coffee of the skeleton militia, back across their State line, and stationed five companies along the border to prevent their return. He was so fortunate as to accomplish all this without bloodshed. "I do not think," he wrote, June 23d, "there is an armed body of either party now in the territory, with the exception perhaps of a few freebooters."‡ The colonel found very soon that he was only too efficient and faithful. "My measures have necessarily borne hard against both parties," wrote Sumner to the War Department, "for both have in many instances been more or less wrong. The Missourians were perfectly satisfied so long as the troops were employed exclusively against the free-State party; but when they found that I would be strictly impartial, that lawless mobs could no longer come from Missouri, and that their interference with the affairs of Kansas was brought to an end, then they immediately raised a hue and cry that they were oppressed by the United States troops."§ The complaint had its usual prompt effect at Washington. By orders dated June 27th the colonel was superseded in his command, and Brigadier-General P. F. Smith was sent to Leavenworth. Known to be pro-slavery in his opinions, great advantages were doubtless expected by the conspiracy from this change. But General Smith was an invalid, and incapable of active service; and so far as the official records show, the army officers and troops in Kansas continued to maintain a just impartiality in their dealings with the vexed political quarrel of the day.

The removal of Governor Shannon a few weeks after Colonel Sumner once more made Secretary Woodson, always a willing instrument of the conspiracy, acting governor. It was under this individual's promptings and proclamation, Shannon being absent from the territory, that Colonel Sumner, before the arrival of the orders superseding him, forcibly dispersed the free-State legislature on the 4th of July, as narrated. For this act the cynical Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, was not slow to send the colonel an implied censure,‖ perhaps to justify his removal from command; but not a word of reproof went from President or Secretary of State to the acting governor.

It has already been stated that for a considerable length of time after the organization of Kansas Territory the Missouri River was its principal highway of approach from the States. To antislavery men who were unwilling to conceal their sentiments, this had from the very first been a route of difficulty and danger. But now that political strife culminated in civil war, the Missourians established a complete practical blockade of the river against Northern men or Northern goods. Recently, however, railroads had been pushed forward across Iowa, and the Northern emigration to Kansas little by little found a new route through that State and Nebraska.

It was about this time that great consternation was created in pro-slavery circles by the report that Lane had arrived at the Iowa border with a "Northern army," exaggerated into fabulous numbers, and intent upon fighting his way to Kansas. Parties headed by Lane and others and aggregating some hundreds had in fact so arrived, and were more or less provided with arms, though they had no open military organization. While spies and patrols were on the lookout for marching companies and regiments, they, concealing their arms, quietly slipped down in detached parties to Lawrence. Thus reënforced and inspirited, the free-State men took the aggressive, and by several bold movements broke up a number of pro-slavery camps and gatherings. Greatly exaggerated reports of these affairs were promptly sent to the neighboring Missouri counties, and the Border Ruffians rose almost to a man for a third military invasion of Kansas.

Governor Shannon, not yet notified of his removal, reported to General Smith that Lecompton was threatened with an attack. General Smith, becoming himself alarmed, called together all available force for the protection of the territorial capital, and reported the exigency to the War Department. All the hesitation which had hitherto characterized the instructions of Jefferson Davis, the Secretary of War, in the use of troops otherwise than as an officer's posse, instantly vanished.

* Shannon Proclamation, June 4th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d. Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 47.
† Shannon to Sumner, June 4th, 1856. Ibid., p. 45.
‡ Sumner to Cooper, June 23d, 1856. Ibid., p. 50.
§ Sumner to Cooper, Aug. 11th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 58.
‖ Sumner to Cooper, Aug. 11th, 1856. Endorsement, Aug. 27th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 59.

The whole Kansas militia was placed under the orders of General Smith, and requisitions were issued for two regiments from Illinois and two from Kentucky.

"The position of the insurgents," wrote the Secretary, "as shown by your letter and its inclosures, is that of open rebellion against the laws and constitutional authorities, with such manifestation of a purpose to spread devastation over the land as no longer justifies further hesitation or indulgence. To you, as to every soldier, whose habitual feeling is to protect the citizens of his own country, and only to use his arms against a public enemy, it cannot be otherwise than deeply painful to be brought into conflict with any portion of his fellow-countrymen. But patriotism and humanity alike require that rebellion should be promptly crushed, and the perpetration of the crimes which now disturb the peace and security of the good people of the territory of Kansas should be effectually checked. You will therefore energetically employ all the means within your reach to restore the supremacy of the law, always endeavoring to carry out your present purpose to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood." *

The cold-blooded Secretary, who could read a description of the sack of Lawrence unmoved, had probably cast his eye upon the Platte county battle-call in the "Weston Argus Extra," which formed one of the general's inclosures.

"So sudden and unexpected has been the attack of the abolitionists that the law-and-order party was unprepared to effectually resist them. To-day the bogus free-State government, we understand, is to assemble at Topeka. The issue is distinctly made up; either the free-State or pro-slavery party is to have Kansas. . . . Citizens of Platte county! the war is upon you, and at your very doors. Arouse yourselves to speedy vengeance and rub out the bloody traitors." †

It was perhaps well that the pro-slavery zeal of General Smith was less ardent than that of Secretary Jefferson Davis, or the American civil war might have begun in Lawrence instead of Charleston. Upon a little fuller information and more mature reflection, the general found that he had no need either of the four regiments from Illinois and Kentucky or Border-Ruffian mobs led by skeleton militia generals, neither of which he had asked for. Both the militia generals and the Missourians were too eager even to wait for an official call. "General" Richardson ordered out his whole division on the strength of the "Argus Extra" and neighborhood reports,‡ and the entire border was already in motion when Acting Governor Woodson issued his proclamation § declaring the territory "to be in a state of open insurrection and rebellion." General Smith found it necessary to direct his first orders against the Border-Ruffian invaders themselves.

"It has been rumored for several days," he wrote to his second in command, "that large numbers of persons from the State of Missouri have entered Kansas, at various points, armed, with the intention of attacking the opposite party and driving them from the territory, the latter being also represented to be in considerable force. If it should come to your knowledge that either side is moving upon the other with the view to attack, it will become your duty to observe their movements and prevent such hostile collisions." ‖

Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, upon whom this active field work devolved, because of the general's ill health, concentrated his little command between Lawrence and Lecompton, where he could to some extent exert a salutary check upon the main bodies of both parties, and where he soon had occasion to send a remonstrance to the acting governor that his "militia" was ransacking and burning houses.¶ To the acting governor's mind, such a remonstrance was not a proper way to suppress rebellion. He therefore sent Colonel Cooke a requisition to invest the town of Topeka, disarm the insurrectionists, hold them as prisoners, level their fortifications, and intercept aggressive invaders on "Lane's trail"; ** all of which demands the officer prudently and politely declined, replying that he was there to assist in serving judicial process, and not to make war on the town of Topeka.††

If, as had been alleged, General Smith was at first inclined to regard the pro-slavery side with favor, their arrogance and excesses soon removed his prejudices, and he wrote an unsparing report of the situation to the War Department.

"In explanation of the position of affairs, lately and now, I may remark that there are more than two opposing parties in the territory. The citizens of the territory who formed the majority in the organization of the territorial government, and in the elections for its legislature and inferior officers, form one party. The persons who organized a State government, and attempted to put it in operation against the authority of that established by Congress, form another. A party, at the head of which is a former Senator from Missouri, and which is composed in a great part of citizens from that State, who have come into this territory armed, under the excitement produced by reports exaggerated in all cases, and in many absolutely false, form the third. There is a fourth, composed of idle men congregated from various parts, who assume to arrest, punish, exile, and even kill all those whom they assume to be bad citizens; that is, those who will not join them or contribute to their maintenance. Every one of these has in its own peculiar way (except some few of the first party) thrown aside all regard to law, and even honesty, and the territory under their sway is ravaged from one end to the other. . . . Until the day before yesterday I was deficient in force

* Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, to General Smith, Sept. 3d, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 29.

† August 18th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., pp. 76-7.

‡ Richardson to General Smith, August 18th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 75.

§ August 25th, 1856. Ibid., p. 80.

‖ Deas, A. A. G., to Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, August 28th, 1856. Ibid., p. 85.

¶ Cooke to Deas, August 31st, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 89.

** Woodson to Cooke, Sept. 1st, 1856. Ibid., p. 90.

†† Cooke to Woodson, Sept. 2d, 1856. Ibid., p. 91.

to operate against all these at once; and the acting governor of the territory did not seem to me to take a right view of affairs. If Mr. Atchison and his party had had the direction of affairs, they could not have ordered them more to suit his purpose." *

All such truth and exposure of the conspiracy, however, was unpalatable at Washington; and Secretary Jefferson Davis, while approving the conduct of Colonel Cooke and expressing confidence in the general, nevertheless curtly indorsed upon his report:

"The only distinction of parties which in a military point of view it is necessary to note is that which distinguishes those who respect and maintain the laws and organized government from those who combine for revolutionary resistance to the constitutional authorities and laws of the land. The armed combination of the latter class come within the denunciation of the President's proclamation and are proper subjects upon which to employ the military force." †

Such was the state of affairs when the third governor of Kansas, newly appointed by President Pierce, arrived in the territory. The Kansas pro-slavery cabal had upon the dismissal of Shannon fondly hoped that one of their own clique, either Secretary Woodson or Surveyor General John Calhoun, would be made executive, and had set on foot active efforts in that direction. In principle and purpose they enjoyed the abundant sympathy of the Pierce administration; but as the presidential election of 1856 was at hand, the success of the Democratic party could not at the moment be endangered by so open and defiant an act of partisanship. It was still essential to placate the wounded antislavery sensibilities of Pennsylvania and other Northern States, and to this end John W. Geary of the Keystone State was nominated by the President and unanimously confirmed by the Senate. He was a man of character and decision, had gone to the Mexican War as a volunteer captain, and had been made a colonel and intrusted with an important command for merit. Afterwards he had served as postmaster, as alcalde, and as mayor of the city of San Francisco in the turbulent gold excitements of 1848–9, and was again made a funding commissioner by the California legislature. ‡ Both by nature and experience, therefore, he seemed well fitted to subdue the civil commotions of Kansas.

But the pro-slavery leaders of the territory were very far from relishing or desiring qualifications of this character. In one of their appeals calling upon the Missourians for "assistance in men, provisions, and munitions, that we may drive out the 'Army of the North,'" they had given the President and the public a piece of their mind about this appointment.

"We have asked the appointment of a successor," said they, "who was acquainted with our condition," with "the capacity to appreciate and the boldness and integrity requisite faithfully to discharge his duty regardless of the possible effect it might have upon the election of some petty politician in a distant State. In his stead we have one appointed who is ignorant of our condition, a stranger to our people; who, we have too much cause to fear, will, if no worse, prove no more efficient to protect us than his predecessors. . . . We cannot await the convenience in coming of our newly appointed governor. We cannot hazard a second edition of imbecility or corruption!" §

Animated by such a spirit, they now bent all their energies upon concentrating a sufficient force in Kansas to crush the free-State men before the new governor could interfere. Acting Governor Woodson had by proclamation declared the territory in a state of "open insurrection and rebellion," || and the officers of the skeleton militia were hurriedly enrolling the Missourians, giving them arms, and planting them in convenient camps for a final and decisive campaign.

It was on September 9th, 1856, that Governor Geary and his party landed at Leavenworth. Even on his approach he had already been compelled to note and verify the evidences of civil war. He had met, fleeing from the territory, Governor Shannon, who drew for him a direful picture of the official inheritance to which he had come. ¶ While this interview took place, during the landing of the boat at Glasgow, a company of sixty Missouri Border Ruffians was embarking, with wagons, arms, and cannon, and with the open declaration that they were bound for Kansas to hunt and kill "abolitionists." ** Similar belligerent preparations were in progress at all the river towns they touched. At Kansas City the vigilance committee of the blockade boarded and searched the boat for concealed "abolitionists." Finally arrived at Leavenworth, the governor saw a repetition of the same scenes,— parades and military control in the streets, fugitives within the inclosure of the fort, and hundreds of minor evidences of lawlessness and a reign of terror.

Governor Geary went at once to the fort, where he spent the day in consultation with General Smith. That same evening he wrote to Secretary of State Marcy a report of the day's impressions which was anything but reassuring — Leavenworth in the hands of armed men committing outrages under the

* Smith to Cooper, Sept. 10th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 80.

† Sec. War, endorsement, Sept. 23d, on letter of Gen. Smith to A. G., Sept. 10th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 83.

‡ "Washington Union," August 1st, 1856.

§ Gihon, p. 130.

|| Woodson, Proclamation, August 25th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 80.

¶ Gihon, p. 104. ** Gihon, pp. 104–5.

shadow of authority; theft and murder in the streets and on the highways; farms plundered and deserted; agitation, excitement, and utter insecurity everywhere, and the number of troops insufficient to compel peace and order. All this was not the worst, however. Deep in the background stood the sinister apparition of the Atchison cabal.

"I find," wrote he, "that I have not simply to contend against bands of armed ruffians and brigands whose sole aim and end is assassination and robbery — infatuated adherents and advocates of conflicting political sentiments and local institutions — and evil-disposed persons actuated by a desire to obtain elevated positions; but worst of all, against the influence of men who have been placed in authority and have employed all the destructive agents around them to promote their own personal interests at the sacrifice of every just, honorable, and lawful consideration. . . . Such is the condition of Kansas faintly pictured. . . . In making the foregoing statements I have endeavored to give the truth and nothing but the truth. I deem it important that you should be apprised of the actual state of the case; and whatever may be the effect of such revelations, they will be given from time to time without extenuation." *

Discouraging as he found his new task of administration, Governor Geary grappled with it in a spirit of justice and decision. The day following his interview with General Smith found him at Lecompton, the nominal capital of the territory, where the other territorial officials, Woodson, Calhoun, Donaldson, Sheriff Jones, Lecompte, Cato, and others, constituted the ever-vigilant working force of the Atchison cabal, precisely as had been so truthfully represented to him by General Smith, and as he had so graphically described in his yesterday's letter to Marcy. Paying little heed to their profusely offered advice, he adhered to his determination to judge for himself, and at once issued an inaugural address, declaring that in his official action he would do justice at all hazards, that he desired to know no party and no section, and imploring the people to bury their past strifes, and devote themselves to peace, industry, and the material development of the territory.† As an evidence of his earnestness he simultaneously issued two proclamations,‡ one disbanding the volunteer or Missouri militia lately called into service by Acting Governor Woodson, and the other commanding the immediate enrollment of the true citizen militia of Kansas Territory, this step being taken by the advice of General Smith.§

He soon found that he could not govern Kansas with paper proclamations alone. His sudden arrival at this particular juncture was evidently an unexpected *contretemps*. While he was preaching and printing his sage admonitions about peace and prosperity at Lecompton, and laboring to change the implements of civil war into plowshares and pruning-hooks, the Missouri raid against Lawrence, officially called into the field by Woodson's proclamation, was about to deal out destruction to that town. A thousand Border Ruffians (at least two eye-witnesses say twenty-five hundred), led by their recognized Missouri chiefs, were at that moment camped within striking distance of the hated "New Boston." Their published address, which declared that "these traitors, assassins, and robbers must now be punished, must now be taught a lesson they will remember," that "Lane's army and its allies must be expelled from the territory," left no doubt of their errand.

This news reached the governor about midnight of his second day in Lecompton. One of the brigadiers of the skeleton militia was apparently in command, and not yet having caught the cue of the governor's intentions, reported the force for orders, "in the field, ready for duty, and impatient to act."‖ At about the same hour he received a message from the agent he had sent to Lawrence to distribute copies of his inaugural, that the people of that town were arming and preparing to receive and repel this contemplated attack of the Missourians. The governor was dumfounded at the information. His promises and policy, upon which the ink was not yet dry, were already in jeopardy. Instead of bringing peace his advent was about to open war.

In this contingency the governor took his measures with true military promptness. He immediately dispatched to the Missouri camp Secretary Woodson with copies of his inaugural, and the adjutant-general of the territory with orders to disband and muster out of service the Missouri volunteers,¶ while he himself, at the head of three hundred dragoons and a light battery, moved rapidly to Lawrence, a distance of twelve miles. Entering that town at sunrise, he found a few hundred men hastily organized for defense in the improvised intrenchments and barricades about the place, ready enough to sell their lives, but vastly more willing to intrust their protection to the governor's authority and the Federal

* Geary to Marcy, Sept. 9th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 88.

† Geary, Inaugural Address, Sept. 11th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 116.

‡ Geary, Proclamation, Sept. 11th, 1856. Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 93–4.

§ Geary to Marcy, Sept. 12th, 1856. Ibid., p. 95.

‖ General Heiskell to Geary, Sept. 11th and 12th, 1856. Gihon, pp. 136–7.

¶ Geary to Marcy, Sept. 16th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 107.

troops.* They listened to his speech and readily promised to obey his requirements.

Since the Missourians had officially reported themselves to him as subject to his orders, the governor supposed that his injunctions, conveyed to them in writing and print, and borne by the Secretary and the adjutant-general of the territory, would suffice to send them back at once to their own borders, and he returned to Lecompton to take up his thorny duties of administration. But though forewarned by ex-Governor Shannon and by General Smith, the governor did not yet realize the temper and purpose of either the cabal conspirators or the Border-Ruffian rank and file. He had just dispatched a military force in another direction to intercept and disarm a raid about to be made by a detachment of Lane's men, when news came to him that the Missourians were still moving upon Lawrence in increased force, that his officers had not yet delivered their orders, and that skirmishing had begun between the outposts.

Menaced thus with dishonor on one side and contempt on the other, he gathered all his available Federal troops, and hurrying forward posted them between Lawrence and the invaders. Then he went to the Missouri camp, where the true condition of affairs began to dawn upon him. All the Border-Ruffian chiefs were there, headed by Atchison in person, who was evidently the controlling force, though a member of the legislature of the State of Missouri, named Reid, exercised nominal command.† He found his orders unheeded and on every hand mutterings of impatience and threats of defiance. These invading aliens had not the least disposition



JOHN W. GEARY (1866).
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY DRAPER & HUSTED.)

to receive commands as Kansas militia; they invoked that name only as a cloak to shield them from the legal penalties due their real character as organized banditti.

The governor called the chiefs together and made them an earnest harangue. He explained to them his conciliatory policy, read his instructions from Washington, affirmed his determination to keep peace, and appealed personally to Atchison to aid him in enforcing law and preserving order. That wily chief, seeing that refusal would put him in the attitude of a law-breaker, feigned a ready compliance, and he and Reid, his factotum commander, made eloquent speeches "calculated to produce submission to the legal demands made upon them."‡ Some of the lesser captains, however, were mutinous, and treated the governor to choice bits of Border-Ruffian rhetoric. Law and violence vibrated in uncertain balance, when Colonel Cooke, commanding the Federal troops, took the floor and cut the knot of discussion in a summary way. "I felt called upon to say some words myself," he writes naïvely, "appealing to these militia officers as an old resident of Kansas and friend to the Missourians to submit to the patriotic demand that they should retire,

* Colonel Cooke to Porter, A. A. G., Sept. 13th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 113.
† Wilder, p. 108; Gihon, p. 152.
‡ Colonel Cooke to Porter, Sept. 16th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 121.



HOUSE OCCUPIED BY GOVERNOR GEARY.

assuring them of my perfect confidence in the inflexible justice of the governor, and that it would become my painful duty to sustain him at the cannon's mouth."* This argument was decisive. The valiant border chiefs felt willing enough to lead their awkward squads against the slight barricades of Lawrence, but quailed at the unlooked-for prospect of encountering the carbines and sabers of half a regiment of regular dragoons and the grape-shot of a well-drilled light battery. They accepted the inevitable; and swallowing their rage and still nursing their revenge, they consented perforce to retire and be "honorably" mustered out. But for this narrow contingency Lawrence would have been sacked by the direct agency of the territorial cabal a second time.

Nothing could more forcibly demonstrate the unequal character of the contest between the slave-State and the free-State men in Kansas, even in these manœuvres and conflicts of civil war, than the companion exploit to this third Lawrence raid. The day before Governor Geary, seconded by the "cannon" argument of Colonel Cooke, was convincing the reluctant Missourians that it was better to accept, as a reward for their unfinished expedition, the pay, rations, and honorable discharge of a "muster out," rather than the fine, imprisonment, or halter which the full execution of their design would render them liable to, another detachment of Federal dragoons was enforcing the bogus laws upon a company of free-State men who had just had a skirmish with another detachment of this same invading army of Border Ruffians, at a place called Hickory Point. The encounter itself had all the usual characteristics of the dozens of similar affairs which occurred during this prolonged period of border warfare — a neighborhood feud; neighborhood violence; the appearance of organized bands for retaliation; the taking of forage, animals, and property; the fortifying of two or three log-houses by a pro-slavery company then on its way to join in the Lawrence attack, and finally the appearance of a more numerous free-State party to dislodge them. The besieging column, some three hundred and fifty in number, had brought up a brass four-pounder, lately captured from the pro-slavery men, and with this and their rifles kept up a long-range fire for about six hours, when the garrison of Border Ruffians capitulated on condition of being allowed "honorably" to evacuate their stronghold and retire. The casualties were one man killed and several wounded.†



DRAWN BY WILLIAM BREYMAN. LITHOGRAPHED BY J. H. BUFFORD.

BATTLE OF HICKORY POINT. (IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

* Cooke to Porter, Sept. 16th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., p. 122.

† Examination, Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., pp. 156–169.

The rejoicing of the free-State men over this not too brilliant victory was short-lived. Returning home in separate squads, they were successively intercepted by the Federal dragoons acting as a posse to the Deputy United States Marshal,* who arrested them on civil writs obtained in haste by an active member of the territorial cabal, and to the number of eighty-nine † were taken prisoners to Lecompton. So far the affair had been of such frequent occurrence as to have become commonplace — a frontier "free fight," as they themselves described and regarded it. But now it took on a truly remarkable aspect. Sterling G. Cato, one of the pro-slavery territorial judges, had been found by Governor Geary in the Missouri camp drilling and doing duty as a soldier,‡ ready and doubtless more than willing to take part in the projected sack of Lawrence. This Federal judge, as open a law-breaker as these Hickory Point prisoners (the two affairs really forming part of one and the same enterprise), now seated himself on his judicial bench and committed the whole party for trial on charge of murder in the first degree; § and at the October term of his court proceeded to try and condemn to penalties prescribed by the bogus laws some eighteen or twenty of these prisoners, for offenses in which in equity and good morals

GENERAL P. ST. GEORGE COOKE (1861).
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY WHITEHURST.)

* Captain Wood to Colonel Cooke, Sept. 16th, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. III., pp. 123–126.

† Geary to Marcy, October 1st, 1856. Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 156.

‡ Gihon, p. 158.

§ Record of examination, Senate Docs., 3d Sess. 34th Cong. Vol. II., p. 169.

DRAWN BY WILLIAM BREYMAN. LITHOGRAPHED BY J. H. BUFFORD.

IN LECOMPTON PRISON. (IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

FREE-STATE PRISONERS ON THEIR WAY TO LECOMPTON.

he was personally *particeps criminis* — some of the convicts being held in confinement until the following March, when they were pardoned by the governor.* *Inter arma silent leges*, say the publicists; but in this particular instance the license of guerilla war, the fraudulent statutes of the territory, and the laws of Congress were combined and perverted with a satanic ingenuity in furtherance of this wretched conspiracy.

The vigorous proceedings of Governor Geary, the forced retirement of the Missourians on the one hand, and the arrest and conviction of the free-State partisans on the other, had the effect to bring the guerilla war to an abrupt termination. The retribution had fallen very unequally upon the two parties to the conflict,† but this was due to the legal traps and pitfalls prepared with such artful design by the Atchison conspiracy, and not to the personal indifference or ill-will of the governor. He strove sincerely to restore impartial administration; he completed the disbandment of the territorial militia, reënlisting into the Federal service one pro-slavery and one free-State company for police duty. By the end of September he was enabled to write to Washington that "peace now reigns in Kansas." Encouraged by this success in allaying guerilla strife, he next endeavored to break up the existing political persecution and intrigues.

It was not long, however, before Governor Geary became conscious, to his great surprise and mortification, that he had been nominated and sent to Kansas as a partisan manœuvre, and not to institute administrative reforms; that his instructions, written during the presidential campaign, to tranquillize Kansas by his "energy, impartiality, and discretion,"‡ really meant that after Mr. Buchanan was elected he should satisfy the Atchison cabal.

In less than six months after he had come to the territory, clothed with the executive authority, speaking the President's voice, and representing the unlimited military power of the republic, he, the third Democratic governor of Kansas, was, like his predecessors, in secret and ignoble flight from the province he had so trustfully come to rule, contemned and execrated by his party associates, abandoned and disgraced by the Administration which had appointed him, and without protection to guard him from the assault of highwayman or assassin. Humiliating as was this local conspiracy to plant servitude in Kansas, a more aggressive political movement to nationalize slavery in all the Union was about to eclipse it.

THE CONVENTIONS OF 1856.

IN the State of Illinois, the spring of the year 1856 saw an almost spontaneous impulse toward the formation of a new party. As already described, it was a transition period in politics. The disorganization of the Whig party was materially increased and hastened by the failure, two years before, to make Lincoln a Senator. On the other hand, the election of Trumbull served quite as effectively to consolidate the Democratic rebellion against Douglas in his blind determination to make the support of his Nebraska bill a test of party orthodoxy. Many of the Northern counties formed "Republican" organizations in the two previous years; but the name was entirely local, while the opposition, not yet united, but fighting in factions against the Nebraska bill, only

* Gihon, pp. 142–3. Geary, Executive Minutes, Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong. Vol. VI., p. 195.

† The Kansas territorial legislature, in the year 1859, by which time local passion had greatly subsided, by law empowered a non-partisan board of three commissioners to collect sworn testimony concerning the ravages of the civil war in Kansas, with a view of obtaining indemnity from the General Government for the individual sufferers. These commissioners, after a careful examination, made an official report, from which may be gleaned an interesting summary in numbers and values of the harvest of crime and destruction which the Kansas contest produced, and which report can be relied upon, since eye-witnesses and participants of both parties freely contributed their testimony at the invitation of the commissioners.

The commissioners fixed the period of the war as beginning about November 1st, 1855, and continuing until about December 1st, 1856. They estimated that the entire loss and destruction of property, including the cost of fitting out the various expeditions, amounted to an aggregate of not less than $2,000,000. Fully one-half of this loss, they thought, was directly sustained by actual settlers of Kansas. They received petitions and took testimony in 463 cases. They reported 417 cases as entitled to indemnity. The detailed figures and values of property destroyed are presented as follows:

"Amount of crops destroyed, $37,349.61; number of buildings burned and destroyed, 78; horses taken or destroyed, 368; cattle taken or destroyed, 533. Amount of property owned by pro-slavery men, $77,198.99; property owned by free-State men, $335,779.04; property taken or destroyed by pro-slavery men, $318,718.63; property taken or destroyed by free-State men, $94,529.40."

About the loss of life the commissioners say, "Although not within our province, we may be excused for stating that, from the most reliable information that we have been able to gather, by the secret warfare of the guerilla system, and in well-known encounters, the number of lives sacrificed in Kansas during the period mentioned probably exceeded rather than fell short of two hundred. . . . That the excitement in the Eastern and Southern States, in 1856, was instigated and kept up by garbled and exaggerated accounts of Kansas affairs, published in the Eastern and Southern newspapers, is true, most true; but the half of what was done by either party was never chronicled!" — House Reports, 2d Sess. 36th Cong. Vol. III., Part 1, pp. 90 and 93.

‡ Marcy to Geary, August 26th, 1856. Gihon, p. 272.

acknowledged political affinity under the general term of the "Anti-Nebraska" party.

In the absence of any existing party machinery, some fifteen editors of anti-Nebraska newspapers met for conference at Decatur on the 22d of February and issued a call for a delegate State convention of the "Anti-Nebraska party," to meet at Bloomington on the 29th of May. Prominent leaders, as a rule, hesitated to commit themselves by their presence at Decatur. Not so with Mr. Lincoln. He could not attend the deliberations as an editor; but he doubtless lent his suggestion and advice, for we find him among the distinguished guests and speakers at the banquet which followed the business session, and toasts to his candidacy as "the next United States Senator" show that his leadership had suffered no abatement. The assembled editors purposely set the Bloomington convention for a somewhat late day in the campaign, and before the time arrived, the political situation in the State was already much more clearly defined.

One factor which greatly baffled the calculations and forecast of politicians was the existence of the Know-Nothing or American party. It was apparent to all that this order or affiliation had during the past two years spread into Illinois, as into other States. But as its machinery and action were secret, and as no general election had occurred since 1854 to exhibit its numerical strength, its possible scope and influence could only be vaguely estimated. Still it was clearly present as a positive force. Its national council had in February at Philadelphia nominated Fillmore and Donelson as a presidential ticket; but the preponderating Southern membership forced an indorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska act into its platform, which destroyed the unity and power of the party, driving the Northern delegates to a bolt. Nevertheless many Northern voters, indifferent to the slavery issue, still sought to maintain its organization; and thus in Illinois the State Council met early in May, ratified the nomination of Fillmore for President, and nominated candidates for governor and other State offices.*

The Democratic party, or rather so much of that party as did not openly repudiate the policy and principle of the Kansas-Nebraska act, made early preparations for a vigorous campaign. The great loss in prestige and numbers he had already sustained admonished Douglas that his political fortunes hung in a doubtful balance. But he was a bold and aggressive leader, to whom controversy and party warfare were rather an inspiration than a discouragement. Under his guidance, the Democratic State convention nominated for governor of Illinois William A. Richardson, late a member of the House of Representatives, in which body as chairman of the Committee on Territories he had been the leader to whom the success of the Nebraska bill was specially intrusted, and where his somewhat unscrupulous parliamentary management had contributed materially to the final passage of that measure.

Thus the attitude of opposing factions and the unorganized unfolding of public opinion, rather than any mere promptings or combinations of leaders, developed the cause of the anti-Nebraska men of Illinois. Out of this condition sprang directly one important element of future success. Richardson's candidacy, long foreshadowed, was seen to require an opposing nominee of unusual popularity. He was found in the person of Colonel William H. Bissell, late a Democratic representative in Congress, where he had denounced disunion in 1850, and opposed the Nebraska bill in 1854. He had led a regiment to the Mexican war, and fought gallantly at the battle of Buena Vista. His military laurels easily carried him into Congress; but the exposures of the Mexican campaign also burdened him with a disease which paralyzed his lower limbs, and compelled retirement from active politics after his second term. He was now, however, once more recovering; and having already exhibited civic talents of a high order, the popular voice made light of his physical infirmity, and his friends declared their readiness to match the brains of Bissell against the legs of his opponents.

One piece of his history rendered him specially acceptable to young and spirited Western voters. His service in Congress began amid exciting debates over the Compromise measures of 1850, when the Southern fire-eaters were already rampant and reckless. Seddon of Virginia, in his eagerness to depreciate the North and glorify the South, affirmed in a speech that at the battle of Buena Vista, "at that most critical juncture when all seemed lost save honor," amid the discomfiture and rout of "the brave but unfortunate troops of the North through a mistaken order," "the noble regiment of Mississippians" had snatched victory from the jaws of death.† Replying some days later to Seddon's innuendo, Bissell, competent by his presence on the battlefield to bear witness, retorted that when the 2d Indiana gave way, it was McKee's 2d Kentucky, Hardin's 1st Illinois, and Bissell's 2d Illinois which had retrieved the fortunes of the hour, and that the vaunted Mississippi regiment was not within a mile and a half of the scene of action. Properly this was an issue of veracity between Seddon and Bissell, of

* "History of Illinois," Davidson and Stuvé, p. 648.

† January 23d, 1850; "Globe," app. 78.

easy solution. But Jefferson Davis, who commanded the Mississippi regiment in question, began an interchange of notes with Bissell which from the first smelt of gunpowder. Were his reported remarks correct? asked Davis in substance. Bissell answered, repeating the language of his speech and defining the spot and the time to which it applied, adding, "I deem it due, in justice alike to myself and the Mississippi regiment, to say that I made no charge against that regiment." Davis persisting, then asked, in substance, whether he meant to deny General Lane's official report that "the regiment of Mississippians came to the rescue at the proper time to save the fortunes of the day." Bissell rejoined, "My remarks had reference to a different time and place from those referred to by General Lane."

At this point both parties might with great propriety have ended the correspondence. Sufficient inquiry had been met by generous explanation. But Davis, apparently determined to push Bissell to the wall, now sent his challenge. This time, however, he met his match in courage. Bissell named an officer of the army as his second, instructing him to suggest as weapons "muskets, loaded with ball and buckshot." The terms of combat do not appear to have been formally proposed between the friends who met to arrange matters, but they were evidently understood; for the affair was hushed up, with the simple addition to Bissell's first reply that he was willing to award the Mississippi regiment "the credit due to their gallant and distinguished services in that battle."

The Bloomington convention came together according to call on the 29th of May. By this time the active and observant politicians of the State had become convinced that the anti-Nebraska struggle was not a mere temporary and insignificant "abolition" excitement, but a deep and abiding political issue, involving in the fate of slavery the fate of the nation. Minor and past differences were therefore generously postponed or waived in favor of a hearty coalition on the single dominant question. A most notable gathering of the clans was the result. About one-fourth of the counties sent regularly chosen delegations; the rest were volunteers. In spirit and enthusiasm, therefore, it was rather a mass-meeting than a convention; but every man present was in some sort a leader in his own locality. The assemblage was much more representative than similar bodies gathered by the ordinary caucus machinery. It was an earnest and determined council of five or six hundred cool, sagacious, independent thinkers, called together by a great public exigency, led and directed by the first minds of the State. Not only did it show a brilliant array of eminent names, but a remarkable contrast of former antagonisms: Whigs, Democrats, Free-soilers, Know-nothings, Abolitionists; Judd, Yates, Peck, Swett, Trumbull, Davis, Lovejoy, Browning, Codding, Williams, and many more. Chief among these, as adviser and actor, was Abraham Lincoln.

Rarely has a deliberative body met under circumstances more exciting than did this one. The Congressional debates at Washington and the civil war in Kansas were each at a culmination of passion and incident. Within ten days Sumner had been struck down in the Senate, and the town of Lawrence sacked by the guerilla posse of Atchison and Sheriff Jones. Ex-Governor Reeder, of that suffering territory, addressed the citizens of Bloomington and the earliest-arriving delegates on the evening of the 28th, bringing the very atmosphere of the Kansas conflict into the convention itself.

The convention met and conducted its work with earnestness and dignity. Bissell, already designated by unmistakable popular indications, was nominated for governor by acclamation. The candidate for lieutenant-governor was named in like manner. So little did the convention think or care about the mere distribution of political honors on the one hand, and so much, on the other, did it regard and provide for the success of the cause, that it did not even ballot for the remaining candidates on the State ticket, but deputed to a committee the task of selecting and arranging them, and adopted its report as a whole and by acclamation. The more difficult task of drafting a platform was performed by another committee, with such prudence that it too received a unanimous acceptance. It boldly adopted the Republican name, formulated the Republican creed, and the convention further appointed delegates to the coming Republican national convention.

There were stirring speeches by eloquent leaders, eagerly listened to and vociferously applauded; but scarcely a man stirred from his seat in the crowded hall until Mr. Lincoln had been heard. Every one felt the fitness of his making the closing argument and exhortation, and right nobly did he honor their demand. A silence full of emotion filled the assembly as for a moment before beginning his tall form stood in commanding attitude on the rostrum, the impressiveness of his theme and the significance of the occasion reflected in his thoughtful and earnest features. The spell of the hour was visibly upon him; and holding his audience in rapt attention, he closed in a brilliant peroration with an appeal to the people to join the Republican standard, to

"Come as the winds come, when forests are rended;
Come as the waves come, when navies are stranded."

The influence was irresistible; the audience rose and acknowledged the speaker's power with cheer upon cheer. Unfortunately the speech was never reported; but its effect lives vividly in the memory of all who heard it, and it crowned his right to popular leadership in his own State, which thereafter was never disputed.

The organization of the Republican party for the nation at large proceeded very much in the same manner as that for the State of Illinois. Pursuant to separate preliminary correspondence and calls from State committees, a general meeting of prominent Republicans or anti-Nebraska politicians from all parts of the North, and even from a few border slave States, came together at Pittsburgh on Washington's birthday, February 22d. Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania sent the largest contingents; but around this great central nucleus were gathered small but earnest delegations, aggregating between three and four hundred zealous leaders, representing twenty-eight States and territories. It was merely an informal mass convention; but many of the delegates were men of national character, each of whose names was itself a sufficient credential. Above all, the members caught the inspiration of wisdom from their opportunity; they were cautious, moderate, conciliatory, and unambitious to act beyond the requirements of the hour. They contented themselves with the usual parliamentary routine; appointed a committee on national organization; issued a call for a delegate convention; and adopted and put forth a stirring address to the country. Their resolutions were brief, and formulated but four demands: the repeal of all laws which allow the introduction of slavery into territories once consecrated to freedom; resistance by constitutional means to slavery in any United States territory; the immediate admission of Kansas as a free State, and the overthrow of the present national Administration.

In response to the official call embodied in the Pittsburgh address, the first national convention of the Republican party met at Philadelphia on the 17th of June, 1856. The character and dignity of the Pittsburgh proceedings assured the new party of immediate prestige and acceptance; with so favorable a sponsorship it sprang full-armed into the political conflict. That conflict which opened the year with the long congressional contest over the speakership, and which found its only solution in the choice of Banks by a plurality vote, had been fed by fierce congressional debates, by presidential messages and proclamations, by national conventions, by the Sumner assault, by the Kansas war; the body politic throbbed with activity and excitement in every fiber. Every free State and several border States and territories were represented in the Philadelphia convention; its regular and irregular delegates counted nearly a full thousand of eager local leaders, full of the zeal of new proselytes.

The party was too young and its prospect of immediate success altogether too slender to develop any serious rivalry for a presidential nomination. Because its strength lay evidently among the former adherents of the now dissolved and abandoned Whig party, Seward naturally took highest rank in leadership; after him stood Chase as the representative of the independent Democrats, who, bringing fewer voters, had nevertheless contributed the main share of the courageous pioneer work. It is, however, a just tribute to their sagacity that they were willing to wait for the maturer strength and riper opportunities of the new organization. Mr. Justice McLean of the Supreme Bench, an eminent jurist, a faithful Whig, whose character happily combined both the energy and the conservatism of the great West, also had a large following; but as might have been expected, the convention found a more typical leader, young in years, daring in character, brilliant in exploit; and after one informal ballot it nominated John C. Frémont of California. The credit of the selection and its successful management has been popularly awarded to Francis P. Blair, senior, somewhat famous as the talented and powerful newspaper lieutenant of President Jackson; but it was rather an intuitive popular choice, which at the moment seemed so indisputably appropriate as to preclude necessity for artful intrigue.

There was a dash of romance in the personal history of Frémont which gave his nomination a high popular relish. Of French descent, born in Savannah, Georgia, orphaned at an early age, he acquired a scientific education largely by his own unaided efforts in private study; a sea voyage as teacher of mathematics, and employment in a railroad survey through the then wilderness of the Tennessee Mountains, developed the taste and the qualifications that made him useful as an assistant in Nicollet's scientific exploration of the great plateau where the Mississippi River finds its sources, and secured his appointment as second lieutenant of topographical engineers. These labors brought him to Washington, where the same Gallic restlessness and recklessness which had rendered the restraint of schools insupportable brought about an attachment, elopement, and



MILLARD FILLMORE. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE.)

marriage with the daughter of Senator Benton of Missouri.

Reconciliation followed in good time; and the unexplored great West being Benton's peculiar hobby, through his influence Frémont was sent with an exploring party to the Rocky Mountains. Under his command similar expeditions were repeated again and again to that yet mysterious wonderland; and never were the wildest fictions read with more avidity than his official reports of daily adventure and danger and discovery, of scaling unclimbed mountains, wrecking his canoes on the rapids of unvisited rivers, parleying or battling with hostile Indians, or facing starvation while hemmed in by trackless snows. One of these journeys had led him to the Pacific coast when our war with Mexico let loose the spirit of revolution in the then Mexican province of California. With the abandon of a petrel in a storm, Frémont joined his little company of explorers to the insurrectionary faction, organized the revolt, improvised and took command of a mounted regiment, overturned the tottering local Mexican authority and put her remnant of officials to flight, setting up instead a temporary government under a declaration of independence. With others he skillfully assisted in turning this movement into a conquest of the country for the United States; and when through the famous gold discoveries California was soon afterwards organized and admitted as a new State of the Union, Frémont became for a brief period one of her first United States Senators.

So salient a record could not well be without strong contrasts, and of these unsparing criticism took advantage. High romance was changed to merciless ridicule by thousands of sharp newspaper quills in the savage dissections to which presidential candidates are subjected. Hostile journals delineated Frémont as a shallow, vainglorious, "woolly-horse," "mule-eating," "free-love," "nigger-embracing" black Republican; an extravagant, insubordinate, reckless adventurer; a financial spendthrift and political mountebank. As the reading public is not always skillful in winnowing truth from libel when artfully mixed in print, even the grossest calumnies were not without their effect in contributing to his defeat. To the sanguine zeal of the new Republican party, however, Frémont was for the hour a heroic and ideal leader; for upon the vital point at issue, his antislavery votes and

clear declarations satisfied every doubt and inspired unlimited confidence.

However picturesquely Frémont for the moment loomed up as the standard-bearer of the Republican party, future historical interest centers upon the second act of the Philadelphia convention. It shows us how strangely to human wisdom vibrate the delicately balanced scales of fate; or rather how inscrutable and yet how unerring are the far-reaching processes of divine providence. The principal candidate having been selected without contention or delay, the convention proceeded to a nomination for Vice-President. On the first informal ballot William L. Dayton of New Jersey received 259 votes and Abraham Lincoln of Illinois 110; the remaining votes being scattered among thirteen other names.* The dominating thought of the convention being the assertion of principle, and not the promotion of men, there was no further contest;† and though Mr. Dayton had not received a majority support, his nomination was nevertheless at once made unanimous. Those who are familiar with the eccentricities of nominating conventions when in this listless and drift-

JOHN C. FRÉMONT. (FROM A STEEL PLATE IN POSSESSION OF MRS. FRÉMONT.)

ing mood know how easily an opportune speech from some eloquent delegate or a few adroitly arranged delegation caucuses might have reversed this result; and imagination may not easily construct the possible changes in history which a successful campaign of the ticket in that form might have wrought. What would have been the consequences to America and

* For David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, 43; Preston King of New York, 9; Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, 36; Thomas H. Ford of Ohio, 7; Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky, 3; Jacob Collamer of Vermont, 15; William F. Johnston of Pennsylvania, 2; Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, 46; Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, 7; William Pennington of New Jersey, 1; —— Carey of New Jersey, 3; S. C. Pomeroy of Kansas, 8; J. R. Giddings of Ohio, 2. The vote in detail for Lincoln was: Maine, 1; New Hampshire, 8; Massachusetts, 7; Rhode Island, 2; New York, 3; Pennsylvania, 11; Ohio, 2; Indiana, 26; Illinois, 33; Michigan, 5; California, 12.

† Mr. T. S. Van Dyke, son of one of the delegates to Philadelphia, kindly writes us: "Nothing that Mr. Lincoln has ever written is more characteristic than the following note from him to my father just after the

humanity had the Rebellion, even then being vaguely devised by Southern Hotspurs, burst upon the nation in the winter of 1856, with the nation's sword of commander-in-chief in the hand of the impulsive Frémont, and Lincoln, inheriting the patient wariness and cool blood of three generations of pioneers and Indian-fighters, wielding only the powerless gavel of Vice-President? But the hour of destiny had not yet struck.

The platform devised by the Philadelphia convention was unusually bold in its affirmations, and most happy in its phraseology. Not only did it "deny the authority of Congress, or of a territorial legislature, of any individual or association of individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States;" it further "Resolved, that the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign power over the territories of the United States for their government, and that in the exercise of this power it is both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism,— polygamy and slavery." At Buchanan, recently nominated by the Democratic National Convention in Cincinnati, it aimed a barbed shaft: "Resolved, that the highwayman's plea that 'might makes right,' embodied in the Ostend circular, was in every respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction." It demanded the maintenance of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, of the Federal Constitution, of the rights of the States, and the union of the States. It favored a Pacific railroad, congressional appropriations for national rivers and harbors; it affirmed liberty of conscience and equality of rights; it arraigned the policy of the Administration; demanded the immediate admission of Kansas as a State, and invited "the affiliation and coöperation of men of all parties, however differing from them in other respects, in support of the principles declared."

The nominees and platform of the Philadelphia convention were accepted by the opposition voters of the free States with an alacrity and an enthusiasm beyond the calculation of even the most sanguine; and in November a vote was recorded in their support which, though then unsuccessful, laid the secure foundation of an early victory, and permanently established a great party destined to carry the country through trials and vicissitudes equal in magnitude and results to any which the world had hitherto witnessed.



WILLIAM L. DAYTON.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY MOSES E. ERTZ.)

In the present year none of the presidential honors were reserved for the State of Illinois. While Lincoln thus narrowly missed a nomination for the second place on the Republican ticket, his fellow-citizen and competitor, Douglas, failed equally to obtain the nomination he so much coveted as the candidate of the Democratic party. The Democratic national convention had met at Cincinnati on the 2d day of June, 1856. If Douglas flattered himself that such eminent services as he had rendered the South would now find their reward, his disappointment must have been severe. A frequent phenomenon of human nature again occurred. While the benefits he had conferred were lightly estimated or totally forgotten, former injuries inflicted in his name were keenly remembered and resented. But three prominent candidates, Buchanan, Pierce, and Douglas, were urged upon the convention. The indiscreet crusade of Douglas's friends against "old fogies" in 1852 had defeated Buchanan and nominated Pierce; now, by the turn of political fortune, Buchanan's friends were able to wipe out the double score by defeating both Pierce and Douglas. The bulk of the Southern delegates seem to have been guided by the mere instinct of present utility; they voted to renominate Pierce,

convention — not for publication, but merely as a private expression of his feelings to an old acquaintance:

"'SPRINGFIELD, ILL., June 27, 1856.
"'HON. JOHN VAN DYKE.
"'MY DEAR SIR: Allow me to thank you for your kind notice of me in the Philadelphia convention.

"'When you meet Judge Dayton present my respects, and tell him I think him a far better man than I for the position he is in, and that I shall support both him and Colonel Frémont most cordially. Present my best respects to Mrs. V., and believe me, Yours truly,
"'A. LINCOLN.'"

because of his subservient Kansas policy, forgetting that Douglas had not only begun it, but was their strongest future ally to continue it. When after a day of fruitless balloting they changed their votes to Douglas, Buchanan, the so-called "old fogy," just returned from the English mission, and therefore not handicapped by present personal jealousies and heart-burnings, had secured the firm adhesion of a decided majority, mainly from the North.* The "two-thirds rule" was not yet fulfilled, but at this juncture the friends of Pierce and Douglas yielded to the inevitable, and withdrew their favorites in the interest of "harmony." On the seventeenth ballot, therefore, and the fifth day of the convention, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania became the unanimous nominee of the Democratic party for President, and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky for Vice-President.

The famous "Cincinnati platform" holds a conspicuous place in party literature for length, for vigor of language, for variety of topics, for boldness of declaration; and yet, strange to say, its chief merit and utility lay in the skillful concealment of its central thought and purpose. About one-fourth of its great length is devoted to what to the eye looks like a somewhat elaborate exposition of the doctrines of the party on the slavery question. Eliminate the verbiage and there only remains an indorsement of "the principles contained in the organic laws establishing the Territory of Kansas and Nebraska" (non-interference by Congress with slavery in State and territory, or in the District of Columbia); and the practical application of "the principles" is thus further defined:

"Resolved, that we recognize the right of the people of all the territories, including Kansas and Nebraska, acting through the legally and fairly expressed will of a majority of actual residents, and whenever the number of their inhabitants justifies it, to form a Constitution with or without domestic slavery, and be admitted into the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the other States."

We have already seen how deliberately the spirit and letter of "the principle" was violated by the Democratic national administration of President Pierce, and by nearly all the Democratic Senators and Representatives in Congress; and we shall see how the more explicit resolution was again even more flagrantly violated by the Democratic national administration and party under President Buchanan.

For the present, however, these well-rounded phrases were especially convenient; first, to prevent any schism in the Cincinnati convention itself, and, secondly, to furnish points for campaign speeches; politicians not having any pressing desire, nor voters the requisite critical skill, to demonstrate how they left untouched the whole brood of pertinent queries which the discussion had already raised, and which at the very next national convention were destined to disrupt and defeat the Democratic party. For this occasion the studied ambiguity of the Cincinnati platform made possible a last coöperation of North and South, in the face of carefully concealed mental reservations, to secure a presidential victory.

It is not the province of this work to describe the incidents of the national canvass, but only to record its results. At the election of November, 1856, Buchanan was chosen President. The popular vote in the nation at large stood: Buchanan, 1,838,169; Frémont, 1,341,264; Fillmore, 874,534. By States Buchanan received the votes of fourteen slave States and five free States, a total of 174 electors; Frémont the vote of eleven free States, a total of 114 electors; and Fillmore the vote of one slave State, a total of eight electors.†

Our recital has carried us forward beyond the regular order of chronological events; we must therefore turn back and once more take up the thread of local political history in the State of Illinois. Among the other work of the Bloomington convention was the nomination of a full ticket of Presidential electors, at the head of which was placed Abraham Lincoln. While this was a gratifying mark of honor, it was also a somewhat onerous post of duty, involving a laborious campaign of speech-making in support of the Republican presidential ticket. This duty Mr. Lincoln performed with faithful zeal, making about fifty speeches before election. Among the addresses which he thus delivered in the different counties, it is interesting to read a fragment of a speech he made at Galena, Illinois, discussing the charge of "sectionalism," the identical pretext upon which the South inaugurated its rebellion against his administration four years afterward:

*On the sixteenth ballot Buchanan received 168 votes, of which 121 were from the free States and 47 from the slave States; Douglas received 122 votes, of which 49 were from the free States and 73 from the slave States; Cass received 6 votes, all from the free States; Pierce had been finally dropped on the previous ballot.—"Proceedings of Cincinnati Convention," p. 45.

† The vote more in detail was: For Buchanan, slave States, Alabama, 9; Arkansas, 4; Delaware, 3; Florida, 3; Georgia, 10; Kentucky, 12; Louisiana, 6; Mississippi, 7; Missouri, 9; North Carolina, 10; South Carolina, 8; Tennessee, 12; Texas, 4; Virginia, 15. Free States, California, 4; Illinois, 11; Indiana, 13; New Jersey, 7; Pennsylvania, 27. Total, 174.

For Frémont, free States, Connecticut, 6; Iowa, 4; Maine, 8; Massachusetts, 13; Michigan, 6; New Hampshire, 5; New York, 35; Ohio, 23; Rhode Island, 4; Vermont, 5; Wisconsin, 5. Total, 114.

For Fillmore, slave State, Maryland, 8.

"You further charge us with being disunionists. If you mean that it is our aim to dissolve the Union, I for myself answer that it is untrue; for those who act with me I answer that it is untrue. Have you heard us assert that as our aim? Do you really believe that such is our aim? Do you find it in our platform, our speeches, our conventions, or anywhere? If not, withdraw the charge.

"But you may say that though it is not our aim, it will be the result, if we succeed, and that we are therefore disunionists in fact. This is a grave charge you make against us, and we certainly have a right to demand that you specify in what way we are to dissolve the Union. How are we to effect this?

"The only specification offered is volunteered by Mr. Fillmore in his Albany speech. His charge is that if we elect a President and Vice-President both from the free States it will dissolve the Union. This is open folly. The Constitution provides that the President and Vice-President of the United States shall be of different States; but says nothing as to the latitude and longitude of those States. In 1828 Andrew Jackson of Tennessee and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina were elected President and Vice-President, both from slave States; but no one thought of dissolving the Union then on that account. In 1840 Harrison of Ohio and Tyler of Virginia were elected. In 1841 Harrison died and John Tyler succeeded to the presidency, and William R. King of Alabama was elected acting Vice-President by the Senate; but no one supposed that the Union was in danger. In fact, at the very time Mr. Fillmore uttered this idle charge, the state of things in the United States disproved it. Mr. Pierce of New Hampshire and Mr. Bright of Indiana, both from free States, are President and Vice-President, and the Union stands and will stand. You do not pretend that it ought to dissolve the Union, and the facts show that it won't; therefore the charge may be dismissed without further consideration.

"No other specification is made, and the only one that could be made is, that the restoration of the restriction of 1820 making the United States territory free territory would dissolve the Union. Gentlemen, it will require a decided majority to pass such an act. We, the majority, being able constitutionally to do all that we purpose, would have no desire to dissolve the Union. Do you say that such restriction of slavery would be unconstitutional, and that some of the States would not submit to its enforcement? I grant you that an unconstitutional act is not a law; but I do not ask and will not take your construction of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal to decide such a question, and we will submit to its decisions; and if you do also, there will be an end of the matter. Will you? If not, who are the disunionists, you or we? We, the majority, would not strive to dissolve the Union; and if any attempt is made it must be by you, who so loudly stigmatize us as disunionists.

But the Union, in any event, will not be dissolved. We don't want to dissolve it, and if you attempt it we won't let you. With the purse and sword, the army and navy and treasury in our hands and at our command, you could not do it. This government would be very weak indeed if a majority with a disciplined army and navy and a well-filled treasury could not preserve itself, when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined, unorganized minority. All this talk about the dissolution of the Union is humbug, nothing but folly. We do not want to dissolve the Union; you shall not." *

With three presidential tickets in the field — with the Democrats seeking the election of Buchanan and Breckinridge, the Americans, or Know-Nothings, asking votes for Fillmore and Donelson, and the Republicans making proselytes for Frémont and Dayton — the political campaign of 1856 was one of unabated activity and excitement. In the State of Illinois the contest resulted in a drawn battle. The American party held together with tolerable firmness in its vote for President, but was largely disintegrated in its vote on the ticket for State officers. The consequence was that Illinois gave a plurality of 9164 for Buchanan, the Democratic candidate for President, while at the same time it gave a plurality of 4729 for Bissell, the Republican candidate for governor.†

Half victory as it was, it furnished the Illinois Republicans a substantial hope of the full triumph which they achieved four years later. About a month after this election, at a Republican banquet given in Chicago on the 10th of December, 1856, Abraham Lincoln spoke as follows, partly in criticism of the last annual message of President Pierce, but more especially as an unsleeping leader and prophet sounding a new battle-call and pointing out the rising star of promise:

"We have another annual presidential message. Like a rejected lover making merry at the wedding of his rival, the President felicitates himself hugely over the late presidential election. He considers the result a signal triumph of good principles and good men, and a very pointed rebuke of bad ones. He says the people did it. He forgets that the 'people,' as he complacently calls only those who voted for Buchanan, are in a minority of the whole people by about four hundred thousand votes — one full tenth of all the votes. Remembering this, he might perceive that the 'rebuke' may not be quite as durable as he seems to think — that the majority may not choose to remain permanently rebuked by that minority.

"The President thinks the great body of us Frémonters, being ardently attached to liberty, in the abstract, were duped by a few wicked and designing men. There is a slight difference of opinion on this. We think he, being ardently attached to the hope of a second term, in the concrete, was duped by men who had liberty every way. He is the cat's-paw. By much dragging of chestnuts from the fire for others to eat, his claws are burnt off to the gristle, and he is thrown aside as unfit for further use. As the fool said of *King Lear*, when his daughters had turned him out-of-doors, 'He's a shelled peascod.' [That's a sheal'd peascod.]

"So far as the President charges us 'with a desire to change the domestic institutions of existing States,' and of 'doing everything in our power to deprive the Constitution and the laws of moral authority,' for the whole party on belief, and for myself on knowledge, I pronounce the charge an unmixed and unmitigated falsehood.

"Our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion can change the government practically just so much. Public opinion, on any subject, always has a 'central idea,' from which all its minor thoughts radiate. That 'central idea' in our polit-

* Galena "Advertiser," copied into the Illinois "State Journal," August 8th, 1856.

† For President, Buchanan (Dem.), 105,344; Frémont (Rep.), 96,180; Fillmore (Am.), 37,451. For Governor, Richardson (Dem.), 106,643; Bissell (Rep.), 111,372; Morris (Am.), 19,241.

ical public opinion at the beginning was, and until recently has continued to be, 'the equality of men.' And although it has always submitted patiently to whatever of inequality there seemed to be as matter of actual necessity, its constant working has been a steady progress towards the practical equality of all men. The late presidential election was a struggle by one party to discard that central idea and to substitute for it the opposite idea that slavery is right in the abstract, the workings of which as a central idea may be the perpetuity of human slavery and its extension to all countries and colors. Less than a year ago the Richmond 'Enquirer,' an avowed advocate of slavery, regardless of color, in order to favor his views, invented the phrase 'State equality,' and now the President, in his message, adopts the 'Enquirer's' catch-phrase, telling us the people 'have asserted the constitutional equality of each and all of the States of the Union as States.' The President flatters himself that the new central idea is completely inaugurated; and so indeed it is, so far as the mere fact of a presidential election can inaugurate it. To us it is left to know that the majority of the people have not yet declared for it, and to hope that they never will. All of us who did not vote for Mr. Buchanan, taken together, are a majority of four hundred thousand. But in the late contest we were divided between Frémont and Fillmore. Can we not come together for the future? Let every one who really believes, and is resolved, that free society is not and shall not be a failure, and who can conscientiously declare that in the past contest he has done only what he thought best, let every such one have charity to believe that every other one can say as much. Thus let bygones be bygones; let past differences as nothing be; and with steady eye on the real issue, let us reinaugurate the good old 'central ideas' of the Republic. We can do it. The human heart is with us, God is with us. We shall again be able not to declare that 'all States as States are equal,' nor yet that 'all citizens as citizens are equal,' but to renew the broader, better declaration, including both these and much more, that 'all men are created equal.'" *

* Illinois "State Journal," December 16th, 1856.

[We are indebted for much valuable aid in preparing the Kansas illustrations to Judge F. G. Adams, Secretary of the Kansas State Historical Society.— Ed. C. M.]

Century mag 1887

KEATS.

DEATH hath his fancies, and why not? A king
So great as he must have his royal whim,—
Sometimes a fool, sometimes the wailing string
Of some slain minstrel's harp, must humor him.

There was a youthful singer once, a soul
Loved of the gods, and hence not loved of men,
Who sang too well, and, shame to say, the whole
Small race of songsters rose against him then.

And all the critics too — like daws that peck
Some lustrous jewel from its golden setting —
Beaked his fair lines, so, hastening on to wreck
The fragile bark that every flaw was fretting.

Love, also, with his barbéd baby spear
Racked all the chambers of his heart with anguish;
But bravely through it all, more strong and clear,
Went up his matchless song that would not languish.

And all so well he pleased the sable king,
Though many a famous bard sang at his call,
That straight he sent his messenger to bring
This tortured soul which pleased him best of all.

So Keats was brought, and when his strain beguiled
The sad-faced king and his brave company
To strange, unwonted tears — Death kindly smiled,
Approving his unequaled minstrelsy.

And when at times his watchful eye could trace
The swiftly passing spasm of fierce pain
Which swept across the minstrel's pallid face,
He quickly cried, "Thy songs were not in vain;

"Fixed in the world's large memory they shall live,
Undying as that beauty to whose shrine
Thy kneeling soul brought all thou hadst to give;
All things of which thy heart once dreamed are thine:

"As thou didst leave them they shall picture thee
Both to thine own and far-off other lands,
And while men sing, thy name shall never be
Forgotten in their songs." And so he stands,

A fair-formed image of immortal youth
Breasting the steep hillside of life's endeavor;
A white-robed herald of eternal truth
Shouting a message from the gods forever.

Robert Burns Wilson.

June 1887

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ATTACK ON SUMNER, AND THE DRED SCOTT CASE.

CONGRESSIONAL RUFFIANISM.

THE official reports show that the proceedings of the American Congress, while in the main conducted with becoming propriety and decorum, have occasionally been dishonored by angry personal altercations and scenes of ruffianly violence. These disorders increased as the great political struggle over the slavery question grew in intensity, and they reached their culmination in a series of startling incidents.

Charles Sumner, one of the Senators from the State of Massachusetts, had become conspicuous, in the prevailing political agitation, for his aggressive and radical antislavery speeches in the Senate and elsewhere. The slavery issue had brought him into politics; he had been elected to the United States Senate by the coalition of a small number of Free-soilers with the Democrats in the Massachusetts legislature. This question, therefore, became the dominant principle and the keynote of his public career. He was a man of profound culture, of considerable erudition in the law, of high literary ability, and he had attained an enviable social eminence. Though of large physical frame and strength, the combative quality was almost totally lacking in his organization, a lack, however, which was fully compensated by a moral fearlessness that led him to give free utterance to his convictions.

In this spirit he joined unreservedly in the exciting Senate debates, provoked by the rival applications from Kansas for her admission as a State. On the 19th and 20th of May, 1856, he delivered an elaborate speech in the Senate, occupying two days. It was one of his greatest efforts, and had been prepared with his usual industry. In character it was a philippic rather than an argument, strong, direct, and aggressive, in which classical illustration and acrimonious accusation were blended with great effect. It described what he called "the crime against Kansas"; and the excuses for the crime he denominated the apology tyrannical, the apology imbecile, the apology absurd, and the apology infamous. "Tyranny, imbecility, absurdity, and infamy," he continued, "all unite to dance, like the weird sisters, about this crime." In the course of this speech he alluded, among others, to Senator Butler of South Carolina, and in reply to some severe strictures by that Senator during preceding debates indulged in caustic personal criticism upon his course and utterance, as well as upon the State of South Carolina, which he represented.

"With regret," said Sumner, "I come again upon the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Butler], who, omnipresent in this debate, overflowed with rage at the simple suggestion that Kansas had applied for admission as a State; and with incoherent phrases discharged the loose expectoration of his speech, now upon her representative and then upon her people. There was no extravagance of the ancient parliamentary debate which he did not repeat; nor was there any possible deviation from truth which he did not make, with so much of passion, I am glad to add, as to save him from the suspicion of intentional aberration. But the Senator touches nothing which he does not disfigure — with error, sometimes of principle, sometimes of fact. He shows an incapacity of accuracy, whether in stating the Constitution or in stating the law, whether in details of statistics or the diversions of scholarship. He cannot open his mouth but out there flies a blunder."

Butler was not present in the Senate on either day: what he might have said or done, had he been there, can only be conjectured. The immediate replies from Douglas and others were very bitter. Among pro-slavery members of both Houses there was an under-current of revengeful murmurs. It is possible that this hostile manifestation may have decided a young member of the House, Preston S. Brooks, a nephew of Senator Butler, to undertake retaliation by violence. Acquainting Edmundson, another member, with his design, he waited on two different occasions at the western entrance to the Capitol grounds to encounter Mr. Sumner, but without meeting him.

On the 22d of May, two days after the speech, Brooks entered the Senate Chamber on the same errand. The session had been short, and after adjournment Sumner remained at his desk, engaged in writing. The sessions were at that time held in the old Senate Chamber,

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

PLAN OF SENATE CHAMBER, 1ST SESSION 34TH CONGRESS.

9. Sumner's desk. 15. Where Brooks sat. X. Where Sumner fell.

now occupied by the Supreme Court. The seats were arranged in semicircles, with a railing to separate them from a narrow lobby or open space next the wall; a broad aisle ran from the main door to the desk of the presiding officer. Mr. Sumner's seat was in the outside row next to the railing, at the second desk to the right from the entrance and the main aisle. Occupied with his work, Mr. Sumner did not notice Mr. Brooks sitting across the aisle to his left, and where in conversation with a friend he was manifesting his impatience that a lady seated near Mr. Sumner did not take her departure from the chamber. Almost at that moment she probably arose and went out, for quickly afterwards Brooks got up and advanced to the front of Sumner's desk. The fact attracted the attention of Brooks's friend; he was astonished, amid the bitterness of party feeling, to see a South Carolina Representative talk to a Massachusetts Senator. His astonishment was quickly corrected. Leaning upon the desk and addressing Sumner with a rapid sentence or two, to the effect that he had read his speech, that it was a libel upon his absent relative, and that he had come to punish him for it, Brooks began striking him on the head with a gutta-percha walking-cane, of the ordinary length and about an inch in diameter.

Surprised, blinded, and stunned by the blows, Sumner's first instinct was to grapple with his assailant. This effort, however, was futile; the desk was between them, and being by his sitting posture partially under it, Sumner was prevented from rising fully to his feet until he had by main strength, in his struggles, wrenched it from its fastenings on the floor. In his attempt to follow Brooks they became turned, and from between the desks moved out into the main aisle. By this time, through the repetition of the heavy blows, and loss of blood, Sumner became unconscious. Brooks, seizing him by the coat-collar, continued his murderous attack till Sumner, reeling in utter helplessness, sank upon the floor beside the desk nearest the aisle, one row nearer the center of the chamber than his own. The witnesses variously estimated the number of blows given at from ten to thirty. Two principal wounds, two inches long and an inch deep, had been cut on the back of Sumner's head; and near the end of the attack, Brooks's cane was shivered to splinters.

There were perhaps ten or fifteen persons in the chamber, and after the first momentary pause of astonishment half a dozen started to interfere. Before they reached the spot, however, Mr. Keitt, another South Carolina member of Congress, came rushing down the main aisle, brandishing his cane, and with imprecations warning lookers-on to "let them alone." Among those hastening to the rescue, Mr. Morgan arrived first, just in time to catch and sustain the Senator as he fell. Another bystander, who had run around outside the railing, seized Brooks by the arm about the same instant; and the wounded man was borne to an adjoining room, where he was cared for by a hastily summoned physician.

Among Mr. Sumner's friends the event created a certain degree of consternation. The language which provoked the assault, whatever might be thought of its offensive character, was strictly parliamentary, uninterrupted either by the chair or by any member. The assault itself was so desperate and brutal that it implied a vindictiveness deeper than mere personal revenge. This spirit of bullying, this resort to violence, had recently become alarmingly frequent among members of Congress, especially as it all came from the pro-slavery party. Since the beginning of the current session, a pro-slavery member from Virginia had assaulted the editor of a Washington newspaper; another pro-slavery member, from Arkansas, had violently attacked Horace Greeley on the street; a third pro-slavery member, from California, had shot an unoffending waiter at Willard's Hotel. Was this fourth instance the prelude of an intention to curb or stifle free congressional debate? It is probable that this question was seriously considered at the little caucus of Republican Senators held that night at the house of Mr. Seward. The Republicans had only a slender minority in the Senate, and a plurality in the House; they could do nothing but resolve on a course of parliamentary inquiry, and agree on an attitude of defense.

Sumner's colleague, Mr. Wilson, made a very brief announcement of the occurrence to the Senate on the following day, and it at once became apparent that the transaction would assume an almost strictly party char-

acter. As no Democratic Senator proposed an inquiry, Mr. Seward moved for a committee of investigation; upon which Mason of Virginia proposed that the committee should be elected by ballot. The result was that no Republican was chosen upon it; and the committee reached the conclusion that it had no power in the premises, except to report the occurrence to the House. In the House the usual committee from the three parties was raised, resulting in two reports. The minority, sustained by the vote of sixty members, pleaded a want of jurisdiction. The majority recommended the expulsion of Brooks, and expressed disapprobation by the House of the course of his colleague Edmundson in countenancing the assault, and of the act of Keitt in his personal interference. But the necessary two-thirds vote for the expulsion of Brooks could not be obtained; a vote of censure was therefore passed by a large majority. The discussion of the report and resolutions occupied the House several days, and whatever effort



CHARLES SUMNER.

members made to disguise their motives, their actions, either of condemnation or of excuse, arose in the main clearly enough from their party relations. Under the forms of parliamentary debate, the South and the North were breathing mutual recrimination and defiance.

The public of both sections took up the affair with equal party zeal. From the North



PRESTON S. BROOKS.

came resolutions of legislatures, outbursts of indignation in meetings and addresses, and the denunciation of Brooks and his deed in the newspapers. In the South the exactly opposite sentiment predominated. Brooks was defended and eulogized, and presented with canes and pitchers as testimonials to his valor. When the resolution of censure had been passed, he at once resigned his seat in the House, and, going home to his constituents, was immediately reëlected. Within three weeks he reappeared at the bar of the House, with a new commission from his governor, and was sworn in and continued his service as before. The somewhat arrogant address which preceded his resignation contained the remarkable intimation that much more serious results might have grown out of the incident. "No act of mine," he said, "on my personal account shall inaugurate revolution; but when you, Mr. Speaker, return to your own home, and hear the people of the great North — and they are a great people — speak of me as a bad man, you will do me the justice to say that a blow struck by me at this time would be followed by a revolution, and this I know."

Under the state of public sentiment then prevailing at the South, it would have been strange if the extraordinary event and the following debate had not provoked other similar affairs. Mr. Sumner's colleague, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, in his speech characterized the assault as "brutal, murderous, and cowardly." For this language Brooks sent him a challenge. Wilson wrote a reply declining the encounter, but in the same letter announcing that "I religiously believe in the right of self-defense, in its broadest sense."

One of the sharpest denunciations of the assault was made by Burlingame, a Massachusetts Representative. "I denounce it," he said, "in the name of the Constitution it violates. I denounce it in the name of the sovereignty of Massachusetts, which was stricken down by the blow. I denounce it in the name of humanity. I denounce it in the name of civilization, which it outraged. I denounce it in the name of that fair play which bullies and prize-fighters respect." For this, after some efforts had been made by mutual friends to patch up an amicable understanding, Brooks sent him also a challenge. Mr. Burlingame accepted the challenge, and his second designated Clifton House in Canada as the rendezvous and rifles as weapons. Burlingame at once started on the journey; but Brooks declined to go, on the excuse that his life would not be safe on such a trip through the North.

Broadened into national significance by all these attendant circumstances, the Sumner assault became a leading event in the great slavery contest which was being fought out between the South and the North. It might well rank as one of the episodes of the civil

war then raging in Kansas, out of which it had in reality grown, and with which it was intertwined in motive, act, and comment. In result the incident was extremely damaging to the South, for it tended, much more than any single Border-Ruffian crime in Kansas, to unite hesitating and wavering opinion in the North against the alarming flood of lawlessness and violence, which as a rule found its origin and its defense in the ranks of the pro-slavery party. Certainly no phase of the transaction was received by the North with such popular favor as some of the bolder avowals by Northern Representatives of their readiness to fight, and especially by Burlingame's actual acceptance of the challenge of Brooks.

Readers of a later generation will naturally wish to know what further befell Senator Sumner. The shock of the attack, and the serious wounds he received, produced a spinal malady, from which he rallied with great difficulty, and only after severe medical treatment and years of enforced abstinence from work. As the constituents of Brooks sent him back to the House, so also the legislature of Massachusetts, in January, 1857, with but a few dissenting votes, reëlected Sumner to a new senatorial term, beginning the 4th of March. He came to Washington and was sworn in, but within a few days sailed for Europe, and during the greater part of the long interim between that time and the succeeding presidential campaign his seat in the Senate stood vacant.



ANSON BURLINGAME. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY WILLIAM SHAW.)



HENRY WILSON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY HOYT.)

It was on the 4th of June, 1860, that he again raised his voice in debate. Some changes had occurred; both Butler and Brooks were dead;* the Senate was assembled in its new hall in the north wing of the Capitol extension. But in the main the personnel and the spirit of the pro-slavery party still confronted him. "Time has passed," he said, "but the question remains." A little more than four years before, he had essayed to describe "The Crime against Kansas"; now, in an address free from offensive personalities but more unsparing in rhetoric and stronger in historical arraignment, he delineated what he named the "Barbarism of Slavery." Picturing to ourselves the orator, the circumstances, and the theme, we can comprehend the exaltation with which he exclaimed in his exordium:

"Slavery must be resisted not only on political grounds, but on all other grounds, whether social, economical, or moral. Ours is no holiday contest; nor is it any strife of rival factions — of White and Red Roses; of theatric Neri and Bianchi; but it is a solemn battle between Right and Wrong, between Good and Evil. . . . Grander debate has not occurred in our history, rarely in any history; nor can this debate close or subside except with the triumph of Freedom."

* P. S. Brooks died January 27th, 1857; A. P. Butler died May 25th, 1857.

With this speech Sumner resumes his place as a conspicuous figure and an indefatigable energy in national politics and legislation, tireless in attacking and pursuing slavery until its final overthrow.

THE DRED SCOTT DECISION.

Deep and widespread as hitherto had been the slavery agitation created by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and by the consequent civil war in Kansas, an event entirely unexpected to the public at large now suddenly doubled its intensity. This was the announcement, two days after Buchanan's inauguration, of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case. This celebrated case had arisen as follows:



DRED SCOTT.

HARRIET, WIFE OF DRED SCOTT.

Two or three years before the Nebraska Bill was thought of, a suit was begun by a negro named Dred Scott, in a local court at St. Louis, Missouri, to recover his and his family's freedom from slavery. He alleged that his master, one Dr. Emerson, an army surgeon, living in Missouri, had taken him as his slave to the military post at Rock Island in the State of Illinois, and afterwards to Fort Snelling, situated in what was originally Upper Louisiana, but was at that time part of Wisconsin Territory, and now forms part of the State of Minnesota. While at this latter post Dred Scott, with his master's consent, married a colored woman, also brought as a slave from Missouri, and of this marriage two children were born. All this happened between the years 1834 and 1838. Afterwards Dr. Emerson brought Dred Scott and his family back to Missouri. In this suit they now claimed freedom, because during the time of residence with their master at these military posts slavery was there prohibited by positive law; namely, at Rock Island by the ordinance of 1787, and later by the Constitution of Illinois; at Fort Snelling by the Missouri Compromise act of 1820, and sundry other acts of Congress relating to Wisconsin Territory.

The local court at St. Louis before which this action was brought appears to have made short work of the case. It had become settled legal doctrine by Lord Mansfield's decision in the Somersett case, rendered four years before our Declaration of Independence, that "the state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only positive law. . . . It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law." The learned chief-justice therefore ordered that Somersett, being claimed as a Virginia slave brought by his master into England, and attempted to be carried away against his will, should be discharged from custody or restraint, because there was no positive law in England to support slavery. The doctrine was subsequently modified by another English chief-justice, Lord Stowell, in 1827, to the effect that absence of positive law to support slavery in England only operates to suspend the master's authority, which is revived if the slave voluntarily returns into an English colony where slavery does exist by positive law.

The States of the Union naturally inherited and retained the common law of England, and the principles and maxims of English jurispru-



ROGER B. TANEY, CHIEF-JUSTICE U. S. SUPREME COURT.

dence not necessarily abrogated by the change of government, and among others this doctrine of Lord Mansfield. Unlike England, however, where there was no slavery and no law for or against it, some of the American States had positive laws establishing slavery, others positive laws prohibiting it. Lord Mansfield's doctrine, therefore, enlarged and strengthened by American statutes and decisions, had come to be substantially this: Slavery, being contrary to natural right, exists only by virtue of local law; if the master takes his slave for permanent residence into a jurisdiction where slavery is prohibited, the slave thereby acquires a right to his freedom everywhere. On the other hand, Lord Stowell's doctrine was similarly enlarged and strengthened so as to allow the master right of transit and temporary sojourn in free States and territories without suspension or forfeiture of his authority over his slave. Under the somewhat complex American system of government, in which the Federal Union and the several States each claim sovereignty and independent action within certain limitations, it became the theory and practice that toward each other the several States occupied the attitude of foreign nations, which relation was governed by international law, and that the principle of comity alone controlled the recognition and enforcement by any State of the law of any other State. Under this theory, the courts of slave States had generally accorded freedom to slaves, even when acquired by the laws of a free State, and reciprocally the courts of free States had enforced the master's right to his slave where that right depended on the laws of a slave State. In this spirit, and conforming to this established usage, the local court of Missouri declared Dred Scott and his family free.

The claimant, loath to lose these four human "chattels," carried the case to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, where at its



JOHN McLEAN, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE U. S. SUPREME COURT.

March term, 1852, it was reversed, and a decree rendered that these negroes were not entitled to freedom. Three judges formed the court, and two of them joined in an opinion bearing internal evidence that it was prompted, not by considerations of law and justice, but by a spirit of retaliation growing out of the ineradicable antagonism of freedom and slavery.

"Every State," says the opinion, "has the right of determining how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States. Those laws have no intrinsic right to be enforced beyond the limits of the State for which they were enacted. The respect allowed them will depend altogether on their conformity to the policy of our institutions. No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws. . . . It is a humiliating spectacle to see the courts of a State confiscating the property of her own citizens by the command of a foreign law. . . . Times now are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our Government. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others." *

To this partisan bravado the third judge replied with a dignified rebuke:

"As citizens of a slave-holding State," said he in his dissenting opinion, "we have no right to complain of our neighbors of Illinois, because they introduce into their State Constitution a prohibition of slavery; nor has any citizen of Missouri who removes with his slave to Illinois a right to complain that the fundamental law of the State to which he removes, and in which he makes his residence, dissolves the relation between him and his slave. It is as much his own voluntary act as if he had executed a deed of emancipation. . . . There is with me nothing in the law relating to slavery which distinguishes it from the law on any other subject, or allows any more accommodation to the temporary public excitements which are gath-

* Scott, J., 15 Mo. R., pp. 582–6.



SAMUEL NELSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE U. S. SUPREME COURT.

ered around it. . . . In this State it has been recognized from the beginning of the government, as a correct position in law, that a master who takes his slave to reside in a State or territory where slavery is prohibited thereby emancipates his slave. [Citing cases.] . . .

"But the Supreme Court of Missouri, so far from standing alone on this question, is supported by the decisions of other slave States, including those in which it may be supposed there was the least disposition to favor emancipation. [Citing cases.] . . . Times may have changed, public feeling may have changed, but principles have not and do not change; and in my judgment there can be no safe basis for judicial decision but in those principles which are immutable." *

These utterances, it must be remembered, occurred in the year 1852, when all slavery agitation was supposed to have been forever settled. They show conclusively that the calm was superficial and delusive, and that this deep-reaching contest was still, as before the adjustment of 1850, actually transforming the various institutions of society. Gradually, and as yet unnoticed by the public, the motives disclosed in these opinions were beginning to control courts of justice, and popular discussion and excitement were not only shaping legislation, but changing the tenor of legal decisions throughout the country.

Not long after the judgment by the Supreme Court of Missouri, Dred Scott and his family were sold to a man named Sandford, who was a citizen of New York. This circumstance afforded a ground for bringing a similar action in a Federal tribunal, and accordingly Dred Scott once more sued for freedom, in the United States Circuit Court at St. Louis.†

* Gamble, J. 15 Mo. R., pp. 589–92.

† The declaration in the case of Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandford was filed in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri on the second day of November, 1853. The trespass complained of is alleged to have occured on the first day of January, 1853. [Records Supreme Court United States.]



BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE U. S. SUPREME COURT.

The case was tried in May, 1854, and a decree rendered that they "were negro slaves, the lawful property" of Sandford. As a final effort to obtain justice, they appealed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest judicial tribunal of the nation.

Before this court of last resort the case was argued a first time in the spring of 1856. The country had been for two years in a blaze of political excitement. Civil war was raging in Kansas; Congress was in a turmoil of partisan discussion; a presidential election was impending, and the whole people were anxiously noting the varying phases of party politics. But few persons knew there was such a thing as the Dred Scott case on the docket of the Supreme Court; but those few appreciated the importance of the points it involved, and several distinguished lawyers volunteered to take part in the argument.* Two questions were presented to the court: First, Is Dred Scott a citizen entitled to sue? Secondly, did his residence at Rock Island and at Fort Snelling, under the various prohibitions of slavery existing there, work his freedom?

The Supreme Court was composed of nine justices; namely, Chief-Justice Taney and Associate Justices McLean, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier, Curtis, and Campbell. There was at once manifested among the judges not only a lively interest in the questions presented, but a wide difference of views as to the manner of treating them. Consultations of the Supreme Court are always shrouded in inviolable secrecy, but the opinions afterwards published indicate that the political aspects of slavery which were then convulsing the country from the very first found a certain sympathy and reflection in these grave judicial deliberations. The discussions yet turned upon certain merely technical rules to be applied to the pleadings under review; and ostensibly to give time for further examination, the case was postponed and a re-argument ordered for the next term. It may, however, be suspected that the nearness of the presidential election had more to do with this postponement than did the exigencies of the law.†

The presidential election came, and Mr. Buchanan was chosen. Soon after, the court again met to begin its long winter term; and about the middle of December, 1856, the Dred Scott case was once more elaborately argued. Again occupying the attention of the court for four successive days, as had also been done in the first hearing, the eminent counsel, after

* At the first hearing Mr. Montgomery Blair argued the case for Dred Scott, and Senator Geyer of Missouri and ex-Attorney-General Reverdy Johnson of Maryland for the claimant. At the second hearing Mr. Blair and Mr. George T. Curtis of Boston argued the case on behalf of Dred Scott, and Mr. Geyer and Mr. Johnson again made the argument for the claimant. All of them performed the service without compensation.

† "The court will not decide the question of the Missouri Compromise line,—a majority of the judges being of opinion that it is not necessary to do so. (This is confidential.) The one engrossing subject in both houses of Congress and with all the members is the presidency; and upon this everything done and omitted, except the most ordinary necessities of the country, depends." [Judge Curtis to Mr. Ticknor, April 8th, 1856. Curtis, "Life of B. R. Curtis," Vol. I., p. 180.]

passing lightly over mere technical subtleties, discussed very fully what was acknowledged to be the leading point in the controversy; namely, whether Congress had power under the Constitution to prohibit slavery in the Federal territories, as it had done by the Missouri Compromise act and various other laws. It was precisely the policy, or impolicy, of this and similar prohibitions which formed the bone of contention in party politics. The question of their constitutional validity was certain to take even a higher rank in public interest.

When after the second argument the judges took up the case in conference for decision the majority held that the judgment of the Missouri Federal tribunal should simply be affirmed on its merits. In conformity to this view, Mr. Justice Nelson was instructed to prepare an opinion to be read as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States. Such a paper was thereupon duly written by him, of the following import: It was a question, he thought, whether a temporary residence in a free State or territory could work the emancipation of a slave. It was the exclusive province of each State, by its legislature or courts of justice, to determine this question for itself. This determined, the Federal courts are bound to follow the State's decision. The Supreme Court of Missouri had decided Dred Scott to be a slave. In two cases tried since, the same judgment had been given. Though former decisions had been otherwise, this must now be admitted as "the settled law of the State," which, he said, "is conclusive of the case in this court."

This very narrow treatment of the points at issue, having to do with the mere lifeless machinery of the law, was strikingly criticised in the dissenting opinion afterwards read by Mr. Justice McLean, whose reply, by way of anticipation, may properly be quoted here. He denied that it was exclusively a Missouri question.

> "It involves a right claimed under an act of Congress and the Constitution of Illinois, and which cannot be decided without the consideration and construction of those laws. . . .
>
> "Rights sanctioned for twenty-eight years ought not and cannot be repudiated, with any semblance of justice, by one or two decisions, influenced, as declared, by a determination to counteract the excitement against slavery in the free States. . . . Having the same rights of sovereignty as the State of Missouri in adopting a constitution, I can perceive no reason why the institutions of Illinois should not receive the same consideration as those of Missouri. . . . The Missouri court disregards the express provisions of an act of Congress and the Constitution of a sovereign State, both of which laws for twenty-eight years it had not only regarded, but carried into effect. If a State court may do this, on a question involving the liberty of a human being, what protection do the laws afford?"

Had the majority of the judges carried out their original intention, and announced their decision in the form in which Mr. Justice Nelson under their instruction wrote it,* the case of Dred Scott would, after a passing notice, have gone to a quiet sleep under the dust of the law libraries. A far different fate was in store for it. The nation was then being stirred to its very foundation by the slavery agitation. The party of pro-slavery reaction was for the moment in the ascendant; and as by an irresistible impulse, the Supreme Court of the United States was now swept from its hitherto impartial judicial moorings into the dangerous seas of politics.

Before Judge Nelson's opinion was submitted to the judges in conference for final adoption as the judgment of the court, a movement seems to have taken place among the members, not only to change the ground of the decision, but also to greatly enlarge the field of inquiry. It is stated by one of the participants in that memorable transaction (Mr. Justice Campbell) that this occurred:

> "Upon a motion of Mr. Justice Wayne, who stated that the case had created public interest and expectation, that it had been twice argued, and that an impression existed that the questions argued would be considered in the opinion of the court." †

He further says that

> "The apprehension had been expressed by others of the court, that the court would not fulfill public expectation or discharge its duties by maintaining silence upon these questions; and my impression is, that several opinions had already been begun among the members of the court, in which a full discussion of the case was made, before Justice Wayne made this proposal." ‡

The exact time when this movement was begun cannot now be ascertained. The motives which prompted it can be inferred by recalling contemporaneous political events. A great controversy divided public opinion whether slavery might be extended or should be restricted. The Missouri Compromise had been repealed to make such an extension possible. The terms of that repeal were purposely couched in ambiguous language. Kansas and Nebraska were left "perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Whether under the Constitution slavery could be excluded from the Federal territories was affirmed by Northern and denied by Southern Democrats. Northern and Southern Democrats, acting together in the Cincinnati National Convention, had ingeniously avoided any solution of this difference.

A twofold interpretation had enabled that party to elect Mr. Buchanan, not by its own

* Campbell to Tyler, "Life of Taney," pp. 383–4.
† Ibid. p. 384.
‡ Ibid. p. 384.

popular strength, but by the division of its opponents. Notwithstanding its momentary success, unless it could develop new sources of strength the party had only a precarious hold upon power. Its majority in the Senate was waning. In Kansas free-State emigration was outstripping the South in numbers and checkmating her in border strife. According to present relative growth in sectional representation and sectional sentiment, the balance of power was slowly but steadily passing to the North.

Out of this doubt and difficulty there was one pathway that seemed easy and certain. All the individual utterances from the Democratic party agreed that the meaning of the words "subject to the Constitution" was a question for the courts. This was the original compact between Northern and Southern Democrats in caucus when Douglas consented to repeal. Douglas, shorn of his prestige by his defeat for presidential nomination, must accept conditions from his successful rival. The Dred Scott case afforded the occasion for a decision. Of the nine judges on the Supreme Bench seven were Democrats, and of these five were appointed from slave States. A better opportunity for the South to obtain a favorable dictum could never be expected to arise. A declaration by the Supreme Court of the United States that under the Constitution Congress possessed no power to prohibit slavery in the Federal territories would by a single breath end the old and begin a new political era. Congress was in session and the political leaders were assembled at Washington. Political topics excluded all other conversation or thought. Politics reddened the plains of Kansas; politics had recently desecrated the Senate chamber with a murderous personal assault; politics contended greedily for the spoils of a new administration; politics nursed a tacit conspiracy to nationalize slavery. The slavery sentiment ruled society, ruled the Senate, ruled the Executive Mansion. It is not surprising that this universal influence flowed in at the open door of the national hall of justice,—that it filtered through the very walls which surrounded the consulting-room of the Supreme Court.

The judges were, after all, but men. They dined, they talked, they exchanged daily personal and social courtesies with the political world. Curiosity, friendship, patriotism, led them to the floors of Congress to listen to the great debates. Official ceremony called them into the presence of the President, of legislators, of diplomats. They were feasted, flattered, questioned, reminded of their great opportunity, tempted with the suggestion of their supreme authority.* They could render their names illustrious. They could honor their States. They could do justice to the South. They could perpetuate their party. They could settle the slavery question. They could end sectional hatred, extinguish civil war, preserve the Union, save their country. Advanced age, physical feebleness, party bias, the political ardor of the youngest and the political satiety of the eldest, all conspired to draw them under the insidious influence of such considerations. One of the judges in official language frankly avows the motive and object of the majority of the court. "The case," he wrote, "involves private rights of value, and constitutional principles of the highest importance, about which there had become such a difference of opinion that the peace and harmony of the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision." † This language betrays the confusion of ideas and misconception of authority which tempted the judges beyond their proper duty. Required only to decide a question of private rights, they thrust themselves forward to sit as umpires in a quarrel of parties and factions.

In an evil hour they yielded to the demands of "public interest," and resolved to "fulfill public expectation." Mr. Justice Wayne "proposed that the Chief-Justice should write an opinion on all of the questions as the opinion of the court. This was assented to, some reserving to themselves to qualify their assent as the opinion might require. Others of the court proposed to have no question, save one, discussed." ‡ The extraordinary proceeding was calculated to touch the pride of Mr. Justice Nelson. He appears to have given it a kind of sullen acquiescence. "I was not present," he writes, "when the majority decided to change the ground of the decision, and assigned the preparation of the opinion to the Chief-Justice; and when advised of the change I simply gave notice that I should read the

* A striking example may be found in the utterance of Attorney-General Cushing of the retiring Pierce administration, in a little parting address to the Supreme Court, March 4th, 1857:

"Yours is not the gauntleted hand of the soldier, nor yours the voice which commands armies, rules cabinets, or leads senates; but though you are none of these, yet you are backed by all of them. Theirs is the external power which sustains your moral authority; you are the incarnate mind of the political body of the nation. In the complex institutions of our country you are the pivot point upon which the rights and liberties of all, government and people alike, turn; or, rather, you are the central light of constitutional wisdom around which they perpetually revolve. Long may this court retain the confidence of our country as the great conservators, not of the private peace only, but of the sanctity and integrity of the Constitution."—[Nat. Int., March 5th, 1857.]

† Wayne, J., Opinion in the Dred Scott case, 19 Howard, pp. 454–5.

‡ Campbell to Tyler, "Life of Taney," p. 384.

opinion I had prepared as my own, and which is the one on file."* From this time the pens of the other judges were busy, and in the inner political circles of Washington the case of Dred Scott gradually became a shadowy and portentous *cause célèbre*.

The first intimation which the public at large had of the coming new dictum was given in Mr. Buchanan's inaugural. The fact that he did not contemplate such an announcement until after his arrival in Washington † leads to the inference that it was prompted from high quarters. In congressional and popular discussions the question of the moment was at what period in the growth of a territory its voters might exclude or establish slavery. Referring to this Mr. Buchanan said: "It is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever this may be."

The popular acquiescence being thus invoked by the presidential voice and example, the court announced its decision two days afterwards,— March 6th, 1857. The essential character of the transaction impressed itself upon the very form of the judgment, if indeed it may be called at all by that name. Chief-Justice Taney read the opinion of the court. Justices Nelson, Wayne, Daniel, Grier, Catron, and Campbell each read a separate and individual opinion, agreeing with the Chief-Justice on some points, and omitting or disagreeing on others, or arriving at the same result by different reasoning, and in the same manner differing from one another. The two remaining associate justices, McLean and Curtis, read emphatic dissenting opinions. Thus the collective utterance of the bench resembled the speeches of a town meeting rather than the decision of a court, and employed two hundred and forty printed pages of learned legal disquisition to order the simple dismissal of a suit. Compared with the prodigious effort the result is a ridiculous anti-climax, revealing the motive and animus of the whole affair. The opinion read by Chief-Justice Taney was long and elaborate, and the following were among its leading conclusions:

That the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States do not include or refer to negroes otherwise than as property; that they cannot become citizens of the United States nor sue in the Federal courts. That Dred Scott's claim to freedom by reason of his residence in Illinois was a Missouri question, which Missouri law had decided against him. That the Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the Federal government to protect it; and that the Missouri Compromise act and like prohibitory laws are unconstitutional. That the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction in the case and could give no judgment in it, and must be directed to dismiss the suit.

This remarkable decision challenged the attention of the whole people to a degree never before excited by any act of their courts of law. Multiplied editions were at once printed,‡ scattered broadcast over the land, read with the greatest avidity, and earnestly criticised.

The public sentiment regarding it immediately divided, generally on existing party lines — the South and the Democrats accepting and commending, the North and the Republicans spurning and condemning it. The great anti-slavery public was not slow in making a practical application of its dogmas: that a sweeping and revolutionary exposition of the Constitution had been attempted when confessedly the case and question had no right to be in court; that an evident partisan dictum of national judges had been built on an avowed partisan decision of State judges; that both the legislative and judicial authority of the nation had been trifled with; that the settler's "sovereignty" in Kansas consisted only of a Southern planter's right to bring his slaves there; and that if under the "property" theory the Constitution carries slavery to the territories, it would by the same inevitable logic carry it into free States.

But much more offensive to the Northern mind than his conclusions of law were the language and historical assertions by which Chief-Justice Taney strove to justify them.

"In the opinion of the court," said he, "the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither

* Nelson to Tyler, "Life of Taney," p. 385.

† "Mr. Buchanan was also preparing his inaugural address with his usual care and painstaking, and I copied his drafts and recopied them until he had prepared it to his satisfaction. It underwent no alteration after he went to the National Hotel in Washington, except that he there inserted a clause in regard to the question then pending in the Supreme Court, as one that would dispose of a vexed and dangerous topic by the highest judicial authority of the land."— [Statement of James Buchanan Henry (President Buchanan's private secretary) in Curtis's "Life of Buchanan," Vol. II., p. 187.]

‡ "It may not be improper for me here to add that so great an interest did I take in that decision, and in its principles being sustained and understood in the commonwealth of Kentucky, that I took the trouble at my own cost to print or have printed a large edition of that decision to scatter it over the State; and unless the mails have miscarried, there is scarcely a member elected to the Legislature who has not received a copy with my frank."— [Vice-President Breckinridge, Frankfort speech, December, 1859.]

the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it."

Quoting the provisions of several early slave codes, he continues:

"They show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings that intermarriages between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race."

Referring to the Declaration, which asserts that all men are created equal, he remarks:

"The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation."

He then applies the facts thus assumed, as follows:

"The only two provisions which point to them and include them treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect it; no other power in relation to this race is to be found in the Constitution. . . . No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. . . . It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States."

This cold and pitiless historical delineation of the bondage, ignorance, and degradation of the unfortunate kidnapped Africans and their descendants in a by-gone century, as an immutable basis of constitutional interpretation, was met by loud and indignant protest from the North. The people and press of that section seized upon the salient phrase of the statement, and applying it in the present tense, accused the Chief-Justice with saying that "a negro has no rights which a white man is bound to respect." This was certainly a distortion of his exact words and meaning; yet the exaggeration was more than half excusable, in view of the literal and unbending rigor with which he proclaimed the constitutional disability of the entire African race in the United States, and denied their birthright in the Declaration of Independence. His unmerciful logic made the black before the law less than a slave; it reduced him to the status of a horse or dog, a bale of dry-goods or a block of stone. Against such a debasement of any living image of the Divine Maker the resentment of the public conscience of the North was quick and unsparing.

Had Chief-Justice Taney's delineation been historically correct, it would have been nevertheless unwise and unchristian to embody it in the form of a disqualifying legal sentence and an indelible political brand. But its manifest untruth was clearly shown by Mr. Justice Curtis in his dissenting opinion. He reminded the Chief-Justice that at the adoption of the Constitution:

"In five of the thirteen original States colored persons then possessed the elective franchise, and were among those by whom the Constitution was ordained and established. If so, it is not true in point of fact that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white race, and that it was made exclusively for the white race is in my opinion not only an assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening declaration that it was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves and their posterity; and as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established."

Elsewhere in the same opinion he says:

"I shall not enter into an examination of the existing opinions of that period respecting the African race, nor into any discussion concerning the meaning of those who asserted in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. My own opinion is, that a calm comparison of these assertions of universal abstract truths, and of their own individual opinions and acts, would

not leave these men under any reproach of inconsistency; that the great truths they asserted on that solemn occasion they were ready and anxious to make effectual, wherever a necessary regard to circumstances, which no statesman can disregard without producing more evil than good, would allow; and that it would not be just to them, nor true in itself, to allege that they intended to say that the Creator of all men had endowed the white race exclusively with the great natural rights which the Declaration of Independence asserts."

Mr. Justice McLean, in his dissenting opinion, completes the outline of the true historical picture in accurate language:

"I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period into a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian nations. I do not like to draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground. Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while I admit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition.

"Many of the States on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly afterward, took measures to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; and it is a well-known fact that a belief was cherished by the leading men, South as well as North, that the institution of slavery would gradually decline until it would become extinct. The increased value of slave labor, in the culture of cotton and sugar, prevented the realization of this expectation. Like all other communities and States, the South were influenced by what they considered to be their own interests. But if we are to turn our attention to the dark ages of the world, why confine our view to colored slavery? On the same principles white men were made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power and is against right."

To the constitutional theory advanced by the Chief-Justice, that Congress cannot exercise sovereign powers over Federal territories, and hence cannot exclude slave property from them, Justices McLean and Curtis also opposed a vigorous and exhaustive argument, which the most eminent lawyers and statesmen of that day deemed conclusive. The historical precedents alone ought to have determined the issue.

"The judicial mind of this country, State and Federal," says McLean, "has agreed on no subject within its legitimate action with equal unanimity as on the power of Congress to establish territorial governments. No court, State or Federal, no judge or statesman, is known to have had any doubts on this question for nearly sixty years after the power was exercised."

And Curtis adds:

"Here are eight distinct instances, beginning with the first Congress, and coming down to the year 1848, in which Congress has excluded slavery from the territory of the United States; and six distinct instances in which Congress organized governments of territories by which slavery was recognized and continued, beginning also with the first Congress, and coming down to the year 1822. These acts were severally signed by seven Presidents of the United States, beginning with General Washington, and coming regularly down as far as Mr. John Quincy Adams, thus including all who were in public life when the Constitution was adopted. If the practical construction of the Constitution, contemporaneously with its going into effect, by men intimately acquainted with its history from their personal participation in framing and adopting it, and continued by them through a long series of acts of the gravest importance, be entitled to weight in the judicial mind on a question of construction, it would seem to be difficult to resist the force of the acts above adverted to."

DOUGLAS AND LINCOLN ON DRED SCOTT.

MANIFESTLY, when the trained and informed intellects of the learned judges differed so radically concerning the principles of law and the facts of history applicable to the Dred Scott question, the public at large could hardly be expected to receive the new dogmas without similar divergence of opinion. So far from exercising a healing influence, the decision widened immensely the already serious breach between the North and the South. The persons immediately involved in the litigation were quickly lost sight of;* but the constitutional principle affirmed by the court was defended by the South and denounced by the North with zeal and acrimony. The Republican party did not further question or propose to disturb the final judgment in the case; but it declared that the Dred Scott doctrines of the Supreme Court should not be made a rule of political action, and precisely this the South, together with the bulk of the Northern Democrats, insisted should be done.

A single phase of the controversy will serve to illustrate the general drift of the discussion throughout the Union. Some three months after the delivery of the opinion of the court, Senator Douglas found himself again among his constituents in Illinois, and although there was no political campaign in progress, current events and the roused state of public feeling seemed to require that he should define his views in a public speech. It marks his acuteness as a politician that he already realized what a fatal stab the Dred Scott decision had given his vaunted principle of "Popular Sovereignty," with which he justified his famous repeal of the Missouri Compromise. He had ever since argued that congressional prohibition of slavery was obsolete and useless, and

* The ownership of Dred Scott and his family passed by inheritance to the family of a Massachusetts Republican member of Congress. The following telegram, copied from the "Providence Post" into the "Washington Union," shows the action of the new owner:

"ST. LOUIS, May 26 [1857]. Dred Scott with his wife and two daughters were emancipated to-day by Taylor Blow, Esq. They had been conveyed to him by Mr. Chaffee for that purpose."

that the choice of slavery or freedom ought to be confided to the local territorial laws, just as it was confided to local State constitutions. But the Dred Scott decision announced that slaves were property which Congress could not exclude from the territories, adding also the inevitable conclusion that what Congress could not do a territorial legislature could not.*

Difficult as this made his task of reconciling his pet hobby with the Dred Scott decision, such was his political boldness, and such had been his skill and success in sophistry, that he undertook even this hopeless effort. Douglas therefore made a speech at Springfield, Illinois, on the 12th of June, 1857, in which he broadly and fully indorsed and commended the opinion of Chief-Justice Taney and his concurring associates, declaring that

"Their judicial decisions will stand in all future time, a proud monument to their greatness, the admiration of the good and wise, and a rebuke to the partisans of faction and lawless violence. If unfortunately any considerable portion of the people of the United States shall so far forget their obligations to society as to allow the partisan leaders to array them in violent resistance to the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal on earth, it will become the duty of all the friends of order and constitutional government, without reference to past political differences, to organize themselves and marshal their forces under the glorious banner of the Union, in vindication of the Constitution and supremacy of the laws over the advocates of faction and the champions of violence."

Proceeding then with a statement of the case, he continued:

"The material and controlling points in the case, those which have been made the subject of unmeasured abuse and denunciation, may be thus stated: 1st. The court decided that under the Constitution of the United States, a negro descended from slave parents is not and can not be a citizen of the United States. 2d. That the act of March 6th, 1820, commonly called the Missouri Compromise act, was unconstitutional and void before it was repealed by the Nebraska act, and consequently did not and could not have the legal effect of extinguishing a master's right to his slave in that territory. While the right continues in full force under the guarantees of the Constitution, and cannot be divested or alienated by an act of Congress, it necessarily remains a barren and a worthless right, unless sustained, protected, and enforced by appropriate police regulations and local legislation, prescribing adequate remedies for its violation. These regulations and remedies must necessarily depend entirely upon the will and wishes of the people of the territory, as they can only be prescribed by the local legislatures. Hence the great principle of popular sovereignty and self-government is sustained and firmly established by the authority of this decision."

It is scarcely possible that Douglas convinced himself by such a glaring *non sequitur*; but he had no other alternative. It was a desperate expedient to shield himself as well as he might from the damaging recoil of his own temporizing statesmanship. The declaration made thus early is worthy of historical notice as being the substance and groundwork of the speaker's somewhat famous "Freeport doctrine," or theory of "unfriendly legislation," to which Lincoln's searching interrogatories drove him in the great Lincoln-Douglas debates of the following year. Repeated and amplified at that time, it became in the eyes of the South the unpardonable political heresy which lost him the presidential nomination and caused the rupture of the Democratic National Convention at Charleston in the summer of 1860. For the moment, however, the sophism doubtless satisfied his many warm partisans. He did not dwell on the dangerous point, but trusted for oratorical effect rather to his renewed appeals to the popular prejudice against the blacks, so strong in central Illinois, indorsing and emphasizing Chief-Justice Taney's assertion that negroes were not included in the words of the Declaration of Independence, and arguing that if the principle of equality were admitted and carried out to its logical results, it would necessarily lead not only to the abolition of slavery in the slave States, but to the general amalgamation of the two races.

The Republican party of Illinois had been greatly encouraged and strengthened by its success in electing the State officers in the previous autumn; and as their recognized leader and champion, Lincoln made a reply to this speech some two weeks later, June 26th, 1857, also at Springfield. Though embracing other topics, the question of the hour, the Dred Scott decision, was nevertheless its chief subject. The extracts here presented from it will give the reader some idea of its power of statement and eloquence:

"And now," said Mr. Lincoln, "as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares two propositions — first, that a negro cannot sue in the United States courts; and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the territories. It was made by a divided court — dividing differently on the different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the decision, and in that respect I shall follow his example, believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on Taney. He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision, declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him? Judicial decisions have two uses — first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and, secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they arise. For the latter use they are called 'precedents' and 'authorities.' We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution. But we

* 19 Howard, pp. 450–1.

think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it overrule this. We offer no resistance to it. Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense and the customary understanding of the legal profession. If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had been in no part based on assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and reaffirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, not to acquiesce in it as a precedent. But when, as is true, we find it wanting in all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country."

Rising above all questions of technical construction to the broad and universal aspects of the issue, Mr. Lincoln continued:

"The Chief-Justice does not directly assert, but plainly assumes as a fact, that the public estimate of the black man is more favorable now than it was in the days of the Revolution. This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars the condition of that race has been ameliorated; but as a whole, in this country, the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or four years. In two of the five States — New Jersey and North Carolina — that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since been taken away; and in a third — New York — it has been greatly abridged; while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional State, though the number of the States has more than doubled. In those days, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate their slaves; but since then such legal restraints have been made upon emancipation as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days, legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State constitutions to withhold that power from the legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to the new countries was prohibited; but now Congress decides that it will not continue the prohibition, and the Supreme Court decides that it could not if it would. In those days, our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, and sneered at, and construed and hawked at, and torn, till if its framers could rise from their graves they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him, ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison house, they have searched his person and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is. . . .

"There is a natural disgust in the minds of nearly all white people at the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope upon the chances of his being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust to himself. If he can by much drumming and repeating fasten the odium of that idea upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle through the storm. He therefore clings to this hope as a drowning man to the last plank. He makes an occasion for lugging it in, from the opposition to the Dred Scott decision. He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of Independence includes *all* men, black as well as white, and forthwith he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they want to vote, and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against the counterfeit logic which concludes that because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands, without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal and the equal of all others.

"Chief-Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole human family; but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not at once actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument comes to just nothing at all by the other fact that they did not at once or ever afterwards actually place all white people on an equality with one another. And this is the staple argument of both the Chief-Justice and the senator, for doing this obvious violence to the plain, unmistakable language of the Declaration.

"I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men; but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created equal — equal with 'certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere. The assertion that 'all men are created equal' was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that but for future use. Its authors meant it to be, as, thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling-block to all those who in after times might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they meant when such should reappear in this fair land and commence their vocation, they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack."

June 1887
1887

JACK.

By the author of "The Gates Ajar," "The Madonna of the Tubs," etc.

JACK was a Fairharbor boy. This might be to say any of several things; but it is at least sure to say one,— he was a fisherman, and the son of a fisherman.

When people of another sort than Jack's have told their earthly story through, the biography, the memorial, the obituary remains. Our poet, preacher, healer, politician, and the rest pass on to this polite sequel which society has ordained for human existence. When Jack dies, he stops. We find the fisherman squeezed into some corner of the accident column: "Washed overboard," or "Lost in the fog," and that is the whole of it. He ends just there. There is no more Jack. No fellow-members in the Society for Something-or-Nothing pass resolutions to his credit and the consolation of his family. No funeral discourse is preached over him and privately printed at the request of the parishioners. The columns of the religious weekly to which he did not subscribe contain no obituary sketches signed by the initials of friends not thought to be too afflicted to speak a good word for a dead man. From the press of the neighboring city no thin memorial volume sacred to his virtues and stone-blind to his defects shall ever issue. Jack needs a biographer. Such the writer of this sketch would fain aspire to be.

Jack was born at sea. His father was bringing his mother home from a visit at a half-sister's in Nova Scotia, for Jack's mother was one of those homesick, clannish people who pine without their relations as much as some of us pine with them; and even a half-sister was worth more to her in her fanciful and feeble condition than a whole one is apt to be to bolder souls.

She had made her visit at her half-sister's, and they had talked over receipts, and compared yeast, and cut out baby things, and turned dresses, and dyed flannel, and gone to prayer meetings together; and Jack's mother was coming home, partly because Jack's father came for her, and partly because he happened to come sober, which was a great point, and partly because the schooner had to sail, which was another,— she was coming home, at all events, when a gale struck them. It was an ugly blow. The little two-masted vessel swamped, in short, at midnight of a moonlit night, off the coast, just the other side of seeing Cape Ann light. The crew were picked up by a three-master, and taken home. Aboard the three-master, in fright and chill and storm, the little boy was born. They always put it that he was born in Fairharbor. In fact, he was born rounding Eastern Point. "The toughest place to be borned in, this side o' Torment," Jack's father said. But Jack's mother said nothing at all.

Jack's father kept sober till he got the mother and the child safely into the little crumbling, gray cottage in half of whose meager dimensions the family kept up the illusion which they called home. Then, for truth compels me, I must state that Jack's father went straightway out upon what, in even less obscure circles than his, it is customary to call "a tear." There seems to be something in the savage, incisive fitness of this word which has overridden all mere distinctions of class or culture, and must ultimately make it a classic in the language. "I've stood it long as I ken stand, and I'm goin' on a tear,— I'm a-goin' on a *netarnal* tear," said Jack's father to his oldest dory-mate, a fellow he had a feeling for, much as you would for an oar you had handled a good many years; or perhaps a sail that you were used to, and had patched and watched, and knew the cracks in it, and the color of it, and when it was likely to give way, and whereabouts it would hold.

In fact, that proved to be, in deed and truth, an eternal tear for Jack's father. Drunk as a fisherman could be,— and that is saying a good deal,— he reshipped that night, knowing not whither nor why, nor indeed knowing that the deed was done; and when he came to himself he was twelve hours out, on his way to the Banks of Newfoundland; and the young mother, with the baby on her arms, looked out of the frosty window over the foot of her old bedstead, and watched for him to come, and did not like to tell the neighbors that she was short of fuel.

She was used to waiting — women are; Fairharbor women always are. But she had never waited so long before. And when, at the end of her waiting, the old dory-mate came in one night and told her that it happened falling from the mast because he was not sober enough to be up there, Jack's mother said she had always expected it. But

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



BUILDING IN WHICH THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION WAS DRAWN.

THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION.

THE year 1857 brings us to a decided change in the affairs of Kansas, but to no less remarkable occurrences. Active civil war gradually ceased in the preceding autumn,—a result due to the vigorous and impartial administration of Governor Geary and the arrival of the inclement winter weather.

On the evening of the day the legislature met (January 12th, 1857), the pro-slavery party held a large political convention, in which it was confessed that they were in a hopeless minority in the territory, and the general conclusion was reached that it was no longer worth while to attempt to form a slave State in Kansas.† Many of its hitherto active leaders immediately and definitely abandoned the struggle. But the Missouri cabal, intrenched in the various territorial and county offices, held to their design, though their labors now assumed a somewhat different character. They denounced Governor Geary in their resolutions, and devised legislation to further their intrigues.‡ By the middle of February, under their inspiration, a bill providing for a convention to frame a State constitution was perfected and enacted. The governor immediately sent the legislature his message, reminding them that the leading idea of the organic act was to leave the actual *bonâ fide* inhabitants of the territory "perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way," and vetoing the bill because "the legislature has failed to make any provision to submit the constitution when framed to the consideration of the people for their ratification or rejection."§ The governor's argument was wasted on the predetermined legislators. They promptly passed the act over his veto.

The cabal was in no mood to be thwarted, and under a show of outward toleration, if not respect, their deep hostility found such means of making itself felt that the governor began to receive insult from street ruffians, and to become apprehensive for his personal safety. In such a contest he was single-handed against the whole pro-slavery town of Lecompton. The foundation of his authority was gradually sapped; and finding himself no longer sustained at Washington, where the private appeals and denunciations of the cabal were more influential than his official reports, he wrote his resignation on the day of Buchanan's inauguration, and a week later left the territory in secrecy as a fugitive. Thus, in less than three years, three successive Democratic executives had been resisted, disgraced, and overthrown by the political conspiracy which ruled the territory; and Kansas had indeed become, in the phraseology of the day, "the graveyard of governors."

The Kansas imbroglio was a political scandal of such large proportions, and so clearly threatened a dangerous schism in the Demo-

† January 12th, 1857, Wilder, Annals of Kansas, p. 113. Bell, Speech in Senate, March 18th, 1858. Appendix to Cong. Globe, p. 137.

‡ Geary to Marcy, January 19th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. VI., Ex. Doc. 17, p. 131.

§ Geary, Veto Message, February 18th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. VI., Ex. Doc. 17, p. 167.

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

JAMES BUCHANAN, PRESIDENT, 1857–61. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

cratic party, that the new President, Buchanan, and his new Cabinet, proceeded to its treatment with the utmost caution. The subject was fraught with difficulties not of easy solution. The South, to retain her political supremacy, or even her equality, needed more slave States to furnish additional votes in the United States Senate. To make a slave State of Kansas, the Missouri Compromise had been repealed, and a bogus legislature elected and supported by the successive Missouri invasions and the guerrilla war of 1856. All these devices had, however, confessedly failed of their object. Northern emigration and antislavery sentiment were clearly in possession of Kansas, and a majority of voters stood ready upon fair occasion to place her in the column of free States. It had become a game on the chessboard of national politics. The moving pieces stood in Missouri and Kansas, but the

players sat in Washington. In reality it was a double game. There was plot and under-plot. Beneath the struggle between free States and slave States were the intrigue and deception carried on between Northern Democrats and Southern Democrats. The Kansas-Nebraska act was a double-tongued statute, and the Cincinnati platform a Janus-faced banner. Momentary victory was with the Southern Democrats, for they had secured the nomination and election of President Buchanan, a "Northern man with Southern principles."



GOVERNOR ROBERT J. WALKER.

Determined to secure whatever prestige could be derived from high qualification and party influence, Buchanan tendered the vacant governorship of Kansas to his intimate personal and political friend, Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, a man of great ability and national fame, who had been senator and Secretary of the Treasury. Walker, realizing fully the responsibility and danger of the trust, after repeated refusals finally accepted upon two distinct conditions: first, that General Harney should be "put in special command in Kansas with a large body of troops, and especially of dragoons and a battery," * and retained there subject to his military directions until the danger was over; and second, that he "should advocate the submission of the constitution to the vote of the people for ratification or rejection." †

This latter had now become a vital point in the political game. The recent action of the territorial legislature and Geary's already

* Walker to Cass, July 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 32.

† Walker to Cass, Dec. 15th, 1857. Ibid., p. 122.

mentioned veto message were before the President and his Cabinet.* But much more important than this move of the Kansas pieces was the prior determination of prominent Washington players. During the Kansas civil war and the Presidential campaign of the previous year, by way of offset to the Topeka constitution, both Senator Douglas† and Senator Toombs‡ wrote and introduced in the Senate bills to enable Kansas to form a State constitution. The first by design, and the second by accident, contained a clause to submit such constitution, when formed, to a vote of the people. Both these bills were considered not only by the Senate Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was chairman, but also by a caucus of Democratic senators. Said Senator Bigler:

"It was held, by those most intelligent on the subject, that in view of all the difficulties surrounding that Territory, [and] the danger of any experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be better that there should be no such provision in the Toombs bill; and it was my understanding, in all the intercourse I had, that that convention would make a constitution and send it here without submitting it to the popular vote." §

This Toombs bill was, after modification in other respects, adopted by Douglas, and duly passed by the Senate; but the House with an opposition majority refused its assent. All these preliminaries were well known to the Buchanan Cabinet, and of course also to Douglas. It is fair to assume that under such circumstances Walker's emphatic stipulation was deliberately and thoroughly discussed. Indeed, extraordinary urging had been necessary to induce him to reconsider his early refusals. Douglas personally joined in the solicitation. ‖ Because of the determined opposition of his own family, Walker had promised his wife that he would not go to Kansas without her consent; and President Buchanan was so anxious on the point that he personally called on Mrs. Walker and persuaded her to waive her objections. ¶ Under influences like these Walker finally accepted the appointment, and the President and Cabinet accepted his conditions without reserve. He wrote his inaugural address in Washington, using the following language:

FREDERICK P. STANTON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"I repeat then as my clear conviction that unless the convention submit the constitution to the vote of all the actual resident settlers, and the election be fairly and justly conducted, the constitution will be and ought to be rejected by Congress."

He submitted this draft of his inaugural to President Buchanan, who read and approved the document and the promise. Secretary Cass wrote his official instructions in accordance with it. On Walker's journey West he stopped at Chicago and submitted his inaugural to Douglas, who also indorsed his policy.** The new governor fondly believed he had removed every obstacle to success, and every possibility of misunderstanding or disapproval by the Administration, such as had befallen his predecessors. But President Buchanan either deceived him at the beginning, or betrayed him in the end.

With Governor Walker there was sent a new territorial secretary. Woodson, who had

* Geary to Marcy, Feb. 21st, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. VI., Ex. Doc. 17, p. 178.

† March 7th, 1856. ‡ June 25th, 1856.

§ Bigler, Senate Speech, Dec. 9th, 1857. Globe, Part I., p. 21. See also Bigler, Senate Speech, Dec. 21st, 1857. Globe, Part I., p. 113.

‖ Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13th, 1860.

¶ Walker, Testimony before the Covode Committee. Reports of Committees H. R. 1st Sess. 36th Cong., Vol. V., pp. 105, 6.

** Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13th, 1860.

so often abused his powers during his repeated service as acting governor, was promoted to a more lucrative post to create the vacancy. Frederick P. Stanton, of Tennessee, formerly a representative in Congress, a man of talent and, as the event proved, also a man of courage, was now made Secretary. Both Walker and Stanton being from slave States, it may be presumed that the slavery question was considered safe in their hands. Walker, indeed, entertained sentiments somewhat more valuable to the South in this conjuncture. He believed in the balance of power; he preferred that the people of Kansas should make it a slave State; he was "in favor of maintaining the equilibrium of the government by giving the South a majority in the Senate, while the North would always necessarily have a majority in the House of Representatives."* Both also entered on their mission with the feelings entertained by the President and the Democratic party; namely, that the free-State men were a mischievous insurrectionary faction, willfully disturbing the peace and defying the laws. Gradually, however, their personal observation convinced them that this view was a profound error.

Governor Walker arrived in the Territory late in May, and it required but short investigation to satisfy him that any idea of making Kansas a slave State was utterly preposterous. Had everything else been propitious, climate alone seemed to render it impossible. But popular sentiment was also overwhelmingly against it; he estimated that the voters were for a free State more than two to one.† All the efforts of the pro-slavery party to form a slave State seemed to be finally abandoned. If he could not make Kansas a slave State, his next desire was to make her a Democratic State. "And the only plan to accomplish this was to unite the free-State Democrats with the pro-slavery party, and all those whom I regarded as conservative men, against the more violent portion of the Republicans."‡ He therefore sought by fair words to induce the free-State men to take part in the election of delegates to the constitutional convention. His inaugural address, quoting the President's instructions, promised that such election should be free from fraud and violence; that the delegates should be protected in their deliberations; and that if unsatisfactory, "you may by a subsequent vote defeat the ratification of the constitution."§

This same policy was a few weeks later urged at Topeka, where a mass meeting of the free-State men was called to support and instruct another sitting of the "insurrectionary" free-State legislature elected under the Topeka constitution. The governor found a large assemblage, and a very earnest discussion in progress, whether the "legislature" should pursue only nominal action, such as would in substance amount to a petition for redress of grievances, or whether they should actually organize their State government, and pass a complete code of laws. The moderate free-State men favored the former, the violent and radical the latter course. When their mass meeting adjourned, they proceeded to the governor's lodgings and called him out in a speech, in which he renewed the counsels and promises of his inaugural address. "The legislature," said he, "has called a convention to assemble in September next. That constitution they will or they will not submit to the vote of a majority of the then actual resident settlers of Kansas. If they do not submit it, I will join you, fellow-citizens, in lawful opposition to their course. And I cannot doubt, gentlemen, that one much higher than I, the Chief Magistrate of the Union, will join you in that opposition."‖ His invitation to them to participate in the election of a convention produced no effect; they still adhered to their resolve to have nothing to do with any affirmative proceedings under the bogus laws or territorial legislature. But the governor's promise of a fair vote on the constitution was received with favor. "Although this mass convention," reports the governor, "did not adopt fully my advice to abandon the whole Topeka movement, yet they did vote down by a large majority the resolutions prepared by the more violent of their own party in favor of a complete State organization and the adoption of a code of State laws."

If the governor was gratified at this result as indicative of probable success in his official administration, he rejoiced yet more in its significance as a favorable symptom of party politics. "The result of the whole discussion at Topeka," he reports, "was regarded by the friends of law and order as highly favorable to their cause, and as the commencement of a great movement essential to success; viz., the separation of the free-State Democrats from the Republicans, who had to some extent heretofore coöperated under the name of the free-State party."** Another party symptom gave

* Walker, Testimony, Covode Committee Report, p. 109.

† Walker to Buchanan, June 28th, 1857. Covode Committee Report, p. 115.

‡ Walker, Testimony, Covode Committee Report, p. 107.

§ Walker, Inaugural, May 27th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 11.

‖ Walker, Topeka Speech, June 6th, 1857, in "Washington Union" of June 27th, 1857.

** Walker to Cass, July 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 27.

the governor equal, if not greater, encouragement. On the 2d and 3d of July the "National Democratic" or pro-slavery party of the Territory met in convention at Lecompton. The leaders were out in full force. The hopelessness of making Kansas a slave State was once more acknowledged, the governor's policy indorsed, and a resolution "against the submission of the constitution to a vote of the people was laid on the table as a test vote by a vote of forty-two to one." * The governor began already to look upon his counsels and influence as a turning-point in national destiny. "Indeed," he writes, "it is universally admitted here that the only real question is this: whether Kansas shall be a conservative, constitutional, Democratic, and ultimately free State, or whether it shall be a Republican and abolition State; and that the course pursued by me is the only one which will prevent the last most calamitous result, which, in my opinion, would soon seal the fate of the republic." †

In his eagerness to reform the Democratic party of Kansas, and to strengthen the Democratic party of the nation against the assaults and dangers of "abolitionism," the governor was not entirely frank; else he would at the same time have reported, what he was obliged later to explain, that the steps taken to form a constitution from which he hoped so much were already vitiated by such defects or frauds as to render them impossible of producing good fruit. The territorial law appointing the election of delegates provided for a census and a registry of voters, to be made by county officers appointed by the territorial legislature. These officers so neglected or failed to discharge their duty, that in nearly half the organized counties of the interior no attempt whatever was made to obtain the census or registration; ‡ and in the counties lying on the Missouri border, where the pro-slavery party was strong, the work of both was exceedingly imperfect, and in many instances with notorious discrimination against free-State voters. While the disfranchised counties had a comparatively sparse population, the number of voters in them was too considerable to be justly denied their due representation. § The apportionment of delegates was based upon this defective registration and census, and this alone would have given the pro-slavery party a disproportionate power in the convention. But at the election of delegates on the 15th of June, the free-State men, following their deliberate purpose and hitherto unvarying practice of non-conformity to the bogus laws, abstained entirely from voting. "The consequence was that out of the 9250 voters whose names had been registered . . . there were in all about 2200 votes cast, and of these the successful candidates received 1800." ‖

"The black Republicans," reported the governor, "would not vote, and the free-State Democrats were kept from voting by the fear that the constitution would not be submitted by the convention, and that by voting they committed themselves to the proceeding of the convention. But for my inaugural, circulated by thousands, and various speeches all urging the people to vote, there would not have been one thousand votes polled in the Territory, and the convention would have been a disastrous failure." ¶

But this was not the only evil. The apportionment of the members of the territorial legislature to be chosen the ensuing autumn was also based upon this same defective registry and census. Here again disproportionate power accrued to the pro-slavery party, and the free-State men loudly charged that it was a new contrivance for the convenience of Missouri voters. Governor Walker publicly deplored all these complications and defects; but he counseled endurance, and constantly urged in mitigation that in the end the people should have the privilege of a fair and direct vote upon their constitution. That promise he held aloft as a beacon-light of hope and redress. This attitude and policy, frequently reported to Washington, was not disavowed or discouraged by the President and Cabinet.

The governor, however, soon found a storm brewing in another quarter. When the newspapers brought copies of his inaugural address, his Topeka speech, and the general report of his Kansas policy back to the Southern States, there arose an ominous chorus of protest and denunciation from the whole tribe of fire-eating editors and politicians. What right had the governor to intermeddle? they indignantly demanded. What call to preach about climate, what business to urge submission of the constitution to popular vote, or to promise his own help to defeat it if it were not submitted; what author-

* Walker to Cass, July 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 29.

† Walker to Cass, July 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 30.

‡ F. P. Stanton's Speech, Philadelphia, February 8th, 1858.

§ "These fifteen counties in which there was no registry gave a much larger vote at the October election, even with the six months' qualification, than the whole vote given to the delegates who signed the Lecompton constitution on the 7th November last."— [Walker to Cass, December 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 128.]

‖ F. P. Stanton, Speech, Philadelphia, Feb. 8th, 1858.

¶ Walker to Buchanan, June 28th, 1857. Report Covode Committee, p. 118.

ity to pledge the President and Administration to such a course? The convention was sovereign, they claimed, could do what it pleased, and no thanks to the governor for his impertinent advice. The Democratic State Convention of Georgia took the matter in hand, and by resolution denounced Walker's inaugural address, and asked his removal from office. The Democratic State Convention of Mississippi followed suit, and called the inaugural address an unjust discrimination against the rights of the South, and a dictatorial intermeddling with the high public duty intrusted to the convention.

Walker wrote a private letter to Buchanan, defending his course, and adding:

"Unless I am thoroughly and cordially sustained by the Administration here, I cannot control the convention, and we shall have anarchy and civil war. With that cordial support the convention (a majority of whose delegates I have already seen) will do what is right. I shall travel over the whole Territory, make speeches, rouse the people in favor of my plan, and see all the delegates. But your cordial support is indispensable, and I never would have come here, unless assured by you of the cordial coöperation of all the Federal officers. . . . The extremists are trying your nerves and mine, but what can they say when the convention submits the constitution to the people and the vote is given by them? But we must have a slave State out of the south-western Indian Territory, and then a calm will follow; Cuba be acquired with the acquiescence of the North; and your Administration, having in reality settled the slavery question, be regarded in all time to come as a re-signing and re-sealing of the constitution. . . . I shall be pleased soon to hear from you. Cuba! Cuba! (and Porto Rico, if possible) should be the countersign of your Administration, and it will close in a blaze of glory." *

The governor had reason to be proud of the full and complete reëndorsement which this appeal brought from his chief. Under date of July 12th, 1857, the President wrote in reply:

"On the question of submitting the constitution to the *bonâ fide* resident settlers of Kansas I am willing to stand or fall. In sustaining such a principle we cannot fall. It is the principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill; the principle of popular sovereignty; and the principle at the foundation of all popular government. The more it is discussed the stronger it will become. Should the convention of Kansas adopt this principle, all will be settled harmoniously, and with the blessing of Providence you will return triumphantly from your arduous, important, and responsible mission. The strictures of the Georgia and Mississippi conventions will then pass away and be speedily forgotten. In regard to Georgia, our news from that State is becoming better every day; we have not yet had time to hear much from Mississippi. Should you answer the resolutions of the latter, I would advise you to make the great principle of the submission of the constitution to the *bonâ fide* residents of Kansas conspicuously prominent. On this you will be irresistible." †

The delegates to the constitutional convention, chosen in June, met according to law at Lecompton, September 7th, and, having spent five days in organization, adjourned their session to October 19th. The object of this recess was to await the issue of the general election of October 5th, at which a full territorial legislature, a delegate to Congress, and various county officers were to be chosen.

By the action of the free-State men this election was now made a turning-point in Kansas politics. Held together as a compact party by their peaceful resistance to the bogus laws, emigration from the North had so strengthened their numbers that they clearly formed a majority of the people of the Territory. A self-constituted and self-regulated election held by them for sundry officials under their Topeka constitution revealed a numerical strength of more than seven thousand voters. Feeling that this advantage justified them in receding from their attitude of non-conformity, they met in convention toward the end of August, and while protesting against the "wicked apportionment," resolved that "whereas Governor Walker has repeatedly pledged himself that the people of Kansas should have a full and fair vote, before impartial judges, at the election to be held on the first Monday in October, . . . we the people of Kansas, in mass convention assembled, agree to participate in said election." ‡

Governor Walker executed his public promises to the letter. A movement of United States troops to Utah was in progress, and about two thousand of these were detained by order until after election day. Stationed at ten or twelve different points in the Territory, they served by their mere presence to overawe disorder, and for the first time in the history of Kansas the two opposing parties measured their strength at the ballot-box. The result was an overwhelming triumph for the free-State party. For delegate in Congress, Ransom, the Democratic candidate, received 3799 votes; Parrott, the Republican candidate, 7888,—a free-State majority of 4089. For the legislature, even under the defective apportionment, the council stood 9 free-State members to 4 Democrats, and the House 24 free-State members to 15 Democrats.

That the pro-slavery cabal would permit power to slip from their grasp without some extraordinary effort was scarcely to be expected. When the official returns were brought from the various voting-places to the governor's office, there came from Oxford, a single precinct in Johnson county, "a roll of paper, 40 or 50 feet long, containing names as thickly

* Walker to Buchanan, June 28th, 1857. Report Covode Committee, pp. 117–119.

† Buchanan to Walker, July 12th, 1857. Report Covode Committee, p. 112.

‡ Wilder, p. 133.

as they could be written,"* and a large part of which were afterward discovered to have been literally copied from an old Cincinnati directory. This paper purported to be a return of 1628 votes for the 11 pro-slavery candidates for the legislature in that district, and if counted, it would elect 8 members of the House and 3 of the council by a trifling majority, and thereby change the political complexion and power of the legislature. Inspection showed the document to be an attempt to commit a stupendous fraud; and after visiting the locality ("a village with six houses, including stores, and without a tavern")† and satisfying himself of the impossibility of such a vote from such a place, Governor Walker rejected the whole return from Oxford precinct for informality, and gave certificates of election to the free-State candidates elected as appeared by the other regular returns. A similar paper from McGee county with more than 1200 names was treated in like manner.‡ Judge Cato issued his writ of mandamus to compel the governor to give certificates to the pro-slavery candidates, but without success. The language of Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton in a proclamation announcing their action deserves remembrance and imitation.

"The consideration that our own party by this decision will lose the majority in the legislative assembly does not make our duty in the premises less solemn and imperative. The elective franchise would be utterly valueless, and free government itself would receive a deadly blow, if so great an outrage as this could be shielded under the cover of mere forms and technicalities. We cannot consent in any manner to give the sanction of our respective official positions to such a transaction. Nor can we feel justified to relieve ourselves of the proper responsibility of our offices, in a case where there is no valid return, by submitting the question to the legislative assembly, and in that very act giving the parties that might claim to be chosen by this spurious vote the power to decide upon their own election." §

The decisive free-State victory, the Oxford and McGee frauds,|| and the governor's fearless action in exposing and rejecting them, called forth universal comment; and under the new political conditions which they revealed, created intense interest in the further proceedings of the Lecompton Constitutional Convention. That body reassembled according to adjournment on the 19th of October. Elected in the preceding June without any participation by free-State voters, the members were all pro-slavery, and were presided over by John Calhoun (the same man who, as county surveyor of Sangamon county, Illinois, employed Abraham Lincoln as his deputy in 1832).

At the June election, while he and his seven colleagues from Douglas county were yet candidates for the convention, they had circulated a written pledge that they would submit the constitution to the people for ratification. This attitude was generally maintained by them till the October election. But when by that vote they saw their faction overwhelmed with defeat, they and others undertook to maintain themselves in power by an unprecedented piece of political jugglery. Calhoun, who was surveyor-general of the Territory, employed a large number of subordinates, and was one of the most able and unscrupulous leaders in the pro-slavery cabal. A large majority of the convention favored the establishment of slavery; only the question of a popular vote on ratification or rejection excited controversy.

An analysis shows that the principle of delegated authority had become attenuated to a remarkable degree. The defective registration excluded a considerable number (estimated at about one-sixth) of the legal voters. Of the 9250 registered, only about 2200 voted, all told. Of these 2200, only about 1800 votes were given for the successful candidates for delegate. Of the whole 60 delegates alleged to have been chosen, "but 43," says a Committee Report,

"participated in the work of the convention. Sessions were held without a quorum, and the yeas and nays often show that but few above thirty were present. It is understood, and not denied, that but 28 of these — less than half of a full house of 60 — decided the pro-slavery or free-State question; and upon the question of submission of their work to the will of the people, the pro-slavery party carried the point by a majority of two votes only. It was quite in keeping

* Stanton, Speech at Philadelphia, February 8th, 1858.

† Walker, Proclamation, October 19th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 103.

‡ Ibid., pp. 104–6.

§ Walker, Proclamation, October 19th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Ex. Doc. 8, p. 104.

|| The ingenuity which evolved 1600 Kansas votes from an old Cincinnati directory and 1200 more from an uninhabited county, was not exhausted by that prodigious labor. The same influences, and perhaps the same manipulators, produced a companion piece known by the name of the "candle-box fraud." At the election of January 4th, 1858, for officers under the Lecompton constitution, the returns from Delaware Agency underwent such suspicious handling that an investigating commission of the Legislature, by aid of a search-warrant, found them secreted in a candle-box buried under a wood-pile near Calhoun's "Surveyor-General's office" at Lecompton. A forged list of 379 votes had been substituted for the original memorandum of only 43 votes cut from the certificate of the judges; the votes on the forged list being intended for the pro-slavery candidates. During the investigation Calhoun was arrested, but liberated by Judge Cato on *habeas corpus*, after which he immediately went to Missouri, and from there to Washington. The details and testimony are found in House Com. Reports, 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. III., Report No. 377.

with the character of this body and its officers to find the journal of its proceedings for the last days missing." *

Their allotted task was completed in a short session of about three weeks; the convention adjourned November 7th, 43 of the 50 delegates present having been induced to sign the constitution. When the document was published the whole country was amazed to see what perversity and ingenuity had been employed to thwart the unmistakable popular will. Essentially a slave-State constitution of the most pronounced type, containing the declaration that the right of property in slaves is "before and higher than any constitutional sanction," it made the right to vote upon it depend on the one hand on a test oath to "support this constitution" in order to repel conscientious free-State voters, and on the other hand on mere inhabitancy on the day of election to attract nomadic Missourians; it postponed the right to amend or alter for a period of seven years; it kept the then existing territorial laws in force until abrogated by State legislation; it adopted the late Oxford fraud as a basis of apportionment; it gave to Calhoun, the presiding officer, power to make the precincts, the judges of election, and to decide finally upon the returns in the vote upon it, besides many other questionable or inadmissible provisions. Finally the form of submission to popular vote to be taken on the 21st of December was prescribed to be, "constitution with slavery" or "constitution with no slavery," thus compelling the adoption of the constitution in any event.

There is a personal and political mystery underlying this transaction which history will probably never solve. Only a few points of information have come to light, and they serve to embarrass rather than aid the solution. The first is that Calhoun, although the friend and protégé of Douglas, and also himself personally pledged to submission, came to the governor and urged him to join in the new programme as to slavery,—alleging that the Administration had changed its policy, and now favored this plan,—and tempted Walker with a prospect of the Presidency if he would concur. Walker declared such a change impossible, and indignantly spurned the proposal. † The second is that one Martin, a department clerk, was, after confidential instructions from Secretary Thompson and Secretary Cobb, of Buchanan's Cabinet, sent to Kansas in October, ostensibly on department business; that he spent his time in the lobby and the secret caucuses of the convention. Martin testifies that these Cabinet members favored submission, but that Thompson wished it understood that he was unwilling to oppose the admission of Kansas "if a pro-slavery constitution should be made and sent directly to Congress by the convention." ‡ A wink was as good as a nod with that body, or rather with the cabal which controlled it; and after a virtuous dumb-show of opposition, it made a pretense of yielding to the inevitable, and acted on the official suggestion. This theory is the more plausible because Martin testifies further that he himself drafted the slavery provision which was finally adopted. § The third point is that the President inexcusably abandoned his pledges to the governor and adopted this Cobb-Thompson-Calhoun contrivance, instead of keeping his word and dismissing Calhoun, as honor dictated. This course becomes especially remarkable in view of the fact that the change did not occur until after Walker's rejection of the fraudulent Oxford returns, which action placed the legislative power of the Territory in the hands of the newly elected free-State legislature, as already related. On the same day (October 22d, 1857) on which Walker and Stanton issued their proclamation rejecting the fraudulent returns, President Buchanan wrote another highly commendatory letter to Governor Walker. As it has never before been published, its full text will have special historical interest.

"WASHINGTON CITY, 22d October, 1857.

"MY DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of the tenth instant by Captain Pleasonton and am rejoiced to learn from you, what I had previously learned from other less authentic sources, that the convention of Kansas will submit the constitution to the people. It is highly gratifying that the late election passed off so peacefully; and I think we may now fairly anticipate a happy conclusion to all the difficulties in that Territory. Your application for a month's leave of absence has been granted to commence after the adjournment of the convention. During its session your presence will be too important to be dispensed with. I shall be glad to see you before you publish anything. The whole affair is now gliding along smoothly. Indeed, the revulsion in the business of the country seems to have driven all thoughts of 'bleeding Kansas' from the public mind. When and in what manner anything shall be published to revive the feeling, is a question of serious importance. I am persuaded that with every passing day the public are more and more disposed to

* Minority Report, Select Com. of Fifteen. Report No. 377, page 109, Vol. III., H. R. Reports, 1st Sess. 35th Cong.

This "missing link," no less than the remaining portion of the journal printed in the proceedings of the investigating committee, is itself strong circumstantial proof of the imposture underlying the whole transaction. Many sections of the completed constitution are not even mentioned in the journal: it does not contain the submission clause of the schedule, and the authenticity of the document rests upon the signatures and the certificate of John Calhoun.

† Walker, Testimony. Report Covode Committee, p. 110.

‡ Martin, Testimony. Report Covode Committee, p. 159.

§ Report Covode Committee, pp. 170–1.

do you justice. You certainly do injustice to Harris, the editor of the 'Union.' In the beginning I paid some attention to the course of the paper in regard to yourself, and I think it was unexceptionable: I know he stood firm amidst a shower of abuse from the extremists. I never saw nor did I ever hear of the communication published in the 'Union' to which you refer, and Harris has no recollection of it. I requested him to find me the number and send it to me; but this he has not done. He is not responsible in any degree for the non-publication of the letters to which you refer.* I knew nothing of them until after the receipt of yours; and upon inquiry I found their publication had been prevented by Mr. Cobb under a firm conviction that they would injure both yourself and the Administration. Whether he judged wisely or not I cannot say, for I never saw them. That he acted in fairness and friendship I have not a doubt. He was anxious that General Whitfield should publish a letter and prepared one for him, expecting he would sign it before he left. He sent this letter after him for his approval and signature; but it has not been returned. I know not what are its contents. General W. doubtless has the letter in his possession. Beyond all question, the motives of Mr. Cobb were proper. Mrs. Walker and Mrs. Bache have just left me after a half hour's very agreeable conversation. Mrs. Walker desires me to inform you the family are all well and sends her love.

"From your friend, very respectfully,
"JAMES BUCHANAN.
"Hon. ROBERT J. WALKER."†

The question naturally occurs, for whom did Calhoun speak when he approached Governor Walker, offering him the bribe of the Presidency and assuring him that the Administration had changed its mind? That was before, or certainly not long after, the probable receipt of this letter in Kansas, for the governor left the Territory (November 16th) about one week after the adjournment of the Lecompton convention. The question becomes still more pressing owing to Governor Walker's testimony that when he reached Washington, "the President himself distinctly and emphatically assured me that he had not authorized anybody to say that he had approved of that [Lecompton] programme."‡ On whose authority, then, did Calhoun declare that the Administration had changed its mind?

This query brings us to another point in President Buchanan's letter of October 22d, in which he mentions that Secretary Cobb, of his Cabinet, had without his knowledge suppressed the publication of certain letters in the "Washington Union." These were, as we learn elsewhere, § the letters in which some of the Kansas pro-slavery leaders repeated their declaration of the hopelessness of any further contest to make Kansas a slave State. Why this secret suppression by Secretary Cobb? There is but one plausible explanation of this whole chain of contradictions. The conclusion is almost forced upon us that a Cabinet intrigue, of which the President was kept in ignorance, was being carried on, under the very eyes of Mr. Buchanan, by those whom he himself significantly calls "the extremists,"—a plot to supersede his own intentions and make him falsify his own declarations. As in the case of similar intrigues by the same agents a few years later, he had neither the wit to perceive nor the will to resist.

The protest of the people of the Territory against the extraordinary action of the Lecompton convention almost amounted to a popular revolt. This action opened a wide door to fraud, and invited Missouri over to an invasion of final and permanent conquest. Governor Walker had quitted the Territory on his leave of absence, and Secretary Stanton was acting governor. "The people in great masses," he says, "and the legislature that had been elected, with almost an unanimous voice called upon me to convene the legislature, in order that they might take such steps as they could to counteract the misfortune which they conceived was about to befall them in the adoption of this constitution."‖ As already stated, Stanton had come to Kansas with the current Democratic prejudices against the free-State party. But his whole course had been frank, sincere, and studiously impartial, and the Oxford fraud had completely opened his eyes. "I now discovered for the first time to my entire satisfaction why it was that the great mass of the people of the Territory had been dissatisfied with their government, and were ready to rebel and to throw it off."¶ Having, like Walker, frequently and earnestly assured the people of their ultimate right to ratify or reject the work of the convention, he was personally humiliated by the unfairness and trickery of which that body was guilty. Under the circumstances he could not hesitate in his duty. By proclamation he convened the new legislature in extra session.

The members respected the private pledge

* "Dr. Tebbs and General Whitfield a month since left very strong letters for publication with the editor of the 'Union' which he promised to publish. His breach of this promise is a gross outrage. If not published immediately our success in convention materially depends on my getting an immediate copy at Lecompton. My friends here all regard now the 'Union' as an enemy and encouraging by its neutrality the fire-eaters not to submit the constitution. Very well, the facts are so clear that I can get along without the 'Union,' but he had no right to suppress Dr. Tebbs's letter. I shall in due time expose that transaction."—[R. J. Walker to James Buchanan, October, 1857. Extract.]

† For this autograph letter and other interesting manuscripts, we are indebted to General Duncan S. Walker, a son of the governor, now residing in Washington, D. C.

‡ Report Covode Committee, p. 111.

§ John Bell, Senate Speech, March 18th, 1858.

‖ Stanton, Philadelphia Speech, Feb. 8th, 1858.

¶ Ibid.

they had given him to engage in no general legislation; but provided by law for an investigation of the Oxford and McGee frauds, and for an election to be held on January 4th, 1858 (the day fixed by the Lecompton constitution for the election of State officers and a State legislature), at which the people might vote for the Lecompton constitution or against it. Thus in course of events two separate votes were taken on this notorious document. The first, provided for in the instrument itself, took place on the 21st of December, 1857. Detachments of troops were stationed at several points; the free-State men abstained from voting; the election was peaceable; and in due time Calhoun proclaimed that 6143 ballots had been cast "for the constitution with slavery," and 589 "for the constitution with no slavery." But the subsequent legislative investigation disclosed a gross repetition of the Oxford fraud, and proved the actual majority, in a one-sided vote, to have been only 3423. The second election occurred on January 4th, 1858, under authority of the legislative act. At this election the pro-slavery party voted for the State officers, but in its turn abstained from voting on the constitution, the result being,—against the Lecompton constitution, 10,226; for the Lecompton constitution with slavery, 138; for the Lecompton constitution without slavery, 24.*

This emphatic rejection of the Lecompton constitution by a direct vote of the people of Kansas sealed its fate. We shall see further on what persistent but abortive efforts were made in Congress to once more galvanize it into life. The free-State party was jubilant; but the pro-slavery cabal, foiled and checked, was not yet dismayed or conquered. For now there was developed, for the first time in its full proportions, the giant pro-slavery intrigue which proved that the local conspiracy of the Atchison-Missouri cabal was but the image and fraction of a national combination, finding its headquarters in the Administration, first of President Pierce, and now of President Buchanan; working as patiently and insidiously as the order of Jesuits in the Church of Rome, through successive efforts to bring about a practical subversion of the whole theory and policy of the American government. It linked the action of Border Ruffians, presidential aspirants, senates, courts, and cabinets into efficient coöperation; leading up, step by step, from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, through the Nebraska bill, border conquest, the Dred Scott decision, the suppression of the submission clause in the Toombs bill, and the extraordinary manipulation and machinery of the Lecompton constitution, toward the final overthrow of the doctrine that "all men are created equal," and the substitution of the dogma of property in man; toward the judicial construction that property rights in human beings are before and above constitutional sanction, and that slavery must find protection and perpetuity in States as well as in Territories.

The first weather-sign came from Washington. On the day after Acting Governor Stanton convened the October Legislature in special session, and before news of the event reached him, Secretary Cass transmitted to him advance copies of the President's annual message, in which the Lecompton constitution was indorsed in unqualified terms.† A week later he was admonished to conform to the views of the President in his official conduct.‡ At this point the State Department became informed of what had taken place, and the acting governor had short shrift. On December 11th Cass wrote to J. W. Denver, Esq.: "You have already been informed that Mr. Stanton has been removed from the office of Secretary of the Territory of Kansas and that you have been appointed in his place." Cass further explained that the President

> "was surprised to learn that the secretary and acting governor had, on the 1st of December, issued his proclamation for a special session of the territorial legislature on the 7th instant, only a few weeks in advance of its regular time of meeting, and only fourteen days before the decision was to be made on the question submitted by the convention. This course of Mr. Stanton, the President seriously believes, has thrown a new element of discord among the excited people of Kansas, and is directly at war, therefore, with the peaceful policy of the Administration. For this reason he has felt it his duty to remove him."§

Walker, already in Washington on leave of absence, could no longer remain silent. He was as pointedly abandoned and disgraced by the Administration as was his subordinate. In a dignified letter justifying his own course, which, he reminded them, had never been criticised or disavowed, he resigned the governorship.

> "From the events occurring in Kansas as well as here," he wrote, "it is evident that the question is passing from theories into practice; and that as governor of Kansas I should be compelled to carry out new instructions, differing on a vital question from those received at the date of my appointment. Such instructions I could not execute consistently with my views of the Federal Constitution, of the Kansas and

* Under an Act of Congress popularly known as the "English Bill," this same Lecompton constitution was once more voted upon by the people of Kansas on August 2d, 1858, with the following result: for the proposition, 1788; against it, 11,300.—[Wilder, pp. 186–8.]

† Cass to Stanton, December 2d, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Doc. 8, p. 112.

‡ Cass to Stanton, December 8th, 1857. Ibid., p. 113.

§ Cass to Denver, December 11th, 1857. Ibid., p. 120.

Nebraska bill, or with my pledges to the people of Kansas." "The idea entertained by some that I should see the Federal Constitution and the Kansas-Nebraska bill overthrown and disregarded, and that, playing the part of a mute in a pantomime of ruin, I should acquiesce by my silence in such a result, especially where such acquiescence involved, as an immediate consequence, a disastrous and sanguinary civil war, seems to me most preposterous." *

The conduct and the language of Walker and Stanton bear a remarkable significance when we remember that they had been citizens of slave States and zealous Democratic partisans, and that only hard practical experience and the testimony of their own eyes had forced them to join their predecessors in the political "graveyard." "The ghosts on the banks of the Styx," said Seward, "constitute a cloud scarcely more dense than the spirits of the departed governors of Kansas, wandering in exile and sorrow for having certified the truth against falsehood in regard to the elections between Freedom and Slavery in Kansas." †

THE REVOLT OF DOUGLAS.

THE language of President Buchanan's annual message, the summary dismissal of Acting Governor Stanton, and the resignation of Governor Walker, abruptly transferred the whole Lecompton question from Kansas to Washington; and even before the people of the Territory had practically decided it by the respective popular votes of December 21st, 1857, and January 4th, 1858, it had become the dominant political issue in the Thirty-fifth Congress, which convened on December 7th, 1857. The attitude of Senator Douglas on the new question claimed universal attention. The Dred Scott decision, affirming constitutional sanction and inviolability for slave property in Territories, had rudely damaged his theory. But we have seen how in his Springfield speech he ingeniously sought to repair and rehabilitate "popular sovereignty" by the sophism that a master's abstract constitutional right to slave property in a Territory was a "barren and a worthless right unless sustained, protected, and enforced by appropriate police regulations," which could only be supplied by the local territorial legislatures; and that the people of Kansas thus still possessed the power of indirect prohibition.

To invent and utter this sophism for home consumption among his distant constituents on the 12th of June (a few days before the Lecompton delegates were elected), and in so unobtrusive a manner as scarcely to attract a ripple of public notice, was a light task compared with that which confronted him as Senator, at the meeting of Congress in December, in the light of John Calhoun's doings and powers, of the scandal of the Oxford fraud, and of the indignation of Northern Democrats against the betrayal of Walker and Stanton.

One of his first experiences was a personal quarrel with Buchanan. When he reached Washington, three days before the session, he went to the President to protest against his adopting the Lecompton constitution and sending it to Congress for acceptance. Buchanan insisted that he must recommend it in his annual message. Douglas replied that he would denounce it as soon as it was read. The President, excited, told him to remember "that no Democrat ever yet differed from an administration of his own choice without being crushed. Beware of the fate of Tallmadge and Rives," added he. "Mr. President," retorted Douglas, "I wish you to remember that General Jackson is dead." ‡

In the election of Mr. Buchanan as President the South had secured a most important ally for the work of pro-slavery reaction. Trained in the belief that the South had hitherto been wronged, he was ready on every occasion to appear as her champion for redress; and the Southern politicians were now eager to use his leadership to make their views of public policy and constitutional duty acceptable to the North. Mediocre in talent and feeble in will, he easily submitted to control and guidance from a few Southern leaders of superior intellectual force. In his inaugural, he sought to prepare public opinion for obedience to the Dred Scott decision, and since its publication he had undertaken to interpret its scope and effect. Replying to a memorial from certain citizens of New England, he declared in a public letter, "Slavery existed at that period, and still exists in Kansas, under the Constitution of the United States. This point has at last been finally decided by the highest tribunal known to our laws. How it could ever have been seriously doubted is a mystery." § In the same letter he affirmed the legality of the Lecompton convention, though he yet clearly expressed his expectation that the constitution to be framed by it would be submitted to popular vote for "approbation or rejection."

But when that convention adjourned, and made known its cunningly devised work, the whole South instantly became clamorous to secure the sectional advantages which lay in its

* Walker to Cass, Dec. 15, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Doc. 8, pp. 131, 130.

† Seward, Senate Speech, April 30th, 1858.

‡ Douglas, Milwaukee Speech, October 13th, 1860.

§ Buchanan to Silliman and others, Aug. 15th, 1857. Senate Docs., 1st Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. I., Doc. 8, p. 74.



JOHN CALHOUN. (FROM A PAINTING BY D. C. FABRONIUS, AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY, OWNED BY JOSEPH LEDLIE, ESQ.)

technical regularity, its strong affirmance of the "property" theory, and the extraordinary power it gave to John Calhoun to control the election and decide the returns. This powerful reactionary movement was not lost upon Mr. Buchanan. He reflected it as unerringly as the vane moves to the change of the wind. Long before the meeting of Congress, the Administration organ, the "Washington Union," heralded and strongly supported the new departure. When, on the 8th of December, the President's annual message was transmitted and read, the Lecompton constitution, as framed and submitted, was therein warmly indorsed and its acceptance indicated as the future Administration policy.

The language of this message discloses with what subtle ingenuity words, phrases, definitions, ideas, and theories were being invented and plied to broaden and secure every coigne of vantage, every conquest of the pro-slavery reaction. An elaborate argument was made to defend the enormities of the Lecompton constitution. The doctrine of the Silliman letter, that "slavery exists in Kansas under the Constitution of the United States," was assumed as a conceded theory. "In emerging from the condition of territorial dependence into that of a sovereign State," the people might vote "whether this important domestic institution should or should not continue to exist." "Domestic institutions" was defined to mean slavery. "Free to form and regulate their domestic institutions"—the phrase employed in the Kansas-Nebraska act—was construed to mean a vote to continue or discontinue slavery. And "if any portion of the inhabitants shall refuse to vote, a fair opportunity to do so having been presented, ... they alone will be responsible for the consequences." "Should the constitution without slavery be adopted by the votes of the majority, the rights of property in slaves now in the Territory are reserved. . . . These slaves were brought into the Territory under the Constitution of the United States and are now the property of their masters. This point has at length been finally decided by the highest judicial tribunal of the country."*

However blind Buchanan might be to the fact that this extreme interpretation shocked and alarmed the sentiment of the North; that if made before the late presidential campaign it would have defeated his own election; and that if rudely persisted in, it might destroy the Democratic ascendency in the future, the danger was obvious and immediately vital to Douglas. His senatorial term was about to expire. To secure a reëlection he must carry the State of Illinois in 1858, which had on an issue less pronounced than this defeated his colleague Shields in 1854, and his lieutenant Richardson in 1856. But more than this, his own personal honor was as much involved in his pledges to the voters of Illinois as had been that of Governor Walker to the voters of Kansas. His double-dealing caucus bargain had thus placed him between two fires,—party disgrace at Washington and popular disgrace in Illinois. In such a dilemma his choice could not be doubtful. At all risk he must endeavor to sustain himself at home.

He met the encounter with his usual adroitness and boldness. Assuming that the President had made no express recommendation, he devoted his speech mainly to a strong argument of party expediency, repelling without reserve and denouncing without stint the work of the Lecompton convention.

"Stand by the doctrine," said he, "that leaves the people perfectly free to form and regulate their institutions for themselves, in their own way, and your party will be united and irresistible in power. Abandon

* Buchanan, Annual Message, Dec. 8th, 1857.

that great principle, and the party is not worth saving, and cannot be saved after it shall be violated. I trust we are not to be rushed upon this question. Why shall it be done? Who is to be benefited? Is the South to be the gainer? Is the North to be the gainer? Neither the North nor the South has the right to gain a sectional advantage by trickery or fraud. . . . But I am told on all sides, 'Oh! just wait; the pro-slavery clause will be voted down.' That does not obviate any of my objections; it does not diminish any of them. You have no more right to force a free-State constitution on Kansas than a slave-State constitution. If Kansas wants a slave-State constitution she has a right to it; if she wants a free-State constitution she has a right to it. It is none of my business which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is voted down or voted up. Do you suppose, after the pledges of my honor, that I would go for that principle and leave the people to vote as they choose, that I would now degrade myself by voting one way if the slavery clause be voted down, and another way if it be voted up? I care not how that vote may stand. . . . Ignore Lecompton; ignore Topeka; treat both those party movements as irregular and void; pass a fair bill — the one that we framed ourselves when we were acting as a unit; have a fair election — and you will have peace in the Democratic party, and peace throughout the country, in ninety days. The people want a fair vote. They will never be satisfied without it. . . . But if this constitution is to be forced down our throats in violation of the fundamental principle of free government, under a mode of submission that is a mockery and insult, I will resist it to the last."*

President Buchanan and the strong pro-slavery faction which was directing his course paid no attention whatever to this proposal of a compromise. Shylock had come into court to demand his bond, and would heed no pleas of equity or appeals to grace. The elections of December 21st and January 4th were held in due time, and with what result we have already seen. John Calhoun counted the votes on January 13th, and declared the "Lecompton constitution with slavery" duly adopted, prudently reserving, however, any announcement concerning the State officers or legislature under it. This much accomplished, he hurried away to Washington, where he was received with open arms by the President and his advisers, who at once proceeded with a united and formidable effort to legalize the transparent farce by Congressional sanction.

On the second day of February, 1858, President Buchanan transmitted to Congress the Lecompton constitution, "received from J. Calhoun, Esq.," and "duly certified by himself." The President's accompanying special message argues that the organic law of the Territory conferred the essential rights of an enabling act; that the free-State party stood in the attitude of willful and chronic revolution; that their various refusals to vote were a sufficient bar to complaint and objection; that the several steps in the creation and work of the Lecompton convention were regular and legal.

"The people of Kansas have, then, 'in their own way,' and in strict accordance with the organic act, framed a constitution and State government, have submitted the all-important question of slavery to the people, and have elected a governor, a member to represent them in Congress, members of the State legislature, and other State officers. They now ask admission into the Union under this constitution, which is Republican in form. It is for Congress to decide whether they will admit or reject the State which has thus been created. For my own part I am decidedly in favor of its admission and thus terminating the Kansas question."

The vote of January 4th against the constitution he declared to be illegal because it was "held after the Territory had been prepared for admission into the Union as a sovereign State, and when no authority existed in the territorial legislature which could possibly destroy its existence or change its character." His own inconsistency was lightly glossed over.

"For my own part, when I instructed Governor Walker in general terms, in favor of submitting the constitution to the people, I had no object in view except the all-absorbing question of slavery. . . . I then believed, and still believe, that under the organic act the Kansas convention were bound to submit this all-important question of slavery to the people. It was never, however, my opinion that independently of this act they would have been bound to submit any portion of the constitution to a popular vote, in order to give it validity."

To the public at large, the central point of interest in this special message, however, was the following dogmatic announcement by the President:

"It has been solemnly adjudged by the highest judicial tribunal known to our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of the United States. Kansas is, therefore, at this moment as much a slave State as Georgia or South Carolina. Without this, the equality of the sovereign States composing the Union would be violated, and the use and enjoyment of a territory acquired by the common treasure of all the States would be closed against the people and the property of nearly half the members of the Confederacy. Slavery can, therefore, never be prohibited in Kansas except by means of a constitutional provision, and in no other manner can this be obtained so promptly, if a majority of the people desire it, as by admitting it into the Union under its present constitution."

In the light of subsequent history this extreme pro-slavery programme was not only wrong in morals and statesmanship, but short-sighted and fool-hardy as a party policy. But to the eyes of President Buchanan this latter view was not so plain. The country was apparently in the full tide of a pro-slavery reaction. He had not only been elected President, but the Democratic party had also re-

* Douglas, Senate Speech, Dec. 9th, 1857.

covered its control of Congress. The presiding officer of each branch was a Southerner. Out of 64 members of the Senate, 39 were Democrats, 20 Republicans, and 5 Americans. Of the 237 members of the House, 131 were Democrats, 92 Republicans, and 14 Americans. Here was a clear majority of 14 in the upper and 25 in the lower House. This was indeed no longer the formidable legislative power which repealed the Missouri Compromise, but it seemed perhaps a sufficient force to carry out the President's recommendation. His error was in forgetting that this apparent popular indorsement was secured to him and his party by means of the double construction placed upon the Nebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform, by the caucus bargain between the leaders of the South and the leaders of the North. The moment had come when this unnatural alliance needed to be exposed and in part repudiated.

The haste with which the Southern leaders advanced step by step, forced every issue, and were now pushing their allies to the wall was, to say the least, bad management, but it grew logically out of their situation. They were swimming against the stream. The leading forces of civilization, population, wealth, commerce, intelligence, were bearing them down. The balance of power was lost. Already there were 16 free States to 15 slave States. Minnesota and Oregon, inevitably destined also to become free, were applying for admission to the Union.

Still, the case of the South was not hopeless. Kansas was apparently within their grasp. Existing law provided for the formation and admission of four additional States to be carved out of Texas, which would certainly become slave States. Then there remained the possible division of California, and a race for the possession of New Mexico and Arizona. Behind all, or, more likely, before all except Kansas, in the order of desired events, was the darling ambition of President Buchanan, the annexation of Cuba. As United States Minister to England, he had publicly declared, that if Spain refused to sell us that coveted island, we should be justified in wresting it from her by force;* as presidential candidate he had confidentially avowed, amid the first blushes of his new honor, "If I can be instrumental in settling the slavery question upon the terms I have mentioned, and then add Cuba to the Union, I shall, if President, be willing to give up the ghost, and let Breckinridge take the government."† Thus, even excluding the more problematical chances which lay hidden in filibustering enterprises, there was a possibility, easily demonstrable to the sanguine, that a decade or two might change mere numerical preponderance from the free to the slave States. Nor could this possibility be waved aside by any affectation of incredulity. Not alone Mr. Buchanan, but the whole Democratic party was publicly pledged to annexation. "Resolved," said the Cincinnati platform, "that the Democratic party will expect of the next Administration that every proper effort will be made to insure our ascendency in the Gulf of



LIFE-MASK OF STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, TAKEN BY LEONARD W. VOLK.

Mexico"; while another resolution declaring sympathy with efforts to "regenerate" Central America was no less significant.‡

But to accomplish such marvels, they must not sit with folded hands. The price of slavery was fearless aggression. They must build on a deeper foundation than presidential elections, party majorities, or even than votes in the Senate. The theory of the government must be reversed, the philosophy of the republic interpreted anew. In this subtler effort they had made notable progress. By the Kansas-Nebraska act they had paralyzed the legislation of half a century. By the Dred Scott decision they had changed the Constitution and blighted the Declaration of Independence. By the Lecompton trick they would show that

* Ostend Manifesto, Oct. 9th, 1854.

† Senator Brown to Adams, June 18th, 1856. Am. Conflict, Vol. I., p. 278.

‡ Official proceedings, pamphlet.



STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS.

in conflict with their dogmas the public will was vicious, and in conflict with their intrigues the majority powerless. They had the President, the Cabinet, the Senate, the House, the Supreme Court, and, by no means least in the immediate problem, John Calhoun with his technical investiture of far-reaching authority. The country had recovered from the shock of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and rewarded them with Buchanan. Would it not equally recover from the shock of the Lecompton constitution?

It was precisely at this point that the bent bow broke. The great bulk of the Democratic party followed the President and his Southern advisers, even in this extreme step; but to a minority sufficient to turn the scale, the Lecompton scandal had become too offensive for further tolerance.

In the Senate, with its heavy Democratic majority, the Administration easily secured the passage of a bill to admit Kansas with the Lecompton constitution. Out of eleven Democratic Senators from free States, only three — Douglas of Illinois, Broderick of California, and Stuart of Michigan — took courage to speak and vote against the measure. In the House of Representatives, however, with a narrower

margin of political power, the scheme, after an exciting discussion running through about two months, met a decisive defeat. A formidable popular opposition to it had developed itself in the North, in which speeches and letters from Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton in denunciation of it were a leading feature and a powerful influence. The lower House of Congress always responds quickly to currents of public sentiment; but in this case it caught direction all the more promptly because its members were to be chosen anew in the ensuing autumn. However much they might have party subordination and success at heart, some of them felt that they could not defend before their antislavery constituencies the Oxford frauds, the Calhoun dictatorship, the theory that slave property is above constitutional sanction, and the dogma that "Kansas is therefore at this moment as much a slave State as Georgia or South Carolina." When the test vote was taken on April 1st, out of the 53 Democratic representatives from the free States 31 voted for Lecompton; but the remaining 22,* joining their strength to the opposition, passed a substitute, originating with Mr. Crittenden of the Senate, which in substance directed a resubmission of the Lecompton constitution to the people of Kansas; — if adopted, the President to admit the new State by a simple proclamation; if rejected, the people to call a convention and frame a new instrument.

As the October vote had been the turning-point in the local popular struggle in the Territory, this adoption of the Crittenden-Montgomery substitute, by a total vote of 120 to 112 in the House of Representatives, was the culmination of the National intrigue to secure Kansas for the South. It was a narrow victory for freedom; a change of 5 votes would have passed the Lecompton bill and admitted the State with slavery, and a constitutional prohibition against any change for seven years to come. With his authority to control election returns, there is every reason to suppose that Calhoun would have set up a pro-slavery State legislature, to choose two pro-slavery senators, whom in its turn the strong Lecompton majority in the United States Senate would have admitted to seats; and thus the whole chain of fraud and usurpation back to the first Border-Ruffian invasion of Kansas would have become complete, legal, and irrevocable, on plea of mere formal and technical regularity.

* From California, 1; Illinois, 5; Indiana, 3; New Jersey, 1; New York, 2; Ohio, 6; Pennsylvania, 4.
For Lecompton: California, 1; Connecticut, 2; Indiana, 3; New Jersey, 2; New York, 10; Ohio, 2; Pennsylvania, 11.

Foiled in its main object, the Administration made another effort which served to break somewhat the force and humiliation of its first and signal defeat. The two houses of Congress having disagreed as stated, and each having once more voted to adhere to its own action, the President managed to make enough converts among the anti-Lecompton Democrats of the House to secure the appointment of a committee of conference. This committee devised what became popularly known as the "English bill," a measure which tendered a land grant to the new State, and provided that on the following August 3d the people of Kansas might vote "proposition accepted" or "proposition rejected." Acceptance should work the admission of the State with the Lecompton constitution, while rejection should postpone any admission until her population reached the ratio of representation required for a member of the House. "Hence it will be argued," explained Douglas, "in one portion of the Union that this is a submission of the constitution, and in another portion that it is not." The English bill became a law; but the people of Kansas once more voted to reject the "proposition" by nearly ten thousand majority.

Douglas opposed the English bill as he had done the Lecompton bill, thus maintaining his attitude as the chief leader of the anti-Lecompton opposition. In proportion as he received encouragement and commendation from Republican and American newspapers, he fell under the ban of the Administration journals. The "Washington Union" especially pursued him with denunciation. "It has read me out of the Democratic party every other day at least, for two or three months," said he, "and keeps reading me out; and, as if it had not succeeded, still continues to read me out, using such terms as 'traitor,' 'renegade' 'deserter,' and other kind and polite epithets of that nature." He explained that this arose from his having voted in the Senate against its editor for the office of public printer; but he also pointed out that he did so because that journal had become pro-slavery to the point of declaring "that the emancipation acts of New York, of New England, of Pennsylvania, and of New Jersey were unconstitutional, were outrages upon the right of property, were violations of the Constitution of the United States." "The proposition is advanced," continued he, "that a Southern man has a right to move from South Carolina with his negroes into Illinois, to settle there and hold them there as slaves, anything in the constitution and laws of Illinois to the contrary notwithstanding." Douglas further intimated broadly that the President and Cabinet were inspiring these editorials of the Administration organ, as part

and parcel of the same system and object with which they were pushing the Lecompton constitution with its odious "property" doctrine; and declared, "if my protest against this interpolation into the policy of this country or the creed of the Democratic party is to bring me under the ban, I am ready to meet the issue."*

He had not long to wait for the issue. The party rupture was radical, not superficial. It was, as he had himself pointed out, part of the contest for national supremacy between slavery and freedom. From time to time he still held out the olive-branch of an accommodation, and pointed wistfully to the path of reconciliation. But the reactionary faction which ruled Mr. Buchanan never forgave Douglas for his part in defeating Lecompton, and more especially for what they alleged to be his treachery to his caucus bargain, in refusing to accept and defend all the logical consequences of the Dred Scott decision.

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES.

THE anti-Lecompton recusancy of Douglas baffled the plotting extremists of the South and created additional dissension in the Democratic ranks; and this growing Democratic weakness and the increasing Republican ardor and strength presaged a possible Republican success in the coming Presidential election. While this condition of things gave national politics an unusual interest, the State of Illinois now became the field of a local contest which for the moment held the attention of the entire country in such a degree as to involve and even eclipse national issues.

In this local contest in Illinois, the choice of candidates on both sides was determined long beforehand by a popular feeling, stronger and more unerring than ordinary individual or caucus intrigues. Douglas, as author of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, as a formidable Presidential aspirant, and now again as leader of the anti-Lecompton Democrats, could, of course, have no rival in his party for his own Senatorial seat. Lincoln, who had in 1854 gracefully yielded his justly won Senatorial honors to Trumbull, and who alone bearded Douglas in his own State throughout the whole anti-Nebraska struggle, with anything like a show of equal political courage and intellectual strength, was as inevitably the leader and choice of the Republicans. Their State convention met in Springfield on the 16th of June, 1858, and, after its ordinary routine work, passed with acclamation a separate resolution, which declared "that Abraham Lincoln is the first and only choice of the Republicans of Illinois for the United States Senate as the successor of Stephen A. Douglas." The proceedings of the convention had consumed the afternoon, and an adjournment was taken. At 8 o'clock that same evening, the convention having reassembled in the State-house, Lincoln appeared before it, and made what was perhaps the most carefully prepared speech of his whole life. Every word of it was written, every sentence had been tested; but the speaker delivered it without manuscript or notes. It was not an ordinary oration, but, in the main, an argument, as sententious and axiomatic as if made to a bench of jurists. Its opening sentences contained a political prophecy which not only became the groundwork of the campaign, but heralded one of the world's great historical events. He said:

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated, with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South."†

Then followed his demonstration, through the incidents of the Nebraska legislation, the Dred Scott decision, and present political theories and issues, which would by and by find embodiment in new laws and future legal doctrines. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the language of the Nebraska bill, which declared slavery "subject to the Constitution," the Dred Scott decision, which declared that "subject to the Constitution" neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could exclude slavery from a Territory,—the argument presented point by point and step by step with legal precision the silent subversion of cherished principles of liberty. "Put this and that together," said he, "and we have another nice little niche, which we may ere long see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. . . . Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. . . . We shall lie down," continued the orator, "pleasantly

* Douglas, Senate Speech, March 22d, 1858.

† Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 1.

dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free; and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State."

His peroration was a battle-call:

"Our cause then must be intrusted to and conducted by its own undoubted friends, those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work, who do care for the result. Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then to falter now? — now, when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail — if we stand firm we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate or mistakes delay it, but sooner or later the victory is sure to come."

Lincoln's declaration that the cause of slavery restriction "must be intrusted to its own undoubted friends" had something more than a general meaning. We have seen that while Douglas avowed he did not care "whether slavery was voted down or voted up" in the Territories, he had opposed the Lecompton constitution on the ground of its non-submission to popular vote, and that this opposition caused the Buchanan Democrats to look upon and treat him as an apostate. Many earnest Republicans were moved to strong sympathy for Douglas in this attitude, partly for his help in defeating the Lecompton iniquity, partly because they believed his action in this particular a prelude to further political repentance, partly out of that chivalric generosity of human nature which sides with the weak against the strong. In the hour of his trial and danger many wishes for his successful reëlection came to him from Republicans even of national prominence. Greeley, in the New York "Tribune" as well as in private letters, made no concealment of such a desire. Burlingame in a fervid speech in the House of Representatives called upon the young men of the country to stand by the Douglas men. It was known that Colfax and other influential members of the House were holding confidential interviews with Douglas, the object of which it was not difficult to guess.* There were even rumors that Seward intended to interfere in his behalf. This report was bruited about so industriously that he felt it necessary to permit a personal friend to write an emphatic denial, so that it might come to Lincoln's knowledge.† On the other hand, newspapers ventured the suggestion that Lincoln might retaliate by a combination against Seward's Presidential aspirations.

Rival politicians in Illinois were suspicious of each other, and did not hesitate to communicate their suspicions to Lincoln.‡ Personal friends, of course, kept him well informed about these various political under-currents, and an interesting letter of his shows that he received and treated the matter with liberal charity.

"I have never said or thought more," wrote he, "as to the inclination of some of our Eastern Republican friends to favor Douglas, than I expressed in your hearing on the evening of the 21st April, at the State Library in this place. I have believed — do believe now — that Greeley, for instance, would be rather pleased to see Douglas reëlected over me or any other Republican; and yet I do not believe it is so because of any secret arrangement with Douglas — it is because he thinks Douglas's superior position, reputation, experience, and ability, if you please, would more than compensate for his lack of a pure Republican position, and, therefore, his reëlection do the general cause of Republicanism more good than would the election of any one of our better undistinguished pure Republicans. I do not know how you estimate Greeley, but I consider him incapable of corruption or falsehood. He denies that he directly is taking part in favor of Douglas, and I believe him.§ Still his feeling constantly manifests itself in his paper, which, being so

* See Hollister, "Life of Colfax," pp. 119–22.

† J. Watson Webb to Bates, June 9th, 1858. MS.

‡ Wentworth to Lincoln, April 19th, 1858. MS.

§ It is interesting to compare with Lincoln's a letter from Greeley to a Chicago editor on the same subject:

"New York, July 24th, 1858.

"My Friend: You have taken your own course — don't try to throw the blame on others. You have repelled Douglas, who might have been conciliated and attached to our own side, whatever he may *now* find it necessary to say, or do, and, instead of helping us in other States, you have thrown a load upon us that may probably break us down. You knew what was the almost unanimous desire of the Republicans of other States; and you spurned and insulted them. Now go ahead and fight it through. You are in for it, and it does no good to make up wry faces. What I have said in the 'Tribune' since the fight was resolved on, has been in good faith, intended to help you through. If Lincoln would fight up to the work also, you might get through — if he apologizes, and retreats, he is lost, and all others go down with him. His first Springfield speech (at the convention) was in the right key; his Chicago speech was bad; and I fear the new Springfield speech is worse. If he dare not stand on broad Republican ground, he cannot stand at all. That, however, is *his* business; he is nowise responsible for what I say. I shall stand on the broad anti-slavery ground, which I have occupied for years. I cannot change it to help your fight; and I should only damage you if I did. You have got your Elephant — you would have him — now shoulder him! He is not so very heavy, after all. As I seem to displease you equally when I try to keep you out of trouble, and when, having rushed in in spite of me, I try to help you in the struggle you have unwisely provoked, I must keep neutral, so far as may be hereafter. Yours,

(Signed) "Horace Greeley.

"J. Medill, Esq., Chicago, (very) Ill.

"What have I ever said in favor of 'Negro equality' with reference to your fight? I recollect nothing."

The above is from a manuscript copy of Greeley's letter, and the authors cannot vouch for its literal accuracy, though it bears internal evidence of genuineness.

extensively read in Illinois, is, and will continue to be, a drag upon us. I have also thought that Governor Seward, too, feels about as Greeley does; but not being a newspaper editor, his feeling in this respect is not much manifested. I have no idea that he is, by conversation or by letter, urging Illinois Republicans to vote for Douglas.

"As to myself, let me pledge you my word that neither I nor any friend, so far as I know, has been setting stake against Governor Seward. No combination has been made with me, or proposed to me, in relation to the next presidential candidate. The same thing is true in regard to the next governor of our State. I am not directly or indirectly committed to any one; nor has any one made any advance to me upon the subject. I have had many free conversations with John Wentworth; but he never dropped a remark that led me to suspect that he wishes to be governor. Indeed it is due to truth to say that while he has uniformly expressed himself for me, he has never hinted at any condition. The signs are that we shall have a good convention on the 16th, and I think our prospects generally are improving some every day. I believe we need nothing so much as to get rid of unjust suspicions of one another." *

While many alleged defections were soon disproved by the ready and loyal avowals of his friends in Illinois and elsewhere, there came to him a serious disappointment from a quarter whence he little expected it. Early in the canvass Lincoln began to hear that Crittenden of Kentucky favored the reëlection of Douglas, and had promised so to advise the Whigs of Illinois by a public letter. Deeming it well-nigh incredible that a Kentucky Whig like Crittenden could take such a part against an Illinois Whig of his own standing and service, to help a life-long opponent of Clay and his cherished plans, Lincoln addressed him a private letter making the direct inquiry. "I do not believe the story," he wrote, "but still it gives me some uneasiness. If such was your inclination, I do not believe you would so express yourself. It is not in character with you as I have always estimated you."† Crittenden's reply, however, confirmed his worst fears. He said he and Douglas had acted together to oppose Lecompton. For this Douglas had been assailed, and he thought his reëlection was necessary to rebuke the Buchanan administration.‡ In addition Crittenden also soon wrote the expected letter for publication, in which phraseology of apparent fairness covered an urgent appeal in Douglas's behalf.§

In the evenly balanced and sensitive condition of Illinois politics this ungracious outside interference may be said to have insured Lincoln's defeat. While it gave him pain to be thus wounded in the house of his friends, he yet more deeply deplored the inexcusable blunder of weak and blind leaders whose misplaced sympathy put in jeopardy the success of a vital political principle. In his convention speech he had forcibly stated the error and danger of such a step.

"How can he [Douglas] oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the 'public heart' to care nothing about it. . . . For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property. . . . Now as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle so that our great cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But clearly he is not now with us — he does not pretend to be — he does not promise ever to be." ‖

Lincoln in no wise underrated the severity of the political contest in which he was about to engage. He knew his opponent's strong points as well as his weak ones — his energy, his adroitness, the blind devotion of his followers, his greater political fame.

"Senator Douglas is of world-wide renown," he said. "All the anxious politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past, have been looking upon him as certainly at no distant day to be the President of the United States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful face post-offices, land-offices, marshalships, and cabinet appointments, chargé-ships and foreign missions, bursting and sprouting out in wonderful exuberance ready to be laid hold of by their greedy hands. And as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so long, they cannot, in the little distraction that has taken place in the party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but with greedier anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches, triumphal entries, and receptions, beyond what even in the days of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in his favor. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, lank face, nobody has ever seen that any cabbages were sprouting out. These are disadvantages all taken together, that the Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle upon principle, and upon principle alone." ¶

Douglas and his friends had indeed entered upon the canvass with an unusual flourish of trumpets. Music, banners, salutes, fireworks, addresses, ovation, and jubilation with enthusiasm genuine and simulated, came and went in almost uninterrupted sequence; so much of the noise and pomp of electioneering had not been seen since the famous hard-cider campaign of Harrison. The "Little Giant," as he was proudly nicknamed by his adherents, arrived

* Lincoln to Wilson, June 1st, 1858. MS.

† Lincoln to Crittenden, July 7th, 1858. Mrs. Coleman, "Life of Crittenden," Vol. II., p. 162.

‡ Crittenden to Lincoln, July 29th, 1858. Ibid., p. 163.

§ Crittenden to Dickey, Aug. 1st, 1858. Ibid., p. 164.

‖ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 4.

¶ Lincoln, Springfield Speech, July 17th, 1858. Debates, p. 55.

n Illinois near midsummer, after elaborate preparation and heralding, and made speeches successively at Chicago, Bloomington, and Springfield on the 9th, 16th, and 17th of July. The Republicans and their candidate were equally alert to contest every inch of ground. Mr. Lincoln made speeches in reply at Chicago on the 10th and at Springfield on the evening of Douglas's day address; and in both instances with such force and success as foreshadowed a fluctuating and long-continued struggle.

For the moment the personal presence of Douglas not only gave spirit and fresh industry to his followers, but the novelty impressed the indifferent and the wavering. The rush of the campaign was substituting excitement for inquiry, blare of brass bands and smoke of gunpowder for intelligent criticism. The fame and prestige of the "Little Giant" was beginning to incline the vibrating scale. Lincoln and his intimate and political advisers were not slow to note the sign of danger; and the remedy devised threw upon him the burden of a new responsibility. It was decided in the councils of the Republican leaders that Lincoln should challenge Douglas to joint public debate.

There is no need to reproduce here the challenge sent by Lincoln on July 24th and the correspondence in which Douglas proposed that they should meet at the towns of Ottawa, Freeport, Jonesborough, Charleston, Galesburg, Quincy, and Alton, each speaker alternately to open and close the discussion; Douglas to speak one hour at Ottawa, Lincoln to reply for an hour and a half, and Douglas to make a half hour's rejoinder. In like manner Lincoln should open and close at Freeport, and so on alternately. Lincoln's note of July 31st accepts the proposal as made. "Although by the terms," he writes, "as you propose, you take four openings and closes to my three, I accede and thus close the arrangement." Meanwhile each of the speakers made independent appointments for other days and places than these seven; and in the heat and dust of midsummer traveled and addressed the people for a period of about one hundred days, frequently making the necessary journeys by night, and often making two and sometimes even three speeches in a single day. To the combat of intellectual skill was thus added an ordeal of physical endurance.*

Lincoln entered upon the task which his party friends had devised with neither bravado nor misgiving. He had not sought these public discussions; neither did he shrink from them. Throughout his whole life he appears to have been singularly correct in his estimate of difficulties to be encountered and of his own powers for undertaking them. Each of these seven meetings, comprising both the Republican and Democratic voters of the neighboring counties, formed a vast, eager, and attentive assemblage. It needed only the first day's experience to show the wisdom of the Republican leaders in forcing a joint discussion upon Douglas. Face to face with his competitor, he could no longer successfully assume airs of superiority, or wrap himself in his Senatorial dignity and prestige. They were equal spokesmen, of equal parties, on an equal platform, while applause and encouragement on one side balanced applause and encouragement on the other.

In a merely forensic sense, it was indeed a battle of giants. In the whole field of American politics no man has equaled Douglas in the expedients and strategy of debate. Lacking originality and constructive logic, he had great facility in appropriating by ingenious restatement the thoughts and formulas of others. He was tireless, ubiquitous, unseizable. It would have been as easy to hold a globule of mercury under the finger's tip as to fasten him to a point he desired to evade. He could almost invert a proposition by a plausible paraphrase. He delighted in enlarging an opponent's assertion to a forced inference ridiculous in form and monstrous in dimensions. In spirit he was alert, combative, aggressive; in manner, patronizing and arrogant by turns.

Lincoln's mental equipment was of an entirely different order. His principal weapon was direct, unswerving logic. His fairness of statement and generosity of admission had long been proverbial. For these intellectual duels with Douglas, he possessed a power of analysis that easily outran and circumvented the "Little Giant's" most extraordinary gymnastics of argument. But, disdaining mere quibbles, he pursued lines of concise reasoning to maxims of constitutional law and political morals. If we may borrow a comparison from the combats of the Roman arena, Douglas was a gladiator who fought with the net and trident of party catchwords, while Lincoln carried the helmet, sword, and buckler of logic and principle. Both speakers used plain words and pithy sentences. Platitude and declamation could not have held the crowds that listened to them hour after hour in sun and rain. Douglas was always forcible in statement and bold in assertion; but Lincoln was his superior in quaint originality, aptness of phrase, and subtlety of

* "Last year in the Illinois canvass I made just 130 speeches."—[Douglas, Wooster (O.) Speech.] This was between July 9th and November 2d, 1858, just one hundred days, exclusive of Sundays.

definition; and oftentimes Lincoln's philosophic vision and poetical fervor raised him to flights of eloquence which were not possible to the fiber and temper of his opponent

It is, of course, out of the question to abridge the various Lincoln-Douglas discussions of which the text fills a good-sized volume. Only a few points of controversy may be stated. Lincoln's convention speech, it will be remembered, declared that in his belief the Union could not endure permanently half slave and half free, but must become all one thing or all the other. Douglas in his first speech of the campaign attacked this as an invitation to a war of sections, declaring that uniformity would lead to consolidation and despotism. He charged the Republicans with intent to abolish slavery in the States; said their opposition to the Dred Scott decision was a desire for negro equality and amalgamation; and prescribed his principle of popular sovereignty as a panacea for all the ills growing out of the slavery agitation.

To all this Lincoln replied that Republicans did not aim at abolition in the slave States, but only the exclusion of slavery from free Territories; they did not oppose the Dred Scott decision in so far as it concerned the freedom of Dred Scott, but they refused to accept its dicta as rules of political action. He repelled the accusation that the Republicans desired negro equality or amalgamation, saying:

"There is a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together upon the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that notwithstanding all this there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,— the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects — certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment; but in the right to eat the bread without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal, and the equal of Judge Douglas and the equal of every living man." *

In return he pressed upon Douglas his charge of a political conspiracy to nationalize slavery, alleging that his "don't care" policy was but the convenient stalking-horse under cover of which a new Dred Scott decision would make slavery lawful everywhere.

"It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the territorial legislature can do it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed." †

"The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about it. Try it by some of Judge Douglas's arguments. He says he 'don't care whether it is voted up or voted down' in the Territories. I do not care myself, in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the national policy he desires to have established. It is alike valuable for my purpose. Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery, but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it; because no man can logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. He may say he don't care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing. He contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them. So they have if it is not a wrong. But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong. He says that upon the score of equality slaves should be allowed to go into a new Territory, like other property. This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property. If it and other property are equal, his argument is entirely logical. But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. You may turn over everything in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim-like arguments — it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it.

"That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles — right and wrong — throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle, in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, 'You work and toil and earn bread, and I'll eat it.' No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle." ‡

As to the vaunted popular sovereignty principle, Lincoln declared it

"the most arrant quixotism that was ever enacted before a community. . . . Does he mean to say that he has been devoting his life to securing to the people of the Territories the right to exclude slavery from the Territories? If he means so to say, he means to deceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of the Supreme Court, which he approves and makes especial ground of attack upon me for disap-

* Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 75.
† Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 82.
‡ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 233–4.

proving, forbids the people of a Territory to exclude slavery. This covers the whole ground from the settlement of a Territory till it reaches the degree of maturity entitling it to form a State constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, the Judge is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposing it. He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will of the Territories has no constitutional power to exclude slavery during their territorial existence." *

By no means the least interesting of the many points touched in these debates is Lincoln's own estimate of the probable duration of slavery, or rather of the least possible period in which "ultimate extinction" could be effected, even under the most favorable circumstances.

"Now at this day in the history of the world," said he, in the Charleston debate, "we can no more foretell where the end of this slavery agitation will be than we can see the end of the world itself. The Nebraska-Kansas bill was introduced four years and a half ago, and if the agitation is ever to come to an end, we may say we are four years and a half nearer the end. So too we can say we are four years and a half nearer the end of the world; and we can just as clearly see the end of the world as we can see the end of this agitation. The Kansas settlement did not conclude it. If Kansas should sink to-day, and leave a great vacant space in the earth's surface, this vexed question would still be among us. I say then there is no way of putting an end to the slavery agitation amongst us, but to put it back upon the basis where our fathers placed it, no way but to keep it out of our new Territories — to restrict it forever to the old States where it now exists. Then the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction. That is one way of putting an end to the slavery agitation.

"The other way is for us to surrender and let Judge Douglas and his friends have their way and plant slavery over all the States; cease speaking of it as in any way a wrong; regard slavery as one of the common matters of property and speak of negroes as we do of our horses and cattle. But while it drives on in its state of progress as it is now driving, and as it has driven for the last five years, I have ventured the opinion, and I say to-day, that we will have no end to the slavery agitation until it takes one turn or the other. I do not mean to say that when it takes a turn toward ultimate extinction it will be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction would occur in less than a hundred years at least; but that it will occur in the best way for both races, in God's own good time, I have no doubt." †

But the one dominating characteristic of Lincoln's speeches is their constant recurrence to broad and enduring principles, their unremitting effort to lead public opinion to loftier and nobler conceptions of political duty; and nothing in his career stamps him so distinctively an American — "the first American," as Lowell has so happily named him — as his constant eulogy and defense of the philosophical precepts of the Declaration of Independence. The following is one of his indictments of his political opponents on this point:

"At Galesburg the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes in the term 'all men.' I re-assert it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term 'all men' in the Declaration did not include the negro. Do not let me be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the ascendency and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it. I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Declaration. I know that it ran along in the mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that shameful though rather forcible declaration of Pettit of Indiana, upon the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of Independence was in that respect 'a self-evident lie' rather than a self-evident truth. But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not include the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief-Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend, Stephen A. Douglas. And now it has become the catch-word of the entire party. I would like to call upon his friends everywhere to consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a way so entirely different from their former belief! to ask whether they are not being borne along by an irresistible current, whither they know not?" ‡

In the joint debates, however, argument and oratory were both necessarily hampered by the inexorable limit of time. For the full development of his thought, the speeches Lincoln made separately at other places afforded him a freer opportunity. A quotation from his language on one of these occasions is therefore here added, as a better illustration of his style and logic, where his sublime theme carried him into one of his more impassioned moods:

"The Declaration of Independence was formed by the representatives of American liberty from thirteen States of the Confederacy, twelve of which were slave-holding communities. We need not discuss the way or the reason of their becoming slave-holding communities. It is sufficient for our purpose that all of them greatly deplored the evil and that they placed a provision in the Constitution which they supposed would gradually remove the disease by cutting off its source. This was the abolition of the slave trade. So general was the conviction, the public determination, to abolish the African slave trade, that the provision which I have referred to as being placed in the Constitution declared that it should not be abolished prior to the year 1808. A constitutional provision was necessary to prevent the people, through Congress, from putting a stop to the traffic immediately at the close of the war. Now if slavery had been a good thing, would the Fathers

* Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 56.
† Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 157.
‡ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 225.

of the Republic have taken a step calculated to diminish its beneficent influences among themselves, and snatch the boon wholly from their posterity? These communities, by their representatives in old Independence Hall, said to the whole world of men: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe. This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to his creatures. Yes, gentlemen, to all his creatures, to the whole great family of man. In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on and degraded, and imbruted by its fellows. They grasped not only the whole race of man then living, but they reached forward and seized upon the farthest posterity. They erected a beacon to guide their children, and their children's children, and the countless myriads who should inhabit the earth in other ages. Wise statesmen as they were, they knew the tendency of prosperity to breed tyrants, and so they established these great self-evident truths, that when in the distant future some man, some faction, some interest, should set up the doctrine that none but rich men, or none but white men, or none but Anglo-Saxon white men, were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, their posterity might look up again to the Declaration of Independence and take courage to renew the battle which their fathers began, so that truth and justice and mercy and all the humane and Christian virtues might not be extinguished from the land; so that no man would hereafter dare to limit and circumscribe the great principles on which the temple of liberty was being built.

"Now, my countrymen, if you have been taught doctrines conflicting with the great landmarks of the Declaration of Independence; if you have listened to suggestions which would take away from its grandeur and mutilate the fair symmetry of its proportions; if you have been inclined to believe that all men are not created equal in those inalienable rights enumerated by our chart of liberty, let me entreat you to come back. Return to the fountain whose waters spring close by the blood of the Revolution. Think nothing of me — take no thought for the political fate of any man whomsoever — but come back to the truths that are in the Declaration of Independence. You may do anything with me you choose, if you will but heed these sacred principles. You may not only defeat me for the Senate, but you may take me and put me to death. While pretending no indifference to earthly honors, I do claim to be actuated in this contest by something higher than an anxiety for office. I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man's success. It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. But do not destroy that immortal emblem of Humanity — the Declaration of American Independence." *

THE FREEPORT DOCTRINE.

WHAT has been thus far quoted has been less to illustrate the leading lines of discussion, than to explain more fully the main historical incident of the debates. In the first joint discussion at Ottawa, in the northern or anti-slavery part of Illinois, Douglas read a series of strong antislavery resolutions which he erroneously alleged Lincoln had taken part in framing and passing. He said:

"My object in reading these resolutions was to put the question to Abraham Lincoln this day whether he now stands and will stand by each article in that creed and carry it out. . . . I ask Abraham Lincoln these questions † in order that when I trot him down to lower Egypt ‡ I may put the same questions to him."§

In preparing a powerful appeal to local prejudice, Douglas doubtless knew he was handling a two-edged sword; but we shall see that he little appreciated the skill with which his antagonist would wield the weapon he was placing in his hands.

At their second joint meeting at Freeport, also in northern Illinois, Lincoln, who now had the opening speech, said, referring to Douglas's speech at Ottawa:

"I do him no injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories. I now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give him an opportunity to respond. The judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have done so, I shall propound mine to him." ‖

Lincoln then read his answers to the seven questions which had been asked him, and proposed four in return, the second one of

* Lincoln's Lewiston Speech, August 17th, 1858. Chicago "Press and Tribune."

† See questions and answers below.

‡ A local nickname by which the southern or pro-slavery portion of Illinois was familiarly known.

§ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 68.

‖ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 87.

† DOUGLAS'S QUESTIONS AND LINCOLN'S ANSWERS.

"*Question 1.* 'I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the fugitive-slave law.'

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the fugitive-slave law.

Q. 2. 'I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union even if the people want them.'

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into the Union.

Q. 3. 'I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.'

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4. 'I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.'

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. 'I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the different States.'

which ran as follows: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution?"*

To comprehend the full force of this interrogatory, the reader must recall the fact that the "popular sovereignty" of the Nebraska bill was couched in vague language, and qualified with the proviso that it was "subject to the Constitution." The caucus which framed this phraseology agreed, as a compromise between Northern and Southern Democrats, that the courts should interpret and define the constitutional limitations, by which all should abide. The Dred Scott decision declared in terms that Congress could not prohibit slavery in Territories nor authorize a territorial legislature to do so. The Dred Scott decision had thus annihilated "popular sovereignty." Would Douglas admit his blunder in law, and his error in statesmanship?

He had already faced and partly evaded this dilemma in his Springfield speech of 1857, but that was a local declaration and occurred before his Lecompton revolt, and the ingenious sophism then put forth had attracted little notice. Since that time things had materially changed. He had opposed Lecompton, become a party recusant, and been declared a party apostate. His Senatorial term was closing, and he had to look to an evenly balanced if not a hostile constituency for reëlection. The Buchanan administration was putting forth what feeble strength it had in Illinois to insure his defeat. His Democratic rivals were scrutinizing every word he uttered. He stood before the people to whom he had pledged his word that the voters of Kansas might regulate their own domestic concerns. They would tolerate no juggling nor evasion. There remained no resource but to answer *Yes*, and he could conjure up no justification of such an answer except the hollow subterfuge he had invented the year before.

Lincoln clearly enough comprehended the dilemma and predicted the expedient of his antagonist. He had framed his questions and submitted them to a consultation of shrewd party friends. This one especially was the subject of anxious deliberation and serious disagreement. Nearly a month before, Lincoln in a private letter accurately foreshadowed Douglas's course on this question. "You shall have hard work to get him directly to the point whether a territorial legislature has or has not the power to exclude slavery. But if you succeed in bringing him to it — though he will be compelled to say it possesses no such power — he will instantly take ground that slavery cannot actually exist in the Territories unless the people desire it, and so give it protection by territorial legislation. If this offends the South, he will let it offend them, as at all events he means to hold on to his chances in Illinois." There is a tradition that on the night preceding this Freeport debate Lincoln was catching a few hours' rest, at a little railroad center named Mendota, to which place the converging trains brought after midnight a number of excited Republican leaders, on their way to attend the great meeting at the neighboring town of Freeport. Notwithstanding the late hour, Mr. Lincoln's bedroom was soon invaded by an improvised caucus, and the ominous question was once more brought under consideration. The whole drift of advice ran against putting the interrogatory to Douglas; but Lincoln persisted in his determination to force him to answer it. Finally his friends in a chorus cried out, "If you do, you can never be Senator." "Gentlemen," replied Lincoln, "I am killing larger game; if Douglas answers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this."

When Lincoln had finished his opening speech in the Freeport debate, and Douglas in his reply came to interrogatory number two, which Lincoln had propounded, he answered as follows:

* LINCOLN'S QUESTIONS.

"*Question 1.* If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English bill,— some 93,000,— will you vote to admit them?

Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution?

Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political action?

Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?"—[Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 90.]

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the different States.

Q. 6. 'I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the Missouri Compromise line.'

A. I am impliedly if not expressly pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.

Q. 7. 'I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein.'

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves."—[Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 88.]

"The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, Can the people of a Territory in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from their limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution. Mr. Lincoln knew that I had answered that question over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over the State in 1854, in 1855, and in 1856, and he has no excuse for pretending to be in doubt as to my position on that question. It matters not what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it, as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislature, and if the people are opposed to slavery they will elect representatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point." *

The remarkable theory here proposed was immediately taken up and exhaustively discussed by the leading newspapers of all parts of the Union, and thereby became definitely known under the terms "unfriendly legislation" and "Freeport doctrine." Mr. Lincoln effectually disposed of it in the following fashion in the joint debate at Alton:

"I understand I have ten minutes yet. I will employ it in saying something about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still somehow exclude slavery. The first thing I ask attention to is the fact that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether they could or not, was a question for the Supreme Court. But after the court has made the decision he virtually says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the people. And how is it he tells us they can exclude it? He said it needs 'police regulations,' and that admits of 'unfriendly legislation.' Although it is a right established by the Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the territorial legislature will give friendly legislation, and, more especially, if they adopt unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him. Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to consider the real constitutional obligation. Let me take the gentleman who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that he is a member of the territorial legislature. The first thing he will do will be to swear that he will support the Constitution of the United States. His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that constitutional right. Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States, which he has sworn to support? Can he withhold it without violating his oath? and more especially, can he pass unfriendly legislation to violate his oath? Why this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States! There has never been so outlandish or lawless a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man on earth. I do not believe it is a constitutional right to hold slaves in a Territory of the United States. I believe the decision was improperly made, and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious against those who go for reversing a decision. But he is for legislating it out of all force while the law itself stands. I repeat that there has never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respectable man."

The announcement and subsequent defense by Douglas of his "Freeport doctrine" proved, as Lincoln had predicted, something more important than a mere campaign incident. It was the turning-point in Douglas's political fortunes. With the whole South, and with a few prominent politicians of the North, it served to put him outside the pale of party fellowship. Compared with this his Lecompton revolt had been a venial offense. In that case he had merely contended for the machinery of a fair popular vote. This was the avowal of a principle as obnoxious to the slavery propaganda as the unqualified abolitionism of Giddings or Lovejoy. Henceforth all hope of reconciliation, atonement, or chance of Presidential nomination by the united Democratic party was out of the question. Before this, newspaper zealots had indeed denounced him for his Lecompton recusancy as a traitor and renegade, and the Administration had endeavored to secure his defeat; now, however, in addition, the party high-priests put him under solemn ban of excommunication. How they felt and from what motives they acted is stated with singular force and frankness in a Senate speech, soon after the Charleston convention, by Senator J. P. Benjamin of Louisiana, one of the ablest and most persistent of the conspirators to nationalize slavery, and who, not long after, was one of the principal conspirators and actors in the great Rebellion:

"Up to the years 1857 and 1858 no man in this nation had a higher or more exalted opinion of the character, the services, and the political integrity of the senator from Illinois [Douglas] than I had. . . . Sir, it has been with reluctance and sorrow that I have been obliged to pluck down my idol from his place on high, and to refuse to him any more support or confidence as a member of the party. I have done so, I trust, upon no light or unworthy ground. I have not done so alone. The causes that have operated on me have operated on the Democratic party of the United States, and have operated an effect which the whole future life of the Senator will be utterly unable to obliterate. It is impossible that confidence thus lost can be restored. On what ground has that confidence been forfeited, and why is it that we now refuse him our support and fellowship? I have stated our reason to-day. I have appealed to the record. I have not followed him back in the false issue or the feigned traverse that he makes in relation to matters that are not now in contest between him and the Democratic party. †

* Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 95.

† Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 234.

The question is not what we all said or believed in 1840 or in 1856. How idle was it to search ancient precedents and accumulate old quotations from what Senators may have at different times said in relation to their principles and views. The precise point, the direct arraignment, the plain and explicit allegation made against the Senator from Illinois is not touched by him in all of his speech.

"We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point upon which we were at issue, that it should be considered a judicial point; that he would abide the decision; that he would act under the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that having said that to us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a local election, his knees gave way; his whole person trembled. His adversary stood upon principle and was beaten; and lo! he is the candidate of a mighty party for the Presidency of the United States. The Senator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for which he faltered; but lo! the grand prize of his ambition to-day slips from his grasp because of his faltering in his former contest, and his success in the canvass for the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the loss of the Presidency of the United States." *

The Senatorial canvass in Illinois came to a close with the election on the 2d of November and resulted in a victory for Douglas. The Republicans, on their State ticket, polled 125,430 votes; the Douglas Democrats, 121,609; the Buchanan Democrats, 5071. By this plurality the Republican State officers were chosen. But in respect to members of the legislature the case stood differently, and when in the following January the Senatorial election took place in joint session of the two Houses, Douglas received the vote of every Democrat, 54 members, and Lincoln the vote of every Republican, 46 members, whereupon Douglas was declared elected Senator of the United States for 6 years from the 4th of March, 1859.

The main cause of Lincoln's defeat was the unfairness of the existing apportionment, which was based upon the census of 1850. A fair apportionment, based on the changes of population which had occurred, would have given northern Illinois a larger representation; and it was there the Republicans had recruited their principal strength in the recent transformation of parties. The Republicans estimated that this circumstance caused them a loss of 6 to 10 members.

But the unusual political combinations also had a large influence in the result. Lincoln, in an Ohio speech made in the following year, addressing himself to Kentuckians, thus summarized the political forces that contributed to his defeat:

"Douglas had three or four very distinguished men of the most extreme antislavery views of any men in the Republican party expressing their desire for his reëlection to the Senate last year. That would of itself have seemed to be a little wonderful, but that wonder is heightened when we see that Wise of Virginia, a man exactly opposed to them, a man who believes in the divine right of slavery, was also expressing his desire that Douglas should be reëlected; that another man that may be said to be kindred to Wise, Mr. Breckinridge, the Vice-President, and of your own State, was also agreeing with the antislavery men in the North, that Douglas ought to be reëlected. Still to heighten the wonder, a Senator from Kentucky, whom I have always loved with an affection as tender and endearing as I have ever loved any man, who was opposed to the antislavery men for reasons which seemed sufficient to him and equally opposed to Wise and Breckinridge, was writing letters to Illinois to secure the reëlection of Douglas. Now that all these conflicting elements should be brought, while at daggers' points with one another, to support him, is a feat that is worthy for you to note and consider. It is quite probable that each of these classes of men thought, by the reëlection of Douglas, their peculiar views would gain something; it is probable that the antislavery men thought their views would gain something; that Wise and Breckinridge thought so too, as regards their opinions; that Mr. Crittenden thought that his views would gain something although he was opposed to both these other men. It is probable that each and all of them thought they were using Douglas, and it is yet an unsolved problem whether he was not using them all." †

After a hundred consecutive days of excitement, of intense mental strain, and of unremitting bodily exertion, after speech-making and parades, music and bonfires, it must be something of a trial to face at once the mortification of defeat, the weariness of intellectual and physical reaction, and the dull commonplace of daily routine. Letters written at this period show that under these conditions Mr. Lincoln remained composed, patient, and hopeful. Two weeks after election he wrote thus to Mr. Judd, a member of the legislature and chairman of the Republican State Central Committee:

"I have the pleasure to inform you that I am convalescent and hoping these lines may find you in the same improving state of health. Doubtless you have suspected for some time that I entertain a personal wish for a term in the United States Senate; and had the suspicion taken the shape of a direct charge I think I could not have truthfully denied it. But let the past as nothing be. For the future my view is that the fight must go on. The returns here are not yet completed, but it is believed that Dougherty's vote will be slightly greater than Miller's majority over Tracy. We have some hundred and twenty thousand clear Republican votes. That pile is worth keeping together. It will elect a State Treasurer two years hence.

"In that day I shall fight in the ranks, but I shall be in no one's way for any of the places. I am especially for Trumbull's reëlection; and, by the way, this brings me to the principal object of this letter. Can you not take your draft of an apportionment law and carefully revise it till it shall be strictly and obviously just in all particulars, and then by an early and persistent effort get enough of the enemies' men to enable you to pass it? I believe if you and Peck make a job of it, begin early and work earnestly and quietly, you can succeed in it. Unless something be done, Trumbull is inevitably beaten two years hence. Take this into serious consideration." ‡

* Benjamin, Senate Speech, May 22d, 1860.

† Lincoln, Cincinnati Speech, Sept. 17th, 1859. Debates, p. 263.

‡ Lincoln to Judd, Nov. 15th, 1858.

On the following day he received from Mr. Judd a letter informing him that the funds subscribed for the State Central Committee did not suffice to pay all the election bills, and asking his help to raise additional contributions. To this appeal Lincoln replied:

"Yours of the 15th is just received. I wrote you the same day. As to the pecuniary matter, I am willing to pay according to my ability, but I am the poorest hand living to get others to pay. I have been on expenses so long without earning anything that I am absolutely without money now for even household expenses. Still, if you can put in $250 for me towards discharging the debt of the committee, I will allow it when you and I settle the private matter between us. This, with what I have already paid, and with an outstanding note of mine, will exceed my subscription of $500. This, too, is exclusive of my ordinary expenses during the campaign, all which being added to my loss of time and business, bears pretty heavily upon one no better off in world's goods than I; but as I had the post of honor, it is not for me to be over-nice. You are feeling badly — 'And this too shall pass away.' 'Never fear.'" *

The sting of personal defeat is painful to most men, and it was doubtless so to Lincoln. Yet he regarded the passing struggle as something more than a mere scramble for office, and drew from it the consolation which all earnest workers feel in the consciousness of a task well done. Thus he wrote to a friend on November 19th as follows:

"You doubtless have seen ere this the result of the election here. Of course I wished, but I did not much expect, a better result. . . . I am glad I made the late race. It gave me a hearing on the great and durable question of the age, which I could have had in no other way; and though I now sink out of view, and shall be forgotten, I believe I have made some marks which will tell for the cause of liberty, long after I am gone." †

To these one other letter may be added, showing his never-failing faith in the political future. To a personal friend in Quincy, Illinois, who had watched the campaign with unusual attention, Lincoln wrote that same day:

"Yours of the 13th was received some days ago. The fight must go on. The cause of civil liberty must not be surrendered at the end of one or even one hundred defeats. Douglas had the ingenuity to be supported in the late contest, both as the best means to break down and to uphold the slave interest. No ingenuity can keep these antagonistic elements in harmony long. Another explosion will soon come." ‡

Douglas was also greatly exhausted by the wearing labors of the campaign; but he had the notable triumph of an assured reëlection to the Senate and the congratulations of his enthusiastic friends to sustain and refresh him. Being an indefatigable worker, he was already organizing a new and more ambitious effort. Three weeks after election he started on a brief tour to the Southern States, making speeches at Memphis and New Orleans, of which further mention will be made in the next chapter. Perhaps he deemed it wise not to proceed immediately to Washington, where Congress convened on the first Monday of December, and thus to avoid a direct continuance of his battle with the Buchanan Administration. If so, the device proved ineffectual. The President and his partisans were determined to put the author of the "Freeport doctrine" under public ban, and to that end, when Congress organized, one of the first acts of the Senate majority was to depose Douglas from his place as chairman of the Committee on Territories, which he had held in that body for eleven years.

* Lincoln to Judd, Nov. 16th, 1858.
† Lincoln to Dr. Henry, Nov. 19th, 1858. MS.
‡ Lincoln to Asbury, Nov. 19th, 1858.

NOTE.— In the next number will be given an account of Lincoln's Ohio speeches, his Cooper Institute speech, etc.

July 1887

LOSS AND GAIN.

IF the June rose could guess
Before the sunbeam wooed her from the bud,
And reddened into life her faint young blood,
What blight should fall upon her loveliness,
What darkness of decay, what shroud of snow—
Would the rose ever blow?

If the wild lark could feel
When first between two worlds he caroled clear,
Voicing the ecstasy of either sphere,
What apathy of song should o'er him steal,
What broken accents and what faltering wing—
Would the lark ever sing?

Alas, and yet alas,
For glory of existence that shall pass!
For pride of beauty and for strength of song!
Yet were the untried life a deeper wrong.
Better a single throb of being win,
Than never to have been!

Kate Putnam Osgood.

Aug. 1887

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

LINCOLN'S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH,

AND OTHER POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1859-60.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN'S OHIO SPEECHES.

WHEN Lincoln, in opening the senatorial campaign of Illinois, declared that the Republican cause must be intrusted to its own undoubted friends who do care for the result, he displayed a much better understanding of the character and aims of his opponent than those who, not so well informed, desired the adoption of a different course. Had the wishes of Greeley and others prevailed, had Douglas been adopted by the Illinois Republicans, the party would now have found itself in a fatal dilemma. No sooner was the campaign ended than Douglas started on a tour to the South, and began making speeches apparently designed to pave his way to a nomination for President by the next Democratic National Convention. Realizing that he had lost ground by his anti-Lecomptonism, and especially by his Freeport doctrine, and having already felt in the late campaign the hostility of the Buchanan Administration, he now sought to recover prestige by publishing more advanced opinions indirectly sustaining and defending slavery.

Hitherto he had declared he did not care whether slavery was voted down or voted up. He had said he would not argue the question whether slavery is right or wrong. He had adopted Taney's assertion that the negro had no share in the Declaration of Independence. He had asserted that uniformity was impossible, but that freedom and slavery might abide together forever. But now that the election was over, and a new term in the Senate secure, he was ready to conciliate pro-slavery opinion with stronger expressions. Hence, in a speech at Memphis, he cunningly linked together in argument unfriendly legislation, slavery, and annexation. He said:

"Whenever a territory has a climate, soil, and production making it the interest of the inhabitants to encourage slave property, they will pass a slave code."

Wherever these preclude the possibility of slavery being profitable, they will not permit it. On the sugar plantations of Louisiana it was not a question between the white man and the negro, but between the negro and the crocodile. He would say that between the negro and the crocodile, he took the side of the negro; but between the negro and the white man, he would go for the white man. The Almighty has drawn the line on this continent, on the one side of which the soil must be cultivated by slave labor; on the other by white labor. That line did not run on 36° and 30′ [the Missouri Compromise line], for 36° and 30′ runs over mountains and through valleys. But this slave line, he said, meanders in the sugar fields and plantations of the South, and the people living in their different localities and in the territories must determine for themselves whether their "middle bed" is best adapted to slavery or free labor.

Referring to annexation, he said our destiny had forced us to acquire Florida, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, and California. "We have now territory enough, but how long will it be enough? One hive is enough for one swarm of bees, but a new swarm comes next year and a new hive is wanted." Men may say we shall never want anything more of Mexico, but the time would come when we would be compelled to take more. Central America was half-way to California and on the direct road. The time will come when our destiny, our institutions, our safety will compel us to have it. "So it is," concluded he, "with the island of Cuba. . . . It is a matter of no consequence whether we want it or not; we are compelled to take it, and we can't help it."†

When Douglas reached New Orleans on his trip he, in another long speech, substantially repeated these declarations and, as if he had not yet placed himself in entire harmony with Southern opinion, he added a sentiment almost as remarkable as the "mud-sill" theory of Hammond, or the later "corner-stone" doctrine of Stephens:

"It is a law of humanity," said he, "a law of civilization, that whenever a man or a race of men show themselves incapable of managing their own affairs, they must consent to be governed by those who are capable of performing the duty. It is on this principle that you establish those institutions of charity for the support of the blind, or the deaf and dumb, or the insane. In accordance with this principle, I assert that the negro

† Douglas, Memphis speech, Nov. 29th, 1858. Memphis "Eagle and Enquirer."

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race, under all circumstances, at all times, and in all countries, has shown itself incapable of self-government." *

Once more, in a speech at Baltimore, Douglas repeated in substance † what he had said at Memphis and New Orleans, and then in the beginning of January, 1859, he reached Washington and took his seat in the Senate. Here he now began to comprehend the action of the Democratic caucus in deposing him from the chairmanship of the Committee on Territories. His personal influence and prestige among the Southern leaders were gone. Neither his revived zeal for annexation, nor his advanced views on the necessity for slave labor restored his good-fellowship with the extremists. Although, pursuant to a recommendation in the annual message, a measure was then pending in the Senate to place thirty millions in the hands of President Buchanan with which to negotiate for Cuba, the attitude of the pro-slavery faction was not one of conciliation, but of unrelenting opposition to him.

Toward the close of the short session this feeling broke out in open demonstration. On February 23d, while an item of the appropriation bill was under debate, Senator Brown, of Mississippi, said he wanted the success of the Democratic party in 1860 to be a success of principles and not of men. He neither wanted to cheat nor be cheated. Under the decision of the Supreme Court the South would demand protection for slavery in the Territories. If he understood the senator from Illinois, Mr. Douglas, he thought a Territorial legislature might by non-action or by unfriendly action rightfully exclude slavery. He dissented from him, and now he would like to know from other senators from the North what they would do:

"If the Territorial legislature refuses to act, will you act? If it pass unfriendly acts, will you pass friendly? If it pass laws hostile to slavery, will you annul them and substitute laws favoring slavery in their stead? . . . I would rather," concluded he, "see the Democratic party sunk, never to be resurrected, than to see it successful only that one portion of it might practice a fraud on another." ‡

Douglas met the issue, and defended his Freeport doctrine without flinching. The Democracy of the North hold, said he, that if you repudiate the doctrine of non-intervention, and form a slave code by act of Congress, where the people of a Territory refuse it, you must step off the Democratic platform.

"I tell you, gentlemen of the South, in all candor, I do not believe a Democratic candidate can ever carry any one Democratic State of the North on the platform that it is the duty of the Federal Government to force the people of a Territory to have slavery when they do not want it." §

The discussion extended itself to other Senators; Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, Clay, of Alabama, Mason, of Virginia, and Gwin, of California, seconded the demands and arguments of Brown; while Pugh, of Ohio, Broderick, of California, and Stuart, of Michigan, came to the help and defense of Douglas and non-intervention. Several Republicans drifted into the debate on behalf of the position and principles of their party, which of course differed from those of both Brown and Douglas. The discussion was continued to a late hour, and finally came to an end through mere lapse of time, but not until an irreparable schism in the Democratic party had been opened.

Silence upon so vital an issue could not long be maintained. In the following June, an Iowa friend wrote to Douglas to inquire whether he would be a candidate for the presidential nomination at the coming Charleston convention. Douglas replied that party issues must first be defined. If the Democracy adhered to their former principles, his friends would be at liberty to present his name.

"If, on the contrary," continued he, "it shall become the policy of the Democratic party, which I cannot anticipate, to repudiate these their time-honored principles, on which we have achieved so many patriotic triumphs, and in lieu of them the convention shall interpolate into the creed of the party such new issues as the revival of the African slave-trade, or a Congressional slave-code for the Territories, or the doctrine that the Constitution of the United States either establishes or prohibits slavery in the Territories beyond the power of the people legally to control it, as other property — it is due to candor to say that, in such an event, I could not accept the nomination if tendered to me." ‖

We must leave the career of Douglas for a while to follow up the personal history of Lincoln. The peculiar attitude of national politics had in the previous year drawn the attention of the whole country to Illinois in a remarkable degree. The senatorial campaign was hardly opened when a Chicago editor, whose daily examination of a large list of newspaper exchanges brought the fact vividly under his observation, wrote to Lincoln:

"You are like Byron, who woke up one morning and found himself famous. People wish to know about you. You have sprung at once from the position of a capital fellow, and a leading lawyer in Illinois, to a national reputation." ¶

* Douglas, New Orleans speech, Dec. 6th, 1858. Pamphlet.

† Douglas, Baltimore speech, Jan. 5th, 1859. Pamphlet.

‡ Brown, Senate speech, Feb. 23d, 1859. Globe, p. 1241, *et seq.*

§ Douglas, Senate speech, Feb. 23d, 1859. Globe, p. 1247.

‖ Douglas to Dorr, June 22d, 1859. Baltimore "Sun," June 24th, 1859.

¶ Ray to Lincoln, July 27th, 1858. MS.

The compliment was fully warranted; the personal interest in Lincoln increased daily from the beginning to the end of the great debates. The Freeport doctrine and its effect upon the Democratic party gave these discussions both present significance and a growing interest for the future. Another friend wrote him, a few days after election:

"You have made a noble canvass, which, if unavailing in this State, has earned you a national reputation, and made you friends everywhere." *

That this was not the mere flattery of partial friends became manifest to him by other indications; by an increased correspondence filled with general commendation, and particularly by numerous invitations to deliver speeches in other States. The Republican Central Committee of New Hampshire wrote him that if Douglas came, as was expected, to that State, they desired Lincoln to come and answer him. The Central Committee of Minnesota wished him to come there and assist in their canvass. There was an incessant commotion in politics throughout the whole North, and as the season progressed, calls came from all quarters. Kansas wanted him; † Buffalo wanted him; ‡ Des Moines wanted him; § Pittsburg wanted him; || Thurlow Weed telegraphed: "Send Abraham Lincoln to Albany immediately." ¶ Not only his presence, but his arguments, ideas, and counsel were in demand. Dennison, making the canvass for governor of Ohio, asked for a report of his debates for campaign "material."**

That men in all parts of the Union were thus turning to him for help and counsel was due, not alone to the publicity and credit he had gained in his debates with Douglas in the previous year; it grew quite as much out of the fact that by his sagacity and courage he had made himself the safest, as well as the most available, rallying-point of the Republican party and exponent of Republican doctrine. The Lecompton quarrel in the Democratic party had led many prominent Republicans on a false trail. In Douglas's new attitude, developed by his Southern speeches and his claim to re-admission into regular Democratic fellowship, these leaders found themselves at fault, discredited by their own course. Lincoln, on the contrary, not only held aloft the most aggressive Republican banner but stood nearest the common party enemy, and was able to offer advice to all the elements of the Republican party, free from any suspicion of intrigue with foe or faction. The causes of his senatorial defeat thus gave him a certain party authority and leadership, which was felt if not openly acknowledged. On his part, while never officious or obtrusive, he was always ready with seasonable and judicious suggestions generous in spirit and comprehensive in scope, and which looked beyond mere local success. Thus he wrote from Springfield to Hon. Schuyler Colfax, July 6th, 1859:

"I much regret not seeing you while you were here among us. Before learning that you were to be at Jacksonville on the 4th, I had given my word to be at another place. Besides a strong desire to make your personal acquaintance, I was anxious to speak with you on politics a little more fully than I can well do in a letter. My main object in such conversation would be to hedge against divisions in the Republican ranks generally, and particularly for the contest of 1860. The point of danger is the temptation in different localities to 'platform' for something which will be popular just there, but which, nevertheless, will be a firebrand elsewhere, and especially in a national convention. As instances, the movement against foreigners in Massachusetts; in New Hampshire, to make obedience to the fugitive slave law punishable as a crime; in Ohio 'to repeal the fugitive slave law; and 'squatter sovereignty,' in Kansas. In these things there is explosive matter enough to blow up half a dozen national conventions, if it gets into them; and what gets very rife outside of conventions is very likely to find its way into them. What is desirable, if possible, is that in every local convocation of Republicans a point should be made to avoid everything which will disturb Republicans elsewhere. Massachusetts Republicans should have looked beyond their noses, and then they could not have failed to see that tilting against foreigners would ruin us in the whole Northwest. New Hampshire and Ohio should forbear tilting against the fugitive slave law in such way as to utterly overwhelm us in Illinois with the charge of enmity to the Constitution itself. Kansas, in her confidence that she can be saved to freedom on 'squatter sovereignty,' ought not to forget that to prevent the spread and naturalization of slavery is a national concern, and must be attended to by the nation. In a word, in every locality we should look beyond our noses; and at least say nothing on points where it is probable we shall disagree. I write this for your eye only; hoping, however, if you see danger as I think I do, you will do what you can to avert it. Could not suggestions be made to leading men in the State and Congressional conventions, and so avoid, to some extent at least, these apples of discord?" *

By this time Colfax was cured of his late coquetting with Douglas, and he replied:

"The suggestions you make have occurred to me. . . . Nothing is more evident than that there is an ample number of voters in the Northern States, opposed to the extension and aggressions of slavery and to Democratic misrule, to triumphantly elect a President of the United States. But it is equally evident that making up this majority are men of all shades and gradations of opinion, from the conservative who will scarcely defend his principles for fear of imperiling peace, to the bold radical who strikes stalwart blows

* David Davis to Lincoln, Nov. 7th, 1858. MS.
† Delahay to Lincoln, March 15th, 1859. MS.
‡ Dorsheimer to Chase, Sept. 12th, 1859. MS.
§ Kasson to Lincoln, Sept. 13th, 1859. MS.
|| Kirkpatrick to Lincoln, Sept. 15th, 1859. MS.

¶ Weed to Judd, Oct. 21st, 1859. MS.
** Dennison to Trumbull, July 21st, 1859. MS.
* Partly printed in Hollister, "Life of Colfax," p. 146. We are indebted to Mrs. Colfax for the full manuscript text of this and other letters.

regardless of policy or popularity. How this mass of mind shall be consolidated into a victorious phalanx in 1860 is the great problem, I think, of our eventful times. And he who could accomplish it is worthier of fame than Napoleon or Victor Emanuel. . . . In this work, to achieve success, and to achieve it without sacrifice of essential principle, you can do far more than one like myself, so much younger. Your counsel carries great weight with it; for, to be plain, there is no political letter that falls from your pen which is not copied throughout the Union."*

This allusion was called out by two letters which Lincoln had written during the year; one declaring his opposition to the waning fallacy of know-nothingism, and in which he also defined his position on "fusion." Referring to a provision lately adopted by Massachusetts to restrict naturalization, he wrote:

"Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent State; and it is no privilege of mine to scold her for what she does. Still, if from what she has done, an inference is sought to be drawn as to what I would do, I may, without impropriety, speak out. I say then, that, as I understand the Massachusetts provision, I am against its adoption in Illinois, or in any other place where I have a right to oppose it. Understanding the spirit of our institutions to aim at the elevation of men, I am opposed to whatever tends to degrade them. I have some little notoriety for commiserating the oppressed condition of the negro; and I should be strangely inconsistent if I could favor any project for curtailing the existing rights of white men, even though born in different lands, and speaking different languages from myself. As to the matter of fusion, I am for it, if it can be had on Republican grounds; and I am not for it on any other terms. A fusion on any other terms would be as foolish as unprincipled. It would lose the whole North, while the common enemy would still carry the whole South. The question of men is a different one. There are good patriotic men and able statesmen in the South whom I would cheerfully support, if they would now place themselves on Republican ground, but I am against letting down the Republican standard a hair's breadth."†

The other was a somewhat longer letter, to a Boston committee which had invited him to a festival in honor of Jefferson's birthday.

"Bearing in mind that about seventy years ago two great political parties were first formed in this country; that Thomas Jefferson was the head of one of them, and Boston the headquarters of the other, it is both curious and interesting that those supposed to descend politically from the party opposed to Jefferson, should now be celebrating his birthday, in their own original seat of empire, while those claiming political descent from him have nearly ceased to breathe his name everywhere. . . .

"But, soberly, it is now no child's play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. One would state with great confidence that he could convince any sane child that the simpler propositions of Euclid are true; but nevertheless he would fail, utterly, with one who should deny the definitions and axioms. The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society. And yet they are denied and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them 'glittering generalities.' Another bluntly calls them 'self-evident lies.' And others insidiously argue that they apply only to 'superior races.' These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object and effect,— the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. They would delight a convocation of crowned heads plotting against the people. They are the van-guard — the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them, or they will subjugate us. This is a world of compensation; and he who would be no slave must consent to have no slave. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under a just God, cannot long retain it. All honor to Jefferson — to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there that to-day and in all coming days it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling-block to the very harbingers of re-appearing tyranny and oppression."‡

Lincoln's more important political work of the year 1859 was the part he took in the canvass in the State of Ohio, where a governor was to be chosen at the October election, and where the result would decide not merely the present and local strength of the rival candidates, but also to some extent indicate the prospects and probabilities of the presidential campaign of 1860. The Ohio Democrats had called Douglas into their canvass, and the Republicans, as soon as they learned the fact, arranged that Lincoln should come and answer him. There was a fitness in this, not merely because Lincoln's joint debates with him in Illinois in the previous summer were so successful, but also because Douglas in nearly every speech made since then, both in his Southern tour and elsewhere, alluded to the Illinois campaign, and to Lincoln by name, especially to what he characterized as his political heresies. By thus everywhere making Lincoln and Lincoln's utterances a public target, Douglas himself, in effect, prolonged and extended the joint debates over the whole Union. Another circumstance added to the momentary interest of the general discussion. Douglas was by nature aggressive. Determined to hold his Northern followers in the new issues which had grown out of his Freeport doctrine, and the new antagonisms which the recent slave code debate in the Senate revealed, he wrote and published in "Harper's Magazine" for September, 1859, a long political article beginning with the assertion that "under our complex system of government it is the first duty of American statesmen to mark distinctly the dividing-line between Federal and Local authority." Quoting both the paragraph of Lincoln's Springfield speech declaring that "a house divided against itself cannot stand," and the paragraph from Seward's Rochester speech, announcing

* Colfax to Lincoln, July 14th, 1859. MS.

† Lincoln to Canisius, May 17th, 1859.

‡ Lincoln to Pierce and others, April 6th, 1859.

HOUSE IN WHICH JOHN BROWN WAS BORN, TORRINGTON, CONNECTICUT. (REDRAWN FROM A PHOTOGRAPH LENT BY F. B. SANBORN, ESQ.)

the "irrepressible conflict," Douglas made a long historical examination of his own theory of "non-intervention" and "popular sovereignty," and built up an elaborate argument to sustain his own course. The novelty of this appeal to the public occasioned general interest and varied comment, and the expedient seemed so ingenious as to excite the envy of Administration Democrats. Accordingly, Attorney-General Black, of President Buchanan's Cabinet, at "the request of friends," wrote, printed, and circulated an anonymous pamphlet in answer, in which he admitted that Douglas was "not the man to be treated with a disdainful silence," but characterized the "Harper" essay as "an unsuccessful effort at legal precision; like the writing of a judge who is trying in vain to give good reasons for a wrong decision on a question of law which he has not quite mastered." Douglas, in a speech at Wooster, Ohio, criticised this performance of Black's. Reply and rejoinder on both sides followed in due time; and this war of pamphlets was one of the prominent political incidents of the year.

Thus Lincoln's advent in the Ohio campaign attracted much more than usual notice. He made but two speeches, one at Columbus, and one at Cincinnati, at each of which places Douglas had recently preceded him. Lincoln's addresses not only brought him large and appreciative audiences, but they obtained an unprecedented circulation in print. In the main, they reproduced and tersely re-applied the ideas and arguments developed in the senatorial campaign in Illinois, adding, however, searching comments on the newer positions and points to which Douglas had since advanced. There is only space to insert a few disconnected quotations:

"Now, what is Judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is as a principle no other than that, if one man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that other man nor any body else has a right to object. . . .

"If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that Judge Douglas himself says, a controversy between the American Colonies and the Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and continued from that time until the revolution; and, while he did not say so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever since the revolution. . . .

"Take these two things and consider them together; present the question of planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a question of who shall be governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there a man here, is there a man on earth, who would not say the governor question is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I ask any honest Democrat if the small, the local, the trivial and temporary question is not, Who shall be governor? while the durable, the important, and the mischievous one is, Shall this soil be planted with slavery? This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglas's mind from his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery really looks small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would hurt him, but a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him. . .

"The Dred Scott decision expressly gives every citizen of the United States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories. And now there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was right, and saying too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter was cleared away from it, all the chaff was fanned out of it, it was a bare absurd-



JOHN BROWN. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY J. W. BLACK & CO.)

ity; no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven away from where it has a lawful right to be. . . .

"The Judge says the people of the Territories have the right, by his principle, to have slaves if they want them. Then I say that the people in Georgia have the right to buy slaves in Africa if they want them, and I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two things — to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful; to show on original principles, that the one is better or worse than the other; or to show by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other. He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no Constitutional provision against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him that there is equally no constitutional provision against buying slaves in Africa. . . .

"Then I say, if this principle is established, that there is no wrong in slavery, and whoever wants it has a right to have it; that it is a matter of dollars and cents; a sort of question how they shall deal with brutes; that between us and the negro here there is no sort

of question, but that at the South the question is between the negro and the crocodile; that it is a mere matter of policy; that there is a perfect right according to interest to do just as you please — when this is done, where this doctrine prevails, the miners and sappers will have formed public opinion for the slave-trade. . . .

"Public opinion in this country is everything. In a nation like ours this popular sovereignty and squatter sovereignty have already wrought a change in the public mind to the extent I have stated. There is no man in this crowd who can contradict it. Now, if you are opposed to slavery honestly, as much as anybody, I ask you to note that fact, and the like of which is to follow, to be plastered on layer after layer, until very soon you are prepared to deal with the negro everywhere as with the brute. If public sentiment has not been debauched already to this point, a new turn of the screw in that direction is all that is wanting; and this is constantly being done by the teachers of this insidious popular sovereignty. You need but one or two turns further until your minds, now ripening under these teachings, will be ready for all these things; and you will receive and support, or submit to, the slave-trade revived with all its horrors, a slave-code enforced in our Territories, and a new Dred Scott decision to bring slavery up into the very heart of the free North."*

"This Government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare. We believe — nay, we know, that this is the only thing that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union itself. . . .

"I say we must not interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, because the Constitution forbids it, and the general welfare does not require us to do so. We must not withhold an efficient fugitive slave law, because the Constitution requires us, as I understand it, not to withhold such a law. But we must prevent the outspreading of the institution, because neither the Constitution nor the general welfare requires us to extend it. We must prevent the revival of the African slave-trade, and the enacting by Congress of a Territorial slave-code. We must prevent each of these things being done by either congresses or courts. The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both congresses and courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution." †

The Ohio Republicans gained a decided success at the October election. Ascribing this result in a large measure to the influence of

JOHN BROWN'S CAP. (ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

Lincoln's speeches, the State Executive Committee resolved to publish in cheap book form the full Illinois Joint Debates and the two Ohio addresses, to serve as campaign material for the ensuing year.

"We regard them," wrote the committee to Lincoln, "as luminous and triumphant expositions of the doctrines of the Republican party, successfully vindicated from the aspersions of its foes, and calculated to make a document of great practical service to the Republican party in the approaching Presidential contest." ‡

Lincoln, thanking them for the flattering terms of their request, explained in his reply:

"The copies I send you, are as reported and printed by the respective friends of Senator Douglas and myself at the time — that is, his by his friends, and mine by mine. It would be an unwarrantable liberty for us to change a word or a letter in his, and the changes I have made in mine, you perceive, are verbal only, and very few in number. I wish the reprint to be precisely as the copies I send, without any comment whatever." §

The enterprise proved a success beyond the most sanguine expectations. A Columbus firm undertook the publication, itself assuming all pecuniary risk. Three large editions were sold directly to the public, without any aid from or any purchase by the committee,— the third edition containing the announcement that up to that date, June 16th, 1860, thirty thousand copies had already been circulated. ‖

* Lincoln, Columbus speech, Sept. 16th, 1859. Debates, pp. 243–254.

† Lincoln, Cincinnati speech, Sept. 17th, 1859. Debates pp. 267 – 268.

‡ Parsons and others to Lincoln, Dec. 7th, 1859. Debates, preface.

§ Lincoln to Parsons and others, Dec. 19th, 1859. Debates, preface.

‖ The preface to this third edition contains a letter from Douglas, alleging that injustice had been done him because, "the original reports as published in the 'Chicago Times,' although intended to be fair and just, were necessarily imperfect, and in some respects erroneous;" charging at the same time that Lincoln's speeches had been revised, corrected, and improved.* To this the publishers replied: "The speeches of Mr. Lincoln were never 'revised, corrected, or improved' in the sense you use those words. Remarks by the crowd which were not responded to, and the reporters' insertions of 'cheers,' 'great applause,' and so forth, which received no answer or comment from the speaker, were by our direction omitted, as well from Mr. Lincoln's speeches as yours, as we thought their perpetuation in book form would be in bad taste, and were in no manner pertinent to, or a part of, the speech." †

* Douglas to Follet, Foster & Co., June 9th, 1860. Debates, third edition, preface.

† Ibid., Follet, Foster & Co. to Douglas, June 16th, 1860.

ONE OF JOHN BROWN'S PIKES. (ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF THE KANSAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY.)

HARPER'S FERRY, AND LINCOLN'S VIEW OF JOHN BROWN'S RAID.

And now there occurred another strange event which, if it had been specially designed as a climax for the great series of political sensations since 1852, could scarcely have been more dramatic. This was John Brown's invasion of Harper's Ferry in order to create a slave insurrection. We can only understand the transaction as far as we can understand the man, and both remain somewhat enigmatical.

Of Puritan descent, John Brown was born in Connecticut in the year 1800. When he was five years old, the family moved to Ohio, at that time yet a comparative wilderness. Here he grew up a strong, vigorous boy of the woods. His father taught him the tanner's trade; but a restless disposition drove him to frequent changes of scene and effort when he grew to manhood. He attempted surveying. He became a divinity student. He tried farming and tanning in Pennsylvania, and tanning and speculating in real estate in Ohio. Cattle-dealing was his next venture; from this to sheep-raising; and by a natural transition to the business of a wool-factor in Massachusetts. This not succeeding, he made a trip to Europe. Returning, he accepted from Gerrit Smith a tract of mountain land in the Adirondacks, where he proposed to found and foster colonies of free negroes. This undertaking proved abortive, like all his others, and he once more went back to the wool business in Ohio.

Twice married, nineteen children had been born to him, of whom eleven were living when, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska bill plunged the country into the heat of political strife. Four of his sons moved away to the new Territory in the first rush of emigrants; several others went later. When the Border Ruffian hostilities broke out, John Brown followed, with money and arms contributed in the North. With his sons as a nucleus, he gathered a little band of fifteen to twenty adventurers, and soon made his name a terror in the lawless guerilla war-



GRAVE OF JOHN BROWN, NORTH ELBA, N. Y. (REDRAWN FROM A PHOTOGRAPH LENT BY GEORGE BALDWIN, ESQ.)

fare of the day. His fighting was of the prevailing type, justifiable, if at all, only on the score of defensive retaliation, and some of his acts were as criminal and atrocious as the worst of those committed by the Border Ruffians.* His losses, one son murdered, another wounded to the death, and a third rendered insane from cruel treatment, are scarcely compensated by the transitory notoriety he gathered in a few fool-hardy skirmishes.

These varied experiences give us something of a clew to his character: a strong will; great physical energy; sanguine, fanatical temperament; unbounded courage, and little wisdom; crude, visionary ideality; the inspiration of biblical precepts and Old Testament hero-worship; and ambition curbed to irritation by the hard fetters of labor, privation, and enforced endurance. In association, habit, language, and conduct he was clean, but coarse; honest, but rude. In disposition he mingled the sacrificing tenderness with the sacrificial sternness of his prototypes in Jewish history. He could lay his own child on the altar without a pang. The strongest element of his character was religious fanaticism. Taught from earliest childhood to "fear God and keep his commandments," he believed firmly in the divine authenticity of the Bible, and memorized much of its contents. His favorite texts became literal and imperative mandates; nay, more, he came to feel that he bore the commission and enjoyed the protection of the Almighty. In his Kansas camps he prayed and saw visions; believed he wielded the sword of the Lord and of Gideon; had faith that the angels encompassed him.† He desired no other safeguard than his own ideas of justice and his own convictions of duty. These ideas and convictions, however, refused obedience to accepted laws and morals, and were mere fantastic and pernicious outgrowths of his religious fanaticism. His courage partook of the recklessness of insanity. He did not count odds. "What are five to one?" he asked; and at another time he said, "One man in the right, ready to die, will chase a thousand." Perhaps he even believed he held a charmed life, for he boasted that he had been fired at thirty times and only his hair had been touched. In personal appearance he was tall, slender, with rather a military bearing, in garb half deacon, half soldier.‡ He had an impressive, half-persuasive, half-commanding manner. He was always very secretive, affected much mystery in his movements, came and went abruptly, was direct and dogmatic to bluntness in his conversation. His education was scant, his reading limited; he wrote strong phrases in bad orthography. If we may believe the intimations from himself and those who knew him best, he had not only acquired a passionate hatred of the institution of slavery, but had for twenty years nursed the longing to become a liberator of slaves in the Southern States. To this end he read various stories of insurrections, and meditated on the vicissitudes, chances, and strategy of partisan warfare. A year's border fighting in Kansas not only suddenly put thought into action, but his personal and family sacrifices intensified his visionary ambition into a stern and inflexible purpose.

It is impossible to trace exactly how and when the Harper's Ferry invasion first took practical shape in John Brown's mind, but the indications are that it grew little by little out of his Kansas experience. His earliest collisions with the Border Ruffians occurred in the spring and summer of 1856. In the autumn of that year the United States troops dispersed his band, and generally suppressed the civil war. In January, 1857, we find him in the Eastern States, appealing for arms and supplies to various committees and in various places, alleging that he desired to organize and equip a company of one hundred minute-men, who were "mixed up with the people of Kansas," but who should be ready on call to rush to the defense of freedom. This appeal only partly succeeded. From one committee he obtained authority as agent over certain arms stored in Iowa, the custody and control of which had been in dispute. From another committee he obtained a portion of the clothing he desired. From still other sources he received certain moneys, but not sufficient for his requirements. Two circumstances, however, indicate that he was practicing a deception upon the committees and public. He entered into a contract with a blacksmith, in Collinsville, Connecticut, to manufacture him

* On the night of May 24–25, 1856, five pro-slavery men living on Pottawatomie Creek, in Kansas, were mysteriously and brutally assassinated. The relatives and friends of the deceased charged John Brown and his band with these murders, which the relatives and friends of Brown persistently denied. His latest biographer, however, unreservedly admits his guilt: "For some reason he [John Brown] chose not to strike a blow himself; and this is what Salmon Brown meant when he declared that his father 'was not a participator in the deed.' It was a very narrow interpretation of the word 'participator' which would permit such a denial; but it was no doubt honestly made, although for the purpose of disguising what John Brown's real agency in the matter was. He was, in fact, the originator and performer of these executions, although the hands that dealt the wounds were those of others."— F. B. Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown," pp. 263–4.

† Redpath, "Life of John Brown," p. 48.

‡ Sanborn, in "Atlantic," April, 1872.

1000 pikes of a certain pattern,* to be completed in 90 days, and paid $550 on the contract. There is no record that he mentioned this matter to any committee. His proposed Kansas minute-men were only to be one hundred in number, and the pikes could not be for them; his explanation to the blacksmith, that they would be a good weapon of defense for Kansas settlers, was clearly a subterfuge. These pikes, ordered about March 23d, 1857, were without doubt intended for his Virginia invasion; and in fact the identical lot, finished after long delay, under the same contract, were shipped to him in September, 1859, and were actually used in his Harper's Ferry attempt. The other circumstance is that, about the time of his contract for the pikes, he also, without the knowledge of committees or friends, engaged a worthless adventurer, named Forbes, to go West and give military instruction to his company,— a measure neither useful nor practicable for Kansas defense. These two acts may be taken as the first preparation for Harper's Ferry.

But merely to conceive great enterprises is not to perform them, and every after-step of John Brown reveals his lamentable weakness and utter inadequacy for the heroic rôle to which he fancied himself called. His first blunder was in divulging all his plans to Forbes, an utter stranger, while he was so careful in concealing them from others. Forbes, as ambitious and reckless as himself, of course soon quarreled with him, and left him, and endeavored first to supplant and then betray him.

Meanwhile, little by little, Brown gathered one colored and six white confederates from among his former followers in Kansas, and assembled them for drill and training in Iowa;† four others joined him there.‡ These, together with his son Owen, counted, all told, a band of twelve persons engaged for, and partly informed of, his purpose. He left them there for instruction during the first three months of the year 1858, while he himself went East to procure means.

At the beginning of February, 1858, John Brown became, and remained for about a month, a guest at the house of Frederick Douglass, in Rochester, New-York. Immediately on his arrival there he wrote to a prominent Boston abolitionist, T. W. Higginson:

"I now want to get, for the perfecting of by far the most important undertaking of my whole life, from $500 to $800 within the next sixty days. I have written Rev. Theodore Parker, George L. Stearns, and F. B. Sanborn, Esquires, on the subject." §

Correspondence and mutual requests for a conference ensued, and finally these Boston friends sent Sanborn to the house of Gerrit Smith, in Peterboro, New-York, where a meeting had been arranged.‖ Sanborn was a young man of twenty-six, just graduated from college, who, as secretary of various Massachusetts committees, had been the active agent for sending contributions to Kansas. He arrived on the evening of Washington's birthday, February 22d, 1858, and took part in a council of conspiracy, of which John Brown was the moving will and chief actor.¶

Brown began by reading to the council a long document which he had drafted since his stay in Rochester.** It called itself a "Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United States," which, as it explained, looked to no overthrow of States or dissolution of the Union, but simply to "amendment and repeal." It was not in any sense a reasonable project of government, but simply an ill-jointed outline of rules for a proposed slave insurrection. The scheme, so far as any comprehension of it may be gleaned from the various reports which remain, was something as follows:

Somewhere in the Virginia mountains he would raise the standard of revolt and liberation. Enthusiasts would join him from the free States, and escaped blacks come to his help from Canada. From Virginia and the contiguous and neighboring slave States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, fugitive slaves, with their families, would flock to his camps. He would take his supplies, provisions, and horses by force from the neighboring plantations. Money, plate, watches, and jewelry would "constitute a liberal safety or intelligence fund." †† For arms, he had 200 Sharps rifles, and 200 revolvers, with which he would

* "He was exhibiting to a number of gentlemen, who happened to be collected together in a druggist's store, some weapons which he claimed to have taken from Captain Pate in Kansas. Among them was a two-edged dirk, with a blade about eight inches long, and he remarked that if he had a lot of those things to attach to poles about six feet long, they would be a capital weapon of defense for the settlers of Kansas. . . . When he came to make the contract, he wrote it to have malleable ferrules, cast solid, and a guard to be of malleable iron. . . . After seeing the sample he made a slight alteration. One was, to have a screw put in, as the one here has, so that they could be unshipped in case of necessity."—Blair, Testimony before Investigating Committee, pp. 121–2.

† Realf Testimony, p. 91. Mason Report, 36th Cong. 1st Sess. Senate Reports, Vol. II.

‡ Ibid., pp. 91–94.

§ "Atlantic," July, 1872, p. 51.

‖ Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown," p. 438.

¶ "Atlantic," July, 1872, p. 52.

** Sanborn in "Atlantic," March, 1875, p. 329.

†† Mason Report, Appendix, p. 55.

arm his best marksmen. His ruder followers, and even the women and children, he would arm with pikes to defend fortifications. He would construct defenses of palisades and earthworks. He would use natural strongholds; find secret mountain-passes to connect one with another; retreat from and evade attacks he could not overcome. He would maintain and indefinitely prolong a guerilla war, of which the Seminole Indians in Florida and the negroes in Hayti afforded examples. With success, he would enlarge the area of his occupation so as to include arable valleys and lowlands bordering the Alleghany range in the slave States; and here he would colonize, govern, and educate the blacks he had freed, and maintain their liberty. He would make captures and reprisals, confiscate property, take, hold, and exchange prisoners, and especially secure white hostages and exchange them for slaves to liberate. He would recognize neutrals, make treaties, exercise humanity, prevent crime, repress immorality, and observe all established laws of war. Success would render his revolt permanent, and in the end, through "amendment and repeal," abolish slavery. If, at the worst, he were driven from the mountains he would retreat with his followers through the free States to Canada. He had 12 recruits drilling in Iowa, and a half-executed contract for 1000 pikes in Connecticut;* furnish him $800 in money and he would begin operations in May.

This, if we supply continuity and arrangement to his vagaries, must have been approximately what he felt or dreamily saw, and outlined in vigorous words to his auditors. His listening friends were dumfounded at the audacity as well as heart-sick at the hopelessness of such an attempt. They pointed out the almost certainty of failure and destruction, and attempted to dissuade him from the mad scheme; but to no purpose.† They saw they were dealing with a foregone conclusion; he had convoked them, not to advise as to methods, but to furnish the means. All reasonable argument he met with his rigid dogmatic formulas, his selected proverbs, his favorite texts of Scripture. The following, preserved by various witnesses as samples of his sayings at other times, indicate his reasoning on this occasion:

"Give a slave a pike and you make him a man. I would not give Sharps rifles to more than ten men in a hundred, and then only when they have learned to use them. A ravine is better than a plain. Woods and mountain-sides can be held by resolute men against ten times their force. Nat Turner, with fifty men, held Virginia five weeks; the same number, well organized and armed, can shake the system out of the State."‡ "A few men in the right, and knowing they are right, can overturn a king. Twenty men in the Alleghanies could break slavery to pieces in two years." "If God be for us who can be against us? Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain."§

One of the participants relates, that — "When the agitated party broke up their council for the night, it was perfectly plain that Brown could not he held back from his purpose."|| The discussion of the friends on the second day (February 23d) was therefore only whether they should aid him, or oppose him, or remain indifferent. Against every admonition of reason, mere personal sympathy seems to have carried a decision in favor of the first of these alternatives. "You see how it is," said the chief counsellor, Gerrit Smith; "our dear old friend has made up his mind to this course and cannot be turned from it. We cannot give him up to die alone; we must support him."¶ Brown has left an exact statement of his own motive and expectation, in a letter to Sanborn on the following day.

"I have only had this one opportunity in a life of nearly sixty years. . . . God has honored but comparatively a very small part of mankind with any possible chance for such mighty and soul-satisfying rewards. . . . I expect nothing but to endure hardness, but I expect to effect a mighty conquest, even though it be like the last victory of Samson."**

Nine days later Brown went to Boston, where the conspiracy was enlarged and strengthened by the promises and encouragements of a little coterie of radical abolitionists.†† Within the next two months the funds he desired were contributed and sent him. Meanwhile Brown returned West, and moved his company of recruits from Iowa, by way of Chicago and Detroit, to the town of Chatham, in Canada West, arriving there about the 1st of May. By written invitations, Brown here called together what is described as "a quiet convention of the friends of freedom," to perfect his organization. On the 8th of May, 1858, they held a meeting with closed doors, there being present the original company of ten or

* Blair Testimony, Mason Report, pp. 121–5.
† Sanborn in "Atlantic," March, 1875, p. 329.
‡ Redpath, "Life of John Brown," p. 206.
§ Sanborn in "Atlantic," July, 1872, p 52.
|| Sanborn in "Atlantic," March, 1875, p. 329.
¶ Sanborn, "Life and Letters of John Brown," p. 439.
** Sanborn, "Atlantic," July, 1872, p. 53.
†† "Meantime I had communicated his plans at his request to Theodore Parker, Wentworth Higginson, and Dr. Howe, and had given Mr. Stearns some general conception of them. . . . No other person in New England except these four was informed by me of the affair, though there were many who knew or suspected Brown's general purposes. . . . Brown's first request, in 1858, was for a fund of $1000 only; with this in hand he promised to take the field either in April or May. Mr. Stearns acted as treasurer of this fund, and before the first of May nearly the whole amount had been paid in or subscribed." — Sanborn, "Atlantic," April, 1875, pp. 456–7.

eleven white members and one colored, whom Brown had brought with him, and a somewhat miscellaneous gathering of negroes residents of Canada. Some sort of promise of secrecy was mutually made; then John Brown, in a speech, laid his plan before the meeting. One Delaney, a colored doctor, in a response, promised the assistance of all the colored people in Canada.* The provisional constitution drafted by Brown at Rochester was read and adopted by articles, and about forty-five persons signed their names to the "Constitution," for the "proscribed and oppressed races of the United States." Two days afterward, the meeting again convened for the election of officers, John Brown was elected Commander-in-chief by acclamation; other members were by the same summary method appointed Secretary of War, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and two of them members of Congress. The election of a President was prudently postponed.

This Chatham convention cannot claim consideration as a serious deliberative proceeding. John Brown was its sole life and voice. The colored Canadians were nothing but spectators. The ten white recruits were mere Kansas adventurers, mostly boys in years and waifs in society, perhaps depending largely for livelihood on the employment or bounty, precarious as it was, of their leader. Upon this reckless, drifting material the strong despotic will, emotional enthusiasm, and mysterious rhapsodical talk of John Brown exercised an irresistible fascination; he drew them by easy gradations into his confidence and conspiracy. The remaining element, John Brown's son in the Chatham meeting, and other sons and relatives in the Harper's Ferry attack, are of course but the long educated instruments of the father's thought and purpose.

With funds provided, with his plan of government accepted, and himself formally appointed commander-in-chief, Brown doubtless thought his campaign about to begin; it was however destined to an unexpected interruption. The discarded and disappointed adventurer Forbes had informed several prominent Republicans in Washington City that Brown was meditating an unlawful enterprise; and the Boston committee, warned that certain arms in Brown's custody, which had been contributed for Kansas defense, were about to be flagrantly misused, dared not incur the public odium of complicity in such a deception and breach of faith. The Chatham organization was scarcely completed when Brown received word from the Boston committee that he must not use the arms (the 200 Sharps rifles and 200 revolvers) which had been intrusted to him, for any other purpose than for the defense of Kansas.† Brown hurried to Boston; but oral consultation with his friends confirmed the necessity for postponement; and it was arranged that, to lull suspicion, he should return to Kansas and await a more favorable opportunity. He yielded assent, and that fall and winter performed the exploit of leading an armed foray into Missouri, and carrying away eleven slaves to Canada — an achievement which, while to a certain degree it placed him in the attitude of a public outlaw, nevertheless greatly increased his own and his followers' confidence in the success of his grand plan. Gradually the various obstacles melted away. Kansas became pacified. The adventurer Forbes faded out of sight and importance. The disputed Sharps rifles and revolvers were transferred from committee to committee, and finally turned over to a private individual to satisfy a debt. He in turn delivered them to Brown without any hampering conditions. The Connecticut blacksmith finished and shipped the thousand pikes. The contributions from the Boston committee swelled from one to several thousands of dollars. The recruits, with a few changes, though scattered in various parts of the country, were generally held to their organization and promise, and slightly increased in number. The provisional Constitution and sundry blank commissions were surreptitiously printed, and captains and lieutenants appointed by the signature of John Brown "Commander-in-chief," countersigned by the "Secretary of War."

Gradually, also, the Commander-in-chief resolved on an important modification of his plan; that, instead of plunging at once into the Virginia mountains, he would begin by the capture of the United States armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry. Two advantages seem to have vaguely suggested themselves to his mind as likely to arise from this course: the possession of a large quantity of government arms, and the wide-spread panic and moral influence of so bold an attempt. But it nowhere appears that he had any conception of the increased risk and danger it involved, or that he adopted the slightest precaution to meet them.

Harper's Ferry was a town of five thousand inhabitants, lying between the slave States of Maryland and Virginia, at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah rivers, and where the united streams flow through a picturesque gap in the single mountain-range called the Blue Ridge. The situation possesses none of the elements which would make it a defensible fastness for protracted guerilla war-

* Realf Testimony, Mason Report, p. 99.

† Stearns to Brown, May 14th, 1858; Howe, Testimony, Mason Report, p. 177.

fare, such as was contemplated in Brown's plan. The mountains are everywhere approachable without difficulty; are pierced by roads and farms in all directions; contain few natural resources for sustenance, defense, or concealment ; are easily observed or controlled from the plain by superior forces. The town is irregular, compact, and hilly ; a bridge across each stream connects it with the opposite shores, and the Government factory and buildings, which utilized the water-power of the Potomac, lay in the lowest part of the point of land between the streams. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac bridge.

On the 4th of July, 1859, John Brown, under an assumed name, with two sons and another follower, appeared near Harper's Ferry, and soon after rented the Kennedy Farm, in Maryland, five miles from the town, where he made a pretense of cattle-dealing and mining; but in reality collected secretly his rifles, revolvers, ammunition, pikes, blankets, tents, and miscellaneous articles for a campaign. His rather eccentric actions, and the irregular coming and going of occasional strangers at his cabin, created no suspicion in the neighborhood. Cautiously increasing his supplies, and gathering his recruits, he appointed the attack for the 24th of October; but for some unexplained reason (fear of treachery, it is vaguely suggested,) he precipitated his movement in advance of that date. From this point the occurrences exhibit no foresight or completeness of preparation, no diligent pursuit of an intelligent plan, nor skill to devise momentary expedients; only a blind impulse to act.

On Sunday evening, October 16th, 1859, Brown gave his final orders, humanely directing his men to take no life where they could avoid it. Placing a few pikes and other implements in his one-horse wagon, he started with his company of eighteen followers at eight o'clock in the evening, leaving five men behind. They cut the telegraph wires on the way, and reached Harper's Ferry about eleven o'clock. He himself broke open the armory gates, took the watchmen prisoners, and made that place his headquarters. Separating his men into small detachments, he took possession of, and attempted to hold, the two bridges, the arsenal, and the rifle-factory. Next he sent six of his men five miles into the country to bring in several prominent slave-owners and their slaves. This was accomplished before daylight, and all were brought as prisoners to Brown at the armory. With them they also brought a large four-horse farm wagon, which he now sent to transfer arms from his Kennedy farm to a school-house on the Maryland side of the Potomac, about one mile from the town.

Meanwhile, about midnight of Sunday, they detained the railroad train three hours, but finally allowed it to proceed. A negro porter was shot on the bridge. The town began to be alarmed. Citizens were captured at various points, and brought to swell the number of prisoners at the armory, counting forty or fifty by morning. Still, not until daylight, and even until the usual hour of rising on Monday morning, did the town comprehend the nature and extent of the trouble.

What, now, did Brown intend to do ? What result did he look for from his movement thus far ? Amid his conflicting acts and contradictory explanations, the indications seem clear only on two or three points. Both he and his men gave everybody to understand without reserve that they had come not to kill or destroy, but only to liberate the slaves. Soon, also, he placed pikes in the hands of his black prisoners. But that ceremony did not make soldiers of them, as his favorite maxim taught. They held them in their hands with listless indifference, remaining themselves, as before, an incumbrance instead of a reënforcement. He gave his white prisoners notice that he would hold them as hostages, and informed one or two that, after daylight, he would exchange them for slaves. Before the general fighting began, he endeavored to effect an armistice or compromise with the citizens, to stop bloodshed, on condition that he be permitted to hold the armory and retain the liberated negroes. All this warrants the inference that he expected to hold the town, first, by the effect of terror; secondly, by the display of leniency and kindness; and supposed that he could remain indefinitely, and dictate terms at his leisure. The fallacy of this scheme became quickly apparent.

As the day dawned upon the town and the truth upon the citizens, his situation in a military point of view was already hopeless,—eighteen men against perhaps 1000 adults, and these eighteen scattered in four or five different squads, without means of mutual support, communication, or even contingent orders! Gradually, as the startled citizens became certain of the insignificant numbers of the assailants, an irregular street-firing broke out between Brown's sentinels and individuals with firearms. The alarm was carried to neighboring towns, and killed and wounded on both sides augmented the excitement. Tradition rather than definite record asserts that some of Brown's lieutenants began to comprehend that they were in a trap, and advised him to retreat. Nearly all his eulogists have assumed that such was his original plan, and his own subsequent excuses hint at this intention. But the claim is clearly untenable. He had no means of defensive retreat,—

no provisions, no transportation for his arms and equipage, no supply of ammunition. The suggestion is an evident afterthought.

Whether from choice or necessity, however, he remained only to find himself more and more closely pressed. By Monday noon the squad in the rifle-works, distant one mile from the armory, had been driven out, killed, and captured. The other squads, not so far from their leader, joined him at the armory, minus their losses. Already he was driven to take refuge with his diminished force in the engine-house, a low, strong brick building in the armory yard, where they barricaded the doors and improvised loop-holes, and into which they took with them ten selected prisoners as hostages. But the expedient was one of desperation. By this movement Brown literally shut himself up in his own prison, from which escape was impossible.

A desultory fire was kept up through doors and loop-holes. But now the whole country had become thoroughly aroused, and sundry military companies from neighboring towns and counties poured into Harper's Ferry. Brown himself at length realized the hopelessness of his position, and parleyed for leave to retreat across the river on condition of his giving up his prisoners; but it was too late. President Buchanan also took prompt measures; and on Monday night a detachment of eighty marines from the Washington navy-yard, under command of Colonel Robert E. Lee, of the United States army, the same who afterward became the principal leader of the Confederate armies in the Rebellion, reached the scene of action, and were stationed in the armory yard so as to cut off the insurgents from all retreat. At daylight on Tuesday morning Brown was summoned to surrender at discretion, but he refused. The instant the officer left the engine-house a storming-party of marines battered in the doors; in five minutes the conflict was over. One marine was shot dead in the assault; Brown fell under severe sword and bayonet wounds, two of his son's lay dead or dying, and four or five of his men were made prisoners, only two remaining unhurt. The great scheme of liberation built up through nearly three years of elaborate conspiracy, and designed to be executed in defiance of law, by individual enterprise with pikes, rifles, forts, guerilla war, prisoners, hostages, and plunder, was, after an experimental campaign of thirty-six hours, in utter collapse. Of Brown's total force of twenty-two men, ten were killed, five escaped, and seven were captured, tried, and hanged. Of the townspeople, five had been killed and eight wounded.

While John Brown's ability for military leadership is too insignificant even for ridicule, his moral and personal courage compelled the admiration of his enemies. Arraigned before a Virginia court, the authorities hurried through his trial for treason, conspiracy, and murder, with an unseemly precipitancy, almost calculated to make him seem the accuser, and the commonwealth the trembling culprit. He acknowledged his acts with frankness, defended his purpose with a sincerity that betokened honest conviction, bore his wounds and met his fate with a manly fortitude. Eight years before, he had written, in a document organizing a band of colored people in Springfield, Massachusetts, to resist the fugitive slave law: "Nothing so charms the American people as personal bravery. The trial for life of one bold, and to some extent successful, man, for defending his rights in good earnest, would arouse more sympathy throughout the nation than the accumulated wrongs and sufferings of more than three millions of our submissive colored population." Even now, when mere Quixotic knight-errantry and his own positive violation of the rights of individuals and society had put his life in forfeit, this sympathy for his boldness and misfortune came to him in large measure. Questioned by Governor Wise, Senator Mason, and Representative Vallandigham about his accomplices, he refused to say anything except about what he had done, and freely took upon himself the whole responsibility. He was so warped by his religious training as to have become a fatalist as well as a fanatic. "All our actions," he said to one who visited him in prison, "even all the follies that led to this disaster, were decreed to happen ages before the world was made."* The gloomy philosophy of Calvin is the key which unlocks the mysteries of Brown's life and deeds.

He was convicted, sentenced, and hanged on the 2d of December. Congress met a few days afterward, and the Senate appointed an investigating committee to inquire into the seizure of the United States armory and arsenal. The long and searching examination of many witnesses brought out with sufficient distinctness the varied personal plottings of Brown, but failed to reveal that half a dozen radical abolition clergymen of Boston were party to the conspiracy; nor did they then or afterward justify their own conduct by showing that Christ ever counseled treason, abetted conspiracy, or led rebellion against established government. From beginning to end, the whole act was reprehensible, and fraught with evil result. Modern civilization and republican government require that beyond the self-defense necessary to the protection of life and limb, all coercive reform shall act by authority of law only.

* Sanborn in "Atlantic," Dec., 1875, p. 718.

Upon politics the main effect of the Harper's Ferry incident was to aggravate the temper and increase the bitterness of all parties. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi; Mason, of Virginia; and Fitch, of Indiana, democratic members of the Senate investigating committee, sought diligently but unsuccessfully to find grounds to hold the Republican party at large responsible for Brown's raid. They felt obliged to report that they could not recommend any legislation to meet similar cases in the future, since the "invasion" of Virginia was not of the kind mentioned in the Constitution, but was "simply the act of lawless ruffians, under the sanction of no public or political authority." * Collamer, of Vermont, and Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Republican members of the committee, in their minority report, considered the affair an outgrowth of the pro-slavery lawlessness in Kansas. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, however, apparently with the object of still further setting himself right with the South, and atoning for his Freeport heresy, made a long speech in advocacy of a law to punish conspiracies in one State or Territory against the government, people, or property of another; once more quoting Lincoln's Springfield speech, and Seward's Rochester speech as containing revolutionary doctrines.

In the country at large, as in Congress, the John Brown raid excited bitter discussion and radically diverse comment,—some execrating him as a deserved felon, while others exalted him as a saint. His Boston friends particularly, who had encouraged him with either voice or money, were extravagant in their demonstrations of approval and admiration. On the day of his execution religious services were held, and funeral bells were tolled. "Some eighteen hundred years ago," said Thoreau, "Christ was crucified; this morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung. These are the two ends of a chain which is not without its links." † "The road to heaven," said Theodore Parker, "is as short from the gallows as from a throne; perhaps, also, as easy." Emerson, using a yet stronger figure, had already called him "a new saint, waiting yet his martyrdom, and who, if he shall suffer, will make the gallows glorious like the cross." ‡

Amid this conflict of argument, public opinion in the free States gravitated to neither extreme. It accepted neither the declaration of the great orator Wendell Phillips, that "the lesson of the hour is insurrection," § nor the assertion of the great lawyer Charles O'Conor, that slavery "is in its own nature, as an institution, beneficial to both races." ‖

This chapter would be incomplete if we neglected to quote Mr. Lincoln's opinion of the Harper's Ferry attempt. His quiet and common-sense criticism of the affair, pronounced a few months after its occurrence, was substantially the conclusion to which the average public judgment has come after the lapse of a quarter of a century:

"Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which at least three times as many lives were lost as at Harper's Ferry? You can scarcely stretch your very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was 'got up by Black Republicanism.' In the present state of things in the United States, I do not think a general or even a very extensive slave insurrection is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot be attained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can incendiary freemen, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials are everywhere in parcels; but there neither are nor can be supplied the indispensable connecting trains.

"Much is said by Southern people about the affection of slaves for their masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot for an uprising could scarcely be devised and communicated to twenty individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder plot of British history, though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that case, only about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in his anxiety to save a friend, betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local revolts extending to a score or so, will continue to occur as the natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears or much hopes for such an event, will be alike disappointed. . . .

"John Brown's effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which the slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the many attempts related in history, at the assassination of kings and emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt, which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini's attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown's attempt at Harper's Ferry were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one case, and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things." ¶

The aggravation of partisan temper over the Harper's Ferry incident found a manifestation

* Mason Report, p. 18.

† Redpath, "Echoes of Harper's Ferry," p. 41.

‡ Cooke's Life of Emerson, p. 140.

§ Lecture at Brooklyn, November 1st, 1859. "Echoes of Harper's Ferry," p. 43.

‖ Letter to Committee of Merchants, December 20th, 1859. "Echoes of Harper's Ferry," p. 299.

¶ Lincoln, Cooper Institute speech, Feb. 27th, 1860.

in a contest over the Speakership in the House of Representatives as prolonged and bitter as that which attended the election of Banks. In the Congressional elections of 1858, following the Lecompton controversy, the Democrats had once more lost control of the House of Representatives; there having been chosen 113 Republicans, 93 Administration Democrats, 8 anti-Lecompton Democrats, and 23 South Americans, as they were called; that is, members, mainly from the slave States, opposed to the Administration.*

This XXXVIth Congress began its session three days after the execution of John Brown, and the election of a Speaker was the first work of the new House of Representatives. The Republicans, not having a majority, made no caucus nomination; but John Sherman, of Ohio, had the largest following on the first ballot, and thereafter received their united efforts to elect him. At this point a Missouri member introduced a resolution declaring:

"That the doctrines and sentiments of a certain book called 'The Impending Crisis of the South — How to Meet it,' purporting to have been written by one Hinton R. Helper [of North Carolina], are insurrectionary and hostile to the domestic peace and tranquillity of the country, and that no member of this House who has indorsed and recommended it, or the compend from it, is fit to be Speaker of this House." †

This resolution was aimed at Sherman, who with some seventy Republicans of the previous Congress had signed a circular indorsing and recommending the book upon the general statement that it was an antislavery work, written by a Southerner. The book addressed itself to non-slaveholding Southern whites, and was mainly made up of statistics, but contained occasional passages of intolerant and vindictive sentiment against slaveholders. Whether it could be considered "insurrectionary" depended altogether on the pro-slavery or antislavery bias of the critic. Besides, the author had agreed that the obnoxious passages should not be printed in the compendium which the Republicans recommended in their circular. When interrogated, Mr. Sherman replied that he had never seen the book, and that "I am opposed to any interference whatever by the people of the free States with the relations of master and slave in the slave States." But the disavowal did not relieve him from Southern enmity. The fire-eaters seized the pretext to charge him with all manner of "abolition" intentions, and by violent debate and the utterance of threats of disunion, made the House a parliamentary and almost a revolutionary babel for nearly two months. Certain appropriations were exhausted, and the treasury was in sore need of funds. Efforts were made to adopt the plurality rule, and to choose a Speaker for a limited period; but every such movement was resisted for the purpose of defeating Sherman, or rather, through his defeat to force the North into unconditional submission to extreme pro-slavery sentiment. The struggle, nominally over an incident, was in reality over a policy.

On January 30th, 1860, Mr. Sherman withdrew his name, and the solid Republican vote was given to William Pennington of New Jersey, another Republican, who, on February 1st, was elected Speaker by 117 votes, 4 opposing members having come to his support. The South gained nothing by the obstructionist policy of its members. During the long contest, extending through forty-four ballots, their votes were scattered among many candidates of different factions, while the Republicans maintained an almost unbroken steadiness of party discipline. On the whole, the principal results of the struggle were to sectionalize parties, more completely ripen Southern sentiment toward secession, and combine wavering voters in the free States in support of Republican doctrines.

LINCOLN'S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH.

Among the many invitations to deliver addresses which Lincoln received in the fall of 1859, was one from a committee asking him to lecture in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, in a course then in progress there, designed for popular entertainment. "I wrote," said Lincoln, "that I could do it in February, provided they would take a political speech, if I could find time to get up no other." ‡ "Your letter was duly received and handed over to the committee," was the response, "and they accept your compromise. You may lecture at the time you mention, and they will pay you $200. I think they will arrange for a lecture in New York also, and pay you $200 for that." §

Financial obstacles, or other reasons, brought about the transfer of the engagement to a new committee, ‖ and the invitation was repeated in a new form:

"The Young Men's Central Republican Union of this city (New York) very earnestly desire that you should deliver what I may term a political lecture during the ensuing month. The peculiarities of the case are these: A series of lectures has been determined upon. The first was delivered by Mr. Blair, of St. Louis, a

* Tribune Almanac, 1860.

† Globe, December 5th, 1859, p. 3.

‡ Lincoln to McNeill, April 6th, 1860. Lamon, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 441.

§ Jas. A. Briggs to Lincoln, November 1st, 1859. MS.

‖ Jas. A. Briggs in New York "Evening Post," August 16th, 1867.

short time ago; the second will be in a few days, by Mr. Cassius M. Clay, and the third we would prefer to have from you rather than any other person. Of the audience I should add that it is not [that] of an ordinary political meeting. These lectures have been contrived to call out our better, but busier, citizens who never attend political meetings. A large part of the audience will also consist of ladies." *

Lincoln, however, remained under the impression that the lecture was to be given in Brooklyn, and only learned after he reached New York to fulfill his engagement that he was to speak in the Cooper Institute.† When, on the evening of February 27th, 1860, he stood before his audience, he saw not only a well-filled house, but an assemblage of listeners in which were many whom, by reason of his own modest estimate of himself, he would have been rather inclined to ask advice from than to offer instruction to. William Cullen Bryant presided over the meeting; David Dudley Field escorted the speaker to the platform; ex-Governor King, Horace Greeley, James W. Nye, Cephas Brainerd, Charles C. Nott, Hiram Barney, and others sat among the invited guests. "Since the days of Clay and Webster," said the "Tribune" next morning, "no man has spoken to a larger assemblage of the intellect and mental culture of our city." Of course the presence of such a gathering was no mere accident. Not only had Lincoln's name for nearly two years found constant mention in the newspapers, but both friendly and hostile comment had coupled it with the two ranking political leaders in the free States — Seward and Douglas. The representative men of New York were naturally eager to see and hear one who, by whatever force of eloquence or argument, had attracted so large a share of the public attention. We may also fairly infer that, on his part, Lincoln was no less curious to test the effect of his words on an audience more learned and critical than those collected in the open-air meetings of his Western campaigns. This mutual interest was an evident advantage to both; it secured a close attention from the house, and insured deliberation and emphasis by the speaker, enabling him to develop his argument with perfect precision and unity, reaching perhaps the happiest general effect ever attained in any one of his long addresses.

He took as his text a phrase uttered by Senator Douglas in the late Ohio campaign,— "Our fathers, when they framed the government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than we do now." Lincoln defined "this question," with a lawyer's exactness, thus:

"Does the proper division of local from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to slavery in our Federal Territories? Upon this Senator Douglas holds the affirmative, and the Republicans the negative. This affirmation and denial form an issue, and this issue — this question — is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood 'better than we.'"

From this "precise and agreed starting-point" Lincoln next traced with minute historical analysis the action of "our fathers" in framing "the government under which we live," by their votes and declarations in the Congresses which preceded the Constitution, and in the Congresses following which proposed its twelve amendments and enacted various Territorial prohibitions. His conclusions were irresistibly convincing.

"The sum of the whole is," said he, "that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one — a clear majority of the whole — certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories; while all the rest probably had the same understanding. Such unquestionably was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question 'better than we.' . . . It is surely safe to assume that the thirty-nine framers of the original Constitution and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who may be fairly called 'our fathers who framed the government under which we live.' And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that in his understanding any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. I go a step further. I defy any one to show that any living man in the whole world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of the last half of the present century), declare that in his understanding any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. To those who now so declare, I give, not only 'our fathers who framed the government under which we live,' but with them all other living men within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing with them.

"Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current experience — to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is, that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most surely not in a case, whereof we ourselves declare they understood the question better than we."

If any part of the audience came with the expectation of hearing the rhetorical fireworks of a Western stump-speaker of the "half-horse, half-alligator" variety, they met novelty of an unlooked for kind. In Lincoln's entire address

* C. C. Nott to Lincoln, February 9th, 1860. MS.
† Lincoln to McNeill, April 6th, 1860. Lamon, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 441.

he neither introduced an anecdote nor essayed a witticism; and the first half of it does not contain even an illustrative figure or a poetical fancy. It was the quiet, searching exposition of the historian, and the terse, compact reasoning of the statesman, about an abstract principle of legislation, in language well-nigh as restrained and colorless as he would have employed in arguing a case before a court. Yet such was the apt choice of words, the easy precision of sentences, the simple strength of propositions, the fairness of every point he assumed, and the force of every conclusion he drew, that his listeners followed him with the interest and delight a child feels in its easy mastery of a plain sum in arithmetic.

With the sympathy and confidence of his audience thus enlisted, Lincoln next took up the more prominent topics in popular thought, and by words of kindly admonition and protest addressed to the people of the South, showed how impatiently, unreasonably, and unjustly they were charging the Republican party with sectionalism, with radicalism, with revolutionary purpose, with the John Brown raid, and kindred political offenses, not only in the absence of any acts to justify such charges, but even in the face of its emphatic and constant denials and disavowals. The illustration with which he concluded this branch of his theme could not well be surpassed in argumentative force.

"But you will not abide the election of a Republican President! In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and then you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through his teeth, 'Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer!' To be sure what the robber demanded of me — my money — was my own; and I had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is my own; and the threat of death to me to extort my money, and the threat of destruction to the Union to extort my vote, can scarcely be distinguished in principle."

But the most impressive, as well as the most valuable, feature of Lincoln's address was its concluding portion, where, in advice directed especially to Republicans, he pointed out in dispassionate but earnest language that the real, underlying conflict was in the difference of moral conviction between the sections as to the inherent right or wrong of slavery, and in view of which he defined the proper duty of the free States.

"A few words now," said he, "to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace and in harmony one with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper. Even though the Southern people will not so much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if, in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us determine, if we can, what will satisfy them.

"Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against us the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know it will not. We so know, because we know we never had anything to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.

"The question recurs, What will satisfy them? Simply this: We must not only let them alone, but we must, somehow, convince them that we do let them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been so trying to convince them from the very beginning of our organization, but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches we have constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb them.

"These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly — done in acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated; we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Senator Douglas's new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our free-State constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery before they will cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us.

"I am quite aware they do not state their case precisely in this way. Most of them would probably say to us, 'Let us alone, do nothing to us, and say what you please about slavery.' But we do let them alone — have never disturbed them; so that, after all, it is what we say which dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing until we cease saying.

"I am also aware they have not, as yet, in terms, demanded the overthrow of our free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the wrong of slavery, with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings against it, and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced, the overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded and nothing be left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right, and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it, as a legal right and a social blessing.

"Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground, save our conviction that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality — its universality! if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension — its enlargement. All they ask we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right, and our thinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition, as being right; but thinking it wrong as we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can we do this?

"Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us here in the free-States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored, contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man, such as a policy of 'don't care,' on a question about which all true men do care, such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists; reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did.

"Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it."

The smiles, the laughter, the outbursts of applause which greeted and emphasized the speaker's telling points, showed Mr. Lincoln that his arguments met ready acceptance. The next morning the four leading New York dailies printed the speech in full, and bore warm testimony to its merit and effect.

"Mr. Lincoln is one of nature's orators," said the "Tribune," "using his rare powers solely to elucidate and convince, though their inevitable effect is to delight and electrify as well. We present herewith a very full and accurate report of this speech; yet the tones, the gestures, the kindling eye, and the mirth-provoking look defy the reporter's skill. The vast assemblage frequently rang with cheers and shouts of applause, which were prolonged and intensified at the close. No man ever before made such an impression on his first appeal to a New York audience." *

A pamphlet reprint was at once announced by the same paper; and later, in the Presidential campaign, a more careful edition was prepared and circulated, to which were added copious notes by two members of the committee under whose auspices the address was delivered. Their comment, printed in the preface, is worth quoting as showing its literary value under critical analysis.

"No one who has not actually attempted to verify its details can understand the patient research and historical labor which it embodies. The history of our earlier politics is scattered through numerous journals, statutes, pamphlets, and letters; and these are defective in completeness and accuracy of statement, and in indices and tables of contents. Neither can any one who has not traveled over this precise ground appreciate the accuracy of every trivial detail, or the self-denying impartiality with which Mr. Lincoln has turned from the testimony of 'the fathers' on the general question of slavery, to present the single question which he discusses. From the first line to the last, from his premises to his conclusion, he travels with a swift, unerring directness which no logician ever excelled, an argument complete and full, without the affectation of learning, and without the stiffness which usually accompanies dates and details. A single, easy, simple sentence of plain Anglo-Saxon words contains a chapter of history that, in some instances, has taken days of labor to verify, and which must have cost the author months of investigation to acquire." †

From New York Lincoln went to fill other engagements to speak at several places in New England, where he met the same enthusiastic popular reception and left the same marked impression, especially upon the more critical and learned hearers. They found no little surprise in the fact that a Western politician, springing from the class of unlettered frontiersmen, could not only mold plain strong words into fresh and attractive phraseology, but maintain a clear, sustained, convincing argument, equal in force and style to the best examples in their college text-books. More interesting, however, than the experiences of those who listened to him are the comments of Lincoln himself on the methods by which he acquired his powers as an orator. A clergyman who was among his auditors on one of these occasions has recorded the following as among his statements in a conversation he held with him in a railroad car:

"'Ah! that reminds me,' he said 'of a most extraordinary circumstance, which occurred in New Haven, the other day. They told me that the professor of rhetoric in Yale College — a very learned man, isn't he?' 'Yes, sir, and a very fine critic too.' 'Well, I suppose so; he ought to be at any rate — they told me that he came to hear me, and took notes of my speech, and gave a lecture on it to his class the next day; and, not satisfied with that, he followed me up to Meriden the next evening, and heard me again for the same purpose. Now, if this is so, it is to my mind very extraordinary. I have been sufficiently astonished at my success in the West. It has been most unexpected. But I had no thought of any marked success at the East, and least of all that I should draw out such commendations from literary and learned men!' . . .

"'That suggests, Mr. Lincoln, an inquiry which has several times been upon my lips during this conversation. I want very much to know how you got this unusual power of "putting things." It must have been a matter of education. No man has it by nature alone. What has your education been?'

"'Well, as to education, the newspapers are correct — I never went to school more than six months in my life. But, as you say, this must be a product of culture in some form. I have been putting the question you ask me to myself while you have been talking. I say this, that among my earliest recollections, I remember how, when a mere child, I used to get irritated when anybody talked to me in a way I could not understand. I don't think I ever got angry at anything else in my life. But that always disturbed my temper, and has ever since. I can remember going to my little bedroom, after hearing the neighbors talk of an evening with my father, and spending no small part of the night walking up and down, and trying to make out what was the exact meaning of some of their, to me, dark sayings. I could not sleep, though I often tried to, when I got on such a hunt after an idea, until I had caught it; and when I thought I had got it, I was not satisfied until

* "New York Tribune," February 28th, 1860.

† Pamphlet edition with notes and preface by Charles C. Nott and Cephas Brainerd, September, 1860.

I had repeated it over and over, until I had put it in language plain enough, as I thought, for any boy I knew to comprehend. This was a kind of passion with me, and it has stuck by me, for I am never easy now, when I am handling a thought, till I have bounded it north and bounded it south and bounded it east and bounded it west. Perhaps that accounts for the characteristic you observe in my speeches, though I never put the two things together before.'

"'Mr. Lincoln, I thank you for this. It is the most splendid educational fact I ever happened upon. This is genius, with all its impulsive, inspiring, dominating power over the mind of its possessor, developed by education into talent, with its uniformity, its permanence, and its disciplined strength, always ready, always available, never capricious — the highest possession of the human intellect. But, let me ask, did you not have a law education? How did you prepare for your profession?'

"'Oh, yes! I "read law," as the phrase is; that is, I became a lawyer's clerk in Springfield, and copied tedious documents, and picked up what I could of law in the intervals of other work. But your question reminds me of a bit of education I had, which I am bound in honesty to mention. In the course of my law-reading I constantly came upon the word demonstrate. I thought at first that I understood its meaning, but soon became satisfied that I did not. I said to myself, "What do I do when I demonstrate more than when I reason or prove? How does demonstration differ from any other proof?" I consulted Webster's Dictionary. That told of "certain proof" "proof beyond the possibility of doubt;" but I could form no idea of what sort of proof that was. I thought a great many things were proved beyond a possibility of doubt, without recourse to any such extraordinary process of reasoning as I understood "demonstration" to be. I consulted all the dictionaries and books of reference I could find, but with no better results. You might as well have defined blue to a blind man. At last I said, "Lincoln, you can never make a lawyer if you do not understand what demonstrate means;" and I left my situation in Springfield, went home to my father's house, and staid there till I could give any proposition in the six books of Euclid at sight. I then found out what "demonstrate" means, and went back to my law studies.'

"I could not refrain from saying, in my admiration at such a development of character and genius combined, 'Mr. Lincoln, your success is no longer a marvel. It is the legitimate result of adequate causes.'" *

It must be borne in mind that the report of the foregoing conversation was not written until more than four years after it took place. While the main facts and ideas are doubtless given with reasonable fidelity, anything like verbal accuracy in recording Mr. Lincoln's phraseology is not to be presumed. Those acquainted with his style can see that the language is clearly that of his interviewer, though the latter has evidently reproduced the main current of the conversation. We have in Mr. Lincoln's own handwriting the affirmance of one of the facts mentioned and discussed. In a brief sketch of his early life which he wrote after his first nomination, to serve as memoranda for a campaign biographer, stands this modest sentence; he speaking of himself in the third person: "He studied and nearly mastered the six books of Euclid since he was a member of Congress." In the frank explanation made in the interview quoted from, we are let more into the motives and details of this and other of his educational experiences, and, despite the verbal defects of the report, we discern the strong qualities and diligent methods by aid of which he attained such rare excellence in argument and oratory.

* The Rev. J. P. Gulliver in N. Y. "Independent," Sept. 1st, 1864.

THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION.

THE great political struggle between the North and the South, between Freedom and Slavery, was approaching its culmination. The "irrepressible conflict" had shifted uneasily from caucus to Congress; from Congress to Kansas; incidentally to the Supreme Court and to the Congressional elections in the various States; from Kansas it had come back with renewed intensity to Congress. The next stage of development through which it was destined to pass was the Presidential election of 1860, where, necessarily, the final result would depend largely upon the attitude and relation of parties, platforms, and candidates as selected and proclaimed by their National conventions.

The first of these National conventions was that of the Democratic party, long appointed to meet at Charleston, South Carolina, on April 23d, 1860. The fortunes of the party had greatly fluctuated. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had brought it shipwreck in 1854; it had regained victory in the election of Buchanan, and a majority of the House of Representatives in 1856; then the Lecompton imbroglio once more caused its defeat in the Congressional elections of 1858. But worse than the victory of its opponents was the irreconcilable schism in its own ranks — the open war between President Buchanan and Senator Douglas. In a general way the Southern democracy followed Buchanan, while the Northern democracy followed Douglas. Yet there was just enough local exception to baffle accurate calculation. Could the Charleston Convention heal the feud of leaders, and bridge the chasm in policy and principle? As the time approached, and delegation after delegation was chosen by the States, all hope of accommodation gradually disappeared. Each faction put forth its utmost efforts, rallied its strongest men. Each caucus and convention only accentuated and deepened existing differences. When the convention met, its members brought not the ordinary tricks and expedients of politicians with *carte blanche* authority, but the precise formulated terms to which their constituencies would consent. They were only messengers, not arbitrators. The Charleston

Convention was the very opposite of its immediate predecessor, the Cincinnati Convention. At Cincinnati, concealment and ambiguity had been the central thought and purpose. Everybody was anxious to be hoodwinked. Delegates, constituencies, and leaders had willingly joined in the game of "cheat and be cheated." Availability, harmony, party success, were the paramount objects.

No similar ambiguity, concealment, or bargain was possible at Charleston. There was indeed a whole brood of collateral issues to be left in convenient obscurity, but the central questions must not be shirked. The Lecompton quarrel, the Freeport doctrine, the property theory, the "slave-State" dogma, the Congressional slave code proposal, must be boldly met and squarely adjusted. Even if the delegates had been disposed to trifle with their constituents, the leaders themselves would tolerate no evasion on certain cardinal points. Douglas, in his Dorr letter, had announced that he would suffer no interpolation of new issues into the Democratic creed. In his pamphlet reply to Judge Black he repeated his determination with emphasis.

"Suppose it were true that I am a presidential aspirant; does that fact justify a combination by a host of other presidential aspirants, each of whom may imagine that his success depends upon my destruction, and the preaching a crusade against me for boldly avowing now the same principles to which they and I were pledged at the last presidential election? Is this a sufficient excuse for devising a new test of political orthodoxy? . . . I prefer the position of Senator or even that of a private citizen, where I would be at liberty to defend and maintain the well-defined principles of the Democratic party, to accepting a presidential nomination upon a platform incompatible with the principle of self-government in the Territories, or the reserved rights of the States, or the perpetuity of the Union under the Constitution." *

This declaration very clearly defined the issue on one side. On the other side it was also formulated with equal distinctness. Jefferson Davis, already recognized as the ablest leader of the Buchanan wing of the Democratic Senators, wrote and submitted to the United State Senate, on February 2d, 1860, a series of resolutions designed to constitute the Administration or Southern party doctrines, which were afterward revised and adopted by a caucus of Democratic Senators.† These resolutions expressed the usual party tenets; and on two of the controverted points asserted dogmatically exactly that which Douglas had stigmatized as an intolerable heresy. The fourth resolution declared —

"That neither Congress nor a Territorial legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the Constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while the Territorial condition remains."— Globe, March 1st, 1860, p. 935.

While the fifth resolution declared —

"That if experience should at any time prove that the judiciary and executive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to constitutional rights in a Territory, and if the Territorial government shall fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency."

Party discipline was so strong among the Democrats that public expectation looked somewhat confidently to at least a temporary agreement or combination which would enable the factions, by a joint effort, to make a hopeful presidential campaign. But no progress whatever was made in that direction. As the clans gathered at Charleston, the notable difference developed itself, that while one wing was filled with unbounded enthusiasm for a candidate, the other was animated by an earnest and stubborn devotion to an idea.

"Douglas was the pivot individual of the Charleston Convention," wrote an observant journalist; "every delegate was for or against him; every motion meant to nominate or not nominate him; every parliamentary war was *pro* or *con* Douglas."‡ This was the surface indication, and, indeed, it may be said with truth, it was the actual feeling of the Northern faction of the Democratic party. Douglas was a genuinely popular leader. He had the power to inspire a pure personal enthusiasm. He had aroused such hero-worship as may be possible in modern times and in American politics. Beyond this, however, the Lecompton controversy, and his open persecution by the Buchanan Administration, made his leadership and his candidacy a necessity to the Northern Democrats.

With Southern Democrats the feeling went somewhat deeper. Forgetting how much they owed him in the past, and how much they might still gain through him in the future, they saw only that he was now their stumbling-block, the present obstacle to their full and final success. It was the Douglas doctrine, squatter sovereignty, and "unfriendly legislation," rather than the *man* which they had come to oppose, and were determined to put down. Any other individual holding these heresies would have been equally obnoxious. They had no candidate of their own; they worshiped no single leader; but they followed a principle with unfaltering devotion. They clung unswervingly not only to the property

* Douglas's Reply to Black. Pamphlet, Oct., 1859.
† Jefferson Davis, Senate speech, Globe, May 17th, 1860, p. 2155.
‡ Halstead, Conventions of 1860.

theory, but advanced boldly to its logical sequence,— Congressional protection to slavery in the Territories.

Of the convention's preliminary work little is worth recording,— there were the clamor and protest of contesting delegations and small fire of parliamentary skirmishes, by which factions feel and measure each other's strength. Caleb Cushing was made permanent chairman, for the triple reason that he was from Massachusetts, that he was the ablest presiding officer in the body, and was for the moment filled with blind devotion to Southern views. The actual temper of the convention was made manifest by the ready agreement of both extremes to join battle in making the platform before proceeding to the nomination of candidates. The usual committee of one member from each State was appointed, and to it was referred the deluge of resolutions which had been showered upon the convention.

Had an amicable solution of the slavery issue been possible, this platform committee would have found it, for it labored faithfully to accomplish the miracle. But after three days and nights of fruitless suggestion and persuasion, the committee re-appeared in convention. Upon four points they had come to either entire or substantial agreement. In addition to formally re-affirming the Cincinnati platform of 1856, they advised the convention to favor, 1. The faithful execution of the fugitive slave law. 2. The protection of naturalized citizens. 3. The construction of a Pacific railroad. 4. The acquisition of the Island of Cuba. But upon the principal topic, the question of slavery in the Territories, they felt compelled to report that even an approximate unanimity was impossible. In undisguised sorrow they proceeded to present two radically different reports. The convention, not yet in the least realizing that the great Democratic party had suffered fatal shipwreck in the secret caucus-room, listened eagerly to the reports and explanatory speeches of the majority and minority of the committee.

The majority report * planted itself squarely upon the property theory and Congressional protection. Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, said it was presented in the name of 17 States with 127 electoral votes, every one of which would be cast for the nominee. He argued that in occupying new Territories Southern men could not compete with emigrant-aid societies at the North. These could send a voter to the Territories for the sum of $200, while it would cost a Southern man $1500. Secure political power by emigration, and permit the Territorial legislatures to decide the slavery question, and the South would be excluded as effectually as by the Wilmot proviso. Cuba must be acquired, and the flag of this great country must float over Mexico and the Central American States. But if you apply this doctrine of popular sovereignty, and establish a cordon of free States from the Pacific to the Atlantic, where in the future are the South to emigrate? They asked the equal right to emigrate with their property, and protection from Congress during the Territorial condition. They would leave it to the people in convention assembled, when framing a State constitution, to determine the question of slavery for themselves. They had no purpose but to have a vexed question settled, and to put the Democratic party on a clear, unclouded platform, not a double-faced one — one face to the North and one face to the South.

Henry B. Payne, of Ohio, presented and defended the report of the minority.† It asserted that all questions in regard to property in States or Territories are judicial in their character, and that the Democratic party will abide by past and future decisions of the Supreme Court concerning them. Mr. Payne explained that while the majority report was supported by fifteen slave and two free States, ‡ representing 127 electoral votes, the minority

* MAJORITY REPORT.

"Resolved, That the platform adopted at Cincinnati be affirmed, with the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That the Democracy of the United States hold these cardinal principles on the subject of slavery in the Territories: First. That Congress has no power to abolish slavery in the Territories. Second. That the Territorial legislature has no power to abolish slavery in any Territory, nor to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, nor any power to exclude slavery therefrom, nor any power to destroy or impair the right of property in slaves by any legislation whatever.

"Resolved, That it is the duty of the Federal Government to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property on the high seas, in the Territories, or wherever else its constitutional authority extends."

† MINORITY REPORT.

"Resolved, That we, the Democracy of the Union, in convention assembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions unanimously adopted and declared as a platform of principles by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati in the year 1856, believing that Democratic principles are unchangeable in their nature when applied to the same subject-matters; and we recommend as the only further resolutions, the following:

"Resolved, That all questions in regard to the rights of property in States or Territories arising under the Constitution of the United States are judicial in their character, and the Democratic party is pledged to abide by and faithfully carry out such determination of these questions as has been, or may be made by the Supreme Court of the United States."

‡ Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, California, Oregon.

report was indorsed by fifteen free States,* representing 176 electoral votes. He argued that, by the universal consent of the Democratic party, the Cincinnati platform referred this question of slavery to the people of the Territories, declaring that Congress shall in no event intervene one way or the other, and that all controversies shall be settled by the courts. Now the proposition of the majority report is to make a complete retraction of those two cardinal doctrines of the Cincinnati platform. The Northern mind has become thoroughly imbued with this great doctrine of popular sovereignty. You cannot tear it out of their hearts unless you tear out their heart-strings themselves. "I repeat, that upon this question of Congressional non-intervention we are committed by the acts of Congress, we are committed by the acts of National Democratic Conventions; we cannot recede without personal dishonor, and, so help us God, we never will recede!"

Between these extremes of recommendation another member of the platform committee — Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts — proposed a middle course. He advocated the simple re-affirmance of the Cincinnati platform. If it had suffered a double interpretation, so had the Bible and the Constitution of the United States. But beyond serving to consume time and amuse the convention, Mr. Butler's speech made no impression. The real tournament of debate followed, between William L. Yancey, of Alabama, and Senator Pugh, of Ohio.

It turned out in the end that Mr. Yancey was the master-spirit of the Charleston Convention, though that body was far from entertaining any such suspicion at the beginning. In exterior appearance he did not fill the portrait of the traditional fire-eater. He is described as "a compact middle-sized man, straight-limbed, with a square-built head and face, and an eye full of expression;" "a very mild and gentlemanly man, always wearing a genuinely good-humored smile, and looking as if nothing in the world could disturb the equanimity of his spirits."† He had, besides, a marvelous gift of persuasive oratory. He was the Wendell Phillips of the South, for, like his Northern rival, he was a born agitator. Above all his colleagues, he was the brain and soul and irrepressible champion of the pro-slavery reaction throughout the Cotton States. He was tireless and ubiquitous; traveling, talking, writing, lecturing, animating every intrigue, directing every caucus, making speeches and drafting platforms at every convention. To defend, propagate, and perpetuate African slavery was his mission. He was the ultra of the ultras, accepting the institution as morally right and divinely sanctioned, desiring its extension and inclined to favor, though not then himself advocating the re-opening of the African slave-trade. He held that all Federal laws prohibiting such trade ought to be repealed so that each State might decide the question for itself. Still more, Mr. Yancey was not only an agitator and fire-eater, but for years an insidious, persevering conspirator to promote secession. Occupying such a position, he was naturally the champion of the Cotton States at Charleston. The defense of the ultra demands of the South was by common consent devolved upon him,‡ and it was understood long beforehand that he was prepared with the principal speech from that side.

In full consciousness of the fact that he and his colleagues were then at Charleston with a predetermination to force a programme of disruption expressly designed as a prelude to intended disunion, Mr. Yancey stood up and with smiling face and silvery tones assured his hearers that he and his colleagues from Alabama were not disunionists *per se*. Then he proceeded with his speech. Only its key-note was new, but the novelty was of startling import to Northern delegates. The Northern Democrats, he stated, were losing ground and falling before their victorious adversaries. Why? Because they had tampered with, and pandered to, the antislavery sentiment. They had admitted that slavery was wrong. This was surrendering the very citadel of their argument. They must reform their lines and change their tactics. They must come up to the high requirements of the occasion and take a new departure. The remainder of his speech was an insinuating plea for the property doctrine and Congressional intervention, for which the galleries and convention rewarded him with long and earnest applause. Even if the great Southern agitator's speech had been wanting in point and eloquence, success was supplied by the unmistakable atmosphere and temper of this great Charleston audience.

The more astute of the Douglas delegates were struck with the dismay of a new revela-

* Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota. Massachusetts presented a separate report through Mr. Butler, but her electoral vote is included in Mr. Payne's estimate.

† Halstead, The Conventions of 1860, pp. 5, 48.

‡ "The leadership at Charleston, in this attempt to divide and destroy the Democratic party, was intrusted to appropriate hands. No man possessed the ability, or the courage, or the sincerity in his object for such a mission in a higher degree than the gifted Yancey." — Douglas, Senate speech, May 16th, 1860; Appendix to Congressional Globe, page 313.

tion. Their cause was lost — their party was gone. Senator Pugh, of Ohio, resented the dictation of the advocates of slavery in a warmth of just indignation. He thanked God that at last a bold and honest man had told the whole truth of the demands of the South. It was now before the country that the South did demand an advanced step from the Democratic party. He accurately traced the downfall of the Northern Democracy to her changing and growing exactions. Taunted with their weakness, they were now told they must put their hands on their mouths and their mouths in the dust. "Gentlemen of the South," said Mr. Pugh, "you mistake us — we will not do it."

Such language had never been heard in a Democratic National Convention, and the hall was as still as a funeral. This was Friday night, the fifth day of the convention. "A crisis" had long been whispered of as the skeleton in the party closet. It seemed to be at hand, and in a parliamentary uproar the "question" was vehemently demanded, but the chairman skillfully managed at length to secure an adjournment.

The "crisis" had in reality come on Thursday night, in the committee-room, in the hopeless first double report of its platform committee. The dissolution of the convention did not take place till the Monday following. A great party, after a vigorous and successful life of thirty years, could not die easily. The speeches of Avery and Payne, of Yancey and Pugh, on Friday, were recognized as cries of defiance, but not yet accepted as moans of despair. On Saturday morning, President Buchanan's lieutenant, Bigler, of Pennsylvania, essayed to ride the storm and steer to a Southern victory. But he only succeeded in securing a recommittal of both platforms to the committee. Nothing, however, was gained by the manœuvre. Saturday afternoon the committee once more reported the same disagreement in slightly changed phraseology;* two antagonistic platforms, presenting the same sharp difference of principle — one demanding Congressional intervention, the other insisting upon Congressional non-intervention. Then the parliamentary storm was unloosed for the remainder of that day with such fury that the chairman declared his physical inability to continue a contest with six hundred gentlemen as to who should cry the loudest, and threatened to leave the chair. On Monday, April 30th, the seventh day of the convention, a final decision was reached. By a vote of 165 to 138, the convention voted to substitute the minority report for that of the majority; in other words, to adopt the Douglas non-intervention platform.

The explosion was near, but still delayed, and the Cotton-States delegates sat sullenly through a tangle of routine voting. Finally, the question was put on Butler's proposition to adopt the Cincinnati platform pure and simple. This was the red flag to the mad bull. Mississippi declared that the Cincinnati platform was a great political swindle on one half the States of the Union; and from that time on, though a large affirmative vote sustained the proposition (237½ to 65), the Cotton States ceased to act as a part of the convention. As soon as a lull in the proceedings permitted, Mr. Yancey put in execution his programme of demand, disruption, disunion, and rebellion, labored for through long years, and announced by himself, with minute distinctness, three months before.† Led by the Alabama delegation, the Cotton States,— Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Tex-

* SECOND MAJORITY REPORT.

"*Resolved*, That the platform adopted by the Democratic party at Cincinnati be affirmed with the following explanatory resolutions:

"*First.* That the government of a Territory organized by an act of Congress is provisional and temporary, and, during its existence, all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory without their rights, either of person or property, being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.

"*Second.* That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all its departments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wherever else its constitutional authority extends.

"*Third.* That when the settlers in a Territory having an adequate population, form a State constitution, the right of sovereignty commences, and, being consummated by admission into the Union, they stand on an equal footing with the people of other States, and the State thus organized ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery."

SECOND MINORITY REPORT.

"1. *Resolved*, That we, the Democracy of the Union, in convention assembled, hereby declare our affirmance of the resolutions unanimously adopted and declared as a platform of principles by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati, in the year 1856, believing that democratic principles are unchangeable in their nature when applied to the same subject-matters; and we recommend as the only further resolutions the following:

"Inasmuch as differences of opinion exist in the Democratic party as to the nature and extent of the powers of a Territorial legislature and as to the powers and duties of Congress under the constitution of the United States over the institution of slavery within the Territories:

"2. *Resolved*, That the Democratic party will abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the questions of constitutional law."

† "To obtain the aid of the Democracy in this contest, it is necessary to make a contest in its Charleston Convention. In that body Douglas's adherents will press his doctrines to a decision. If the State-Rights men keep out of that convention, that decision must



CALEB CUSHING. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

as, and Arkansas,— with protests and speeches, with all the formality and "solemnity" which the occasion allowed, seceded from the Charleston Convention, and withdrew from the deliberations of Institute Hall.

That same Monday night the city of Charleston held a grand jubilee. Music, bonfires, and extravagant declamation held an excited crowd in Court-house Square till a late hour; and in a high-wrought peroration Yancey prophesied, with all the confidence and exultation of a triumphant conspirator, that "perhaps even now the pen of the historian was nibbed to write the story of a new revolution."

inevitably be against the South, and that either in direct favor of the Douglas doctrine, or by the indorsement of the Cincinnati platform, under which Douglas claims shelter for his principles." "The State-Rights men should present in that convention their demands for a decision, and they will obtain an indorsement of their demands, or a denial of these demands. If indorsed, we shall have a greater hope of triumph within the Union. If denied, in my opinion, the State-Rights wing should secede from the convention, and appeal to the whole people of the South, without distinction of parties, and organize another convention upon the basis of their principles, and go into the election with a candidate nominated by it, as a grand constitutional party. But in the presidential contest a black Republican may be elected. If this dire event should happen,

in my opinion the only hope of safety for the South is in a withdrawal from the Union before he shall be inaugurated; before the sword and treasury of the Federal Government shall be placed in the keeping of that party. I would suggest that the several State legislatures should by law require the governor, when it shall be made manifest that the black Republican candidate for the Presidency shall receive a majority of the electoral vote, to call a convention of the people of the State, to assemble in time to provide for their safety before the 4th of March, 1861. If, however, a black Republican should not be elected, then, in pursuance of the policy of making this contest within the Union, we should initiate measures in Congress which should lead to a repeal of all the unconstitutional acts against slavery. If we should fail to obtain so just a system of legislation, then the South should seek her independence out of the Union."—Speech of W. L. Yancey before the Alabama Democratic Convention, January, 1860.

The authors copy this declaration of Mr. Yancey from a campaign pamphlet issued by the central committee of the Douglas party, in Washington, in 1860. They have been unable to find the original newspaper report, but the corroboration and fulfillment of the plot here indicated are found in the official proceedings of the Alabama Convention and the Alabama Legislature. The convention on January 13th, 1860, expressly instructed its delegation at Charleston to secede in case the ultra-Southern doctrines were not incorporated in the National Democratic platform, and sent Mr. Yancey as a delegate to execute their instructions, which he did as the text states. The Alabama Legislature, on its part, passed a joint resolution, which the governor approved, February 24th, 1860, providing "that upon the election of a President advocating the principles and action of the party in the Northern States calling itself the Republican party," the governor should forthwith call a convention of the State. This convention was duly called after the election of Lincoln, and passed the secession ordinance of Alabama.

W. L. YANCEY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY COOK.)

Aug 1887

IS IT A PIECE OF A COMET?

"Of star-dust and star-pilgrimages"—

THERE has recently come into my possession *the ninth* iron meteorite whose fall to the earth has been observed. It is, moreover, the first meteorite which seems to evidence a direct connection with a star-shower. The mass acquires still further interest from the fact that it is presumably a fragment of the famous comet of Biela.

A brief account of this celestial wanderer will doubtless be of interest to the readers of THE CENTURY, in which magazine the essays of the astronomer Langley have recently appeared.

Astronomers have waited patiently for the fall to the earth's surface, at the time of the periodical star-showers, of something *tangible*, but until now they have waited in vain.

In looking over a considerable amount of astronomical literature, only one record can be found of the falling of a body to the earth at such a time; this was near Paris, on the 10th of April, 1094, when "many shooting-stars were seen, and a very large one was said to have been found on the ground as a glowing substance."

From the 24th to the 29th of November, 1885, the earth was passing through a train of meteors that proceeded from the constellation Andromeda, and once formed a part of Biela's comet. These meteors are now known to astronomers as Andromedes or Bielids. The

go out at all hours and in all kinds of weather to see which way the wind was blowing, this vane was connected by a rod with a dial under the roof of the porch, so that it was only necessary to step outside the door and look up at this dial to see to what quarter the hand upon it was pointing. Another very curious contrivance was a little dumb-waiter, not more than six inches wide, which ran from the wine-cellar to the dining-room, its upper opening being covered with a movable panel in the wood-work of the mantel-piece. In this dumb-waiter were two shelves, each one large enough to contain a bottle of wine; the butler put these in place in the cellar, and when the master wanted them he pulled them up.

Not only in his house, but in its grounds, Jefferson's ingenuity gave itself full scope. In order that every one might take whatever degree of exercise inclination or the weather made desirable, several "roundabouts" were laid out on the varying surface of the mountain. These were walks or roads which environed the house, one being of quite moderate length, and not far from the mansion, while the longest was several miles in extent, in one part running by the banks of the River Rivanna at the base of the mountain. Here one could walk or drive around and around, always amid fair scenery, and sometimes reaching points from which could be had the most lovely views of far-stretching plains and mountains.

These grounds were abundantly enjoyed by Jefferson's numerous friends, especially perhaps those from Europe, who were not accustomed to see art so pleasantly commingled with what must have appeared to them as the wildest nature. Jefferson was a very systematic man, and could always be relied upon to appear at meal-time, but one day dinner was long kept waiting for his visitor, M. Volney, and himself, who were out walking. It afterwards appeared that the two philosophers had been detained by the labor of damming up a little stream in order that they might design a picturesque waterfall. A portrait of Jefferson by Kosciusko used to hang in the room occupied by Mrs. Randolph, the oldest daughter, a flattering inscription, placed beneath it by the artist, having banished it from the more public apartments. What became of this portrait is not known.

The entrance hall, in which stood, very appropriately on opposite sides, busts of Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, is a somewhat remarkable apartment. It is the largest room in the house, and is as high as the dome. There is a railed gallery in it which connects the chambers in the upper part of the building. It has been supposed that there was to have been a staircase in this hall, communicating with this gallery; but none was ever built, access to the gallery and the upper rooms being obtained by small and inadequate stairways in inside passages. The walls of the hall were adorned not only with horns of elk and moose, interspersed with Indian and Mexican weapons and implements, but with great bones of mastodons, and other fossil remains, and with huge specimens of native minerals. The whole collection is calculated to produce a very American impression on a foreign visitor.

Indoors and out, wherever one might wander through the apartments or grounds of this delightful home, one could not fail to perceive that the mind or the hand of Thomas Jefferson was at the bottom of everything. He thought nothing so large or so small that his ingenuity or his care need not be exercised upon it. With his own hands he made all the plans for the buildings of the University of Virginia, and he has left behind him the carefully prepared drawings of a gate-latch which he invented.

Jefferson's hope that his only surviving child would be left the mistress of Monticello was not fulfilled. The times were hard, and, although after his death all the estates were sold, the debts were not paid, and Mrs. Randolph was obliged to leave this happy "Little Mountain," which was never again occupied by Jefferson's descendants.

The first purchaser of Monticello was a Dr. Barclay, who was afflicted with the *morus multicaulis* disease, and he cut down many of the beautiful trees about the house, some of them exotics, for the purpose of planting a mulberry grove,—the leaves of which were to feed the silk-worms which were to become the inhabitants of the halls and chambers of the Jeffersonian mansion. But his cocoons proving to be anything but golden, the doctor gave up his silken dreams and sold the estate.

The next purchaser, Captain Levy, kept the house in good condition; but the civil war and the litigations among his heirs, which continued for some fifteen years after the captain's death, had a depressing effect upon the beauties of Monticello. If it had been a modern-built house it would have gone to wreck and ruin; but Jefferson built it to stay; and, although it suffered very much, especially in regard to shutters, window-sashes, and water-spouts, and although the terraced walks which stretched over the two lines of out-buildings connecting the main building with the pavilions were destroyed, and were replaced by ordinary roofs, the whole establishment has been put in excellent order by the present owner, a nephew of Captain Levy, and is now as sound and substantial a country mansion as it ever was. There is a modern air about its furnishings and fittings which is not Jeffersonian, but the house is still Monticello.

But Jefferson's orchards and terraced gardens, the serpentine flower-borders on the western lawn, to which came yearly contributions from the Jardin des Plantes of Paris, and the beautiful "roundabout" walks and drives have all disappeared; while in the little graveyard on the mountain-side, around the simple monument erected to the memory of the "Author of the Declaration of Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia," lie the bones of five generations of his descendants, in the only ground they inherited from him.

Although Thomas Jefferson died owing much money, no shadow of debt now rests upon his fame. Having no son, his grandson, Thomas Jefferson Randolph, became, at an early age, the general manager of his estates; and, at the death of his grandfather, Mr. Randolph—then living at Edge Hill, a large neighboring estate, which had come by original grant to the Randolph family—set himself to work to pay Mr. Jefferson's debts. In this labor of love he was assisted by his daughters, who established a school, which soon became a noted one, for the sole purpose of helping their father pay what was due to the creditors of their great ancestor. Their efforts were entirely successful, for many years did not elapse before every cent was paid.

Frank R. Stockton.

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

LINCOLN'S NOMINATION AND ELECTION.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE BALTIMORE NOMINATIONS.

THOUGH the compact voting body of the South had retired from the Charleston Convention, her animating spirit yet remained in the numbers and determination of the anti-Douglas delegates. When on Tuesday morning, May 1st, the eighth day, the convention once more met, the Douglas men, with a view to making the most of the dilemma, resolved to force the nomination of their favorite. But there was a lion in the path. Usage and tradition had consecrated the two-thirds rule. Stuart, of Michigan, tried vainly to obtain the liberal interpretation, that this meant "two-thirds of the votes given," but Chairman Cushing ruled remorselessly against him, and at the instance of Howard, of Tennessee, the convention voted (141 to 112) that no person should be declared nominated who did not receive two-thirds of all the votes the full convention was entitled to cast.

This sealed the fate of Douglas. The Electoral College numbered 303; 202 votes therefore were necessary to a choice. Voting for candidates was duly begun, and continued throughout all the next day (Wednesday, May 2d). Fifty-seven ballots were taken in all; Douglas received 145½ on the first, and on several subsequent ballots his strength rose to 152½. The other votes were scattered among eight other candidates with no near approach to agreement.*

The dead-lock having become unmistakable and irremediable, and the nomination of Douglas under existing conditions impossible, all parties finally consented to an adjournment, especially as it became evident that unless this were done the sessions would come to an end by mere disintegration. Therefore, on the tenth day (May 3d), the Charleston Convention formally adjourned, having previously resolved to reassemble on the 18th of June, in the city of Baltimore, with a recommendation that the several States make provision to fill the vacancies in their delegations.

Mr. Yancey and his seceders had meanwhile organized another convention in St. Andrew's Hall. Their business was of course to report substantially the platform rejected by the Douglasites, and for which rejection they had retired. Mr. Yancey then explained to them that the adoption of this platform was all the action they proposed to take until the "rump democracy" should make their nomination, when, he said, "it may be our privilege to indorse the nominee, or our duty to proceed to make a nomination." Other seced-

* The first ballot stood: Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, 145½; James Guthrie, of Kentucky, 35½; Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York, 7; R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, 42; Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, 12; Joseph Lane, of Oregon, 6; Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, 1½; Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut, 2½; Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, 1.

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ers were more impatient, and desired that something be done forthwith; but as the sessions were continued to the second and third day, their overflowing zeal found a safety-valve in their speeches. Mr. Yancey's programme prevailed, and they also adjourned to meet again in Richmond on the 11th of June.

At the time of the disruption, rumors were current in Charleston that the movement, if not prompted, was at least encouraged and sustained by telegrams from leading senators and representatives then at their Congressional duties in Washington. As the day for reassembling in Baltimore drew near, the main fact was abundantly proved by the publication of an address, signed by Jefferson Davis, Toombs, Iverson, Slidell, Benjamin, Mason, and some fourteen others, in which they undertook to point out a path to union and harmony in the Democratic party. They recited the withdrawal of eight States at Charleston, and indorsed the step without qualification. "We cannot refrain," said the address, "from expressing our admiration and approval of this lofty manifestation of adherence to principle, rising superior to all considerations of expediency, to all trammels of party, and looking with an eye single to the defense of the constitutional rights of the States." They then alleged that the other Democratic States remained in the convention only to make a further effort to secure "some satisfactory recognition of sound principles," declaring, however, their determination also to withdraw if their just expectation should be disappointed. The address now urged that the seceders should defer their meeting at Richmond, but that they should come to Baltimore and endeavor to effect "a reconciliation of differences on a basis of principle." If the Baltimore Convention should adopt "a satisfactory platform of principles,"— and their votes might help secure it,— then cause of dissension would have ceased. "On the other hand," continues the address, "if the convention, on reassembling at Baltimore, shall disappoint the just expectations of the remaining Democratic States, their delegations cannot fail to withdraw and unite with the eight States which have adjourned to Richmond." The address, in another paragraph, explained that the seventeen Democratic States which had voted at Charleston for the seceders' platform, "united with Pennsylvania alone, comprise a majority of the entire electoral vote of the United States, able to elect the Democratic nominees against the combined opposition of all the remaining States."

This was a shrewd and crafty appeal. Under an apparent plea for harmony lurked an insidious invitation to Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania to join the seceders, reconstruct the Democratic party, cut off all the "popular sovereignty" recusants, and secure perpetual ascendency in national politics through the consolidated South. The signers of this address, forgetting their own constant accusation of "sectionalism" against the Republicans, pretended to see no impropriety in proposing this purely selfish and sectional alliance. If it succeeded, their triumph in the Union was irresistible and permanent; if it failed, it served to unite the South for secession and a slave confederacy.

If any Democrat harbored a doubt that the proposed reconciliation meant simply a reunion on the Davis-Yancey platform, the doubt was soon removed. In the Senate of the United States, Jefferson Davis was pressing to a vote his caucus resolutions, submitted in February, to serve as a model for the Charleston platform; and this brought on a final discussion between himself and Douglas.

Davis had begun the debate on the 7th of May by a savage onslaught on "Squatter Sovereignty"— a fallacy, he said, fraught with mischief more deadly than the fatal upas, because it spread its poison over the whole Union.* Douglas took up the gauntlet, and, replying on May 15th and 16th, said he could not recognize the right of a caucus of the Senate or the House to prescribe new tests for the Democratic party. Senators were not chosen for the purpose of making platforms. That was the duty of the Charleston Convention, and it had decided in his favor, platform, organization, and least of all the individual, by giving him a majority of fifty votes over all the other candidates combined. He reprobated the Yancey movement as leading to dissolution and a Southern confederacy. The party rejected this caucus platform. Should the majority, he asked, surrender to the minority? † Davis, replying on the 17th, contended that Douglas had on the Kansas policy of the Administration put himself outside the Democratic organization. He desired no divided flag for the party. He preferred that the senator's banner should lie in its silken folds to feed the moth; "but if it impatiently rustles to be unfurled in opposition to ours, we will plant our own on every hill." ‡ Douglas retorted, and again attacked the caucus dictation. Why, he asked, are all the great measures for the public good made to give place to the emergency of passing some abstract resolutions on the subject of politics to reverse the Democratic plat-

* Globe, May 7th, 1860, p. 1940.
† Globe, May 15th and 16th, 1860. Appendix, p. 312.
‡ Globe, May 17th, 1860.

form, under supposition that the representatives of the people are men of weak nerve who are going to be frightened by the thunders of the Senate Chamber? * Davis rejoined, that they wanted a new article in the creed because they could not get an honest construction of the platform as it stands. "If you have been beaten on a rickety, double-construed platform, kick it to pieces, and lay one broad and strong, on which men can stand." "We want nothing more than a simple declaration that negro slaves are property, and we want the recognition of the obligation of the Federal Government to protect that property like all other." † A somewhat restrained undertone of personal temper had been running through the debate, and Jefferson Davis could not resist an expression of contempt for his opponent. "The fact is," said he, "I have a declining respect for platforms. I would sooner have an honest man on any sort of a rickety platform that you could construct, than to have a man I did not trust on the best platform which could be made."

Douglas promptly called attention to the inconsistency of Davis's method of forcing his resolutions with one breath and avowing his indifference to a platform with another, especially as Yancey and his followers had seceded on the platform and not on the man; but he did not press his adversary to the wall, as he might have done, on the insincerity which Davis's sneer exposed. He was hampered by his own attitude as a candidate. Douglas, who had received a hundred and fifty votes at Charleston, and who expected the whole at Baltimore, could not let his tongue wag as freely as Davis, who had received only a vote and a half at Charleston, and could count on none at Baltimore; else he might have denounced him on the score of patriotism. For Jefferson Davis, like Yancey, only not so constantly, and like so many others of that secession coterie, blew hot and cold about disunion as occasion demanded. This same debate of May 17th furnished an instructive example.

In the beginning of the day's discussion Davis indulged in a repetition of the old alarm-cry:

> "And so, sir, when we declare our tenacious adherence to the Union, it is the Union of the Constitution. If the compact between the States is to be trampled into the dust; if anarchy is to be substituted for the usurpation which threatened the Government at an earlier period; if the Union is to become powerless for the purpose for which it was established, and we are vainly to appeal to it for protection,— then, sir, conscious of the rectitude of our course, and self-reliant within ourselves, we look beyond the confines of the Union for the maintenance of our rights." ‡

* Globe, May 17th, 1860.
† Globe, May 17th, 1860, p. 2155.

But after Douglas had made a damaging exposure of Yancey's disunion intrigues, which had come to light, and had charged their animus on the Charleston seceders, Davis changed his tone. He said there were not more than seventy-five men in the lodges of the Southern Leagues. He did not think the Union was in danger from them.

> "I have great confidence," said he, "in the strength of the Union. Every now and then I hear that it is about to tumble to pieces; that somebody is going to introduce a new plank into the platform, and if he does, the Union must tumble down; until at last I begin to think it is such a rickety old platform that it is impossible to prop it up. But then I bring my own judgment to bear, instead of relying on witnesses, and I come to the conclusion that the Union is strong and safe,— strong in its power as well as in the affections of the people." §

The debate made it very plain that it was not reconciliation but domination which the South wanted. So in due time (May 25th) the Jefferson Davis resolutions, affirming the "property" theory and the "protection" doctrine, were passed by a large majority of the Democratic senators.

When the Charleston Convention proper reassembled at Baltimore, it was seen that the programme laid out by Jefferson Davis and others in their published address had been duly adopted. The seceders had met at Richmond, taken a recess, and now appeared at Baltimore making application for readmission. But some of the States that withdrew at Charleston had sent contesting delegations, and it resolved itself into tangled rivalry and quarrel of platforms, candidates, and delegations all combined. For four days a furious debate raged in the convention during the day, while rival mass-meetings in the streets at night called each other "disorganizers," "bolters," "traitors," "disunionists," and "abolitionists." When Douglas, before a test-vote was reached, sent a dispatch suggesting that the party and the country might be saved by dropping his name and uniting upon some other candidate, his followers suppressed the dispatch.

On the fifth day at Baltimore the Democratic National Convention underwent its second "crisis," and suffered its second disruption. This time, also, the secession was somewhat broadened; Chairman Cushing resigned his seat, and Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and California withdrew wholly or in part to join the States which had gone out at Charleston.

For the present the disunion extremists were keeping their scheme too well masked to establish clearly its historical record. But the signs

‡ Globe, May 17th, 1860, p. 2151.
§ Globe, May 17th, 1860, p. 2156.

and footprints of their underplot are evident. Here at Baltimore, as at Charleston, and as on every critical occasion, Mr. Yancey was conspicuously present. Here, as elsewhere, he was no doubt persistently intriguing for disunion in secret while ostentatiously denying disunion purposes in public.

But little remained to do after the disruption at Baltimore, and that little was quickly done. The fragments of the original convention continued their session in the Front-street Theatre, where they had met, and on the first ballot nominated Stephen A. Douglas for President by an almost unanimous vote. The seceders organized, under the chairmanship of Caleb Cushing, in Maryland Institute Hall, and also by a nearly unanimous ballot nominated as their candidate for President, John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky. Then Mr. Yancey, who in a street mass-meeting had declared that he was neither for the Union *per se* nor for disunion *per se*, but for the Constitution,* announced that the Democracy, the Constitution, and, through them, the Union were yet safe.

A month prior to the reassembling of the Charleston "Rumps" above described, Baltimore had already witnessed another Presidential convention and nomination, calling itself peculiarly "National," in contradistinction to the "sectional" character which it charged upon the Democratic and Republican parties alike. This was a third party, made up mainly of former Whigs whose long-cherished party antagonisms kept them aloof from the Democrats in the South and the Republicans in the North. In the South, they had been men whose moderate antislavery feelings were outraged by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Lecompton trick. In the North, they were those whose traditions and affiliations revolted at the extreme utterances of avowed abolitionists. In both regions many of them had embraced Know-nothingism, more as an alternative than from original choice. The Whig party was dissolved; Know-nothingism had utterly failed — their only resource was to form a new party.

In the various States they had, since the defeat of Fillmore in 1856, held together a minority organization under names differing in different localities. All these various factions and fragments sent delegations to Baltimore, where they united themselves under the designation of the Constitutional Union Party. They proposed to take a middle course between Democrats and Republicans, and to allay sectional strife by ignoring the slavery question.

Delegates of this party, regular and irregular, from some twenty-two States, convened at Baltimore on the 9th of May. John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, called the meeting to order, and Washington Hunt, of New York, was made both temporary and permanent chairman. They adopted as their platform a single resolution declaring in substance that they would "recognize no other political principle than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws." They had no reasonable hope of direct success at the polls in November; but they had a clear possibility of defeating a popular choice, and throwing the election into the House of Representatives; and in that case their nominee might stand on high vantage-ground as a compromise candidate. This possibility gave some zest to the rivalry among their several aspirants. On their second ballot, a slight preponderance of votes indicated John Bell, of Tennessee, as their favorite, and the convention made his nomination unanimous. Mr. Bell had many qualities desirable in a candidate for President. He was a statesman of ripe experience, and of fair, if not brilliant, fame. Though from the South, his course on the slavery question had been so moderate as to make him reasonably acceptable to the North on his mere personal record. He had opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Lecompton outrage. But upon this platform of ignoring the political strife of six consecutive years, in which he had himself taken such vigorous part, he and his followers were of course but as grain between the upper and nether mill-stones.

This party becomes historic, not through what it accomplished, but by reason of what a portion of it failed to perform. Within one year from these pledges to the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws, Mr. Bell and most of his Southern adherents in the seceding States were banded with others in open rebellion. On the other hand, Mr. Everett and most of the Northern members, together with many noble exceptions in the border slave States, like Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, supported the Government in the war with patriotic devotion.

LINCOLN NOMINATED AT CHICAGO.

In recognition of the growing power and importance of the great West, the Republican National Convention was called to meet in Chicago on the 16th of May. The former Presidential canvass, though resulting in the defeat of Frémont, had nevertheless shown the remarkable popular strength of the Republican party in the country at large; since then, its double victory in Congress against Lecompton,

* Halstead, The Conventions of 1860.

and at the Congressional elections over the representatives who supported Lecompton, gave it confidence and aggressive activity. But now it received a new inspiration and impetus from the Charleston disruption. Former possibility was suddenly changed to strong probability of success in the coming Presidential election. Delegates were not only quickened with a new zeal for their principles; the growing chances spurred them to fresh efforts in behalf of their favorite candidates. Those who had been prominently named were diverse in antecedents and varied in locality, each however presenting some strong point of popular interest. Seward, of New York, a Whig of preëminent fame; Chase, of Ohio, a talented and zealous antislavery Democrat, an original founder of the new party; Dayton, of New Jersey, an old Whig high in personal worth and political service; Cameron, of Pennsylvania, a former Democrat, now the undisputed leader of an influential tariff State; Bates, of Missouri, an able and popular antislavery Whig from a slave State; and last, but by no means least in popular estimation, Lincoln, of Illinois.

The idea of making Lincoln a Presidential candidate had occurred to the minds of many during his growing fame. The principle of natural selection plays no unimportant part in the politics of the United States. There are always hundreds of newspapers ready to "nail to the mast-head" the name of any individual which begins to appear frequently in dispatches and editorials. A few months after the close of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and long before the Ohio speeches and the Cooper Institute address, a warm personal friend, the editor of an Illinois newspaper, wrote him an invitation to lecture, and added in his letter:

"I would like to have a talk with you on political matters, as to the policy of announcing your name for the Presidency, while you are in our city. My partner and myself are about addressing the Republican editors of the State on the subject of a simultaneous announcement of your name for the Presidency." *

To this Lincoln replied:

"As to the other matter you kindly mention, I must in candor say I do not think myself fit for the Presidency. I certainly am flattered and gratified that some partial friends think of me in that connection; but I really think it best for our cause that no concerted effort, such as you suggest, should be made." †

A much more hopeful ambition filled his mind. Notwithstanding his recent defeat, he did not think that his personal contest with Douglas was yet finished. He had the faith and the patience to wait six years for a chance to repeat his political tournament with the "Little Giant." From his letter quoted in a previous chapter we know he had resolved to "fight in the ranks" in 1860. From another, we know how generously he kept faith with other Republican aspirants.

"If Trumbull and I were candidates for the same office you would have a right to prefer him, and I should not blame you for it; but all my acquaintance with you induces me to believe you would not pretend to be for me while really for him. But I do not understand Trumbull and myself to be rivals. You know I am pledged not to enter a struggle with him for the seat in the Senate now occupied by him; and yet I would rather have a full term in the Senate than in the Presidency." ‡

This spirit of fairness in politics is also shown by the following letter, written apparently in response to a suggestion that Cameron and Lincoln might form a popular Presidential ticket:

"Yours of the 24th ult. was forwarded to me from Chicago. It certainly is important to secure Pennsylvania for the Republicans in the next Presidential contest; and not unimportant to also secure Illinois. As to the ticket you name, I shall be heartily for it after it shall have been fairly nominated by a Republican National Convention; and I cannot be committed to it before. For my single self, I have enlisted for the permanent success of the Republican cause; and for this object I shall labor faithfully in the ranks, unless, as I think not probable, the judgment of the party shall assign me a different position. If the Republicans of the great State of Pennsylvania shall present Mr. Cameron as their candidate for the Presidency, such an indorsement of his fitness for the place could scarcely be deemed insufficient. Still, as I would not like the public to know, so I would not like myself to know, I had entered a combination with any man to the prejudice of all others whose friends respectively may consider them preferable." §

Not long after these letters, at some date near the middle of the winter of 1859–60, the leaders of the Republican party of Illinois met at Springfield, the capital of the State, and in a more pressing and formal manner requested him to permit them to use his name as a Presidential candidate, more with the idea of securing his nomination as Vice-President than with any further expectation. To this he now consented. His own characteristic language, however, plainly reveals that he believed this would be useful to him in his future senatorial aspirations solely, and that he built no hopes whatever on national preferment. A quarrel was going on among rival aspirants to the Illinois governorship, and Lincoln had written a letter to relieve a friend from the imputation of treachery to him in the recent senatorial contest. This act of justice was now used to his disadvantage in the scramble for the Illinois Presidential delegates, and he wrote as follows:

"I am not in a position where it would hurt much for me not to be nominated on the national ticket; but I am where it would hurt some for me to not get the

* Pickett to Lincoln, April 13th, 1859. MS.
† Lincoln to Pickett, April 16th, 1859. MS.
‡ Lincoln to Judd, Dec. 9th, 1859. MS.
§ Lincoln to Frazer, Nov. 1st, 1859. MS.



Springfield, April 16. 1859.

T. J. Pickett, Esq.

My dear Sir.

Yours of the 13th inst. is just received. My engagements are such that I can not, at any very early day, visit Rock Island, to deliver a lecture, or for any other object.

As to the other matter you kindly mention, I must, in candor, say I do not think myself fit for the Presidency. I certainly am flattered and gratified that some partial friends think of me in that connection; but I really think it best for our cause that no concerted effort, such as you suggest, should be made.

Let this be considered confidential.

Yours very truly

A. Lincoln.

LINCOLN'S LETTER TO PICKETT, CONCERNING THE PRESIDENCY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH FURNISHED BY ROBERT McREYNOLDS.)

Illinois delegates. What I expected when I wrote the letter to Messrs. Dole and others is now happening. Your discomfited assailants are most bitter against me; and they will for revenge upon me, lay to the Bates egg in the South, and to the Seward egg in the North, and go far towards squeezing me out in the middle with nothing. Can you not help me a little in this matter in your end of the vineyard?" *

The extra vigilance of his friends thus invoked, it turned out that the Illinois Republicans sent a delegation to the Chicago Convention, not only full of personal devotion to Lincoln, but composed of men of the highest standing, and of consummate political ability, and their enthusiastic efforts in his behalf among the delegations from other States contributed largely to the final result.

The political campaign had now so far taken shape that its elements and chances could be calculated with more than usual accuracy. The Charleston Convention had been disrupted on the 1st of May, and adjourned on May 3d; the nomination of John Bell by the Constitutional Union party occurred on May 9th. The Chicago Convention met on May 16th; and while there was at that date yet great uncertainty as to whom the dissevered fragments of the Democratic party would finally nominate, little doubt existed that both the Douglas and Buchanan wings would have candidates in the field. With their opponents thus divided, the plain policy of the Republicans was to find a candidate on whom a thorough and hearty union of all the elements of the opposition could be secured. The party was constituted of somewhat heterogeneous material; a lingering antagonism remained between former Whigs and Democrats, protectionists and free-traders, foreign-born citizens and Know-nothings. Only on a single point could all hitherto agree,—opposition to the extension of slavery.

But little calculation was needed to show that at the November polls four doubtful States would decide the Presidential contest. Buchanan had been elected in 1856 by the vote of all the slave States (save Maryland), with the help of the free States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and California. Change the first four or even the first three of these free States to the Republican side, and they, with the Frémont States of 1856, would elect the President against all the others com-

* Lincoln to Judd, Feb. 9th, 1860. MS. Also printed in a pamphlet.

bined. The Congressional elections of 1858 demonstrated that such a change was possible. But besides this, Pennsylvania and Indiana were, like Ohio, known as "October States," because they held elections for State officers in that month; and they would at that early date give such an indication of sentiment as would forecast their November vote for President, and exert a powerful, perhaps a decisive, influence on the whole canvass. What candidate could most easily carry New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois, became therefore the vital question among the Chicago delegates, and especially among the delegates from the four pivotal States themselves.

William H. Seward, of New York, was naturally the leading candidate. He had been longest in public life, and was highest in official rank. He had been governor of the greatest State of the Union, and had nearly completed a second term of service in the United States Senate. Once a prominent Whig, his antecedents coincided with those of the bulk of the Republican party. His experience ran through two great agitations of the slavery question. He had taken important part in the Senate discussions which ended in the compromise measures of 1850, and in the new contest growing out of the Nebraska Bill his voice had been in every debate from "Repeal" to "Lecompton." He was not only firm in his antislavery convictions, but decided in his utterances. Discussing the admission of California, he proclaimed the "higher law" doctrine* in 1850; reviewing Dred Scott and Lecompton, he announced the "irrepressible conflict"† in 1858. He had tact as well as talent; he was a consummate politician, as well as a profound statesman. Such a leader could not fail of a strong following, and his supporters came to Chicago in such numbers, and of such prominence and character, as seemed to make his nomination a foregone conclusion. The delegation from New York worked and voted throughout as a unit for him, not merely to carry out their constituents' wishes, but with a personal zeal that omitted no exertion or sacrifice. They showed a want of tact, however, in carrying their street demonstrations for their favorite a little to excess; they crowded together at the Richmond House, making that hotel the Seward headquarters, with somewhat too much ostentation; they marched every day to the convention with music and banners and badges; and when any mention was made of doubtful States, their more headlong members talked altogether too much of the campaign funds they intended to raise. All this occasioned a reaction,—a certain mental protest among both Eastern and Western delegates against what have in later days come to be characterized as "machine" methods.

The positive elements in Seward's character and career had developed, as always happens, strong antagonisms. Having many enthusiastic friends, he had also very active and decided opponents. One of the earliest symptoms of this among the delegates at Chicago was the existence of a strong undercurrent of opposition to his nomination. This opposition was as yet latent, and scattered here and there among many State delegations, but very intense, silently watching its opportunity, and ready to combine upon any of the other candidates. The opposition soon made a discovery: that of all the names mentioned, Lincoln's was the only one offering any chance for such a combination. It needed only the slightest comparison of notes to show that Dayton had no strength save the New Jersey vote; Chase little outside of the Ohio delegation; Cameron none but that of Pennsylvania, and that Bates had only his Missouri friends and a few in border slave States, which could cast no electoral vote for the Republicans. The policy of the anti-Seward delegates was therefore quickly developed, namely, to use Lincoln's popularity as a means to defeat Seward.

The credit of the nomination is claimed by many men, and by several delegations, but every such claim is wholly fictitious. Lincoln was chosen not by personal intrigue, but through political necessity. The Republican party was a purely defensive organization; the South had created the crisis which the new party was compelled to overcome. The

* "It is true indeed that the national domain is ours. It is true it was acquired by the valor and with the wealth of the whole nation. But we hold, nevertheless, no arbitrary power over it. We hold no arbitrary authority over anything, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable degree their happiness."—William H. Seward, Senate speech, March 11th, 1850.

† "Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think that it is accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and therefore ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free-labor nation."—Seward, Rochester speech, October 25th, 1858.



JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, NOMINEE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE BUCHANAN WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. (FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1850. LENT BY ANSON MALTBY.)

The ascendency of the free States, not the personal fortunes of Seward, hung in the balance. Political victory at the ballot-box or a vital transformation of the institutions of government was the immediate alternative before the free States.

Victory could only be secured by help of the electoral votes of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. It was therefore a simple problem: What candidate could carry these States? None could answer this question so well as their own delegates, and these, when interrogated, still further reduced the problem by the reply that whoever else could, Seward certainly could not. These four States lay on the border land next to the South and to slavery. Institutions inevitably mold public sentiment; and a certain tenderness toward the "property" of neighbors and friends infected their people. They shrunk from the reproach of being "abolitionized." They would vote for a conservative Republican; but Seward and radicalism and "higher law" would bring them inevitable defeat.

Who, then, could carry these doubtful and pivotal States? This second branch of the question also found its ready answer. The contest in these States would be not against a Territorial slave code, but against "popular sovereignty"; not with Buchanan's candidate, but with Douglas; and for Douglas there was only a single antagonist, tried and true,—Abraham Lincoln. Such, we may reasonably infer, was the substance of the discussion and argument which ran through the caucus-rooms of the delegates, day and night, during the 16th and 17th of May. Meanwhile the Seward men were not idle; having the large New York delegation to begin with, and counting the many positive committals from other States, their strength and organization seemed impregnable. The opposing delegations, each still nursing the chances of its own candidate, hesitated to give any positive promises to each other. At midnight of May 17th, Horace Greeley,* one of Seward's strongest opponents, and perhaps better informed than any other single delegate, telegraphed his conclusion "that the opposition to Governor Seward cannot concentrate on any candidate, and that he will be nominated." †

Chicago was already a city of a hundred thousand souls. Thirty to forty thousand visitors, full of life, hope, ambition, most of them from the progressive group of incircling North-western States, and strung to the highest tension of political excitement, had come to attend the convention. Charleston had shown a great party in the ebb-tide of disintegration, tainted by the spirit of disunion. Chicago exhibited a great party springing to life and power, every motive and force compelling coöperation and growth. The rush and spirit of the great city, and the

* Greeley sat in the convention as a delegate for Oregon.

† Greeley to the N. Y. "Tribune," May 17th, 1860.



JOSEPH LANE, NOMINEE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE BUCHANAN WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

enthusiasm and hope of its visitors, blended and reacted upon each other as if by laws of chemical affinity. Something of the freshness and sweep of the prairie winds exhilarated the delegates and animated the convention.

GEORGE ASHMUN, OF MASSACHUSETTS.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY NOTMAN.)

No building in the city of Chicago at that time contained a hall with sufficient room for the sittings of the great assemblage. A temporary frame structure, which the committee of arrangements christened "The Wigwam," was therefore designed and erected for this especial use. It was said to be large enough to hold ten thousand persons, and whether or not that estimate was entirely accurate, a prodigious concourse certainly gathered each day within its walls.

The very first day's session (May 16th) demonstrated the successful adaptation of the structure to its uses. Participants and spectators alike were delighted with the ease of ingress and egress, the comfortable division of space, the perfection of its acoustic qualities. Every celebrity could be seen, every speech could be heard. The routine of organization, the choice of officers and committees, and the presentation of credentials were full of variety and zest. Governor Edwin D. Morgan, of New York, as Chairman of the National Republican Committee, called the convention to order; and when he presented the historic name of David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, for temporary chairman, the faith of the audience in the judgment of the managers was already won. The report of the committee on organization in the afternoon made George Ashmun, of Massachusetts, a most skillful parliamentarian, ready in decision and felicitous in his phrases, the permanent presiding officer. One thing was immediately and specially manifest: an overflowing heartiness and deep feeling pervaded the whole house. No need of a *claque*, no room for sham demonstration here! The galleries were as watchful and earnest as the platform. There was something genuine, elemental, uncontrollable in the moods and manifestations of the vast audience. Seats and standing-room were always packed in advance, and, as the delegates entered by their own separate doors, the crowd easily distinguished the chief actors. Blair, Giddings, Greeley, Evarts, Kelley, Wilmot, Schurz, and others were greeted with spontaneous applause, which, rising at some one point, grew and rolled from side to side and corner to corner of the immense building, brightening the eyes and quickening the breath of every inmate.*

With the second day's proceedings the interest of delegates and spectators was visibly increased, first by some sharp-shooting speeches about credentials, and secondly by the main event of the day,—the report from the platform committee. Much difficulty was expected on this score, but a little time had smoothed the way with an almost magical effect. The great outpouring of delegates and people, the self-evident success of the gathering, the harmonious, almost joyous, beginning of the deliberations in the first day's session, were more convincing than logic in solidifying the party. These were the premonitions of success; before the signs of victory all spirit of faction was fused into a generous glow of emulation.

The eager convention would have accepted a weak or defective platform; the committee, on the contrary, reported one framed with remarkable skill. It is only needful to recapitulate its chief points. It denounced disunion, Lecomptonism, the property theory, the dogma that the Constitution carries slavery to Territories, the reopening of the slave-trade, the popular sovereignty and non-intervention fallacies, and denied "the authority of Congress, of a Territorial legislature, or of any individuals to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States." It opposed any change in the naturalization laws. It recommended an adjustment of import duties to encourage the industrial interests of the whole country. It advocated the immediate admission of Kansas, free homesteads

* One of the authors was a spectator at all the sessions of the convention, and witnessed the scenes in the Wigwam which he has endeavored to describe.

to actual settlers, river and harbor improvements of a national character, and a railroad to the Pacific Ocean. Bold on points of common agreement, it was unusually successful in avoiding points of controversy among its followers, or offering points for criticism to its enemies.

It is not surprising that Charleston and Chicago should furnish many striking contrasts. At the Charleston Convention, the principal personal incident was a long and frank speech from one Gaulden, a Savannah slave-trader, in advocacy of the reopening of the African slave-trade.* In the Chicago Convention, the exact and extreme opposite of such a theme created one of the most interesting of the debates. The platform had been read and received with tremendous cheers, when Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, who was everywhere eager to insist upon what he designated as the "primal truths" of the Declaration of Independence, moved to amend the first resolution by incorporating in it the phrase which announces the right of all men to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The convention was impatient to adopt the platform without change; several delegates urged objections, one of them pertinently observing that there were also many other truths enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. "Mr. President," said he, "I believe in the ten commandments, but I do not want them in a political platform." Mr. Giddings's amendment was voted down, and the antislavery veteran, feeling himself wounded in his most cherished philosophy, rose and walked out of the convention.

Personal friends, grieved that he should feel offended, and doubly sorry that the general harmony should be marred by even a single dissent, followed Mr. Giddings, and sought to change his purpose. While thus persuading him, the discussion had passed to the second resolution, when Mr. George William Curtis, of New York, seized the chance to renew substantially Mr. Giddings's amendment. There



THE WIGWAM AT CHICAGO IN WHICH LINCOLN WAS NOMINATED.

* "I tell you, fellow-Democrats, that the African slave-trader is the true Union man [cheers and laughter]. I tell you that the slave-trading of Virginia is more immoral, more unchristian in every possible point of view, than that African slave-trade which goes to Africa and brings a heathen and worthless man here, christianizes him, and sends him and his posterity down the stream of time to enjoy the blessings of civilization. . . It has been my fortune to go into that noble old State to buy a few darkies, and I have had to pay from $1000 to $2000 a head, when I could go to Africa and buy better negroes for $50 apiece. . . I advocate the repeal of the laws prohibiting the African slave-trade, because I believe it to be the true Union movement. I do not believe that sections whose interests are so different as the Southern and Northern States can ever stand the shocks of fanaticism unless they be equally balanced. I believe that by reopening this trade, and giving us negroes to populate the Territories, the equilibrium of the two sections will be maintained."—Speech of W. B. Gaulden, of Georgia, in the Charleston Democratic National Convention, May 1st, 1860.

HANNIBAL HAMLIN.

were new objections, but Mr. Curtis swept them away with a captivating burst of oratory. "I have to ask this Convention," said he, "whether they are prepared to go upon the record before the country as voting down the words of the Declaration of Independence? . . . I rise simply to ask gentlemen to think well before, upon the free prairies of the West, in the summer of 1860, they dare to wince and quail before the assertions of the men in Philadelphia, in 1776 — before they dare to shrink from repeating the words that these great men enunciated." "This was a strong appeal, and took the convention by storm,"* writes a recording journalist. A new vote formally embodied this portion of the Declaration of Independence in the Republican platform; and Mr. Giddings, overjoyed at his triumph, had already returned to his seat when the platform as a whole was adopted with repeated and renewed shouts of applause that seemed to shake the wigwam.

The third day of the convention (Friday, May 18th) found the doors besieged by an excited multitude. The preliminary business was disposed of,— the platform was made,— and every one knew the balloting would begin. The New York delegation felt assured of Seward's triumph, and made an effort to have its march to the convention, with banners and music, unusually full and imposing. It proved a costly display; for while the New York "irregulars" were parading the streets, the Illinoisans were filling the wigwam: when the Seward procession arrived, there was little room left except the reserved seats for the delegates. New York deceived itself in another respect: it counted on the full New England strength, whereas more than half of it had already resolved to cast its vote elsewhere. This defection in advance practically insured Seward's defeat. New York and the extreme North-west were not sufficiently strong to nominate him, and in the nature of things he could not hope for much help from the conservative middle and border States. But this calculation could not as yet be so accurately made. Caucusing was active up to the very hour when the convention met, and many delegations went to the wigwam with no definite programme beyond the first ballot.

What pen shall adequately describe this vast audience of ten thousand souls? the low, wave-like roar of its ordinary conversation; the rolling cheers that greeted the entrance of popular favorites; the solemn hush which fell upon it during the opening prayer? There was just enough of some unexpected preliminary wrangle and delay to arouse the full impatience of both convention and spectators; but at length the names of candidates were announced. This ceremony was still in its simplicity. The more recent custom of short dramatic speeches from conspicuous and popular orators to serve as electrifying preludes, had not yet been invented. "I take the liberty," said Mr. Evarts, of New York, "to name as a candidate to be nominated by this convention for the office of President of the United States, William H. Seward." "I desire," followed Mr. Judd, "on



GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS.

* Halstead, "Conventions of 1860," p. 138.



WILLIAM M. EVARTS. (FROM AN OIL-PAINTING BY THOMAS HICKS. 1867.)

behalf of the delegation from Illinois, to put in nomination as a candidate for President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois." Then came the usual succession of possible and alternative aspirants who were to be complimented by the first votes of their States,—Dayton, Cameron, Chase, Bates, Collamer, McLean. The fifteen minutes required by this formality had already indisputably marked out and set apart the real contestants. The "complimentary" statesmen were lustily cheered by their respective State delegations; but at the names of Seward and Lincoln, the whole wigwam seemed to respond together.

There is something irresistibly exciting in the united voice of a great crowd. For a moment the struggle appeared to resolve itself into a contest of throats and lungs. Indiana seconded the nomination of Lincoln, and the applause was deafening. Michigan seconded the nomination of Seward; the New York delegation rose *en masse*, waved their hats, and joined the galleries in a shout which doubled the volume of any yet given. Then a portion of the Ohio delegates once more seconded Lincoln, and his adherents, feeling themselves put upon their mettle, made an effort. "I thought the Seward yell could not be surpassed," wrote a spectator; "but the Lincoln boys were clearly ahead, and, feeling their victory, as there was a lull in the storm, took deep breaths all round, and gave a concentrated shriek that was positively awful, and accompanied it with stamping that made every plank and pillar in the building quiver." *

The tumult gradually died away, and balloting began. Here we may note another contrast. The Charleston Convention was reactionary and exclusive; it followed the two-thirds rule. The Chicago Convention was progressive and liberal; it adopted majority rule. Liberal even beyond this, it admitted the Territories and border slave States, containing only a minority or fraction of Republican sentiment, to seats and to votes. It was throwing a drag-net for success. Under different circumstances, these sentimental delegations might have become powerful in intrigue; but, dom-

* Halstead, "Conventions of 1860," p. 145.

inated as they were by deeper political forces, they afforded no distinct advantage to either candidate.*

Though it was not expected to be decisive, the very first ballot foreshadowed accurately



JOHN BELL, NOMINEE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

the final result. The "complimentary" candidates received the tribute of admiration from their respective States. Vermont voted for Collamer, and New Jersey for Dayton, each solid.† Pennsylvania's compliment to Cameron was shorn of six votes, four of which went at once for Lincoln. Ohio divided her compliment, 34 for Chase, 4 for McLean, and at once gave Lincoln her 8 remaining votes. Missouri voted solid for her candidate, Bates, who also received a scattering tribute from other delegations. But all these compliments were of little avail to their recipients, for far above each towered the aggregates of the leading candidates: Seward, 173½; Lincoln, 102.

In the groundswell of suppressed excitement which pervaded the convention there was no time to analyze this vote; nevertheless, delegates and spectators felt the full force of its premonition; to all who desired the defeat of Seward it pointed out the winning man with unerring certainty. Another little wrangle over some disputed and protesting delegate made the audience almost furious at the delay, and "Call the roll!" sounded from a thousand throats.

A second ballot was begun at last, and, obeying a force as sure as the law of gravitation, the former complimentary votes came rushing to Lincoln. The whole 10 votes of Collamer, 44 from Cameron, 6 from Chase and McLean, were now cast for him, followed by a scatter of additions along the whole roll-call. In this ballot Lincoln gained 79 votes, Seward only 11. The faces of the New York delegation whitened as the balloting progressed and as the torrent of Lincoln's popularity became a river. The result of the second ballot was: Seward, 184½; Lincoln, 181; scattering, 99½. When the vote of Lincoln was announced, there was a tremendous burst of applause, which the chairman prudently but with difficulty controlled and silenced.

The third ballot was begun amid a breathless suspense; hundreds of pencils kept pace with the roll-call, and nervously marked the changes on their tally-sheets. The Lincoln figures steadily swelled and grew. Votes came to him from all the other candidates,— 4½ from Seward, 2 from Cameron, 13 from Bates, 18 from Chase, 9 from Dayton, 8 from McLean, 1 from Clay. Lincoln had gained 50½, Seward had lost 4½. Long before the official tellers footed up their columns, spectators and delegates rapidly made the reckoning and knew the result: Lincoln, 231½; Seward, 180. Counting the scattering votes, 465 ballots had been cast, and 233 were necessary to a choice; only 1½ votes more were needed to make a nomination.

A profound stillness suddenly fell upon the

* These sentimental delegations were: Maryland, 11; Delaware, 6; Virginia, 22; Kentucky, 23; Texas, 6; Kansas, 6; Nebraska, 6; District of Columbia, 2. Total, 82 votes. Of these the leading candidates received as follows:

1st ballot	Seward,	30	Lincoln,	21
2d "	"	35	"	30
3d "	"	33	"	43

Missouri might be counted in the same category; but, as she voted steadily for Bates through all the ballots, she did not in any wise influence the result.

† Each State cast a vote equal to double the number of its Electoral College.

wigwam; the men ceased to talk and the ladies to flutter their fans; one could distinctly hear the scratching of pencils and the ticking of telegraph instruments on the reporters' tables. No announcement had been made by the chair; changes were in order, and it was only a question of seconds who should speak first. While every one was leaning forward in intense expectancy, Mr. Cartter sprang upon his chair and reported a change of four Ohio votes from Chase to Lincoln. There was a moment's pause,—a teller waved his tally-sheet toward the skylight and shouted a name,—and then the boom of a cannon on the roof of the wigwam announced the nomination to the crowds in the streets, where shouts and salutes took up and spread the news. In the convention the Lincoln river now became an inundation. Amid the wildest hurrahs, delegation after delegation changed its vote to the victor.

A graceful custom prevails in orderly American conventions, that the chairman of the vanquished delegation is first to greet the nominee with a short address of party fealty and promise of party support. Mr. Evarts, the spokesman for New York, essayed promptly to perform this courteous office, but was delayed a while by the enthusiasm and confusion. The din at length subsided, and the presiding officer announced that on the third ballot Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, received 364 votes, and "is selected as your candidate for President of the United States." Then Mr. Evarts, in a voice of unconcealed emotion, but with admirable dignity and touching eloquence, speaking for Seward and for New York, moved to make the nomination unanimous.

The interest in a National Convention usually ceases with the announcement of the principal nomination. It was only afterward that the delegates realized how fortunate a selection they made by adding Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, to the ticket as candidate for Vice-President. Indeed, this was even more true of Mr. Lincoln. For the moment their chief self-congratulation was that they had secured the doubtful vote of the conservative States. Or rather, perhaps, might it be said that it was hardly the work of the delegates — it was the concurrent product of popular wisdom. Political evolution had with scientific precision wrought "the survival of the fittest." The weary delegates leaving Chicago on the various homeward-bound railroad trains that night, saw that already the excitement and enthusiasm of the convention was transferred from the wigwam to the country.



EDWARD EVERETT, NOMINEE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY.



WIDE AWAKES.

"At every station where there was a village, until after 2 o'clock, there were tar-barrels burning, drums beating, boys carrying rails, and guns great and small banging away. The weary passengers were allowed no rest, but plagued by the thundering of the cannon, the clamor of drums, the glare of bonfires, and the whooping of the boys, who were delighted with the idea of a candidate for the Presidency who thirty years before split rails on the Sangamon River — classic stream now and for evermore — and whose neighbors named him 'honest.'" *

LINCOLN ELECTED.

THUS the Presidential canvass in the United States for the year 1860 began with the very

* Halstead, "Conventions of 1860," p. 154.



HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON, CANDIDATE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE DOUGLAS WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

unusual condition of four considerable parties, and four different candidates for President and Vice-President. In the order of popular strength, as afterward shown, they were:

First. The Republican party, which at the Chicago Convention had nominated as its candidate for President, Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, and for Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine. Its animating spirit was a belief and declaration that the institution of slavery was wrong in morals and detrimental to society; its avowed policy was to restrict slavery to its present limits in the States where it existed in virtue of local constitutions and laws.

Second. The Douglas wing of the Democratic party, which at Baltimore nominated Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and whose candidate for Vice-President was Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.* It declared indifference as to the moral right or wrong of slavery, and indifference to its restriction or extension. Its avowed policy was to permit the people of a Territory to decide whether they would prevent or establish slavery, and it further proposed to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court on all questions of constitutional law growing out of it.

Third. The Buchanan wing of the Democratic party, which at Baltimore nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for Vice-President. Its animating spirit was a belief and declaration that slavery was morally right and politically beneficial; its avowed policy was the extension of slavery into the Territories, and the creation of new slave States, whereby it might protect and perpetuate itself by a preponderance, or at least a constant equality, of political power, especially in the Senate of the United States. As one means to this end, it proposed the immediate acquisition of the island of Cuba.

Fourth. The Constitutional Union party, which in its convention at Baltimore nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President. It professed to ignore the question of slavery, and declared that it would recognize no political principle other than "the Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the Laws."

The first, most striking feature of the four-sided Presidential canvass which now began, was the personal pledge by every one of the candidates of devotion to the Union. Each of the factions was in some form charging disunion motives or tendencies upon part or all of the others;

* Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, had been nominated at Baltimore, but he declined the nomination, and the National Committee substituted the name of Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.



STATE-HOUSE IN WHICH WAS LINCOLN'S OFFICE DURING HIS CAMPAIGN.

but each indignantly denied the allegation as to itself. To leave no possible doubt, the written letters of acceptance of each of the candidates emphasized the point. Lincoln invoked "the inviolability of the Constitution, and the perpetual union, harmony, and prosperity of all." Douglas made his pledge broad and full. "The Federal Union," wrote he, "must be preserved. The Constitution must be maintained inviolate in all its parts. Every right guaranteed by the Constitution must be protected by law in all cases where legislation is necessary to its enjoyment. The judicial authority, as provided in the Constitution, must be sustained, and its decisions implicitly obeyed and faithfully executed. The laws must be administered, and the constituted authorities upheld, and all unlawful resistance to these things must be put down with firmness, impartiality, and fidelity." "The Constitution and the equality of the States," wrote Breckinridge, "these are the symbols of everlasting union. Let these be the rallying cries of the people." Bell declared that, if elected, all his ability, strength of will, and official influence should be employed "for the maintenance of the Constitution and the Union against all opposing influences and tendencies." Even President Buchanan, in a little campaign speech from the portico of the Executive mansion, hastened to purge himself of the imputation of suspicion or fear on this point. He declared that neither of the Democratic conventions was "regular," and that therefore every Democrat was at liberty to vote as he thought proper. For himself, he preferred Breckinridge. The Democratic party, when divided for the moment, "has always closed up its ranks, and become more powerful even from defeat. It will never die whilst the Constitution and the Union survive. It will live to protect and defend both." *

No progress was made, however, toward a reunion of the Democratic party. The Buchanan faction everywhere waged unrelenting war on Douglas, both in public discussion and in the use of official patronage. The contest was made with equal obstinacy and bitterness in the Northern and the Southern States. Douglas, on his part, was not slow to retaliate. He immediately entered on an extensive campaign tour, and made speeches at many of the principal cities of the Northern States, and a few in the slave States. Everywhere he stigmatized the Breckinridge wing of the Democracy as an extremist and disunion faction,† charging that it was as obnoxious and dangerous as the Republicans. Whatever be his errors, it must be recorded to his lasting renown that he boldly declared for maintaining the Union by force. At Norfolk, Virginia, the question was put to him in writing. "I answer emphatically," replied Douglas, "that it is the duty of the President of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States passed by Congress, and as the courts expound them, and I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, would do all in my power to aid the Government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President, whoever he may be, should treat all attempts to break up the Union by resistance to the laws, as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers in 1832."‡

All parties entered upon the political canvass with considerable spirit; but the chances of the Republicans were so manifestly superior that their enthusiasm easily outran that of all their competitors. The character and antecedents of Mr. Lincoln appealed directly to the sympathy and favor of the popular masses of the Northern States. As pioneer, farm-laborer, flat-boatman, and frontier politician, they saw in him a true representative of their early if not their present condition. As the successful lawyer, legislator, and public debater in questions of high statesmanship, he was the admired ideal of their own aspirations. The popular fancy seized upon his personal characteristics as effective symbols of their zealous partisanship.

While the Illinois State Republican Convention was in session at Decatur (May 10th), about a week before the Chicago Convention, the balloting for State officers was interrupted by the announcement, made with much mystery, that "an old citizen of Macon County" had something to present to the convention. When curiosity had been sufficiently aroused, John Hanks, Lincoln's fellow-pioneer, and a neighbor of Hanks were suddenly marched into the convention, each bearing upright an old fence-rail, and displaying a banner with an inscription to the effect that these were two rails from the identical lot of three thousand which, when a pioneer boy, Lincoln had helped to cut and split to inclose his father's first farm in Illinois, in 1830. These emblems

* G. T. Curtis, "Life of Buchanan," Vol. II., p. 294.

† "In my opinion there is a mature plan throughout the Southern States to break up the Union. I believe the election of a Republican is to be the signal for that attempt, and that the leaders of the scheme desire the election of Lincoln so as to have an excuse for disunion. I do not believe that every Breckinridge man is a disunionist, but I do believe that every disunionist in America is a Breckinridge man."— Douglas, Baltimore speech, September 6th, 1860.

‡ Douglas, Norfolk speech August 25th, 1860.



Springfield, Ill. May 23. 1860

Hon: George Ashmun

President of the Republican National Convention.

Sir:

I accept the nomination tendered me by the Convention over which you presided, and of which I am formally apprized in the letter of yourself and others, acting as a Committee of the Convention, for that purpose.

The declaration of principles and sentiments, which accompanies your letter, meets my approval; and it shall be my care not to violate, or disregard it, in any part.

Imploring the assistance of Divine Providence, and with due regard to the views and feelings of all who were represented in the Convention; to the rights of all the states, and territories, and people of the nation; to the inviolability of the Constitution, and the perpetual union, harmony, and prosperity of all, I am most happy to co-operate for the practical success of the principles declared by the Convention.

Your obliged friend, and fellow citizen

A. Lincoln

FAC-SIMILE OF LINCOLN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

of his handiwork were received by the convention with deafening shouts, as a prelude to a unanimous resolution recommending him for President. Later, these rails were sent to Chicago; there, during the sittings of the National Republican Convention, they stood in the hotel parlor at the Illinois headquarters, lighted up by tapers, and trimmed with flowers by enthusiastic ladies. Their history and campaign incidents were duly paraded in the newspapers, and throughout the Union Lincoln's ancient and local *sobriquet* of "Honest Old Abe" was supplemented by the national epithet of "The Illinois Rail-splitter." Of the many humors and peculiarities of the campaign, one feature deserves special mention. Political clubs, for parades and personal campaign work, were no novelty; now, however, the new expedients of a cheap yet striking uniform and a half-military organization were tried with marked success. When Lincoln made his New England trip, immediately after the Cooper Institute speech, a score or two of active Republicans in the city of Hartford appeared in close and orderly ranks, wearing each a cap and large cape of oil-cloth, and bearing over their shoulders a long staff, on the end of which blazed a brilliant torch-light. This first "Wide Awake"* Club, as it called itself, marching with soldierly step,

* We condense the following account of the origin of the "Wide Awakes" from memoranda kindly furnished us by Mr. William P. Fuller, one of the editors of the Hartford "Courant" in 1860, Major J. C. Kinney, at present connected with the paper, and General Joseph R. Hawley, the principal editor, now United States Senator from Connecticut, and who in 1860 marched in the ranks in the first "Wide Awake" parades.

The "Wide Awake" organization grew out of the first campaign meeting in Hartford on February 25th, 1860 — State election campaign. Hon. Cassius M. Clay was the speaker, and after the meeting was escorted to the Allyn House by a torch-light parade. Two of the young men who were to carry torches, D. G. Francis and H. P. Blair, being dry-goods clerks, in order to protect their clothing from dust and the oil liable to fall from the torches, had prepared capes of black cambric, which they wore in connection with the glazed caps commonly worn at the time. Colonel George P. Bissell, who was marshal, noticing the uniform, put the wearers in front, where the novelty of the rig and its double advantage of utility and show attracted much attention. It was at once proposed to form a campaign club of fifty torch-bearers with glazed caps and oil-cloth capes instead of cambric; the torch-bearing club to be "auxiliary to the Young Men's Republican Union." A meeting to organize formally

and military music, escorted Mr. Lincoln, on the evening of March 5th, from the hall where he addressed the people, to his hotel. The device was so simple and yet so strikingly effective that it immediately became the pattern for other cities. After the campaign opened, there was scarcely a county or village in the North without its organized and drilled association of "Wide Awakes," immensely captivating to the popular eye, and forming everywhere a vigilant corps to spread the fame of, and solicit votes for, the Republican presidential candidate. On several occasions twenty to thirty thousand "Wide Awakes" met in the larger cities and marched in monster torch-light processions through the principal streets.

His nomination also made necessary some slight changes in Mr. Lincoln's daily life. His law practice was transferred entirely to his partner, and instead of the small, dingy office so long occupied by him, he was now given the use of the Governor's room in the State-house, which was not needed for official business during the absence of the legislature. This also was a room of modest proportions, with scanty and plain furniture. Here Mr. Lincoln, attended by only his private secretary (Mr. Nicolay), passed the long summer days of the campaign, receiving the constant stream of visitors anxious to look upon a real presidential candidate. There was free access to him; not even an usher stood at the door; any one might knock and enter. His immediate personal friends from Sangamon County and central Illinois availed themselves largely of this opportunity. With men who had known him in field and forest he talked over the incidents of their common pioneer experience with unaffected sympathy and interest, as though he were yet the flat-boatman, surveyor, or village lawyer of the early days. The letters which came to him by hundreds, the newspapers, and the conversation of friends, kept him sufficiently informed of the progress of the campaign, in which personally he took a very slight part. He made no addresses, wrote no public letters, held no conferences. Political leaders several times came to make campaign speeches at the Republican wigwam in Springfield. But, beyond a few casual interviews on such occasions, the great presidential canvass went on with scarcely a private suggestion or touch of actual direction from the Republican candidate.

It is perhaps worth while to record Lincoln's expression on one point, which adds testimony to his general consistency in political action. The rise of the Know-nothing or American party, in 1854–5 (which was only a renewal of the Native-American party of 1844), has been elsewhere mentioned. As a national organization, the new faction ceased with the defeat of Fillmore and Donelson in 1856; its fragments nevertheless held together in many places in the form of local minorities, which sometimes made themselves felt in contests for members of the legislature and county officers; and citizens of foreign birth continued to be justly apprehensive of its avowed jealousy and secret machinery. It was easy to allege that any prominent candidate belonged to the Know-nothing party, and attended the secret Know-nothing lodges; and Lincoln, in the late senatorial, and now again in the presidential, campaign, suffered his full share of these newspaper accusations.

We have already mentioned that in the campaign of 1844 he put on record, by public resolutions in Springfield, his disapprobation of, and opposition to, Native-Americanism.* In the later campaigns, while he did not allow his attention to be diverted from the slavery discussion, his disapproval of Know-nothingism was quite as decided and as public. Thus he wrote in a private letter, dated October 30th, 1858:

> "I understand the story is still told and insisted upon that I have been a Know-nothing. I repeat what I stated in a public speech at Meredosia, that I am not, nor ever have been, connected with the party called the Know-nothing party, or party calling themselves the American party. Certainly no man of truth, and I believe no man of good character for truth, can be found to say on his own knowledge that I ever was connected with that party." †

So also in the summer of 1860, when his candidacy for President did not permit his writing public letters, he wrote in a confidential note to a friend:

was appointed for March 6th; but before the new uniforms were all ready, Abraham Lincoln addressed a meeting in Hartford on the evening of March 5th. After his speech, the cape-wearers of the previous meeting with a number of others who had secured their uniforms escorted Mr. Lincoln to the hotel.

The club was formally organized on the following night. Mr. William P. Fuller, city editor, had, in noticing this meeting for organization, written in the "Courant" of March 3d: "THE WIDE AWAKES.—The Republican club-room last evening was filled as usual with those who are going to partake in the great Republican triumph in this State in April next," etc., etc. The name "Wide Awakes" was here applied to the Republican Young Men's Union, torch-bearers included; but at the meeting of March 6th, the torch-bearers appropriated it by making it the distinctive title to their own special organization, which almost immediately, there as elsewhere, swallowed up the names and the memberships of other Republican clubs. Just one year after they escorted Mr. Lincoln in their first parade, he was inaugurated President of the United States.

* Compare THE CENTURY, Jan., 1887, p. 396.

† Lincoln to Edward Lusk, Oct. 30th, 1858. MS.

"Yours of the 20th is received. I suppose as good or even better men than I have been in American or Know-nothing lodges; but, in point of fact, I never was in one, at Quincy or elsewhere. . . . . And now a word of caution. Our adversaries think they can gain a point if they can force me to openly deny the charge, by which some degree of offense would be given to the Americans. For this reason it must not publicly appear that I am paying any attention to the charge." *

His position on the main question involved was already sufficiently understood; for in his elsewhere quoted letter of May 17th, 1859, he had declared himself against the adoption by Illinois, or any other place where he had a right to oppose it, of the recent Massachusetts constitutional provision restricting foreign-born citizens in the right of suffrage. It is well to repeat the broad philosophical principle which guided him to this conclusion: "Understanding the spirit of our institutions to aim at the elevation of men, I am opposed to whatever tends to degrade them." †

As the campaign progressed the chances of the result underwent an important fluctuation, involving some degree of uncertainty. The Democratic disruption, and the presence of four tickets in the field, rendered it possible that some very narrow plurality in one or more of the States might turn the scale of victory. Calculating politicians, especially those belonging to the party hitherto in power, and who had enjoyed the benefits of its extensive Federal patronage, seized eagerly upon this possibility as a means of prolonging their official tenure, and showed themselves not unwilling to sacrifice the principles of the general contest to the mere material and local advantage which success would bring them.

Accordingly, in several States, and more notably in the great State of New York, there was begun a quiet but unremitting effort to bring about a coalition or "fusion," as it was termed, of the warring Democratic factions, on the basis of a division of the spoils which such a combination was hoped to be able to secure. Nor did the efforts stop there. If the union of the two factions created the probability, the union of three seemed to insure certainty, and the negotiations for a coalition, therefore, extended to the adherents of Bell and Everett. Amid the sharp contest of ideas and principles which divided the country, such an arrangement was by no means easy; yet in a large voting population there is always a percentage of party followers on whom the obligations of party creeds sit lightly. Gradually, from talk of individuals and speculations of newspapers, the intrigue proceeded to a coquetting between rival conventions; where the formal proceedings encountering too much protest and indignation, the scheme was handed over to standing committees, who could deliberate and bargain in secret. It must be stated to the credit of Douglas, that he publicly rejected any alliance not based on his hobby of "non-intervention"; ‡ but the committees and managers cared little for the disavowal. In due time they perfected their agreement that the New York electoral ticket (numbering 35) should be made up of adherents of the three different factions in the following proportion: Douglas, 18; Bell, 10; Breckinridge, 7.§ This agreement was carried out, and the fusion ticket thus constituted was voted for at the presidential election by the combined opponents of Lincoln.

In Pennsylvania, notwithstanding that Douglas disfavored the scheme, an agreement or movement of fusion also took place; but in this case it did not become complete, and was not altogether carried out by the parties to it, as in New York. The electoral ticket had been nominated by the usual Democratic State convention (March 1st) prior to the Charleston disruption, and, as it turned out, about one-third of these nominees were favorable to Douglas. After the disruption, the Douglasites also formed a straight, or Douglas, electoral ticket. In order to unite the two wings at the October State election, the Executive Committee of the original convention recommended (July 2d) that the electors first nominated should vote for Douglas if his election were possible; if not, should vote for Breckinridge. A subsequent resolution (August 9th) recommended that the electors should vote for either Douglas or Breckinridge, as the preponderance of Douglas or Breckinridge votes in the State might indicate. On some implied agreement of this character, not clearly defined or made public, the Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell factions voted together for governor in October. Being beaten by a considerable majority at that election, the impulse to fusion was

* Lincoln to Hon. A. Jonas, July 21st, 1860. MS.

† Lincoln to Dr. Theodore Canisius, May 17th, 1859.

‡ "I will give you my opinion as to fusion. I think that every man [*sic*] who believes that slavery ought to be banished from the halls of Congress, and remanded to the people of the Territories subject to the Constitution, ought to fuse and act together; but that no Democrat can, without dishonor, and forfeiture of self-respect and principle, fuse with anybody who is in favor of intervention, either for slavery or against slavery. Lincoln and Breckinridge might fuse, for they agree in principle. I can never fuse with either of them, because I differ from both. I am in favor of all men acting together who are opposed to this slavery agitation, and in favor of banishing it from Congress forever; but as Democrats we can never fuse, either with Northern abolitionists, or Southern bolters and secessionists."— Douglas, speech at Erie, Penn., "N. Y. Tribune," October 3d, 1860, p. 4.

§ Greeley, "American Conflict," Vol. I., p. 324.

greatly weakened. Finally the original Democratic State Committee rescinded (October 12th) all its resolutions of fusion, and the Douglas State Committee withdrew (October 18th) its straight Douglas ticket. This action left in the field the original electoral ticket nominated by the Democratic State convention at Reading prior to the Charleston Convention, untrammeled by any instructions or agreements. It was nevertheless a fusion ticket in part, because nine of the candidates (one-third of the whole number) were pledged to Douglas. What share or promise the Bell faction had in it was not made public. At the presidential election it was voted for by a large number of fusionists; but a portion of the Douglasites voted straight for Douglas, and a portion of the Bell men straight for Bell.*

In New Jersey also a definite fusion agreement was reached between the Bell, Breckinridge, and Douglas factions. An electoral ticket was formed, composed of 2 adherents of Bell, 2 of Breckinridge, and 3 of Douglas.† This was the only State in which the fusion movement produced any result in the election. It turned out that a considerable fraction of the Douglas voters refused to be transferred by the agreement which their local managers had entered into. They would not vote for the two Bell men and the two Breckinridge men on the fusion ticket, but ran a straight Douglas ticket, adopting the three electors on the fusion ticket.‡ By this turn of the canvass the 3 Douglas electors whose names were on both tickets were chosen, but the remainder of the fusion ticket was defeated, giving Lincoln 4 electoral votes out of the 7 in New Jersey. Some slight efforts towards fusion were made in two or three other States, but accomplished nothing worthy of note, and would have had no influence on the result, even had it been consummated.

All these efforts to avert or postpone the great political change which was impending were of no avail. In the long six years' agitation popular intelligence had ripened to conviction and determination. Every voter substantially understood the several phases of the great slavery issue, its abstract morality, its economic influence on society, the intrigue of the Administration and the Senate to make Kansas a slave State, the judicial status of slavery as expounded in the Dred Scott decision, the validity and the effect of the fugitive-slave law, the question of the balance of political power as involved in the choice between slavery extension and slavery restriction,—and reaching beyond even this, the issue so clearly presented by Lincoln whether the States ultimately should become all slave or all free. In the whole history of American politics the voters of the United States never pronounced a more deliberate judgment than that which they recorded upon these grave questions at the presidential election in November, 1860.

From much doubt and uncertainty at its beginning, the campaign swept onward through the summer months, first to a probability, then to an assurance of Republican success. In September the State of Maine elected a Republican governor by 18,000 majority. In October the pivotal States gave decisive Republican majorities: Pennsylvania 32,000 for governor, Indiana nearly 10,000 for governor, and Ohio 12,000 for State ticket and 27,000 on congressmen. Politicians generally conceded that the vote in these States clearly foreshadowed Lincoln's election. The prophecy not only proved correct, but the tide of popular conviction and enthusiasm, rising still higher, carried to his support other States which were yet considered uncertain.

The presidential election occurred on November 6th, 1860. In seventeen of the free States—namely, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, California, and Oregon—all the Lincoln electors were chosen. In one of the free States (New Jersey) the choice resulted in 4 electors for Lincoln and 3 for Douglas, as already explained. This assured Lincoln of the votes of 180 presidential electors, or a majority of 57 in the whole electoral college. The 15 slave States were divided between the other 3 candidates. Eleven of them — Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas — chose Breckinridge electors, 72 in all. Three of them — Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia — chose Bell electors, 39 in all; and one of them—Missouri—Douglas electors, 9 in number, which, together with the 3 he received in the free State of New Jersey, gave him 12 in all; the aggregate of all the electors opposed to Lincoln being 123.

The will of the people as expressed in this popular vote was in due time carried into execution. As the law prescribes, the presidential electors met in their several States on the 5th of December, and cast their official votes according to the above enumeration. And on

* The vote in Pennsylvania stood: Lincoln, 268,030; Breckinridge (nominally), 178,871; Douglas, 16,765; Bell, 12,776.

† Greeley, "American Conflict," Vol. I., p. 328.

‡ Greeley, "American Conflict," Vol. I., p. 328.

the 13th of February, 1861, the Congress of the United States in joint session made the official count, and declared that Abraham Lincoln, having received a majority of the votes of presidential electors, was duly elected President of the United States for four years, beginning March 4th, 1861.

One feature of the result must not be omitted. Many careless observers felt at the time that the success of Lincoln was due entirely to the fact of there having been three opposing candidates in the field; or, in other words, to the dissensions in the Democratic party, which divided its vote between Breckinridge and Douglas. What merely moral strength the Democratic party would have gained had it remained united, it is impossible to estimate. Such a supposition can only be based on the absence of the extreme Southern doctrines concerning slavery. Given the presence of those doctrines in the canvass, and no hypothesis can furnish a result different from that which occurred. In the contest upon the questions as they existed, the victory of Lincoln was certain. If all the votes given to all the opposing candidates had been concentrated and cast for a "fusion ticket," as was wholly or partly done in five States, the result would have been changed nowhere except in New Jersey, California, and Oregon; Lincoln would still have received but 11 less, or 169 electoral votes — a majority of 35 in the entire electoral college. It was a contest of ideas, not of persons or parties. The choice was not only free, but distinct and definite. The voter was not, as sometimes happens, compelled to an imperfect or partial expression of his will. The four platforms and candidates offered him an unusual variety of modes of political action. Among them the voters by undisputed constitutional majorities, in orderly, legal, and unquestioned proceedings, chose the candidate whose platform pronounced the positive and final popular verdict that slavery should not be extended, and whose election unchangeably transferred the balance of power to the free States.

BEGINNINGS OF REBELLION.

DISUNION was not a fungus of recent growth in American politics. Talk of disunion, threats of disunion, accusations of intentions of disunion, lie scattered rather plentifully through the political literature of the country from the very formation of the Government. In fact, the present Constitution of the United States was strenuously opposed by large political factions, and, it may almost be said, succeeded by only a hair's-breadth. That original opposition perpetuated itself in some degree in the form of doubts of its duration and prophecies of its failure. The same dissatisfaction and restlessness resulted in early and important amendments, but these did not satisfy all dissenters and doubters. Immediate and profound conflict of opinion sprang up over the administration and policy of the new Government; active political parties and hot discussion arose, the one side proclaiming that it was too strong, the other asserting that it was too weak, to endure.

Before public opinion was well consolidated, the war of 1812 produced new complaints and new opposition, out of which grew the famous Hartford Convention. It has been charged and denied, that this was a movement of disunion and rebellion. The exact fact is not important in our day; it is enough that it was a sign of deep political unrest and of shallow public faith. Passing by lesser manifestations of the same character, we come to the eventful nullification proceedings in South Carolina in the year 1832. Here was a formal legislative repudiation of Federal authority with a reserved threat of forcible resistance. At this point disunion was in full flower, and the terms nullification, secession, treason, rebellion, revolution, coercion, constitute the current political vocabulary. Take up a political speech of that period, change the names and dates, and the reader can easily imagine himself among the angry controversies of the winter of 1860.

Nullification was half-throttled by Jackson's proclamation, half-quieted by Clay's compromise. But from that time forward the phraseology and the spirit of disunion became a constant factor in congressional debate and legislation. In 1850, it broke out to an extent and with an intensity never before reached. This time it enveloped the whole country, and many of the wisest and best statesmen believed civil war at hand. The compromise measures of 1850 finally subdued the storm; but not till the serious beginning of a secession movement had been developed and put down, both by the general condemnation of the whole country, and the direct vote of a union majority in the localities where it took its rise.

Among these compromise acts of 1850 was the admission of California as a free State. The gold discoveries had suddenly filled it with population, making the usual probation as a Territory altogether needless. A considerable part of the State lay south of the line of 36°, 30′, and the pro-slavery extremists had demanded that it should be divided into two States — one to be a free, and the other to be a slave State — in order to preserve the political balance between the sections, in the United States Senate. This being refused, they not only violently opposed the compromise measures, but organized

a movement for resistance in South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi, demanding redress, and threatening secession if it were not accorded. A popular contest on this issue followed in 1851 in these States, in which the ultra-secession party was signally overthrown. It submitted sullenly to its defeat; leaving however, as always before, a considerable faction unsatisfied and implacable, only awaiting a new opportunity to start a new disturbance. This new opportunity arose in the slavery agitation, beginning with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, and ending with the election of Lincoln. During this six years' controversy, disunion was kept in the background because the pro-slavery party had constant and sanguine hopes of ultimate triumph. It did not despair of success until the actual election of Lincoln, on the 6th of November, 1860; consequently, even in the Southern States, as a rule, disunion was frowned upon till near the end of the presidential campaign, and only paraded as an evil to be feared, not to be desired.

This aspect, however, was superficial. Under the surface, a small but determined disunion conspiracy was actively at work. It has left but few historical traces; but in 1856 distinct evidence begins to crop out. There was a possibility, though not a probability, that Frémont might be elected President; and this contingency the conspirators proposed to utilize by beginning a rebellion. A letter from the governor of Virginia to the governors of Maryland and other States is sufficient proof of such an intent, even without the evidence of later history.

"RICHMOND, VA., Sept. 15th, 1856.

"DEAR SIR: Events are approaching which address themselves to your responsibilities and to mine as chief Executives of slave-holding States. Contingencies may soon happen which would require preparation for the worst of evils to the people. Ought we not to admonish ourselves by joint counsel of the extraordinary duties which may devolve upon us from the dangers which so palpably threaten our common peace and safety? When, how, or to what extent may we act, separately or unitedly, to ward off dangers if we can, to meet them most effectually if we must?

"I propose that, as early as convenient, the governors of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee shall assemble at Raleigh, N. C., for the purpose generally of consultation upon the state of the country, upon the best means of preserving its peace, and especially of protecting the honor and interests of the slave-holding States. I have addressed the States only having Democratic Executives, for obvious reasons.

"This should be done as early as possible before the presidential election, and I would suggest Monday, the 13th of October next. Will you please give me an early answer, and oblige,

"Yours most truly and respectfully,

"HENRY A. WISE.

"His Excellency Thomas W. Ligon,

"Governor of Maryland."

If any explanation were needed of the evident purpose of this letter, or of the proposed meeting, it may be found in the following from Senator Mason, of Virginia, to Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, who was at the time Secretary of War under President Pierce:

"SELMA, NEAR WINCHESTER, VA.,

"Sept. 30th, 1856.

"MY DEAR SIR: I have a letter from Wise, of the 27th, full of spirit. He says the governors of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana have already agreed to rendezvous at Raleigh, and others will — this in your most private ear. He says, further, that he had officially requested you to exchange with Virginia, on fair terms of difference, percussion for flint muskets. I don't know the usage or power of the department in such cases, but if it can be done, even by liberal construction, I hope you will accede. Was there not an appropriation at the last session for converting flint into percussion arms? If so, would it not furnish good reason for extending such facilities to the States? Virginia probably has more arms than the other Southern States, and would divide, in case of need. In a letter yesterday to a committee in South Carolina, I give it as my judgment, in the event of Frémont's election, the South should not pause, but proceed at once to 'immediate, absolute, and eternal separation.' So I am a candidate for the first halter.

"Wise says his accounts from Philadelphia are cheering for Old Buck in Pennsylvania. I hope they be not delusive. *Vale et Salute* [sic].

"J. M. MASON.

"Colonel Davis." *

In these letters we have an exact counterpart of the later and successful efforts of these identical conspirators conjointly with others, to initiate rebellion. When the Senatorial campaign of 1858 between Lincoln and Douglas was at its height, there was printed in the public journals of the Southern States the following extraordinary letter, which at once challenged the attention of the whole reading public of the country, and became known by the universal stigma of "The Scarlet Letter." In the light of after events it was both a revelation and a prophecy:

"MONTGOMERY, June 15th, 1858.

"DEAR SIR: Your kind favor of the 15th is received. I heartily agree with you that [no] general movement can be made that will clean out the Augean stable. If the Democracy were overthrown, it would result in giving place to a greater and hungrier swarm of flies.

"The remedy of the South is not in such a process. It is in a diligent organization of her true men for prompt resistance to the next aggression. It must come in the nature of things. No national party can save us; no sectional party can ever do it. But if we could do as our fathers did — organize 'committees of safety' all over the Cotton States (it is only in them that we can hope for any effective movement)— we shall fire the Southern heart, instruct the Southern mind, give courage to each other, and at the proper moment, by one organized concerted action, we can precipitate the Cotton States into a revolution.

"The idea has been shadowed forth in the South by Mr. Ruffin; has been taken up and recommended in the 'Advertiser' (published at Montgomery, Alabama), under the name of 'League of United Southern-

* Victor, "American Conspiracies," p. 520.

ers,' who, keeping up their old party relations on all other questions, will hold the Southern issue paramount, and will influence parties, legislatures, and statesmen. I have no time to enlarge, but to suggest merely. In haste, yours, etc.,

"WM. L. YANCEY.

"To James Slaughter, Esq." *

The writer of this "Scarlet Letter" had long been known to the country as a prominent politician of Alabama, affiliated with the Democratic party, having once represented a district of that State in Congress, and of late years the most active, pronounced, and conspicuous disunionist in the South. In so far as this publication concerned himself, it was no surprise to the public; but the project of an organized conspiracy had never before been broached with such matter-of-fact confidence.†

An almost universal condemnation by the public press reassured the startled country that the author of this revolutionary epistle was one of the confirmed fanatics who were known and admitted to exist in the South, but whose numbers, it was alleged, were too insignificant to excite the most distant apprehension.

The letter was everywhere copied, its author denounced, and his proposal to "precipitate the Cotton States into a revolution" held up to public execration. Mr. Yancey immediately printed a statement deploring the betrayal of personal confidence in the publication, and to modify ‡ the obnoxious declaration by a long and labored argument. But in the course of this explanation he furnished additional proof of the deep conspiracy disclosed by the "Scar-

* Quoted in Appendix to Globe for 1859-60, p. 313.

† As an evidence of the disunion sentiment combination which lay like smoldering embers under the surface of Southern politics, it is instructive to read a hitherto unpublished letter from Governor Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, to a gentleman in Philadelphia, for a copy of which we are indebted to General Duncan S. Walker. The other letter of Wise — previously quoted — shows us his part and interest in the proposed conspiracy against Frémont; but the erratic governor had, after the lapse of nearly two years, become an anti-Lecompton-Douglasite, and was ready to give confidential warning of designs with which he was only too familiar. As this was written nearly three weeks before Yancey's "Scarlet Letter," its concurrent testimony is of special significance:

"RICHMOND, VA., May 28th, 1858.

"TO WM. SERGEANT, ESQ.

"MY DEAR SIR: I write to you almost from a sick-bed. I am just up out of a two weeks' bedridden illness, and am very weak. Mr. Forney's letter does not surprise me, for the suggestions and queries are natural and necessary, and to me not at all offensive or disagreeable. Yet I would not go before the public at this time with such a correspondence as it calls for. The present aspect of politics is gloomy enough. It is well to define what it is. The *Kansas* question has not been the cause of a split in the Democratic party. It has only been the pretext for a development of dissension which previously existed. The truth is that there is in the South an organized, active, and dangerous faction, embracing most of the Federal politicians, who are bent upon bringing about causes of a dissolution of the Union. They desire a united South, but not a united country. Their hope of embodying a sectional antagonism is to secure a sectional defeat. At heart, they do not wish the Democracy to be any longer national, united, or successful. In the name of Democracy they propose to make a nomination for 1860, at Charleston; but an ultra nomination of an extremist; on the slavery issue alone; to unite the South on that one idea; and on that to have it defeated by a line of sectionalism which will inevitably draw swords between fanatics on one side and fire-eaters on the other. Bear it in mind, then, that they desire to control a nomination for no other purpose than to have it defeated by a line of sections. They desire defeat, for no other end than to make a pretext for the clamor of dissolution. This must be borne in mind in order to understand why it is that the argument of splitting the Democracy has not only no weight with them for desisting from their madness, but is the very stimulus which pricks them on to the extreme of designed defeat, so it be purely sectional. This you see is their only hope. What will be their scheme of action? To pack the Charleston Convention with fire-eating disunionists from the South, and with Lecompton Democrats of the North — to nominate a Southern Lecomptonite, purposely to be defeated by a sectional vote! The Administration don't or won't see this, and an Administration organization cannot prevent it, perhaps, if it did or would see it. What then? The only hope is in the anti-Lecomptonite Democrats, North and South. I have no doubt we can beat them on the Lecompton issue in Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Maryland. The Lecomptonites have in fact the pap-fed office-holders alone in the free States North and West, but they will send their whole force and ten times more to Charleston. What have our friends to do, then? Why, to adhere to the national Democracy, the Union-saving Democracy, to save Democracy itself from maladministration. We must claim our identity, and never let go the party. We must organize, and send all our forces to Charleston. The consequence will probably be that every Northern, Western, and Middle State will be split. They will be divided, and, like New York in the Cincinnati Convention, be neutralized and count nothing. Or the Lecomptonites will be counted entirely out. In either event, a minority, a combined Southern and office-holding minority, will nominate at Charleston. It will then be time enough for the anti-Lecomptonite Democrats to decide not to abide by a nomination so made. What, then, if they do not? Why, they may return to their respective States, appeal to the people who still abide a national platform, and still desire to preserve the Union, and, in their respective States, make their own nominations. This may save the North from absorption by black-Republicanism, may throw the election into the House of Representatives, and save the Union. I see no other course. The word now should be silent, quiet, active organization, with a preconcerted understanding as to ultimate action. Let us be earnestly conservative; maintain party relations until forced to separate action, and when forced, be prepared to save and not destroy the country and the party.

"This is crude, I know, but you may fill the skeleton with muscle and nerve. Show this to Mr. Forney as my general view, and beg him not to publish it at this time at all events.

"All are well except myself. Love to all.

"Yours truly, HENRY A. WISE." MS.

‡ "I am a secessionist and not a revolutionist, and would not 'precipitate' but carefully prepare to meet an inevitable dissolution." —Yancey to Pryor. "Richmond South," copied in "National Intelligencer," Sept. 4th, 1858.

let Letter." He made mention of "A well-considered Southern policy, a policy which has been digested, and understood, and approved by the ablest men in Virginia, as you yourselves must be aware," to the effect that while the Cotton States began rebellion, "Virginia and the other border States should remain in the Union," where, by their position and their counsels, they would form a protecting barrier to the proposed separation. "In the event of the movement being successful," he continued, "in time Virginia and the other border States that desired it could join the Southern Confederacy."

Less uncertainty than ordinary hung over the final issue of the presidential campaign of 1860. To popular apprehension the election of Lincoln became more and more probable. The active competition for votes by four presidential tickets greatly increased his chances of success; and the verdict of the October elections appeared to all sagacious politicians to render his choice a practical certainty. Sanguine partisans, however, clung tenaciously to their favorites, and continued to hope against hope, and work against fate. This circumstance produced a deplorable result in the South. Under the shadow of impending defeat the Democrats of the Cotton States made the final months of the canvass quite as much a threat against Lincoln as a plea for Breckinridge. This preaching of secession seemed to shallow minds harmless election buncombe; but when the contingency finally arrived, and the choice of Lincoln became a real event, they found themselves already in a measure pledged to resistance. They had vowed they would never submit; and now, with many, the mere pride of consistency moved them to adhere to an ill-considered declaration. The sting of defeat intensified their resentment, and in this irritated frame of mind the secession demagogues among them lured them on skillfully into the rising tide of revolution.

In proportion to her numbers, the State of South Carolina furnished the largest contingent to the faction of active conspirators; and to her, by a common consent, were accorded the dangers and honors of leadership. Since conspiracies work in secret, only fragmentary proofs of their efforts ever come to light. Though probably only one of the many early agencies in organizing the rebellion, the following circular reveals in a startling light what labor and system were employed to "fire the Southern heart" after the November election:

"CHARLESTON, Nov. 19th, 1860.

"EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, 'The 1860 Association.'

"In September last, several gentlemen of Charleston met to confer in reference to the position of the South in the event of the accession of Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party to power. This informal meeting was the origin of the organization known in this community as 'The 1860 Association.'

"The objects of the Association are:

"*First.* To conduct a correspondence with leading men in the South, and by an interchange of information and views prepare the slave States to meet the impending crisis.

"*Second.* To prepare, print, and distribute in the slave States, tracts, pamphlets, etc., designed to awaken them to a conviction of their danger, and to urge the necessity of resisting Northern and Federal aggression.

"*Third.* To inquire into the defenses of the State, and to collect and arrange information which may aid the Legislature to establish promptly an effective military organization.

"To effect these objects a brief and simple Constitution was adopted, creating a President, a Secretary, and Treasurer, and an Executive Committee, specially charged with conducting the business of the Association. One hundred and sixty-six thousand pamphlets have been published, and demands for further supplies are received from every quarter. The Association is now passing several of them through a second and third edition.

"The conventions in several of the Southern States will soon be elected. The North is preparing to soothe and conciliate the South by disclaimers and overtures. The success of this policy would be disastrous to the cause of Southern Union and Independence, and it is necessary to resist and defeat it. The Association is preparing pamphlets with this special object. Funds are necessary to enable it to act promptly. 'The 1860 Association' is laboring for the South, and asks your aid.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"ROBERT N. GOURDIN,

"Chairman of the Executive Committee." *

The half-public endeavors of "The 1860 Association" to create public sentiment were vigorously seconded by the efforts of high official personages to set on foot concerted official action in aid of disunion. In this also, with becoming expressions of modesty, South Carolina took the initiative. On the 5th of October, Governor Gist wrote a confidential letter,† which he dispatched by a secret

* Victor, "History of Southern Rebellion," Vol. I., p. 203.

† "EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

"UNIONVILLE, So. Ca., Oct. 5th, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR MOORE.

"DEAR SIR: The great probability, nay almost certainty of Abram Lincoln's election to the Presidency, renders it important that there should be a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Southern, and more especially the Cotton States, and while I unreservedly give you my views and the probable action of my State, I shall be much pleased to hear from you; that there may be concert of action, which is so essential to success. Although I will consider your communication confidential, and wish you so to consider mine so far as publishing in the newspapers is concerned, yet the information of course will be of no service to me unless I can submit it to reliable and leading men in consultation for the safety of our State and the South; and will only use it in this way. It is the desire of South Carolina that some other State should take the lead, or at least move simultaneously with her. She will unquestionably call a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors will support Lincoln. If a single State secedes, she will follow her. If no other State takes the lead, South

agent to his colleagues, the several governors of the Cotton States, whom the bearer, General S. R. Gist, visited in turn during that month of October. Governor Gist wrote that, in view of the almost certain election of Lincoln, it became important to have a full and free interchange of opinion between the Southern States, that concert of action might be obtained. It was the desire of South Carolina that some other State should take the lead. She would unquestionably call a convention. "If a single State secedes, she will follow her. If no other State takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful."

The responses to this inquiry given by the Executives of the other Cotton States were not all that so ardent a disunionist could have wished, but were yet sufficient to prompt him to a further advance. The adjoining State of North Carolina was first to reply.* "Our people are very far from being agreed as to what action the State should take," wrote Governor Ellis; "some favor submission, some resistance." He intimated that no convention would be called, and that the State would not secede, but on the other hand added, "I do not think North Carolina would become a party to coercion." Louisiana sent an equally lukewarm answer.† Governor Moore said, while he believed in the right of secession for just cause, he would not advise it, and did not

Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States; otherwise it is doubtful. If you decide to call a convention upon the election of a majority of Electors favorable to Lincoln, I desire to know the day you propose for the meeting, that we may call our convention to meet the same day if possible. If your State will propose any other remedy, please inform me what it will probably be, and any other information you will be pleased to give me.

"With great respect and consideration,

"I am yours, etc., WM. H. GIST.

"Governor Thos. O. Moore." MS.

* "EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

"RALEIGH, N. C., Oct. 18th, 1860.

"DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 5th, which reached me on the 12th inst.

"In compliance with your request, I will give as accurately as it is in my power to do the views and feelings of the people of North Carolina upon the important subject of your communication.

"Political differences and party strife have run so high in this State for some years past, and particularly during the past nine months, that anything like unanimity upon any question of a public nature could scarcely be expected; and such is the case with the one under consideration. Our people are very far from being agreed as to what action the State should take in the event of Lincoln's election to the Presidency. Some favor submission, some resistance, and others still would await the course of events that might follow. Many argue that he would be powerless for evil with a minority party in the Senate, and perhaps in the House of Representatives also; while others say, and doubtless with entire sincerity, that the placing of the power of the Federal Government into his hands would prove a fatal blow to the institution of negro slavery in this country.

"None of our public speakers I believe have taken the ground before the people that the election of Lincoln would, of itself, be a cause of secession. Many have said it would not, while others have spoken equivocally.

"Upon the whole I am decidedly of opinion that a majority of our people would not consider the occurrence of the event referred to as sufficient ground for dissolving the union of the States. For which reason I do not suppose that our Legislature, which will meet on the 19th prox., will take any steps in that direction — such for instance as the calling of a convention.

"Thus, sir, I have given you what I conceive to be the sentiment of our people upon the subject of your letter, and I give it as an existing fact, without comment as to whether the majority be in error or not.

"My own opinions, as an individual, are of little moment. It will be sufficient to say, that as a States Rights man, believing in the sovereignty and reserved powers of the States, I will conform my actions to the action of North Carolina, whatever that may be. To this general observation I will make but a single qualification — it is this: I could not in any event assent to, or give my aid to a political enforcement of the monstrous doctrine of coercion. I do not for a moment think that North Carolina would become a party to the enforcement of this doctrine, and will not therefore do her the injustice of placing her in that position, even though hypothetically.

"With much respect, I have the honor to be,

"Your obt. servt.,

"JOHN W. ELLIS.

"His Excellency William H. Gist,

"Governor of So. Carolina." MS.

† "ALEXANDRIA, LA., 26th October, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR GIST.

"DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 5th inst. was received a few days ago at this place. I regret my inability to consult with as many of our leading citizens as I wished, but I will not delay in replying any longer. You will [of course] consider my letter as private, except for use in consultation with friends.

"I shall not call a convention in this State if Lincoln is elected, because I have no power or authority to do so. I infer from your letter that an authority has been vested in you by your Legislature to call a convention in a specified contingency. Our Legislature has taken no action of that or any similar kind. That body will meet in regular annual session about the middle of January; but it is not improbable that I may consider it necessary to convene it at an earlier day, if the complexion of the Electoral Colleges shall indicate the election of Lincoln.

"Even if that deplorable event shall be the result of the coming election, I shall not advise the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course. I shall recommend that Louisiana meet her sister slave-holding States in council to consult as to the proper course to be pursued, and to endeavor to effect a complete harmony of action. I fear that this harmony of action, so desirable in so grave an emergency, cannot be effected. Some of the Cotton States will pursue a more radical policy than will be palatable to the border States, but this only increases the necessity of convening the consultative body of which I have spoken. I believe in the right of secession for

think the people of Louisiana would ultimately decide in favor of that course. The answer of Mississippi was a little more radical.* Governor Pettus replied that both politicians and people seemed willing to do anything to prevent that State from passing under the Black Republican yoke. He thought Mississippi would call a council of the Southern States, and if that council should advise secession, she would go with them. Mississippi would not move alone, but if any State moved, she would go with her. Georgia hung in a more uncertain balance. † Governor Brown answered he had no doubt Georgia would determine her action by a convention; that he favored retaliatory legislation, and thought the people would be inclined to wait for an overt act. Alabama, her governor replied,‡ did not con-

just cause, of which the sovereignty must itself be the judge. If therefore the General Government shall attempt to coerce a State, and forcibly attempt the exercise of this right, I should certainly sustain the State in such a contest.

"There has never been any indication made by Louisiana, or by any public body within her limits, of her probable course in the event of an election of a Black Republican President, and she is totally unprepared for any warlike measures. Her arsenals are empty. While some of her sister States have been preparing for an emergency, which I fear is now imminent, she has been negligent in this important matter.

"If coming events should render necessary the convocation of the Southern Convention, I shall endeavor to compose the representation of Louisiana of her ablest and most prudent men, if the power shall be vested in me to appoint them. However, I presume the Legislature will adopt some other course in the appointments. The recommendations of such a body assembled in such a crisis must necessarily carry great weight, and if subsequently ratified and adopted by each State by proper authority, will present the South in united and harmonious action.

"I have the honor to be your Excellency's obt. servt.,

"THOS. O. MOORE." MS.

*"MACON, Oct. 26th, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. GIST.

"DEAR SIR: Your letter of Oct. 5th was handed me by General Gist. Having but few moments to reply, I write this more to acknowledge its receipt than to reply to its contents. Our friends in this State are willing to do anything they may have the power to do to prevent the State from passing under the Black Republican yoke. Our people know this, and seem to approve such sentiments, yet I do not believe Mississippi can move alone.

"I will call our Legislature in extra session as soon as it is known that the Black Republicans have carried the election. I expect Mississippi will ask a council of the Southern States, and if that council advise secession, Mississippi will go with them. If any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her. I will write at length from Jackson.

"Yours respectfully,

"JOHN J. PETTUS." MS.

†"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

"MILLEDGEVILLE, GA., Oct. 31st, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY W. H. GIST.

"DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor by the hand of General Gist, with whom I have had a free interchange of opinions. In the event of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency I have no doubt that Georgia will determine her action by a convention of the people, which will probably be held before the 4th day of March next. Her legislature, which convenes here next Wednesday, will have to determine on the time when the convention shall be held. My opinion is that the people of Georgia will, in case of the election of Lincoln, decide to meet all the Southern States in convention and take common action for the protection of the rights of all. Events not yet foreseen may change their course and might lead to action on the part of Georgia without waiting for all the Southern States, if it should be found necessary to her safety. I have handed General Gist a copy of my message on our federal relations, which will be sent to our legislature on the first day of the session. I send only the forms from the press as it is just being put in type. I may make some immaterial alterations before it is completed. If your State remains in the Union, I should be pleased that she would adopt such retaliatory measures as I recommend in the message, or others which you may determine to be more appropriate. I think Georgia will pass retaliatory laws similar to those I recommend, should Lincoln be defeated. Should the question be submitted to the people of Georgia, whether they would go out of the Union on Lincoln's election without regard to the action of other Sates, my opinion is they would determine to wait for an overt act. The action of other States may greatly influence the action of the people of this State. This letter is not intended for publication in the newspapers, and has been very hastily prepared.

"I have the honor to be your Excellency's

"Obt. servt.,

"JOSEPH E. BROWN." MS.

‡"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., Oct. 25th, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY W. H. GIST.

"DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 5th inst. was handed me a few days since by General Gist. I fully concur with you in the opinion that Lincoln will be elected President, and that a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Southern States, and especially of the Cotton States, should be had as to what ought to be done and what will be done by them to protect the interest and honor of the slave-holding States in the event he should be elected.

"My opinion is, that the election of Lincoln alone is not sufficient cause for a dissolution of the Union; but that fact, when taken in connection with the avowed objects and intentions of the party whose candidate he is, and the overt acts already committed by that party in nullifying the fugitive-slave law, and the enactment of personal liberty bills in many of the non-slave-holding States, with other acts of like kind, is sufficient cause for dissolving every tie which binds the Southern States to the Union.

"It is my opinion that Alabama will not secede alone, but if two or more States will coöperate with her, she will secede with them; or if South Carolina or any other Southern State should go out alone and the Federal Government should attempt to use force against her, Alabama will immediately rally to her rescue.

"The opinions above expressed are predicated upon observation and consultation with a number of our most distinguished statesmen. The opinion thus expressed is not intended as a positive assurance, but is my best impression as to what will be the course of Alabama. Should Lincoln be elected, I shall certainly call a convention under the provisions of the resolutions of the last General Assembly of the State. The convention cannot be convened earlier than the first

sider the election of Lincoln in itself sufficient cause for disunion; but, taken in connection with other objects and acts of the North, it was. In his opinion she would not secede alone, but would coöperate with two or more Southern States; or would rally to the aid of South Carolina in resisting coercion. He intended calling a convention as soon as practicable. Florida, though the last to respond, was loudest in her eagerness to embark in the revolt.* Governor Perry wrote: "Florida is ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States in any course which she or they may in their judgment think proper to adopt." He suggested that she might be unwilling to lead off, but would most assuredly coöperate or follow the lead of any single Cotton State.

Two agencies have thus far been described as engaged in the work of fomenting the rebellion: the first, secret societies of individuals, like "The 1860 Association," designed to excite the masses and create public sentiment; the second, a secret league of Southern governors and other State functionaries, whose mission it became to employ the governmental machinery of States, in furtherance of the plot. These, though formidable and dangerous, would probably have failed, either singly or combined, had they not been assisted by a third of still greater efficacy and certainty. This was nothing less than a conspiracy in the very bosom of the National Administration at Washington, embracing many United States Senators, Representatives in Congress, three members of the President's Cabinet, and numerous subordinate officials in the several Executive departments. The special work which this powerful central cabal undertook by common consent, and successfully accomplished, was to divert Federal arms and forts to the use of the rebellion, and to protect and shield the revolt from any adverse influence, or preventive or destructive action of the General Government.

Monday in February next, and I have fixed upon that day (in my own mind). The vote of the electors will be cast for President on the 5th day of December, after which it will require a few days to ascertain the result. Thirty days' notice will have to be given after the day upon which the delegates to the convention will be elected, and the convention is required to convene in two weeks after the election. This is not a matter of discretion with me, but is fixed by law. I regret that earlier action cannot be had, as it may be a matter of much importance that all the States that may determine to withdraw from the Union should act before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of service.

"The facts and opinions herein communicated you are at liberty to make known to those with whom you may choose to confer, but they are not to be published in the newspapers.

"I have had a full and free conversation with General Gist, the substance of which is contained in this letter. He will, however, give it to you more in detail. It is ny opinion that all the States that may determine to take action upon the election of Lincoln should call a convention as soon as practicable after the result is known. With great respect, your obt. servt.

"A. B. MOORE." MS.

* "EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Nov. 9th, 1860.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. GIST.

"DEAR SIR: Your communication of the 5th ultimo reached me per last mail under cover from General States Rights Gist, with an explanatory note from that gentleman in relation to the subject-matters thereof.

"The mode employed by your Excellency to collect authoritatively the views of several of the Executives of the Southern States as to their plan of action in the event of the election of Lincoln, commends itself warmly to my judgment. Concert of action can alone be arrived at by a full and free interchange of opinion between the Executives of the Cotton States, by whom it is confidently expected that the ball will be put in motion.

"We are in the midst of grave events, and I have industriously sought to learn the public mind in this State in the event of the election of Lincoln, and am proud to say Florida is ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States in any course which she or they may in their judgment think proper to adopt, looking to the vindication and maintenance of the rights, interests, honor, and safety of the South. Florida may be unwilling to subject herself to the charge of temerity or immodesty by leading off, but will most assuredly coöperate with or follow the lead of any single Cotton State which may secede. Whatever doubts I may have entertained upon this subject have been entirely dissipated by the recent elections in this State.

"Florida will most unquestionably call a convention as soon as it is ascertained that a majority of the electors favor the election of Lincoln, to meet most likely upon a day to be suggested by some other State.

"I leave to-day for the capital, and will write you soon after my arrival, but would be pleased in the mean time to hear from you at your earliest convenience.

"If there is sufficient manliness at the South to strike for our rights, honor, and safety, in God's name let it be done before the inauguration of Lincoln.

"With high regard, I am yours, etc.,

"M. S. PERRY.

"Direct to Tallahassee.

"P. S. I have written General Gist at Union C. H." MS.



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[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE SECESSION MOVEMENT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE CABINET CABAL.

VERY soon after the effort to unite the cotton-State governors in the revolutionary plot, we find the local conspiracy at Charleston in communication with the central cabal at Washington. It is necessary to bear in mind that at the time of which we write, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania was still President of the United States, and that his Cabinet consisted of the following members: Lewis Cass of Michigan, Secretary of State; Howell Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury; John B. Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of War; Isaac Toucey of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy; Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior; Joseph Holt of Kentucky, Postmaster-General; and Jeremiah S. Black of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General. It was in and about this Cabinet that the central secession cabal formed itself. Even if we could know in detail the successive steps that led to the establishment of this intercourse, which so quickly became "both semi-official and confidential," it could add nothing to the force of the principal fact that the conspiracy was in its earliest stages efficient in perverting the resources and instrumentalities of the Government of the United States to its destruction. That a United States Senator, a Secretary of War, an Assistant Secretary of State, and no doubt sundry minor functionaries were already then, from six to eight weeks before any pretense of secession, with "malice aforethought" organizing armed resistance to the Constitution and laws they had sworn to support, stands forth in the following correspondence too plainly to be misunderstood. As a fitting preface to this correspondence, a few short paragraphs may be quoted from the private diary of Secretary of War Floyd, from which longer and more important extracts appear in a subsequent chapter. Those at present quoted are designed more especially to show the names of the persons composing the primary group of this central cabal, and the time and place of their early consultations and activity.

EXTRACTS FROM FLOYD'S DIARY.*

"November 8th, 1860. . . . I had a long conversation to-day with General Lane, the candidate for Vice-President on the ticket with Mr. Breckinridge. He was grave and extremely earnest; said that resistance to the anti-slavery feeling of the North was hopeless, and that nothing was left to the South but 'resistance or dishonor'; that if the South failed to act with promptness and decision in vindication of her rights, she would have to make up her mind to give up first her honor and then her slaves. He thought disunion inevitable, and said when the hour came that his services could be useful, he would offer them unhesitatingly to the South. I called to see the President this evening, but found him at the State Department engaged upon his message and did not see him. Miss Lane returned last evening from Philadelphia, where she had been for some time on a visit. Mr. W. H. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State, called to see me this evening, and conversed at length upon the condition of things in South Carolina, of which State he is a native. He expressed no sort of doubt whatever of his State separating from the Union. He brought me a letter from Mr. Drayton, the agent of the State, proposing to buy ten thousand muskets for the use of the State. . . .

"November 10th. . . . Beach, Thompson, and Cobb came over with me from Cabinet and staid, taking informally a family dinner. The party was free and communicative; Toucey would not stay for dinner. Mr. Pickens, late Minister to Russia, came in after dinner with Mr. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State, and sat an hour, talking about the distracted state of public feeling at the South. He seemed to think the time had come for decisive measures to be taken by the South.

"November 11th. I spent an hour at the President's, where I met Thompson, Robert McGraw, and some others; we sat around the tea-table, and discussed the disunion movements of the South. This seems to be the absorbing topic everywhere.

"November 12th. Dispatched the ordinary business of the department; dined at 5 o'clock; Mr. Pickens, late Minister to Russia, Mr. Trescott, Mr. Secretary Thompson, Mr. McGraw, Mr. Browne, editor of the 'Constitution,' were of the party. The chief topic of discussion was, as usual, the excitement in the South. The belief seemed to be that disunion was inevitable; Pickens, usually very cool and conservative, was excited and warm. My own conservatism seems in these discussions to be unusual and almost misplaced."

TRESCOTT TO RHETT.

"WASHINGTON, Nov. 1st, 1860.

"DEAR RHETT: I received your letter this morning. As to my views or opinions of the Administration, I can, of course, say nothing. As to Mr. Cobb's views, he is willing that I should communicate them to you, in order that they may aid you in forming your own

* Printed on pages 791 to 794 in "The Life and Times of Robert E. Lee," etc. By a distinguished Southern journalist. (E. A. Pollard, author of "The Lost Cause.")

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judgment; but, you will understand that this is confidential — that is, neither Mr. Cobb nor myself must be quoted as the source of your information. I will not dwell on this, as you will, on a moment's reflection, see the embarrassments which might be produced by any *authorized* statement of his opinions. I will only add, by way of preface, that after the very fullest and freest conversations with him, I feel sure of his earnestness, singleness of purpose, and resolution in the whole matter.

"Mr. Cobb believes that the time is come for resistance; that upon the election of Lincoln, Georgia ought to secede from the Union, and that she will do so; that Georgia and every other State should, as far as secession, act for herself, resuming her delegated powers, and thus put herself in position to consult with other sovereign States who take the same ground. After the secession is effected, then will be the time to consult. But he is of opinion, most strongly, that whatever action is resolved on should be consummated on the 4th of March, not before.

"That while the action determined on should be decisive and irrevocable, its initial should be the 4th of March. He is opposed to any Southern convention, merely for the purpose of consultation. If a Southern convention is held, it must be of delegates empowered to *act*, whose action is at once binding on the States they represent.

"But he desires me to impress upon you his conviction, that any attempt to precipitate the actual issue upon this Administration will be most mischievous — calculated to produce differences of opinion and destroy unanimity. He thinks it of great importance that the cotton crop should go forward at once, and that the money should be in the hands of the people, that the cry of popular distress shall not be heard at the outset of this move.

"My own opinion is that it would be well to have a discreet man, one who knows the value of silence, who can listen wisely, present in Milledgeville, at the meeting of the State Legislature, as there will be there an outside gathering of the very ablest men of that State.

"And the next point, that pou should, at the earliest possible day of the session of our own Legislature, elect a man as governor whose name and character will conciliate as well as give confidence to all the men of the State,— if we do act, I really think this half the battle,— a man upon whose temper the State can rely.

"I say nothing about a convention, as I understand, on all hands, that that is a fixed fact, and I have confined myself to answering your question. I will be much obliged to you if you will write me soon and fully from Columbia.

"It is impossible to write you, with the constant interruption of the office, and as you want Cobb's opinions, not mine, I send this to you. Yours,

"W. H. T." *

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"CHARLESTON, 3d Nov., 1860.

"On the 22d of last month I was in Washington, and called upon the Secretary at War, in company with Senator Wigfall of Texas, to make inquiries as to the efficiency and price of certain muskets belonging to the United States, which had been altered by the Ordnance Department from flint to percussion. They will shoot for 200 yards as well as any smooth-bored gun in the service, and if *rifled* will be effective at 500 yards. But if the conical ball will be made lighter by enlarging the hollow at the base of the cone, the effective range may be increased to 700 yards. Should your Excellency give a favorable consideration to the above, I can have the whole of what I have stated authenticated by the board of ordnance officers, who inspected and reported to the Secretary at War upon these muskets. If 10,000 or more of these muskets are purchased, the price will be two ($2) dollars each; for a less quantity the charge will be $2.50 each. If a portion or all of them are to be rifled, the Secretary says he will have it done for the additional cost of ($1) one dollar per barrel. As this interview with Mr. Secretary Floyd was both semi-official and confidential, your Excellency will readily see the necessity, should this matter be pursued further, of appointing an agent to negotiate with him, rather than conduct the negotiation directly between the State and the Department. . . . I unhesitatingly advise purchasing several thousand of them. . . . There are many other important facts in connection with the above that I could disclose, but will reserve them for some other occasion, that I may give them verbally as soon as I can find a day to wait upon your Excellency in Columbia.

"The State of Texas has engaged twenty thousand (20,000) of these muskets, and the State of Kentucky purchased several thousand last summer." †

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"CHARLESTON, 6th Nov., 1860.

"I have only within a few hours received yours of the 5th inst., authorizing me to purchase from the War Department at Washington 10,000 rifles of pattern and price indicated in my letter to your Excellency of the 3d inst.

"I accept the appointment and will discharge the duty assigned to the best of my ability and with the least possible delay. For I feel that the past and present agitation are ruinous to our peace and prosperity and that our only remedy is to break up with dispatch the present Confederacy and construct a new and better one. I will communicate with Mr. Secretary Floyd to-night and have the rifles put in preparation so as to have them for use at an early day. . . .

"I would wish that my agency in this transaction be kept private *until I reach Washington*, or indeed till I write to say the arms are on their way to Columbia. . . ." †

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"CHARLESTON, 8th Nov., 1860.

"I have just received your letter of the 7th inst., and I think I can render you all the information you desire, without resorting to any agent. If my ability can only be made to keep pace with my zeal, I hope yet to render some service to the dear old State of South Carolina." †

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"CHARLESTON, 16th Nov., 1860.

"I have been most reluctantly detained here by an accidental fall, and also by business of an urgent kind associated with the railroad. My absence from Washington, however, has not delayed the execution of your order for the rifles: the Secretary of War has had the preparation of them in hand for some time.

"When I write to you from Washington, had I not better address you through your private secretary . . . Please address me at Washington to the care of Wm. H. Trescott, Esq. . . . I will give strict attention to your letter of the 7th inst., and hope to furnish you with much of the information you desire, for I am quite sensible of the importance of knowing the views and policy of the President at this juncture." †

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"WASHINGTON, 19th Nov., 1860.

". . . . I called this morning upon the Secretary of War to make arrangements for the immediate trans-

* Lossing, "Civil War." Vol. I., p. 44.

† MS. Confederate Archives, War Department.

mission of the rifles to Columbia, but much to my astonishment he informed me that since he had looked over the report of "Small Fire-arms" (now inclosed) that he found he had labored under an error in stating to me that the 10,000 rifles I had engaged were ready for delivery when called for by me. He said he could have them rifled, but it would take 3 or 4 months to execute the contract, but suggested that we should purchase the 10,000 smooth-bored muskets instead, as a more efficient arm, particularly if large-sized buckshot should be used, which, put up in wire case capable of containing 12 of them, would go spitefully through an inch plank at 200 yards. I was much astonished at the result of my interview with Governor Floyd to-day, for he had not only informed me that the rifles would be ready for me on my arrival, but told Mr. Trescott so likewise, and that if I had been in Washington last Saturday I could have got them. . . . If you will be satisfied with the smooth-bored muskets like the specimen forwarded to you, I will purchase them. Better do this, although not the best pattern, than be without arms at a crisis like the present. Colonel Benjamin Huger can give you much information about these muskets. This is derived not only from Mr. Floyd, but also from General J. E. Johnston, Quartermaster-General, who was President of the Ordnance Board who had these muskets changed from flint to percussion, and also from smooth bore to rifle, and he says that for our purposes the smooth-bored musket is preferable to the altered rifle. The why I cannot explain to-day. . . . I also send you a letter from Mr. Trescott, in reply to certain inquiries from me. I am unable to make any comments upon them nor to add other facts which I will forward you more leisurely to-morrow. . . ." *

TRESCOTT (ASST. SEC. STATE) TO DRAYTON.

"WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 1860.

"(Private, Confidential.)

"MY DEAR DRAYTON: It is difficult to reply specifically to your inquiries, partly because I do not believe that the exact course of the Administration has been yet determined on, and partly because my knowledge, or rather my inference, of its intentions is derived from intercourse with its members which I am bound to consider confidential. I do not regard it of serious importance to you to know the individual opinions of either the President or the Cabinet. No action of any sort will be taken until the message has been sent indicating the opinions of the Executive, and that message, whatever it be, will find our legislature in session, and the convention on the point of meeting. I think it likely that the President will state forcibly what he considers the grievances of the South, that he will add that he does not think, if the right of secession existed, it would be a wise policy for the State to adopt, and that he does *not* think the right to secede does exist, and then refer the whole matter to Congress; what he will do when the State does secede, he has not said, and I do not know, nor any man, I believe. He will do, as we will, what he believes to be his duty, and that duty, I suppose, will be discharged in full view of the consequences following any line of action that may be determined on. But I think that, as long as Cobb and Thompson retain seats in the Cabinet, you may feel confident that no action has been taken which seriously affects the position of any Southern State.

"I think that I may safely rely upon my knowledge of what will be done, and you may rely upon my resignation as soon as that knowledge satisfies me of any move in a direction positively injurious to us, or altering the present condition of things to our disadvantage. When you pass through on Wednesday, however, I will speak to you more fully. Yours, W. H. T." *

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"WASHINGTON, 19th Nov., 1860.

"Mr. Buchanan, while he can discover no authority under the Constitution to justify secession by a State, on the other hand he can find no power to coerce one to return after the right of secession has been exercised. He will not allow entry or clearance of a vessel except through the Custom-house, to be established as soon as secession is declared, upon the deck of a man-of-war off the harbor of Charleston. He will enforce the collection of duties, not by Navy, but by a Revenue Cutter, as our Collector now would do if his authority was resisted. I will write to you more fully when I return from New York, where I go to-morrow at daylight, at the suggestion of the Secretary of War, who deems it important that I should go there to make arrangements for shipping the arms (should you still want them) from that point instead of this city. . . . Do send a copy of the list of arms at the Arsenals to H. R. Lawton, Milledgeville, Ga. I am getting some smooth-bored muskets for Georgia, like the specimen I sent you. . . ."

THOS. F. DRAYTON TO GOVERNOR GIST.

"WASHINGTON, 23d Nov., 1860.

"I arrived here at 6 A. M. from New York, where I had gone at the suggestion of Mr. Floyd to engage Mr. G. B. Lamar, President of the Bank of the Republic, to make an offer to the Secretary for such a number of muskets as we might require. The Secretary at War was reluctant to dispose of them to me, preferring the intermediate agency. Mr. Lamar has consented to act accordingly, and to-day the Secretary has written to the commanding officer [at] Watervliet Arsenal to deliver five or ten thousand muskets (altered from flint to percussion) to Mr. Lamar's order. Mr. Lamar will pay the United States paymaster for them, and rely upon the State to repay him. I have been most fortunate in having been enabled to meet the payments for the arms through Mr. L., for I feel satisfied that without his intervention we could not have effected the purchase at this time. . . . I expect to return at daylight to-morrow to New York, for I am very anxious about getting possession of the arms at Watervliet, and forward them to Charleston. The Cabinet may break up at any moment, on differences of opinion with the President as to the rights of secession, and a new Secretary of War might stop the muskets going South, if not already on their way when he comes into office.

"I will write to you again by the next mail. The impression here and elsewhere among many Southern men is, that our senators have been precipitate in resigning; they think that their resignations should have been tendered from their seats after they had announced to the Senate that the State had seceded. Occupying their seats up to this period would have kept them in communication with senators from the South and assisted very powerfully in shaping to our advantage coming events." *

If any further quotation be necessary to show the audacity with which at least three Secretaries and one Assistant Secretary of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet engaged in flagrant conspiracy in the early stages of rebellion, it may be found in an interview of Senator Clingman with the Secretary of the Interior, which the former has recorded in his speeches and writings as an interesting reminiscence. It may be doubted whether Secretary Thompson correctly reported the President as wishing him success in his North Carolina mission,

* MS. Confederate Archives, War Department.

but he is, of course, a competent witness to his own declarations and acts.

"About the middle of December (1860) I had occasion to see the Secretary of the Interior on some official business. On my entering the room, Mr. Thompson said to me, 'Clingman, I am glad you have called, for I intended presently to go up to the Senate to see you. I have been appointed a commissioner by the State of Mississippi to go down to North Carolina to get your State to secede, and I wished to talk with you about your Legislature before I start down in the morning to Raleigh, and to learn what you think of my chance of success.' I said to him, 'I did not know that you had resigned.' He answered, 'Oh, no, I have not resigned.' 'Then,' I replied, 'I suppose you resign in the morning.' 'No,' he answered, 'I do not intend to resign, for Mr. Buchanan wished us all to hold on, and to go out with him on the 4th of March.' 'But,' said I, 'does Mr. Buchanan know for what purpose you are going to North Carolina?' 'Certainly,' he said, 'he knows my object.' Being surprised by this statement, I told Mr. Thompson that Mr. Buchanan was probably so much perplexed by his situation that he had not fully considered the matter, and that as he was already involved in difficulty, we ought not to add to his burdens; and then suggested to Mr. Thompson that he had better see Mr. Buchanan again, and by way of inducing him to think the matter over, mention what I had been saying to him. Mr. Thompson said, 'Well, I can do so, but I think he fully understands it.' In the evening I met Mr. Thompson at a small social party, and as soon as I approached him, he said, 'I knew I could not be mistaken. I told Mr. Buchanan all you said, and he told me that he wished me to go, and hoped I might succeed.' I could not help exclaiming, 'Was there ever before any potentate who sent out his own Cabinet ministers to excite an insurrection against his government!' The fact that Mr. Thompson did go on the errand, and had a public reception before the Legislature, and returned to his position in the Cabinet is known, but this incident serves to recall it." *

To this sketch of the Cabinet cabal it is necessary to add the testimony of his participation, by one who, from first to last, was a principal and controlling actor. Jefferson Davis records that:

"In November, 1860, after the result of the presidential election was known, the governor of Mississippi, having issued his proclamation convoking a special session of the Legislature to consider the propriety of calling a convention, invited the senators and representatives of the State of Congress, to meet him for consultation as to the character of the message he should send to the Legislature when assembled. While engaged in the consultation with the governor just referred to, a telegraphic message was handed to me from two members of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, urging me to proceed 'immediately' to Washington. This dispatch was laid before the governor and the members of Congress from the State who were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should comply with the summons. On arrival at Washington, I found, as had been anticipated, that my presence there was desired on account of the influence which it was supposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) in relation to his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respects to the President, he told me that he had finished the rough draft of his message, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, and that he would like to read it to me. He did so and very kindly accepted all the modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterward somewhat changed." †

Here is a substantial unmasking of the combined occult influence which presided over the initiatory steps of the great American Rebellion — its central council — the master wheel of its machinery — and the connecting relation which caused all its subordinate parts to move in harmonious accord.

With the same mind to dictate a secession message to a legislature and a non-coercion message to Congress — to assemble insurrectionary troops to seize Federal forts and withhold government troops from their protection — to incite governors to rebellion and overawe a weak President to a virtual abdication of his rightful authority, history need not wonder at the surprising unity and early success of the conspiracy against the Union.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

Less than a month intervened between the November election at which Lincoln had been chosen and the annual session of Congress, which would meet on the first Monday of December, and it was necessary at once to begin the preparation of the annual message. Now indeed a golden opportunity presented itself to President Buchanan. The suffrages of his fellow-citizens had covered his political theories, his party measures, and his official administration with condemnation, in a perfect avalanche of ballots.‡ But the Charleston conspirators had within a very few days created for him a new issue overshadowing all the questions on which he had suffered political wreck. Since the 6th of November, the campaign of the Border Ruffians for the conquest of Kansas, and the wider congressional struggle for the possession of the Territories, might be treated as things of the past. Even had they still been pending issues, they paled into insignificance before the paramount question of disunion. Face to face with this danger, the adherents of Lincoln, of Douglas, of Bell, and the fraction of his own partisans in the free States would be compelled to sink minor discords, and as one man to follow the constitutional ruler in a constitutional defense of the laws, the flag, and the territory of the Union.

Without change of position, without recantation of principle, without abatement even of declared party doctrine, honestly executing

* "Speeches and Writings of T. L. Clingman," p. 526.

† Davis: "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," pages 57, 58, 59.

‡ 3,832,240 opposition popular votes against 847,953 for Breckinridge, the candidate championed by the President and his adherents.

only the high mandate of the Constitution, he could turn from the old issues and take up the new. A single stride, and from the flying leader of a discomfited rout, he might become the mailed hero of an overpowering host. Tradition, patriotism, duty, the sleepless monition of a solemn official oath, — all summoned him to take this step, and a brilliant precedent in presidential annals, an incident forever luminous in American history, assured him of the plaudits of posterity.

Unfortunately for himself and for his country, President Buchanan had neither the intellectual independence nor the courage equal to such an act of moral heroism. Of sincere patriotism and of blameless personal rectitude, he had reached political eminence by slow promotion through seniority, not by brilliancy of achievement. He was a politician, not a statesman. Of fair ability and great industry in his earlier life, the irresolution and passiveness of advancing age and physical infirmity were now upon him. Though from the great free State of Pennsylvania, he saw with Southern eyes and heard with Southern ears, and had convinced himself that the South was acting under the impulse of resentment arising from deliberate and persistent injuries from the North.

The fragment of an autograph diary from the pen of John B. Floyd, Secretary of War,* affords the exact evidence of the temper in which President Buchanan officially confronted the rebellion of the Southern States. The following are extracts from entries, on several days, beginning with November 7th, 1860, the day following the presidential election:

"WASHINGTON CITY, November 7th, 1860.

". . . The President wrote me a note this evening, alluding to a rumor which reached the city to the effect that an armed force had attacked and carried the forts in Charleston Harbor. He desired me to visit him, which I did, and assured him that the rumor was altogether without foundation, and gave it as my opinion that there was no danger of such an attempt being made. We entered upon a general conversation upon the subject of disunion and discussed the probabilities of it pretty fully. We concurred in the opinion that all indications from the South looked as if disunion was inevitable. He said that whilst his reason told him there was great danger, yet his feelings repelled the convictions of his mind.

"Judge Black, the Attorney-General, was present during a part of the conversation, and indicated an opinion, that any attempt at disunion by a State should be put down by all the power of the Government.†

"November 9th. . . . A Cabinet meeting was held as usual at 1 o'clock; all the members were present, and the President said the business of the meeting was the most important ever before the Cabinet since his induction into office. The question, he said, to be considered and discussed, was as to the course the Administration should advise him to pursue in relation to the threatening aspect of affairs in the South, and most particularly in South Carolina. After a considerable amount of desultory conversation, he asked the opinions of each member of the Cabinet as to what should be done or said relative to a suggestion which he threw out. His suggestion was that a proposition should be made for a general convention of the States as provided for under the Constitution, and to propose some plan of compromising the angry disputes between the North and the South. He said if this were done, and the North or non-slaveholding States should refuse it, the South would stand justified before the whole world for refusing longer to remain in a confederacy where her rights were so shamefully violated. He said he was compelled to notice at length the alarming condition of the country, and that he would not shrink from the duty.

"General Cass spoke with earnestness and much feeling about the impending crisis — admitted fully all the great wrongs and outrages which had been committed against the South by Northern fanaticism, and deplored it. But he was emphatic in his condemnation of the doctrine of secession by any State from the Union. He doubted the efficacy of the appeal for a convention, but seemed to think it might do well enough to try it. He spoke warmly in favor of using force to coerce a State that attempted to secede.

"Judge Black, the Attorney-General, was emphatic in his advocacy of coercion, and advocated earnestly the propriety of sending at once a strong force into the forts in Charleston Harbor, enough to deter if possible the people from any attempt at disunion. He seemed to favor the idea of an appeal for a general convention of all the States.

"Governor Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, declared his very decided approbation of the proposition, for two reasons — first, that it afforded the President a great opportunity for a high and statesmanlike treatment of the whole subject of agitation, and the proper remedies to prevent it; secondly, because, in his judgment, the failure to procure that redress which the South would be entitled to and would demand (and that failure he thought certain), would tend to unite the entire South in a decided disunion movement. He thought disunion inevitable, and under present circumstances most desirable.

"Mr. Holt, the Postmaster-General, thought the proposition for the convention dangerous, for the reason, that if the call should be made and it should fail to procure redress, those States which now are opposed to secession, might find themselves inclined, from a feeling of honor, to back the States resolving on disunion. Without this common demand and common failure, he thought there would be no such danger of united action, and therefore a stronger prospect of some future plan of reconciliation.

"Mr. Thompson, the Secretary of the Interior, thought well of the plan of calling for a general convention — thought his State (Mississippi) about equally

* Printed in "The Early Life, Campaigns, and Public Services of Robert E. Lee, with a record of the campaigns and heroic deeds of his companions in arms, by a distinguished Southern journalist." 8vo., E. B. Treat, Publisher, New York 1871, p. 789, article Major General John B. Floyd. It says: "Among his private papers examined after his death the fragment of a diary was found, written in his own hand, and which is here copied entire." The diary also bears internal evidence of genuineness.

† The astounding mysteries and eccentricities of politics find illustration in the remarkable contrast between this recorded impulsive, off-hand and patriotic expression of Attorney-General Black, on November 7th, and his labored official opinion of an exactly opposite tenor, certified to the President under date of November 20th. See Opinions of the Attorney-General, Vol. IX, p. 517.

divided between the union and disunion men. He deprecated the idea of force, and said any show of it by the Government would instantly make Mississippi a unit in favor of disunion.

"Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, thought well of the appeal for the convention — coincided in an opinion I had expressed, that retaliatory State measures would prove most availing for bringing the Northern fanatics to their senses.

"I expressed myself decidedly opposed to any rash movement, and against the idea of secession at this time. I did so because I think that Lincoln's administration will fail, and be regarded as impotent for good or evil within four months after his inauguration. We are to meet to-morrow at 1 o'clock.

"November 10th. . . . We had a Cabinet meeting to-day, at which the President read a very elaborate document, prepared either as a part of his message or as a proclamation. It was well written in the main, and met with extravagant commendation from General Cass, Governor Toucey, Judge Black, and Mr. Holt. Cobb, Thompson, and myself found much to differ from in it,— Cobb because it inculcated submission to Lincoln's election and intimated the use of force to coerce a submission to his rule, and because it reprehended the policy of the Kansas-Nebraska bill; Thompson because of the doctrine of acquiescence and the hostility to the secession doctrine. I objected to it because I think it misses entirely the temper of the Southern people and attacks the true State-Rights doctrine on the subject of secession. I do not see what good can come of the paper, as prepared, and I do see how much mischief may flow from it."

It is extremely doubtful whether we may accept these extracts at their full literal import. Either the words "coerce," "submission," "use of force," and so on are written down by the diarist in a sense different from that in which they were spoken, or the President and several of his counselors underwent an amazing change of sentiment. But in a general way they show us that on the fourth day after Lincoln's election the Buchanan Cabinet was already divided into hostile camps. Cass of Michigan, Secretary of State, Toucey of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy, Black of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General, and Holt of Kentucky, Postmaster-General, were emphatic Unionists; while Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior, and Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of War, were secessionists — the latter yet professing devotion to the Union, but with such ifs and buts as left sufficiently clear evidence of his inevitable drift to disloyalty.

All impulses of prudence or patriotism ought to have moved the President to reconstruct his Cabinet. But instead of some energetic executive act of this character, he seems to have applied himself to the composition of a political essay to teach the North its duty; as if his single pen had power to change the will of the people of the United States upon a point which they had decided by their votes only four days previously after six years of discussion. In the draft of this document, which he read to his Cabinet on November 10th, we have the important record that "it inculcated submission to Lincoln's election, and intimated the use of force to coerce a submission to his rule,"— positions which Floyd records were "met with extravagant commendations from General Cass, Governor Toucey, Judge Black, and Mr. Holt." This was a true touchstone; it instantly brought out not only the open secessionism of Cobb and Thompson, but the disguised disloyalty of Floyd.

It is a strange historical phenomenon that with the President and a majority of the Cabinet in this frame of mind, the South should have been permitted to organize revolution. The solution seems to lie in the temporizing feebleness of Buchanan and in the superior finesse and daring conspiracy of Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd.

Many indications make it evident that a long and laborious factional struggle took place over the preparation of the President's message. The telegraph announced several protracted Cabinet sessions; and as early as the 21st of November the points under discussion and the attitude of the President and his several official advisers were accurately foreshadowed in the newspapers. Nor were these momentous deliberations confined to the Cabinet proper. All the varieties of suggestion and contradictory counsels which were solicited or tendered we may never learn, and yet we know enough to infer the highest extremes and antagonisms of doctrine and policy. On the one hand came Jefferson Davis, the future chief of the Rebellion, at the urgent call of his fellow-conspirators; on the other hand came Edwin M. Stanton, Buchanan's future Attorney-General and Lincoln's Secretary of War,* called in by Mr. Buchanan himself, to help him through the intricate maze of his perplexed opinions and inclinations. How many others may have come voluntarily or by summons it is impossible to guess. Many brains and hands, however, must have joined in the work, since the document is such a heterogeneous medley of conflicting theories, irreconcilable doctrines, impracticable and irrelevant suggestions. For at length the hesitating and bewildered Presi-

* "It was while these plans for a *coup d'état* before the 4th of March were being matured in the very Cabinet itself and in the presence of a President too feeble to resist them and too blind even to see them, that Mr. Stanton was sent for by Mr. Buchanan to answer the question, 'Can a State be coerced?' For two hours he battled and finally scattered for the time being the heresies with which secession had filled the head of that old broken-down man. He was requested to prepare an argument in support of the power to be inserted in the forthcoming message."— [Hon. H. L. Dawes, in the "Boston Congregationalist." See "Atlantic Monthly," XXVI., p. 468.]

dent, unable to decide and impotent to construct, seems to have made his message a patchwork from the contributions of his advisers, regular and irregular, with the inevitable effect, not to combine and strengthen, but to weaken and confuse the warring thoughts and alien systems.

Aside from the mere recapitulation of department reports, the message of President Buchanan delivered to Congress on the 4th of December occupied itself mainly with two subjects,— slavery and disunion. On the question of slavery it repeated the assertions and arguments of the Buchanan faction of the Democratic party during the late presidential campaign, charging the present peril entirely upon the North. As a remedy it recommended an amendment to the Federal Constitution expressly* recognizing slavery in States which had adopted or might adopt it, and also expressly giving it existence and protection in the Federal Territories. The proposal was simply childish. Precisely this issue had been decided at the presidential election; to do this would be to reverse the final verdict of the ballot-box.†

On the question of disunion or secession, the message raised a vague and unwarrantable distinction between the infractions of law and allegiance by individuals, and the infractions of law and allegiance by the commonwealth, or body politic denominated a State. Under the first head it held: That the Union was designed to be perpetual; that the Federal Government is invested with sovereign powers on special subjects, which can only be opposed or abrogated by revolution; that secession is unconstitutional, and is, therefore, neither more nor less than revolution; that the executive has no right to recognize the secession of a State; that the Constitution has established a perfect government in all its forms, legislative, executive, and judicial, and this government, to the extent of its powers, acts directly upon the individual citizen of every State and executes its own decrees by the agency of its own officers; and, finally, that the Executive cannot be absolved from his duty to execute the laws.

But, continues the President, the laws can only be executed in certain prescribed methods, through the agency of courts, marshals, *posse comitatus*, aided, if necessary, by the militia or land and naval forces. The means and agencies, therefore, fail, and the performance of this duty becomes impracticable, when, as in South Carolina, universal public sentiment has deprived him of courts, marshals, and *posse*. Present laws being inadequate to overcome a united opposition, even in a single State, Congress alone has the power to decide whether they can be effectually amended.‡

It will be seen from the above summary, that the whole of the President's rambling

* Slavery existed by virtue of express enactments in the several constitutions of the slave States, but the Constitution of the United States gave it only implied sanction.

† "It was with some surprise, I confess, that I read the message of the President. The message laid down certain conditions as those upon which alone the great Confederacy of the United States could be preserved from disruption. In so doing the President appeared to be preparing beforehand an apology for the secession. Had the conditions, indeed, been such as the Northern States would be likely to accept, the message might have been considered one of peace. But it seems very improbable that the Northern States should now, at the moment of their triumph, and with large majorities of Republicans in their assemblies, submit to conditions which, during many years of struggle, they have rejected or evaded." — [Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons, December 25th, 1860. British Blue Book.]

‡ The logic of the message utterly breaks down by a palpable omission to state the well-known fact that, though every citizen of South Carolina, or any other State, might refuse to accept or execute the office of United States marshal, or, indeed, that of any Federal officer, the want could be immediately lawfully supplied by appointing any qualified citizen of any other State, who might lawfully and properly lead either a *posse*, or Federal forces, or State militia, to put down obstruction of the Federal laws, insurrection, or rebellion. President Buchanan admitted his own error, and repudiated his own doctrine, when on January 2d, following, he nominated a citizen of Pennsylvania for the office of collector of the port of Charleston, South Carolina.

But this whole fine-spun web of partisan sophistry is superfluous and mere concealing rubbish. Sections two and three of the Act of February 28th, 1795, authorize the President, when the execution of the laws is obstructed by insurrection too powerful for courts and marshals, to call forth the militia of any and all the States, first and primarily to "suppress such combinations," and, secondly, "to cause the laws to be duly executed; and the use of militia so to be called forth may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress." In performing this duty the act imposes but a single condition or prerequisite on the Executive: he shall by proclamation command the insurgents to disperse. These sections are complete, harmonious, self-sufficient, and, in their chief provisions, nowise dependent upon or connected with any other section or clause of the act. They place under the President's command the whole militia, and by a subsequent law (March 3d, 1807) also the entire army and navy of the Union, against rebellion. The assertion that the army can only follow a marshal and his writ in a case of rebellion, is not only unsupported by the language of the act, but utterly refuted by strong implication. The last section repeals a former provision limiting the President's action to cases of insurrection of which United States judges shall have given him notice, and thereby remits him to any and all his official sources of information. Jackson's famous force bill only provided certain supplementary details; it directly recognized and invoked the great powers of the Act of 1795, and expiring by limitation, left its wholesome plenitude and broad original grant of authority unimpaired.

discussion of the first head of the disunion question resulted logically in three ultimate conclusions: (1) That South Carolina was in revolt; (2) that the Constitution, the laws, and moral obligation all united gave the Government the right to suppress this revolt by executing the laws upon and against the citizens of that State; (3) that certain defects in the laws paralyzed their practical enforcement.

Up to this point in his argument, his opinions, whatever may be thought of their soundness, were confined to the legitimate field of executive interpretation, and such as in the exercise of his official discretion he might with undoubted propriety communicate to Congress. But he had apparently failed to satisfy his own conscience in thus summarily reasoning the executive and governmental power of a young, compact, vigorous, and thoroughly organized nation of thirty millions of people into sheer nothingness and impotence. How supremely absurd was the whole national panoply of commerce, credit, coinage, treaty power, judiciary, taxation, militia, army and navy, and Federal flag, if, through the mere joint of a defective law, the hollow reed of a secession ordinance could inflict a fatal wound!

The President proceeds, therefore, to discuss the second head of the disunion question, by an attempt to formulate and define the powers and duties of Congress with reference to the threatened rebellion. He would not only roll the burden from his own shoulders upon the national legislature, but he would by volunteer advice instruct that body how it must be borne and disposed of. Addressing Congress, he says in substance:

"You may be called upon to decide the momentous question, whether you possess the power by force of arms to compel a State to remain in the Union. The question, fairly stated, is: Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and to make war against a State. After much serious reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government. It may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. But if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it under existing circumstances? Our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force."

Why did the message thus leap at one bound without necessary connection or coherence from the discussion of executive to those of legislative powers? Why waste words over doubtful theories when there was pressing need to suggest practical amendments to the statute whose real or imaginary defects Mr. Buchanan had pointed out? Why indulge in lamentations over the remote possibility that Congress might violate the Constitution, when the occasion demanded only prompt preventive orders from the executive to arrest the actual threatened violation of law by Charleston mobs? Why talk of war against States when the duty of the hour was the exercise of acknowledged authority against insurrectionary citizens?

The issue and argument were wholly false and irrelevant. No State had yet seceded. Execute such laws of the United States as were in acknowledged vigor, and disunion would be impossible. Buchanan needed only to do what he afterward so truthfully asserted Lincoln had done.* But through his inaction, and still more through his declared want of either power or right to act, disunion gained two important points and advantages,— the influence of the executive voice upon public opinion, and especially upon Congress; and the substantial pledge of the Administration that it would lay no straw in the path of peaceful, organized measures to bring about State secession.

The central dogma of the message, that while a State has no right to secede, the Union has no right to coerce, has been universally condemned as a paradox. The popular estimate of Mr. Buchanan's proposition and arguments was forcibly presented at the time by a jesting criticism attributed to Mr. Seward. "I think," said the New York senator, "the President has conclusively proved two things: (1) That no State has the right to secede unless it wishes to; and (2) that it is the President's duty to enforce the laws unless somebody opposes him." † If this be looked upon as the sarcasm of a political enemy, it is even less damaging than the serious explanation put upon his language by his political friends. The recognized organ of the Administration said: "Mr. Buchanan has increased the displeasure of the Lincoln party by his repudiation of the coercion theory, and his firm refusal to permit a resort to force as a means of preventing the secession of a sovereign State." ‡ Nor were intelligent lookers-on in

* "Happily our civil war was undertaken and prosecuted in self-defense, not to coerce a State, but to enforce the execution of the laws within the States against individuals, and to suppress an unjust rebellion raised by a conspiracy among them against the Government of the United States."—[Buchanan, in "Mr. Buchanan's Administration," p. 129.]

† Corres. N. Y. "Evening Post."

‡ Washington "Constitution" of December 19th, 1860.

foreign lands a whit less severe in their judgment: "Mr. Buchanan's message," said the London "Times," a month later, "has been a greater blow to the American people than all the rants of the Georgian governor or the 'ordinances' of the Charleston convention. The President has dissipated the idea that the States which elected him constitute one people."

THE CONSPIRACY PROCLAIMED.

To a great majority of the people the hopes and chances of a successful compromise seemed still cheering and propitious. There was indeed a prevailing agitation in the Southern part of the Union, but it had taken a virulent form in less than half a dozen States. In most of these a decided majority still deprecated disunion. Three of the great political parties of the country were by the voice of their leaders pledged to peace and order; the fourth, apparently controlled as yet by the powerful influences of official subordination and patronage, must, so it seemed, yield to the now expressed and public advice of the President in favor of Union and the enforcement of the law; especially in view of the forbearance and kindness he was personally exercising toward the unruly elements of his faction. Throughout the Northern States the folly and evils of disunion appeared so palpable, that it was not generally regarded as an imminent danger, but rather as merely a possible though not probable event. The hasty and seemingly earnest action of the people and authorities of South Carolina was looked upon as a historical repetition of the nullification crisis of 1831–2; and without examining too closely the real present condition of affairs, men hoped, rather than intelligently expected, that the parallel would continue to the end. Some sort of compromise of the nature of that of 1850 was the prevailing preoccupation in politics.

This was the popular view of the situation. But it was a very narrow and erroneous view, because it lacked the essential information necessary to form a correct and solid judgment. The deep estrangement between the sections was imperfectly realized. The existence of four parties, a very unusual occurrence in American politics, had seriously weakened party cohesion, and more than quadrupled party prejudice and mistrust. There was a strong undercurrent of conviction and purpose, not expressed in speeches and platforms. But the most serious ignorance was in respect to the character and fidelity of the high officers of the government. Of the personal timidity of Mr. Buchanan, of the treachery of at least three members of the Cabinet, of the exclusion of General Scott from military councils, of the President's persistent refusal to send troops to Anderson, of his stipulation with the South Carolina members, of the intrigue which drove General Cass from the head of the State Department and from the Cabinet, the people at large knew nothing, or so little that they could put no intelligent construction upon the event. The debates of Congress shed the first clear light upon the situation, but the very violence and bitterness of the secession speeches caused the multitude to doubt their sincerity and truthfulness, or, as a final probability, placed their authors in the category of fanatics who would gain no followers.

While, therefore, the Republicans in Congress and in the country maintained, as a rule, an expectant and watchful silence, the conservatives, made up for the greater part of the supporters of Bell and Everett, were active in setting on foot a movement for compromise, in the final success of which they had the fullest confidence; and it is but justice to their integrity and ability to add that this confidence was fully warranted by the delusive indications of surface politics. Highly patriotic in sentiment and purpose and highly prudent in word and act, their leading men in Congress had promptly opposed secession, had moved a Senate Committee of Thirteen, and secured the authorization, the appointment, and the organization of a House Committee of Thirty-three. Already had some twenty-three different propositions of adjustment been submitted to this committee, and under the circumstances it actually seemed as if only a little patience and patriotic earnestness were needed to find a compromise,— perhaps an amendment of the Constitution which the feverish unrest and impatience of the nation would compel Congress to enact or propose, and the different States and sections, willing or unwilling, to accept and ratify.

Superior political wisdom and more thorough information, as well as a finer strategy, a quicker enthusiasm, a more absolute devotion, and a more unremitting industry, must be freely accorded to the conspirators who now labored night and day in the interest of disunion. They counted more clearly than their opponents the demoralization of parties at the North, the latent revolutionary discontent at the South, the potent influence of brilliant and combined leadership, and the social, commercial, and political conditions which might be brought into present and ultimate action. They recognized that they were but a minority, a faction; but they also realized that as such they had a substantial control of from six to eleven States whenever they chose to make that control effective, and that, for present uses

at least, the President was, under their influence, but as clay in the hands of the potter.

Better than the Republicans from the North, or even the conservatives from the border States, they knew that in the cotton-States a widespread change of popular sentiment was then being wrought and might very soon be complete. Except upon the extreme alternative of disunion, the people of the border States were eager to espouse their quarrel, and join them in a contest for alleged political rights. Nearly half the people of the North were ready to acknowledge the existence and justness of their formulated complaints. The election of Lincoln was indeed a flimsy and specious pretext for separation, but it had the merit of universal publicity, and of rankling irritation among the unthinking masses. Agriculture was depressed, commerce was in panic, manufacturing populations were in want, the national treasury was empty, the army was dispersed, the fleet was scattered. The national prestige was humbled, the national sentiment despondent, the national faith disturbed.

Meanwhile their intrigues had been successful beyond hope. The Government was publicly committed to the fatal doctrine of non-coercion, and was secretly pursuing the equally fatal policy of concession. Reënforcements had been withheld from Charleston and must from motives of consistency be withheld from all other forts and stations. An unofficial stipulation, with the President, and a peremptory order to Anderson, secured beyond chance the safe and early secession of South Carolina, and the easy seizure of the Government property and forts at Charleston. The representatives of foreign governments were already secretly coquetting for the favor of a free port and an advantageous cotton-market. Friendly voices came to the South from the North, in private correspondence, in the public press, even in the open debates of Congress, promising that cities should go up in flames and the fair country be laid waste ere a single Northern bayonet should molest them in their meditated secession.

Upon such a real or assumed state of facts the conspirators based their theory, and risked their chances of success in dismembering the republic,— and it must be admitted that they chose their opportunity with a skill and foresight which for a considerable period of time gave them immense advantages over the friends of the Union. One vital condition of success, however, they strangely overlooked, or rather, perhaps, deliberately crowded out of their problem,— the chance of civil war, without foreign intervention. For the present their whole plan depended upon the assumption that they could accomplish their end by means of the single instrumentality of peaceable secession; and with this view they proceeded to put their scheme into prompt execution.

The House Committee of Thirty-three had been organized by the selection of Thomas Corwin as its chairman, and had entered hopefully upon the task confided to it. An angry and excited caucus of active conspirators was said to have been held the week previous, to intimidate the members from the cotton-States and induce them to refuse to serve on the committee, but this coercive movement only partly succeeded. The committee held a long meeting on December 12th, and now on the morning of the 13th was once more convened for work. The informal propositions and discussions of the day previous were renewed, but resulted only in calling out views and schemes too vague on the one hand or too extreme on the other. The subject was about to be laid over to the following Saturday, when Mr. Rust of Arkansas startled the committee with the information that the extremists were obtaining signatures to a paper to announce to the South that no further concession was expected from the North, and that any adjustment of pending difficulties had become impossible. He therefore offered a resolution to meet this unexpected crisis, but accepted the following substitute, offered by Mr. Dunn of Indiana:

"Resolved, That in the opinion of this committee, the existing discontent among the Southern people and the growing hostility among them to the Federal Government are greatly to be regretted, and that whether such discontent and hostility are without just cause or not, any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies and effectual guarantees of their peculiar rights and interests, as recognized by the Constitution, necessary to preserve the peace of the country and the perpetuation of the Union, should be promptly and cheerfully granted."

Other amendments were voted down, and this proposition was adopted by a vote of 22 to 8; and thus in good faith a tender of reasonable concession and honorable and satisfactory compromise was made by the North to the South. But the peace-offering was a waste of patience and good-will. Caucus after caucus of the secession leaders had only grown more aggressive, and deepened and strengthened their inflexible purpose to push the country into disunion. Keeping themselves thoroughly informed of every political intrigue and every official movement, they timed their own decisions and demonstrations with a fatal promptness and precision. The presence of General Scott, who after a long illness had come from New York to Washington, on December 12th, to give his urgent advice to the work of counteracting secession by vigorous military preparation, did not in the least disconcert or

hinder the secession leaders. His patriotic appeal to the Secretary of War* on the 13th naturally fell without effect upon the ears of one of their active confederates.

This vital issue once decided, the revolutionists did not lose or delay a single moment in taking their next step forward. Neither the temporizing concession of the President nor the conciliatory and half-apologetic resolution of the Committee of Thirty-three for one instant changed or affected their determination to destroy the Government and dissolve the Union.

Friday, December 14th, 1860, was a day of gloom and despondency in Mr. Buchanan's office, bringing to his mind more forcibly than he had ever before realized the utter shipwreck into which he had guided his Administration. To the jubilant secessionists, on the other hand, it was not only a day of perilous triumph achieved, but also of apparently assured successes yet to come. The hitherto official organ of the Administration in its issue of the following morning contained two publications which gave startling notice to the country of the weakness of the right and the strength of the wrong in the swiftly forming struggle for national existence.

The first of these documents was a proclamation from the President of the United States, stating that in response to numerous appeals he designated the fourth day of January, proximo, as a day of humiliation, fasting, and prayer. The "dangerous and distracted condition of our country" was therein thus set forth:

"The Union of the States is at the present moment threatened with alarming and immediate danger — panic and distress of a fearful character prevail throughout the land — our laboring population are without employment, and consequently deprived of the means of earning their bread — indeed, hope seems to have deserted the minds of men. All classes are in a state of confusion and dismay, and the wisest counsels of our best and purest men are wholly disregarded. . . . Humbling ourselves before the Most High, . . . let us implore him to remove from our hearts that false pride of opinion which would impel us to persevere in wrong for the sake of consistency, rather than yield a just submission to the unforeseen exigencies by which we are now surrounded. . . . An omnipotent Providence may overrule existing evils for permanent good."†

The second manifesto was more practical, more pertinent, more resolute. As the first public and combined action of the conspirators, it forms the hinge upon which they well-nigh turned the fate of the New World Republic. It was a brief document, but contained and expressed all the essential purpose of the conspiracy. It was signed by about one-half the senators and representatives of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas. It precedes every ordinance of secession, and is the "official" beginning of the subsequent "Confederate States," just as Governor Gist's October circular was the "official" beginning of South Carolina secession.

ADDRESS OF CERTAIN SOUTHERN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

TO OUR CONSTITUENTS.

WASHINGTON, December 14th, 1860.

The argument is exhausted. All hope of relief in the Union through the agency of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments is extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances or the pretense of new guarantees. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the organization of a Southern Confederacy — a result to be obtained only by separate State secession — that the primary object of each slaveholding State ought to be its speedy and absolute separation from a Union with hostile States.

J. L. Pugh	of Alabama.
David Clopton	of Alabama.
Sydenham Moore	of Alabama.
J. L. M. Curry	of Alabama.
J. A. Stallworth	of Alabama.
J. W. H. Underwood	of Georgia.
L. J. Gartrell	of Georgia.
James Jackson	of Georgia.
John J. Jones	of Georgia.
Martin J. Crawford	of Georgia.
Alfred Iverson, U. S. Senator	Georgia.
George S. Hawkins	of Florida.
T. C. Hindman	of Arkansas.
Jefferson Davis, U. S. Senator	Mississippi.
A. G. Brown, U. S. Senator	Mississippi.
Wm. Barksdale	of Mississippi.
O. R. Singleton	of Mississippi.
Reuben Davis	of Mississippi.
Burton Craige	of North Carolina.
Thomas Ruffin	of North Carolina.
John Slidell, U. S. Senator	Louisiana.
J. P. Benjamin, U. S. Senator	Louisiana.
J. M. Landrum	of Louisiana.
Lewis T. Wigfall, U. S. Senator	Texas.
John Hemphill, U. S. Senator	Texas.
J. H. Reagan	of Texas.
M. L. Bonham	of South Carolina.
Wm. Porcher Miles	of South Carolina.
John McQueen	of South Carolina.
John D. Ashmore	of South Carolina.

Instead of the argument being exhausted, it was scarcely begun. So far from congressional or constitutional relief having been refused, the Southern demand for them had not been formulated. Not only had no committee denied hearing or action, but the Democratic Senate, at the instance of a Southern State, had ordered the Committee of Thirteen, which the Democratic and Southern Vice-President had not yet even appointed; and when the names were announced a week later, Jefferson Davis, one of the signers of this complaint of non-

* "Scott Auto." Vol. II., p. 613.

† Washington "Constitution," Dec. 15th, 1860.

action, was the only man who refused to serve on the committee — a refusal he withdrew when persuaded by his co-conspirators that he could better aid their designs by accepting. On the other hand, the Committee of Thirty-three, raised by the Republican House, appointed by a Northern Speaker, and presided over by a Northern chairman, had the day before by more than a two-thirds vote distinctly tendered the Southern people "any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies and effectual guarantees."

Outside of congressional circles there was the same absence of any new complications, any new threats, any new dangers from the North. Since the day when Abraham Lincoln was elected President there had been absolutely no change of word or act in the attitude or intention of himself or his followers. By no possibility could they exert a particle of adverse political power, executive, legislative, or judicial, for nearly three months to come. Not only was executive authority in the hands of a Democratic Administration, which had made itself the peculiar champion of the Southern party, but it had yielded every successive demand of administrative policy made by the conspirators themselves. The signers of this address to their Southern constituents had not one single excuse. Their proclamation was a falsehood; but nothing less would serve their new step in conspiracy.

SOUTH CAROLINA SECESSION.

THE secret circular of Governor Gist of South Carolina, heretofore quoted, inaugurated the great American Rebellion a full month before a single ballot had been cast for Abraham Lincoln. This was but repeating in a bolder form the action taken by Governor Wise of Virginia, during the Frémont campaign four years before. But, instead, as in that case, of confining himself to a proposed consultation among slave-State executives, Governor Gist proceeded almost immediately to a public and official revolutionary act.

On the 12th of October, 1860, he issued his proclamation convening the Legislature of South Carolina in extra session, "to appoint electors of President and Vice-President. . . . and also that they may, if advisable, take action for the safety and protection of the State." There was no external peril menacing either the commonwealth or its humblest citizen; but the significance of the phrase was soon developed.

A large caucus of prominent South Carolina leaders was held on the 25th of October at the residence of Senator Hammond. Their deliberations remained secret, but the determination arrived at appears clearly enough in the further official action of Governor Gist, who was present, and who doubtless carried out the plans of the assemblage. When the legislature met on November 5th (the day before the presidential election) the governor sent them his opening message, advocating both secession and insurrection, in direct and undisguised language. He recommended that in the event of Lincoln's election, a convention should be immediately called; that the State should secede from the Federal Union; and "if in the exercise of arbitrary power and forgetful of the lessons of history, the Government of the United States should attempt coercion, it will be our solemn duty to meet force by force." To this end he recommended a reorganization of the militia and the raising and drilling an army of ten thousand volunteers. He placed the prospects of such a revolution in a hopeful light. "The indications from many of the Southern States," said he, "justify the conclusion that the secession of South Carolina will be immediately followed, if not adopted simultaneously, by them, and ultimately by the entire South. The long-desired coöperation of the other States having similar institutions, for which so many of our citizens have been waiting, seems to be near at hand; and, if we are true to ourselves, will soon be realized."*

The legislature, remaining in extra session, and cheered and urged on by repeated popular demonstrations and the inflamed speeches of the highest State officials, proceeded without delay to carry out the governor's programme.

The first day's session of the legislature (November 5th) developed one of the most important preparatory steps of the long-expected revolution. The legislature of 1859 had appropriated a military contingent fund of $100,000 "to be drawn and accounted for as directed by the Legislature." The appropriation had been allowed to remain untouched. It was now proposed to place this sum at the control of the governor to be expended in obtaining improved small arms, in purchasing a field battery of rifled cannon, in providing accouterments, and in furnishing an additional supply of tents; and a resolution to that effect duly passed two days later.† The chief measure of the session, however, was a bill to provide for calling the proposed State convention, which, it was well understood, should adopt an ordinance of secession.

The delegates to the convention were duly

* Governor Gist's Message, Nov. 5th, 1860. "S. C. House Journal," pp. 10, 11.

† "S. C. House Journal," pp. 13, 14.

elected on the 6th of December, and assembled and organized at Columbia, the capital of the State, on the 17th of the same month; on account of a local epidemic, however, both the convention and the legislature adjourned to Charleston, where the former reassembled on the following day and the latter two days afterwards. Elected under the prevailing secession *furor*, which tolerated no opposition, and embracing the leading conspirators in its membership, the convention was practically unanimous. "There is no honor," said the chairman on taking his seat, "I esteem more highly than to sign the ordinance of secession as a member of this body; but I will regard it as the greatest honor of my life to sign it as your presiding officer."*

The legislature of South Carolina had also just elected a new governor, who was inaugurated on the same day on which the convention met. This was F. W. Pickens, a revolutionist of a yet more radical and energetic type than his predecessor Gist, and who, as we have seen, had been in close consultation with the Cabinet cabal at Washington, more than a month before. He was, of course, anxious to signalize his advent; and to this end he immediately dispatched to Washington a special messenger, bearing the following letter to President Buchanan:

"(Strictly confidential.)

"COLUMBIA, December 17th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR: With a sincere desire to prevent a collision of force, I have thought proper to address you directly and truthfully on points of deep and immediate interest.

"I am authentically informed that the forts in Charleston Harbor are now being thoroughly prepared to turn, with effect, their guns upon the interior and the city. Jurisdiction was ceded by this State expressly for the purpose of external defense from foreign invasion, and not with any view that they should be turned upon the State.

"In an ordinary case of mob rebellion, perhaps it might be proper to prepare them for sudden outbreak. But when the people of the State, in sovereign convention assembled, determine to resume their original powers of separate and independent sovereignty, the whole question is changed, and it is no longer an act of rebellion. I, therefore, most respectfully urge that all work on the forts be put a stop to for the present, and that no more force may be ordered there.

"The regular convention of the people of the State of South Carolina, legally and properly called, under our Constitution, is now in session, deliberating upon the gravest and most momentous questions, and the excitement of the great masses is great, under a sense of deep wrongs, and a profound necessity of doing something to preserve the peace and safety of the State.

"To spare the effusion of blood, which no human power may be able to prevent, I earnestly beg your immediate consideration of all the points I call your attention to. It is not improbable that, under orders from the Commandant, or perhaps from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the alteration and defenses of those posts are progressing without the knowledge of yourself or the Secretary of War.

"The arsenal, in the city of Charleston, with the public arms, I am informed, was turned over very properly to the keeping and defense of a State force, at the urgent request of the governor of South Carolina. I would most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the public peace, request that you would allow me to send a small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an officer, to take possession of Fort Sumter, immediately, in order to give a feeling of safety to the community. There are no United States troops in that fort whatever, or perhaps only four or five, at present; besides some additional workmen or laborers, lately employed to put the guns in order. If Fort Sumter could be given to me, as governor, under a permission similar to that by which the governor was permitted to keep the arsenal, with the United States arms in the city of Charleston, then I think the public mind would be quieted under a feeling of safety; and as the convention is now in full authority, it strikes me that could be done with perfect propriety. I need not go into particulars, for urgent reasons will force themselves readily upon your consideration.

"If something of the kind be not done, I cannot answer for the consequences.

"I send this by a private and confidential gentleman, who is authorized to confer with Mr. Trescott fully, and to receive through him any answer you may think proper to give to this.

"I have the honor to be, most respectfully,

"Yours truly, F. W. PICKENS.

"To the President of the United States."†

Arrived in Washington, the special messenger who bore this document sought the active agent‡ of the central cabal, Mr. Trescott, Assistant Secretary of State, and was by him on Thursday morning, December 20th, conducted to the White House and presented to Mr. Buchanan, to whom he personally delivered his communication. The President received the document and promised an answer to it on the following day.§ The temper and condition of his mind is plainly reflected in what he wrote. He seems to have realized no offense in this insult to the sovereignty and dignity of the United States whose Constitution he had sworn to "preserve, protect, and defend"; no patriotic resentment against the South Carolina conspirators who, as he knew by the telegraph, were assembling that same day in convention to inaugurate local rebellion;—his whole answer breathes a tone of apology that his oath and duties will not permit him to oblige the South Carolina governor; and he feebly gropes for relief from his perplexities in the suggestion

* "Convention Journal," p. 10.

† Pickens to Buchanan, December 17th, 1860. "S. C. House Journal," 1861, p. 167.

‡ In his message of November 5th, 1861, Governor Pickens of South Carolina refers to William H. Trescott, Esq., who was in December, 1860, Assistant Secretary of State at Washington, as "a distinguished citizen, appointed, as I have since been informed by my predecessor, to remain at Washington as confidential representative of the State."—"South Carolina House Journal," 1861, p. 31.

§ Curtis's "Life of Buchanan," President's memorandum, p. 383.

that Congress might perhaps somehow arrange the trouble. This was the answer prepared:

"WASHINGTON, December 20th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of the 17th inst. by Mr. Hamilton. From it I deeply regret to observe that you seem entirely to have misapprehended my position, which I supposed had been clearly stated in my message. I have incurred, and shall incur, any reasonable risk within the clearly prescribed line of my executive duties to prevent a collision between the army and navy of the United States and the citizens of South Carolina in defense of the forts within the harbor of Charleston. Hence I have declined for the present to reënforce these forts, relying upon the honor of South Carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition; but that commissioners will be sent by the convention to treat with Congress on the subject. I say with *Congress* because, as I state in my message, 'Apart from the execution of the laws so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State.' This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign *de facto* government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on my part, be a naked act of usurpation.

"As an executive officer of the Government, I have no power to surrender to any human authority Fort Sumter, or any of the other forts or public property in South Carolina. To do this would, on my part, as I have already said, be a naked act of usurpation. It is for Congress to decide this question, and for me to preserve the status of the public property as I found it at the commencement of the troubles.

"If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she will then become the assailant in a war against the United States. It will not then be a question of coercing a State to remain in the Union, to which I am utterly opposed, as my message proves, but it will be a question of voluntarily precipitating a conflict of arms on her part, without even consulting the only authority which possesses the power to act upon the subject. Between independent governments, if one possesses a fortress within the limits of another, and the latter should seize it without calling upon the appropriate authorities of the power in possession to surrender it, this would not only be a just cause of war, but the actual commencement of hostilities.

"No authority was given, as you suppose, from myself or from the War Department, to Governor Gist, to guard the United States Arsenal in Charleston by a company of South Carolina volunteers. In this respect you have been misinformed — I have, therefore, never been more astonished in my life, than to learn from you that unless Fort Sumter be delivered into your hands, you cannot be answerable for the consequences." *

It is easy to infer from results, that while the President was laboring over this document the central cabal was busy. They saw that the rash zeal of Governor Pickens was endangering the fine web of conspiracy they had wound around him. He was committed to non-coercion; committed to non-reënforcements; committed to await the arrival of South Carolina commissioners. This new demand from a new authority not only indicated a division of sentiment and purpose in the insurrectionary councils in the Palmetto State, but created an opportunity through which Mr. Buchanan under a possible healthier impulse of patriotism might repudiate the whole obligation of non-resistance to their schemes into which they had beguiled him. They clearly saw, as they themselves explained, that though he would not deliver Sumter now, he might be willing to "approach such action" hereafter, "a possibility not at all improbable, and which ought to be kept open."† Mr. Trescott therefore hastened to take the advice of two of the South Carolina congressmen,— McQueen and Bonham,— and it is not a violent presumption to assume also of the chief senatorial conspirators; for only six days had elapsed since the congressional circular was signed and published, which called upon the cotton-States to proceed with the plot of secession and the formation of a Southern confederacy. A telegram was at once sent to Charleston, mildly explaining to Governor Pickens the blunder he was making and asking his authority to withdraw his letter to Mr. Buchanan. Governor Pickens must be credited with astuteness enough to comprehend the situation, for he at once gave the consent requested. On Friday morning Mr. Trescott waited upon Mr. Buchanan and informed him that he would not be required to answer, but that Governor Pickens had withdrawn his demand; and Mr. Trescott records, with an evident appreciation of the whole affair as a successful stroke of policy, that "the withdrawal of the letter was a great relief to the President." To understand more fully the whole scope and spirit of the incident, we must read the report of it which he then transmitted to Charleston:

"TO HIS EXCELLENCY F. W. PICKENS,
"GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA:
"WASHINGTON, December 21st, 1860.

"SIR: Your confidential letter to the President was duly delivered to him yesterday by D. H. Hamilton, Esq., according to your instructions. It was withdrawn (no copy having been taken) this morning by me, under the authority of your telegraphic dispatch. Its withdrawal was most opportune. It reached here under circumstances which you could not have anticipated, and it produced the — effect upon the President.

"He had removed Colonel Gardiner from command at Fort Moultrie, for carrying ammunition from the arsenal at Charleston; he had refused to send reënforcements to the garrison there; he had accepted the resignation of the oldest, most eminent, and highest member of his Cabinet, rather than consent to send additional force, and the night before your letter arrived, he, upon a telegraphic communication that arms had been removed from the arsenal to Fort Moultrie, the Department of War had issued prompt orders by

* Curtis's "Life of Buchanan," Vol. II., p. 384.

† Trescott to Pickens. "South Carolina House Journal," 1861, p. 170.

telegraph to the officer removing them,* to restore them immediately. He had done this upon his determination to avoid all risk of collision, and upon the written assurance of the majority of the Congressional Delegation from the State that they did not believe there was any danger of an attack upon the forts before the passage of the Ordinance, and an expression of their trust and hope that there would be none after, until the State had sent commissioners here. His course had been violently denounced by the Northern press, and an effort was being made to* — a Congressional investigation. At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of action you desired and I felt confident that if forced to answer your letter then he would have taken such ground as would have prevented his ever approaching it hereafter, a possibility not at all improbable, and which ought to be kept open. I considered, also, that the chance of public investigation rendered the utmost caution necessary as to any communications from the State, and having presented the letter, and ascertained what the nature of the reply would be, you had all the advantage of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having it put on record. Besides this, the President seemed to think that your request was based upon the impossibility of your restraining the spirit of our people; an interpretation which did you injustice, and the possibility of which I deemed it due to you to avoid. He also appeared to labor under the impression that the representation of the members of Congress and your own differed essentially, and this, I thought, on account of both, should not be stated in any reply to you. I was also perfectly satisfied that the status of the garrisons would not be disturbed.



FRANCIS W. PICKENS, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1861. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH IN POSSESSION OF LOUIS MANIGAULT.)

"Under these circumstances, if I had been acting under formal credentials from you, and the letter had been unsealed, I would have delayed its presentation for some hours, until I could have telegraphed you, but that was impossible. As Mr. Hamilton, therefore, had brought with him General McQueen and General Bonham, when he called on me and delivered the letter, and had even gone so far as to express the wish that they should be present when he delivered it to the President — a proposition which they declined, however — I deemed it not indiscreet, nor in violation of the discretionary confidence which your letter implied, to take their counsel. We agreed perfectly, and the result was the telegraphic dispatch of last night. The withdrawal of the letter was a great relief to the President, who is most earnestly anxious to avoid an issue with the State or its authorities, and I think, has encouraged his disposition to go as far as he can in this matter, and to treat those who may represent the State with perfect frankness.

"I have had this morning an interview with Governor Floyd, the Secretary of War. No order has been issued that will at all disturb the present condition of the garrisons, and while I cannot even here venture into details, which are too confidential to be risked in any way, I am prepared to say, with a full sense of the responsibility, that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm. Of course when your commissioners have succeeded or failed to effect their negotiations, the whole issue is fairly before you, to be met as courage, honor, and wisdom may direct.

"My delay in answering your telegraph concerning Colonel Huger, was caused by his absence from this place. He came, in reply to my telegraph last night, and this morning I telegraphed, upon his decision, which I presume he has explained by a letter of this same date. As Dr. Hamilton leaves this evening, I have only time to write this hurried letter, and am, sir,

"Very respectfully,

"WM. HENRY TRESCOTT.†

"I inclose your confidential letter in this."‡

We must now turn our attention from the executive rooms of the presidential mansion in Washington to the executive rooms of South Carolina in Charleston, where on the same day a feeble counterpart of the transaction we have described was going on. Since the beginning of these new troubles, especially since the dis-

* The blanks and the awkward rhetorical construction are copied exactly as the authors find them printed in the "South Carolina House Journal."

† Trescott to Pickens, December 21st, 1860. "S. C. House Journal," 1861, pp. 169–171.

‡ In Mr. Curtis's "Life of Buchanan," Vol. II., p. 383, will be found the private memorandum of President Buchanan giving his statement of the incident:

"On Thursday morning, December 20th, 1860, Hamilton, late marshal of South Carolina, sent especially for this purpose, presented me a letter from Governor Pickens, in the presence of Mr. Trescott, dated at Columbia, South Carolina, 17th December (Monday). He was to wait till this day (Friday afternoon) for my answer. The character of the letter will appear from the answer to it which I had prepared. Thursday night, between 9 and 10 o'clock, Mr. Trescott called upon me. He said that he had seen Messrs. Bonham and McQueen of the South Carolina delegation, that they all agreed that this letter of Governor Pickens was in violation of the pledge which had been given by themselves not to make an assault upon the forts, but to leave them in *statu quo* until the result of an application of commissioners to be appointed by the State was known; that Pickens, at Columbia, could not have known of the arrangements. They — to wit, Bonham, McQueen, and Trescott — had telegraphed to Pickens for authority to withdraw his letter. Friday morning, 10 o'clock, 21st December, Mr. Trescott called upon me with a telegram of which the following is a copy from that which he delivered to me: 'December 21st, 1860. — You are authorized and requested to withdraw my letter sent by Dr. Hamilton immediately. F. W. P.' Mr. Trescott read to me, from the same telegram, that Governor Pickens had seen Mr. Cushing; the letter was accordingly written."

cussion and issuing of his message, President Buchanan felt anxious and ill at ease. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that in South Carolina at least a tide of revolution was steadily rising. He appears to have dimly felt that his official responsibility and honor were somehow involved; and since he had reasoned the executive power into nothingness, the idea suggested itself to his mind that a little friendly expostulation at least was due from him. Under some such impulse he wrote the following letter to Governor Pickens, and with it dispatched the Hon. Caleb Cushing to Charleston, to see if he might not exert a personal influence upon the malcontents, who paid no heed to any wishes or interests but their own:

"WASHINGTON, December 18th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR: From common notoriety, I assume the fact that the State of South Carolina is now deliberating on the question of seceding from the Union. Whilst any hope remains that this may be prevented, or even retarded, so long as to allow the people of her

POSTMASTER-GENERAL JOSEPH HOLT.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

sister States an opportunity to manifest their opinions upon the causes which have led to this proceeding, it is my duty to exert all the means in my power to avert so dread a catastrophe. I have, therefore, deemed it advisable to send to you the Hon. Caleb Cushing, in whose integrity, ability, and prudence I have full confidence, to hold communications with you on my behalf, for the purpose of changing or modifying the contemplated action of the State in the manner I have already suggested. Commending Mr. Cushing to your kind attention, for his own sake, as well as that of the cause, I remain, "Very respectfully, your friend,

"JAMES BUCHANAN.

"HIS EXCELLENCY FRANCIS W. PICKENS." *

Mr. Cushing was a man of great affability, and of prominence in the Democratic party. He had been Attorney-General under President Pierce, and was called to preside over the Charleston convention, until the dissension in that body between Northern and Southern Democrats caused its disruption and adjournment to Baltimore. In the second disruption at Baltimore, Mr. Cushing had followed the fortunes of the Southern leaders, and with them had seceded, and presided over that fraction of the original body which nominated Breckinridge. Though a Massachusetts man, he was thus affiliated in party principle, party organization, and party action with the South, and President Buchanan not unnaturally thought that he was a proper personal agent, and ought to be an influential party representative, capable, in behalf of the Administration, of dissuading the Charleston conspirators from their dangerous determination, or at least from their reckless precipitancy.

But the sequel shows that Buchanan both misunderstood the men he had to deal with, and was unequal in purpose or will to cope with their superior daring and resolution.

Mr. Cushing arrived in Charleston on the day the South Carolina convention passed its ordinance of secession. He obtained an interview with Governor Pickens, and presented the President's letter. "I had but a short interview with him," says Governor Pickens in his message of November 5th, 1861, "and told him I would return no reply to the President's letter, except to say very candidly that there was no hope for the Union, and that, so far as I was concerned, I intended to maintain the separate independence of South Carolina, and from this purpose neither temptation nor danger should for a moment deter me." There is a notable contrast in this haughty and defiant reception by a South Carolina governor of the messenger of the President of the United States, to the cringing and apologetic spirit in which the President had on that same morning received the messenger of the governor and replied to his demand. Mr. Cushing's reply deserves special notice. "He said," continues Governor Pickens, "that he could not say what changes circumstances might produce, but when he left Washington there was then no intention whatever to change the status of the forts in our harbor in any way." By this language Mr. Cushing himself seems to have changed his errand from a patriotic mission of protest and warning to one conveying hopeful and advantageous information to the conspirators.

It could hardly have been without a sense of personal mortification to Mr. Cushing that the drama which he had been sent to avert, or at least to postpone, immediately unrolled itself under his very eyes, and his mortification must have risen to indignation when he was requested by his presence to grace the pageant. The South Carolina convention, during the

* Buchanan to Pickens, December 18th, 1860. "S. C. House Journal," 1861, p. 171.

two days which had elapsed since its adjournment hither from Columbia, had been deliberating in secret session. A little after midday of December 20th, the streets of Charleston were filled with the following placards, giving the public the first notice of its action:

CHARLESTON MERCURY

EXTRA:

Passed unanimously at 1.15 o'clock, P. M., December 20th, 1860.

AN ORDINANCE

To dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united with her under the compact entitled "The Constitution of the United States of America."

We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained,

That the Ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, all Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of "The United States of America," is hereby dissolved.

THE

UNION IS DISSOLVED!

The usual jubilations immediately followed, —ringing of bells, salutes of cannon, and the noise and display of street parades. The convention resolved to celebrate the event further by a public ceremonial to which it invited the governor, the legislature, and other dignitaries; and both branches of the legislature also sent a committee to Caleb Cushing to give him an official invitation to attend. At half-past 6 that evening the members of the convention marched in procession to Institute Hall, where the public signing of the ordinance of secession was performed with appropriate solemnities, and at its close the President announced: "The ordinance of secession has been signed and ratified, and I proclaim the State of South Carolina an Independent Commonwealth."

ATTORNEY-GENERAL JEREMIAH S. BLACK.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

The city and the State joined in general exultation as if a great work had been accomplished, as if the efforts of a generation had been crowned with fulfillment, and nothing remained but to rest and enjoy the ripened fruit of independence. There seemed to be no dream, amid all this rejoicing, that nothing definite had as yet been effected; that the reckless day's act was but the prelude to the most terrible tragedy of the age, the unchaining of a storm which should shake the continent with terror and devastation, leaving every Southern State a wreck, and sweeping from the face of the earth the institution in whose behalf the fatal work was done.

The secession ordinance having been passed, signed, and proclaimed, the convention busied itself for the next few days in making up a public statement of its reasons for the anomalous procedure. The discussion showed a wide divergence of opinion as to the causes which had produced the act. One ascribed it to the election of Lincoln, another to the failure of the Northern States to execute the fugitive-slave law, a third to the antislavery sentiment of the free States, a fourth to the tariff, a fifth to unconstitutional appropriations by Congress, and so on. On the 24th of December the convention adopted a "Declaration of Causes," and an "Address to the Slaveholding States," the two papers together em-

bracing the above and other specifications. Since neither the Constitution of the United States nor the laws of Congress contained any section, clause, word, or reasonable implication that authorized an act of secession, the "Declaration of Causes" formulated the doctrine of State-rights in justification. That doctrine in substance was, that the several States entered the Union as sovereignties; that in forming the Federal Government they delegated to it only specific powers for specific ends; that the Federal Government was not a sovereign over sovereignties, but was only an agent between them; that there existed no common arbiter to adjudge differences; that each State or sovereignty might judge for itself any violation of the common agreement and choose its own mode of redress; consequently that each State might adhere to or secede from the Union, at its own sovereign will and pleasure.

This doctrine, springing from early differences of constitutional interpretation, had not been promulgated in its ultra form until South Carolina's nullification movement in 1832. It had been accepted and sustained by only a small fraction of the American people. The whole current, action, and development of the government of the United States under the Constitution was based upon the opposite theory. Washington and the succeeding Presidents rejected it in their practical administration; Marshall and the Supreme Court condemned it in their judicial decisions; Webster refuted it in his highest constitutional arguments; Congress repudiated it in its legislation; Jackson denounced it in executive proclamation as treasonable and revolutionary; and the people of the Union at large regarded it as an absurd and dangerous political heresy.



MAJOR ROBERT ANDERSON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

CHARLESTON HARBOR.

We have sketched the positions assumed by President Buchanan upon the political theories involved in the secession movement, as well as the contradictory policy he proposed to pursue in dealing with it. In addition, it becomes necessary to state briefly the practical action so far taken by him, especially in regard to the forts in Charleston Harbor, the possession of which was so earnestly desired by the leaders of rebellion in South Carolina. To secede, to declare their political independence without power to control their harbors and regulate their commerce, would be an absurdity calculated to draw upon them only the ridicule of foreign powers. The possession of the Federal forts, therefore, far exceeded in importance even their ordinance of secession, and had engaged a much earlier and deeper solicitude on their part. These forts were three in number. Look

at any good map of Charleston Harbor, and it will be seen that the city lies on the extreme point of a tongue of land between the Ashley and Cooper rivers, every part being within easy range under the guns of Castle Pinckney, which stands on a small island, three-quarters of a mile distant. Four miles to seaward is the mouth of the harbor, and nearly midway therein stands the more extensive and imposing work of Fort Sumter, its guns not only sweeping all the approaches and ship-channels, but the shores and islands on either hand. It needs but a glance at the map to see that, with proper garrisons and armaments, Fort Sumter commands the harbor, and Castle Pinckney commands the city, in the absence of very formidable preparations for attack.

Owing to the long period of peace through which the country had passed, these works were in a neglected condition, and only partly occupied. There was only an ordnance sergeant in Castle Pinckney, only an ordnance sergeant in Fort Sumter, and a partial garrison at Fort Moultrie. Both Sumter and Moultrie were greatly, and Castle Pinckney slightly, out of repair, with no mounted guns or the usual necessary appurtenances for defense. During the summer of 1860 Congress made an appropriation for these works; and the engineer captain who had been in charge for two years past had, indeed, been ordered to begin and prosecute repairs in the two forts. Whether this step was taken to afford ultimate help to the Union or help to the Rebellion, will perhaps never be historically proved, nor is the fact material.

It is needless at this point to enter upon certain very interesting details showing how these forts, from the very first, became objects of prime solicitude; how the leaders and people of Charleston in various ways manifested their purpose to seize them; how General Scott recommended that they should be reënforced; how the officer in command specifically asked that the garrison in Moultrie might be increased; how Secretary of War Floyd sent an officer to inspect their condition.

A more necessary fact to be stated is that the Administration, on the 13th of November, ordered Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky to take command of the forts and forces in Charleston Harbor. In the execution of this duty Major Anderson reached Fort Moultrie and assumed command on November 21st; and having from his several interviews with the President, Secretary of War, and Lieutenant-General Scott become fully impressed with the importance of his trust, proceeded as a first step to acquaint himself thoroughly with his situation and resources. As a result his report urgently warned the Government that the harbor must be immediately and strongly reënforced, and this suggestion he repeated from time to time with earnestness and persistence. This judicious advice, however, was neglected by the President and rejected by the Secretary of War. "It is believed,"— so ran the reply and apparently the final decision of the Government,—

"from information thought to be reliable, that an attack will not be made on your command, and the Secretary has only to refer to his conversation with you, and to caution you that should his convictions unhappily prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be free from the charge of initiating a collision. If attacked, you are, of course, expected to defend the trust committed to you to the best of your ability. The increase of the force under your command, however much to be desired, would, the Secretary thinks, judging from the recent excitement produced on account of an anticipated increase, as mentioned in your letter, but add to that excitement, and might lead to serious results."

It is a fair inference from facts not necessary to relate here that the Charleston leaders of secession had knowledge of this decision of the Secretary of War; but so eager was their desire to prevent reënforcements that they proceeded to obtain a substantial pledge in that behalf.

On Saturday, December 8th, four of the representatives in Congress from South Carolina requested an interview of President Buchanan, which he granted them. One of their number has related the substance of their address with graphic frankness:

"Mr. President, it is our solemn conviction that if you attempt to send a solitary soldier to these forts, the instant the intelligence reaches our people (and we shall take care that it does reach them, for we have sources of information in Washington so that no orders for troops can be issued without our getting information) these forts will be forcibly and immediately stormed.

"We all assured him that if an attempt was made to transport reënforcements, our people would take these forts, and that we would go home and help them to do it; for it would be suicidal folly for us to allow these forts to be manned. And we further said to him that a bloody result would follow the sending of troops to those forts, and that we did not believe that the authorities of South Carolina would do anything prior to the meeting of this convention, and that we hoped and believed that nothing would be done after this body met until we had demanded of the general government the recession of these forts." *

Here was an avowal to the President himself — not only of treason at Charleston, but of conspiracy in the executive departments of the general Government; a demand coupled with menace. Instead of meeting these with a stern rebuke and dismissal, the President cowered and yielded. He hastened to assure his visitors that it was his determination "not to reënforce the forts in the harbor and

* Statement of Miles and Keitt to the South Carolina Convention.

thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked," or until he had "certain evidence that they were about to be attacked."

The President suggested that "for prudential reasons" it would be best to put in writing what they had said to him verbally. This they readily promised, and on Monday, the 10th, gave him, duly signed by five of the South Carolina representatives, this important paper:

"WASHINGTON, December 9th, 1860.

"In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made through an accredited representative to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the Federal Government, provided that no reënforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present."

When President Buchanan came to look at the cold, explicit language of this document, he shrank from the definite programme to which it committed him. "I objected to the word 'provided,' as it might be construed into an agreement on my part which I never would make. They said nothing was further from their intention; they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it."* There followed mutual protests that the whole transaction was voluntary, informal, and in the nature of a mediation; that neither party possessed any delegated authority or binding power.

While the Charleston conspirators had thus taken effectual steps to bind the future acts of the Executive in respect to the forts in Charleston Harbor, and to make sure that the rising insurrection in South Carolina should not be crippled or destroyed by any surprise or sudden movement emanating from Washington, they were not less watchful to counteract and prevent any possible hostile movement against them on the part of Major Anderson or his handful of officers and troops in Fort Moultrie, undertaken on their own discretion. Their boast of secret sources of information in Washington, coupled with subsequent events, furnish unerring proof that Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, though openly opposing disunion, was already in their confidence and councils, and was lending them such active coöperation as might be disguised or perhaps still excused to his own conscience as tending to avert collision and bloodshed.

Shortly before, or about the time of the truce we have described, Secretary Floyd sent an officer of the War Department to Fort Moultrie with special verbal instructions to Major Anderson, which were duly communicated and the substance of them reduced to writing and delivered to that officer, on the 11th of December, being the day following the final conclusion of the President's unofficial truce at Washington.

Upon mere superficial inspection this order disclosed only the then dominant anxiety of the Administration to prevent collision. But if we remember that it was issued and sent to Major Anderson without the President's knowledge and without the knowledge of General Scott,† and especially if we keep in sight the state of public sentiment of both Charleston and Washington and the paramount official influences which had taken definite shape in the President's truce, we can easily read between the lines that it was a most artfully contrived document to lull suspicion while it effectually restrained Major Anderson from any act or movement which might check or control the insurrectionary preparations. He must do nothing to provoke aggression; he must take no hostile attitude without evident and imminent necessity; he must not move his troops into Fort Sumter, unless it were attempted to attack or take possession of one of the forts or such a design was tangibly manifested. Practically, when the attempt to seize the vacant forts might come it would be too late to prevent it, and certainly too late to move his own force into either of them. Practically, too, any serious design of that nature would never be permitted to come to his knowledge. Supplement these negations and restrictions by the unrecorded verbal explanations and comments made by Major Buell, by his emphatic and express disapproval of the meager defensive preparations which had been made, such as his open declaration that a few loop-holes "would have a tendency to irritate the people,"‡ and we can readily imagine how a faithful officer, whose reiterated reasonable requests had been refused, felt that under such instructions, amid such surroundings, under such neglect, "his hands were tied" and that he and his little command were a foredoomed sacrifice.§

* Buchanan to Comrs., December 31st, 1860. W. R., I., p. 116.

† "The President has listened to him with due friendliness and respect, but the War Department has been little communicative. Up to this time he has not been shown the written instructions of Major Anderson, nor been informed of the purport of those more recently conveyed to Fort Moultrie verbally by Major Buell."—[General Scott (by G. W. Lay) to Twiggs, December 28th, 1860. "War Records," Vol. I., p. 580.]

‡ Doubleday's "Sumter," p. 51.

§ In a Senate speech, January 10th, 1861 ("Globe," page 307), Jefferson Davis, commenting on these orders, while admitting that they empowered Major Anderson to go from one post to another, said, "though his orders were not so designed, as I am assured."

THE RETIREMENT OF CASS.

THE non-coercion doctrine had been yielded as early as November 20th, in the Attorney-General's opinion of that date. The fact was rumored not only in the political circles of the capital, but in the chief newspapers of the country; and the three secession members of the Cabinet had doubtless communicated it confidentially to all their prominent and influential confederates. Since that time South Carolina had continued her preparation for secession with unremitting industry; Mississippi had authorized a convention and appointed commissioners to visit all the slave States and propagate disunion — among them Mr. Thompson, Buchanan's Secretary of the Interior, exercised this insurrectionary function while yet remaining in the Cabinet. North Carolina had refused to go into an election of United States senator; Florida had passed a convention bill; Georgia had initiated legislative proceedings to bring about a conference of the Southern States at Atlanta; both houses of the National Congress had rung with secession speeches, while daily and nightly caucuses took place at Washington.

Mr. Buchanan's truce with the South Carolina representatives had as little effect in arresting the secession intrigues as his non-coercion doctrine officially announced in the annual message. On the evening of the very day (December 8th) on which he received the South Carolina pledge, his Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb of Georgia, tendered his resignation, announcing in the same letter his intention to embark in the active work of disunion. "My withdrawal," he wrote to the President, "has not been occasioned by anything you have said or done." Ignoring the fact that the Treasury was prosperous and solvent when he took charge of it, and that at the moment of his leaving, it could not pay its drafts, Mr. Cobb five days later published a long and inflammatory address to the people of Georgia, concluding with this exhortation: "I entertain no doubt either of your right or duty to secede from the Union. Arouse then all your manhood for the great work before you and be prepared on that day to announce and maintain your independence out of the Union, for you will never again have equality and justice in it."

The President had scarcely yet found a successor for Mr. Cobb when the head of his Cabinet, Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, also tendered his resignation and retired from the Administration.

The incident of Secretary Cass's resignation brings into relief the mental reservations under which Buchanan's paradoxical theories had been concurred in by his Cabinet. A private memorandum, in Mr. Buchanan's handwriting, commenting on the event, makes the following emphatic statement:

> "His resignation was the more remarkable on account of the cause he assigned for it. When my late message (of December, 1860) was read to the Cabinet before it was printed, General Cass expressed his unreserved and hearty approbation for it, accompanied by every sign of deep and sincere feeling. He had but one objection to it, and this was, that it was not sufficiently strong against the power of Congress to make war upon a State for the purpose of compelling her to remain in the Union; and the denial of this power was made more emphatic and distinct upon his own suggestion."—[G. T. Curtis's "Life of Buchanan," II., p. 399.]

But this position was probably qualified and counterbalanced in his own mind by the President's positive promise that he would collect the Federal revenue and protect the Federal property. Little by little, however, delay and concession rendered this impossible. The collector at Charleston still nominally exercised his functions as a Federal officer; but it was an open secret among the Charleston authorities, and must also by this time have become known to the Government at Washington, that he was only holding the place in trust for the coming secession convention. As to protecting the Federal property, the refusal to send Anderson troops, the President's truce, the gradual development of Mr. Buchanan's irresolution and lack of courage, and finally Mr. Cobb's open defection, must have convinced Mr. Cass that under existing determinations, orders, and influences it was an utterly hopeless prospect.

The whole question seems to have been finally debated and decided in a long and stormy Cabinet session held on December 13th.* The events of the past few days had evidently shaken the President's confidence in his own policy. He startled his dissembling and conspiring Secretary of War with the sudden question, "Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruits to Charleston to strengthen the forts?" "Don't you intend to strengthen the forts at Charleston?" The apparent change of policy alarmed the Secretary, but he replied promptly that he did not. "Mr. Floyd," continued Mr. Buchanan, "I would rather be in the bottom of the Potomac to-morrow than that these forts in Charleston should fall into the hands of those who intend to take them. It will destroy me, sir, and, Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover your name with an infamy that all time can never efface, because it is in vain that you will attempt to show that you have not some complicity in handing over those forts to those who take them." The wily

* Floyd's Richmond speech. "N. Y. Herald," January 17th, 1861, p. 2.

Secretary replied, "I will risk my reputation, I will trust my life that the forts are safe under the declarations of the gentlemen of Charleston." "That is all very well," replied the President, "but does that secure the forts?" "No, sir; but it is a guaranty that I am in earnest," said Floyd. "I am not satisfied," said the President.

Thereupon the Secretary made the never-failing appeal to the fears and timidity of Mr. Buchanan. He has himself reported the language he used:

"I am sorry for it," said he; "you are President, it is for you to order. You have the right to order, and I will consider your orders when made. But I would be recreant to you if I did not tell you that this policy of garrisoning the forts will lead to certain conflicts; it is the inauguration of civil war, and the beginning of the effusion of blood.

"[If] it is a question of property, why not put an ordnance sergeant — a man who wears worsted epaulets on his shoulders and stripes down his pantaloons — as the representative of the property of the United States? That will be enough to secure the forts. If it is a question of property, he represents it,* and let us wait until the issue is made by South Carolina. She will go out of the Union and send her commissioners here. Up to that point the action is insignificant. Action after this demands the attention of the great council of the nation. Let us submit the question to Congress — it is for Congress to deal with the matter."

This crafty appeal to the President's hesitating inclinations was seconded by the active persuasions of the leading conspirators of Congress whom Floyd promptly called to his assistance.

"I called for help from that bright Saladin of the South, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi — and I said, 'Come to my rescue, the battle is a little more than my weak heart can support — come to me,' and he came. Then came that old jovial-looking, noble-hearted representative from Virginia, James M. Mason. Here came that anomaly of modern times, the youthful Nestor, here came Hunter. From the North, the South, the East, and the West there came up the patriots of the country, the champions of constitutional liberty, and they talked with the President of the United States, and they quieted his fears and assured him in the line of duty. They said, 'Let there be no force'; and the President said to me, 'I am content with your policy!' and then it was that we determined that we would send no more troops to the harbor in Charleston." — [Floyd's Richmond speech. "N. Y. Herald," January 17th, 1861, p. 2.]

With a last effort to rouse the President from his lethargy, Cass demanded in the Cabinet meeting of the 13th, that the forts should be strengthened. But he was powerless to break the spell. Says Floyd:

"The President said to him in reply, with a beautiful countenance and with a heroic decision that I shall never forget, in the council chamber, 'I have considered this question — I am sorry to differ from the Secretary of State — I have made up my mind. The interests of the country do not demand a reënforcement of the forces in Charleston. I cannot do it — and I take the responsibility of it upon myself.'"

The other Union members of the Cabinet received the rumor of Mr. Cass's resignation with gloomy apprehensions. Postmaster-General Holt,† with whom by reason of their loyal sympathy he had been on intimate terms, hastened to him to learn whether the report were indeed true and whether his determination were irrevocable. Cass confirmed the fact with his own lips; saying that, representing the Northern and loyal constituency which he did, he could no longer without dishonor to himself and to them remain in such treasonable surroundings. Holt endeavored to persuade him that under the circumstances it was all the more necessary that the loyal members of the Cabinet should remain at their posts, in order to prevent the country's passing into the hands of the secessionists by mere default. But Cass replied, No; that the public feeling and sentiment of his section would not tolerate such a policy on his part. "For you," he said, "coming from a border State, where a modified, perhaps a divided, public sentiment exists, that is not only a possible course, but it is a true one; it is your duty to remain, to sustain the Executive and counteract the plots of the traitors. But my duty is otherwise; I must adhere to my resignation."

FORT SUMTER.

THE Charleston conspirators were aware that, in their well-laid intrigues to obtain possession of all the Charleston forts, there was one point of weakness and danger. They had secured a virtual pledge that no reënforcements would be sent, and they had reasonable confidence that at any desirable moment they could, by a sudden, overwhelming assault, capture Fort Moultrie with its slender garrison of sixty soldiers under Anderson's command. But if Anderson should suddenly move his garrison into Fort Sumter, a larger and stronger work, rising sheer out of the waters of the bay, midway in the mouth of the harbor, their task would be more serious, perhaps impossible. Against such a contingency they had taken two important precautions. The vaguely worded instructions of Secretary Floyd, as interpreted by themselves, seemed to forbid such a movement on his part; and to make assurance more

* Jefferson Davis, in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," p. 215, Vol. I., also lays claim to this suggestion: "The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden duty to preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this I replied with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I would pledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores and munitions in the fort, and an ordnance sergeant with a few men left in charge of them, they would not be disturbed."

† Holt, conversation with J. G. N. MS.

certain they had set two guard-boats to patrolling the harbor at night to discover and prevent any surprise of this character.

Anderson also clearly saw the point of military advantage, and by a very pointed suggestion asked on December 22d for instructions from the War Department for a movement from Moultrie to Sumter,* but found no response in the hopes and designs of Secretary Floyd.

The officers meantime freely visited the city and exchanged social courtesies with leading secessionists with many mutual protestations of the highest regard. "We appreciate your position," said their entertainers. "It is a point of honor with you to hold the fort, but a political necessity obliges us to take it."† But after the passage of the ordinance of secession, Major Anderson had ceased his visits to Charleston. Christmas day, however, was once more celebrated with these social amenities at a family party in Moultrieville, on Sullivan's Island. When Anderson returned from the scene of merry-making, in the solitude of his soldier's room he formed the resolution to abandon Fort Moultrie at the earliest possible moment; and on the evening of December 26th the transfer was secretly and successfully accomplished.

A BLUNDERING COMMISSION.

On Wednesday, December 26th, at 3 o'clock P. M., it being about the same time of the same day that Anderson was completing his preparations to leave Moultrie, Messrs. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr, the three commissioners from South Carolina, reached Washington. They were by authority of the convention empowered to negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship between the embryo republic and the United States; to secure the delivery of the forts, arsenal, and light-houses; to divide the public property and apportion the public debt, and generally to settle all pending questions, upon the assumption that South Carolina was no longer a member of the Union, but an independent foreign State.

There being no concealment about the temper and purpose of Mr. Buchanan, the arrival of the commissioners was promptly communicated to him, and he with an equal promptness appointed an interview with them at 1 o'clock of the next day, Thursday, December 27th. On their part, the commissioners deliberately settled themselves for business by taking a house and appointing a secretary. But at sunrise on Thursday things were no longer as they had been at the previous sunset. Anderson's move on the military chess-board had changed not only the game of war but, yet more radically, the game of politics. The Charleston authorities, dumfounded by the event, probably suspected treachery from the Administration, and under this impulse interdicted the transmission of the news northward‡ until the next forenoon. They, however, sent the information to the commissioners at Washington, who communicated it to Mr. Buchanan.§

Catching at straws, Buchanan's first impulse was to assume that Anderson had abandoned Moultrie in a panic, and to restore the *status* by ordering him back into the fort. He had the distinct impression that his orders did not contemplate or permit the change; showing either how ignorant he was of the Buell memorandum, which had passed under his personal notice only six days before, or how thoroughly that contradictory document had mystified him as well as everybody else. Had the influences which were theretofore paramount in Washington yet remained intact, it is more than likely that this first impulse of the President would have been carried out. But things were changed at the capital as well as in Charleston. An embezzlement of near a million dollars' worth of Indian Trust Bonds had come to light and kept the Federal city and the whole country in a ferment for nearly a week. A department clerk and a New York contractor were in prison; but the responsibility of the affair had been brought home to Secretary Floyd so pointedly that three days before the President requested his resignation. Floyd was in no haste to comply, and Mr. Buchanan was too timid to dismiss his disgraced minister summarily, who still exercised the functions of Secretary of War.

Anderson's report, written at 8 P. M. on December 26th and sent by mail, had not yet reached Washington. Floyd was, therefore, incredulous about what the commissioners told him, but took immediate steps to verify the rumor. "Information has reached here this morning," he telegraphed to Anderson on the morning of the 27th, "that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. Explain the meaning of this report."

"The telegram is correct," replied Anderson; "I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I

* Anderson to A. G., December 22d, 1860. W. R., I., p. 105.

† Doubleday, p. 47.

‡ The news of the evacuation of Moultrie, which should have been telegraphed before midnight, did not reach Washington till about noon next day, and then only by way of Baltimore. (Washington "Star," 27th, Baltimore telegram.)

§ Mr. Buchanan's Administration, p. 180.

was certain that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns from being used against us." And he added, "If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight."

Meanwhile the Cabinet was called together to deliberate on the unwelcome news. During the two weeks which had elapsed since the retirement of Cass and Cobb, a profound change had occurred in that body of presidential advisers. Governor Thomas of Maryland, also a secessionist, was made Secretary of the Treasury, a substitution which brought no reform; but, on the other hand, Black had not only been made Secretary of State but had been marvelously transformed in his political sentiments and acts by being brought into contact and companionship with Edwin M. Stanton, a man of iron will and hearty Union sentiments, who was nominated to succeed him as Attorney-General. A new and healthier atmosphere pervaded the executive council chamber in the discussion of the crisis. But the political condition of the nation was so abnormal, the public service so disorganized, and the executive so timid, that for three days and four nights, from the evening of the 27th to the morning of the 31st, Anderson hung doubtfully in the balance between honorable approval and disgraceful censure.*

Secretary Floyd maintained with vehemence the existence of a mutual pledge created by the President's truce of the 10th; and claimed that Anderson had violated this pledge, since there was nothing in his instructions which could in any wise justify his removal to Sumter. Against this assumption Mr. Black, the new Secretary of State, took much more radical union ground than he had hitherto occupied. He insisted that Anderson's transfer was in perfect accordance with his orders, announced his unqualified approval of it, and asserted the duty of the Administration to sustain it. In regard to the issue thus raised, the President exhibited his usual irresolution. He denied the technical existence of a pledge, but could not, of course, deny its spirit; and sided with Floyd in the belief that Anderson's zeal had outrun the limit of his instructions. The Buell memorandum and the modifying order were sent for in hot haste, and now for the first time underwent Cabinet criticism. The studied ambiguity of these papers furnished arguments for both sides; the entire question turning upon the point whether Anderson had "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act." Floyd now submitted a written demand that he should be allowed at once to order the garrison to be withdrawn entirely from the harbor of Charleston, alleging that the Government was dishonored in the violation of its most solemn pledges.

Pending the discussion, the Cabinet adjourned until evening. The President's audience to the commissioners had been postponed until the next day; but they were not idle. All that day and until midnight they were the center of the consternation, the hopes, and the counsels of the conspirators.† Meanwhile the official leakage, the Baltimore dispatches, and finally the issue of the afternoon papers had communicated Anderson's stroke to the whole Federal city, which seethed with excitement. General Scott, confined to his sick-room, sent his aide-de-camp to remind the President of the existence of such an officer as the General-in-Chief of the American armies. In the evening the adjourned Cabinet meeting resumed its deliberations, and continued the session to a late hour. News went forth to the Northern newspapers that night that before its close a vote of four to three had decided against ordering the troops back to Moultrie. This news, however, was premature. Whether a vote was taken or not, the question did not reach a decision. What was done is described in the language of Mr. Buchanan:

"In this state of suspense, the President determined to await official information from Major Anderson himself. After its receipt, should he be convinced upon full examination that the major, on a false alarm, had violated his instructions, he might then think seriously of restoring for the present the former *status quo* of the forts."

But the aggressive acts of the insurgents were continually outrunning the vacillating decisions of the President. During the afternoon and evening of Thursday, Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the Arsenal, Post-office, and Custom-house at Charleston passed into the hands of the insurrection. Like the news of Anderson's transfer the day before, the information was suppressed by the Charleston authorities. Beyond its transmission perhaps to their friends in Washington, none of the transactions at Charleston on Thursday afternoon and night were permitted to be telegraphed to the North, until about 10 o'clock on Friday morning the 28th, in the hope that the order for Anderson's return could be extorted from the President before he should be stung to resistance.

But the seizures at Charleston, made on the personal judgment of Governor Pickens, and against at least the implied consent of the convention, were of doubtful expediency for them,

* C. F. Black, "Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black," pp. 11 and 12.

† Charleston "Courier," December 28th, 1860. Washington dispatch of 27th.

and were so regarded by many ardent secessionists. The "Richmond Whig" denounced them as a "shameful outrage," and soundly berated South Carolina for not being content to go out of the Union peacefully. These seizures, however, might still have been turned to advantage, but for the more serious blunder now committed by the commissioners themselves.

Their promised interview with Mr. Buchanan, postponed from 1 o'clock on Thursday, on account of the Anderson news, was held at half-past 2 on Friday the 28th. The President had that forenoon heard of the Charleston outrages, and knew that from being the agents of a conspiracy they had now become the emissaries of an insurrection. But he failed to note the declaration of the Constitution that treason against the United States consists in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. According to his explanations the Constitution indeed forbade his recognizing the authority of the commissioners, or deciding their claim; but he would give this claim point and dignity by referring it officially to Congress, with the sanction of a presidential message.

Had sound judgment guided them they would have seized eagerly upon this *quasi* acceptance of their mission,— which virtually gave them the President as an ally,— divided and paralyzed Congress by a sudden and combined intrigue, and made a conciliatory appeal to the commercial apprehensions of the Northern cities and manufacturing districts. But instead they now ventured their whole success upon a single desperate chance. Assuming a tone of anger and accusation, they impugned the honor of the Government, asked explanations of Anderson's conduct under the futile threat of suspending negotiations which were not yet begun, and urged the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston.

Under wiser advice Mr. Buchanan's hesitating decision finally went against them; and in that failure terminated the last and only hope of accomplishing peaceable secession.

THE CABINET RÉGIME.— BUCHANAN'S VIRTUAL ABDICATION.

THE ultimatum presented by the commissioners was at once made the subject of a Cabinet discussion, and continued in the evening of the same day. No decision was arrived at, and the meetings would be without special interest, were it not for the report of one of the incidents that shows the feeling which divided the presidential advisers into two irreconcilable factions. The scene is given in the language of one of the participants in the evening session of Friday, December 28th, who afterward recounted the event in the council-room of the White House itself.

"The last I saw of Floyd," said Secretary Stanton, "was in this room, lying on the sofa which then stood between the windows yonder. I remember it well — it was on the night of the 28th of December, 1860. We had had high words and had almost come to blows, in our discussion over Fort Sumter. Thompson was here — Thompson was a plausible talker, and as a last resort, having been driven from every other argument, advocated the evacuation of the fort on the plea of generosity. South Carolina, he said, was but a small State with a sparse white population — we were a great and powerful people and a strong, vigorous government. We could afford to say to South Carolina, 'See, we will withdraw our garrison as an evidence that we mean you no harm.'"

Stanton replied to him, "Mr. President, the proposal to be generous implies that the Government is strong, and that we as the public servants have the confidence of the people. I think that is a mistake. No administration has ever suffered the loss of public confidence and support as this has done. Only the other day it was announced that a million of dollars had been stolen from Mr. Thompson's department. The bonds were found to have been taken from the vault where they should have been kept, and the notes of Mr. Floyd were substituted for them. Now it is proposed to give up Sumter. All I have to say is, that no administration, much less this one, can afford to lose a million of money and a fort in the same week. Floyd remained silent and did not reappear in that chamber."*

The Cabinet was again convened on the evening of Saturday, December 29th; but when it met, there was one vacant seat at the council-board. During that day, Floyd sent in his formal resignation, complaining that he had been subjected "to a violation of solemn pledges and plighted faith." The resignation was duly accepted on the following Monday, and the War Department placed provisionally under the charge of Postmaster-General Holt.† To the six assembled councilors, Mr. Buchanan now submitted the draft of his reply to the commissioners. The precise terms and substance of this document remain unpublished, and we are compelled to gather its import from a rather elaborate written criticism of it by a member of the Cabinet. This indicates, however, with sufficient clearness

* Stanton, conversation. J. G. N., Personal memoranda. MS.

† R. R., I., Doc. 10.

that the paper, like all Mr. Buchanan's writings and conversations of this period, was contradictory, loose in expression, and entirely lacking in any clear presentation of issues.

Most radical of all the changes effected by these developments was that wrought in the Hon. Jeremiah S. Black, Secretary of State. Growing with his increasing national responsibilities, he now, with the Sumter crisis, seems to have risen, for a time at least, to genuine leadership.

On Sunday morning, December 30th, convinced of the President's intention to adhere to his submitted reply to the commissioners, Mr. Black convened the Union section of the Cabinet, and announcing to them his inability to further sustain the President's contemplated action, declared his intention to resign, in which resolve he was also joined by Mr. Stanton. After due discussion and reflection, Mr. Toucey carried the information of this threatened defection to the President. Mr. Buchanan's courage utterly broke down before the prospect of finding himself alone in face of the political complications which came crowding upon him. He at once sent for Mr. Black; and after a confidential interview, the details of which have never been revealed, he gave the objectionable draft of his reply to his Secretary of State, with liberty to make all changes and amendments which in his opinion might be necessary. It was the President's virtual abdication.

Mr. Black rewrote his answer to the commissioners, refusing their demand. This result abruptly terminated their mission, and sent them home, not alone in the bitterness of disappointment, but to the great consternation of the Charleston conspirators. It also left Anderson in command and possession of Sumter, with at least the implied approval of the Government. There is not space here to relate the events of the next few days: the sudden change of policy pervading the Executive Mansion; the vigorous efforts of the Union members of the Cabinet to send reënforcements to Anderson; the relief expedition which sailed in the steamer *Star of the West*, and its unsuccessful effort to reach Fort Sumter; how Governor Pickens began the construction of batteries around it with which the rebels bombarded and captured the fort some three months later; and finally the further transformation of the executive council of the President by the retirement of the two secessionist members Thompson and Thomas, the latter being succeeded by John A. Dix as Secretary of the Treasury, who has left so brilliant a record as a stanch defender of the Government and the Union. With the adjournment of that Cabinet meeting on Saturday night, December 29th, therefore, terminated the real administration of James Buchanan. Thenceforward, though he still continued to affix his official signature, the country was practically governed, in his name, by his Cabinet, to the end of the presidential term.

THE COTTON "REPUBLICS."

In the main the secession incidents and proceedings enacted in South Carolina were imitated and repeated in the other cotton States. Their several governors initiated the movement by early official action,— proclamations, messages, and orders. The office-holders at each State capital formed a convenient local caucus and committee of conspiracy. The programme in each case ran through essentially the same stages. There was first the meeting of the legislature, prompted and influenced by the State officials and the senators and representatives in Congress. Then under a loud outcry of public danger which did not exist, hasty measures to arm and defend the State; large military appropriations and extensive military organization. Next an act to call a convention, ostensibly to consult public opinion, but really for the occasion to rouse and mislead it. In each of the cotton States the Breckinridge Democracy, the most ultra of the three factions, all pro-slavery, was largely in the majority. Again, the long political agitation had brought into power and prominence the most radical leaders of this extreme party. These radical leaders were generally disunionists at heart, even where they had not been active and persistent conspirators. They now took up with alacrity the task of electing a secession convention. That the people were not with them a month before the presidential election is proved by the replies of the several governors to South Carolina, which are cited in a previous chapter. Nothing but the election itself had occurred to change that feeling; no threat, no act, no law, no catastrophe. Had governors and officials remained silent, the people would have felt no want and seen no danger. But when official action began the agitation, first by proclamations, then by legislative enactments, and lastly by forcing the issue upon the people through an election for delegates, there came an inevitable growth and cumulation of excitement. In this election it was the audacious, the ambitious, the reckless element which took the lead; which gathered enthusiasm, which organized success.

It must be remembered that this result was reached under specially favoring conditions. The long slavery agitation had engendered a brooding discontent, and the baseless

complaint of sectional injustice had grown through mere repetition from clamor into belief. The presidential election left behind it the sharp sting of defeat. Not in form and in law, but nevertheless in essential characteristics, the South was controlled by a landed aristocracy. The great plantation masters dominated society and politics. There was no diffused and healthy popular action, as in the town meetings of New England. Even the slaves of the wealthy proprietors spoke with habitual contempt of the "poor white trash" who lived in mean cabins and hoed their own corn and cotton. Except in Georgia the opposition to the secessionists' programme was either hopelessly feeble or entirely wanting. The Bell and Douglas factions had bitterly denounced Lincoln and the Republicans during the presidential campaign. Disarmed by their own words, they could not now defend them. The seaboard towns and cities of the South, jealous of the commercial supremacy of the North, anticipated in independence and free trade a new growth and a rich prosperity. Over all floated the constant dream of Southern Utopians, an indefinite expansion southward into a great slave empire. We may infer that under these various causes the election in most instances went by default.

Three special agencies coöperated with marked effect to stimulate the movement. Very early each cotton State sent commissioners to each of the other Southern States, and in every case the most active and zealous secessionists were of course appointed. These commissioners attended, harangued, and intrigued with the various deliberative assemblies, and thus constituted a network of most industrious propagandism. Another potent influence was the assembling of military conventions, that is, convocations of the captains, majors, colonels, and would-be generals, to spur on or intimidate lagging legislatures and conventions. Finally, the third and most effective piece of machinery was the State delegations in Congress assembled in Washington city at the beginning of December, and sending a running fire of encouragement or orders home to the capitals of their States.

Even with all this organization acting intelligently and persistently to a common end, from two to three months were required to work up the people of the cotton States to an acquiescence in the rebellion the conspirators had for years been planning. Without being exactly of contemporaneous date, it happened that in general the month of November witnessed the assembling of the legislatures and the making of necessary laws and appropriations. The month of December was mainly occupied by the election of delegates to the State conventions. In this stage the voice of central authority from Washington was begun to be utilized. While the election excitement was at its highest ferment, there came from Washington, under date of the 14th of December, the revolutionary circular, signed by about one-half the Southern senators and representatives in Congress already quoted elsewhere. This circular announced that argument was exhausted, that hope was extinguished, that the Republicans would grant nothing which would or ought to satisfy the South, and that the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people required immediate separate State secession, and the organization of a Southern confederacy. The effect of a congressional firebrand of such dimensions thrown upon the inflammable temper of the cotton States at such a juncture, may be easily imagined. Their people could not know that no single assertion in this circular was warranted by the facts; that Congress had not deliberated, that the compromise committees had not reported, and that the Republicans had in no shape presented or declared an ultimatum. The circular had been issued for a purpose, and served the end completely. Few Southern voters or speakers could dare to stand up and deny in Georgia or Alabama the accusation made by these "honorable" signers in Washington.

But the central cabal did not stop with this single *pronunciamento*. By this time the revolution, both local and central, had gained an accelerated momentum, and was rushing rapidly to its climax. Non-coercion was promised, Cass was driven from the Cabinet, the President was overawed, Congress was demoralized. Secession had secured a free path, and counted on an easy victory. So far as had been divulged, the programme hitherto was to complete separation by easy stages during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's term, and not to organize the new Confederacy till after the 4th of March. But about New Year's the central conspiracy received a serious check. There was a Cabinet crisis. Buchanan momentarily asserted himself. Floyd was in turn driven from the Cabinet, the Unionists gained control of it, and Holt was made Secretary of War. This portended loyalty, decision, energy, reënforcements. Immediately there came a shower of telegrams and orders from the Washington fire-eaters to the cotton-State leaders, proclaiming danger and urging action. The central cabal was called together, deliberated earnestly, and perfected and hastened the plot. At a caucus held on January 5th (in one of the rooms of the Capitol building itself, it is said) the decisive and final rev-

olutionary programme committed itself to the following distinct points and plan. First: Immediate secession. Second: A convention at Montgomery, Alabama, not later than the 15th of February, to organize a Confederacy. Third: That, to prevent hostile legislation under the changed and loyal impulses of the President and his reconstructed Cabinet, the cotton-State senators should yet remain awhile in their places, to "keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied." Finally, and most important of all, the caucus appointed a committee, consisting of Jefferson Davis and Senators Slidell and Mallory, "to carry out the object of this meeting."* The future chief of the great rebellion was chosen to preside over its primary organization.

If there had been any hesitation in the several State conventions about taking the final plunge, we may suppose that it disappeared when the programme outlined in this central caucus of January 5th, at Washington, was transmitted. We find that nearly the whole secession movement very speedily followed. Mississippi passed her ordinance on January 9th, Florida on January 10th, Alabama on January 11th, Georgia on January 19th, Louisiana on January 26th, and Texas, where peculiar conditions existed, on February 1st. Immediately connected with the passage of these secession ordinances, in some instances even preceding them, the next step in the insurrectionary scheme was taken. Each governor who organized the revolution in his State, now finding a little army of impulsive volunteers and ambitious officers at his nod and beck, orders two or three regiments to the nearest fort or arsenal, where an ordnance sergeant, or an attenuated infantry or artillery company of Federal soldiers is representing the government title rather than the government power. The insurgents demand possession, and make a display of force. The officer in charge yields to the inevitable. He receives the demand for surrender in the name of the State; he complies under protest. There is a salute to the flag, peaceable evacuation, and he is allowed unmolested transit home as a military courtesy. By this process there was a quick succession of captures through which all the military strongholds and depots in the cotton States, excepting Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Fort Pickens in Pensacola Harbor, Fort Taylor at Key West, and Fort Jefferson on Tortugas Island passed to the occupation and use of the rebellion; giving it a vantage-ground for defense, and a store of war material for offense, which for the first time since the presidential election gave the revolution a serious and formidable strength. We have thus far described the secession movement throughout the South in its general aspect. A glance at some of its features more in detail may not be without interest.

The State of Florida was the most zealous follower of South Carolina. She has a magnificent geographical area; and even allowing that perhaps three-fourths of it may be rivers and swamps, there yet remain near ten million acres of habitable land; which, with a climate favorable to a class of sub-tropical products much in demand, is enough to make her eventually the garden State of the South. But this immense domain was practically a wilderness, notwithstanding her earliest permanent settlement was almost three centuries old. Her white population did not reach the ratio of one representative

* Senator Yulee of Florida to Joseph Finegan, Esq.

"WASHINGTON, January 7, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: On the other side is a copy of resolutions adopted at a consultation of the Senators from the seceding States — in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, and Florida were present. The idea of the meeting was that the States should go out at once, and provide for the early organization of a Confederate Government, not later than 15th February. This time is allowed to enable Louisiana and Texas to participate. It seemed to be the opinion that if we left here, force, loan, and volunteer bills might be passed, which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostilities; whereas by remaining in our places until the 4th of March, it is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of the incoming Administration. The resolutions will be sent by the delegation to the President of the Convention. I have not been able to find Mr. Mallory this morning. Hawkins is in Connecticut. I have therefore thought it best to send you this copy of the resolutions.

"In haste, yours truly,

"D. L. YULEE.

"JOSEPH FINEGAN, Esq.

"'Sovereignty Convention,' Tallahassee, Florida."

The following were the resolutions referred to:

"*Resolved* 1. That in our opinion each of the Southern States should, as soon as may be, secede from the Union.

"*Resolved* 2. That provision should be made for a convention to organize a Confederacy of the seceding States, the convention to meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of Montgomery, in the State of Alabama.

"*Resolved*, That in view of the hostile legislation that is threatened against the seceding States, and which may be consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date for the purpose of defeating such legislation.

"*Resolved*, That a committee be and are hereby appointed, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out the objects of this meeting."

"The copy of these resolutions, forwarded by Senator Mallory January 6th, 1861, to the president of the Florida Convention, shows that they were adopted on the 5th of that month, and that they were signed by Messrs. Davis and Brown, of Mississippi; Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas; Slidell and Benjamin, of Louisiana; Iverson and Toombs, of Georgia; Johnson, of Arkansas; Clay, of Alabama, and Yulee and Mallory, of Florida." W. R., Vol. I., 443-4.

in Congress.* There was not a single town of three thousand inhabitants within her borders. She therefore became an easy prey to her ultra pro-slavery leaders, who were the first to applaud and second the Charleston insurrection. "Florida is with the gallant Palmetto State," wrote her governor, November 9th; and his message to the legislature, November 26th, clamored for "secession from our faithless, perjured Confederates." Under the manipulations of such an executive, backed by the equally aggressive advice and exertions of her two United States senators, prominent among the conspirators at Washington, she went through the forms of a convention, and the passing of a secession ordinance, January 10th. Her governor, with total disregard of authority, had already seized the arsenal at Appalachicola on January 5th, Fort Marion and the ordnance depot at St. Augustine on the 7th, as well as a schooner belonging to the Coast Survey. There were, in the arsenal, no arms, but 500,000 musket cartridges, 300,000 rifle cartridges, and 50,000 pounds of gunpowder. On the 8th he ordered the seizure of the navy yard and forts at Pensacola, which was accomplished on the 12th. However insignificant in her political power, the gain of Florida was nevertheless of great military and strategical value to the rebellion.

In Mississippi, the revolutionary sentiment had long been fostered by her most able and influential politicians. Jefferson Davis, eager to wear the mantle of Calhoun, had two years before announced the new rebellion. His speech at Vicksburg, November 27th, 1858, is thus reported in the "Daily Mississippian":

"Before concluding his remarks, he would anticipate the interrogatory which his audience might be disposed to propound to him, in view of the fast growing strength of the abolition party, as to what policy he would recommend in the event of the triumph of that party in 1860. He was for resistance — stern resistance. Rather than see the executive chair of the nation filled by a sworn enemy of our rights, he would shatter it into a thousand fragments before he had an opportunity of taking his seat. . . . The Government is at an end the very moment that an abolitionist is elected to the presidency."

The governor of Mississippi also was one of the most advanced revolutionists in the South. He declared himself ready for action as early as August 30th, 1860.

"I assure you," wrote he, "that I do sympathize and expect to continue to act with those who dare all and hazard all, rather than see Mississippi become a dependent province of a Black Republican government, and hold her constitutional rights by the frail tenure of Black Republican oath. When sparks cease to fly upwards, Comanches respect treaties, and wolves kill sheep no more, the oath of a Black Republican might be of some value as a protection to slave property."

With Jefferson Davis in the Senate to conspire and advise, and Governor Pettus at home to order and execute, the fate of Mississippi could not long remain in doubt. The legislature had in the previous winter provided a military fund of $150,000. Early in October the State made a purchase of arms, which at Jefferson Davis's request, and with Floyd's concurrence, were obligingly inspected by a government officer. The legislature was convened to meet, November 26th, to consider "the propriety and necessity of providing surer and better safeguards for the lives, liberties, and property of her citizens than have been found or are to be hoped for in Black Republican oaths." Commissioners to other States were appointed, and an election ordered, in pursuance of which a convention met, January 7th, and passed a secession ordinance on January 9th, 84 yeas to 15 nays. The proceedings, as in other States, were secret and precipitate. Military organization was stimulated to the utmost, and on the 20th the unfinished fort on Ship Island and the Marine Hospital on the Mississippi River were seized by the insurrectionists at the governor's orders.

The State of Alabama had by her dominant partisanship on the slavery question been carried farther toward revolt than the other cotton States. Her legislature, on February 24th, 1860, with but two dissenting voices, provided by joint resolution that in case of the election of a Republican President, the governor should at once by proclamation order an election of delegates to a convention "to consider and do whatever in the opinion of said convention the rights, interests, and honor of the State of Alabama requires [*sic*] to be done for their protection." A fund of $200,000 was appropriated for "military contingences"; and the governor was further authorized to send delegates to any future convention of the slave States.

A week after the November elections, the governor in a public letter announced that he would exercise this power to inaugurate revolution as soon as the choice of Lincoln should be made certain by the vote of the electoral college on December 5th. In the same letter he made a labored argument that Alabama ought to secede at once and "coöperate afterward." His proclamation was in due time issued, and the delegates were elected on December 24th. A spirited canvass seems to have been made. Judge Campbell, of the United States Supreme Court, addressed the voters in an earnest letter against disunion. Partisans separated themselves into three groups desig-

* The population of Florida in 1860 was: White, 77,748; free colored, 932; slave, 61,745; total, 140,425. The ratio of representation for Members of Congress, from 1852 to 1863, was 93,423.—"Spofford's American Almanac," 1878, p. 170.

nated respectively as "submissionists," "co-operationists," and "straight-out secessionists." The southern half of the State, embracing the cotton-lands and strong slave counties on the gulf, was intensely revolutionary; the northern end, reaching up towards the commerce of the free States, was, or believed itself to be, conservative and union-loving; and the final popular decision was supposed to hang in considerable doubt.

The meeting of the convention at Montgomery, January 7th, soon dispelled this idea. On the first day it unanimously adopted a resolution declaring in substance that "Alabama cannot and will not submit to the Administration of Lincoln and Hamlin." Why any of the members after such a vote should have hesitated to commit themselves to the full scope of the conspirator's programme, shows the confused perception of their own attitude and intentions. They did not appear to realize how helplessly they were drifting in a current of revolution. Upon such material the radical secessionists concentrated their influence. Outside pressure gathered in overwhelming force. Telegrams poured in upon them in profusion. "They came so thick and fast, they seemed like snowflakes to fall from the clouds," said one of the members. Crowds besieged the doors. The governor had on January 4th, without warrant, seized Mount Vernon arsenal and Forts Morgan and Gaines at Mobile, and had caused the banks to suspend, and he now asked to be justified in these usurpations. News arrived that Florida and Mississippi had seceded. Application was made for military help to seize Pensacola. In the midst of the excitement came telegrams of the firing on the *Star of the West* at Charleston, and its attending incidents.

Before these combined influences conservative resolves and combinations gave way, and an ordinance of immediate secession was prepared. The ubiquitous Yancey, fresh from his Northern disavowals of the "Scarlet Letter," was once more on hand in the rôle of leading conspirator, and came near "precipitating revolution" in the convention itself, by his flaming declamation. The "coöperationists" were pleading for delay, when he indiscreetly threatened the penalties of treason against any factious minority which should venture to disobey an ordinance of secession. The Northern members flared up under the taunt. "Will the gentlemen go into those sections of the State and hang all who are opposed to secession? Will he hang them by families, by neighborhoods, by counties, by congressional districts? Who, sir, will give the bloody order? . . . Are these to be the first-fruits of a Southern Republic?" "Coming at the head of any force which he can muster," replied another member, "aided and assisted by the executive of this State, we will meet him at the foot of our mountains, and there with his own selected weapons, hand to hand, and face to face, settle the question of the sovereignty of the people."

The flurry was quieted, however, and the ordinance reported on the third day of the session. The conservatives endeavored to substitute a project of a slave-State convention, and a basis of settlement with the North, but it was voted down, 54 to 45. After this the radicals had easy sailing, and on January 11th the ordinance passed, 61 to 39. It is touching to read the expressions of regret, of doubt, of protest, with which the opposition members reluctantly gave in their adhesion, and parted from their government and their flag, under the final and fallacious promptings of State pride and the baneful heresy of paramount State allegiance. And this lingering sorrow of delegates was followed in many localities by the lingering condemnation and remonstrance of their constituents. Four weeks later Hon. Jere. Clemens wrote from Huntsville: "There is still much discontent here at the passage of the ordinance of secession, but it is growing weaker daily, and, unless something is done to stir it up anew, will soon die away"; adding, also, "Last week Yancey was burned in effigy in Limestone." But it was all of no avail; the people writhed helplessly in the toils of their false leaders.

The State of Georgia was then, and is still, regarded as the Empire State of the South. Her action, therefore, became an object of the greatest solicitude. Her leading men were known to be divided in sentiment. The North looked with some confidence there for a conservative reaction; but they were leaning on a broken reed. With all their asseverations of loyalty, the Unionists of that State were such only upon impossible conditions. "As a Union man," wrote B. H. Hill, in September, "I shall vote in November. As a Union man I shall hope for the right. As a Southern man I shall meet the enemy and go with my State." Stephens, equally unsound in his allegiance, was ultra-radical on slavery. He believed it the normal condition of the negro, and looked forward to its spread into every State of the Union. Supporting Douglas, he repudiated "Squatter Sovereignty." H. V. Johnson was an old-time "resistance" advocate. This kind of leadership was *quasi* disunion, especially under the assaults of aggressive and uncompromising revolutionists like Toombs, Iverson, Cobb, and Governor Brown.

Nevertheless, the popular voice, which some-

times restrains the rashness of leaders, was yet in doubt, and compelled a policy of slow approaches to insurrection. Governor Brown, therefore, in his message of November 8th, went only to the extent of recommending retaliatory legislation, and that the State should be armed. The vote at the presidential election had been: Breckinridge, 51,889; Bell, 42,886; Douglas, 11,590. The statutes required a majority vote for electors, hence there was no choice by the people. In conformity with law, the legislature was obliged to appoint them; and accordingly it chose (January 29th) a college favorable to Breckinridge. In the interim the legislature was convulsed with the topics of the hour. Stephens made a famous plea for union; Toombs an equally fervid harangue for disunion.

Meanwhile the members had listened to an insidious suggestion apparently midway between the two extremes. "The truth is, in my judgment," writes Stephens, "the wavering scale in Georgia was turned by a sentiment, the key-note to which was given in the words—'We can make better terms out of the Union than in it.' It was Mr. Thomas R. R. Cobb who gave utterance to this key-note in his speech before the legislature two days anterior to my address before the same body. This idea did more, in my opinion, in carrying the State out, than all the arguments and eloquence of all others combined." A formidable outside pressure in the shape of a military convention, and a large secession caucus was also organized and led by Governor Brown. The legislature could not resist the impetuous current. A military appropriation of one million dollars was made November 13th, and a convention bill passed on the 18th.

Perhaps the most hotly contested election campaign which occurred in any Southern State now took place for the convention, in the course of which fifty-two members of the legislature joined in a "coöperation" address, urging a conference of Southern States instead of immediate secession. The vote was cast January 2d, and, encouraged by apparent success, Governor Brown, on the following day, ordered the seizure of Fort Pulaski, and placed the telegraph under surveillance. The convention assembled at Milledgeville on January 16th, and the respective factions mustered their adherents for the combat. The struggle was short and decisive. In place of a brief and direct secession resolution the conservatives offered to substitute a proposition to hold a Southern conference at Atlanta, and setting forth certain "indispensable" amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It is almost needless to say they were exacting and advanced to a degree not yet suggested in any quarter. The "Georgia platform," hitherto proclaimed by Mr. Stephens as his creed, was left far behind. That was a simple affirmance of the settlement of 1850. These new "guarantees" embraced provisions which would in practice have legalized slavery in the free States. There was no more hope that the North would accept them than that it would set up a monarchy. Radical as was this alternative, the straight-out secessionists would not even permit a vote to be taken upon it. The secession resolution was rushed through under the previous question, 166 yeas to 130 nays. On the following day an inquiry into the election for delegates was throttled with similar ferocity, 168 to 127. After this all opposition broke down, and on January 19th the secession ordinance was passed, 208 yeas to 89 nays. It was finally meekly signed by all the delegates but six, and even those promised their lives and fortunes to the cause. Governor Brown, on January 24th, set up the cap-sheaf of insurrection by sending six or seven hundred volunteers to demand and receive the surrender of the Augusta arsenal, declaring with sarcastic etiquette in his demand that "the State is not only at peace, but anxious to cultivate the most amicable relations with the United States Government."

The State of Louisiana followed in the main the action of the already mentioned cotton States except that it was somewhat more tardy. Her governor and her senators in Congress were as pronounced as the other principal conspirators, but her people as a whole were not yet quite so ripe for insurrection. "The State of Louisiana," wrote one of the secession emissaries, "from the fact that the Mississippi River flows through its extent and debouches through her borders, and that the great commercial depot of that river and its tributaries is the city of New Orleans, occupies a position somewhat more complicated than any other of the Southern States, and may present some cause of delay in the consummation and execution of the purpose of a separation from the North-western States, and the adoption of a new political status." Here as elsewhere, however, the executive sword was thrown into the vibrating scale. First, the governor's proclamation calling an extra session of the legislature to meet December 10th; then, on the plea of public danger, an appropriation to arm the State; next, on pretext of consulting public opinion, a convention bill; then, having volunteers, the seizure of Baton Rouge barracks and arsenal (January 10th) and Forts Jackson and St. Phillip (January 15th), and other Federal property; and then the terrorism of loud-mouthed revolution. When the convention

met, January 23d, its tide was already as irresistible as the waters of the Mississippi. A proposition for a slave-State conference was voted down, 106 to 24; another to "provide for a popular vote," defeated by 84 to 43, and on January 26th, some of the "coöperation" delegates having prudently silenced their scruples, the secession ordinance was passed, 113 yeas to 17 nays. Two exceptional incidents occurred in the action of Louisiana. One was the unanimous adoption of a resolution recognizing "the right of the free navigation of the Mississippi River and its tributaries by all friendly States bordering thereon," and also "the right of egress and ingress of the mouths of the Mississippi by all friendly States and powers." The other was that one of her Federal representatives, Hon. John E. Bouligny, remained true to his oath and his loyalty, and continued to hold his seat in Congress to the end of his term — the solitary instance from the cotton States.

It is a significant feature in the secession proceedings of the six cotton States which first took action, that their conventions in every case neglected or refused to submit their ordinances of secession to a vote of the people for ratification or rejection. The whole spirit and all the phenomena of the movement forbade their doing so. From first to last the movement was forced, not spontaneous, official, not popular; and its leaders could not risk the period of doubt which a submission of the ordinances would involve, much less their rejection at the polls. To this general rule Texas, the seventh seceding State, forms an exception. Governor Houston opposed secession, and as long as possible thwarted the conspirators' plans. By a bolder usurpation than elsewhere, they nevertheless assembled an independent and entirely illegal convention, passed an ordinance of secession, February 1st, and held an election to ratify or reject it, February 23d. Long before this they had in substance joined the State to the rebel Confederacy, and the popular vote showed a nominal majority for secession, though the partial returns and the voting, amid a local revolution, afforded no trustworthy indication of a popular sentiment.

Oct 1887

MY SHADOW.

UP and down it follows, follows,
I can never quite escape;
On the hills and in the hollows,
This familiar, silent shape
Still is with me, tireless ever;
Friend or foe — whoe'er I meet,
This companion leaves me never,
Keeping step with soundless feet.

Looking at it, I am lonely,
For a stranger still it seems;
Though it follows me — me only,
Yet, as something seen in dreams,
I behold it. Oft I wonder
Whither all its steps do tend;
All its features hidden under
Veils no changeful winds can rend.

Can no pain nor passion move thee,
O my comrade? I am tossed
By the tempests sent to prove me,—
On thy calm their wrath is lost.
Come thou near, my patient lover,
Let me whisper that I see —
What no other may discover —
Change at last has come to thee!

Once thy feet were swift beside me:
Not a hill too high to climb;
From the heat thou didst not hide thee,
Naught to thee were space and time;
Light as air, I saw thee dancing
Down the pathway where I strayed,—
Dost thou see the night advancing?
Art thou of the dark afraid?

Canst thou hear me, lover, stranger?
Silent shape, I tell thee now,
I, through safety and through danger,
Am become as changed as thou;
Yet my heart leaps on before me,
New stars burn within the sky;
Courage, courage! I implore thee,—
O my comrade, faster fly!

Ellen M. H. Gates.

try. This feeling is not a mere transitory impression; it is a well-founded consciousness of the fact that our ruling mechanism does not answer to the mutability and the increasing complexity of a great empire's demands. Now, as in "the good old times," the central Government jealously excludes the people from participation in the national life and takes upon itself the difficult task of thinking and acting for them. This task was hard enough even when the life of the people went on in the long-established patriarchal way to which both society and the Government were accustomed, but that order of things has undergone in recent years more vital changes than perhaps ever came to a similar system in any country in the course of a single generation. The emancipation of the serfs has completely and radically transformed the whole economic life of the agricultural peasants and the landed proprietors as well as their relations to each other. Artificial methods of swift intercommunication and transportation have altered the time-honored routes and methods of trade and production, have created new industries and destroyed old ones, and have put the fortunes of whole provinces in the hands of the railroad authorities. Banks and financial institutions of various kinds have sprung up in great numbers and have bound widely separated regions together with meshes of mutual obligation and indebtedness. These changes, complicated and supplemented by others like them, have created everywhere a thousand questions and necessities which previously did not exist, and have so interwoven the interests of separate localities that delay or error in the settlement of a question at one point has a direct influence upon the fortunes of other places often very remote. Every local necessity or calamity, whether it be a drought, the grain beetle, the disorganization of a railroad, an epidemic disease, pleuro-pneumonia among cattle, or industrial stagnation, exerts, without losing its local significance, a wide-spread influence upon the well-being of the empire as a whole.

In an economic life thus complicated, one central administration, even though it possess superhuman wisdom and energy, cannot possibly deal with the innumerable questions and problems which, in the absence of popular self-government, necessarily devolve upon it. Whole classes of wants and demands either remain entirely unsatisfied, are inadequately appeased by methods which take no account of local interests, or are met by a series of unsystematic and mutually contradictory measures. Each of these ways of dealing with such wants and demands undermines respect for authority and inspires painful distrust.

The only way to extricate the country from its present position is to summon an independent parliament [*Sobrania*] consisting of representatives of the *zemstvos;* to give that parliament a share in the control of the national life, and to securely guarantee personal rights, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. Such freedom will call into action the best capabilities of the people, will rouse the slumbering life of the nation, and will develop the abundant productive resources of the country. Liberty will do more than the severest repressive measures to crush anarchistic parties hostile to the State. Free discussion will show the error of their theories, and the substitution of vigorous healthful activity for epidemic discontent in the life of the people will deprive them of the field in which they carry on their propaganda.

The Russians are as fit for free institutions as the Bulgarians are, and they feel deep humiliation at being kept so long under guardianship. The desire for such institutions, although forced into concealment, and half stifled by repressive measures, finds expression, nevertheless, in the *zemstvos*, in the assemblies of the nobles, and in the press. The granting of such institutions, and the calling together of a representative body to preside over them, will give to the nation renewed strength, and renewed faith in the Government and in its own future. When the people of Russia made themselves ready for the recent war, it was with an instinctive feeling that in the great work of freeing kindred nations there was the promise of freedom for themselves. Are such expectations, hopes, and promises never to be realized?

THE above temperate, patriotic, and courageous address was laid before the Tsar, and he acted upon it; but, unfortunately, his action came too late. On the 12th of March, 1881, he signed a proclamation announcing to the people his intention to summon a national assembly and to grant a constitutional form of government. On the very next day, before this proclamation had been made public, he was assassinated.

George Kennan.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AT SPRINGFIELD.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MONTGOMERY CONFEDERACY.

FOLLOWING the successive ordinances of secession passed by the cotton-States, their delegations withdrew one by one from Congress. In this final step their senators and members adopted no concerted method, but went according to individual convenience or caprice; some making the briefest announcement of their withdrawal, others delivering addresses of considerable length. These parting declarations contain nothing of historical interest. They are a mere repetition of what they had said many times over in debate: complaints of Northern aggression and allegations of Northern hostility; they failed to make any statement or acknowledgment of the aggressions and hostility on the part of the South against the North. The ceremony of withdrawal, therefore, was formal and perfunctory; pre-announced and recognized as a foregone conclusion, it attracted little attention from Congress or the public. Only two cases were exceptional,—that of Mr. Bouligny, a representative from Louisiana, who, as already mentioned, remained loyal to the Union and retained his seat in the House; and that of Senator Wigfall of Texas, who, radically and outspokenly disloyal, yet kept his seat in the Senate, not only through the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's term, but even during the special session assembled, according to custom, to confirm the nominations made by President Lincoln immediately after his inauguration.

One of the remarkable coincidences of the secession conspiracy is, that on the same day which witnessed the meeting of a peace convention in Washington city to deceive and confuse further the public opinion of the North with discussion of an impossible compromise, the delegates of the seceded States convened at Montgomery, Alabama, to consolidate rebellion and prepare for armed resistance. It is not impossible that this was a piece of strategy, purposely designed by the secession leaders; for the Washington peace conference, despite its constant avowals of a desire to promote union, was originated and managed by the little clique of Virginia conspirators whose every act, if not preconceived, at least resulted in treasonable duplicity.

The secession conventions of the cotton-States had appointed delegates equal in number to their former senators and representatives in Congress. These met in Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th day of February, 1861, to form a Southern Confederacy. The Washington caucus, it will be remembered, suggested the 15th of the month. But such had been the success, or, rather, the want of opposition to the movement, that it was probably considered advisable to hasten the programme, and instead of only having preliminary secession complete by the 4th of March, to finish the whole structure of an independent government before the inauguration of President Lincoln. Thus far Mr. Buchanan had not offered the slightest impediment to the insurrection; it might reasonably be inferred that this inaction on his part would continue to the end of his term. Mr. Lincoln would be powerless until officially invested with the executive duties, and thus the formal organization of a Southern Confederacy could proceed at convenient leisure and in perfect immunity from disturbance.

The meeting at Montgomery had its immediate origin in the resolutions of a committee of the Mississippi Legislature, adopted January 29th; and it is another evidence of the secret and swift concert of secession leaders, that in six days thereafter the delegates of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida were assembled for conference. The delegates from Texas joined them later on. An organization was effected by choosing Howell Cobb chairman, and the body called itself a Provisional Congress, though it was merely a revolutionary council, invested with no direct representation of the people, but appointed by the secession conventions. Its reactionary spirit was shown in returning to the antiquated and centralizing mode of voting by States. This same rule under the old Congress of the Confederation had produced nothing but delay and impotence, and earned deserved contempt; and these

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

HOWELL COBB, PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CONFEDERATE CONGRESS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH LENT BY GENERAL MARCUS J. WRIGHT.)

identical delegates, after incorporating the rule in their provisional scheme of government, immediately rejected it when framing their permanent one. We may infer that they employed it at the moment, because it was admirably suited to the use of cliques and the purposes of intrigue. Very little more than half the delegates of four States could carry a measure, and the minority of total membership could exercise full power of legislation. A project of government was perfected on February 8th, and the name of the "Confederate States of America" was adopted.

This first project was provisional only, to serve for one year; and the Provisional Congress retained the legislative power for the same period. The temporary continuance of certain United States laws and officials was provided for. On the following day (February 9th) it elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi President and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia Vice-President of the new Confederacy. The body then set itself more seriously at work to prepare a permanent constitution which should go into effect a year later. This labor it completed and adopted on the 11th of March. In this permanent constitution, as in the provisional one, they adhered closely to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the United States, making few changes other than those which the pretensions and designs of the rebellion made essential.

"The new constitution professed to be established by 'each State acting in its sovereign and independent character,' instead of simply by 'we the people.' It provided that in newly acquired territory 'the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the Territorial Government'; also for the right of transit and sojourn for 'slaves and other property,' and the right to

reclaim 'slaves and other persons' to service or labor. It did not, as consistency required, provide for the right of secession, or deny the right of coercion; on the contrary, all its implications were against the former and in favor of the latter; for it declared itself to be the supreme law of the land, binding on the judges in every State. It provided for the punishment of treason; and declared that no State should enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, lay duties, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, make any compact with another State or with a foreign power;—a sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical dogma of State supremacy upon which they had built their revolt."*

Stephens, being a member of the Congress, was sworn into office as Vice-President, February 10th. Davis, with becoming modesty, remained absent during the election; being sent for, he arrived and was formally inaugurated on February 18th. His inaugural address presents few salient points. In later times he has disavowed the fiery and belligerent harangues the newspapers reported him to have made on his way to assume his new duties. Perhaps the most important announcement of his inaugural was the opinion that the new Confederacy might welcome the border slave-States; "but beyond this," he continued, "if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable."

Superficially, it appeared that the new government had been agreed upon among the leaders, with unusual harmony and unanimity; and such is the impression conveyed in the books written long years after by the two principal chiefs. But plausible reports have come down by tradition, that no previous legislative body had ever developed an equal amount of jealousy and bitterness to that which manifested itself in the Provisional Congress; that there were more candidates for President than States in the Confederacy, Georgia alone having furnished four aspirants, and that the rivalry between Toombs and Cobb in fact brought about the selection of Davis, who had openly expressed his preference for the post of General-in-Chief of the future rebel armies. Cobb might indeed dispute the prize of leadership with Davis, and especially with Toombs, who was, of all the candidates, least suited for such a task. It was Cobb who was the master spirit of secession intrigue in Buchanan's Cabinet; it was Cobb who carried the wavering Georgia convention into secession; it was Cobb who reappeared as the dominating power in the Montgomery Congress. Practically, it was Cobb who by recent secret manipulations had made the Confederacy possible, and erected the Confederate constitution. He might without vanity aspire to become its chief officer; yet with a truer recognition of the fitness of things, the choice of the delegates fell upon Davis, who, for a longer period and with deeper representative characteristics, had been the real embodiment and head of the conspiracy.

Jefferson Davis was born in Christian (afterwards Todd) county, Kentucky, June 3d, 1808. Soon afterwards his father removed to Mississippi; but the boy was sent to complete the education begun by home and academic studies, to Transylvania University, where he remained till the age of sixteen. Appointed in that year a cadet at the Military Academy at West Point, he received the thorough training of that institution, graduating in June, 1828; he was then attached to the army, and served as a lieutenant of infantry in the Black Hawk war and other campaigns against the Indians. He resigned his military commission in 1835, having attained the grade of first lieutenant of dragoons. Returning to Mississippi, he secluded himself in plantation life, devoting his time largely to political studies calculated to qualify him for a public career. In 1843 he launched himself on the tide of Mississippi politics, by a speech in the Democratic State convention, which attracted considerable notice. From the very first he became a central party figure in his State, was made a presidential elector in 1844, and chosen a representative in Congress in 1845. When the Mexican war broke out, Davis's military training and experience naturally carried him into the campaign as colonel of a volunteer regiment called the Mississippi Rifles; and he rendered valuable service and won deserved distinction in the storming of Monterey and the battle of Buena Vista. Returned from the war, the governor of Mississippi appointed him to the United States Senate to fill a vacancy. When the next legislature met, it confirmed the governor's choice by electing him for the remainder of the term; and a subsequent legislature reëlected him for the full term succeeding.

From the beginning to the end of his public career Davis posed as a disciple of Calhoun and an advocate of the extreme doctrine of State-rights. His maiden speech in the Mississippi convention of 1843 was to recommend Calhoun as an alternative presidential candidate; his parting address on leaving the Senate in 1861 drew a contrast between Calhoun as the advocate of nullification, and himself as the advanced defender of secession. So also, when President Polk offered him the commis-

* Nicolay, "The Outbreak of Rebellion."

sion of brigadier-general of volunteers, to reward his military service in Mexico, the Quixotism which was a marked feature of Davis's character moved him to employ the incident for the ostentatious championship of State-rights. He declined the offer, his biographer says, "on the ground that no such commission could be conferred by Federal authority, either by appointment of the President or by act of Congress."

His next State-rights exploit occurred in 1851. A strong party in Mississippi, violently opposing the compromise measures of 1850, organized a resistance movement in that State, and undertook upon that issue to elect General Quitman governor in 1851. A preliminary election, however, in the month of September, showed them to be some seven thousand votes in the minority; whereupon Quitman withdrew from the contest. Jefferson Davis immediately resigned his full term in the United States Senate and took up the canvass for governor of Mississippi, which Quitman had ingloriously abandoned. Davis's short campaign was brilliant but unsuccessful; he was beaten about one thousand votes by Hon. Henry S. Foote, the Union candidate, who had also resigned the remainder of his senatorship to make the contest.

The defeat appeared to have a salutary influence upon Davis's politics, but it proved transient. In the presidential campaign of 1852 a forlorn-hope of the State-rights fanatics nominated Quitman for President. Davis, with a wiser calculation, forsook his reckless friends and supported Pierce; and for this adhesion Pierce gave him a seat in his Cabinet as Secretary of War. The history of the Kansas trouble shows how faithful he was in this position to pro-slavery interests; and when Buchanan succeeded, he again became a senator for Mississippi, and assumed the leadership of the ultra-Democrats. Years afterwards he explained that in abandoning for a while his extreme course, he was conforming his actions to the decision which Mississippi pronounced in 1851 in favor of the Union. "His opinions," he said, "the result of deliberate convictions, he had no power to change." When, therefore, he entered the Cabinet of President Pierce in 1853 as Secretary of War, and when again on the accession of President Buchanan the Legislature of Mississippi returned him to the Senate, he was by his own declaration, and by the evidence of his subsequent words and deeds, only an acting Unionist, who at heart cherished the belief of Federal usurpation, and hoped and labored for the hour of confederated State resistance.

It may not be without interest to call attention at this point to a few coincidences in the careers of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. They were both born in Kentucky — Davis in the south-western, Lincoln near the central part of the State. They were both near the same age, Davis being less than nine months the elder. Both were taken in their early years from their birthplaces — Davis's parents emigrating south to Mississippi, Lincoln's north to Indiana and Illinois. Both were soldiers in the Black Hawk war — Davis as lieutenant of Regulars, Lincoln as captain of Volunteers. Both were candidates for presidential elector in 1844. Both were soon elected to Congress — Davis in 1845, Lincoln in 1846. Both were successful politicians and popular orators. Both were instinctively studious, introspective, self-contained. Both rose to distinction through the advocacy of an abstract political idea. Both became the chiefs of rival sections in a great civil war.

These are the only points of resemblance, and the contrasts running through their lives are bold and radical. It is unnecessary to present them in detail; they are comprehended and expressed in their opposing leaderships. If chance or fate had guided their parents to exchange their routes of emigration from Kentucky; if Lincoln had grown up on a Southern cotton plantation, and Davis had split rails to fence a Northern farm; if the tall Illinois pioneer had studied trigonometry at West Point, and the pale Mississippi student had steered a flat-boat to New Orleans, education might have modified but would not have essentially changed either. Lincoln would never have become a political dogmatist, an apostle of slavery, a leader of rebellion; Davis could never have become the champion of a universal humanity, the author of a decree of emancipation, the martyr to liberty. Their natures were antipodal, and it is perhaps by contemplating the contrast that the character of Davis may be best understood.

His dominant mental traits were subtlety and will. His nature was one of reserve and pride. His biographers give us no glimpse of his private life. They show us little sympathy of companionship, or sunshine of genial humor. Houston is reported to have said of him that he was "as ambitious as Lucifer and as cold as a lizard." His fancy lived in a world of masters and slaves. His education taught him nothing but the law of subordination and the authority of command. A Democrat by party name, he was an aristocrat in feeling and practice. He was a type of the highest Southern culture and most exclusive Southern caste. His social ideas were of the past. In political theory he was a sophist, and not a logician. With him, "consent of the governed" in a State was truth; "consent of the gov-



JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

erned" in a Territory was error. "Rebellion" in a State must be obeyed; "rebellion" in a Territory "must be crushed." Constitutional forms in Kansas in the interest of slavery were sacred law; constitutional forms in the Union in the interest of freedom were flagrant usurpation. The majority in a State was enthroned freedom; a majority in the nation was insufferable despotism. But even his central dogma became pliant before considerations of self-interest. In his own State, a majority of seven thousand against Quitman in September he treated as a dangerous political heresy to be overthrown by his personal championship. A majority of one thousand against himself in November he affected to regard as a command to stultify his own opinions. His beliefs were at war with the most essential principles of American government. He denied the truth of the Declaration of Independence, denied

the right of the majority to rule, denied the supremacy of the national Constitution. His narrowness was of that type which craved the exclusion of Northern teachers and the official censorship of school-books to keep out "Abolition poison." It was in perfect keeping with his character, and in perfect illustration of the paradoxical theories of his followers, that, holding the lash over fifty or a hundred slaves, or exercising an inflexible military dictatorship over nine millions of "his people," he could declaim in fervid oratory against the despotism of a majority.

One of his most salient traits was the endeavor to maintain a double position on the question of disunion. His leadership of the "resistance" party in Mississippi in 1850–51 gave him a conspicuous starting-point as an instigator of sedition, and while laboring then and afterwards to unite the South in extreme political demands, and in armed preparation for war against the Union if those demands were not complied with, he as constantly declared that he was no disunionist. Of course he could do this only by setting at defiance the plainest meaning of words and the clearest significance of acts. As the slavery contest drew to its culmination, his recklessness of assertion and antagonism of declaration on these points reached an extreme entitling them to be classed among the curiosities of abnormal mental phenomena. As a blind man may not be held responsible for his description of a painting, or a deaf-mute be expected to repeat accurately the airs of an opera, so we can only explain Jefferson Davis's vehement denial of the charge of hypocrisy and conspiracy through a whole decade, by the supposition that he was incapable of understanding the accepted meaning of such words as "patriotism," "loyalty" "allegiance," "faith," "honor," and "duty." On no other hypothesis can we credit the honesty of convictions and sincerity of expression of sentiments so diametrically opposed as the following which occur in the same speech:

"Neither in that year [1852], nor in any other, have I ever advocated a dissolution of the Union, or a separation of the State of Mississippi from the Union, except as the last alternative, and have not considered the remedies which lie within that extreme as exhausted, or ever been entirely hopeless of their success. I hold now, as announced on former occasions, that whilst occupying a seat in the Senate, I am bound to maintain the Government of the Constitution, and in no manner to work for its destruction; that the obligation of the oath of office, Mississippi's honor and my own, require that, as a Senator of the United States, there should be no want of loyalty to the Constitutional Union. . . .

"Whether by the House [of Representatives] or by the people, if an Abolitionist be chosen President of the United States, you will have presented to you the question of whether you will permit the Government to pass into the hands of your avowed and implacable enemies. Without pausing for your answer, I will state my own position to be that such a result would be a species of revolution by which the purposes of the Government would be destroyed, and the observance of its mere forms entitled to no respect. In that event, in such manner as should be most expedient, I should deem it your duty to provide for your safety outside of a Union with those who have already shown the will, and would have acquired the power, to deprive you of your birthright and reduce you to worse than the colonial dependence of your fathers. . . . As when I had the privilege of addressing the Legislature a year ago, so now do I urge you to the needful preparation to meet whatever contingency may befall us. The maintenance of our rights against a hostile power is a physical problem and cannot be solved by mere resolutions. Not doubtful of what the heart will prompt, it is not the less proper that due provision should be made for physical necessities. Why should not the State have an armory for the repair of arms, for the alteration of old models so as to make them conform to the improved weapons of the present day, and for the manufacture on a limited scale of new arms, including cannon and carriages; the casting of shot and shells, and the preparation of fixed ammunition?"*

That man is not to be envied whose reason can be quieted by a casuistry capable of discovering consistency between these and analogous propositions. From declarations of this quality he could prove his record black or white, as occasion demanded, and, in face of direct threats of secession in Mississippi, deny in the United States Senate, without wincing, that he had avowed disunion sentiments.

It will not be amiss to invite the reader to a pen-picture of the man as he appeared in the Senate (May 8th, 1860) shortly before he led the South, with open eyes, into that drama of disaster, suffering, and blood of which he was the fatal inspiration:

"The crowd in the galleries give a buzz of relief, and everybody tells his right-hand man, 'Here he comes; that 's Jeff Davis.' And can it be possible that he proposes to make a speech? You are surprised to see him walking. Why, that is the face of a corpse, the form of a skeleton. Look at the haggard, sunken, weary eye, the thin, white wrinkled lips clasped close upon the teeth in anguish. That is the mouth of a brave but impatient sufferer. See the ghastly white, hollow, bitterly puckered cheek, the high, sharp cheek-bone, the pale brow full of fine wrinkles, the grizzly hair, prematurely gray; and see the thin, bloodless, bony, nervous hands! He deposits his documents upon his desk, and sinks into his chair as if incapable of rising. In a few minutes the Vice-President gives his desk a blow with his ivory hammer, calls for profound order, and states 'that the senator from Mississippi' has the floor. Davis rises with a smile. His speech was closely reasoned, and his words were well chosen. Once in a while he pleases his hearers by a happy period; but it was painfully evident that he was ill."

Montgomery having witnessed the glories of such an inauguration pageant as could be extemporized, Davis proceeded to the appointment of his Cabinet. Toombs of Georgia was made Secretary of State; Memminger of South Carolina Secretary of the Treasury; Walker

*Jefferson Davis, speech at Jackson, Mississippi, Nov. 11th, 1858. In "Daily Mississippian," Nov. 15th, 1858.

of Alabama Secretary of War; Mallory of Florida Secretary of the Navy; Reagan of Texas Postmaster-General; and Benjamin of Louisiana Attorney-General. Various acts of the Provisional Congress authorized the new Executive to continue the organization of the provisional government of the Confederate States. A regular army of about 10,000 men was ordered to be established; a navy of 10 steam gun-boats authorized to be constructed or purchased; 100,000 volunteers for 12 months authorized to be enlisted, and existing State troops to be received into the provisional army. A loan of $15,000,000 was authorized, and an export duty on cotton of ⅛ cent per pound levied, to pay principal and interest. Among the first executive acts, Davis assumed control of military operations in the several seceded States; and his Secretary of War (March 9th) made a requisition for 11,000 volunteers, for contingent service at Charleston, Pensacola, and other points. Agents were dispatched to Europe to purchase material of war; and to obtain if possible a recognition of the Confederate States by foreign powers. As a matter of the greatest immediate necessity, a commission of three persons was appointed to proceed to Washington, to bring about the peaceful acquiescence of the United States in the dismemberment of the Union.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

The disunion conspirators had good reason to show symptoms of dismay at the Cabinet régime to which Mr. Buchanan yielded direction and authority in the last days of the year 1860. Hitherto, not alone in shaping a policy of non-coercion and preventing reenforcements, but in numerous minor matters as well, had the complicity of Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson enabled them to turn the varied agencies of the Government against its own life. Under the new dispensation these practices instantly came to an end. For the moment Mr. Buchanan was in a patriotic mood, and at the urgent solicitation of Black, Holt, and Stanton yielded his consent to a number of measures he had for two months persistently neglected. For the first time since his arrival in Washington, General Scott was permitted to notify commanders of forts and garrisons to be on the alert against surprise; and though this admonition came too late to inspirit and reassure many a wavering officer, it had the direct effect of saving one of the most important military posts on the gulf. Reënforcements were resolved upon. The policy of defending the national capital was discussed and adopted. At least one member of the Cabinet placed himself in confidential communication with leading Republicans and unionists in Congress, and counsel and warning in behalf of the Government were freely interchanged and faithfully observed. Preëminent in his opportunities and services at this critical juncture was the new Secretary of War, Joseph Holt, of Kentucky. He had been a life-long Democrat and a stubborn partisan; but above everything else he was a patriot. Under his administration the War Department was no longer a bureau of insurrection.

The Cabinet régime consisted mainly of the combined will and energy of four leading members,—Black, Secretary of State; Dix, Secretary of the Treasury; Holt, Secretary of War; and Stanton, Attorney-General. Neither their relation to the President nor to each other can be very clearly made out. Their loyal activity was still occasionally hampered by Buchanan's stubbornness and timidity. On some points they appear to have had very different views, but the daily stress and danger in which they moved compelled mutual tolerance and tacit cooperation. They had indeed one common bond of union. Now that the conspiracy was so fully revealed they battled against it manfully, not with any proximate hope of crushing it, but to tide over the peril to the end of the presidential term, to be able to lay down their responsibilities with honor. Their services in detail cannot be here recorded, but the principal duty which they successfully performed, the protection of the national capital, needs special mention.

In the early days of January, 1861, Washington city was the natural focus of the secession excitement pervading the South; and the capital seemed to lean towards the prevailing mania. Seditious harangues in Congress were applauded from well-filled galleries, and society feasted and flattered the most daring fire-eaters. So strong was this Southern drift of local sentiment that the Federal city began to be confidently looked upon by the conspirators as the prospective capital of a Southern Confederacy. Nothing seemed wanting to the early consummation of such a scheme but the secession of Virginia and Maryland, of which the signs were becoming only too abundant. Reasoning from this to plausible consequences, the coolest heads began to fear a popular outbreak to seize upon the buildings and archives of the Government; and as a final result forcibly to prevent the inauguration of the President-elect.

Buchanan affected not to share these apprehensions. Nevertheless he acknowledged his duty and purpose to preserve the peace, and authorized the necessary precautions. On the 9th of January, therefore, Colonel Charles P. Stone, chosen for that duty by General Scott, submitted a memorandum in which he sketched a plan for the defense of

Washington, which was adopted, and under which Colonel Stone was appointed inspector-general and ordered to organize and drill the militia of the District of Columbia. This duty he faithfully discharged, and on the 5th of February reported the existence of some thirteen volunteer companies, constituting a total of 925 men, "which can be at once called into service"; adding also, "the number of volunteers for service can be doubled within seven days with proper facilities." Not underrating either the moral or military aid of raw levies of militia, General Scott was nevertheless too old a soldier to rely exclusively upon them in an emergency. He therefore obtained consent to concentrate at the capital available regular forces to the number of eight companies, a total of about 480 men.

Stanton, appointed Attorney-General on the 20th of December, was, with his ardent and positive nature, one of the most energetic and uncompromising unionists in the Cabinet. For him, the expulsion of Floyd, the reënforcement of Sumter, and the other military precautions hastily ordered, were not yet sufficient. Chafing under the President's painful tardiness, he turned to Congress as a means for exposing and thwarting the intrigues of the conspirators. Sacrificing his party attachments to the paramount demands of national safety, he placed himself in confidential correspondence with Republican leaders in that body, giving and receiving advice as to the best means of preserving the Government.

On the 8th of January Mr. Buchanan transmitted to Congress a special message on the state of the Union, discussing also the rumors of hostile designs against the capital. The Republicans in the House of Representatives seized the occasion to secure the appointment of a Committee of Investigation, of which Mr. Howard, of Michigan, was made chairman. He has left us an interesting account of its origin and purpose:

"That committee was raised at the request of loyal members of the Cabinet. The resolutions came from them, and were placed in my hands with a request that I should offer them and thus become, if they should pass, chairman of the committee. At first I refused to assume so fearful a responsibility. But being urged to do so by members and senators, I at last consented, on condition that the Speaker would allow me to nominate two members of the committee. I selected Mr. Dawes, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Reynolds, of New York. Mr. Reynolds was elected as a Democrat, but he was true as steel, and a good lawyer. I do not know that Mr. Stanton wrote the resolutions creating the committee. I did not see him write them. I never heard him say he wrote them. It would be easier, however, to persuade me that Mr. Jefferson did not write the Declaration of Independence than that Mr. Stanton did not write those resolutions."

With this committee Mr. Stanton and perhaps other members of the Cabinet continued to correspond confidentially and coöperate. This has been characterized as disrespect and treachery to their chief; but in the face of Mr. Buchanan's repeated neglect and avowed impotence to resist open insurrection, discriminating history will applaud the act. The committee found no substantial proof of an organized plot to seize the capital; nevertheless its investigation and report quieted the apprehensions of the timid, at the same time that they afforded a warning to mischief-makers that the authorities were on the alert and would make such an enterprise extremely hazardous.

While the Howard Committee was yet pursuing its inquiry, and as the day for counting the presidential vote approached, General Scott requested permission from the Secretary of War to bring several additional companies of regulars from Fortress Monroe, to be replaced by recruits. This would augment his regulars to some seven hundred men, which, with the police and militia, he deemed sufficient for all contingencies. Before the day arrived a confidential arrangement of signals was communicated to the officers, the regular troops being placed under command of Colonel Harvey Brown. General instructions were issued in strict confidence, and to officers alone. The militia was charged with the care of the various bridges of the Potomac; the regulars were stationed at convenient points in the city.

Happily no alarm occurred. On the 13th of February an unusually large and brilliant throng filled the galleries of the House of Representatives to witness the proceedings of the presidential count. Vice-President Breckinridge, one of the defeated candidates, presided over the joint convention of the two Houses. Senator Douglas, another, was on the floor, and moved to dispense with certain tedious routine. The sealed returns of the electoral votes, cast by the chosen colleges of the several States on the 5th of December, were opened and registered. The tellers officially declared the result already known, viz.: that Lincoln had received 180 votes; Breckinridge, 72; Bell, 39; Douglas, 12. Vice-President Breckinridge thereupon announced that "Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, having received a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, is elected President of the United States for four years commencing the 4th of March, 1861."

To comprehend more clearly the transactions growing out of the event, it is necessary to repeat that immediately after the beginning of the Cabinet régime it was resolved to send reënforcements to Fort Sumter. The first arrangement was to dispatch them in the sloop-of-war *Brooklyn;* but owing to certain difficulties and objections which presented

themselves, General Scott decided to send two hundred recruits with supplies from New York in the merchant steamer *Star of the West*, hoping she might enter the harbor and effect their landing at the fort without suspicion of her real errand. But, among others, Secretary Thompson, who was still a member of Buchanan's Cabinet, sent the Charleston conspirators notice of her coming. When on the morning of January 9th about daylight the *Star of the West* attempted her entrance, she was fired upon from a battery which had been erected since New Year's Day under the order of Governor Pickens; and, though the vessel suffered no serious injury, the apparent danger caused the officers to desist from their attempt and turn and run the vessel out of the harbor.

The whole occurrence came upon Major Anderson unexpectedly; and before he could well comprehend the design or decide to encourage or assist the ship with the guns of Fort Sumter, she had retreated, and the opportunity was gone. But the insult to the national flag roused his anger, and he demanded an apology from Governor Pickens for the hostile act. So far from retracting or apologizing, however, the governor boldly avowed and sustained his conduct; and Major Anderson, instead of making good the threat which accompanied his demand, proposed as an alternative to "refer the whole matter to my Government." With great tact Governor Pickens at the same time made use of the occasion to send Attorney-General Hayne, of South Carolina, to President Buchanan, bearing a new written demand (the third one made by the State), for the possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor; and the two messengers arrived in Washington on the 13th of January. But the central cabal at Washington, which in its caucus resolutions of January 5th had issued orders for immediate secession, seeing the danger and complication likely to arise from this headlong separate action of South Carolina's governor, now took possession of Hayne and his mission. By a skillful device of dilatory diplomacy they kept open the question of the demand Hayne had been instructed to make, and thereby prolonged the military truce at Charleston which it involved, until the 6th of February following, when Secretary of War Holt officially wrote the President's refusal of the governor's demand. The advantage of this course to the conspirators became quickly apparent. Between the 12th of January and the 6th of February the insurrection at Charleston worked day and night in building batteries and preparing men and material to attack Sumter. In other States the processes of secession, seizure, drill, equipment, and organization had also been going on with similar activity. Receiving no effective discouragement or check, the various elements of rebellion had finally united in a provisional congress at Montgomery, which two days later (February 8th) perfected a provisional government for the rebellion.

As part of the same intrigue another incident, which for convenience may be called the Fort Pickens truce, must also be mentioned. One of the most important naval and military stations of the United States was that at Pensacola, Florida. Near it on the mainland were Fort Barrancas and Fort McRae, and on Santa Rosa Island, immediately opposite, Fort Pickens, a powerful work, built for a war garrison of 1260 men, but now entirely empty. Lieutenant Slemmer held military command with a garrison of only forty-six men, in Fort Barrancas. When on January 3d General Scott under the Cabinet régime admonished him to prevent the seizure of these forts by surprise, Slemmer repeated the strategy of Anderson, spiking the guns and destroying the powder in Barrancas and McRae, and transferring his command, increased by thirty ordinary seamen from the Navy Yard, with all available supplies, to Fort Pickens, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of January. Lieutenant Slemmer was not a moment too quick. The Florida convention passed an ordinance of secession on the 10th, and two days afterwards a regiment of Florida and Alabama rebels appeared and took possession of the Navy Yard and the two abandoned forts. A considerable rebel force was within a short time concentrated to attempt the capture of Fort Pickens, but in the mean time sundry ships of war had been ordered there by the Government. On January 21st the *Brooklyn*, with a company of regular artillery under Captain Vodges, was dispatched thither as a further reënforcement to the fort. The rebels now perceiving that this preponderance of military strength might enable the Government to recapture the Navy Yard, the central cabal at Washington resorted to an intrigue to paralyze it. They proposed that "no attack would be made on the fort if its present status should be suffered to remain," thus beguiling President Buchanan into a new truce. A joint order was thereupon issued by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, January 29th, that Captain Vodges's artillery company should not be landed from the *Brooklyn* "unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations made for its attack." The advantages of this stipulation were all on the side of the insurrection, and its existence proved a most mischievous complication, and caused perilous delay when the new Lincoln Administration began its dealings with the rebellion.

Want of space forbids us to review the

debates and proceedings of Congress during the winter of 1860–61 further than to note the complete failure of the projects of compromise which were originated in and out of it, and brought to its attention. The Senate Committee of Thirteen ended by reporting an irreconcilable disagreement. The various propositions which were apparently adopted by the House Committee of Thirty-three proved to be nothing but the resolves of the several minority factions of that committee, and commanded no united support when reported to the House. The Peace Conference terminated its labors by certain recommendations receiving only a minority vote of that body, and Congress, to which these recommendations were sent, would have nothing to do with them. So also certain other propositions of adjustment offered in Congress, known as the "Crittenden Compromise," failed equally of acceptance.

Nevertheless these many efforts were not entirely barren of result. At a point where it was least expected, they contributed to the adoption by Congress of a measure of adjustment which might have restored harmony to the country if the rebellion of the cotton-States had not been originated and controlled by a conspiracy bent upon revolution as its prime and ultimate object. It is a noteworthy fact that just at the dawn of the civil war through which slavery rushed to a swift self-destruction, that institution received the largest recognition and concession ever given it in American legislation.

The report of the Committee of Thirty-three was made about the middle of January, but at that time none of its six propositions or recommendations commanded the attention of the House. The secession stage of the revolution was just culminating. All was excitement and surprise over the ordinances of the cotton-States and the seizure, without actual collision or bloodshed, of the several Southern forts and arsenals. The retirement of the Southern members of Congress, and the meeting of the revolutionary leaders, to unite and construct their provisional government at Montgomery, prolonged what was to the public a succession of dramatic and spectacular incidents resembling the movements of a political campaign, rather than the serious progress of a piece of orderly business-like statesmanship. The North could not yet believe that the designs of the cotton-State hotspurs were so desperate.

The more conservative Congressmen from the North and from the border States still hoped that good might come if an effort of conciliation and compromise were once more renewed. Accordingly, near the close of the session (February 27th, 1861), Mr. Corwin, chairman of the House Committee of Thirty-three, brought forward one of the propositions which had been reported more than a month before from his committee. The original report proposed in substance an amendment of the Constitution providing that any constitutional interference with slavery must originate with the slave-States, and have the unanimous assent of all the States to become valid. Mr. Corwin by an amendment changed the phraseology and purport to the following:

> "Article 13. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere within any State with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

This amendment was adopted by the House on February 28th, yeas 133, nays 65. The Senate also passed it during the night preceding the 4th of March, though in the journals of Congress it appears dated as of March 2d. The variation is explained by the fact that the legislative day of the journals frequently runs through two or more calendar days. In that body the vote was, yeas 24, nays 12, and it was approved by President Buchanan probably only an hour or two before the inauguration of his successor.

Mr. Lincoln alluded to this amendment in his inaugural address, reciting its substance and giving it his unreserved approval. "I understand," he said, "a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which amendment, however, I have not seen — has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." The new Lincoln Administration soon after transmitted this Joint Resolution to the several States to receive their official action. But nothing came of it. The South gave no response to the overture for peace, and in the North it was lost sight of amid the overshadowing events that immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities.

It was at this point that the South committed its great political blunder. There is little doubt that in the prevailing anxiety for compromise this constitutional amendment might have been ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the States. Had the Southern leaders been sincere in their professed apprehensions for the security of their slave property and polity in their own States, here was an effectual and practically a perpetual guaranty, offered in good faith as such. Their neglect and rejection of it shows that it was not dread

of ultimate abolition, but chagrin and a species of gambler's desperation at the present and prospective loss of political domination for which they rushed headlong into revolution.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.

AMONG the first congratulations which poured in upon Mr. Lincoln was a terse greeting from Governor Chase, dated November 7th, that admirably expressed the prevalent feeling.

"You are President-elect. I congratulate you and thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of Freedom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is vast. May God strengthen you for your great duties." *

Day after day confirmed the completeness of the Republican victory, and two weeks after election the city of Springfield was in all the blaze and glory of a great celebration to signalize the result. Projected merely as a local jubilee, it called to the city crowds of rejoicing strangers. Though he had not said a public word during the campaign, Mr. Lincoln could not on this occasion refuse the sound of his voice to the huge torch-light procession, and the crowds of his neighbors and friends whose shouts called him to the door of his modest home. It was not the voice of partisan exultation, however, but of patriotic liberality.

"Friends and fellow-citizens," said he, "please excuse me on this occasion from making a speech. I thank you in common with all those who have thought fit by their votes to indorse the Republican cause. I rejoice with you in the success which has thus far attended that cause. Yet in all our rejoicings, let us neither express nor cherish any hard feelings toward any citizen who by his vote has differed with us. Let us at all times remember that all American citizens are brothers of a common country, and should dwell together in the bonds of fraternal feeling."

We will perceive hereafter how in this simple utterance of his opening presidential career he struck the keynote of blended firmness and charity, which was to become the characteristic of his Administration.

For some months Springfield now became the Mecca of American politics. Transient travelers and casual visitors tarried for a few hours to shake hands with the newly chosen chief; correspondents of leading newspapers established temporary headquarters from which to send their readers pen-pictures of his personal appearance, his daily habits, his home and public surroundings, and to catch the flying and often contradictory rumors of his probable intentions. Artists came to paint his portrait, ambitious politicians to note new party currents, and veteran statesmen to urge the adoption of favorite theories or the advancement of faithful adherents.

To all outside appearance Lincoln remained unchanged. In the unpretending two-story frame house which constituted his home, his daily routine continued as before, except that his door was oftener opened to welcome the curious visitor or to shelter the confidential discussion of ominous occurrences in national affairs. His daily public occupation was still to proceed to the governor's office in the State-house, to receive the cordial and entirely unceremonious greetings of high or low,— whosoever chose to enter at the open door,— and in the interim to keep himself informed, by means of the daily-increasing budget of letters and newspapers, of the events of the country at large, and to give directions to his private secretary as to what replies should be made to important communications. Beyond the arrival of distinguished visitors, there was in all this no sign of elevation or rulership; he was still the same kind neighbor and genial companion, who, whether on the street, in his office, or at his fireside, had for every one he met the same familiar nod or smile or cheering word,— the same bearing which for a quarter of a century had made his name a household synonym of manly affection, virtue, and honor.

Under this quiet exterior and commonplace routine he was, however, already undergoing most anxious and harassing labors. Day by day the horizon of politics gathered gloom,— there were signs of disunion in the South, of discord in Congress, of weakness in Mr. Buchanan's administration. The theory of secession became the theme of every newspaper and the staple question of his daily visitors. Even upon theories Lincoln maintained a prudent reserve. Nevertheless his qualified comments to friends were prompt and clear. "My own impression is," said he (November 15th), "leaving myself room to modify the opinion if upon a further investigation I should see fit to do so, that this Government possesses both the authority and the power to maintain its own integrity. That, however, is not the ugly point of this matter. The ugly point is the necessity of keeping the Government together by force, as ours should be a government of fraternity." Later (December 13th) he formulated his opinion a little more in detail. "The very existence," said he, "of a general and national government implies the legal power, right, and duty of maintaining its own integrity. This, if not expressed, is at least implied in the Constitution. The right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question. It was fully discussed in Jackson's

* Chase to Lincoln, Nov. 17th, 1860. Warden, "Life of Chase," p. 364.

time, and denied not only by him, but by the vote of Congress. It is the duty of a President to execute the laws and maintain the existing Government. He cannot entertain any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment. He was not elected for any such purpose. As a matter of theoretical speculation it is probably true, that if the people, with whom the whole question rests, should become tired of the present government, they may change it in the manner prescribed by the Constitution."*

The secrets of the incipient rebellion, and the treachery and conspiracy of a portion of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, which have been already so fully laid bare from data only since become accessible, neither Mr. Lincoln nor any one save the actors themselves had then any means of knowing. But in addition to other current sources of information the confidential letters of Captain Abner Doubleday, second in command at Fort Moultrie, written to the captain's brother in New York, were, so long as mail communication remained, forwarded to the President-elect, giving him an inside view of matters at that critical post.

Most important, however, in its influence, and most valuable in its possible as well as actual consequences, were the correspondence and unity of patriotic confidence which established themselves at an early day between Mr. Lincoln and General Scott. The general was evidently somewhat proud of his famous "Views," written to President Buchanan under date of October 29th, 1860, as a political suggestion. He transmitted a copy of the same to the President-elect, as he had done to many other gentlemen of prominence. A brief acknowledgment was written in reply (November 9th):

"Mr. Lincoln tenders his sincere thanks to General Scott for the copy of his 'views, etc.,' which is received; and especially for this renewed manifestation of his patriotic purposes as a citizen, connected as it is with his high official position and most distinguished character as a military captain." †

The delicate compliment and dignified reserve made their impression on the old hero. Called to Washington about the middle of December, and smarting under the neglect of Secretary Floyd and the discouraging indifference of President Buchanan, his hopes turned toward the elect of the people at Springfield.

It was at this juncture (December 17th) that a personal and political friend of long standing called upon the general, and in a confidential but frank interview learned from his own lips the alarming dangers of the Government,—the neglect of the Administration to send reënforcements, the defenseless situation of Fort Moultrie, and that Sumter, the key of Charleston Harbor, lay at the mercy of the mob.

"None of his suggestions or recommendations have been acted upon, and of course he is powerless to do anything further, but his heart is sound and true. 'I wish to God,' said he, 'that Mr. Lincoln was in office.' He continued, 'I do not know him, but I believe him a true, honest, and conservative man.' Then he asked earnestly, 'Mr. Washburne, is he a *firm* man?' I answered that I had known you long and well and that you would discharge your duty, and your whole duty, in the sight of the furnace seven times heated. He then said resolutely and hopefully, 'All is not lost.'" ‡

In response to this patriotic expression of the general, the return mail carried back the following letter from Lincoln to Washburne:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 21st, 1860.

"HON. E. B. WASHBURNE.

"MY DEAR SIR: Last night I received your letter giving an account of your interview with General Scott, and for which I thank you. Please present my respects to the general, and tell him, confidentially, I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either *hold* or *retake* the forts, as the case may require, at and after the inauguration.

"Yours as ever, A. LINCOLN." ‖

A little later Mr. Lincoln again sent messages of esteem and confidence to the general by Senators Cameron and Baker, who made visits to Springfield.

"I have seen General Scott," writes Cameron in reply (January 3d), "who bids me say he will be glad to act under your orders in all ways to preserve the Union. He says Mr. Buchanan at last has called on him to see that order shall be preserved at the inauguration, in this District; that for this purpose he has ordered here two companies of flying artillery, and that he will organize the militia and have himself sworn in as a constable. The old warrior is roused, and he will be equal to the occasion." §

This statement was repeated in an autograph note from the general himself on the following day:

"Lieutenant-General Scott is highly gratified with the favorable opinion entertained of him by the President-elect as he learns through Senators Baker and Cameron, also personal friends of General S., who is happy to reciprocate his highest respect and esteem. The President-elect may rely with confidence on General S.'s utmost exertions in the service of his country (the Union) both before and after the approaching inauguration."

The general then mentions in detail the measures just taken, under the reorganized Cabinet and the accession of Mr. Holt, to countermand the shipment of the Pittsburg guns, to send reënforcements to Fort Jefferson, and to secure the safety of Washington for the presidential count and the approaching inauguration.¶

"Permit me," wrote Mr. Lincoln in reply, January 11th, "to renew to you the assurance of my high

* Nicolay, Manuscript Memoranda.

† Lincoln to Scott, Nov. 9th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Washburne to Lincoln, Dec. 17th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‖ Lincoln to Washburne, Dec. 21st, 1860. Unpublished MS.

§ Cameron to Lincoln, Jan. 3d, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Scott to Lincoln, Jan. 4th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

appreciation of the many past services you have rendered the Union, and my deep gratification at this evidence of your present active exertions to maintain the integrity and honor of the nation." *

The President-elect was further gratified to receive about the same time from the veteran General Wool a letter of noble and uncompromising loyalty.

"Many thanks," he wrote in reply, January 14th, "for your patriotic and generous letter of the 11th instant. As to how far the military force of the Government may become necessary to the preservation of the Union, and more particularly how that force can best be directed to the object, I must chiefly rely upon General Scott and yourself. It affords me the profoundest satisfaction to know, that with both of you judgment and feeling go heartily with your sense of professional and official duty to the work." †

Meanwhile trusty friends in Washington, both in and out of Congress, had kept Lincoln informed by letter of public events occurring there, so far as they were permitted to come to the knowledge of Republicans: how the Cabinet divided, how the message was scouted, the bold utterances of treason, the growing apprehensions of the public. But general opinion was still in a hopeful mood.

"Mr. Mann," wrote one, "who stated that he knew you personally, requested me to say that he had seen the Union dissolved twice — once when Southern members of Congress refused for three days to occupy their seats — and that it all ended in smoke. He did not appear the least alarmed about the secession movement, but others, particularly Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley, expressed great anxiety." ‡

These were influential names, and it may be well to cite their own words. "I am anticipating troubles," wrote Mr. Weed, December 2d, "not generally apprehended by our friends. I want the North to be sure she is right and then to go ahead." || Some days later he wrote further:

"In consultation yesterday with several friends, it was thought best to invite the governors of several States to meet in this city on Thursday of next week, so that, if possible, there should be harmony of views and action between them. It occurred to me that you should be apprised of this movement. Of course it is to be quiet and confidential. I have been acting without knowledge of your views, upon vital questions. But I find it safe to trust the head and heart when both are under the guidance of right motives. I do not want you to be saddled with the responsibilities of the Government before you take the helm. On the question of preserving the Union, I am unwilling to see a *united* South and a *divided* North. Nor is such an alternative necessary. With wisdom and prudence we can unite the North in upholding the supremacy of the Constitution and Laws, and thus united, your Administration will have its foundation upon a rock. . . ." §

To this Mr. Lincoln replied as follows:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 17th, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 11th was received two days ago. Should the convocation of governors of which you speak seem desirous to know my views on the present aspect of things, tell them you judge from my speeches that I will be inflexible on the territorial question; that I probably think either the Missouri line extended, or Douglas's and Eli Thayer's popular sovereignty, would lose us everything we gain by the election; that filibustering for all south of us, and making slave-States of it would follow, in spite of us, in either case; also that I probably think all opposition, real and apparent, to the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution ought to be withdrawn.

"I believe you can pretend to find but little, if anything, in my speeches, about secession. But my opinion is, that no State can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the President and other government functionaries to run the machine as it is.

"Truly yours, A. LINCOLN." ¶

Mr. Greeley not only had similar fears, but, what was much worse, by his editorials in the "Tribune" encouraged the South to hope for peaceable disunion. He wrote (November 30th):

"Webster and Marshall and Story have reasoned well; the Federal flag represents a government, not a mere league; we are in many respects one nation from the St. John to the Rio Grande; but the genius of our institutions is essentially Republican and averse to the employment of military force to fasten one section of our Confederacy to the other. If eight States, having five millions of people, choose to separate from us, they cannot be permanently withheld from so doing by Federal cannon." **

"There is a pretty general belief here that the cotton-States will go out of the Union," wrote a correspondent from Washington. "One South Carolina member is sorry for the condition of things in his State — is at heart opposed to disunion; but I will not mention his name lest it should by some means get into the newspapers. Orr was forced into the secession movement against his will. This I have from good authority, and yet the statement may be a mistake. It is hard to get at the exact truth." ††

From another Mr. Lincoln received information as to the course of his party friends: "A good feeling prevails among Republican senators. The impression with all, unless there be one exception, is, that Republicans have no concessions to make or compromises to offer, and that it is impolitic even to discuss making them. . . . I was a little surprised that the House voted to raise a committee on the state of the Union. . . . Inactivity and a kind spirit is, it seems to me, all that is left for us to do, till the 4th of March." ‡‡

* Lincoln to Scott, Jan. 11th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
† Lincoln to Wool, Jan. 14th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
‡ Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 2d, 1860. Unpublished MS.
|| Weed to Swett, Dec. 2d, 1860. Unpublished MS.
§ Weed to Lincoln, Dec. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.
¶ Weed, Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 310.
** N. Y. "Tribune," Nov. 30th, 1860.
†† Gurley to Lincoln, Dec. 3d, 1860. MS.
‡‡ Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 4th, 1860. Unpublished MS.



HON. E. B. WASHBURNE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"I have never in my life," wrote Mr. Corwin, chairman of the Committee of Thirty-three (December 10th), "seen my country in such a dangerous position. I look upon it with great alarm, but I am resolved not to be paralyzed by dismay. Our safety can only be insured by looking the danger full in the face and acting with calm dignity in such way as [that] if possible we may ride out the storm."*

These few extracts out of a multitude must suffice to indicate the current and character of the reports which reached Mr. Lincoln from various quarters. The hopes of the more sanguine were, unfortunately, not realized. The timid grew more despondent, the traitors bolder, and the crisis almost became a panic. Business men and capitalists of the Eastern States were beginning to exert a pressure for concessions to avert civil war, under which stanch Republicans were on the point of giving way. The border States, through their presses and their public men, implored a compromise, but the entreaty was uniformly directed to the Republicans to make concessions, and more often to justify than to denounce disunion. Some of the conspirators themselves adroitly encouraged this effort to demoralize the North by a pretense of contrition. "South Carolina, I suppose," wrote a friend to Mr. Lincoln, "will try on her secession project. Perhaps some of the cotton-States will follow. Their number will not be large. Indeed I know that some of the heretofore most rabid secessionists now tremble before the brink on which they stand. They would retreat without trying the experiment if they had not kindled a fire at home which is beyond their control. This, in substance, Jefferson Davis stated to Fitch no longer ago than yesterday."† The profession did not well accord with the signing of the conspirator's secession address by that senator only three days before. "I listened yesterday to Mr. Crittenden's speech," wrote another friend, "in support of his proposed compromise. In my opinion he is one of the most patriotic and at the same time mischievous of the Southern senators. . . . After Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Johnson of Tennessee took the floor. . . . His simple declaration that the supposed wrongs must be settled inside of the Union is worth a hundred-fold more than all the patriotic wailing of the antediluvian Crittendens."‡

There were plenty of correspondents to announce and describe the present and impending dangers, but none to furnish a solution of the national difficulty. There was no end of wild suggestion, and that too from prominent men ordinarily capable of giving counsel. One, as we have seen, was for accepting disunion. Another thought a letter or proclamation from the President-elect would still the storm. A third wanted him to drop down into Washington "with a carpet-sack." A fourth advised him to march to the capital with a hundred thousand "wide-awakes." Still a fifth proposed he should create a diversion by the purchase of Cuba.

It was a providential blessing that in such a crisis the President-elect was a man of unfailing common sense and complete self-control. He watched the rising clouds of insurrection; he noted the anxious warnings of his friends. He was neither buoyed up by reckless hopes, nor cast down by exaggerated fears. He bided his time, grasped at no rash counsels or experiments, uttered neither premature cry of alarm nor boast of overweening confidence. He resisted pressing solicitations to change his position, to explain his intention, to offer, either for himself or the great national majority which chose him, any apology for his or their high prerogative exercised in his election.

It must not, however, be inferred from the foregoing that Mr. Lincoln shut himself up in total silence. To discreet friends, as well as to honorable opponents, under the seal of con-

*Corwin to Lincoln, Dec. 10th, 1860. Unpublished MS.
†Fogg to Lincoln, Dec. 17th, 1860. Unpublished MS.
‡Williams to Lincoln, Dec. 19th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

fidence, he was always free to repeat his well-formed convictions, and even in some degree to foreshadow his probable course. It is gratifying to note in this connection, especially since it evinces his acute judgment of human nature, that in few instances was such confidence violated during the whole period of his candidacy and official life. By unnoticed beginnings he easily and naturally assumed the leadership of his party in the personal interviews and private correspondence following the election, called out by the manifestations of Southern discontent. He was never obtrusive nor dictatorial; but in a suggestion to one, a hint to another, a friendly explanation or admonition to a third, he soon gave direction, unity, and confidence to his adherents.

Mr. Bryant, for instance, was strongly opposed to Mr. Seward's going into the Cabinet. Lincoln wrote him a few lines in explanation, which brought back the following qualified acquiescence:

"I have this moment received your note. Nothing could be more fair or more satisfactory than the principle you lay down in regard to the formation of your council of official advisers. I shall always be convinced that whatever selection you make it will be made conscientiously." *

Mr. Greeley was, as we have seen, indulging in damaging vagaries about peaceable secession, and to him Lincoln sent a word of friendly caution. Greeley wrote a statement of his views in reply, but substantially yielded the point. He said a State could no more secede at pleasure from the Union than a stave could secede from a cask. That if eight or ten contiguous States sought to leave, he should say, "There 's the door — go!" But,

"if the seceding State or States go to fighting and defying the laws, the Union being yet undissolved save by their own say-so, I guess they will have to be made to behave themselves. . . . I fear nothing, care for nothing, but another disgraceful back-down of the free States. That is the only real danger. Let the Union slide — it may be reconstructed; let Presidents be assassinated, we can elect more; let the Republicans be defeated and crushed, we shall rise again. But another nasty compromise, whereby everything is conceded and nothing secured, will so thoroughly disgrace and humiliate us that we can never again raise our heads, and this country becomes a second edition of the Barbary States, as they were sixty years ago. 'Take any form but that.'" †

* W. C. Bryant to Lincoln, Jan. 3d, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Greeley to Lincoln, Dec. 22d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡ Lincoln to Kellogg, Dec. 11th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

It would have been well had his advice been followed. Under the pressure of the disunionists and of the border-State men, Kellogg's firmness gave way, and he announced his willingness to recede from the Republican declarations. The change effected nothing but the sacrifice of his own consistency. He lost his friends and gained no followers. His concession was spurned by the disunionists; and being a large and corpulent man, the wits of the day made themselves merry by dubbing his apostacy the "Mammoth Cave."

THURLOW WEED. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

On this point Lincoln's note had reassured his shrinking faith. The "Tribune" announced that Mr. Lincoln had no thought of concessions, and thenceforward that powerful journal took a more healthy and hopeful tone.

Hon. William Kellogg, the Illinois representative on the Committee of Thirty-three, wrote to him for instructions as to the course he should pursue. Under date of December 11th Mr. Lincoln replied to him as follows:

"Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The instant you do they have us under again: all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to bring in his 'Popular Sovereignty.' Have none of it. The tug has to come, and better now than later. You know I think the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution ought to be enforced — to put it in its mildest form, ought not to be resisted." ‡

Some weeks later Kellogg visited Lincoln to urge his views of compromise on the President-elect. As a result of that visit Lincoln wrote the following letter to Seward on February 1st:

"On the 21st ult. Hon. W. Kellogg, a Republican member of Congress of this State, whom you probably know, was here in a good deal of anxiety for our friends to go in the way of compromise on the now vexed question. While he was with me I received a dispatch from Senator Trumbull, at Washington, al-

luding to the same question and telling me to await letters. I therefore told Mr. Kellogg that when I should receive these letters posting me as to the state of affairs at Washington, I would write you, requesting you to let him see my letter. To my surprise, when the letters mentioned by Judge Trumbull came they made no allusion to the 'vexed question.' This baffled me so much that I was near not writing you at all, in compliance with what I had said to Judge Kellogg. I say now, however, as I have all the while said, that on the territorial question — that is, the question of extending slavery under the national auspices — I am inflexible. I am for no compromise which assists or permits the extension of the institution on soil owned by the nation. And any trick by which the nation is to acquire territory, and then allow some local authority to spread slavery, is as obnoxious as any other. I take it that to effect some such result as this, and to put us again on the high road to a slave empire, is the object of all these proposed compromises. I am against it. As to fugitive slaves, District of Columbia, slave-trade among the slave-States, and whatever springs of necessity from the fact that the institution is amongst us, I care but little, so that what is done be comely and not altogether outrageous. Nor do I care about New Mexico, if further extension were hedged against." *

We shall describe somewhat in detail the formation of Lincoln's Cabinet, and will only mention here that on December 13th he began that work by tendering the post of Secretary of State to Mr. Seward, which offer was accepted December 28th. The correspondence between these eminent men affords an interesting view of the beginnings of the new administration.

"Mr. Weed finding it not inconvenient to go West," wrote Seward, December 16th, "I have had some conversation with him concerning the condition and the prospect of public affairs, and he will be able to inform you of my present unsettled view of the subject upon which you so kindly wrote me a few days ago. I shall remain at home until his return, and shall then in further conference with him have the advantage of a knowledge of the effect of public events certain to occur this week." †

Weed went to Springfield and had several interviews with the President-elect. There is no record of these conferences; but it is likely that Mr. Weed urged on those occasions, as he did on all others, the utmost forbearance, conciliation, and concession to the South. To employ his favorite formula, he wanted Republicans "to meet secession as patriots and not as partisans." The sentiment and the alliteration were both pleasing; but Lincoln, trained in almost life-long debate with Douglas, the most subtle juggler in words ever known to American politics, was not a man to deal in vague phrases. He told Mr. Weed just what he would concede and just how far he would conciliate — drew him a sharp and definite line to show where partisanship ends and where patriotism begins. When Mr. Weed returned he bore with him the written statement of Lincoln; what he believed, and was determined to assert and maintain on pending and probable issues.

Mr. Seward's letter of December 26th, to Lincoln, gives us the sequel of this visit.

"I had only the opportunity for conferring with Mr. Weed which was afforded by our journeying together on the railroad from Syracuse to Albany.

"He gave me verbally the substance of the suggestion you prepared for the consideration of the Republican members, but not the written proposition. This morning I received the latter from him, and also information for the first time of your expectation that I would write to you concerning the temper of parties and the public here.

"I met on Monday my Republican associates on the Committee of Thirteen, and afterwards the whole committee. With the unanimous consent of our section I offered three propositions which seemed to me to cover the ground of the suggestion made by you through Mr. Weed as I understood it.

"*First.* That the Constitution should never be altered so as to authorize Congress to abolish or interfere with slavery in the States. This was accepted.

"*Second.* That the fugitive-slave law should be amended by granting a jury trial to the fugitive. This in opposition to our votes was amended so as to give the jury in the State from which the fugitive fled, and so amended was voted down by our own votes. The committee had already agreed to Mr. Crittenden's amendment concerning the fees of the commissioner, making them the same when the fugitive is returned to slavery as when he is discharged.

"Our *Third* resolution was that Congress recommend to all the States to revise their legislation concerning persons recently resident in other States and to repeal all such laws which contravene the Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. This was rejected by the pro-slavery vote of the committee.

"To-day we have had another meeting. I offered, with the concurrence of my political associates, a fourth proposition, viz.: That Congress should pass a law to punish invasions of our States and conspiracies to effect such invasions, but the latter only in the State and district where the acts of such complicity were committed. This by the votes of our opponents was amended so as practically to carry out Mr. Douglas's suggestion of last winter for the revival of the old Sedition law of John Adams's time, and then was rejected by our own votes.

"This evening the Republican members of the committee with Judge Trumbull and Mr. Fessenden met at my house to consider your written suggestion and determine whether it shall be offered. While we think the ground has been already covered, we find that in the form you give it, it would divide our friends not only in the Committee but in Congress; a portion being unwilling to give up their old opinion that the duty of executing the constitutional provisions concerning fugitives from service belongs to the States, and not at all to Congress. But we shall confer and act as wisely as we can.

"Thus far I have reported only our action on the subject of your suggestion. I proceed now to tell you what I think of the temper of the parties and of the public here.

"South Carolina has already taken her attitude of defiance. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are pushed on towards the same attitude. I think that they could not be arrested even if we should offer all you suggest and with it the restoration of the Missouri Compromise line. But persons acting for those States intimate that they might be so arrested because they think that the Republicans are not going to concede the restoration of that line.

"The action of the border States is uncertain. Sym-

* Lincoln to Seward, Feb. 1st, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.



ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

pathy there is strong with the cotton-States, while prudence and patriotism dictate adhesion to the Union. Nothing could *certainly* restrain them but the adoption of Mr. Crittenden's compromise, and I do not see the slightest indication of its adoption on the Republican side of Congress. The members stand nearly or quite as firm against it as the country is. Under these circumstances, time and accident, it seems to me, must determine the course of the border States.

"Probably all the debate and conferences we have hitherto had will sink out of the public mind within a week or two, when the Republican members shall have refused to surrender at discretion to the State of South Carolina. New and exciting subjects will enter into the agitation and control results.

"Thus I have said all that I am able to say of the temper of parties and of the public. I add, very respectfully, my own opinion on the probable future.

"The United States of America, their Constitution, their capital, their organization in all its departments, and with all its military and naval forces, will stand and pass without resistance into your hands. There will be several, perhaps all, of the slave-States standing in a contumacious attitude on the 4th of March. Sedition will be growing weaker and loyalty stronger every day from the acts of secession as they occur." *

But now the crisis in the affairs of the Government was approaching. It is already foreshadowed in Mr. Seward's letter of December 28th. "There is a feverish excitement here," writes he, "which awakens all kinds of apprehensions of popular disturbance and disorders connected with your assumption of the government." And he suggests that Mr. Lincoln should prepare to come to Washington a week earlier than is usual on such occasions; prefacing the advice, however, with the statement, "I do not entertain these apprehensions myself." But by the day following he becomes convinced of the danger.

"At length I have gotten a position," writes he, December 29th, "in which I can see what is going on in the councils of the President. It pains me to learn that things there are even worse than is understood. The President is debating day and night on the question whether he shall not recall Major Anderson and surrender Fort Sumter and go on arming the South. A plot is forming to seize the capital on or before the 4th of March, and this too has its accomplices in the public councils. I could tell you more particularly than I dare write, but you must not imagine that I am giving you suspicions and rumors. Believe me that I know what I write. In point of fact, the responsibilities of your administration must begin before the time arrives." †

Mr. Seward then advises that the President should arrive earlier, that he appoint his Secretaries of War, Navy, and Treasury, and that they come to Washington as soon as possible.

The events of a day or two, however, dissipated the apparent magnitude of the crisis. Buchanan's council broke up, Floyd retired in disgrace, the Cabinet was reorganized; Holt was made Secretary of War, and the immediate plots of the conspirators were exposed and for a season baffled.

STEPHENS'S SPEECH AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH LINCOLN.

FOLLOWING the lead of South Carolina, the governor of Georgia began the secession movement in that State almost immediately after the presidential election, by such public declarations and acts as fell within the scope of his personal influence and official authority. Georgia had, however, given a heavy vote for Douglas, and her people were imbued with a strong feeling of conditional unionism. An opposition to hasty secession at once developed itself of so formidable a character that all the influence and cunning of the secessionists were needed to push their movement to success. The ablest men in the State hurried to Milledgeville and met in a sort of battle-royal of speech-making and wire-pulling. The Legislature was the target, and its action or non-action upon military appropriations and a convention bill the result to be affected. Senator Toombs and others made speeches to promote

* Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 26, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 29, 1860. Unpublished MS.

secession; and in reply to these Alexander H. Stephens addressed the Legislature by special invitation on the 14th of November. It was the greatest effort of his life, and takes rank as the ablest speech made by a Southerner in opposition to disunion. The occasion appears to have been one of great excitement. Toombs sat on the platform beside the speaker, and interlarded the address with his cynical interrogatories and comments, which Stephens met in every instance with successful repartee.

The speaker declared that to secede in consequence of Lincoln's election was to break the Constitution, and show bad faith. "We went into the election with this people," said he. "The result was different from what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally held." Mr. Lincoln could do the South no harm against an adverse House and Senate. This government, with all its defects, came nearer the object of all good governments than any other on the face of the earth. One by one he refuted the charges and complaints which had been advanced by Toombs, and warned his hearers against the perils of sudden disunion. Liberty once lost might never be restored. Georgia had grown great, rich, and intelligent in the Union.

"I look upon this country, with our institutions," continued he, "as the Eden of the world, the Paradise of the Universe. It may be that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous; but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear if we yield to passion, and without sufficient cause shall take that step, instead of becoming greater, or more peaceful, prosperous, and happy — instead of becoming gods we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats."

The speech created an immense sensation throughout the South, and but for an artful trick of the secessionists would have arrested and changed the immediate tide of secession in Georgia. Seeing that the underlying Union feeling was about to endanger their scheme of revolt, through a defection or hesitation on the part of the Empire State of the South, they devised an adroit plea to appropriate its whole force to further their own plans. They persistently urged that "we can make better terms out of the Union than in it." Mr. Stephens himself has explained the misrepresentation and its result. "Two-thirds at least of those who voted for the ordinance of secession did so, I have but little doubt, with a view to a more certain re-formation of the Union."*

To understand this statement more thoroughly, it must be added that Mr. Stephens's great Union speech was also enthusiastically hailed by the North as a sign of firm allegiance. But that part of the country totally misapprehended its spirit and object. With all his eloquently asserted devotion to the Union, he was a pro-slavery man of the most ultra type. He defended the institution upon the "higher-law" doctrine. "If slavery," said he, "as it exists with us is not best for the African, constituted and made as he is, if it does not best promote his welfare and happiness, socially, morally, and politically, as well as that of his master, it ought to be abolished."† He believed slavery should be protected in the Territories by Federal law. He did not go quite to the extent of advocating a revival of the African slave-trade; but went so far as to suggest that without such a reopening the South could not maintain her coveted balance of power. "If the policy of this country," said he, "settled in its early history, of prohibiting further importations or immigrations of this class of population, is to be adhered to, the race of competition between us and our brethren of the North in the colonization of new States, which heretofore has been so well maintained by us, will soon have to be abandoned."‡

So again, while he asserted that the South had lost nothing, but gained much through the slavery agitation, and while he maintained that she was menaced by no danger, he had been for nearly ten years a conditional disunionist. During the agitation of 1850, a convention of Georgia passed certain resolutions, known as the "Georgia platform." The resolutions declared the acceptance of the Compromise of 1850 as a "permanent adjustment"; and then went on to threaten disunion in case that adjustment were violated.§ This "Georgia platform" was Mr. Stephens's rallying-ground and stronghold; latterly he had extended it by including personal liberty bills as a cause of disunion. He loved the Union, but he held the Union secondary to the Georgia platform; and he opposed secession because he thought it a departure from this platform. "Not only a departure from the Georgia platform," said

*Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 321.

†Stephens, Farewell Speech, Augusta, Ga., July 2d, 1859. Cleveland, "Life of Stephens," p. 650.

‡Ibid., p. 647.

§"*Fourth.* That the State of Georgia, in the judgment of this convention, will, and ought to resist, even (as a last resort) to a disruption of every tie which binds her to the Union, any future act of Congress abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent and petition of the slave-holders thereof, or any act abolishing slavery in places within the slave-holding States, purchased by the United States for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, navy-yards, and other like purposes; or in any act suppressing the slave-trade between slave-holding States; or in any refusal to admit as a State any territory applying, because of the existence of slavery therein; or in any act prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the territories of Utah and New Mexico; or in any act repealing or materially modifying the laws now in force for the recovery of fugitive slaves."— [Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 676.]

he, "and from the long-established principles of the national Democratic party, but an entire change of position of the entire South, of all parties, not of all individuals, in relation to the power and jurisdiction of the Federal Government over the subject of African slavery."* Still further: when the disruption of the Charleston convention paralyzed the Democratic party, Mr. Stephens lost heart. He thought the times out of joint. He saw no further prospect of doing good. The popular fever must run its course. If disunion came he avowed he would yield to the misfortune. His destiny, he said, lay with Georgia and the South.† It will appear from this that if Mr. Stephens was not a flexible reasoner, he was a most unsafe political mentor. Yet, out of this lethargy of conviction and will came the splendid outburst of patriotic eloquence and Union argument of his Milledgeville speech; only to be marred, however, at its close by renewed adhesion to the Georgia platform, and a new subserviency to the "will of Georgia."

The newspapers brought the report of Mr. Stephens's speech to Springfield, the home of Mr. Lincoln, as well as to all other Northern cities, and the President-elect read its stirring periods with something of the general hope that a gleam of light was shining upon dark places. Like other men in the North, he had no means of knowing the eccentricities of Mr. Stephens's principles and policy, and therefore probably shared the general error of overvaluing his expressions of attachment to the Union. He had personally known him as fellow-congressman and a fellow-whig in 1847–9; they had become co-laborers in their advocacy of the nomination and election of General Taylor to the presidency, and through these associations contracted a warm social and political friendship.

It was, therefore, most natural that, upon reading his reported speech Mr. Lincoln addressed a note of a few lines to Mr. Stephens, asking him for a revised copy; and that this note led to a short but most interesting correspondence.

Mr. Stephens replied courteously, saying that his speech had not been revised by him; that while the newspaper report contained several verbal inaccuracies, its main points were sufficiently clear for all practical purposes. The note closed with the following sentence: "The country is certainly in great peril, and no man ever had heavier or greater responsibilities resting upon him than you have in the present momentous crisis." The phrase seemed to open the way to a confidential interchange of thought; and a few days afterwards Mr. Lincoln wrote the following frank letter:

"*For your own eye only.*

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 22d, 1860.

"HON. A. H. STEPHENS.

"MY DEAR SIR: Your obliging answer to my short note is just received, and for which please accept my thanks. I fully appreciate the present peril the country is in, and the weight of responsibility on me. Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican administration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with the slaves, or with them about the slaves? If they do, I wish to answer you, as once a friend, and still, I hope, not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the time of Washington. I suppose, however, this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us. Yours very truly,

"A. LINCOLN."‡

With equal frankness Mr. Stephens, under date of December 30th, wrote back a long reply, which is conspicuous for its candid admissions. Premising that though differing from him politically he was not Mr. Lincoln's enemy, Mr. Stephens proceeds as follows:

"I will also add that in my judgment the people of the South do not entertain any fears that a Republican administration, or at least the one about to be inaugurated, would attempt to interfere directly and immediately with slavery in the States. Their apprehension and disquietude do not spring from that source. They do not arise from the fact of the known antislavery opinions of the President-elect. Washington, Jefferson, and other Presidents are generally admitted to have been antislavery in sentiment. But in those days antislavery did not enter as an element into party organizations. . . . But now this subject, which is confessedly on all sides outside of the constitutional action of the Government so far as the States are concerned, is made the central idea in the platform of principles announced by the triumphant party. The leading object seems to be simply, and wantonly, if you please, to put the institutions of nearly half the States under the ban of public opinion and national condemnation. This, upon general principles, is quite enough of itself to arouse a spirit not only of general indignation, but of revolt on the part of the proscribed. . . . We at the South do think African slavery, as it exists with us, both morally and politically right. This opinion is formed upon the inferiority of the black race; you, however, and perhaps a majority of the North, think it wrong. Admit the difference of opinion. The same difference of opinion existed to a more general extent amongst those who formed the Constitution when it was made and adopted. The changes have been mainly to our side. As parties were not formed on this difference of opinion then, why should they be now? The same difference would, of course, exist in the supposed case of religion. When parties, or combinations of men, therefore, so form themselves, must it not be assumed to arise not from reason or any sense of justice, but from fanaticism? The motive can spring from no other source, and when men come under the influence of fanaticism, there is no telling where their impulses or passions may drive them. This is what creates our

* Stephens, Augusta Speech, Sept. 1st, 1860. Cleveland, p. 692.

† Stephens to Landrum, July 1st, 1860. Cleveland, p. 672.

‡ Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., p. 266.

discontent and apprehension. . . . Conciliation and harmony, in my judgment, can never be established by force. Nor can the Union, under the Constitution, be maintained by force. The Union was formed by the consent of Independent Sovereign States. Ultimate sovereignty still resides with them separately, which can be resumed, and will be, if their safety, tranquillity, and security in their judgment require it. Under our system, as I view it, there is no rightful power in the general government to coerce a State in case any one of them should throw herself upon her reserved rights, and resume the full exercise of her sovereign powers. Force may perpetuate a Union — that depends upon the contingencies of war. But such a Union would not be the Union of the Constitution: it would be nothing short of a consolidated despotism." *

Mr. Lincoln could not, of course, enter upon a further discussion of the topics raised, and made no reply to Mr. Stephens's letter. The correspondence is noteworthy as showing how both writers agreed perfectly upon the actual and underlying cause of the political crisis,— *viz.*, that the South believed slavery to be right and ought to be extended, while the North believed it was wrong and ought to be restricted. It was a conflict of public opinion. Such conflicts have come in all times, in all nations, and under all forms of government. They have sprung from every passion of the human soul, ambition, avarice, the generous affection of kindred nations, and the deadly hatred of religious fanaticism. But, admitting the existence of such a conflict of opinion, the true and legitimate inquiry arises, Was it a proper cause of war?

History must answer this question unhesitatingly and emphatically in the negative. In ages happily passed, the anger of a king, the caprice of a mistress, or the ambition of a minister has often deluged a nation in blood. But in our day the conscience of civilization demands that the sword shall only defend the life of governments, or the life, liberty, and property of their subjects. It has ordained that written constitutions should decide claims of rulers and rights of citizens. Casuistry the most adroit could not prove the right of the free States to expel the slave-States for believing the institution of slavery to be a substantial blessing; equally absurd was the doctrine that the slave-States had a right to destroy the Union by secession because the free States thought slavery a moral, social, and political evil. Upon this question, as upon all others, public opinion was the arbiter appointed by the Constitution and laws. Upon this question the lawful and constitutional verdict had been pronounced by the election of Lincoln; and the proper duty of the South under the circumstances had been admirably stated by Mr. Stephens himself in his Milledgeville speech: "In my judgment the election of no man constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the country." †

Mr. Stephens's letter utterly ignored the existence of the pro-slavery sentiment in the South, which had for six years been united and unceasing in party affiliation and action; that this party action had wrought the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in violation of plighted political faith, and generous comity between sections. Moreover that antislavery opinions had there been not only under ban of public sentiment, but had notoriously for years been visited with mob violence, and been made the subject of prohibitory penal statutes. The experiment of a sentimental union dreamed by Stephens and others had been fully tried in the compromise of 1850, and first and flagrantly violated by the South herself, under party coalition, against every appeal and protest.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

One of the vexatious duties of Lincoln was to answer the importunings of a class of sincere, intelligent, but timid men, alarmed by the signs of disunion, who besought him to make some public statement or declaration to quiet the South. Requests of this character were not confined to one party, but came from all; the more considerable numbers being from Republicans and from Southern unionists or followers of Bell and Everett. The great bulk of these letters were, of course, never answered; but occasionally one was received from a man of such standing and influence that to ignore it would not only seem ungracious, but might subject the President-elect to more serious misrepresentation than it had already been his lot to endure. Both to show a prominent phase of current politics and his manner of dealing with it, several replies of this class are laid before the reader.

Thus, for instance, he wrote, confidentially, to Mr. William S. Speer, a citizen of Tennessee, under date of October 23d:

"I appreciate your motive when you suggest the propriety of my writing for the public something disclaiming all intention to interfere with slaves or slavery in the States; but in my judgment it would do no good. I have already done this many, many times; and it is in print, and open to all who will read. Those who will not read or heed what I have already publicly said would not read or heed a repetition of it. 'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.'" ‡

Among the political newspapers of the West, none had for many years taken a higher rank or wielded a greater influence than the "Louisville Journal." It had in a manner been Mr. Lincoln's primer in politics in those early days

* Stephens, "War Between the States," Vol. II., pp. 267–70.

† Cleveland, p. 696.

‡ Lincoln to Speer, Oct. 23d, 1860. Unpublished MS.

when he labored through Blackstone, or even farther back when he was yet struggling with Kirkham's grammar on the shady knolls of New Salem. Compared with these rocks and pitfalls of letters, the anecdotes, the wit, the epigrammatic arguments of the "Louisville Journal" were a very garden of delight, not only to Lincoln, but to the crude yet knowledge-hungry intellects of the whole Mississippi Valley. In time the "Journal" became a great luminary, and the name of its witty editor a household word. For long years it was a beacon and watchtower of the Whig party; then the Pandora's box of the Nebraska bill was opened; and when finally in the extraordinary campaign of 1860 Lincoln read this once-favorite sheet, it was to find himself the victim of its satire and depreciation. Victory, however, is a sovereign balm for detraction; and it must have been easy for him to forgive his old friend George D. Prentice when the latter wrote him (October 26th): "There is evidently a very strong probability of your being elected to the presidency by the popular vote." Expressing the "strongest" confidence in both his "personal and political integrity," he suggests that in the event of his election he should publish a letter setting forth his conservative views and intentions, "to assure all good citizens of the South and to take from the disunionists every excuse or pretext for treason." *

To this appeal Mr. Lincoln prepared a reply, October 29th, though it was not then sent.

"Your suggestion," wrote he, "that I in a certain event shall write a letter setting forth my conservative views and intentions, is certainly a very worthy one. But would it do any good? If I were to labor a month, I could not express my conservative views and intentions more clearly and strongly than they are expressed in our platform and in my many speeches already in print and before the public. And yet even you, who do occasionally speak of me in terms of personal kindness, give no prominence to these oft-repeated expressions of conservative views and intentions, but busy yourself with appeals to all conservative men to vote for Douglas,— to vote any way which can possibly defeat me,— thus impressing your readers that you think I am the very worst man living. If what I have already said has failed to convince you, no repetition of it would convince you. The writing of your letter, now before me, gives assurance that you would publish such a letter from me as you suggest; but, till now, what reason had I to suppose the 'Louisville Journal,' even, would publish a repetition of that which is already at its command, and which it does not press upon the public attention? And now, my friend,— for such I esteem you personally,— do not misunderstand me. I have not decided that I will not do substantially what you suggest. I will not forbear from doing so merely on punctilio and pluck. If I do finally abstain, it will be because of apprehension that it would do harm. For the good men of the South — and I regard the majority of them as such — I have no objection to repeat seventy and seven times. But I have bad men also to deal with, both North and South; men who are eager for something new upon which to base new misrepresentations; men who would like to frighten me, or at least to fix upon me the character of timidity and cowardice. They would seize upon almost any letter I could write as being an 'awful coming down.' I intend keeping my eye upon these gentlemen, and to not unnecessarily put any weapons in their hands." †

This letter was withheld till after election. On the 16th of November he wrote a letter of very similar purport to Mr. N. Paschal, editor of the "Missouri Republican."

"I could say nothing which I have not already said, and which is in print, and accessible to the public. Please pardon me for suggesting that if the papers like yours, which heretofore have persistently garbled and misrepresented what I have said, will now fully and fairly place it before their readers, there can be no further misunderstanding. I beg you to believe me sincere, when I declare I do not say this in a spirit of complaint or resentment; but that I urge it as the true cure for any real uneasiness in the country, that my course may be other than conservative. The Republican newspapers now and for some time past are and have been republishing copious extracts from my many published speeches, which would at once reach the whole public if your class of papers would also publish them. I am not at liberty to shift my ground — that is out of the question. If I thought a repetition would do any good I would make it. But in my judgment it would do positive harm. The secessionists *per se*, believing they had alarmed me, would clamor all the louder." ‡

With solicitations of this nature coming in part from his political friends, Mr. Lincoln was not only as firm and decided, but more emphatic and unsparing in criticism. On November 5th, the day before the presidential election, there arrived at Springfield, and called upon the President-elect, a gentleman from New England of some prominence in political and official life, who brought and presented letters of this same tenor from a considerable number of citizens representing business, commercial, and manufacturing industries of that region. He was one of those keen, incisive talkers who went direct to the heart of his mission.

"I have called to see," he said, "if the alarms of many persons in New England engaged in commerce and manufactures cannot by some means be relieved. I am myself largely interested in manufactures. Our trade has fallen off, our workmen are idle, we get no orders from the South, and with the increasing chances of civil war, bankruptcy and ruin stare us in the face."

Something in the persistence and manner of his interlocutor, something in the tone of the letters presented, and still more in the character of the signers, quickly irritated Lincoln to a warmth of retort he seldom reached until after long provocation. He divined at once the mercenary nature of the appeal about to be tried on him, and it roused him to repel the pressure. His visitor closed by asking some

* Prentice to Lincoln, Oct. 26th, 1860. Unpublished MS.
† Lincoln to Prentice, Oct. 29th, 1860. Unpublished MS.
‡ Lincoln to Paschal, Nov. 16th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

conservative promise "to reassure the men honestly alarmed."

"There are no such men," bluntly replied Lincoln. "This is the same old trick by which the South breaks down every Northern victory. Even if I were personally willing to barter away the moral principle involved in this contest for the commercial gain of a new submission to the South, I would go to Washington without the countenance of the men who supported me and were my friends before the election; I would be as powerless as a block of buckeye wood."

The man still insisted, and Lincoln continued:

"The honest men (you are talking of honest men) will look at our platform and what I have said. There they will find everything I could now say, or which they would ask me to say. All I could add would be but repetition. Having told them all these things ten times already, would they believe the eleventh declaration? Let us be practical. There are many general terms afloat, such as 'conservatism,' 'enforcement of the irrepressible conflict at the point of the bayonet,' 'hostility to the South,' etc., all of which mean nothing without definition. What then could I say to allay their fears, if they will not define what particular act or acts they fear from me or my friends?"

At this stage of the conversation his visitor, who with true military foresight had provided a reserve, handed him an additional letter numerously signed, asking if he did not there recognize names that were a power.

"Yes," retorted Lincoln sharply, glancing at the document, "I recognize them as a set of liars and knaves who signed that statement about Seward last year."

The visitor was taken aback at this familiarity with the local politics of his State, but rallied and insisted that there were also other names on the list. Lincoln now looked through the paper more carefully, his warmth meanwhile cooling down a little.

"Well," answered he, laughing, "after reading it, it is about as I expected to find it. It annoyed me to hear that gang of men called respectable. Their conduct a year ago was a disgrace to any civilized citizen."

Here his visitor suggested that the South was making armed preparations.

"The North," answered Lincoln, "does not fear invasion from the slave-States, and we of the North certainly have no desire, and never had, to invade the South. They have talked about what they intend to do in the event of a Black Republican victory, until they have convinced themselves there is really no courage left in the North."

GEORGE D. PRENTICE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"Have we backed this time?" interrupted the visitor.

"That is just what I am pressed to do now," replied Lincoln. "If I shall begin to yield to these threats, if I begin dallying with them, the men who have elected me (if I shall be elected) would give me up before my election, and the South, seeing it, would deliberately kick me out. If my friends should desire me to repeat anything I have before said, I should have no objection to do so. If they required me to say something I had not yet said, I would either do so or get out of the way. If I should be elected, the first duty to the country would be to stand by the men who elected me."*

Still, from time to time the point was pressed upon him from other influential quarters. Mr. Raymond, editor of the "New York Times," joined in urging it. Lincoln, on November 28th, answered him confidentially as follows:

"Yours of the 14th was received in due course. I have delayed so long to answer it, because my reasons for not coming before the public in any form just now had substantially appeared in your paper (the 'Times'), and hence I feared they were not deemed sufficient by you, else you would not have written me as you did. I now think we have a demonstration in favor of my view. On the 20th instant Senator Trumbull made a short speech, which I suppose you have both seen and approved. Has a single newspaper, heretofore against us, urged that speech upon its readers with a purpose to quiet public anxiety? Not one, so far as I know. On the contrary, the 'Boston Courier' and its class hold me responsible for that speech, and endeavor to inflame the North with the belief that it foreshadows an abandonment of Republican ground by the incoming administration; while the 'Washington Constitution' and its class hold the same speech up to the South as an open declaration of war against them. This is just as I expected, and just what would happen

* Nicolay, Manuscript memoranda.

with any declaration I could make. These political fiends are not half sick enough yet. Party malice, and not public good, possesses them entirely. 'They seek a sign, and no sign shall be given them.' At least such is my present feeling and purpose."*

And in this purpose he remained steadfast to the end, though put to yet more trying tests. It has already been mentioned, that with the opening of Congress, and the formation of the Senate Committee of Thirteen and the House Committee of Thirty-three, certain conservative men from the border slave-States endeavored to gain control of the political situation by forming a neutral or mediating party between the disunionists and the Republicans. Their policy was an utter mistake; for, while reprobating present dismemberment, their attitude on the slavery question indicated clearly enough that, if clung to, it would inevitably drive them to the extreme plans of the cotton-States. Some of these would-be "neutral" States eventually went that direful road; and those which did not were saved only by the restraint of the Union army. But for the present their leaders were sincerely patriotic. From one of the most prominent of these, Hon. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, to whom Lincoln afterwards made a tender of a Cabinet appointment, he received an inquiry, dated December 10th, concerning his opinions on several points of the slavery controversy, saying:

"I am not without hope that a clear and definite exposition of your views on the questions mentioned may go far to quiet, if not satisfy, all reasonable minds that on most of them it will become plain that there is much more misunderstanding than difference, and that the balance are so much more abstract than practical."†

However difficult to resist this appeal, so influential, so respectful, so promising, the President-elect felt himself bound to adhere to his policy of refusing any public utterance, for reasons which he set forth at some length in a confidential answer, written December 15th.

"I am greatly disinclined," said he, "to write a letter on the subject embraced in yours; and I would not do so, even privately as I do, were it not that I fear you might misconstrue my silence. Is it desired that I shall shift the ground upon which I have been elected? I cannot do it. You need only to acquaint yourself with that ground, and press it on the attention of the South. It is all in print and easy of access. May I be pardoned if I ask whether even you have ever attempted to procure the reading of the Republican platform, or my speeches, by the Southern people? If not, what reason have I to expect that any additional production of mine would meet a better fate? It would make me appear as if I repented for the crime of having been elected and was anxious to apologize and beg forgiveness. To so represent me would be the principal use made of any letter I might now thrust upon the public. My old record cannot be so used; and that is precisely the reason that some new declaration is so much sought.

* Lincoln to Raymond, Nov. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.



JOHN A. GILMER. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

"Now, my dear sir, be assured I am not questioning your candor; I am only pointing out, that while a new letter would hurt the cause which I think a just one, you can quite as well effect every patriotic object with the old record. Carefully read pages 18, 19, 74, 75, 88, 89, and 267 of the volume of Joint Debates between Senator Douglas and myself with the Republican Platform adopted at Chicago, and all your questions will be substantially answered. I have no thought of recommending the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, nor the slave-trade among the slave-States, even on the conditions indicated; and if I were to make such recommendation, it is quite clear Congress would not follow it.

"As to employing slaves in arsenals and dockyards, it is a thing I never thought of in my life, to my recollection, till I saw your letter; and I may say of it precisely as I have said of the two points above.

"As to the use of patronage in the slave-States, where there are few or no Republicans. I do not expect to inquire for the politics of the appointee, or whether he does or not own slaves. I intend in that matter to accommodate the people in the several localities, if they themselves will allow me to accommodate them. In one word, I never have been, am not now, and probably never shall be in a mood of harassing the people either North or South.

"On the territorial question I am inflexible, as you see my position in the book. On that there is a difference between you and us; and it is the only substantial difference. You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is a wrong and ought to be restricted. For this neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other.

"As to the State laws, mentioned in your sixth question, I really know very little of them. I never have read one. If any of them are in conflict with the fugitive-slave clause, or any other part of the Constitution, I certainly shall be glad of their repeal; but I

† Gilmer to Lincoln, Dec. 10th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

could hardly be justified, as a citizen of Illinois, or as President of the United States, to recommend the repeal of a statute of Vermont or South Carolina." *

We have given samples of these solicitations coming from Republicans, from Douglas Democrats, and from the adherents of Bell; the following, coming from the fourth political school, will perhaps be found of equal if not greater interest. Its origin is given in the words of the principal actor, General Duff Green, who, in a letter some three years afterwards, thus described it:

"In December, 1860, at the request of the President of the United States, I went to Springfield to see Mr. Lincoln and urge him to go to Washington and exert his influence in aid of the adjustment of the questions then pending between the North and the South. I was authorized by Mr. Buchanan to say to him that if he came he would be received and treated with the courtesy due to the President-elect. I saw Mr. Lincoln at his own house, and did urge the necessity of his going to Washington and uniting his efforts in behalf of peace, telling him that in my opinion he alone could prevent a civil war, and that if he did not go, upon his conscience must rest the blood that would be shed." †

Whether this proposition came by authority or not, Lincoln could not publicly either question the truth of the envoy or the motive of the mission. In either case the appeal was most adroitly laid. Of course it was impossible to accept or even to entertain it; on the other hand, a simple refusal might be made the basis of very serious misrepresentation. He therefore wrote the following reply:

"SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 28th, 1860.

"GEN. DUFF GREEN.

"MY DEAR SIR: I do not desire any amendment of the Constitution. Recognizing, however, that questions of such amendment rightfully belong to the American people, I should not feel justified nor inclined to withhold from them if I could a fair opportunity of expressing their will thereon through either of the modes prescribed in the instrument.

"In addition I declare that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and I denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as the gravest of crimes.

"I am greatly averse to writing anything for the public at this time; and I consent to the publication of this only upon the condition that six of the twelve United States senators for the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas shall sign their names to what is written on this sheet below my name, and allow the whole to be published together.

"Yours truly,

"A. LINCOLN.

"We recommend to the people of the States we represent respectively, to suspend all action for dismemberment of the Union, at least until some act deemed to be violative of our rights shall be done by the incoming administration." ‡

This letter Lincoln transmitted to Senator Trumbull at Washington, with the following direction:

"General Duff Green is out here endeavoring to draw a letter out of me. I have written one which herewith I inclose to you, and which I believe could not be used to our disadvantage. Still, if on consultation with our discreet friends you conclude that it may do us harm, do not deliver it. You need not mention that the second clause of the letter is copied from the Chicago Platform. If, on consultation, our friends, including yourself, think it can do no harm, keep a copy and deliver the letter to General Green." §

While the fact is not definitely known, it is probable that this letter was delivered. Nothing further came of Duff Green's mission except a letter from himself in the "New York Herald" mentioning his visit and its failure, in the vaguest generalities. His whole aim had been to induce Lincoln tacitly to assume responsibility for the Southern revolt; and when the latter by his skillful answer pointed out the real conspirators, they were no longer anxious to have a publication made.

The whole attitude and issue of the controversy was so tersely summed up by Lincoln in a confidential letter to a Republican friend, under date of January 11th, 1861, that we cannot forbear citing it in conclusion:

"Yours of the 6th is received. I answer it only because I fear you would misconstrue my silence. What is our present condition? We have just carried an election on principles fairly stated to the people. Now we are told in advance the Government shall be broken up unless we surrender to those we have beaten, before we take the offices. In this they are either attempting to play upon us or they are in dead earnest. Either way, if we surrender, it is the end of us, and of the Government. They will repeat the experiment upon us *ad libitum*. A year will not pass till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they will stay in the Union. They now have the Constitution under which we have lived over seventy years, and acts of Congress of their own framing, with no prospect of their being changed; and they can never have a more shallow pretext for breaking up the Government, or extorting a compromise, than now. There is in my judgment but one compromise which would really settle the slavery question, and that would be a prohibition against acquiring any more territory." ‖

* Lincoln to Gilmer, Dec. 15th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

† Duff Green to Jefferson Davis, May 26th, 1863. Unpublished MS.

‡ Lincoln to Duff Green, Dec. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

§ Lincoln to Trumbull, Dec. 28th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‖ Lincoln to Hon. J. T. Hale, Jan. 11th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

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THE POT-HUNTER.

Dec. 1887



A. Lincoln. January 26. 1861
Springfield, Ills.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

SPRINGFIELD TO WASHINGTON.

AS the date of inauguration approached, formal invitations, without party distinction, came from the legislatures of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, tendering Mr. Lincoln the hospitalities of those States and their people, and inviting him to visit their capitals on his journey to Washington. Similar invitations also came to him from the municipal authorities of many cities and towns on the route, and railroads tendered him special trains for the use of himself and family. Mr. Lincoln had no fondness for public display, but in his long political career he had learned the importance of personal confidence and live sympathy between representatives and constituents, leaders and people. About to assume unusual duties in extraordinary times, he doubtless felt that it would not only be a gracious act to accept, so far as he could, these invitations, in which all parties had freely joined, but that both people and executive would be strengthened in their faith and patriotism by a closer acquaintance, even of so brief and ceremonial a character. Accordingly he answered the governors and committees that he would visit the cities of Indianapolis, Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburg, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Trenton, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg, while to the governor of Massachusetts he replied that the want of time alone constrained him to omit that State from his route of travel.

Monday, the 11th day of February, was fixed as the time of departure, and a programme and schedule of special trains from point to point were arranged, extending to Saturday, the 23d, the time of arrival in Washington. Early Monday morning (the 11th) found Mr. Lincoln, his family, and suite at the rather dingy little railroad station in Springfield, with a throng of at least a thousand of his Springfield neighbors who had come to bid him goodbye. It was a cloudy, stormy morning, which served to add gloom and depression to the spirits. The leave-taking became a scene of subdued anxiety, almost of solemnity. Mr. Lincoln took a position in the waiting-room, where his friends filed past him, often merely pressing his hand in silent emotion.

The half-finished ceremony was broken in upon by the ringing bells and the rushing train. The crowd closed about the railroad car into which the President-elect and his party * made their way. Then came the central incident of the morning. Once more the bell gave notice of starting; but as the conductor paused with his hand lifted to the bell-rope, Mr. Lincoln appeared on the platform of the car, and raised his hand to command attention. The bystanders bared their heads to the falling snow-flakes, and standing thus, his neighbors heard his voice for the last time, in the city of his home, in a farewell address † so chaste and pathetic, that it reads as if he already felt the tragic shadow of forecasting fate:

"My friends: no one, not in my situation, can appreciate my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and the kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me, and remain with you, and be everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell."

* The presidential party which made the whole journey consisted of the following persons: Mr. Lincoln, Mrs. Lincoln, their three sons, Robert T., William, and Thomas, Lockwood Todd, Doctor W. S. Wallace, John G. Nicolay, John Hay, Hon. N. B. Judd, Hon. David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sumner, Major David Hunter, Captain George W. Hazard, Captain John Pope, Colonel Ward H. Lamon, Colonel E. E. Ellsworth, J. M. Burgess, George C. Latham, W. S. Wood, and B. Forbes. Besides these a considerable number of other personal friends and dignitaries accompanied the President from Springfield to Indianapolis, and some of them to places farther on the route.

† This address is here correctly printed for the first time, from the original manuscript, having been written down immediately after the train started, partly by Mr. Lincoln's own hand and partly by that of his private secretary from his dictation.

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A proper description of the presidential tour which followed would fill a volume. It embraced two weeks of official receptions by committees, mayors, governors, and legislatures; of crowded evening receptions and interminable hand-shakings; of impromptu or formal addresses at every ceremony; of cheers, salutes, bonfires, military parades, and imposing processions, amid miles of spectators.

Political dissension was for the moment hushed in the general curiosity to see and hear the man who by the free and lawful choice of the nation had been called to exercise the duties of the presidential office. The universal eagerness was perhaps heightened by the fact that during the same two weeks the delegates from the States in insurrection were in session at Montgomery, Alabama, occupied with the temporary organization of a government openly pledged to rebellion, and whose doings were daily reported by the telegraph and printed in every newspaper. Personal curiosity was thus supplemented by growing political anxiety, and every word of the President-elect was scanned for some light by which to read the troubled and uncertain future. Mr. Lincoln was therefore obliged to measure his public utterances with unusual caution; and while he managed to avoid any announcement of policy, the country was nevertheless able to read between the lines that it had made no mistake in the man to whom it had confided the preservation of the Government. It would, of course, be impossible in a single chapter to cite his many speeches on this journey, in which there occurred, of necessity, a great deal of repetition. It will, perhaps, give a better idea of their general tenor to reproduce passages from a few of the most noteworthy. In reading these the critic must constantly bear in mind that they were reported and printed under such circumstances of haste and confusion that verbal accuracy could not be expected, and that they are but abstracts, in which the full structure of his sentences is often abridged or transposed to permit the whole to be brought within the limits of an ordinary press dispatch.

The train which left Springfield in the morning arrived in Indianapolis before nightfall, where, in response to an address from Governor Morton, Mr. Lincoln said:

"Most heartily do I thank you for this magnificent reception, and while I cannot take to myself any share of the compliment thus paid, more than that which pertains to a mere instrument, an accidental instrument, perhaps, I should say, of a great cause, I yet must look upon it as a most magnificent reception, and as such most heartily do I thank you for it. You have been pleased to address yourself to me chiefly in behalf of this glorious Union in which we live, in all of which you have my hearty sympathy, and, as far as may be within my power, will have, one and inseparably, my hearty coöperation. While I do not expect, upon this occasion, or until I get to Washington, to attempt any lengthy speech, I will only say that to the salvation of the Union, there needs but one single thing, the hearts of a people like yours. The people, when they rise in mass in behalf of the Union and the liberties of this country, truly may it be said, 'The gates of hell cannot prevail against them.' In all trying positions in which I shall be placed, and doubtless I shall be placed in many such, my reliance will be upon you and the people of the United States; and I wish you to remember, now and forever, that it is your business, and not mine; that if the union of these States and the liberties of this people shall be lost, it is but little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty millions of people who inhabit these United States, and to their posterity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and preserve the Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for me. . . . I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that not with politicians, not with Presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, is the question, Shall the Union and shall the liberties of this country be preserved to the latest generations?"

The ceremonies during his stay here called out another address from him in which he asked the following pertinent questions:

"I am here to thank you much for this magnificent welcome, and still more for the generous support given by your State to that political cause which I think is the true and just cause of the whole country and the whole world. Solomon says there is 'a time to keep silence,' and when men wrangle by the month with no certainty that they *mean* the same *thing*, while using the same *word*, it perhaps were as well if they would keep silence. The words 'coercion' and 'invasion' are much used in these days, and often with some temper and hot blood. Let us make sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning of those who use them. Let us get exact definitions of these words, not from dictionaries, but from the men themselves, who certainly appreciate the *things* they would represent by the use of words. What, then, is 'Coercion'? What is 'Invasion'? Would the marching of an army into South Carolina, without the consent of her people, and with hostile intent towards them, be 'invasion'? I certainly think it would; and it would be 'coercion' also if the South Carolinians were forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the duties on foreign importations, or even withhold the mails from places where they were habitually violated, would any or all of these things be 'invasion' or 'coercion'? Do our professed lovers of the Union, but who spitefully resolve that they will resist coercion and invasion, understand that such things as these on the part of the United States would be coercion or invasion of a State? If so, their idea of means to preserve the object of their affection would seem exceedingly thin and airy. If sick, the little pills of the homeopathist would be much too large for them to swallow. In their view, the Union, as a family relation, would seem to be no regular marriage, but a sort of 'free-love' arrangement, to be maintained only on 'passional attraction.' By the way, in what consists the special sacredness of a State? I speak not of the position assigned to a State in the Union, by the Constitution; for that, by the bond, we all recognize. That position, however, a State cannot carry out of the Union with it. I speak of that assumed primary right of a State to rule all which is *less* than itself, and ruin all which is larger than itself. If a State and a county, in a given case, should be equal in extent of territory, and equal in number of inhabitants, in what, as a matter of principle, is the State better than the

county? Would an exchange of names be an exchange of *rights* upon principle? On what rightful principle may a State, being not more than one-fiftieth part of the nation, in soil and population, break up the nation and then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision of itself, in the most arbitrary way? What mysterious right to play tyrant is conferred on a district of country, with its people, by merely calling it a State? Fellow-citizens, I am not asserting anything; I am merely asking questions for you to consider."

At Columbus, Ohio, he said to the legislature of that State, convened in joint session in the hall of the Assembly:

"It is true, as has been said by the President of the Senate, that very great responsibility rests upon me in the position to which the votes of the American people have called me. I am deeply sensible of that weighty responsibility. I cannot but know what you all know, that without a name, perhaps without a reason why I should have a name, there has fallen upon me a task such as did not rest even upon the Father of his Country; and so feeling, I cannot but turn and look for that support without which it will be impossible for me to perform that great task. I turn, then, and look to the American people, and to that God who has never forsaken them. Allusion has been made to the interest felt in relation to the policy of the new Administration. In this I have received from some a degree of credit for having kept silence, and from others some deprecation. I still think that I was right. . . . I have not maintained silence from any want of real anxiety. It is a good thing that there is no more than anxiety, for there is nothing going wrong. It is a consoling circumstance that when we look out, there is nothing that really hurts anybody. We entertain different views upon political questions, but nobody is suffering anything. This is a most consoling circumstance, and from it we may conclude that all we want is time, patience, and a reliance on that God who has never forsaken this people."

During a brief halt of the train at Steubenville, where a large crowd was assembled, he made the following short statement of the fundamental question at issue:

"I fear that the great confidence placed in my ability is unfounded. Indeed, I am sure it is. Encompassed by vast difficulties as I am, nothing shall be wanting on my part, if sustained by the American people and God. I believe the devotion to the Constitution is equally great on both sides of the river. It is only the different understanding of that instrument that causes difficulty. The only dispute on both sides is, 'What are their rights?' If the majority should not rule, who would be the judge? Where is such a judge to be found? We should all be bound by the majority of the American people — if not, then the minority must control. Would that be right? Would it be just or generous? Assuredly not. I reiterate, that the majority should rule. If I adopt a wrong policy, the opportunity for condemnation will occur in four years' time. Then I can be turned out, and a better man with better views put in my place."

Necessarily omitting any description of the magnificent demonstrations, and the multiplied speeches in the great State and city of New York, his addresses in the capital of New Jersey must be quoted, because they show a culminating earnestness of thought and purpose. To the Senate he said:

"I am very grateful to you for the honorable reception of which I have been the object. I cannot but remember the place that New Jersey holds in our early history. In the revolutionary struggle few of the States among the Old Thirteen had more of the battle-fields of the country within their limits than New Jersey. May I be pardoned if, upon this occasion, I mention that away back in my childhood, the earliest days of my being able to read, I got hold of a small book, such a one as few of the younger members have ever seen, 'Weems' Life of Washington.' I remember all the accounts there given of the battle-fields and struggles for the liberties of the country, and none fixed themselves upon my imagination so deeply as the struggle here at Trenton, New Jersey. The crossing of the river; the contest with the Hessians; the great hardships endured at that time, all fixed themselves on my memory more than any single revolutionary event; and you all know, for you have all been boys, how these early impressions last longer than any others. I recollect thinking then, boy even though I was, that there must have been something more than common that these men struggled for. I am exceedingly anxious that that thing — that something even more than National Independence; that something that held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to come — I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution, and the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be an humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people for perpetuating the object of that great struggle. You give me this reception, as I understand, without distinction of party. I learn that this body is composed of a majority of gentlemen who, in the exercise of their best judgment in the choice of a chief magistrate, did not think I was the man. I understand, nevertheless, that they came forward here to greet me as the constitutionally elected President of the United States — as citizens of the United States — to meet the man who, for the time being, is the representative of the majesty of the nation — united by the single purpose to perpetuate the Constitution, the Union, and the liberties of the people. As such, I accept this reception more gratefully than I could do did I believe it were tendered to me as an individual."

Passing then to the Assembly Chamber, he addressed the members of the lower house in conclusion:

. . . "You, Mr. Speaker, have well said that this is a time when the bravest and wisest look back with doubt and awe upon the aspect presented by our national affairs. Under these circumstances, you will readily see why I should not speak in detail of the course I shall deem it best to pursue. It is proper that I should avail myself of all the information and all the time at my command, in order that when the time arrives in which I must speak officially, I shall be able to take the ground which I deem the best and safest, and from which I may have no occasion to swerve. I shall endeavor to take the ground I deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the South, and the whole country. I take it, I hope, in good temper, certainly with no malice toward any section. I shall do all that may be in my power to promote a peaceful settlement of all our difficulties. The man does not live who is more devoted to peace than I am, none who would do more to preserve it, but it may be necessary to put the foot down firmly. [Here the audience broke out into cheers so loud and long, that for some moments it was impossible to hear Mr. Lincoln's voice.] And if I do my duty and do right, you will sustain me, will you not? [Loud cheers, and cries of 'Yes, yes, we will.'] Received as I am by the

members of a legislature, the majority of whom do not agree with me in political sentiments, I trust that I may have their assistance in piloting the ship of State through this voyage, surrounded by perils as it is; for if it should suffer wreck now, there will be no pilot ever needed for another voyage."

Perhaps in no one of the many addresses delivered during his tour was he so visibly moved and affected by his surroundings as when he spoke in Independence Hall in Philadelphia, which he visited on the 22d of February, the anniversary of Washington's birthday. He said:

"I am filled with deep emotion at finding myself standing in this place, where were collected together the wisdom, the patriotism, the devotion to principle from which sprang the institutions under which we live. You have kindly suggested to me that in my hands is the task of restoring peace to our distracted country. I can say in return, sirs, that all the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn, so far as I have been able to draw them, from the sentiments which originated in and were given to the world from this hall. I have never had a feeling, politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence. I have often pondered over the dangers which were incurred by the men who assembled here and framed and adopted that Declaration. I have pondered over the toils that were endured by the officers and soldiers of the army who achieved that independence. I have often inquired of myself what great principle or idea it was that kept this Confederacy so long together. It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, but that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all should have an equal chance. This is the sentiment embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Now, my friends, can this country be saved on that basis? If it can, I will consider myself one of the happiest men in the world if I can help to save it. If it cannot be saved upon that principle, it will be truly awful. But if this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle, I was about to say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than surrender it. Now, in my view of the present aspect of affairs, there is no need of bloodshed and war. There is no necessity for it. I am not in favor of such a course; and I may say in advance that there will be no bloodshed unless it be forced upon the Government. The Government will not use force, unless force is used against it.

"My friends, this is wholly an unprepared speech. I did not expect to be called on to say a word when I came here. I supposed it was merely to do something towards raising a flag — I may, therefore, have said something indiscreet. [Cries of 'No, No.'] But I have said nothing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty God, die by."

In his last speech of the series, delivered in Harrisburg, before the assembled legislature of Pennsylvania, he happily described another interesting ceremony which had taken place that same morning before leaving Philadelphia:

"I appear before you only for a very few, brief remarks, in response to what has been said to me. I thank you most sincerely for this reception, and the generous words in which support has been promised me upon this occasion. I thank your great commonwealth for the overwhelming support it recently gave, not me personally, but the cause which I think a just one, in the late election. Allusion has been made to the fact — the interesting fact, perhaps, we should say — that I for the first time appear at the capital of the great commonwealth of Pennsylvania upon the birthday of the Father of his Country. In connection with that beloved anniversary connected with the history of this country, I have already gone through one exceedingly interesting scene this morning in the ceremonies at Philadelphia. Under the conduct of gentlemen there, I was for the first time allowed the privilege of standing in the old Independence Hall, to have a few words addressed to me there, and opening up to me an opportunity of expressing, with much regret that I had not more time to express something of my own feelings, excited by the occasion, somewhat to harmonize and give shape to the feelings that had really been the feelings of my whole life. Besides this, our friends there had provided a magnificent flag of the country. They had arranged it so that I was given the honor of raising it. And when it went up, I was pleased that it went to its place by the strength of my own feeble arm. When, according to the arrangement, the cord was pulled, and it floated gloriously to the wind, without an accident, in the bright, glowing sunshine of the morning, I could not help hoping that there was, in the entire success of that beautiful ceremony, at least something of an omen of what is to come. Nor could I help feeling then, as I often have felt, in the whole of that proceeding I was a very humble instrument. I had not provided the flag; I had not made the arrangements for elevating it to its place; I had applied but a very small portion of my feeble strength in raising it. In the whole transaction I was in the hands of the people who had arranged it, and if I can have the same generous coöperation of the people of the nation, I think the flag of our country may yet be kept flaunting gloriously. I recur for a moment but to repeat some words uttered at the hotel, in regard to what has been said about the military support which the general government may expect from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a proper emergency. To guard against any possible mistake do I recur to this. It is not with any pleasure that I contemplate the possibility that a necessity may arise in this country for the use of the military arm. While I am exceedingly gratified to see the manifestation upon your streets of your military force here, and exceedingly gratified at your promise to use that force upon a proper emergency — while I make these acknowledgments I desire to repeat, in order to preclude any possible misconstruction, that I do most sincerely hope that we shall have no use for them; that it will never become their duty to shed blood, and most especially never to shed fraternal blood. I promise that so far as I may have wisdom to direct, if so painful a result shall in anywise be brought about, it shall be through no fault of mine."

LINCOLN'S SECRET NIGHT JOURNEY.

On the morning of February 23d the whole country was surprised at the telegraphic announcement, coupled with diverse and generally very foggy explanations, that the President-elect, after his long and almost triumphal journey in the utmost publicity and with well-nigh universal greetings of good-will, had suddenly abandoned his announced programme and made a quick and secret night journey through Baltimore to the Federal capital. Public opinion at the time, and for years afterward, was puzzled by the event, and the utmost contra-

riety of comment, ranging from the highest praise to the severest detraction which caricature, ridicule, and denunciation could express, was long current. In the course of time, the narratives of the principal actors in the affair have been written down and published,* and a sufficient statement of the facts and motives involved may at length be made. The newspapers stated (without any prompting or suggestion from Mr. Lincoln) that an extensive plot to assassinate him on his expected trip through Baltimore about midday of Saturday had been discovered, which plot the earlier and unknown passage on Friday night disconcerted and prevented. This theory has neither been proved nor disproved by the lapse of time; Mr. Lincoln did not entertain it in this form† nor base his course upon it. But subsequent events did clearly demonstrate the possibility and probability of attempted personal violence from the fanatical impulse of individuals, or the sudden anger of a mob, and justified the propriety of his decision.

The threats of secession, revolution, plots to seize Washington, to burn the public buildings, to prevent the count of electoral votes and the inauguration of the new President, which had for six weeks filled the newspapers of the country, caused much uneasiness about the personal safety of Mr. Lincoln, particularly among the railroad officials over whose lines he was making his journey; and to no one of them so much as to Mr. S. M. Felton, the President of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railway, whose line formed the connecting link from the North to the South, from a free to a slave State, from the region of absolute loyalty to the territory of quasi-rebellion. Independently of politics, the city of Baltimore at that time bore a somewhat unenviable reputation as containing a dangerous and disorderly element; her "roughs" had a degree of newspaper notoriety by no means agreeable to quiet and non-combative strangers. But Baltimore and Maryland were also profoundly moved by the incipient rebellion. Governor Hicks had been plied with persuasion, protest, and even threats of personal violence, to induce him to convene the Maryland legislature, so that secession might begin under a legal pretext. The investigation of the Howard Congressional Committee, though it found no organized plot to seize the capital, gave abundant traces of secession conspiracy of various degrees — especially of half-formed military companies, organizing to prevent Northern troops from passing through Baltimore to Washington or the South. As part and parcel of this scheme, the railroads were to be destroyed and the bridges burned. The events of April, as they actually occurred, had already been planned, informally at least, in January.

Aside from patriotism, the duty of protecting the tracks and bridges of the railroad of which he was president induced Mr. Felton to call to his aid Mr. Allan Pinkerton, chief of a Chicago detective agency, whom he had before employed on an important matter.

"He was a man of great skill and resources," writes Mr. Felton. "I furnished him with a few hints and at once set him on the track with eight assistants. There were then drilling upon the line of the railroad some three military organizations, professedly for home defense, pretending to be Union men, and in one or two instances tendering their services to the railroad in case of trouble. Their propositions were duly considered; but the defense of the road was never intrusted to their tender mercies. The first thing done was to enlist a volunteer in each of these military companies. They pretended to come from New Orleans and Mobile, and did not appear to be wanting in sympathy for the South. They were furnished with uniforms at the expense of the road, and drilled as often as their associates in arms; became initiated into all the secrets of the organizations, and reported every day or two to their chief, who immediately reported to me the designs and plans of these military companies. One of these organizations was loyal; but the other two were disloyal, and fully in the plot to destroy the bridges, and march to Washington, to wrest it from the hands of the legally constituted authorities. Every nook and corner of the road and its vicinity was explored by the chief and his detectives, and the secret working of secession and treason laid bare and brought to light. Societies were joined in Baltimore, and various modes known to and practiced only by detectives were resorted to, to win the confidence of the conspirators and get into their secrets. The plan worked well; and the midnight plottings and daily consultations of the conspirators were treasured up as a guide to our future plans for thwarting them. . . . It was made as certain as strong circumstantial and positive evidence could make it, that there was a plot to burn the bridges and destroy the road, and murder Mr. Lincoln on his way to Washington, if it turned out that he went there before troops were called. If troops were first called, then the bridges were to be destroyed, and Washington cut off and taken possession of by the South. I at once organized and armed a force of about two hundred men, whom I distributed along the line between the Susquehanna and Baltimore, principally at the bridges. These men were drilled secretly and regularly by drill-masters, and were apparently employed in whitewashing the bridges, putting on some six or seven coats of whitewash, saturated with salt and alum,

* See narrative of S. M. Felton, in Schouler, "Massachusetts in the Civil War," Vol. I., pp. 59–65; Judd to Pinkerton, Nov. 3d, 1867, Edwards, "Life of N. B. Judd," pamphlet, pp. 11–17; Pinkerton, "The Spy of the Rebellion," pp. 45–103; Kennedy to Lossing, embracing narrative of Colonel Stone, Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. II., pp. 147–149; Lincoln's statement to Lossing, Ib., Vol. I., pp. 279, 280; Lincoln's statement to Arnold, Arnold, "Lincoln and Slavery," p. 171; and MS. letters printed in this chapter. Also Lamon, "Life of Lincoln," pp. 511–526.

† Mr. Lincoln, long afterward, declared: "I did not then, nor do I now, believe I should have been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore as first contemplated; but I thought it wise to run no risk, where no risk was necessary." Hon. I. N. Arnold, in his work, "Lincoln and Slavery," adds in a note, p. 171, that the above was "stated to the author by Mr. Lincoln."

to make the outside of the bridges as nearly fire-proof as possible. This whitewashing, so extensive in its application, became the nine-days' wonder of the neighborhood. Thus the bridges were strongly guarded, and a train was arranged so as to concentrate all the forces at one point in case of trouble. The programme of Mr. Lincoln was changed; and it was decided by him that he would go to Harrisburg from Philadelphia, and thence over the Northern Central road by day to Baltimore, and thence to Washington. We were then informed by our detective that the attention of the conspirators was turned from our road to the Northern Central, and that they would there await the coming of Mr. Lincoln." *

It appeared from the reports of Pinkerton's detectives that among the more suspicious indications were the very free and threatening expressions of a man named Ferrandini, an Italian, sometime a barber at Barnum's Hotel in Baltimore, but who had become captain of one of the military companies organized in that city to promote secession. Ferrandini's talk may not have been conclusive proof of a conspiracy, but it showed his own intent to commit assassination, and conveyed the inference of a plot.† Coupled with the fact that the Baltimore air was full of similar threats, it established the probability of a mob and a riot. Add to this Ferrandini's testimony before the Howard Committee (February 5th, 1861), that he was then drilling a company (fifteen members) of "Constitutional Guards" in Baltimore, formed for the express purpose "to prevent Northern volunteer companies from passing through the State of Maryland . . . to come here [Washington] to help the United States troops, or anybody else, to invade the South in any shape whatever"; also that another corps, called the National Volunteers, had formed, "to protect their State," and began drilling the previous Saturday; also that he had "heard that the Minute Men have fifteen companies in Baltimore"—and we have the direct evidence of extensive organization, and strong presumption of the uses to which it could be turned.‡ Then, if we remember that riot, murder, and bridge-burning actually took place in Baltimore two months later, in exact accordance with the plans and ideas formulated, both in the loose talk and the solemn testimony by Ferrandini and others, we are unavoidably driven to the conclusion that Mr. Felton, General Scott, Governor Hicks, and others had abundant cause for the very serious apprehensions under which they acted.

Hon. N. B. Judd, a resident of Chicago, of peculiar prominence in Illinois politics and the intimate personal friend of Lincoln, was perhaps the most active and influential member of the suite of the President-elect. Pinkerton the detective knew Judd personally, and, as the presidential party approached, notified him by letter at Buffalo, and by special messenger at New York, of the investigations he was making in Baltimore. Judd as yet said nothing of the matter to any one. When the party arrived in Philadelphia, however, he was instantly called to a conference with Mr. Felton and the detective. Pinkerton laid his reports before the two, and, after an hour's examination, both were convinced that the allegation of a plot to assassinate the President-elect was as serious and important as in the nature of things such evidence can ever be found. He immediately took Pinkerton with him to Mr. Lincoln's room at the Continental Hotel, to whom the whole story was repeated, and where Judd advised that, in the opinion both of Mr. Felton and himself, Mr. Lincoln's safety required him to proceed that same evening on the 11 o'clock train. "If you follow the course suggested," continued Judd, "you will necessarily be subjected to the scoffs and sneers of your enemies, and the disapproval of your friends, who cannot be made to believe in the existence of so desperate a plot." Mr. Lincoln replied that he appreciated these suggestions, but that he could stand anything that was necessary. Then rising from his seat he said: "I cannot go to-night; I have promised to raise the flag over Independence Hall to-morrow morning, and to visit the legislature at Harrisburg. Beyond that I have no engagements."§

Hitherto, all Lincoln's movements had been made under the invitation, arrangements, direction, and responsibility of committees of legislatures, governors of States, and municipal authorities of towns and cities. No such call or greeting, however, had come from Maryland; no resolutions of welcome from her legislature, no invitation from her governor, no municipal committee from Baltimore. The sole proffers of friendship and hospitality out of the commonwealth came from two citizens in their private capacity — Mr. Gittings, President of the Northern Central Railroad, who tendered a dinner to Mr. Lincoln and his family; and Mr. Coleman, of the Eutaw House, who extended a similar invitation to the President-elect and his suite. Appreciating fully these acts of personal courtesy, Mr. Lincoln yet felt that there was no evidence before him that the official and public authority of the city would be exercised to restrain the unruly elements which would on such an occasion densely pack the streets of Baltimore. During their ten-days' experience on the journey thus

* Schouler, "Massachusetts in the Civil War," Vol. I., pp. 61, 62.

† Lamon, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 516.

‡ Report Select Committee of Five (Howard Committee), pp. 133–137.

§ Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.

far, both he and his suite had had abundant evidence as to how completely exposed and perfectly helpless every individual of the party, and especially Mr. Lincoln, was at times, even amid the friendliest feeling and the kindest attention. He had been almost crushed in the corridor of the State-house at Columbus; arriving after dark in the Pittsburg depot, a stampede of the horses of a small cavalry escort had seriously endangered his carriage and its occupants; at Buffalo, Major Hunter, of his suite, had his arm broken by a sudden rush of the crowd. If with all the good-will and precautions of police and military such perils were unavoidable in friendly cities, what might happen where authorities were indifferent, where municipal control and public order were lax, and where prejudice, hostility, and smoldering insurrection animated the masses of people surging about the carriages of an unprotected street procession? Yet with all these considerations Mr. Lincoln could not entirely convince himself that a deliberate plot to murder him was in existence.

"I made arrangements, however, with Mr. Judd for my return to Philadelphia the next night, if I should be convinced that there was danger in going through Baltimore. I told him that if I should meet at Harrisburg, as I had at other places, a delegation to go with me to Baltimore, I should feel safe, and go on." *

Mr. Judd devoted the remainder of the afternoon and nearly the whole of the night of February 21st to the discussion and perfection of arrangements for a night journey through Baltimore, as suggested by himself and Mr. Felton, and as conditionally accepted by the President-elect. Only four persons joined in this discussion, — Mr. Judd, Mr. Pinkerton, Mr. Franciscus, General Manager of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Mr. Henry Sanford, representing Colonel E. S. Sanford, President of the American Telegraph Company. At 4 o'clock A. M. the party separated, having agreed on the following plan: † that after the reception at Harrisburg, a special train consisting of a baggage car and one passenger car, starting at 6 P. M., should convey Mr. Lincoln and one companion back to Philadelphia, the track between the two cities to be kept clear of everything; that Mr. Felton at Philadelphia should detain the 11 o'clock P. M. Baltimore train until the arrival of the special train from Harrisburg; that Pinkerton should have a carriage ready in which to proceed through Philadelphia from one depot to the other; that a Mrs. Warne, an employee of his, should engage berths in the sleeping-car of the Baltimore train; that Mr. Sanford should so disconnect the wires as to make any telegraphing between the several points within certain hours impossible; and that Mr. Lincoln should have for his single escort and companion Colonel Ward H. Lamon, of his suite, a devoted personal friend from Illinois — young, active, and of almost herculean frame and strength.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of February 22d, the appointed flag-raising by the President-elect, over Independence Hall in Philadelphia, was duly celebrated, and on the trip to Harrisburg, which followed as soon as possible, Mr. Judd communicated the details of his plan to Mr. Lincoln. Before this, however, Lincoln had received at the Continental Hotel the visit of Mr. Frederick W. Seward, who came as a special messenger from his father, in Washington, to place the following correspondence in his hands:

[Seward to Lincoln.]

"WASHINGTON, February 21st, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: My son goes express to you. He will show you a report made by our detective to General Scott, and by him communicated to me this morning. I deem it so important as to dispatch my son to meet you wherever he may find you.

"I concur with General Scott in thinking it best for you to reconsider your arrangement. No one here but General Scott, myself, and the bearer is aware of this communication.

"I should have gone with it myself, but for the peculiar sensitiveness about my attendance at the Senate at this crisis. Very truly yours,

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD." ‡

[General Scott to Seward.]

"February 21st, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: Please receive my friend, Colonel Stone, chief of General Wightman's staff, and a distinguished young officer with me in Mexico. He has an important communication to make.

"Yours truly, WINFIELD SCOTT." ‡

[Colonel Stone's Report.]

"February 21st, 1861.

"A New York detective officer who has been on duty in Baltimore for three weeks past reports this morning that there is serious danger of violence to, and the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln in his passage through that city, should the time of that passage be known. He states that there are banded rowdies holding secret meetings, and that he has heard threats of mobbing and violence, and has himself heard men declare that if Mr. Lincoln was to be assassinated they would like to be the men. He states further that it is only within the past few days that he has considered there was any danger, but now he deems it imminent. He deems the danger one which the authorities and people in Baltimore cannot guard against. All risk might be easily avoided by a change in the traveling arrangements which would bring Mr. Lincoln and a portion of his party through Baltimore by a night train without previous notice." ‡

* Lincoln's statement to Lossing. Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. I., p. 280.

† Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.

‡ Unpublished MS.

Here was a new and most serious additional warning. The investigation on which it was based was altogether independent of that made by Pinkerton, and entirely unknown to him. Colonel Stone, it will be remembered, was the officer to whom General Scott intrusted the organization and command of the District Militia for the defense of Washington and the general supervision and control of the city. The detectives, three in number, were from New York, and at the request of Colonel Stone had been selected and placed on duty by Mr. Kennedy, superintendent of police of New York city.* In both cases similar observations had been made, and similar conclusions arrived at.

Warned thus of danger by concurrent evidence too grave to be disregarded, and advised to avoid it, not only by Judd and Felton in Philadelphia, but now also by Mr. Seward, the chief of his new Cabinet, and by General Scott, the chief of the army, Mr. Lincoln could no longer hesitate to adopt their suggestion. Whether the evidence would prove ultimately true, or whether violence upon him would be attempted, was not the question. The existence of the danger was pointed out and certified by an authority he had no right to disregard; the trust he bore was not merely the personal safety of an individual, but the fortune and perhaps the fate of the Government of the nation. It was his imperative duty to shun all possible and unnecessary peril. A man of less courage would have shrunk from what must inevitably appear to the public like a sign of timidity; but Lincoln on this and other occasions concerned himself only with the larger issues at stake, leaving minor and especially personal consequences to take care of themselves. Mr. Frederick W. Seward was therefore informed by Judd "that he could say to his father that all had been arranged, and that, so far as human foresight could predict, Mr. Lincoln would be in Washington at 6 o'clock the next morning."† With this message Mr. Seward returned to Washington, while Mr. Lincoln and his suite proceeded to Harrisburg, where on that same Friday, the 22d of February, he was officially received by the governor and the legislature of Pennsylvania.

No other member of Mr. Lincoln's suite had as yet been notified of anything connected with the matter; but Mr. Judd had suggested to him that he felt exceedingly the responsibility of the advice he had given and the steps he had taken, and that he thought it due to the age and standing of the leading gentlemen of the President-elect's party that at least they should be informed and consulted. "To the above suggestions," writes Judd, "Mr. Lincoln assented, adding: 'I reckon they will laugh at us, Judd, but you had better get them together.' It was arranged that after the reception at the State-house, and before dinner, the matter should be fully laid before the following gentlemen of the party: Judge David Davis, Colonel E. V. Sumner, Major David Hunter, Captain John Pope, and Ward H. Lamon."

Mr. Judd's narrative then further recites what occurred:

"The meeting thus arranged took place in the parlor of the hotel, Mr. Lincoln being present. The facts were laid before them by me, together with the details of the proposed plan of action. There was a diversity of opinion, and some warm discussion, and I was subjected to a very rigid cross-examination. Judge Davis, who had expressed no opinion, but contented himself with asking rather pointed questions, turned to Mr. Lincoln, who had been listening to the whole discussion, and said: 'Well, Mr. Lincoln, what is your own judgment upon this matter?' Mr. Lincoln replied: 'I have thought over this matter considerably, since I went over the ground with Pinkerton last night. The appearance of Mr. Frederick Seward, with warning from another source, confirms Mr. Pinkerton's belief. Unless there are some other reasons besides fear of ridicule, I am disposed to carry out Judd's plan.' Judge Davis then said: 'That settles the matter, gentlemen.' Colonel Sumner said: 'So be it, gentlemen; it is against my judgment, but I have undertaken to go to Washington with Mr. Lincoln, and I shall do it.' I tried to convince him that any additional person added to the risk; but the spirit of the gallant old soldier was up, and debate was useless.

"The party separated about 4 P. M., the others to go to the dinner table, and myself to go to the railroad station and the telegraph office. At a quarter to 6 I was back at the hotel, and Mr. Lincoln was still at the table. In a few moments the carriage drove up to the side door of the hotel. Either Mr. Nicolay or Mr. Lamon called Mr. Lincoln from the table. He went to his room, changed his dinner dress for a traveling suit, and came down with a soft hat sticking in his pocket, and his shawl on his arm.‡ As the party passed through the hall I said, in a low tone, 'Lamon, go ahead. As soon as Mr. Lincoln is in the carriage, drive off; the crowd must not be allowed to identify him.' Mr. Lamon went first to the carriage; Colonel Sumner was following close after Mr. Lincoln; I put my hand gently on his shoulder; he turned to see what was wanted, and before I could explain, the carriage was off. The situation was a little awkward, to use no stronger terms, for a few moments, until I said to the Colonel: 'When we get to Washington, Mr. Lincoln shall determine what apology is due to you.'"

It is needless to describe the various stages of Mr. Lincoln's journey. The plan arranged

* See Lossing, "Civil War," Vol. II., pp. 147–149, a letter from Kennedy, and the narrative of Colonel Stone.

† Judd to Pinkerton, November 3d, 1867.

‡ Many caricatures and comments of that day were based upon the following sentence in a dispatch to the "New York Times": "He wore a Scotch plaid cap and a very long military cloak, so that he was entirely unrecognizable." This description was the pure invention of a newspaper correspondent understood to be Joseph Howard, Jr., who later in the war was imprisoned in Fort Lafayette for publishing a forged proclamation, about the draft, in the New York newspapers.

by the railroad and telegraph officials was carried out to the smallest detail, without delay or special incident, and without coming to the knowledge of any person on the train or elsewhere, except those to whom the secret was confided. The President-elect and his single companion were safely and comfortably carried from Harrisburg to Philadelphia, and at midnight took their berths in the sleeping-



WARD H. LAMON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

car of the regular train from New York, passing through Baltimore unrecognized and undisturbed, and arriving in Washington at 6 o'clock on the morning of February 23d. Here they were met by Mr. Seward and Mr. Washburne, member of Congress from Illinois, and conducted to Willard's Hotel. The family and the suite made the journey direct from Harrisburg to Baltimore, according to the previously published programme, arriving in Washington late that evening. They encountered in Baltimore no incivility, nor any unusual disorder, though, as elsewhere, dense crowds, very inadequately controlled by the police, surrounded the railroad depots and filled the streets through which their carriages passed. All temptation, however, to commit an assault was now past, since it was everywhere known that Mr. Lincoln was not with the party, but had already arrived at his destination.

LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.

ARRIVED in Washington, and installed in the spacious parlors on the second floor of Willard's Hotel, fronting on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mr. Lincoln had a little more than a week to prepare for the inauguration. Of this a part was taken up with the customary introductory visits,—to the outgoing President and Cabinet, where Mr. Buchanan and his counselors received him with cordial politeness; to the two houses of Congress, where he was enthusiastically welcomed by friends and somewhat sullenly greeted by foes; and to the Supreme Court of the United States, whose venerable chief and associate justices extended to him an affable recognition as the lawful successor in constitutional rulership. In his own parlors, also, the President-elect received numerous demonstrations of respect. President Buchanan and his Cabinet officially returned his visit. The Peace Conference, embracing distinguished delegates from all the free States and the border slave-States, and headed by their chairman, ex-President Tyler, waited upon him in a body, in pursuance of a formal and unanimous resolution.* His presidential rivals, Douglas and Breckinridge, each made him a call of courtesy. The mayor and the municipal council came in an official visit of welcome. Several delegations and many high functionaries repeated these ceremonial calls, which again were supplemented by numerous cordial invitations to private hospitality. While all these tokens of respect were sincere and loyal, there was no concealment of a deep anxiety in public feeling, and a curiosity to learn how the new President would deal with an organized rebellion, which had been allowed by his predecessor to establish itself without the least hindrance, and which, while committing repeated acts of war, had as yet perpetrated no violence or bloodshed,— only, however, because it had met neither official nor military resistance.

Mr. Lincoln's chief labor during this interim was his consultation with the more influential leaders of the Republican party, who, either as members of Congress, delegates in the Peace Conference, or as casual or special visitors to the capital at this moment, had a final word to say to him about the composition of his Cabinet or the policy of his Administration. Thus from the 23d of February to the 4th of March, every moment of the day and many hours of the night were occupied. As his doors were at all times freely opened,

* "Proceedings of Peace Conference," pp. 336–337.

and as his life-long habit was to listen patiently to counsel from all quarters, it is safe to say that no President ever approached his task better informed of the temper of his followers, and none decided more deliberately upon his



FREDERICK W. SEWARD. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

general course of conduct. Yet, here as afterwards, he followed the practice of holding his convictions open to the latest moment, and of not irrevocably committing himself to specific acts till the instant of their execution.

Neither in the formation of his Cabinet nor in his proposed administrative policy, however, did this final consultation with his party friends work any essential alteration of his own well-formed opinions. His executive counselors were chosen upon plans long since matured in his own mind; and his inaugural address, composed and privately printed at Springfield, received on the last days several slight changes in the text, and a number of verbal changes, mainly suggested by the very few individuals to whom he submitted it. Judge David Davis read it while in Springfield. Hon. O. H. Browning read it in Indianapolis after the presidential journey was begun, and suggested perhaps the most important modification which he made. Hon. Francis P. Blair, Sr., read it in Washington, and highly commended it, suggesting no changes. As would be natural in any great political leader scanning his successful rival's first act of practical statesmanship, the most careful scrutiny of the document was made by Mr. Seward. The President-elect handed him a copy some time during the day of his arrival; and the next day being Sunday, Mr. Seward seems to have spent the greater part of it in examining the inaugural and in writing out the list of alterations and amendments which he thought advisable. On Sunday evening he wrote the following letter, which with his list of suggestions he sent to Mr. Lincoln:

"SUNDAY EVENING, February 24th, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR: I have suggested many changes of little importance severally, but in their general effect tending to soothe the public mind. Of course the concessions are, as they ought to be, if they are to be of avail, at the cost of the winning, the triumphant party. I do not fear their displeasure. They will be loyal, whatever is said. Not so the defeated, irritated, angered, frenzied party. I, my dear sir, have devoted myself singly to the study of the case here — with advantages of access and free communication with all parties of all sections. I have a common responsibility and interest with you, and I shall adhere to you faithfully in every case. You must, therefore, allow me to speak frankly and candidly. In this spirit, I declare to you my conviction, that the second and third paragraphs, even if modified as I propose in my amendments, will give such advantages to the Disunionists that Virginia and Maryland will secede, and we shall within ninety, perhaps within sixty, days be obliged to fight the South for this capital, with a divided North for our reliance, and we shall not have one loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the Potomac.

"In that case the dismemberment of the Republic would date from the inauguration of a Republican administration. I therefore most respectfully counsel the omission of those paragraphs. I know the tenacity of party friends, and I honor and respect it. But I know also that they know nothing of the real peril of the crisis. It has not been their duty to study it, as it has been mine. Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and carried us along thus far. Every loyal man, and indeed every disloyal man, in the South will tell you this.

"Your case is quite like that of Jefferson. He brought the first Republican party into power against and over a party ready to resist and dismember the Government. Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot in his inaugural address, and propitiated his adversaries by declaring: 'We are all Federalists, all Republicans.' I could wish that you would think it wise to follow this example in this crisis. Be sure that while all your administrative conduct will be in harmony with Republican principles and policy, you cannot lose the Republican party by practicing in your advent to office the magnanimity of a victor.

"Very faithfully your friend,

"[WM. H. SEWARD.]

"THE HONORABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"General Remarks:

"The argument is strong and conclusive, and ought not to be in any way abridged or modified.

"But something besides or in addition to argument is needful — to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East.

"Some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful confidence." *

Mr. Seward only suggested two important changes: (1) To omit the reference to the Chicago platform mentioned in his letter, with the announcement that the President would

* Unpublished MS. For the copy of this letter and other valuable manuscripts, we are indebted to Hon. Frederick W. Seward.

follow the principles therein declared. (2) Instead of a declaration of intention to reclaim, hold, occupy, and possess the places and property belonging to the Government, to speak ambiguously about the exercise of

tentious diction. The literary styles of Mr. Seward and Mr. Lincoln differed essentially. Mr. Seward was strongly addicted to and unusually felicitous in long, sonorous sentences, amplifying his thought to general application



WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

power, and to hint rather at forbearance. The other modifications in his list were simple changes of phraseology — affecting only the style, but changing no argument or proposition of policy. Whether these were on the whole an improvement depends perhaps upon the taste of the reader and critic, whether he prefers a full and formal or a direct and sen-

and to philosophic breadth. Mr. Lincoln liked to condense his idea into a short sentence, with legal conciseness and specific point. In the present crisis Mr. Seward's policy, as announced in his 12th of January speech, was "to meet prejudice with conciliation, exaction with concession which surrenders no principle, and violence with the right hand of

peace." * Mr. Lincoln's policy was, without prejudice or passion to state frankly and maintain firmly the position and doctrines assumed by the American people in the late presidential election. Mr. Seward believed himself to be the past and the coming peacemaker; and thus his whole effort was to soften, to postpone, to use diplomacy. His corrections of the inaugural were in this view: a more careful qualification of statement, a greater ambiguity of phrase, a gain in smoothness, but a loss in brevity and force. Mr. Lincoln adopted either in whole or in part nearly all the amendments proposed by Mr. Seward. But those which he himself modified, and such further alterations as he added of his own accord, show that whatever the inaugural gained in form and style in these final touches came as much through his own power of literary criticism as from the more practiced pen of Mr. Seward. The most vital change in the document was in adopting a suggestion of his friend Browning, not to announce a purpose to recapture Sumter and other forts and places seized by the rebels, but for the present to declare only that he would hold those yet in possession of the Government. One other somewhat important change Mr. Lincoln himself made. In the original draft any idea of an amendment of the Constitution was rather repelled than invited. In the revision Mr. Lincoln said he should "favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it," and further expressed his willingness to accept the amendment recently proposed by Congress. All these various alterations, proposed or adopted, are added as notes to the text of the inaugural in this chapter, where the critical student will compare them with special interest.

It was in the closing paragraph of the inaugural that Mr. Lincoln's mastery in literary art clearly revealed itself. Mr. Seward, as we have seen in the postscript of his letter, thought that "some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful confidence," "to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East," ought to be added. In the original draft the concluding sentence, addressing itself to "my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen," was: "With you and not with me is the solemn question, Shall it be peace or a sword?" This ending Mr. Seward proposed to strike out, and submitted two drafts of a closing paragraph to take its place. One of them was long and commonplace; under the other lurked a fine poetic thought awkwardly expressed. This Mr. Lincoln took, but his more artistic sense transformed it into an illustration of perfect and tender beauty.



THE INAUGURATION OF LINCOLN. (FROM A SKETCH BY THEODORE R. DAVIS, MADE AT THE TIME.)

The acts of the last ten days of Mr. Buchanan's administration were entirely colorless and negative. The deliberations and recommendations of the much-vaunted Peace Conference proved as barren and worthless as Dead Sea fruit. The concluding labors of Congress were of considerable importance, but of no immediate effect. There was, therefore, as little in pub-

* Seward, Senate Speech, January 12th, 1861. Globe, 343.

lic affairs as in public advice to cause the President-elect to reconsider or remodel his thoughts and purposes.

Inauguration Day fell on Monday, and the ceremonies took place with somewhat unusual attention to display and very uncommon precautions to insure public order and the safety of all the participants. General Stone, who had charge of the military arrangements, has related them with some minuteness.

"On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott held a conference at his headquarters, there being present his staff, General Sumner, and myself; and then was arranged the programme of the procession. President Buchanan was to drive to Willard's Hotel and call upon the President-elect. The two were to ride in the same carriage, between double files of a squadron of the District of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and miners were to march in front of the presidential carriage, and the infantry and riflemen of the District of Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were to be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses which I had selected along Pennsylvania Avenue, with orders to watch the windows on the opposite side, and to fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to fire from those windows on the presidential carriage. The small force of regular cavalry which had arrived was to guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania Avenue, and to move from one to another during the passage of the procession. A battalion of District of Columbia troops were to be placed near the steps of the Capitol, and riflemen in the windows of the wings of the Capitol. On the arrival of the presidential party at the Capitol the troops were to be stationed so as to return in the same order after the ceremony."*

General Stone does not mention another item of preparation,—that on the brow of the hill, not far from the north entrance to the Capitol, commanding both the approach and the broad plateau of the east front, was stationed a battery of flying artillery, in the immediate vicinity of which General Scott remained a careful observer of the scene during the entire ceremonies, ready to take personal command and direction should any untoward occurrence render it necessary.

The closing duties of the session, which expired at noon, kept President Buchanan at the Capitol till the last moment. Accompanied by the committee of the Senate, he finally reached Willard's and conducted the President-elect to his carriage, in which, side by side, they rode in the procession, undisturbed by the slightest disorder. When they reached the Senate Chamber, already densely packed with officials and civilians, the ceremony of swearing-in the Vice-President was soon performed. Then in a new procession of dignitaries Mr. Lincoln was escorted through the corridor of the great edifice to the east portico, where below the platform stood an immense throng in waiting. The principal actors — the Senate Committee of Arrangements, the out-going President, the President-elect and his family, the Chief-Justice in his robe, the Clerk of the Court with the Bible — took their places in a central group on the front of the platform, in full view of the waiting multitude. Around this central group other judges in their robes, senators, representatives, officials, and prominent guests crowded to their seats.

To the imaginative spectator there might have been something emblematic in the architectural concomitants of the scene. The construction of the great dome of the Capitol was in mid-progress, and huge derricks held by a network of steel ropes towered over the incomplete structure. In the grounds in front stood the bronze statue of Liberty, not then lifted to the pedestal from which she now greets the rising sun. At that moment, indeed, it required little poetic illusion to fancy her looking with a mute appeal for help to the man who was the center of all eyes and hearts; and could she have done so, her gaze would already have been rewarded with a vision of fateful prophecy. For in the central group of this inauguration ceremony there confronted each other four historic personages in the final act of a political drama which in its scope, completeness, and consequence will bear comparison with those most famous in human record,— Senator Douglas, the author of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, representing the legislative power of the American Government; Chief-Justice Taney, author of the Dred Scott decision, representing the influence of the judiciary; and President Buchanan, who by his Lecompton measures and messages had used the whole executive power and patronage to intensify and perpetuate the mischiefs born of the repeal and the dictum. Fourth in the group stood Abraham Lincoln, President-elect, illustrating the vital political truth announced in that sentence of his Cincinnati speech in which he declared:

"The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both Congresses and Courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution." †

When the cheers which greeted his appear-

* General C. P. Stone, "Washington on the Eve of the War." THE CENTURY, July, 1883.

† The dramatic element of the scene in another view has been noticed by Dr. Holland, in his "Life of Lincoln," p. 278, where he says: "Mr. Lincoln himself must have wondered at the strange conjunction of personages and events. The 'Stephen' of his first speech in the old senatorial campaign was a defeated candidate for the presidency, who then stood patriotically at his side, holding the hat of the republican President, which he had politely taken at the beginning of the inaugural address; 'James' had just walked out of office to make room for him; 'Franklin' had passed into comparative obscurity or something worse; and 'Roger' had just administered to him the oath of office."

ance had somewhat abated, Senator Baker of Oregon rose and introduced Mr. Lincoln to the audience; and stepping forward, the President-elect, in a firm, clear voice, thoroughly practiced in addressing the huge open-air assemblages of the West, read his inaugural, to which every ear listened with the most intense eagerness.

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: In compliance with a custom as old as the Government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take in your presence the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President "before he enters on the execution of his office."[1]

I do not consider it necessary at present for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement.

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

"Resolved, that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in anywise endangered by the now incoming Administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given[2] to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause — as cheerfully to one section, as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution — to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition then, that slaves, whose cases come within the terms of this clause, "shall be delivered up" their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by State authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him, or to others, by which authority it is done. And should any one, in any case, be content that his oath shall go unkept, on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to *how* it shall be kept?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced so that a free man

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[1] Mr. Lincoln's original draft contained at this point the following paragraphs:

"The more modern custom of electing a Chief Magistrate upon a previously declared platform of principles supersedes in a great measure the necessity of re-stating those principles in an address of this sort. Upon the plainest grounds of good faith, one so elected is not at liberty to shift his position. It is necessarily implied, if not expressed, that in his judgment the platform which he thus accepts binds him to nothing either unconstitutional or inexpedient.

"Having been so elected upon the Chicago platform, and while I would repeat nothing in it, of aspersion or epithet, or question of motive, against any man or party, I hold myself bound by duty, as well as impelled by inclination, to follow, within the Executive sphere, the principles therein declared. By no other course could I meet the reasonable expectations of the country."

Mr. Seward proposed either to omit the whole, or to amend them as follows:

"The more modern custom of nominating a Chief Magistrate upon a previously declared summary of principles supersedes in a great measure the necessity of re-stating those principles in an address of this sort. It is necessarily implied, if not expressed, that the summary binds the officer elected to nothing either unconstitutional or inexpedient. With this explanation I deem it my duty, as I am disposed in feeling, to follow, so far as they apply to the Executive sphere, the principles on which I was brought before the American People."

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Seward's preference of the alternative suggestions made, and omitted the whole.

[2] In the original draft this sentence stood: "The protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given will be cheerfully given to all the States," etc.

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it thus: "will be cheerfully given in every case and under all circumstances to all the States," etc.

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion, but himself modified it so as to read: "will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause —"

be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave?[3] And might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that "the citizen of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?"

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have, in succession, administered the Executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success.[4] Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted.[5]

I hold that, in contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all National Governments. It is safe to assert that no Government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever — it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a Government proper, but an association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it — break it, so to speak, but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it?

Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that, in legal contemplation, the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured,[6] and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was, "*to form a more perfect Union.*"

But if destruction of the Union by one, or by a part only, of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is *less* perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.[7]

It follows from these views, that no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that *resolves* and *ordinances* to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.[8]

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States.[9] Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it, so far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.[10] I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.[11]

In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon

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[3] The remainder of this paragraph was not in the original draft. Mr. Lincoln added it of his own accord.

[4] This sentence stood in the original: "They have conducted it through many perils; and on the whole, with great success."

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Seward's suggestion to make it read: "and generally with great success."

[5] In the original this sentence read: "A disruption of the Federal Union is menaced, and, so far as can be on paper, is already effected. The particulars of what has been done are so familiar and so fresh, that I need not waste any time in recounting them."

Mr. Seward proposed to change it as follows: "A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

[6] This sentence originally stood: "It was further matured and expressly declared and pledged to be perpetual," etc.

Mr. Lincoln of his own accord amended it as follows: "It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual," etc.

[7] In the original, this paragraph concluded as follows: "The Union is less perfect than before, which contradicts the Constitution, and therefore is absurd."

Mr. Seward proposed to strike out the words "and therefore is absurd." Mr. Lincoln adopted this suggestion, and in addition remodeled the whole sentence, so as to read: "The Union is *less* perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity."

[8] The first half of this sentence originally closed: "ordinances to that effect are legally nothing," and the second half, "are insurrectionary or treasonable, according to circumstances." Mr. Seward's suggestions to strike out the word "nothing" and substitute the word "void," and to strike out the word "treasonable" and substitute the word "revolutionary," were adopted.

[9] In the original this sentence stood: "I therefore consider that the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it as follows: "I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the change.

[10] This phrase originally stood: "or in some tangible way direct the contrary."

Mr. Seward's suggestion, to strike out the words "tangible way" and substitute therefor the words "authoritative manner," was adopted.

[11] This sentence originally closed: "will have its own and defend itself." Mr. Seward's suggestion, to strike out these words and insert "will constitutionally defend and maintain itself," was adopted.

the national authority.[12] The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices.

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union.[13] So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections.[14]

That there are persons in one section or another who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word to them.[15] To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak?

Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it?[16] Will you hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from — will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?

All profess to be content in the Union, if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied?[17] I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted,[18] that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the Constitution

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[12] In the original draft this paragraph, after the first sentence, stood as follows:

"All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the public property and places which have fallen: to hold, occupy, and possess these, and all other property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion of any State. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior locality, shall be so great and so universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices."

Mr. Seward proposed to strike out all the above, and to insert the following:

"The power confided to me shall be used indeed with efficacy, but also with discretion in every case and exigency, according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections. There are in this government as in every other, emergencies when the exercise of power lawful in itself is less certain to secure the just ends of administration, than a temporary forbearance from it, with reliance on the voluntary though delayed acquiescence of the people in the laws which have been made by themselves and for their own benefit. I shall not lose sight of this obvious maxim."

Mr. Lincoln, however, did not adopt this proposal, but made a slight change which had been suggested by another friend. At Indianapolis he gave a copy of his original draft to Hon. O. H. Browning, who after carefully reading it on his return, wrote to Mr. Lincoln (February 17th, 1861) referring to this paragraph: "Would it not be judicious so to modify this as to make it read, 'All the power at my disposal will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts, etc,' omitting the declaration of the purpose of reclamation, which will be construed into a threat or menace, and will be irritating even in the border States? On principle the passage is right as it now stands. The fallen places ought to be reclaimed. But cannot that be accomplished as well or even better without announcing the purpose in your inaugural?"

Mr. Lincoln adopted Mr. Browning's advice, and modified his own phraseology as proposed.

He also made in this paragraph another slight change of phraseology. For, "there will be no invasion of any State," he substituted, "there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere."

[13] This phrase originally was, "The mails, unless refused, will continue to be furnished," etc. Mr. Lincoln himself changed this to read: "The mails, unless repelled."

[14] This paragraph originally closed with the following sentence: "This course will be pursued until current experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." Mr. Lincoln himself changed this so as to read: "The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." He also added a part of the language proposed by Mr. Seward for the previous paragraph, as will be seen by comparison.

[15] This sentence originally stood: "That there are persons who seek to destroy the Union," etc. Mr. Seward proposed to amend so as to make it read: "That there are persons in one section as well as in the other, who seek to destroy the Union," etc. Mr. Lincoln changed the amendment to, "That there are persons in one section or another who seek," etc.

Mr. Seward also proposed to add to the last clause of the sentence, after the word "them," the following: "because I am sure they must be few in number and of little influence when their pernicious principles are fully understood."

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion.

[16] Mr. Lincoln himself struck out the word "Union" as it originally appeared in this sentence, and inserted in lieu the words "fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes."

[17] Mr. Seward proposed to insert the word "distinct" after the words, "Is it true, then, that any," in the second sentence of this paragraph.

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the suggestion.

[18] In this sentence Mr. Lincoln himself changed the word "constructed" to "constituted."

has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution — certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions,[19] in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration.[20] No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by State authority? The Constitution does not expressly say. *May* Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. *Must* Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say.

From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other.[21] If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority.[22] For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it?[23] All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this.

Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession?[24]

Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.[25] Whoever rejects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left.

I do not forget the position, assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding, in any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government.[26] And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled, and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.[27] At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.[28] Nor is there in this view any assault upon the

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[19] The phrase, "by affirmations and negations," Mr. Seward proposed to make, "by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

[20] The phrase, "applicable to every question," Mr. Seward proposed to change to, "applicable to every possible question."

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt the change.

[21] In this paragraph Mr. Seward proposed to substitute the words "acquiesce" and "acquiescence" for "submit" and "submission."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

[22] The original phrase, "a minority of their own number will secede from them," Mr. Lincoln himself changed to, "a minority of their own will secede from them."

[23] In the original these sentences ran as follows: "For instance, why may not South Carolina, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede from a new Southern Confederacy, just as she now claims to secede from the present Union? Her people, and, indeed, all secession people, are now being educated to the precise temper of doing this."

Mr. Seward proposed to substitute the names "Alabama or Florida" for "South Carolina"; and the word "communities" for "people."

Instead of adopting this, Mr. Lincoln re-wrote the whole, as follows: "For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this."

[24] For the original phrase, "a Southern Union," Mr. Lincoln himself substituted, "a new Union."

[25] The original sentence, "A constitutional majority is the only true sovereign of a free people," Mr. Seward proposed to change to, "A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign," etc.

Mr. Lincoln adopted the change.

[26] In this sentence the final clause, "while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government," was suggested by Mr. Seward and adopted by Mr. Lincoln.

[27] In the original this phrase ran: "the greater evils of a different rule." Mr. Seward proposed to substitute "practice" for "rule," and Mr. Lincoln struck out the word "greater," making it read, "the evils of a different practice."

[28] In the original this sentence stood: "But if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, it is plain that the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having turned their government over to the despotism of the few life officers composing the court."

Mr. Seward proposed to amend it as follows: "At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, made in the ordinary course of litigation between parties in personal actions,

court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.[29]

One section of our country believes slavery is *right*, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is *wrong*, and ought not to be extended.[30] This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced,[31] perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself.[32] The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases *after* the separation of the sections, than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section;[33] while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory *after* separation than *before?* Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government they can exercise their *constitutional* right of amending it, or their *revolutionary* right to dismember or overthrow it.[34] I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that, to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others, not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which amendment, however, I have not seen — has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose, not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable.

The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the States. The people themselves can do this also if they choose;[35] but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present Government, as it came to his hands, and to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor.

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences

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the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."

Mr. Lincoln adopted the amendment, first changing the phrase, "made in the ordinary course of litigation," to, "the instant they are made in ordinary litigation," and also the phrase, "having practically resigned," to, "having to that extent practically resigned."

[29] The original draft here contained the following paragraph:

"The Republican party, as I understand, have avowed the purpose to prevent, if they can, the extension of slavery under the national auspices; and upon this arises the only dispute between the sections."

Mr. Seward proposed to strike out the whole paragraph, and Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

[30] In the original this phrase stood: "One section believes slavery is right," etc. Mr. Seward proposed to make it read: "One section of our country believes slavery is right," etc.

Mr. Lincoln adopted the amendment.

[31] The phrase, "as well enforced as any law," Mr. Seward suggested should read: "as well enforced, perhaps, as any law," etc.

The suggestion was adopted.

[32] The phrase, "where the moral sense of the people is against the law itself," Mr. Seward suggested should read: "where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself."

The suggestion was adopted.

[33] The phrase, "would be revived," Mr. Seward suggested should read: "would be ultimately revived."

The suggestion was adopted.

[34] Following the words, "dismember and overthrow it," the original continued:

"As I am not much impressed with the belief that the present Constitution can be improved, I make no recommendations of amendments. I am rather for the old ship, and the chart of the old pilots. If, however, the people desire a new or an altered vessel, the matter is exclusively their own, and they can move in the premises, as well without as with an executive recommendation. I shall place no obstacle in the way of what may appear to be their wishes."

Mr. Seward proposed to change the first sentence of the above to the following: "While so great a diversity of opinion exists on the question what amendments, if indeed any, would be effective in restoring peace and safety, it would only tend to aggravate the dispute if I were to attempt to give direction to the public mind in that respect."

Mr. Lincoln did not adopt Mr. Seward's suggestion; but struck out all the above, and remodeled the whole paragraph to the form in which it now stands in the text.

[35] The original phrase "can do this if they choose," Mr. Lincoln himself changed to read, "can do this also if they choose."

is either party without faith of being in the right?[36] If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South,[37] that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people.

By the frame of the Government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief; and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years.[38]

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and *well* upon this whole subject.[39] Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time.[40] If there be an object to *hurry* any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take *deliberately*, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied, still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new Administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty.

In *your* hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in *mine*, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail *you*.[41] You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. *You* have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while *I* shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect and defend it."[42]

I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearth-stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

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[36] The original phrase, "is either party without faith in the right?" Mr. Lincoln himself changed to, "is either party without faith of being in the right?"

[37] The original phrase, "be on our side or on yours," Mr. Seward suggested should read: "be on the side of the North, or of the South, of the East, or of the West."

Mr. Lincoln changed it to read: "be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South."

[38] The original phrase, "While the people remain patient and true to themselves, no man, even in the presidential chair, can," etc., Mr. Seward proposed to change, to "While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no legislature and no administration can," etc.

Mr. Lincoln changed it to read as follows: "While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can," etc.

[39] The original phrase, "take time and think well," Mr. Seward suggested should read: "think calmly and think well."

Mr. Lincoln changed it to, "think calmly and *well*."

[40] The original sentences: "Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. Nothing worth preserving is either breaking or burning," Mr. Seward proposed to strike out.

Mr Lincoln retained the first, and struck out the second.

[41] In the original sentence, "The Government will not assail you, unless you first assail it," Mr. Seward suggested striking out the last clause.

Mr. Lincoln adopted the suggestion.

[42] The original draft, after the words, "preserve, protect, and defend it," concluded as follows, addressing itself to "my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen": "You can forbear the assault upon it, I cannot shrink from the defense of it. With you, and not with me, is the solemn question of 'Shall it be peace or a sword?'"

Mr. Seward did not like this termination; his letter, previously quoted, suggested that "something besides or in addition to argument is needful — to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East. Some words of affection — some of calm and cheerful confidence." Accordingly he submitted two separate drafts for a closing paragraph, from which Mr. Lincoln might choose one to substitute for the two sentences which he proposed to strike out.

Suggestions for a closing paragraph:

NO. I.

"However unusual it may be at such a time to speak of sections or to sections, yet in view of the misconceptions and agitations which have strained the ties of brotherhood so far, I hope it will not be deemed a departure from propriety, whatever it may be from custom, to say that if in the criminations and misconstructions which too often imbue our political contests, any man south of this capital has been led to believe that I regard with a less friendly eye his rights, his interests, or his domestic safety and happiness, or those of his State, than I do those of any other portion of my country, or that I would invade or disturb any legal right or domestic institution in the South, he mistakes both my principles and feelings, and does not know me. I aspire to come in the spirit, however far below the ability and wisdom, of Washington, of Madison, of Jackson, and of Clay. In that spirit I here declare that in my administration I shall know no rule but the Constitution, no guide but the laws, and no sentiment but that of equal devotion to my whole country, east, west, north, and south."

NO. II.

"I close. We are not, we must not be, aliens or enemies, but fellow-countrymen and brethren. Although passion has strained our bonds of affection too hardly, they must not, I am sure they will not, be broken. The mystic chords which, proceeding from so many battle-fields and so many patriot graves, pass through all the hearts and all hearths in this broad continent of ours, will yet again harmonize in their ancient music when breathed upon by the guardian angel of the nation."

The first of these drafts, containing 139 words in its opening sentence, and made up of phrases which had become extremely commonplace by iteration in the six years' slavery discussion, was clearly inadmissible. The second draft, containing the germ of a truly poetic thought amid its somewhat chaotic rhetoric, Mr. Lincoln took, and, in a new development and perfect form, gave it the life and spirit and beauty which have made it celebrated in the text.

I close. We are not we must not be aliens or enemies but ~~country~~ fellow countrymen and brethren. Although passion has strained our bonds of affection too hardly they must not ~~be broken~~ they will not, I am sure they will not be broken. The mystic chords which proceeding from every ~~battle~~ so many battle fields and patriot graves ~~and~~ pass through all the hearts and ~~hearths~~ all the hearths in this broad continent of ours will yet ~~swell~~ again harmonize in their ancient music when ~~touched as they~~ surely be touched upon again by the ~~better~~ ~~angels~~ guardian angel of the nation

SEWARD'S SUGGESTION FOR CLOSE OF INAUGURAL ADDRESS. (FROM THE ORIGINAL MS.)

You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. *You* have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while *I* shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect and defend" it. ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~ I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearth-stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

CLOSING PARAGRAPH. (FROM ORIGINAL FROM WHICH THE ADDRESS WAS DELIVERED.)

A cheer greeted the conclusion. Chief-Justice Taney arose, the clerk opened his Bible, and Mr. Lincoln, laying his hand upon it, with deliberation pronounced the oath:

"I, Abraham Lincoln, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Then, while the battery on the brow of the hill thundered its salute, citizen Buchanan and President Lincoln returned to their carriage, and the military procession escorted them from the Capitol to the Executive Mansion, on the threshold of which Mr. Buchanan warmly shook the hand of his successor, with heartfelt good wishes for his personal happiness and the national peace and prosperity.

Century Dec
1887

Jan. 1888

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE FORMATION OF THE CABINET.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN'S CABINET.

THERE is distinguished authority † for the statement that the work of framing the new Cabinet was mainly performed on the evening of the presidential election. After the polls were closed on the 6th of November (so Mr. Lincoln related a year or two later), the superintendent of the telegraph at Springfield invited him to come and remain in his office and read the dispatches as they should come in. He accepted the offer; and, reporting himself in due time at the telegraph office, from which all other visitors were excluded at 9 o'clock, awaited the result of the eventful day. Soon the telegrams came thick and fast — first from the neighboring precincts and counties; then from the great Western cities, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati; and finally from the capitals of the doubtful States, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Empire State of New York. Here in this little room, in the company of two or three silent operators moving about their mysteriously clicking instruments, and recording with imperturbable gravity the swift-throbbing messages from near and far, Mr. Lincoln read the reports as they came in, first in vague and fragmentary dribblets, and later in the rising and swelling stream of cheering news. There was never a nicer or closer calculator of political probabilities than himself. He was emphatically at home among election figures. All his political life he had scanned tables of returns with as much care and accuracy as he analyzed and scrutinized maxims of government or platforms of parties. Now, as formerly, he was familiar with all the turning-points in contested counties and "close" districts, and knew by heart the value of each and every local loss or gain and its relation to the grand result. In past years, at the close of many a hot campaign he had searched out the comforts of victory from a discouraging and adverse-looking column of figures, or correctly read the fatal omen of defeat in some fragmentary announcement from a precinct or county. Silently, as they were transcribed, the operators handed him the messages, which he laid on his knee while he adjusted his spectacles, and then read and re-read several times with deliberation. He had not long to wait for indications. From a scattering beginning, made up of encouraging local fragments, the hopeful news rose to almost uninterrupted tidings of victory. Soon a shower of congratulatory telegrams fell from the wires, and while his partisans and friends from all parts of the country were thus shaking hands with him "by lightning" over the result, he could hear the shouts and speeches of his Springfield followers, gathered in the great hall of the State-house across the street, and fairly making that building shake with their rejoicings.

Of course his first emotions were those of a kindling pleasure and pride at the sweeping completeness of his success. But this was only a momentary glow. He was indeed President-elect; but with that consciousness there fell upon him the appalling shadow of his mighty task and responsibility. It seemed as if he suddenly bore the whole world upon his shoulders, and could not shake it off; and sitting there in the yet early watches of the night, he read the still-coming telegrams in a sort of absent-minded mechanical routine, while his "inner man" took up the crushing burden of his country's troubles, and traced out the laborious path of coming duties. "When I finally bade my friends good-night and left that room," said Lincoln, "I had substantially completed the framework of my Cabinet as it now exists."

If the grouping and combining of the new President's intended councilors occurred at this time, it is no less true that some of them were selected at a much earlier date. In the mean time no one was informed of his intentions in this regard. For a full month after the election he gave no intimation whatever of his purpose. Cabinet-making is at all times difficult, as Mr. Lincoln felt and acknowledged, even though he had already progressed thus far in his task. Up to the early days of December he followed the current of newspaper criticism, daily read his budget of private letters, gave numerous interviews to visiting pol-

† Hon. Gideon Welles, conversation. J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

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iticians of prominence and influence from other States, and, on the occasion of a short visit to Chicago, met and conferred with Mr. Hamlin, the Vice-President-elect, — all constituting, most probably, little else than a continued study of the Cabinet question. Never arbitrary nor dictatorial in the decision of any matter, he took unusual care on this point to receive patiently and consider seriously all the advice, recommendations, and objections which his friends from different States had to offer.

His personal experience during his service as a member of Congress had given him an insight into the sharp and bitter contentions which grow out of office-seeking and the distribution of patronage. It was therefore doubtless with the view to fortify himself in his selections, that he now determined to make definite offers of some at least of the Cabinet appointments. The question of taking part of his constitutional advisers from among his political opponents, and from the hostile or complaining Southern States, had been thoroughly debated in his own mind. The conclusion arrived at is plainly evinced by the following, written with his own hand, and inserted as a short leading editorial in the Springfield "Journal" on the morning of December 12th (or 13th), 1860:

"We hear such frequent allusions to a supposed purpose on the part of Mr. Lincoln to call into his Cabinet two or three Southern gentlemen from the parties opposed to him politically, that we are prompted to ask a few questions.

"*First.* Is it known that any such gentleman of character would accept a place in the Cabinet?

"*Second.* If yea, on what terms does he surrender to Mr. Lincoln, or Mr. Lincoln to him, on the political differences between them, or do they enter upon the administration in open opposition to each other?"

The high authorship of these paragraphs was not announced, but the *reductio ad absurdum* was so complete that the newspapers were not amiss in guessing whence they emanated.

The selection of enemies being out of the question, Mr. Lincoln, in execution of long-matured plans, proceeded to choose his friends, and those of the best and ablest. On the morning of December 8th, 1860, he penned the following letters:

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 8th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: With your permission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for confirmation as Secretary of State for the United States. Please let me hear from you at your own earliest convenience.

Your friend and obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Washington, D. C.*

(Private and confidential.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 8th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: In addition to the accompanying and more formal note, inviting you to take charge of the State Department, I deem it proper to address you this. Rumors have got into the newspapers to the effect that the Department named above would be tendered you as a compliment, and with the expectation that you would decline it. I beg you to be assured that I have said nothing to justify these rumors. On the contrary, it has been my purpose, from the day of the nomination at Chicago, to assign you, by your leave, this place in the Administration. I have delayed so long to communicate that purpose, in deference to what appeared to me a proper caution in the case. Nothing has been developed to change my view in the premises; and I now offer you the place in the hope that you will accept it, and with the belief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, ability, learning, and great experience all combine to render it an appointment preëminently fit to be made.

One word more. In regard to the patronage sought with so much eagerness and jealousy, I have prescribed for myself the maxim, "Justice to all"; and I earnestly beseech your coöperation in keeping the maxim good.

Your friend and obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Washington, D. C.*

This letter, so full of frankness and delicate courtesy, together with the brief note preceding it, was sent to two intimate friends of the President-elect at Washington, with the request, if their judgment concurred in the step, to hand them to Mr. Seward. They were at once delivered, and the recipient wrote the following equally courteous and characteristic answer:

WASHINGTON, December 13th, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: I have had the honor of receiving as well your note which tenders to me a nomination to the Senate for the office of Secretary of State, as also your private and confidential letter on the same subject.

It would be a violation of my own feelings, as well as a great injustice to you, if I were to leave occasion for any doubt on your part that I appreciate as highly as I ought the distinction which, as the Chief Magistrate of the Republic, you propose to confer upon me, and that I am fully, perfectly, and entirely satisfied with the sincerity and kindness of your sentiments and wishes in regard to my acceptance of it.

You will readily believe that, coming to the consideration of so grave a subject all at once, I need a little time to consider whether I possess the qualifications and temper of a minister, and whether it is in such a capacity that my friends would wish that I should act if I am to continue at all in the public service. These questions are, moreover, to be considered in view of a very anomalous condition of public affairs. I wish, indeed, that a conference with you upon them were possible. But I do not see how it could prudently be held under existing circumstances. Without publishing the fact of your invitation, I will, with your leave, reflect upon it a few days, and then give you my definite answer, which, if I know myself, will be made under the influence exclusively of the most earnest desire for the success of your administration, and through it for the safety, honor, and welfare of the Union.

Whatever may be my conclusion, you may rest assured of my hearty concurrence in your views in regard to the distribution of the public offices as you have communicated them.

Believe me, my dear sir, most respectfully and most faithfully your friend and humble servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President-elect of the United States.*

* Unpublished MS.

Before the end of the month, Mr. Lincoln received a short and simple note from Mr. Seward signifying his acceptance. Meanwhile he had sent (December 13th) a verbal message to Hon. Edward Bates, at St. Louis, Mo., that he would come down there the next day to see and consult him about some points connected with the formation of his Cabinet. "I thought I saw an unfitness in his coming to me, and that I ought to go to him,"* writes Mr. Bates with his old-school politeness. Accordingly, the following Saturday (December 15th) found him at Mr. Lincoln's office in Springfield.

They had had a personal acquaintance of some eight years; and after cordial greetings the President-elect proceeded without further prelude to tell him that since the day of the Chicago nomination it had been his purpose to tender him one of the places in his Cabinet. Some of his friends had asked the State Department for him. He could not now offer him this, which was usually considered the first place in the Cabinet, for the reason that he should offer that place to Mr. Seward, in view of his ability, his integrity, his commanding influence, and his fitness for the place. He did this as a matter of duty to the party and to Mr. Seward's many and strong friends, while at the same time it accorded perfectly with his own personal inclinations, notwithstanding some opposition on the part of sincere and warm friends. He would, therefore, offer Mr. Bates what he supposed would be more congenial, and for which he was certainly in every way qualified,— the Attorney-Generalship.†

Within a few days it was announced by authority that Mr. Bates had been tendered and had accepted a place in the new Cabinet. His adhesion was looked upon as a sure indication of a moderate and constitutional policy by the incoming Administration.

The choice of Mr. Seward as the head of the Cabinet, as well as his probable acceptance, was also soon whispered about among leading Republicans in Congress, rumored in the public press, and in due time confirmed by a semi-official statement in the Albany "Evening Journal," the organ of Mr. Seward's friend Thurlow Weed. This action of Mr. Lincoln also gave the party at large general gratification, since up to the Chicago convention Mr. Seward had been its chief favorite. Whatever of antagonism existed between pronounced and conservative Republicans was thus happily neutralized, and the respective partisans of Mr. Seward and Mr. Bates each felt themselves bound to the new Administration through the presence of an acknowledged and trusted leader in Mr. Lincoln's councils.

To these two selections a third had in the mean time been virtually added. As the individual held a less prominent position in the nation, and as the choice was merely provisional, it provoked no immediate attention or contest. On December 11th, three days after writing his letter to Mr. Seward, two gentlemen called upon the President-elect to present the claims of Hon. Caleb B. Smith of Indiana, one of the "pivotal States" in the November election, to a seat in the Cabinet. After a very short talk, showing that the question had already gone through the crucible of his judgment, Mr. Lincoln replied, that, being determined to act with caution and not embarrass himself with promises, he could only say that he saw no insuperable objections to Indiana's having a place, or to Smith being the man.† To this decision Mr. Lincoln held firm, though, later on, very considerable pressure came upon him in behalf of another citizen of Indiana, already then distinguished and destined to attain still greater eminence. A letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote him, explaining why he adhered to his original choice, will be of interest in this connection as illustrating one of his rules of conduct which contributed so much to his popular strength; namely, neither to forget a friendship nor remember a grudge.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8th, 1861.

HON. SCHUYLER COLFAX.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 6th has just been handed me by Mr. Baker of Minnesota. When I said to you the other day that I wished to write you a letter, I had reference, of course, to my not having offered you a Cabinet appointment. I meant to say, and now do say, you were most honorably and amply recommended; and a tender of the appointment was not withheld, in any part, because of anything happening in 1858. Indeed, I should have decided as I did easier than I did, had that matter never existed. I had partly made up my mind in favor of Mr. Smith — not conclusively, of course — before your name was mentioned in that connection. When you were brought forward I said, "Colfax is a young man, is already in position, is running a brilliant career, and is sure of a bright future in any event — with Smith it is now or never." I considered either abundantly competent, and decided on the ground I have stated. I now have to beg that you will not do me the injustice to suppose for a moment that I remember anything against you in malice.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN. ‡

The next step in Cabinet-making was much more complex as a political and personal adjustment, and proved for the present too difficult of execution. Mr. Lincoln had frequently and without reserve expressed his decided preference for Governor Salmon P. Chase of

* Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.

† J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

‡ Unpublished MS. Also partly printed in Hollister, "Life of Colfax."

Ohio as his Secretary of the Treasury,— not only on account of his acknowledged executive talent, but above all because his spotless integrity of character would at once impart tone to and confidence in the national credit, greatly impaired by recent maladministration and now liable to be lost in the convulsions of civil war. There seemed, too, an eminent fitness in this selection. He was looked upon as the most prominent and able representative of the second great constituent element of the Republican party,— the former Democrats of the Northern States whose anti-slavery convictions had joined them to the new party of freedom.

But against this personal preference of the President-elect, to this particular office there rose up the local claim of the State of Pennsylvania and of Senator Simon Cameron as her most prominent citizen. The manufacturing industry of the State created a local sentiment in behalf of a protective tariff stronger than all other party issues. Protection had not, indeed, been a prominent question in the late election, yet the Republican platform proclaimed that the "industrial interests" should be encouraged; the bulk of the new party were former tariff men; Mr. Lincoln himself had been an avowed protectionist in other political campaigns, and was known not to have changed his convictions on this point. Stronger than all was the implied understanding in favor of protection,— unwritten, indeed, but none the less relied upon by politicians and parties. Now that the election was won, Pennsylvania claimed control of the Treasury Department as that branch of the Government which could wield the greatest influence, both upon legislation and administration, for the promotion of her industrial prosperity. Governor Chase had a wider national reputation than Senator Cameron, but each was an unrivaled leader in his own State, each had received the almost unanimous complimentary vote of his own State in the Chicago convention.

In view of these conflicting motives and interests, the President invited Mr. Cameron to visit him at Springfield, and interviews took place between them on the 30th and 31st of December. Their conversations were undoubtedly intended to be frank and explicit, and yet it would appear that a temporary misunderstanding grew out of them, the precise nature of which has never become public history. When Mr. Cameron returned to his home, he bore with him the following note:

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 31st, 1860.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: I think fit to notify you now, that by your permission I shall at the proper time nominate you to the U. S. Senate for confirmation as Secretary of the Treasury, or as Secretary of War — which of the two I have not yet definitely decided. Please answer at your earliest convenience.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

The purpose of the President-elect, evidently formed with deliberation, was suddenly changed, but, as the sequel proved, for a time only. If he ever explained his full reason for so doing, it was to witnesses who are long since dead. One of the secondary causes he has himself left on record. It happened that just at this juncture he received, both by letter and through personal visits from Pennsylvania politicians, the indications of a bitter hostility to Cameron from an influential and very active minority in that State, headed by the newly elected governor and the chairman of the State central committee, who protested in harsh and severe terms against Cameron's appointment. The situation required prompt action, and keeping his own counsel, Mr. Lincoln wrote:

(Private.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: Since seeing you, things have developed which make it impossible for me to take you into the Cabinet. You will say this comes of an interview with McClure; and this is partly, but not wholly, true. The more potent matter is wholly outside of Pennsylvania; and yet I am not at liberty to specify it. Enough that it appears to me to be sufficient. And now I suggest that you write me declining the appointment, in which case I do not object to its being known that it was tendered you. Better do this at once, before things so change that you cannot honorably decline, and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this letter.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this, saying, "All right."— A. L.*

It will be seen from this that Mr. Lincoln did not offer any explanation of his course; also that he had so well kept his secret, both of the tender and the recall, that, since his judgment so dictated, he could reverse his own action and the world be none the wiser. Still further does it appear from this letter that he had either enjoined or expected an equal discretion on the part of Mr. Cameron. But the latter, in haste to control the party politics of Pennsylvania, and dictate who from that State should succeed him in the Senate, had shown Mr. Lincoln's first note. Mr. Cameron was, therefore, not only unable to telegraph "All right," but was in a measure compelled also to show the recall to a few special friends; and thus the incident, though the correspondence and the actual details were carefully kept out of the newspapers, was more or less understood in the confidential circles of politics.

* Unpublished MS.

As might have been expected, Mr. Cameron's nearest personal friend came at once to Springfield; and the conferences on the subject may be sufficiently inferred from a letter and its inclosure which he carried back to Mr. Cameron:

(Private and confidential.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 13th, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson and with hearty good-will besides, I herewith send you a letter dated Jan. 3d — the same in date as the last you received from me. I thought best to give it that date, as it is in some sort to take the place of that letter. I learn, both by a letter of Mr. Swett and from Mr. Sanderson, that your feelings were wounded by the terms of my letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I should have been; but I beg you to be assured I intended no offense. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible before the matter should be complicated with the Penn. senatorial election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me.

I say to you now I have not doubted that you would perform the duties of a Department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I will not do so without consulting you, and giving all the weight to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have always intended.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

[Inclosure.]

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. SIMON CAMERON.

MY DEAR SIR: When you were here, about the last of December, I handed you a letter saying I should at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for a place in the Cabinet. It is due to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation, and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which you would discharge the duties of the place.

I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for Pennsylvania until I reach Washington.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

Before further describing this Cameron dilemma, we must look at another complication which was added to it. On the day on which Mr. Lincoln had given Mr. Cameron his written tender of a place (December 31st), he had also telegraphed to Governor Chase, "In these troublous times I would like a conference with you. Please visit me here at once."† By a curious coincidence, Mr. Chase arrived in Springfield on the very day (January 3d) on which Mr. Lincoln wrote the recall of the tender to Mr. Cameron. As in other instances, the President-elect waived all ceremony and promptly called on Mr. Chase at his hotel. "I have done with you," said he, "what I would not perhaps have ventured to do with any other man in the country,— sent for you to ask you whether you will accept the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury, without, however, being exactly prepared to offer it to you."‡ He was also informed of the selection of Mr. Seward and Mr. Bates, which he heartily approved. Nothing was, of course, said of the tender to Cameron or its recall; but the opposition of the anti-Cameron minority in Pennsylvania and their urging the selection of Mr. Dayton of New Jersey instead, the apparent acquiescence of all in the choice of Mr. Chase, and the threatening affairs of the nation as well as the strife among Republican factions, were fully talked over during his visit, which lasted two days. Mr. Chase stated that he "was not prepared to say that he would accept that place if offered."† Neither did he positively decline. He valued the trust and its opportunities, but he was reluctant to leave the Senate. It was resolved to ask the advice of friends, and abide the course of events. "A good deal of conversation," writes Mr. Chase, "followed in reference to other possible members of the Cabinet, but everything was left open when we parted."

All these important visits to Springfield were heralded in the newspapers, and the rumors connected therewith proportionately magnified. Particularly did the statement of Mr. Cameron's selection, and its quick contradiction, put both his friends and opponents on the alert. Pennsylvania politics were for the moment at a white heat, and letters showered into Springfield. Politicians are but human, and Mr. Cameron was sorely wounded in pride and weakened in prestige. He felt hurt at the form as well as the substance of the recall, which, being intended to remain secret, was more explicit than conventional. While he did not conceal his chagrin, on the whole he kept his temper, taking the ground that he neither originally solicited the place, nor would he now decline it. His enemies, seeing him at bay, redoubled their efforts to defeat him. They charged him with unfitness, with habitual intrigue, with the odium of corrupt practices. Mr. Lincoln, however, soon noticed that these allegations were vaguely based upon newspaper report and public rumor, and that, when requested to do so, no one was willing to make specific charges and furnish tangible proof.

While the opponents of Mr. Cameron hastened to transmit to Springfield protests against his appointment, his friends were yet more

*Unpublished MS.

† Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase."

‡ Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase."

active in forwarding recommendations in his behalf. All through the month of January this epistolary contest seemed the principal occupation of the Pennsylvania Republicans, and to some extent it communicated itself to other localities. Sharp as were the assaults, the defense was yet more earnest, and testimonials came from all ranks and classes,—citizens, clergymen, editors, politicians, and officials of all grades, and in numbers fully as three to one,—indorsing his private and personal worth, his public services, his official uprightness. Astute Washington politicians were nonplused, and frankly confessed that his vindication from aspersion was complete and overwhelming and that they could not account for it,—attributing it, as usual, to his personal intrigue. Reasons aside, it was evident that Pennsylvania demanded Cameron, and in the same connection protested against Chase, in the Treasury Department, insisting that the latter, through his Democratic teachings and party affiliations, was necessarily wedded to the doctrines of free trade, and hence inimical to the manufacturing prosperity of that State, which was anxiously looking forward to protective legislation. Mr. Cameron was highly gratified at this manifestation from his own State, as he had a right to be, and was thereby able to declare himself entirely satisfied with the situation as thus left, and to express his continued good-will towards the President-elect.*

Pending this incident, still another phase of the Cabinet question had more fully developed itself at Washington. The proposition to appoint at least one distinctly Southern man continued from time to time to be urged upon Mr. Lincoln, notably by some of the most prominent and, it may be added, most radical Republican senators and representatives in Congress. To the policy of such a step the President-elect cordially assented; but the real question was, as he had already so sharply defined it, Would any Southern man of character and influence accept such a place? Since Mr. Seward's selection, he too joined in the current suggestion. "I feel it my duty," he wrote, December 25th, "to submit for your consideration the names of Colonel Frémont for Secretary of War, Randall Hunt of Louisiana, and John A. Gilmer or Kenneth Raynor of North Carolina, for other places. Should you think that any of these gentlemen would be likely to be desirable in the Administration, I should find no difficulty, I think, in ascertaining whether they would accept, without making the matter public."† In another note, of December 28th, he added the name of Hon. Robert E. Scott of Virginia to his list of Southern candidates. Thereupon Mr. Lincoln sent him authority to make the inquiry, while he himself wrote directly to John A. Gilmer asking him to come to Springfield. Mr. Seward's letters had also urged, in this connection, that in view of the threatened revolution Mr. Lincoln should come to Washington somewhat earlier than usual, and should at once select his Secretaries of War and Navy, that they might begin to devise measures of safety. To all these suggestions Mr. Lincoln sent the following reply:

(Private.)
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 3d, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours without signature was received last night. I have been considering your suggestions as to my reaching Washington somewhat earlier than usual. It seems to me the inauguration is not the most dangerous point for us. Our adversaries have us now clearly at disadvantage. On the second Wednesday of February, when the votes should be officially counted, if the two houses refuse to meet at all, or meet without a quorum of each, where shall we be? I do not think that this counting is constitutionally essential to the election; but how are we to proceed in absence of it?

In view of this, I think it best for me not to attempt appearing in Washington till the result of that ceremony is known. It certainly would be of some advantage if you could know who are to be at the heads of the War and Navy Departments; but, until I can ascertain definitely whether I can get any suitable men from the South, and who, and how many, I cannot well decide. As yet, I have no word from Mr. Gilmer, in answer to my request for an interview with him. I look for something on the subject, through you, before long.

Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.‡

The result of Mr. Seward's inquiries soon came, and revealed precisely the hesitation and difficulty which the President-elect had foretold. "Mr. G. of N. C. says he will consider of the proposition, and that he trusts that before giving an answer he will be able to name a person better calculated than himself for the purpose indicated. I do not think he will find such a person. He will not reply further, until required to do so by you, directly or indirectly. I will communicate with him if you wish. I think he would not decline. I have tried to get an interview on my own responsibility with Mr. Scott, but he has not yet come, though he has promised to do so. . . I still think Randall Hunt of Louisiana would be well chosen."§ And again: "Mr. Gilmer has written home confidentially, and will give me an answer in a few days. He is inquiring

*Morehead to Lincoln, Jan. 27th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

†Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 25th, 1860. Unpublished MS.

‡Unpublished MS.

§Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 4th, 1861. Unpublished MS.



SALMON P. CHASE, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BENDANN.)

about Randall Hunt. What do you know of Meredith P. Gentry of Tennessee?"* To this Mr. Lincoln answered:

(Private.)

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 12th, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 8th received. I still hope Mr. Gilmer will, on a fair understanding with us, consent to take a place in the Cabinet. The preference for him over Mr. Hunt or Mr. Gentry is that, up to date, he has a living position in the South, while they have not. He is only better than Winter Davis in that he is farther South. I fear if we could get, we could not safely take, more than one such man — that is, not more than one who opposed us in the election, the danger being to lose the confidence of our own friends.

Your selection for the State Department having become public, I am happy to find scarcely any objection to it. I shall have trouble with every other Northern Cabinet appointment, so much so that I shall have to defer them as long as possible, to avoid being teased to insanity to make changes.

Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN.†

This quest after a loyal member from the South soon terminated. Under date of January 15th Mr. Seward sent an additional report on the subject. "I think," wrote he, "Mr. Scott has been terrified into dropping the subject about which I wrote to you. He has not come to see me; so we will let him pass, if you please. I still think well and have hopes of Gilmer."‡ But Mr. Lincoln was by that time thoroughly satisfied that this last hope would also prove idle; for he himself had a second letter from Mr. Gilmer (dated January 29th) in which that gentleman declined his invitation to come to Springfield, and in which, having missed receiving Mr. Lincoln's former reply, he still pathetically insisted that the President-elect should save the country by writing a letter to satisfy the South.

In this attitude matters remained until towards the end of February, when Mr. Lin-

* Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 8th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Seward to Lincoln, Jan. 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.

coln arrived in Washington; namely, Mr. Seward of New York and Mr. Bates of Missouri had positively accepted definite places in the Cabinet. Mr. Chase of Ohio and Mr. Smith of Indiana had been virtually chosen, but were yet held under advisement; a tender had been made to Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, and recalled but not declined; and distinctively Southern men, like Gilmer of North Carolina and Scott of Virginia, had not the courage to accept. In addition to these, Mr. Lincoln had



SIMON CAMERON, SECRETARY OF WAR.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

by this time practically settled in his own judgment upon Hon. Gideon Welles of Connecticut as the New England member, though no interview had been held nor tender made. But as early as the meeting (November 22d) between the President and Vice-President elect at Chicago, this name had been the subject of special consultation; and a friend had obtained from Mr. Welles the latter's written views upon current political questions, especially the fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution. A great number of letters and formal recommendations since received had but confirmed Mr. Lincoln's first impressions as to his fitness, availability, and representative character.

Washington was thronged with politicians, called there by the proceedings of Congress; by the Peace Convention, just closing; by the secession excitement; and especially by the advent of a new and yet untried party in administration. Willard's, then the principal hotel, was never in its history more busy nor more brilliant. Here Mr. Lincoln and his suite had spacious and accessible rooms, and here during the six or eight working-days which intervened between his arrival and the inauguration was the great political exchange, where politicians, editors, committee-men, delegations, Congressmen, governors, and senators congregated, and besieged the doors of the coming power from morning till midnight.

Mr. Lincoln had a sincere respect for great names in politics and statesmanship, the more so because his own life had in the main been provincial. Nevertheless, he quickly noted that here at the center, as well as in lesser and more distant circles, there was present harmony in the chief party tenets, but that great diversity and cross-purpose, even serious antagonism, as to men and measures in detail were likely to arise in the future; that the powerful cross-lights of the capital only intensified the factional contests, local jealousies, or the national difficulties and dangers he had already viewed more remotely but quite as accurately from Springfield; that the wisdom of trained actors in the political drama was as much beclouded by interest or prejudice as was his own by inexperience and diffidence.

After a week's patient listening he found his well-formed judgment about the composition of his Cabinet unshaken. He had by this time finally determined to place Cameron in the War Department, and Chase was understood to have accepted the Treasury. Hence the East and the West, the great "pivotal States," the Whig and Democratic elements of the Republican party, each by three members were all believed to be fairly and acceptably represented. The slave States too, through Mr. Bates of Missouri, had a voice in the new council; but the charge of sectionalism had been so persistently iterated by the South, that it was thought best to give the single remaining place to Maryland, even then balancing between loyalty and open secession; and the final controversy was whether that choice should fall upon Montgomery Blair, a Democrat, and member of a historic and influential family, or upon Henry Winter Davis, a young Whig of rising fame.

Something of the obstinacy and bitterness of the entire contest was infused into this last struggle over a really minor place. This was partly because so little remained to quarrel about, but mainly because it was supposed to be the casting vote of the new Cabinet, which should decide the dominancy of the Whig Republicans or Democratic Republicans in Mr. Lincoln's administration. In the momentary heat and excitement this phase of the matter expanded beyond any original design, until Mr. Lincoln began to realize that it was

no longer a mere local strife between Blair and Davis in Maryland, but the closing trial of strength and supremacy between Whigs and Democrats of the new party throughout the Union, headed respectively, though perhaps unconsciously, by Seward and Chase. This contingency, too, had been foreseen by the President-elect, and he had long ago determined not to allow himself to be made the football between rival factions. Carrying out, therefore, his motto of "Justice to all," as formulated in his tender to Seward, he now determined to appoint Mr. Blair. When reminded that by this selection he placed four Democrats and only three Whigs in his Cabinet, he promptly replied that "he was himself an old-line Whig, and he should be there to make the parties even." This declaration he repeated, sometimes jocularly, sometimes earnestly, many times afterward. Heated partisans from both factions doubtless found it difficult to persuade themselves that this inexperienced man would persist in attempting to hold an even and just balance between the two. But he had already made up his mind that if the quarrel became irrepressible it should be carried on by both factions outside of his Administration. During the two or three days which elapsed after his selections were finally determined upon and their actual transmission to the Senate for confirmation there were interminable rumors of changes, and, of course, a corresponding rush to influence new combinations. Late one night a friend gained access to him, and in great excitement asked, "Is it true, Mr. Lincoln, as I have just heard, that we are to have a new deal after all, and that you intend to nominate Winter Davis instead of Blair?" "Judd," replied he, "when that slate breaks again, it will break at the top."*

These plottings at last bore mischievous fruit. Superserviceable friends doubtless persuaded Seward that the alleged ascendency of the Chase faction in the Cabinet was real and ominous. Hence, possibly, the subjoined note:

WASHINGTON, March 2d, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Circumstances which have occurred since I expressed to you in December last my willingness to accept the office of Secretary of State, seem to me to render it my duty to ask leave to withdraw that consent.

Tendering to you my best wishes for the success of your administration, with my sincere and grateful acknowledgments of all your acts of kindness and confidence towards me, I remain very respectfully and sincerely,

Your obedient servant,
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President-elect. †



GIDEON WELLES, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

This, from the man who now for several months had held intimate counsel with him, had taken active part in the formation of the Cabinet, and had read and partly revised the inaugural, was unexpected. Did it mean that he would now withdraw and complain that he was forced out because a preponderating influence was given to his rival? The note was received on Saturday, and Mr. Lincoln pondered the situation till Monday morning. While the inauguration procession was forming in the streets, he wrote the following and handed it to his private secretary to copy, with the remark, "I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick."

* Hon. N. B. Judd, conversation. J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

† Unpublished MS.

CALEB B. SMITH, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

It is dated, for form's sake, at the Executive Mansion, though it was written and copied at Willard's:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 4th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Your note of the 2d instant, asking to withdraw your acceptance of my invitation to take charge of the State Department, was duly received. It is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9 o'clock A. M. to-morrow.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD.*

When the inauguration pageant was ended, and the usual public reception and hand-shaking were concluded, Mr. Seward called upon the President at the Executive Mansion, and the two men once more had a long, frank, and confidential talk, in which Seward's answer, sent the following morning, had, perhaps, already been foreshadowed:

March 5th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Deferring to your opinions and wishes as expressed in your letter of yesterday, and in our conversation of last evening, I withdraw my letter to you of the 2d instant, and remain, with great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.*

Whereupon, at 12 o'clock, the Senate being convened in extra session, the President sent to that body the names of his proposed Cabinet, as follows:

For Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York.

For Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio.

For Secretary of War, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.

For Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles of Connecticut.

For Secretary of the Interior, Caleb B. Smith of Indiana.

For Attorney-General, Edward Bates of Missouri.

For Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair of Maryland.

The Senate confirmed all these nominations without delay; and on the day after, March 6th, most of the appointees were formally inducted into office. That evening occurred the first Cabinet meeting, being, however, merely for mutual introduction and acquaintance; and the new President greeted his Cabinet at the Executive Mansion in composition and membership substantially as he had planned and arranged it, on the night of the November election, in the little telegraph office at Springfield.

Carping critics might indeed at the moment have specified defects, incongruities, jealousies, and seeds of possible discord and disaster in the new Cabinet, but we can now understand that they neither comprehended the man who was to dominate and govern it, nor the storms of State which, as captain and crew, he and they were to encounter and outride. He needed advisers, helpers, executive eyes and hands, not alone in department routine, but in the higher qualities of leadership and influence; above all, his principal motive seems to have been representative character, varied talent,—in a word, combination. Statesmanship implies success; success demands coöperation, popular sympathy and support. He wished to combine the experience of Seward, the integrity of Chase, the popularity of Cameron; to hold the West with Bates, attract New England with Welles; please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the Democrats through Blair. Mr. Lincoln possessed a quick intuition of human nature and of the strength or weakness of individual character. His whole life had been a practical study of the details and rivalries of local partisanship. He was, moreover, endowed in yet unsuspected measure with a comprehensive grasp of great causes and results in national politics. He had noted and heralded the alarming portent of the slavery struggle. With more precision than any

* Unpublished MS.

contemporary, he had defined the depth and breadth of the moral issues and rights it involved; he had led the preliminary victory at the November polls. Now that the hydra of secession was raising a threatening head in every cotton-State, his simple logic rose above minor considerations to the peril and the protection of the nation, to the assault on and the defense of the Constitution. He saw but the ominous cloud of civil war in front, and the patriotic faith and enthusiasm of the people behind him. The slogan of a Seward committee, a Chase delegation, or a Cameron clan was but the symbol and promise of a Wide-Awake club to vote for freedom, or of an armed regiment on the battle-field to maintain it. Neither did any one yet suspect his delicate tact in management, strength of will, or firmness of purpose. In weaker hands such a Cabinet would have been a hot-bed of strife; under him it became a tower of strength. He made these selections because he wanted a council of distinctive and diverse, yet able, influential, and representative men, who should be a harmonious group of constitutional advisers and executive lieutenants,—not a confederated board of regents holding the great seal in commission and intriguing for the succession.

EDWARD BATES, ATTORNEY-GENERAL. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

THE QUESTION OF SUMTER.

In his letter of January 4th, General Scott had promised Mr. Lincoln that from time to time he would keep him informed of the situation of military affairs. This promise the General failed to keep; probably not through any intentional neglect, but more likely because in the first place Buchanan's policy of delay, indecision, and informal negotiation with the conspirators left everything in uncertainty; and, secondly, because the attention of the Administration (and measurably of the whole country) was turned to the vague hope of compromise, especially through the labors of the Peace Convention. The rebels, on their part, were absorbed in the formation of the provisional government at Montgomery; Lincoln was making his memorable journey from Springfield to Washington by way of the chief cities of the North; the Fort Pickens truce was practically kept a secret; and thus the military status was for the time being lost sight of beyond the immediate neighborhood of Charleston. Since the reorganization of Buchanan's cabinet on December 31st, and the expulsion or defection of traitors from the departments and from Congress, the whole North had breathed somewhat easier. The firing on the *Star of the West* had indeed created a storm of indignation; but this, too, quickly subsided, and by a sort of common consent all parties and sections looked to the incoming Administration as the only power which could solve the national crisis.

The key-note of such a solution was given in the inaugural of the new President. This announced a decided, though not a violent, change of policy. Buchanan's course had been one professedly of conciliation, but practically of ruinous concession. By argument he had almost justified the insurrection; he had acknowledged the doctrine of non-coercion; he had abdicated the rightful authority and power of the Executive; he had parleyed and stipulated with treason; he had withheld reënforcements. Lincoln, receiving from his hands the precious trust of the Government,—not in its original integrity, but humbled, impaired, diminished, and threatened,—announced his purpose of conciliation and not concession,

but conservation and restoration. "The policy chosen," said he, "looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails at Government expense to the very people who were resisting the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot."*

This pacific purpose was now, however, destined to receive a rude shock. When on the morning of the 5th of March Lincoln went to his office and council chamber in the Executive Mansion, he found a letter from Mr. Holt, still acting as Secretary of War, giving him news of vital importance received on the morning of the inauguration,— namely, that Fort Sumter must, in the lapse of a few weeks at most, be strongly reënforced or summarily abandoned. Major Anderson had in the previous week made an examination of his provisions. There was bread for twenty-eight days; pork for a somewhat longer time; beans, rice, coffee, and sugar for different periods from eight to forty days. He had at the same time consulted his officers on the prospects and possibilities of relief and reënforcement. They unanimously reported that before Sumter could be permanently or effectively succored a combined land and naval force must attack and carry the besieging forts and batteries, and hold the secession militia at bay, and that such an undertaking would at once concentrate at Charleston all the volunteers, not alone of South Carolina, but of the adjacent States as well. "I confess," wrote Anderson, transmitting the reports and estimates of his nine officers, "that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw reënforcements into this harbor within the time for our relief rendered necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men."† Mr. Holt, quoting from previous instructions to and reports from the major, added that this declaration "takes the Department by surprise, as his previous correspondence contained no such intimation."

Retrospective criticism as to why or how such a state of things had been permitted to grow up was, of course, useless. Here was a most portentous complication, not of Lincoln's own creating, but which he must nevertheless meet and overcome. He had counted on the soothing aid of time: time, on the contrary, was in this emergency working in the interest of rebellion. General Scott was at once called into council, but his sagacity and experience could afford neither suggestion nor encouragement. That same night he returned the papers to the President with a somewhat lengthy indorsement reciting the several events which led to, and his own personal efforts to avert, this contingency, but ending with the gloomy conclusion, "Evacuation seems almost inevitable, and in this view our distinguished Chief Engineer (Brigadier Totten) concurs — if indeed the worn-out garrison be not assaulted and carried in the present week."



MONTGOMERY BLAIR, POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

This was a disheartening, almost a disastrous, beginning for the Administration. The Cabinet had only that same day been appointed and confirmed. The presidential advisers had not yet taken their posts — all had not even signified their acceptance. There was an impatient multitude clamoring for audience, and behind these swarmed a hungry army of office-seekers. Everything was urgency and confu-

* Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4th, 1861.
† Anderson to Cooper, Feb. 28th, 1861. MS. Partly printed in War Records.

sion, everywhere was ignorance of method and routine. Rancor and hatred filled the breasts of political opponents departing from power; suspicion and rivalry possessed partisan adherents seeking advantage and promotion. As yet, Lincoln virtually stood alone, face to face with the appalling problems of the present and the threatening responsibilities of the future. Doubtless in this juncture he remembered and acted upon a biblical precedent which in after days of trouble and despondency he was wont to quote for justification or consolation. When the children of Israel murmured on the shore of the Red Sea, Moses told them to "stand still and see the salvation of the Lord." Here then, at the very threshold of his presidential career, Lincoln had need to practice the virtue of patience,—one of the cardinal elements of his character, acquired in many a personal and political tribulation of his previous life.

He referred the papers back to General Scott to make a more thorough investigation of all the questions involved. At the same time he gave him a verbal order, touching his future general public policy, which a few days later was reduced to writing, and on the installation of the new Secretary of War transmitted by that functionary to the General-in-chief through the regular official channels, as follows:

"I am directed by the President to say he desires you to exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places within the military department of the United States, and to promptly call upon all the departments of the Government for the means necessary to that end." *

On the 9th of March, in written questions Lincoln in substance asked General Scott to inform him: 1st. To what point of time can Anderson maintain his position in Sumter? 2d. Can you, with present means, relieve him within that time? 3d. What additional means would enable you to do so? † This was on Saturday following the inauguration. The chiefs of the several departments, with the exception of Cameron, Secretary of War, had been during the week inducted into office. That night the President held his first Cabinet council on the state of the country; and the crisis at Sumter, with the question of relieving the fort, was for the first time communicated to his assembled advisers. The general effect was one of dismay if not consternation. For such a discussion all were unprepared. Naturally all decision must be postponed, and the assistance of professional advice be sought. What followed has been written down by an eye-witness and participant.

"March 9th, 1861, Saturday night.—A Cabinet council upon the state of the country. I was astonished to be informed that Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, must be evacuated, and that General Scott, General Totten, and Major Anderson concur in opinion, that as the place has but twenty-eight days' provision, it must be relieved, if at all, in that time; and that it will take a force of 20,000 men at least, and a bloody battle, to relieve it!

"For several days after this, consultations were held as to the feasibility of relieving Fort Sumter, at which were present, explaining and aiding, General Scott, General Totten, Commodore Stringham, and Mr. Fox, who seems to be *au fait* in both nautical and military matters. The army officers and navy officers differ widely about the degree of danger to rapid-moving vessels passing under the fire of land batteries. The army officers think destruction almost inevitable, where the navy officers think the danger but slight. The one believe that Sumter cannot be relieved — not even provisioned — without an army of twenty thousand men and a bloody battle. The other (the naval) believe that with light, rapid vessels they can cross the bar at high tide of a dark night, run the enemy's forts (Moultrie and Cumming's Point), and reach Sumter with little risk. They say that the greatest danger will be in landing at Sumter, upon which point there may be a concentrated fire. They do not doubt that the place can be and ought to be relieved.

"Mr. Fox is anxious to risk his life in leading the relief, and Commodore Stringham seems equally confident of success.

"The naval men have convinced me fully that the thing can be done, and yet as the doing of it would be almost certain to begin the war, and as Charleston is of little importance as compared with the chief points in the Gulf, I am willing to yield to the military counsel and evacuate Fort Sumter, at the same time strengthening the forts in the Gulf so as to look down opposition, and guarding the coast with all our naval power, if need be, so as to close any port at pleasure.

"And to this effect I gave the President my written opinion on the 16th of March." ‡

This extract from the diary of Edward Bates, the Attorney-General in the new Administration, shows us the drift and scope of the official discussions on the Sumter question. To understand its full bearings, however, we must examine it a little more specifically. The idea of the evacuation and abandonment of the fort was so repugnant that Mr. Lincoln could scarcely bring himself to entertain it: we have his own forcible statement of how the apparently crushing necessity presented itself to his mind. General Scott, on March 11th and 12th, made written replies to the questions the President had propounded, and submitted the draft of an order for evacuation.

He believed Anderson could, in respect to provisions, hold out some forty days without much suffering, but that the assailants, having overpowering numbers, could easily wear out the garrison by a succession of pretended night attacks, and, when ready, take it easily by a single real assault. To supply or reënforce the fort successfully, he should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which it would take

* Cameron to Scott (written by Lincoln). Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.

four months to collect; and, besides, 5000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers, which it would require new acts of Congress to authorize and from six to eight months to raise, organize, and discipline. "It is therefore my opinion and advice," writes Scott, "that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort so long gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark with his command for New York."* "In a purely military point of view," says Lincoln, "this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, however, that so to abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed."†

The dire alternative presented caused a thorough reëxamination and discussion of the various plans of relief which had been suggested; and since the army and the navy showed some considerable disagreement in opinions, these discussions were held in the presence of President and Cabinet in the executive council chamber itself. General Scott's first impulse had been to revive and reorganize the Ward expedition, prepared about the middle of February, which was to have consisted of several small Coast Survey steamers. To this end he called Captain Ward to Washington and again discussed the plan. This, however, considering the increase of batteries and channel obstructions, was now by both of them pronounced impracticable. But one other offer seemed worthy of consideration. This was the plan proposed by Gustavus V. Fox, a gentleman thirty-nine years of age, who had been nineteen years in the United States Navy, had been engaged in the survey of the



BUST OF JAMES LOUIS PETIGRU, PRESENTED TO THE CITY OF CHARLESTON BY MAYOR WILLIAM A. COURTENAY.

* Unpublished MS.

† Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4th, 1861.

Southern coast of the United States, had commanded United States mail steamers, and had resigned from the navy in 1856 to engage in civil pursuits. He was a brother-in-law of the new Postmaster-General, Blair, who seconded his project with persistence. He had made his proposal to General Scott early in February, and, backed by prominent New York merchants and shippers, urged it as he best might through the whole of that month.

In his various communications Captain Fox thus described his plan:

"I propose to put the troops on board of a large, comfortable sea-steamer, and hire two [or three] powerful light-draught New York tug-boats, having the necessary stores on board; these to be convoyed by the United States steamer *Pawnee*, now at Philadelphia, and the revenue cutter *Harriet Lane*. . . . Arriving off the bar [at Charleston], I propose to examine by day the naval preparations and obstructions. If their vessels determine to oppose our entrance (and a feint or flag of truce would ascertain this), the armed ships must approach the bar and destroy or drive them on shore. Major Anderson would do the same upon any vessels within the range of his guns, and would also prevent any naval succor being sent down from the city. Having dispersed this force, the only obstacles are the forts on Cumming's Point and Fort Moultrie, and whatever adjacent batteries they may have erected, distant on either hand from mid-channel about three-quarters of a mile. At night, two hours before high water, with half the force on board of each tug, within relieving distance of each other, I should run in to Fort Sumter.*

"These tugs are sea-boats, six feet draught, speed fourteen knots. The boilers are below, with three and a half feet space on each side, to be filled with coal. The machinery comes up between the wheel-houses, with a gangway on either hand of five to six feet, enabling us to pack the machinery with two or three thicknesses of bales of cotton or hay. This renders the vulnerable parts of the steamer proof against grape and fragments of shells, but the momentum of a solid shot would probably move the whole mass and disable the engine. The men are below, entirely protected from grape — provisions on deck. The first tug to lead in empty, to open their [the enemy's] fire. The other two to follow, with the force divided, and towing the large iron boats of the *Baltic*, which would hold the whole force should every tug be disabled, and empty they would not impede the tugs."†

The feasibility of Captain Fox's plan thus rested upon his ability to "run the batteries," and on this point the main discussion now turned. As recorded in the diary we have quoted, the army officers believed destruction almost inevitable, while the naval officers thought a successful passage might be effected. Captain Fox, who had come to Washington, finally argued the question in person before the President, Cabinet, and assembled military officers, adducing the recorded evidence of examples and incidents which had occurred in the Crimean war, and the results of Dahlgren's experiments in firing at stationary targets; maintaining that there was no certainty whatever, and even only a minimum of chance, that land batteries could hit a small object moving rapidly at right angles to their line of fire at a distance of thirteen hundred yards, especially at night.

So far as mere theory could do it, he successfully demonstrated his plan, convincing the President and at least a majority of his Cabinet against all the objections of General Scott and his subordinate officers.

The scheme of Captain Fox presented such favorable chances that the military problem seemed in fair way of solution; nevertheless, as the more important of the two, the political question yet remained to be considered. Resolved on prudent deliberation, President Lincoln now, on March 15th, asked the written answer of his constitutional advisers to the following inquiry:

"Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?"

As requested, the members of the Cabinet returned on the next day a somewhat elaborate reply, setting forth their reasons and conclusions. Two of them, Chase and Blair, agreeing with the President's own inclinations, responded in the affirmative; the five others, Seward, Cameron, Welles, Smith, and Bates, advised against the measure.

"I have not reached my own conclusion," wrote Chase, "without much difficulty. If the proposed enterprise will so influence civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlistment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot, in the existing circumstances of the country and in the present condition of the national finances, advise it."‡

He argued, however, that an immediate proclamation of reasons, and the manifestation of a kind and liberal spirit towards the South, would avert such a result, and he would therefore return an affirmative answer.

Blair had been from the first in favor of prompt and vigorous measures against the insurrection. A Democrat of the Jackson school, he would repeat Jackson's policy against nullification. He had brought forward and urged the scheme of Captain Fox. By the connivance of Buchanan's administration, he argued, the rebellion had been permitted unchecked to grow into an organized government in seven States. It had been practically treated as a lawful proceeding; and, if allowed to continue, all Southern people must become reconciled to it. The rebels believe Northern men are deficient in courage to maintain the Government. The evacuation of Sumter will convince them that the Administration lacks firmness. Sumter reënforced becomes invulnerable, and will

* Fox, memorandum, Feb. 6th, 1861. War Records.
† Fox to Blair, Feb. 23d, 1861. War Records.
‡ Chase to Lincoln, March 16th, 1861.

completely demoralize the rebellion. No expense or care should be spared to achieve this result. The appreciation of our stocks would reimburse the most lavish outlay for this purpose.

"You should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in this enterprise. They willingly take the hazard for the sake of the country, and the honor, which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free government in all lands."*

Seward, in the negative, argued the political issue at great length. To attempt to provision Sumter would provoke combat and open civil war. A desperate and defeated majority in the South have organized revolutionary government in seven States. The other slave States are balancing between sympathy for the seceders and loyalty to the Union, but indicate a disposition to adhere to the latter. The Union must be maintained, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. But civil war is the most uncertain and fearful of all remedies for political disorders. He would save the Union by peaceful policy without civil war. Disunion is without justification. Devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national sentiment. Silenced by terror it would, if encouraged, rally, and reverse the popular action of the seceding States. The policy of the time is conciliation. Sumter is practically useless.

"I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate Union object. Even then it should be only a naval force that I would employ for that necessary purpose, while I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defense. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side."†

Cameron followed the reasoning of the army officers. Captain Fox, he said, did not propose to supply provisions for more than one or two months. The abandonment of Sumter seemed an inevitable necessity, and therefore the sooner the better.‡ Welles thought the public mind was becoming reconciled to the idea of evacuation as a necessity. The strength, dignity, and character of the Government would not be promoted by a successful attempt, while a failure would be disastrous.§ Smith argued that Sumter is not essential to any of the duties imposed on the Government. There are other and more effective means to vindicate its honor, and compel South Carolina to obey the laws.‖ Bates believed the hazard greater than the gain. "True," wrote he, "war already exists by the act of South Carolina — but this Government has thus far magnanimously forborne to retort the outrage. And I am willing to forbear yet longer in the hope of a peaceful solution of our present difficulties." Pickens, Key West, etc., should, on the contrary, be strongly defended, and the whole coast from South Carolina to Texas be guarded by the entire power of the navy.¶

Against the advice of so decided a majority, Lincoln did not deem it prudent to order the proposed expedition. Neither did his own sense of duty permit him entirely to abandon it. Postponing, therefore, a present final decision of the point, he turned his attention to the investigation of the question immediately and vitally connected with it,— the collection of the revenue. On the 18th of March he once more directed written inquiries to three of his Cabinet officers. To the Attorney-General, whether under the Constitution and laws the Executive has power to collect duties on shipboard off shore?** To the Secretary of the Treasury, whether, and where, and for what cause any importations are taking place without payment of duties? Whether vessels off shore could prevent such importations or enforce payment? and what number and description of vessels besides those already in the revenue service?†† To the Secretary of the Navy, what amount of naval force he could place at the control of the revenue service, and how much additional in the future?‡‡

Pending the receipt of replies to these inquiries, Lincoln determined to obtain information on two other points,— the first, as to the present actual condition and feeling of Major Anderson; the second, as to the real temper and intentions of the people of Charleston. Captain Fox had suggested the possibility of obtaining leave to visit Sumter through the influence of Captain Hartstene, then in the rebel service at Charleston, but who had in former years been his intimate friend, and comrade in command of a companion steamer of the California line. By order of the President, General Scott therefore sent him to obtain "accurate information in regard to the command of Major Anderson in Fort Sumter."§§ As he an-

* Blair to Lincoln, March 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.
† Seward to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861.
‡ Cameron to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861.
§ Welles to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
‖ Smith to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
¶ Bates to Lincoln, March 15th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
** Lincoln to Bates, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
†† Lincoln to Chase, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
‡‡ Lincoln to Welles, March 18th, 1861. Unpublished MS.
§§ Cameron to Scott, March 19th, 1861. War Records.

ticipated, Hartstene introduced him to Governor Pickens, to whom he showed his order, and was, after some delay, permitted to go to the fort under Hartstene's escort, having meanwhile had an interview with General Beauregard.

"We reached Fort Sumter after dark" (March 21st), writes Captain Fox, "and remained about two hours. Major Anderson seemed to think it was too late to relieve the fort by any other means than by landing an army on Morris Island. He agreed with General Scott that an entrance from the sea was impossible; but as we looked out upon the water from the parapet, it seemed very feasible, more especially as we heard the oars of a boat near the fort, which the sentry hailed, but we could not see her through the darkness until she almost touched the landing. I found the garrison getting short of supplies, and it was agreed that I might report that the 15th of April, at noon, would be the period beyond which the fort could not be held unless supplies were furnished. I made no arrangements with Major Anderson for reënforcing or supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my plan." *

Unlike Fox, Anderson was in no wise encouraged by the conversation.

"I have examined the point," wrote he, "alluded to by Captain Fox last night. A vessel lying there will be under the fire of thirteen guns from Fort Moultrie, and Captain Foster says that at the pan-coupé or immediately on its right,— the best place for her to land,— she would require, even at high tide, if drawing ten feet, a staging of forty feet. The department can decide what the chances will be of a safe debarkation and unloading at that point under these circumstances." †

The other point on which the President sought information revealed equally decisive features. It so happened that S. A. Hurlbut of Illinois (afterwards General), an intimate friend of Lincoln, was at the moment in Washington. This gentleman was of Charleston birth, four years a law student of the foremost citizen and jurist of South Carolina, James L. Petigru, and then in frequent correspondence with him. On March 21st the President called Mr. Hurlbut to him, and explaining that Mr. Seward insisted that there was a strong Union party in the South,— even in South Carolina,— asked him to go personally and ascertain the facts. Mr. Hurlbut telegraphed his sister in Charleston that he was coming on a visit, which, in the threatening aspect of affairs, he might not soon be able to repeat. He traveled as a private citizen, though purposely with some show of publicity. Public curiosity, however, centered itself upon his traveling companion, Colonel Ward H. Lamon, who, coming with an ostensible Government mission to examine some post-office matters, was looked upon as the real presidential messenger, was treated to a formal audience with the governor, and permitted to make a visit to Fort Sumter. While Lamon was hobnobbing with the young secessionists at the Charleston Hotel, Hurlbut, quartered at the house of his sister, and thus free from the inquisitive scrutiny of newspaper reporters, was quietly visiting and being visited by his former neighbors and friends,— politicians, lawyers, merchants, and representative citizens in various walks of life. Of greater value than all was his confidential interview with his former legal preceptor. Mr. Petigru was at that time the best lawyer in the South, and the strongest man in the State of South Carolina so far as character, ability, and purity went, and never surrendered nor disguised his Union convictions. Mr. Hurlbut was himself an able lawyer, a man of experience and force in politics, and a shrewd and sagacious judge of human nature. His mission remained entirely unsuspected; and after two days' sojourn, he returned to Washington and made a long written report to the President.

"By appointment," he writes, "I met Mr. Petigru at one P. M. and had a private conversation with him for more than two hours. I was at liberty to state to him that my object was to ascertain and report the actual state of feeling in the city and State. Our conversation was entirely free and confidential. He is now the only man in the city of Charleston who avowedly adheres to the Union. . . . From these sources I have no hesitation in reporting as unquestionable — that separate nationality is a fixed fact, that there is an unanimity of sentiment which is to my mind astonishing, that there is no attachment to the Union. . . . There is positively nothing to appeal to. The sentiment of national patriotism, always feeble in Carolina, has been extinguished and overridden by the acknowledged doctrine of the paramount allegiance to the State. False political economy diligently taught for years has now become an axiom, and merchants and business men believe, and act upon the belief, that great growth of trade and expansion of material prosperity will and must follow the establishment of a Southern republic. They expect a golden era, when Charleston shall be a great commercial emporium and control for the South, as New York does for the North." ‡

These visits to Charleston added two very important factors or known quantities to the problem from which the Cabinet, and chiefly the President, were to deduce the unknown. Very unexpectedly to the latter, and no doubt to all the former as well, a new light, of yet deeper influence, was now suddenly thrown upon the complicated question. The fate of Sumter had been under general discussion nearly three weeks. The Cabinet and the high military and naval officers had divided in opinion and separated into opposing camps. As always happens in such cases, suspicion and criticism of personal motives began to develop themselves, though, at this very beginning, as throughout his whole after-administration, they

* Fox, Official Report, Feb. 24th, 1865. "Chicago Tribune," Sept. 14th, 1865.

† Anderson to Adj. Gen., March 22d, 1861. War Records.

‡ Hurlbut to Lincoln, Report, March 27th, 1861. Unpublished MS.

were held in check by the generous faith and unvarying impartiality of the President. Hitherto the sole issue was the relief or abandonment of Sumter; but now, by an apparent change of advice and attitude on the part of General Scott, the fate of Fort Pickens was also drawn into discussion.

So far as is known, the loyalty and devotion of General Scott never wavered for an instant; but his proneness to mingle political with military considerations had already been twice manifested. The first was when in his memorial entitled "Views," etc., addressed to President Buchanan, October 29th, 1860, he suggested the formation of four new American Unions if the old should be dismembered. The second was more recent. On the day preceding Lincoln's inauguration, the General had written a letter to Seward. In this he advanced the opinion that the new President would have to choose one of four plans or policies: 1st. To adopt the Crittenden compromise, and change the Republican to a Union party; 2d. By closing or blockading rebel ports or collecting the duties on shipboard outside; 3d. Conquer the States by invading armies, which he deprecated; and 4th, Say to the seceded States: "Wayward sisters, depart in peace!"* It must be noted that between three of these alternatives he gives no intimation of preference. The letter was simply a sign of the prevailing political unrest, and therefore remained unnoticed by the President, to whom it was referred.

When Lincoln assumed the duties of government, Scott had among other things briefly pointed out the existing danger at Fort Pickens, and the President by his verbal order of March 5th, directing "all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places," had intended that that stronghold should be promptly reënforced. He made inquiries on this head four days later, and to his surprise found nothing yet done.† Hence he put his order in writing, and had it duly sent to the War Department for record March 11th, and once more gave special directions in regard to Pickens, assuming the omission had occurred through preoccupation about Sumter. Upon this reminder, Scott bestirred himself, and at his instance the war steamer *Mohawk* was dispatched March 12th, carrying a messenger with orders to Captain Vogdes to land his company at Fort Pickens and increase the garrison. Both President and Cabinet had since then considered that port disposed of for the moment.

On the evening of March 28th, the first State dinner was given by the new occupants of the Executive Mansion. Just before the hour of leave-taking, Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet into an adjoining room for an instant's consultation; and when they were alone, he informed them, with evident deep emotion, that General Scott had that day advised the evacuation of Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sumter. The General's recommendation is formulated as follows, in his written memorandum to the Secretary of War:

"It is doubtful, however, according to recent information from the South, whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession. It is known, indeed, that it would be charged to necessity, and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support of that view. Our Southern friends, however, are clear that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual. The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the ocean keys depends on entirely different principles, and should never be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that we should thereby recover the State to which they geographically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining the eight doubtful States."‡

A long pause of blank amazement followed the President's recital,§ broken at length by Blair in strong denunciation, not only of this advice, but of Scott's general course regarding Sumter. He charged that Scott was transcending his professional duties and "playing politician." Blair's gestures and remarks, moreover, were understood by those present as being aimed specially at Seward, whose peace policy he had, with his usual impulsive aggressiveness, freely criticised. Without any formal vote, there was a unanimous expression of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and under the President's request to meet in formal council next day, the Cabinet retired. That night Lincoln's eyes did not close in sleep.‖ It was apparent that the time had come when he must meet the nation's crisis. His judgment alone must guide, his sole will determine, his own lips utter the word that should save or lose the most precious inheritance of humanity, the last hope of free government on the earth. Only the imagination may picture that intense and weary vigil.

* Scott to Seward, March 3d, 1861. Scott, "Autobiography," Vol. II., pp. 625–628.

† Meigs, diary, March 31st, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Scott, memorandum, War Records.

§ Blair to Welles, May 17th, 1873. Welles, "Lincoln and Seward," p. 65.

‖ Meigs, diary. Unpublished MS.

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT?

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE REBEL GAME.

THE rebel conspirators were not unmindful of the great advantages they had hitherto derived from their complaints, their intrigues, their assumptions, their arrogant demands. No sooner was the provisional government organized at Montgomery than they appointed a new embassy of three commissioners to proceed to Washington and make the fourth effort to assist, protect, and if possible to establish the rebellion through a negotiation. They not only desired to avert a war, but, reasoning from the past, had a well-grounded faith that they would secure a peaceful acquiescence in their schemes. The commissioners were instructed to solicit a reception in their official character, and if that were refused, to accept an unofficial interview; to insist on the *de facto* and *de jure* independence of the Confederate States; but nevertheless to accede to a proposition to refer the subject of their mission to the United States Senate, or to withhold an answer until the Congress of the United States should assemble and pronounce a decision in the premises, provided the existing peaceful status were rigidly maintained.†

This modest programme was made necessary by the half-fledged condition of the rebellion: its personal jealousies were not yet hushed; its notions of State rights were not yet swallowed up in an imperious military dictatorship; above all, its military preparation consisted mainly of a self-sacrificing enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the two months' drill and battery-building at Charleston, Davis did not agree with Governor Pickens that the moment had come to storm Sumter. "Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible," wrote the rebel war secretary, but "thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted. . . . A failure would demoralize our people and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world as reckless and precipitate."‡ Therefore they made Beauregard a brigadier-general and sent him to command in the harbor of Charleston. Beauregard's professional inspection justified this prudence.

> If Sumter was properly garrisoned and armed [wrote he (March 6th)], it would be a perfect Gibraltar to anything but constant shelling night and day from the four points of the compass. As it is, the weakness of the garrison constitutes our greatest advantage, and we must for the present turn our attention to preventing it from being reënforced. This idea I am gradually and cautiously infusing into the minds of all here; but should we have to open our batteries upon it, I hope to be able to do so with all the advantages the condition of things here will permit. All that I ask is time for completing my batteries and preparing and organizing properly my command.§

The first of the three commissioners, Martin J. Crawford, arrived in Washington the day before Lincoln's inauguration. He would have nothing more to do with Buchanan, he wrote.

> His fears for his personal safety, the apprehensions for the security of his property, together with the cares of state and his advanced age, render him wholly disqualified for his present position. He is as incapable now of purpose as a child.‖

With the arrival of the second commissioner, John Forsyth, they prepared to begin operations upon the new Administration. It was comparatively easy to call into caucus the active or disguised secessionists who yet remained in the city. Wigfall, Mason, Hunter, and Breckinridge were still in the Senate; Virginia and the other border States had a number of sympathizing Congressmen in the House; Bell, Crittenden, and Douglas, though loyal, had no love for Lincoln, and could be approached with professions of peace; Seward, in order to gain information, had kept himself during the whole winter in relation with all parties, and had openly proclaimed that his policy was one of peace and conciliation.¶

The prospect of beginning negotiations seemed flattering; nevertheless, their first caucus over the inaugural agreed that "it was Lincoln's purpose at once to attempt the col-

† Toombs to commissioners, Feb. 27, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Walker to Pickens. War Records.

§ Beauregard to Walker. War Records.

‖ Crawford to Toombs, March 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Senate speech, Jan. 12, 1861. "Globe."

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lection of the revenue, to reënforce and hold Forts Sumter and Pickens, and to retake the other places."* A day or two later, on comparing the fragmentary gossip they had raked together, in which the difficulties of reënforcing Sumter were dimly reflected, with a general conversation alleged to have been held by one of their informants with Seward, they framed and reported to Montgomery a theory of probable success.

Seward, they thought, was to be the ruling power of the new Administration. Seward and Cameron were publicly committed to a peace policy. They would establish an understanding with the Secretary of State.

> This gentleman [they wrote] is urgent for delay. The tenor of his language is to this effect: I have built up the Republican party; I have brought it to triumph; but its advent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and perils. I must save the party and save the Government in its hands. To do this, war must be averted; the negro question must be dropped; the "irrepressible" conflict ignored; and a Union party to embrace the border slave-States inaugurated. I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own State. I must crush out Davis, Toombs, and their colleagues in sedition in their respective States. Saving the border States to the Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton-States, unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders and reconstruction will follow.

The commissioners therefore deemed it their duty to support Mr. Seward's policy. "Until we reach the point of pacific negotiations, it is unimportant what may be his subsequent hopes and plans. It is well that he should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized." They of course make no mention of the arguments, agencies, and influences which we may infer they employed in their deceitful intent to foster these dreams; unless, indeed, they were instrumental in provoking the Senate debate of March 6th and 7th, in which Clingman attacked the inaugural as an announcement of war, while Douglas defended it as a manifesto of peace, "for the purpose," as Mr. Forsyth wrote that Douglas told him, "of fixing that construction on it and of tomahawking it afterwards if it [the Administration] departed from it."†

Acting upon this assumed anxiety of Seward for delay and for peace, the commissioners now agreed upon what they elaborately described in a long dispatch to Montgomery as a most ingenious plan. They would force the Administration to accept or reject their mission, and thereby confront the immediate issue of peace or war, unless Seward would consent to maintain the present military status. Having reached this conclusion, they laboriously drew up a memorandum which they purposed to ask Seward to sign, and sent it to the State Department by an "agent," but Mr. Seward was at home ill, and could not be seen.

Their long dispatches home, and their mysterious allusions to conversations, to agents, and intermediaries, convey the impression that they were "in relation" with the Secretary of State; but whether they were duped by others, or whether they were themselves duping the Montgomery cabinet, indisputable indications in these documents contradict their assertions. At last, however, their vigilance was rewarded with what they considered an item of important news, and they hurried off several telegrams to Montgomery: "Things look better here than was believed."‡ "The impression prevails in Administration circles that Fort Sumter will be evacuated within ten days."‡ This was on Saturday night, March 9th, and so far from being exclusive or advance information, it was substantially printed in next morning's newspapers.§ After four days' consideration by the Lincoln government, and extended discussion in a Cabinet meeting, the loss of Sumter seemed unavoidable; and the rumor was purposely given out to prepare the public mind, if the need should finally come for the great sacrifice.

The Jefferson Davis cabinet at Montgomery clutched at the report with avidity. Under this hope they were no longer satisfied with the "existing peaceful status" specified in their instructions of February 27th, and repeated in the prepared memorandum of the commissioners. "Can't bind our hands a day without evacuation of Sumter and Pickens," replied Toombs imperatively by telegraph on Monday, March 11th.‖ Until Sumter should be evacuated it was idle to talk of peaceful negotiation, he added in his written dispatch to the commissioners, while they were further instructed to "pertinaciously demand" the withdrawal of the troops and vessels from Pickens and Pensacola.¶

Thus spurred into activity, the commissioners now deemed it incumbent on them to make an effort. The whole tenor of their previous dispatches was calculated to convey the impression that they were twisting the Secretary of State at pleasure between their diplomatic thumb and finger. On Monday, March 11th, they sent him their first message — not the demand of Toombs that day received by tel-

* L. Q. Washington to Walker. War Records.

† Forsyth to Toombs, March 8, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Commissioners to Toombs, March 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ "New York Herald," March 10, 1861.

‖ Toombs to commissioners, March 11, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Toombs to commissioners, March 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

egraph, not even the mild suggestion of their original instructions to maintain the status and appeal to Congress, but a meek inquiry whether they would be allowed to make a sort of back-door visit to the State Department. To describe it in their own words: "We availed ourselves of the kind consent of Senator Hunter of Virginia to see Mr. Seward, and learn if he would consent to an informal interview with us."* Mr. Seward of course received Senator Hunter politely, for he still professed to be a loyal senator representing a loyal State, and gave him the stereotyped diplomatic reply, that "he would be obliged to consult the President." The next morning Seward sent Hunter a note of irreproachable courtesy but of freezing conclusiveness. "It will not be in my power," he wrote, "to receive the gentlemen of whom we conversed yesterday. You will please explain to them that this decision proceeds solely on public grounds and not from any want of personal respect." †

This was a cold bath to the commissioners, and the theories of their own finesse, and of the torturing perplexities into which Seward had been thrown, became untenable.

> To-day at 11 o'clock [so runs their own report] Mr. Hunter brought us the promised reply, a copy of which is appended to this dispatch. It is polite; but it was considered by us at once as decisive of our course. We deemed it not compatible with the dignity of our Government to make a second effort, and took for granted that having failed in obtaining an unofficial interview with the Secretary of State, we should equally fail with the President. Our only remaining course was plain, and we followed it at once in the preparation of a formal note to the State Department informing the United States Government of our official presence here, the objects of our mission, and asking an early day to be appointed for an official interview.

They then repeat the gossip of the day — what Mr. Lincoln was said to have told a gentleman from Louisiana, that "there would be no war and that he was determined to keep the peace"; also what Crittenden told Crawford, "that General Scott was also for peace and would sustain Mr. Seward's policy." Finally, showing in what complete ignorance they were of events happening about them, they ask with bewildered curiosity, "Can it be that while they refuse to negotiate with us to keep the Republican party in heart, they mean to abandon both forts on military grounds and thus avoid the occasion of a collision, or do they mean to refer the questions raised by our note to the Senate? Time only can determine, and we await the result. We are still of the opinion that Fort Sumter will be evacuated. The opinion gains ground here that Lieutenant Slemmer and garrison will also be withdrawn from Fort Pickens." *

Toombs was ready to sue or bluster as occasion demanded.

> You have shown to the Government of the United States [he wrote back to the commissioners] with commendable promptness and becoming dignity that you were not supplicants for its grace and favor, and willing to loiter in the antechambers of officials to patiently await their answer to your petition; but that you are the envoys of a powerful confederacy of sovereignties, instructed to present and demand their rights.

Nevertheless, instead of recalling these neglected envoys, he instructs them to "communicate freely and often," and to employ a secretary to assist them, "at such monthly compensation as you may deem reasonable." ‡

The hint to remain was hardly necessary. The commissioners apparently had no idea of abandoning their intrigues, unpromising as they were.

Their secretary, John T. Pickett, now besieged the State Department for an answer to the commissioners' formal note. Seward replied (March 15th) in a lengthy and courteous but dignified memorandum that he did not perceive in the "Confederate States" a rightful and accomplished revolution or an independent nation; that he could not act on the assumption or in any way admit that they constituted a foreign power with which diplomatic relations ought to be established; that he had no authority, nor was he at liberty, to recognize the commissioners as diplomatic agents, or hold correspondence or other communication with them. §

This paper, if delivered, would have terminated the labors and functions of the commissioners. But they were in no hurry to return empty-handed to Montgomery, and still fondly nursed the theory so elaborately described in their long dispatches. One of them repeated it with emphasis in a private letter to a member of the Montgomery cabinet:

> We are feeling our way here cautiously. We are playing a game in which time is our best advocate, and if our Government could afford the time I feel confident of winning. There is a terrific fight in the Cabinet. Our policy is to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question. ‖

This dispatch is a frank confession that the rebel embassy was so far a complete failure,

* Commissioners to Toombs, March 12, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Seward to Hunter, March 12, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Toombs to commissioners, March 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Seward, memorandum. "Rebellion Record."

‖ Forsyth to Walker, March 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

and that its future opportunity lay solely in the barren regions of hotel gossip and newspaper rumors. The commissioners would have merited no further historical mention had they not unexpectedly secured a most important ally — John A. Campbell, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, appointed from Alabama, and therefore in the confidence and, as it soon turned out, in the secret interest of the South and the rebellion. Justice Campbell now made himself the voluntary intermediary between the commissioners and the Secretary of State. Owing to his station and his professions, Seward gave him undue intimacy and confidence, enabling Campbell, under guise of promoting peace, to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, in violation of his oath and duty. The details of the intrigue rest entirely upon rebel statements, and mainly upon those of Campbell himself, who gave both a confidential and a semi-official version to Jefferson Davis; the latter Davis transmitted in a special message to the Confederate Congress to "fire the Southern heart." Campbell having thus made his share of the transaction official, and having for a quarter of a century stood before the public accusing Seward and the Lincoln administration of "equivocating conduct" and "systematic duplicity," history must adjudge the question as well as it may with the help of his own testimony.

It has already been stated that Seward's official refusal to receive the commissioners was being prepared at the State Department. The Assistant Secretary had promised to send it to the commissioners' hotel. The commissioners thus relate the beginning of Campbell's intrigue:

> The interview between Colonel Pickett and the Assistant Secretary of State occurred on Friday morning the 14th* inst. Immediately thereafter, and within a brief space of time after Colonel Pickett's statement to us, the Hon. John A. Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, sought an interview with Mr. Crawford of this commission, and after stating what he knew to be the wish and desire of Mr. Seward to preserve the peace between the two Governments, asked if there could be no further delay for an answer to our note to the Government, stating at the same time that he had no doubt if it were pressed that a most positive though polite rejection would be the result. †

Commissioner Crawford's official reply to this overture is best described by Toombs's formula that he should "pertinaciously demand" the evacuation of Sumter and maintenance of the "status" elsewhere; the alternative and confidential reply we can only conjecture. But it may well be presumed that Campbell fully revealed to Crawford his sympathy with the rebellion and his purpose to aid it, and that he was in return thoroughly instructed in the game, which was "to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question."

Thus instructed and prepared, Justice Campbell on the same day (March 14th or 15th) made a voluntary call on Mr. Seward, and in the general conversation which he induced evidently played his part of the game of peace and reconciliation with consummate ability. He probably painted the "dreams which we know are not to be realized" in such rosy colors as to call forth from Seward the hopeful observation "that a civil war might be prevented by the success of my [Campbell's] mediation."‡ The impression upon Seward that Campbell was laboring honestly for the preservation of the Union was also strengthened by his having brought Justice Nelson with him, to whom the slightest suspicion of disloyalty has never attached. It seems clear that these professions of patriotic zeal threw Mr. Seward off his guard as to Campbell's motives, and that he accepted his intervention as a Union peacemaker, not as a rebel emissary.

Seward replied confidentially, "that it was impossible to receive the commissioners in any diplomatic capacity or character, or even to see them personally." Campbell adds that he said "it was not desirable to deny them or to answer them." § As part of a general policy of delay and avoidance of conflict he may have said and meant it: as an immediate and urgent diplomatic step he certainly did not mean it, because his Assistant Secretary had already promised to send the answer to the commissioners' hotel, when for mere temporary delay dozens of expedients might have been used. Continuing his conversation and unguardedly enlarging his confidence, Seward, in answer to Campbell's direct inquiry, ventured the opinion that Sumter would be evacuated and collision avoided at Charleston. The idea was not new; the rumor had been openly and half-officially printed in the newspapers nearly a whole week; the commissioners had telegraphed it to Montgomery. Campbell, however, caught eagerly at the suggestion, and proposed to write the peaceful news to Jefferson Davis; and Seward, with a momentary excess of enthusiasm, authorized him (so Campbell relates) to write: "Before this letter

* The almanac shows that Friday was the 15th. There is, therefore, an error either in the day of the week or day of the month.

‡ Campbell to Seward. "Rebellion Record."

† Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

reaches you Sumter will be evacuated, or the orders will have issued for that purpose — and no change is contemplated at present in respect to Pickens."* Campbell rushed off in a fever of delight to tell the commissioners, and magnified the confidence to the proportions of a pledge. The incident began to grow more rapidly than the story of the three black crows. The commissioners, on their part, hurried a telegram to Montgomery:

> By pressing we can get an answer to our official note to-morrow. If we do, we believe it will be adverse to recognition and peace. We are sure that within five days Sumter will be evacuated. We are sure that no steps will be taken to change the military status. With a few days' delay a favorable answer may be had. Our personal interests command us to press. Duty to our country commands us to wait. What shall we do ?†

To all of which Toombs answered laconically, "Wait a reasonable time and then ask for instructions."

It is needless to point out the absurd variance of this announcement with Seward's alleged statement, which was simply an opinion that orders would be issued to evacuate Sumter within five days. He undoubtedly believed every word of this at the moment. Seward was then, as he declared to Lincoln in writing, in favor of evacuation;‡ and Scott's written draft of an order to that effect, under date of the 11th, was in the President's hands. The President had as yet announced no decision. On the 15th, for the first time, the Cabinet voted — five to evacuate, two to attempt to supply. Seward still had every reason to suppose that the necessity, the Cabinet majority, General Scott's influence, and Lincoln's desire to avoid war would, acting together, verify his prediction. Presuming that he was talking to a friend and not an enemy, to a judge and not an advocate, to a Unionist and not a rebel, he undoubtedly and properly thought his words were received as a prediction, and not as a pledge.

The five days elapsed, but Lincoln sent no order to Anderson, and announced no decision to the Cabinet. He was still patiently seeking, and had not found his way out of the dilemma. He had not yet beheld "the salvation of the Lord." He was neither optimist nor pessimist. He wished to decide, not upon impulse or even necessity, but upon judgment and advantage. He was neither stubbornly headstrong nor cravenly submissive. If, like the farmer in his favorite illustration, he could not plow through the log, perhaps he might plow around it. He was meditating on the visit of Fox to Sumter, of Lamon and Hurlbut to Charleston; he was deliberating about a diversion upon the Virginia convention; above all, he was waiting to hear from his order to reënforce Pickens, dispatched on the 12th of March. His Cabinet ministers did not yet understand him. Seward on the one hand, and Blair on the other, unused to men of his fiber, began to fear this was vacillation, indecision, executive incompetence. The atmosphere of Washington had hitherto largely produced two classes of men — those who bluster and domineer, those who protest and yield. Lincoln belonged to neither class; and his persistent non-committal, his silent hopefulness, his patient and well-considered inaction, baffled their prophecy. Such tenacity of purpose, combined with such reticence of declaration, was an anomaly in recent Federal administration.

The hopes of the rebels, so unexpectedly inflated, began once more to collapse. Governor Pickens sent inquiries to the commissioners. Toombs telegraphed them, "We can't hear from you."§ Campbell was summoned and dispatched post-haste to the State Department. He had interviews on March 21st and 22d. But in reality Seward was no wiser than he had been in the previous interviews, and could only repeat his beliefs and his predictions, and declare, in his philosophic vein, that "governments could not move with bank accuracy."‖

For a third time the conspirators grew impatient, and again Campbell, on Saturday, March 30th, and Monday, April 1st, went to the State Department as the messenger of rebellion.¶ By this time Seward had real information. A second Cabinet vote had been taken, on March 29th, in which the majority was reversed. The President had ordered the preparation of the Sumter expedition; and Seward himself, though still advising the abandonment of Sumter, was personally preparing an expedition to reënforce Fort Pickens.

Seward at this point must have realized how injudicious he had been to give Campbell any confidence whatever, since to preserve secrecy for his own project he must abruptly break off the intimacy. Perhaps he had by this time divined that he was dealing with a public enemy. At all events, whatever may have been his reasons, he took occasion to correct any misunderstanding which might previously have sprung up by giving Campbell a written mem-

* Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Commissioners to Toombs, March 15, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Seward to Lincoln, March 15, 1861. Opinion on Sumter.

§ Toombs to commissioners, March 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‖ Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

¶ Campbell to Seward. "Rebellion Record."

orandum (April 1st), as follows: "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens"; adding verbally (Campbell says) that he still did not believe the attempt would be made, and that there was no design to reënforce Sumter. Campbell acknowledges that he took notice of this very important correction and definition. "There was a departure here from the pledges of the previous month," he writes; "but with the verbal explanation I did not consider it a matter then to complain of."*

The commissioners and their game here drop into the background, and Mr. Justice Campbell takes up the rôle of leading conspirator. History will ask, Of what had this high minister of the law any right to complain? Two days afterward we find him making a confidential report to the insurrectionary chief at Montgomery, as follows:

I do not doubt that Sumter will be evacuated shortly, without any effort to supply it; but in respect to Pickens I do not think there is any settled plan, and it will not be abandoned spontaneously, and under any generous policy, though perhaps they may be quite willing to let it be beleaguered and reduced to extremities. I can only infer as to this. All that I have is a promise that the status will not be attempted to be changed prejudicially to the Confederate States without notice to me. It is known that I make these assurances on *my own responsibility*. I have no right to mention any name or to pledge any person. I am the only responsible person to you, I consenting to accept such assurances as are made to me and to say, "I have confidence that this will or will not be done." I have no expectation that there will be bad faith in the dealings with me.

Now I do not see that I can do more. I have felt them in a variety of forms as to the practicability of some armistice or truce that should be durable and would relieve the anxiety of the country. But at present there can be no compact, treaty, recognition of any kind. There will be no objection to giving the commissioners their answer; but if the answer is not called for it will not be sent, and it is intimated that it would be more agreeable to withhold it. So far as I can judge, the present desire is to let things remain as they are, without action of any kind. There is a strong indisposition for the call of Congress, and it will not be done except under necessity. The radicals of the Senate went off in anger, and Trumbull's coercion resolution was offered after a contumelious interview with the President. My own notion is that the inactive policy is as favorable to you as any that this Administration could adopt for you, and that I would not interrupt it.

Here the learned judge might have stopped, and perhaps would have left posterity to question his method rather than his motives. But inexorable History demanded her tribute of truth: under her master-spell he went on, and in the concluding paragraph of the letter his own hand recorded a confession little to have been expected from an officer whose duty it was to expound and to administer the law of treason as written in the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress.

The great want [he continued] of the Confederate States is peace. I shall remain here some ten or fifteen days. My own future course is in some manner depending upon circumstances and the opinions of friends. At present I have access to the Administration I could not have except under my present relations to the Government, and I do not know who could have the same freedom. I have therefore deferred any settlement on the subject until the chance of being of service at this critical period has terminated. This letter is strictly confidential and private. †

There is no need of comment on this "aid and comfort" to the enemies of his Government by a member of the highest court of the United States. It only remains to note the acknowledgment and estimate of it by Jefferson Davis, replying from Montgomery under date of April 6th:

Accept my thanks for your kind and valuable services to the cause of the Confederacy and of peace between those who, though separated, have many reasons to feel towards each other more than the friendships common among nations. Our policy is, as you say, peace. . . . In any event I will gratefully remember your zealous labor in a sacred cause, and hope your fellow-citizens may at some time give you acceptable recognition of your service, and appreciate the heroism with which you have encountered a hazard from which most men would have shrunk. ‡

While this direct correspondence between Davis and Campbell was being carried on, the commissioners, to whom Mr. A. B. Roman had been sent as a reënforcement, were, partly as a matter of form, partly for ulterior purposes, kept in Washington by the Montgomery cabinet to "loiter in the ante-chambers of officials." The occupation seems to have grown irksome to them; for, nowise deceived or even encouraged by Campbell's pretended "pledges," they asked, under date of March 26th, "whether we shall dally longer with a Government hesitating and doubting as to its own course, or shall we demand our answer at once?" § On April 2d, Toombs gave them Jefferson Davis's views at length. He thought the policy of Mr. Seward would prevail. He cared nothing for Seward's motives or calculations. So long as the United States neither declare war nor establish peace, "it affords the Confederate States the advantages of both conditions, and enables them to make all the necessary arrangements for the public defense, and the solidifying of their Government, more safely, cheaply, and expeditiously than they could were the attitude of the United States more definite and decided." ‖ The commis-

* Campbell to Seward. "Rebellion Record."

† Campbell to Jefferson Davis, April 3, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Jefferson Davis to Campbell, April 6, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Commissioners to Toombs, March 26, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‖ Toombs to commissioners, April 2, 1861. Unpublished MS.



A. B. ROMAN, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

sioners were therefore to make no demand for their answer, but maintain their present position. In view of this confident boast of the chief of the rebellion of "the advantages of both conditions," his subsequent accusation of bad faith on the part of the Lincoln administration is culminating proof of the insincerity and tortuous methods of the rebel game.

VIRGINIA.

CIVIL war, though possible, did not at the moment seem imminent or necessary: Lincoln had declared in his inaugural that he would not begin it; Jefferson Davis had written in his instructions to the commissioners that he did not desire it. This threw the immediate contest back upon the secondary question — the control and adhesion of the border slave-States; and of these Virginia was the chief subject of solicitude. The condition of Virginia had become anomalous; it was little understood by the North, and still less by her own citizens. She retained all the ideal sentiment growing out of her early devotion to and sacrifices for the Union; but it was warped by her coarser and stronger material interest in slavery. She still deemed she was the mother of presidents; whereas she had degenerated into being, like other border States, the mother of slave-breeders and of an annual crop of black-skinned human chattels to be sold to the cotton, rice, and sugar planters of her neighboring commonwealths. She thought herself the leader of the South; whereas she was only a dependent of the Gulf States. She yet believed herself the teacher of original statesmanship; whereas she had become the unreasoning follower of Calhoun's disciples — the Ruffins, the Rhetts, and the Yanceys of the ultra South.

The political demoralization of Virginia was completed by the John Brown raid. From that time she dragged her anchors of state; her faith in both constitution and liberty was gone. The true lesson of that affair was indeed the very reverse. The overwhelming popular sentiment of the North denounced the outrage; the national arms defended Virginia and suppressed the invasion; the State vindicated her local authority by hanging the captured offenders. Thus public opinion, Federal power, and State right united in a precedent amounting of itself to an absolute guaranty, but which might have been easily crystallized into statute or even constitutional law. Sagacious statesmanship would have plucked this flower of safety. On the contrary, her blind partisanship spurned the opportunity, distrusted government, and sought refuge in force. Her then governor confesses that from that period

> we began to prepare for the worst. We looked carefully to the State armory; and whilst we had the selection of the State quota of arms we were particular to take field ordnance instead of altered muskets; and when we left the gubernatorial chair, there were in the State armory at Richmond 85,000 stand of infantry arms and 130 field-pieces of artillery, besides $30,000 worth of new revolving arms purchased from Colt. Our decided opinion was that a preparation of the Southern States in full panoply of arms, and prompt action, would have prevented civil war.*

* Wise, "Seven Decades."



JOHN FORSYTH, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)



MARTIN J. CRAWFORD, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Many strong external signs indicated the persistent adherence of Virginia to the Union. Her legislature refused the proposition of South Carolina for a conference of the Southern States, made in the winter of 1859–60. In the presidential election her citizens voted overwhelmingly for Bell and Everett and their platform of "The Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." Notwithstanding these manifestations of allegiance, public sentiment took on a tone and a determination which, paradoxical as it may seem, was rebellion in guise of loyalty. It is perhaps best illustrated by the declaration of ex-Governor Wise that he meant to fight in the Union,* not out of it. To the nation at large the phrase had a pretty and patriotic sound; but when explained to be a determination to fight the Federal Government "in the Union," it becomes as rank treason as secession itself.

However counterfeit logic or mental reservations concealed it, the underlying feeling was to fight, no matter whom, and little matter how, for the protection of slavery and slave property. In this spirit Virginia continued her military preparations. To this end half a million dollars were voted in the winter of 1859–60, and a million more in that of 1860–61. Commissioners were appointed to purchase arms; companies were raised, officers appointed, regiments organized, camps of instruction formed. It was one of these that Floyd sent Hardee to inspect and drill in November, 1860. Before the end of January, this appeal to military strength by Virginia was duly paraded in the United States Senate as a menace, to extort a compromise and constitutional guarantees for slavery. Nor did the threat seem an empty one. The State professed to have an actual army of 62 troops of cavalry, numbering 2547 men; 14 companies of artillery, numbering 820 men; and 149 companies of infantry, numbering 7180 men. All these were uniformed and armed; while 6000 men additional were formed into companies, ready to have arms put into their hands.†

Governor Letcher, the successor of Wise, had begun his administration with the announced belief that disunion was "not only a possible but a highly probable event."‡ The defeat of his favorite, Douglas, and the success of Lincoln, served therefore as a pretended justification of his fears, if not an actual stimulant of his hopes. The presidential election was scarcely over when he called an extra session of the legislature, to "take into consideration the condition of public affairs" consequent on the excitement produced by "the election of sectional candidates for President and Vice-President."‖ That body met January 7, 1861; the doctrine of non-coercion, South Carolina secession, and the Fort Sumter affair had become every-day topics, and the South generally was in a seething ferment. On Federal affairs Governor Letcher's message was a medley of heterogeneous and contradictory arguments and recommendations. He declared a disruption of the Union inevitable. He desired a national convention. He thought that four republics might be formed. He scolded South Carolina for her precipitate action. He joined a correct and a false quotation of Lincoln's sentiments. He opposed a State convention. He recommended sending commissioners to other slave-States. He proposed terms to the North, and thought they

* "As to parting from the Union in my affections, I shall never do that. As to leaving its flag, whenever I leave this confederacy, this north star confederacy, which makes the needle tremble northward, sir, I shall carry the old flag of the Union out with me; and if ever I have to fight,— so help me, God! — I will fight with the star-spangled banner still in one hand and my musket in the other. I will never take any Southern cross or any palmetto for my flag. I will never admit that a Yankee can drive me from the Union and take from me our capital. I will take from him forts; I will take from him flags; I will take from him our capital; I will take from him, if I can, my whole country, and save the whole. Will that satisfy the gentleman as to fighting in the Union?" [Speech of H. A. Wise in the Virginia Convention, April 10, 1861. "Richmond Enquirer."]

† Report Adj.-General of Virginia, Feb. 27, 1861.

‡ Inaugural message, Jan. 7, 1860.

‖ Governor Letcher, proclamation, Nov. 15, 1860.

would be "freely, cheerfully, and promptly assented to." He said, "Let the New England States and western New York be sloughed off." He wanted railroads to Kansas and direct trade to Europe. And finally he summed up: "Events crowd upon each other with astonishing rapidity. The scenes of to-day are dissolved by the developments of to-morrow. The opinions now entertained may be totally revolutionized by unforeseen and unanticipated occurrences that an hour or a day may bring forth." The simple truth was, that in Governor Letcher's hands the "Old Dominion" was adrift towards rebellion without rudder or compass.

His quarrel with South Carolina turned upon an important point. The irascible Palmetto State was offended that Virginia had a year before rejected her proposal for a Southern conference. In retaliation she now intimated that she would help to destroy Virginia's slave-market. "The introduction of slaves from other States," said her governor, "which may not become members of the Southern Confederacy, and particularly the border States, should be prohibited by legislative enactment, and by this means they will be brought to see that their safety depends upon a withdrawal from their enemies, and a union with their friends and natural allies."* Mississippi made a similar threat. "As it is more than probable," said her executive, "that many of the citizens of the border States may seek a market for their slaves in the cotton-States, I recommend the passage of an act prohibiting the introduction of slaves into this State unless their owners come with them and become citizens, and prohibiting the introduction of slaves for sale by all persons whomsoever." Governor Letcher grew very indignant over these declarations. "These references to the border States," said he, "are pregnant with meaning, and no one can be at a loss to understand what that meaning is. While disavowing any unkind feeling towards South Carolina and Mississippi, I must still say that I will resist the coercion of Virginia into the adoption of a line of policy whenever the attempt is made by Northern or Southern States."†

Incensed against the North and distrustful of the South, the governor pushed forward his military preparations. Especially did he cast a longing eye at Fort Monroe. "As far back as January 8th" (1861), says he, "I consulted with a gentleman whose position enabled him to know the strength of that fortress, and whose experience in military matters enabled him to form an opinion as to the number of men that would be required to capture it. He represented it to be one of the strongest fortifications in the world, and expressed his doubts whether it could be taken unless assailed by water as well as by land, and simultaneously."‡ Since Governor Letcher had neither a fleet nor a properly equipped army, he did not follow up this design. The discussion of the project, however, illustrates the condition of his allegiance to the flag of his country and the constitution he was then under oath to uphold.

Like the governor, the legislature at once put itself in an attitude of quasi-rebellion by resolving, on the second day of the session, that it would resist any attempt of the Federal Government to coerce a seceding State. It soon passed an act to assemble a convention; and by a large appropriation for defense, already mentioned, by issuing treasury notes,

JOHN LETCHER, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY A. A. TURNER.)

by amending the militia laws, and by authorizing counties to borrow money to purchase arms, and especially by its debates, further fostered and stimulated the prevailing secession undertow during the whole of its extra session, from January 7th to April 4th.

The election for a convention was held February 4th, and provoked a stirring contest. Its result was apparently for union; the Union members claimed a majority of three to one. This was, however, evidently an exaggerated estimate. The precise result could not be well defined. Politics had become a Babel. Discussion was a mere confusion of tongues.

* Governor Gist, message.
† Governor Letcher, message, Jan. 7, 1861.
‡ Governor Letcher, message, Dec. 2, 1861.

Party organization was swallowed up in intrigue; and conspiracy, not constitutional majorities, became the basis and impulse of legislation.

The Virginia convention met February 13th, and its proceedings reflect a maze of loose declamation and purposeless resolves. It had no fixed mind, and could, therefore, form no permanent conclusion. The prevailing idea of the majority seemed to be expressed in a single phrase of one of its members, that "he would neither be driven by the North nor dragged by the cotton-States." It was virtually a mere committee of observation, waiting the turn of political winds and tides. It gave, however, two encouraging though negative signs of promise; the first, that it had undoubtedly been chosen by a majority of voters really attached to the Union and desiring to remain in it; the second, that during a session of well-nigh a month it had not as yet passed an ordinance of secession, which had so far been a quick result in other State conventions.

As said at the beginning of this chapter, the course of the border States, and especially of Virginia, was on all hands the subject of chief solicitude. Her coöperation was absolutely essential to the secession government at Montgomery. This point, though not proclaimed was understood by Jefferson Davis, and to powerful intrigues from that quarter many otherwise unaccountable movements may doubtless be ascribed. Neither was her adherence to the Union undervalued by Lincoln. Seward was deeply impressed both with the necessity and the possibility of saving her from secession "as a brand from the burning." He relied (too confidently, as the event proved) on the significance of the late popular vote. He sent an agent to Richmond, who brought him hopeful news. He had already proposed to strengthen the hands of the Virginia Unionists by advising Lincoln to nominate George W. Summers to fill the existing vacancy on the bench of the United States Supreme Court.* Under his prompting, no doubt, Lincoln now perhaps thought it possible to bring his personal influence to bear on the Virginia convention. He authorized Seward to invite Summers, or some equally influential and determined Union leader, to come to Washington. It is not likely that he had any great faith in such an effort; for the refusal or neglect of Scott, Gilmer, and Hunt to accept a cabinet appointment, offered each of them with more or less distinctness, had proved that Southern Unionism of this type was mere lip-service and not a living principle. It so turned



JOHN MINOR BOTTS.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

out in this instance. Summers, pleading important business in the convention, excused himself from coming. It would appear, however, that he and others selected one John B. Baldwin as a proper representative, who came to Washington and had an interview with the President on the morning of April 4, 1861. There is a direct conflict of evidence as to what occurred at this interview. The witnesses are Mr. Baldwin himself and Mr. John Minor Botts, both of whom gave their testimony under oath before the Reconstruction Committee of Congress in 1866, after the close of the war.

Mr. Botts testifies that on the 7th of April he called upon the President, who related to him, in confidence, that a week or ten days previously he had written to Summers to come to Washington, and he, instead of obeying the summons, had, after that long delay, sent Baldwin. On Baldwin's arrival (on the 5th of April, as Botts relates the story) Lincoln took him into a private room in the Executive Mansion, and said to him in substance:

> Mr. Baldwin, why did you not come here sooner? I have been waiting and expecting some of you gentlemen of that convention to come to me for more than a week past. I had a most important proposition to make to you. But I am afraid you have come too late. However, I will make the proposition now. We have in Fort Sumter, with Major Anderson, about eighty men. Their provisions are nearly exhausted. I have not only written to Governor Pickens, but I have sent a special messenger† to him to say that I will not permit these

* Seward to Lincoln, March 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† This messenger was not sent until the evening of April 6th.

people to starve; that I shall send them provisions. If he fires on that vessel, he will fire upon an unarmed vessel loaded with bread. But I shall at the same time send a fleet along with her, with instructions not to enter the harbor of Charleston unless that vessel is fired into; and if she is, then the fleet is to enter the harbor and protect her. Now, Mr. Baldwin, that fleet is now lying in the harbor of New York, and will be ready to sail this afternoon at 5 o'clock; and although I fear it is almost too late, yet I will submit the proposition which I intended when I sent for Mr. Summers. Your convention in Richmond has been sitting now nearly two months, and all that they have done has been to shake the rod over my head. You have recently taken a vote in the Virginia convention on the right of secession, which was rejected by ninety to forty-five, a majority of two-thirds, showing the strength of the Union party in that convention. If you will go back to Richmond, and get that Union majority to adjourn and go home without passing the ordinance of secession, so anxious am I for the preservation of the peace of this country, and to save Virginia and the other border States from going out, that I will take the responsibility of evacuating Fort Sumter, and take the chance of negotiating with the cotton-States.

Mr. Botts here asked how Baldwin received that proposition.

Sir [replied Lincoln, with a gesture of impatience], he would not listen to it for a moment; he hardly treated me with civility. He asked me what I meant by an adjournment; did I mean an adjournment *sine die?* Why, of course, Mr. Baldwin, said I. I mean an adjournment *sine die*. I do not mean to assume such a responsibility as that of surrendering that fort to the people of Charleston upon your adjournment, and then for you to return in a week or ten days and pass your ordinance of secession.

Mr. Botts then relates that he asked permission of the President to go himself and submit that proposition to the Union members of the convention, but that Lincoln replied it was too late, the fleet had sailed. Further, that Baldwin returned to Richmond without even disclosing the President's offer; and that he eventually became an active secessionist, and held a commission in the rebel army.*

On the material point Baldwin's testimony is directly to the contrary. He states that Seward's messenger reached Richmond April 3d; that at the request of Summers he immediately returned with him to Washington and called on the President on the morning of April 4th; that Lincoln took him into a private room and said, in substance: "I am afraid you have come too late; I wish you could have been here three or four days ago. Why do you not adjourn the Virginia convention?" "Adjourn it how?" asked Baldwin. "Do you mean *sine die?*" "Yes," said Lincoln; "*sine die*. Why do you not adjourn it? It is a standing menace to me which embarrasses me very much."

Baldwin then relates how he made a grandiloquent speech to the President about the balance of power, the safeguards of the Constitution, and the self-respect of the convention; that the Union members had a clear majority of nearly three to one; they were controlling it for conservative results, and desired to have their hands upheld by a conciliatory policy; that if he had the control of the President's thumb and finger for five minutes he could settle the whole question. He would issue a proclamation, call a national convention, and withdraw the forces from Sumter and Pickens. But Mr. Baldwin declares and reiterates that he received from Mr. Lincoln "no pledge, no undertaking, no offer, no promise of any sort." "I am as clear in my recollections," he says, "as it is possible to be under the circumstances, that he made no such suggestion as I understood it, and said nothing from which I could infer it." †‡

A careful analysis and comparison with established data show many discrepancies and errors in the testimony of both these witnesses. Making due allowances for the ordinary defects of memory, and especially for the strong personal and political bias and prejudice under which they both received their impressions, the substantial truth probably lies midway between their extreme contradictory statements. The actual occurrence may therefore be summed up about as follows:

Mr. Seward had an abiding faith in the Unionism and latent loyalty of Virginia and the border States. He wished by conciliation to re-awaken and build it up; and thereby not merely retain these States, but make them the instruments, and this feeling the agency, to undermine rebellion and finally reclaim the cotton-States. Lincoln did not fully share this optimism; nevertheless he desired to avoid actual conflict, and was willing to make any experimental concession which would not involve the actual loss or abandonment of military or political advantage. The acts of the previous Administration had placed Fort Sumter in a peril from which, so the military authorities declared, he could not extricate it. His Cabinet advised its evacuation. Public opinion would justify him in sacrificing the fort to save the garrison. He had ordered Fort Pickens reënforced; he was daily awaiting news of the execution of his announced policy to "hold, occupy, and possess" the Government posts. Pickens once triumphantly secured, the

* Testimony of John Minor Botts. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st sess. 39th Cong.

† Testimony of John B. Baldwin. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st sess. 39th Cong.

‡ The article "A Piece of Secret History," in the "Atlantic Monthly" for April, 1875, contains only the substance of Baldwin's testimony before the Reconstruction Committee.

loss of Sumter could be borne. But might not the loss of Sumter be compensated? Might he not utilize that severe necessity, and make it the lever to procure the adjournment of the Virginia convention, which, to use his own figure, was daily shaking the rod over his head? This we may assume was his reasoning and purpose when about March 20th, either directly or through Seward, he invited Summers, the acknowledged leader of the Union members of the convention, to Washington.

Summers, however, hesitated, delayed, and finally refused to come. His plea of business was evidently a pretext, not a valid excuse. Meanwhile things had changed. The anxiously-looked-for news of the reënforcement of Fort Pickens did not arrive. The Cabinet once more voted, and changed its advice. The President ordered the preparation of the Sumter expedition. A second expedition to Fort Pickens had been begun. Another perplexing complication, to be hereafter mentioned, had occurred. At this juncture Baldwin made his appearance, but clearly he had come too late. By this time (April 4, 1861) his presence was an embarrassment, and not a relief. Fully to inform him of the situation was hazardous, impossible; to send him back without explanation was impolite and would give alarm at Richmond. Lincoln therefore opened conversation with him, manifesting sufficient personal trust to explain what he intended to have told Summers. This called forth Baldwin's dogmatic and dictatorial rejoinder, from which Lincoln discovered two things: first, that Baldwin was only an embryo secessionist; and, second, that the Virginia convention was little else than a warming-pan for the rebellion. Hence the abrupt termination of the interview, and the unexplained silence at Richmond.

PREMIER OR PRESIDENT?

At noon on the 29th of March the Cabinet assembled and once more took up the all-absorbing question of Sumter. All the elements of the problem were now before them—Anderson's condition and the prospects of relief as newly reported by Fox; the state of public opinion in Charleston as described by Hurlbut; the Attorney-General's presentation of the legal aspects of an attempt at collecting the customs on shipboard; the Secretary of the Treasury's statement of the condition and resources of the revenue service; the report of the Secretary of the Navy as to what ships of war he could supply to blockade the port of Charleston; and, finally, the unexpected attitude of General Scott in advising the evacuation of Fort Pickens. All these features called out so much and such varied discussion, that at length the Attorney-General, taking up a pen, rapidly wrote on a slip of paper a short summing-up of his own conclusions. This he read aloud to the President, who thereupon asked the other members of the Cabinet to do the same.* They all complied, and we have therefore the exact record of the matured opinions of the Cabinet members then present. The importance of the occasion renders these memoranda of enduring interest. Placed in their order they read as follows:

By Mr. Seward:

First. The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reënforce Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve a war at that point.

The fact of preparation for such an expedition would inevitably transpire and would therefore precipitate the war — and probably defeat the object. I do not think it wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and in rescue of an untenable position.

Therefore I advise against the expedition in every view.

Second. I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. Aided by his counsel I would at once and at every cost prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to be taken, however, only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and authority of the United States.

Third. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from Sumter forthwith. †

By Mr. Chase:

If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain possession of Fort Pickens.

I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens, and just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter.

If that attempt be resisted by military force Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reënforced.

If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be best begun in consequence of military resistance to the efforts of the Administration to sustain troops of the Union stationed, under the authority of the Government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service. ‡

By Mr. Welles:

I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off Charleston, with supplies of provisions and reënforcements for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communicating at the proper time the intentions of the Government to provision the fort, peaceably if unmolested. There is little probability that this will be permitted, if the opposing forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in provisions without reënforcing the garrison at the same time might not be advisable; but armed resistance to a peaceable attempt to send provisions to one of our own forts will justify the Government in using all the power at its command to reënforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies.

Fort Pickens and other places retained should be strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made impregnable.

The naval force in the Gulf and on the Southern coast should be increased. Accounts are published that vessels having on board marketable products for the

* Bates, diary. Unpublished MS.
† Seward, memorandum. Unpublished MS.
‡ Chase, memorandum. Unpublished MS.

crews of the squadron at Pensacola are seized — the inhabitants we know are prohibited from furnishing the ships with provisions or water; and the time has arrived when it is the duty of the Government to assert and maintain its authority.*

By Mr. Smith:

Viewing the question whether Fort Sumter shall be evacuated as a political one, I remark that the effect of its evacuation upon the public mind will depend upon the concurrent and subsequent action of the Government. If it shall be understood that by its evacuation we intend to acknowledge our inability to enforce the laws, and our intention to allow treason and rebellion to run its course, the measure will be extremely disastrous and the Administration will become very unpopular. If, however, the country can be made to understand that the fort is abandoned from necessity, and at the same time Fort Pickens and other forts in our possession shall be defended, and the power of the Government vindicated, the measure will be popular and the country will sustain the Administration.

Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be defended, I regard its evacuation as a necessity, and I advise that Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally withdrawn.

At the same time I would adopt the most vigorous measures for the defense of the other forts, and if we have the power I would blockade the Southern ports, and enforce the collection of the revenue with all the power of the Government. †

By Mr. Blair:

First. As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in his judgment on the questions of the day. His political views control his judgment, and his course as remarked on by the President shows that, whilst no one will question his patriotism, the results are the same as if he was in fact traitorous.

Second. It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely delivered from the authority of the United States it will strike a blow against our authority from which it will take years of bloody strife to recover.

Third. For my own part, I am unwilling to share in the responsibility of such a policy. ‡

By Mr. Bates:

It is my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key West ought to be reënforced and supplied, so as to look down opposition at all hazards — and this whether Fort Sumter be or be not evacuated.

It is also my opinion that there ought to be a naval force kept upon the Southern coast sufficient to command it, and if need be actually close any port that practically ought to be closed, whatever other station is left unoccupied.

It is also my opinion that there ought to be immediately established a line of light, fast-running vessels, to pass as rapidly as possible between New York or Norfolk at the North and Key West or other point in the Gulf at the South.

As to Fort Sumter — I think the time is come either to evacuate or relieve it. §

The majority opinion of the Cabinet on the 15th of March had been against the expediency of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter; but now, after a lapse of two weeks, the feeling was changed in favor of the proposed measure. Irrespective of this fresh advice, however, the President's own opinion was already made up. On the day previous he had instructed Captain Fox to prepare him a short order for the ships, men, and supplies he would need for his expedition, || and that officer complied with characteristic and promising brevity:

Steamers *Pocahontas* at Norfolk, *Pawnee* at Washington, *Harriet Lane* at New York, to be under sailing orders for sea, with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred men to be kept ready for departure from on board the receiving ships at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to leave Governor's Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for one hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant shipping. A large steamer and three tugs conditionally engaged. ¶

The Cabinet meeting over, the President wrote at the bottom of this preliminary requisition the following order to the Secretary of War: "Sir: I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached, and that you coöperate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object." ** This order and its duplicate to the Secretary of the Navy †† duly signed and transmitted to the two departments, Captain Fox hurried away to New York to superintend the further details of preparation in person.

It will be observed that the President's order is simply to prepare the expedition; "which expedition," in his own language, was "intended to be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances." ‡‡ But he was by this time convinced that the necessity would arise. Nothing had yet been heard from the order to reënforce Fort Pickens sent two weeks previously; on the contrary, there were rumors through the Southern newspapers that the *Brooklyn*, containing the troops, had left her anchorage off Pensacola and gone to Key West. As a matter of fact, she had first transferred her troops to the *Sabine;* but this was not and could not be known, and the necessary inference was that the *Brooklyn* had carried them away with her. The direction to land them would therefore unavoidably fail, and both Sumter and Pickens be thus left

* Welles, memorandum. Unpublished MS.
† Smith, memorandum. Unpublished MS.
‡ Blair, memorandum. Unpublished MS.
§ Bates, memorandum. Unpublished MS.
|| Fox to Lincoln, March 28, 1861. MS.
¶ Fox, memorandum. War Records.

** Lincoln to Secretary of War, March 29, 1861. War Records.
†† Lincoln to Secretary of Navy, March 29, 1861. "Galaxy," Nov., 1870.
‡‡ Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.

within the grasp of the secessionists. Such was the contingency which had decided the President to prepare the Sumter expedition.*

The logic of daily events had by this time also wrought a change in the mind of Seward. In his written opinion of March 15th he had declared, "I would not provoke war in any way now"; but on the 29th, apparently alarmed, like the rest, at the advice of General Scott to make further concession to the rebels, he wrote, "I would at once, and at every cost, prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas." That very afternoon, as he had suggested in this same paper, he brought Captain M. C. Meigs, the engineer officer in charge of the work on the new wings of the Capitol building, to the President. One reason for selecting him, in addition to his special training and acknowledged merit, was that he had in January personally accompanied the reënforcements then sent to Key West and Tortugas. On the way to and from the President's, Seward explained to Meigs that he wished the President to see some military man who would not talk politics; that they had Scott and Totten, but no one would think of putting either of those old men on horseback. They were in a difficulty. Scott had advised giving up both Sumter and Pickens. For his part, his policy had been to give up Sumter; but he wished to hold Pickens, making the fight there and in Texas, throwing the burden of the war, which all men of sense saw must come, upon those who, by revolting, had provoked it.†

The President talked freely with Captain Meigs, and after some inquiries about Sumter asked him whether Fort Pickens could be held. Meigs replied, "Certainly, if the navy would do its duty." The President then asked him whether he could go down there again and take general command of those three great fortresses, Taylor, Jefferson, and Pickens, and keep them safe. Meigs answered that he was only a captain, and could not command the majors who were there. Here Seward broke in with: "I understand how that is; Captain Meigs must be promoted." "But there is no vacancy," answered the modest captain. Mr. Seward, however, made light of all difficulties, and told the President if he wanted this thing done to put it in Meigs's charge. When Pitt wished to conquer Canada, he said, he sent for a young man whom he had noticed in the society of London, and told him to take Quebec,—to ask for the necessary means and do it,—and it was done. Would the President do this now? Lincoln replied he would consider it, and let him know in a day or two.

Two days afterward (Sunday, March 31st) Meigs was about starting for church when Colonel Keyes, General Scott's military secretary, called and took him to Mr. Seward, who requested them to go forthwith and in consultation with General Scott to put upon paper an estimate and project for relieving and holding Fort Pickens, and to bring it to the President before 4 o'clock that afternoon. The two officers went directly to the engineer's bureau to inspect the necessary charts of Pensacola Harbor and drawings of the fortifications, and over these they matured their plans. The rapid lapse of the few hours allowed compelled them to report back to the President before seeing General Scott. Lincoln heard them read their paper, and then directed them to submit it to the general. "Tell him," said he, "that I wish this thing done, and not to let it fail unless he can show that I have refused him something he asked for as necessary."† The officers obeyed, and on the way encountered Mr. Seward, who went with them. "General Scott," said he, on entering the old soldier's presence, "you have formally reported to the President your advice to evacuate Fort Pickens; notwithstanding this, I now come to bring you his order, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, to reënforce and hold it to the last extremity." The old general had his political crotchets, but he was at heart a soldier and a disciplinarian. "Sir," replied he, drawing himself up to his full height, "the great Frederick used to say, 'When the king commands, all things are possible.' It shall be done." Meigs and Keyes submitted their plan, which he approved in the main, adding a few details they had in their haste overlooked; the project was further discussed and definitely adopted.

Fort Pickens stands on the western extremity of Santa Rosa Island, and serves, in connection with its twin fort, McRae, on the mainland opposite, to guard the entrance to Pensacola Harbor. But in this case the two forts intended to render mutual assistance were held by opposing forces, bent not upon protecting but upon destroying each other, and restrained only by the existence of the "Sumter and Pickens truce," described in a previous chapter. So far as a mere cannonade might go, Pickens was perhaps as strong as McRae; but Lieutenant Slemmer in Pickens had only a handful of Union men, forty-six soldiers and thirty ordinary seamen all told, while some thousands of rebels were either encamped on within reach of the secession General Bragg himself a trained and skillful soldier. The chief danger was that Bragg might organize a large

* Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.
† Meigs, diary. Unpublished MS.

body of men, and by means of boats, crossing the bay at night or in a fog, carry Fort Pickens by a sudden assault long before the reënforcements in the Union fleet could be landed, as they were by the terms of the truce authorized to do in such an emergency. The substance of Meigs's plan was, that while a transport vessel bearing troops and stores landed them at Fort Pickens, outside the harbor, a ship-of-war, arriving simultaneously, should boldly steam past the hostile batteries of Fort McRae, enter the harbor, and take up such a position within as to be able to prevent any crossing or landing by the rebels. The ship destined to run the batteries would necessarily encounter considerable peril, not only from the guns of McRae, but also from those of Fort Barrancas and supposed batteries at the navy yard — all, like McRae, on the mainland, and forming part of the harbor defenses.

For such coöperation Meigs needed a young, talented, and daring naval officer, and accordingly he made choice of Lieutenant David D. Porter, a companion and intimate friend, who, as he believed, combined the requisite qualities.

One important characteristic of this Pickens expedition was to be its secrecy. Seward in his argument on Sumter had much insisted that preparation for reënforcement would unavoidably come to the knowledge of the rebels, and enable them to find means to oppose it. This argument applied with even greater force to Fort Pickens; the rebels controlled both the post and the telegraph throughout the South, and it was thought that upon the first notice of hostile design Bragg would assault and overwhelm the fort. Besides, the orders transmitted through regular channels two weeks before had apparently failed. But now that the ships to supply Sumter were being got ready, it was doubtless thought that under this guise the Pickens relief could be prepared without suspicion. On Monday, April 1, 1861, Captain Meigs, Colonel Keyes, and Lieutenant Porter were busy, under the occasional advice of Seward and General Scott, in perfecting the details of their plans and in drawing up the formal orders required. These were in due time signed by the President himself, it being part of the plan that no one but the officers named, not even the Secretaries of War or Navy, should have knowledge of them.* This was an error which only the anomalous condition and extreme peril of the Government would have drawn Lincoln into, and it was never repeated. He doubtless supposed they were entirely consistent with the Sumter plans, especially as General Scott's written request for his signature accompanied the papers — the general being perfectly cognizant of both expeditions.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861.

DEAR SIR: The immediate departure of a war steamer, with instructions to enter Pensacola Harbor and use all measures in his power to prevent any attack from the mainland upon Fort Pickens, is of prime importance. If the President, as Commander-in-chief, will issue the order of which I inclose a draft, an important step towards the security of Fort Pickens will be taken. I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. W. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, etc. †

But although useful to secrecy, this course was bound to produce confusion and bad discipline; and such was its immediate result. That afternoon the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard received two telegrams, in very similar language, directing him to "fit out the *Powhatan* to go to sea at the earliest possible moment." One was signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the other by the President; the former intending the ship to go to Sumter, the latter to Pickens, and neither being aware of the other's action. Neither had reason to anticipate any such conflict of orders: the *Powhatan* was not included in Fox's original requisition, and Meigs did not even know that the Sumter expedition was being prepared.

On the same afternoon several additional orders, made out under Seward's supervision, were brought to Lincoln. Supposing they all related to this enterprise, he signed them without reading; but it soon turned out that two of them related to a matter altogether different. These orders changed the duty of several naval officers: Captain Pendergrast was to be sent to Vera Cruz on account of "important complications in our foreign relations"; and Captain Stringham was to go to Pensacola.

When these last-mentioned orders reached the hands of the Secretary of the Navy, to whom they were addressed and immediately transmitted, that official was not only greatly mystified but very seriously troubled in mind. He hastened to the President, whom he found alone in the executive office, writing. "What have I done wrong?" Lincoln inquired playfully, as he raised his head, and with his ever-accurate intuition read trouble in the countenance of his Secretary. Mr. Welles presented the anomalous papers and asked what they meant; he had heard of no "foreign complications," and he preferred Stringham in his present duty.

The President [says Mr. Welles] expressed as much surprise as I felt, that he had signed and sent me such a document. He said Mr. Seward, with two or three young men, had been there through the day on a matter which Mr. Seward had much at heart; that he had yielded to the project of Mr. Seward, but

* Meigs, in "National Intelligencer," Sept. 16, 1865.

† Unpublished MS.

as it involved considerable detail, and he had his hands full, and more too, he had left Mr. Seward to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, some of them without reading, trusting entirely to Mr. Seward, for he could not undertake to read all papers presented to him; and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, whom could he rely upon in a public matter that concerned us all? He seemed disinclined to disclose or dwell on the project, but assured me he never would have signed that paper had he been aware of its contents, much of which had no connection with Mr. Seward's scheme. . . . The President reiterated they were not his instructions, and wished me distinctly to understand they were not, though his name was appended to them — said the paper was an improper one — that he wished me to give it no more consideration than I thought proper — treat it as canceled — as if it had never been written.*

Mr. Welles acted upon this verbal assurance, and was highly gratified that the President thus corrected what he felt to be an encroachment upon the duties and powers of the Navy Department. Nevertheless it is apparent that he had his doubts whether Lincoln had fully and unreservedly given him his confidence in this affair. In these surmises he was correct; a circumstance had occurred between the President and Seward which the former could not communicate, and so far as is known never did communicate to any person but his private secretary, and of which the President's private papers have also preserved the interesting record. In order rightly to understand it, a brief glance at contemporary affairs is needful.

It will hardly be possible for the readers of history in our day to comprehend the state of public sentiment in the United States during the month of March, 1861. The desire for peace; the hope of compromise; the persistent disbelief in the extreme purposes of the South; and, strongest of all, a certain national lethargy, utterly impossible to account for,— all marked a positive decadence in patriotic feelings. The phenomenon is attested not only in the records of many public men willing to abandon constitutional landmarks and to sacrifice elementary rights of mankind, but also shown in the words and example of military officers like Scott and Anderson in their consenting to shut their eyes to the truths and principles of their own profession,— that it is the right of the Government to repel menaces as well as blows, and that building batteries is as effective and aggressive war as firing cannon-balls.

This perversion of public opinion in fact extended back to the meeting of Congress in December. Under the spell of such a political nightmare the revolution had been half accomplished. The Union flag had been fired upon, the Federal laws defied, the secession government organized and inaugurated. The work of the conspirators was done, but the popular movement had not yet fully ratified it. Ours is preëminently a country of mass meetings and conventions, of high-sounding resolves and speeches of flaming rhetoric. Perhaps their constant recurrence makes us less critical than we ought to be in scanning their real or fictitious value. Because a certain number of delegates assembled at Montgomery and framed a paper government, it did not necessarily follow that the people of the cotton-States stood behind them. In this case it was even so; but the military thrall by which revolution swept away conservatism was not understood by the North. The difficult problem was presented to the Lincoln administration, not alone whether it should endeavor to knock down the revolutionary edifice half built, but also whether such an effort might not excite the whole Southern people to rise *en masse* to complete it. The disease of rebellion existing in an advanced stage, could the cure be best effected with sedatives or irritants?

From our point of view the answer is easy; but it was not of so ready solution in March, 1861. Lincoln in his hesitation to provision Sumter at all hazards was not executing his own inclinations, but merely submitting to what for the time seemed the military and, more than all, the political necessities of the hour. The Buchanan administration had first refused and then postponed succor to the fort. Congress had neglected to provide measures and means for coercion. The conservative sentiment of the country protested loudly against everything but concession. His own Cabinet was divided in council. The times were "out of joint." Public opinion was awry. Treason was applauded and patriotism rebuked. Laws were held to be offenses, and officials branded as malefactors. In Lincoln's own forcible simile, sinners were "calling the righteous to repentance."

It must be remembered too, that during the month of March, 1861, Lincoln did not yet know the men who composed his Cabinet. Neither, on the other hand, did they know him. He recognized them as governors, senators, and statesmen, while they yet looked upon him as a simple frontier lawyer at most, and a rival to whom chance had transferred the honor they felt to be due to themselves. The recognition and establishment of intellectual rank is difficult and slow. Perhaps the first real question of the Lincoln cabinet was, "Who is the greatest man?" It is pretty safe to assert that no one — not even he himself — believed it was Abraham Lincoln. Bearing this in mind, we shall be better able to understand and explain acts done and acts omitted during that memorable month.

* Welles, in "Galaxy," November, 1870.

In this state of affairs the policy of the new Administration was necessarily passive, expectant, cautious, and tentative. Other causes contributed to their embarrassments. The change from a long Democratic to a Republican régime involved a sweeping change of functionaries and subordinates. The impending revolution made both sides suspicious and vindictive; the new appointees could not, as in ordinary times, lean upon the experience and routine knowledge of the old. Passion swayed the minds of men. There was little calm reasoning or prudent counsel. The new party was not yet homogeneous. A certain friction mutually irritated Republicans of Whig, of Democratic, or of Free-soil antecedents against each other. Douglas was artfully leading a Senate debate to foster and strengthen the anti-war feeling of the North. The Cabinet had not become a working unit. Each Cabinet minister was beset by a horde of applicants, by over-officious friends, by pressing and most contradictory advice.

Seward naturally took a leading part in the new Cabinet. This was largely warranted by his prominence as a party manager; his experience in the New York governorship and in the United States Senate; the quieting and mediating attitude he had maintained during the winter; the influence he was supposed to wield over the less violent Southerners; the information he had gained from the Buchanan cabinet; his intimacy with General Scott; his acknowledged ability and talent; his optimism, which always breathed hope and imparted confidence. During the whole of March he had been busy with various measures of tentative administration. He had advised appointments, written diplomatic notes and circulars, carried on a running negotiation with the rebel commissioners, sought to establish relations with the Virginia convention, sent Lander to Texas to kindle a "back fire" against secession, elaborated his policy of evacuating Sumter, proposed a change of party name and organization, and set on foot the secret expedition to Fort Pickens. All this activity, however, did not appear to satisfy his desires and ambition. His philosophic vision took a yet wider range. He was eager to enlarge the field of his diplomacy beyond the boundaries of the republic. Regarding mere partisanship as a secondary motive, he was ready to grapple with international politics. He would heal a provincial quarrel in the zeal and fervor of a continental crusade. He would smother a domestic insurrection in the blaze and glory of a war which must logically be a war of conquest. He would supplant the slavery question by the Monroe Doctrine. And who shall say that these imperial dreams did not contemplate the possibility of changing a threatened dismemberment of the Union into the triumphant annexation of Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies?

On this same first day of April, while Meigs and Porter were busy with plans and orders about Fort Pickens, Seward submitted to Lincoln the following extraordinary state paper, unlike anything to be found in the political history of the United States:

SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, April 1, 1861.

First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger upon the country.

Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this *idea* as a ruling one, namely, that we must

CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION.

In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of *Patriotism or Union.*

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so *regarded.* Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by Union men in the South.

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last Administration created the necessity.

For the rest I would simultaneously defend and reenforce all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

This will raise distinctly the question of *Union* or *Disunion.* I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

It is not in my especial province.

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.*

The conscientious historian must ask the reader to pause and re-read this most remarkable and pregnant document. It is a little difficult to imagine what must have been the feelings of a President, and particularly of a frank, loyal, and generous nature like that of Lincoln, to receive from his principal councilor and anticipated mainstay of his Administration such a series of proposals. That he should delegate his presidential functions and authority; that he should turn his back upon the party which elected him; that he should ignore the political battle which had been fought and the victory for moral government which had been won; that he should by an arbitrary act plunge the nation into foreign war; that he should ask his rival to rule in his stead — all this might be romantic statesmanship, but to the cool, logical mind of the President it must have brought thoughts excited by no other event of his most eventful life. What was to be said in answer? The tender of a grave issue like this presupposed grave purposes and determinations. Should he by a fitting rebuke break up his scarcely formed Cabinet and alienate the most powerful leader after himself, who might perhaps carry with him the organized support of all the Northern States which had voted for this rival at Chicago?

The President sent his reply the same day. He armed himself with his irresistible logic, his faultless tact, his limitless patience, his kindest but most imperturbable firmness. Only the "hand of iron in the glove of velvet" could have written the following answer:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled "Some thoughts for the President's consideration." The first proposition in it is, "*First*, We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign."

At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts." This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

Again, I do not perceive how the reënforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.

Upon your closing proposition, that "whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it,

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly,

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide," I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.

Your Ob't Serv't,

A. LINCOLN. †

In this reply not a word is omitted which was necessary, and not a hint or allusion is contained that could be dispensed with. The answer was conclusive and ended the argument. So far as is known, the affair never reached the knowledge of any other member of the Cabinet, or even the most intimate of the President's friends; nor was it probably ever again alluded to by either Lincoln or Seward. Doubtless it needed only the President's note to show the Secretary of State how serious a fault he had committed, for all his tireless industry and undivided influence continued to be given for four long years to his chief, not only without reserve, but with a sincere and devoted personal attachment. Lincoln, on his part, easily dismissed the incident from his thought with that grand and characteristic charity which sought only to cherish the virtues of men — which readily recognized the strength and acknowledged the services of his Secretary, to whom he unselfishly gave, to his own last days, his generous and unwavering trust.

* Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

Feb 1888

Century

UNDER THE FOAM.

LIGHTNESS and laughter are with such as he
Only the surf upon the soul's deep sea;
Passions of time but froth the upper main,
While far beneath, eternal passions reign.

Charlotte Fiske Bates.

canons' homes, each set back in its luxuriant little garden. To the north is another expanse of green and then more houses. Most of the dwellings are of Elizabethan design, or of one of those Queen Anne or Georgian patterns which in this country we call "colonial." In size and shape they constantly remind us of things we have seen at home, but in material and color they are wholly English. They have fine red-tiled roofs, and their walls are of brick, or of brick and plaster, or of stone and flint; and where the stones have been patched with ruddy bricks there is no effort to conceal the disparity in material which gives so beautiful a variety in tint. Vines cover, trees embower, and flowers encircle them. The color effect as a whole is enchanting, and the air of mingled dignity, unworldliness, and peace which broods over the church itself broods over the dwellings of its ministrants as well.

Richard Poore, who, as bishop of Salisbury, founded its new church, was the same who a little later, as bishop of Durham, founded there the Chapel of the Nine Altars. It is unlikely that he was in either case the architect; and though the Early-English style is used in both buildings, it is so differently used as not to suggest that their designer was one and the same. The utmost simplicity of which the Lancet Pointed style is capable rules at Salisbury, the utmost luxuriance at Durham — as regards not profuseness of ornament alone but the constructional forms themselves. It is a singular coincidence, therefore, but doubtless nothing more, that the first man whom we know to have actually built at Salisbury — perhaps as architect, perhaps merely as clerk-of-the-works — bears the name of the northern town, Elias de Derham.

Although Salisbury was a cathedral church from very early times, much of its history is as void of great prelatical names as the history of Peterborough, which was merely an abbey church until the sixteenth century. Not the bishops but the earls of Salisbury, whose cross-legged effigies may be seen in the nave, made the name of their town a power in the world.

M. G. van Rensselaer.

May 1886

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE CALL TO ARMS.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FALL OF SUMTER.

MILITARY and naval expeditions rarely move at their first appointed time. That prepared by Captain Fox for Sumter was, by the President's order, directed to sail on April 6, but did not actually start till the 9th; that prepared by Captain Meigs for Fort Pickens was to have got off on the 2d, but only sailed on the 6th. The fitting out of both went on simultaneously at New York, but the officers concerned were not cognizant of each other's plans and measures, and it so happened that, through a misunderstanding which did not come to light until after the sailing of the latter, the war ship *Powhatan*, upon which Captain Fox depended for his most effective aid in his proposed efforts to relieve Fort Sumter, was transferred to the command of Lieutenant Porter, and sailed to Fort Pickens instead. The details of the incident are too long for the pages of this magazine and must be passed, with the simple statement that the



GENERAL M. C. MEIGS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

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Meigs expedition, in conjunction with the successful delivery of fresh orders to the fleet at Pensacola, made Fort Pickens entirely secure against assault by the rebel forces under Bragg, and also rendered more safe the Federal forts at Key West and Tortugas.

Meanwhile affairs at Fort Sumter were hastening to a crisis more rapidly than President Lincoln had been led to expect. The various occurrences during the month of March had created in Anderson the strong expectation that he would receive orders to evacuate the fort, and under this belief less care was taken to make his provisions hold out than might have been done. His letter of the 31st gave notice that "the last barrel of flour was issued day before yesterday"; and on the first day of April he once more wrote:

> The South Carolina Secretary of War has not sent the authority asked for yesterday to enable me to send off the discharged laborers. Having been in daily expectation since the return of Colonel Lamon to Washington of receiving orders to vacate this post, I have kept these men here as long as I could. . . . I told Mr. Fox that if I placed the command on short allowance I could make the provisions last until after the 10th of this month; but as I have received no instructions from the Department that it was desirable I should do so, it has not been done. If the governor permits me to send off the laborers, we will have rations enough to last us about one week longer.*

Upon receipt of this notice President Lincoln issued his final order for the departure of the Sumter expedition, of which he gave notice to Anderson in the following instructions, drafted with his own hand:

> WASHINGTON, April 4, 1861.
>
> SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant occasions some anxiety to the President. On information of Captain Fox he had supposed you could hold out till the 15th instant without any great inconvenience, and had prepared an expedition to relieve you before that period. Hoping still that you will be able to sustain yourself till the 11th or 12th instant, the expedition will go forward; and, finding your flag flying, will attempt to provision you, and, in case the effort is resisted, will endeavor also to reënforce you.
>
> You will therefore hold out, if possible, till the arrival of the expedition. It is not, however, the intention of the President to subject your command to any danger or hardship beyond what, in your judgment, would be usual in military life, and he has entire confidence that you will act as becomes a patriot and a soldier, under all circumstances. Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are authorized to make it.†

* Anderson to Thomas, April 1, 1861. War Records.
† Lincoln, Autograph MS.

COLONEL GUSTAVUS V. FOX. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY CUDLIP.)

This manuscript draft, in words so brief and explicit, in tone so considerate and humane, in foresight and moderation so eminently characteristic of its author, as manifested in almost every important document of his administration, was sent to the War Department, where it was copied in quadruplicate, addressed to Major Robert Anderson, signed by Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, and one copy immediately transmitted by mail to Fort Sumter,‡ while other copies were dispatched by other methods. That same afternoon the Secretary of War and General Scott gave Captain Fox — who, having completed his preliminary arrangements, had come to Washington for the purpose — his final and confidential orders for the command, the destination, the supplies, and the reënforcements of the expedition. In a conversation that afternoon Fox reminded Lincoln that but nine days would remain in which to reach Charleston from New York, a distance of six hundred and thirty-seven miles, and that with this diminished time his chances were greatly reduced. But the President, who had calculated all the probabilities of failure, and who with more comprehensive statesmanship was looking through and beyond the Sumter expedition to the now inevitable rebel attack and the response of an awakened and united North, calmly assured him that he should best fulfill

‡ Anderson to Thomas, April 8, 1861. War Records.

his duty to make the attempt.* Captain Fox returned to New York April 5, with the orders of the Secretary of the Navy for the necessary coöperation of the war vessels. On the evening of April 8 the merchant steamer *Baltic*, bearing two hundred recruits, the required supplies, and Captain Fox, dropped down the bay and went to sea early next morning, with the belief and understanding that the war ships *Powhatan*, *Pawnee*, *Pocahontas*, and *Harriet Lane*, and the steamtugs *Uncle Ben*, *Yankee*, and *Freeborn*, should meet the *Baltic* at the appointed rendezvous ten miles off Charleston bar, due east of the light-house, on the morning of the 11th of April.

Towards the end of March, while the interviews and conversations were going on between Judge Campbell and Seward, and the Sumter affair was a daily topic of discussion, Lincoln (to use his own words)

> told Mr. Seward he might say to Judge Campbell that I should not attempt to provision the fort without giving them notice. That was after I had duly weighed the matter and come to the deliberate conclusion that that would be the best policy. If there was nothing before to bind us in honor to give such notice, I felt so bound after this word was out.†

It is impossible to fix the exact date of this presidential instruction; but several allusions indicate it with sufficient nearness. A dispatch of the commissioners under date of March 22 uses the phrase: "and what is of infinite importance to us, that notice will be given him [Campbell] of any change in the existing status."‡ So also Mr. Welles, advising the Fox expedition in the Cabinet meeting of March 29, adds, "and of communicating at the proper time the intentions of the Government to provision the fort peaceably if unmolested."§ Finally, as already stated, Mr. Seward, on April 1, gave Campbell the written memorandum. "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens."‖

Now that the Fox expedition was ready and ordered to sail, President Lincoln proceeded to carry out this part of his plan. Again, with his own hand, he prepared the following instructions:

> WASHINGTON, April 6, 1861.
>
> SIR: You will proceed directly to Charleston, South Carolina, and if, on your arrival there, the flag of the United States shall be flying over Fort Sumter, and the fort shall not have been attacked, you will procure an interview with Governor Pickens, and read to him as follows: "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort." After you shall have read this to Governor Pickens, deliver to him the copy of it here inclosed, and retain this letter yourself.
>
> But if, on your arrival at Charleston, you shall ascertain that Fort Sumter shall have been already evacuated, or surrendered by the United States force, or shall have been attacked by an opposing force, you will seek no interview with Governor Pickens, but return here forthwith.¶

This autograph manuscript draftof Lincoln's was also copied, and signed "Simon Cameron, Secretary of War," and placed in the hands of Mr. R. S. Chew, a faithful clerk of the State Department, who proceeded to Charleston and delivered it to Governor Pickens.

Thus, on the evening of April 8, 1861, the Montgomery authorities received decisive information that all their hopes of recognition and peaceful disunion were at an end, and that the desperate trial of war was at length upon them. Already, to some extent, forewarned of this contingency, they hastened to make dispositions to meet it. The seven States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were now united in the rebel Government; they were promptly notified of the changed condition of affairs, and each asked to raise a contingent of three thousand volunteers. Bragg, at Pensacola, was notified that "Our commissioners at Washington have received a flat refusal,"** and was instructed to put himself on the defensive, while officers, supplies, and soldiers were ordered to his support with a somewhat spasmodic energy. Beauregard was again put on the alert and ordered to increase his vigilance and vigor. "Under no circumstances are you to allow provisions to be sent to Fort Sumter."†† "Major Anderson's mails must be stopped. The fort must be completely isolated."‡‡ Beauregard complied with alacrity; issued orders, and sent detachments to his posts and batteries; armed additional guard-boats to patrol the harbor; and called out the entire balance of the contingent of five thousand men which had been authorized.

President Lincoln in deciding the Sumter question had adopted a simple but effective policy. To use his own words, he determined to "send bread to Anderson"; if the rebels fired on that, they would not be able to con-

* Fox, Report to Welles, Feb. 24, 1865.

† J. G. N., personal memoranda. MS.

‡ Commissioners to Toombs, March 22, 1861. MS.

§ Welles to Lincoln, Cabinet opinion, March 29, 1861. MS.

‖ Campbell to Seward, April 13, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

¶ Lincoln, instructions, April 5, 1861. Autograph MS.

** Walker to Bragg, April 8, 1861. War Records.

†† Walker to Beauregard, April 8, 1861. War Records.

‡‡ Walker to Beauregard, April 9, 1861. War Records.

vince the world that he had begun civil war. All danger of misapprehension, all accusations of "invasion" and "subjugation," would fall to the ground before that paramount duty not only to the nation, but to humanity. This was universal statesmanship reduced to its simplest expression. To this end he had ordered the relief expedition to sail, and sent open notice to Governor Pickens of its coming. His own duty thus discharged, no less in kindness than in honesty, the American people would take care of the result. It is the record of history that he was right in both his judgment and his faith.

That he by this time expected resistance and hostilities, though unrecorded, is reasonably certain. The presence of armed ships with the expedition, and their instructions to fight their way to the fort in case of opposition, show that he believed the arbitrament of the sword to be at hand. His authorization to Anderson to capitulate after the ordinary risks of war is evidence that he did not expect a decisive battle or a conclusive victory. Whether the expedition would fail or succeed was a question of minor importance. He was not playing a game of military strategy with Beauregard. He was looking through Sumter to the loyal States; beyond the insulted flag to the avenging nation.

The rebels, on their part, had only a choice of evils. They were, as wrong-doers are sure to be, on the horns of a dilemma. Their scheme of peaceable secession demanded incompatible conditions — the union of the South and the division of the North. To preserve the former was to destroy the latter. If they set war in motion, they would lose their Democratic allies in the free States. If they hesitated to fight, the revolution would collapse in the slave-States. As usual on such occasions, rash advice carried the day. "Gentlemen," said an uncompromising fire-eater to Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet, "unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days."*

The possibility suggested to Captain Hartstene, that Sumter might be relieved by boats on a dark night, evidently decided the rebel authorities to order an immediate attack of the fort.† They could not afford the risk of its successful defense. Its capture was the very life of the rebellion.

Therefore, on the 10th of April, they telegraphed to Beauregard:

> If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed in such a manner as you may determine to reduce it.‡

At 2 P. M. on the 11th that officer accordingly made the demand, offering facilities to remove the troops, with their arms and private property, and the privilege of saluting their flag.§ The demand was laid before a council of officers, who voted a unanimous refusal.‖ "I have the honor," thereupon replied Anderson, "to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say in reply thereto, that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor, and of my obligations to my Government, prevent my compliance"; at the same time thanking him for his compliments and courteous terms.¶ The rebel aides-de-camp who bore these messages engaged in informal conversation with Anderson, in the course of which, with somewhat careless freedom, he said to them: "Gentlemen, if you do not batter the fort to pieces about us, we shall be starved out in a few days."** The phrase was telegraphed to Montgomery, whence instructions came back once more to offer time to deliver up the fort; whereupon, near midnight of the 11th, Beauregard again wrote:

> If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that in the mean time you will not use your guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you.††

It was long past midnight when the aides once more reached the fort and handed this second message to Anderson. Anderson in return submitted to them the following proposition in writing:

> I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant should I not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not in the mean

* McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," pp. 112, 113.

† As, in consequence of a communication from the President of the United States to the Governor of South Carolina, we were in momentary expectation of an attempt to reënforce Fort Sumter, or of a descent upon our coast to that end from the United States fleet then lying at the entrance of the harbor, it was manifestly an imperative necessity to reduce the fort as speedily as possible, and not to wait until the ships and the fort should unite in a combined attack upon us. Beauregard, Report, April 27, 1861. War Records.

‡ Walker to Beauregard, April 10, 1861. War Records.

§ Beauregard to Anderson, April 11, 1861. War Records.

‖ Foster, journal, April 11, 1861. War Records.

¶ Anderson to Beauregard, April 11, 1861. War Records.

** Chesnut, Lee, and Chisholm to Adj.-Gen. Jones, April 11, 1861. War Records.

†† Beauregard to Anderson, April 11, 1861, 11 P. M. Victor, "History Southern Rebellion."

time open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears.*

This cautious and resolute answer was not what the rebel commander desired; but apparently he expected nothing else, for he had given his aides discretionary authority to refuse the stipulation. They retired to an adjoining room to consult and compose their answer, and at twenty minutes past three o'clock on the morning of Friday, April 12, 1861, handed Anderson their written notice that the rebel batteries would open their fire upon the fort in one hour. Then taking their leave, they entered their boat and proceeded directly to Fort Johnson, and gave to the officer commanding that post "the order to open fire at the time indicated." †

Unwelcome as was the prospect of the impending conflict, it must in one sense have been a relief as a contrast to the uncertainty in which the fate of the garrison had hung for more than three months. The decisive moment of action was at last reached, and the spirit and strength of every inmate of the fort leaped into new life under the supreme impulse of combat. Until the full dawning of the morning, nothing could be done within the fort. Anderson gave the necessary orders about the coming attack. The sentinels were all withdrawn from their exposed stations on the parapet; every gate and opening was closed; the men were strictly enjoined not to leave the shelter of the casemates except on special summons. These few preparations hastily completed, Sumter seemed to the outside world to have relapsed into the security and silence of a peaceful sleep.

The fort had been built on an artificial island midway in the mouth of Charleston harbor; it was three miles from the city, but projecting points of the neighboring islands inclosed it in a triangle. On these the rebels had built their siege works — to the north-east Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island, distant 1800 yards; to the south, the Cumming's Point batteries on Morris Island, distant 1300 yards; to the west, Fort Johnson on James Island, distant 2500 yards. Some were built merely to oppose the expected reënforcements through the harbor channels; most of them were earth-works. Two were constructed of wood and protected with railroad iron; one of these had been designed to serve as a floating battery, but proving a failure in this object, was now advantageously grounded behind a protecting sea-wall. Altogether there were from fourteen to nineteen of these batteries, mounting a total of thirty guns and seventeen mortars, manned and supported by a volunteer force of four to six thousand men. The greater part of them were holiday soldiers, but among their officers were a dozen or two formerly belonging to the Federal army and possessed of a thorough military education. To these the management of the enterprise was mainly confided.

Fort Sumter, on its part, was a scarcely completed work, dating back to the period of smooth-bore guns of small caliber; its walls were of brick, forty feet high and eight feet thick; it was pierced for one hundred and forty guns, to be mounted in two tiers of casemates and on the parapet. But when Anderson inspected it on his arrival in November previous, the brick-work of walls and casemates was still unfinished, and only a few guns were mounted. ‡ Foster, the engineer in charge, had, with limited help and materials, and in the face of constant obstacles and discouragements, pushed the work towards completion. There was now a total of forty-eight guns mounted and ready for use, though furnished with very rude and insufficient appliances. Of these, twenty-one were in the casemates and twenty-seven on the parapet. To man and support them Anderson had a garrison of nine commissioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant laborers — a total of one hundred and twenty-eight souls. We shall see that while the opposing artillery was nearly equal in number, there existed, in fact, a great disparity in its quality. Not only was Anderson's fire diffused and that of the enemy concentrated, but the rebels had on their side seventeen ten-inch mortars, which could deliver a vertical fire and drop large shells into the fort; while Anderson had nothing to answer them but the horizontal fire of his guns to throw missiles against the face of the rebel bomb-proofs, formed of heavy sand-banks or sloping railroad iron.

The inhabitants of Charleston were informed of the intended bombardment; months of speech-making, drilling, and war preparation had excited an intense eagerness to witness the fight. In the yet prevailing darkness they came pouring out of their houses by a common impulse, and thronged to the wharves and buildings on the bay, where they sought advantageous positions to behold the long-wished-for spectacle. At about half-past four, as the dim outline of Fort Sumter began to define itself in the morning twilight, they saw a shell rise from the mortar batteries near Fort

* Anderson to Beauregard, April 12, 1861, 2.30 A. M. Victor, "Southern Rebellion."

† Chesnut and Lee to Jones, April 12, 1861. War Records.

‡ F. J. Porter, Inspection Report. War Records.

Johnson, and make its slow and graceful curve upon Sumter. This was the signal. Gun after gun and battery after battery responded to its summons, and in less than an hour all the besieging works were engaged in an active cannonade.

Inside of Sumter the garrison received the assault with a certain degree of deliberation. The first care was to note the effect of the firing. The opening shots of the rebels were badly aimed, and fell wide of the mark. With the advancing daylight their gunners obtained a better range; the solid shot began to strike the face of the wall, and the shells from the mortars to explode with alarming precision over the parapet. Nevertheless, no great or rapid damage was done. One vital point was, however, quickly decided. Housed in the casemates, the garrison was comparatively safe; but out on the unprotected parapet, under the concentrated fire of all the rebel artillery, Anderson's little handful of cannoneers would melt away like frost in the morning sun. With a full war garrison he could have replaced officers and men as they were shot down; but with only sufficient trained force to work nine guns, he dared not risk the loss of a single man. His first reluctant duty, therefore, was to order the abandonment of all his barbette guns. These were twenty-seven in number, more than half his available armament, and comprising nearly all his pieces of large caliber. Through this necessity alone, Fort Sumter was largely shorn of its offensive power. His twenty-one casemate guns, of which only four were forty-two pounders, and the remainder thirty-twos, constituted the total of his fighting artillery.

The rations of bread having been exhausted a day or two before, the command breakfasted on pork and water, and at about 7 o'clock Captain Abner Doubleday, the ranking officer, took his station at a casemate gun and hurled the defiance of Sumter, with a solid shot, against the formidable iron-clad battery on Cumming's Point. Fully roused by the combined excitements of resentment and danger, the men sprang with alacrity to their duty; even the forty-three engineer workmen, forgetting their character of non-combatants, eagerly volunteered and rendered active service in the defense. In fact, the enthusiasm of the garrison somewhat outstripped its prudence. They began the engagement with a supply of only seven hundred cartridges; by the middle of the day this stock had become so much reduced that the fort was compelled to slacken its fire. From this time on only six guns were kept in action — two towards Morris Island, two towards Fort Moultrie, and two towards the batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island. These were also fired at longer intervals, while the only six needles in the fort were kept busy sewing up cartridge-bags out of the extra clothing, blankets, hospital sheets, and even coarse paper.

So the unequal combat went on throughout the first day. The journal of the bombardment kept by Captain Foster shows that no very decisive damage was effected on either side. From the fort there were occasional good shots. The iron-clad batteries were repeatedly struck, but the light balls bounded off their sloping roofs. At other batteries they buried themselves harmlessly in the impervious rebel sand-banks. Embrasures were struck; groups of rebel officers and men allowing their curiosity to draw them out from their shelter were hustled pell-mell back into their bomb-proofs; an incautious schooner, receiving a ball, hauled down her Confederate flag and hurried out of range; the two forty-two pounders bearing on Moultrie silenced a gun, riddled the barracks and quarters, and tore three holes through the rebel flag.

> The effect of the enemy's fire upon Fort Sumter [says Foster] during the day was very marked in respect to the vertical fire. This was so well directed, and so well sustained, that from the seventeen mortars engaged in firing ten-inch shells one-half of the shells came within or exploded above the parapet of the fort, and only about ten buried themselves in the soft earth of the parade without exploding. . . . The effect of the direct fire from the enemy's guns was not so marked as the vertical. For several hours' firing from the commencement, a large proportion of their shot missed the fort. Subsequently it improved, and did considerable damage to the roof and upper story of the barracks and quarters, and to the tops of the chimneys on the gorge. . . . The shots from the guns in the batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island did not produce any considerable direct effect, but many of them took the gorge in reverse in their fall, completely riddling the officers' quarters, even down to the first story, so great was the angle of fall of many of the balls.

One additional danger manifested itself: three times during the day the wooden buildings in the fort caught fire, but were extinguished without great difficulty, being low and easily accessible. The rebel batteries, provided with several furnaces, now and then fired a hot shot; but whether these or bursting shells started the burning the officers themselves could not determine. The very work of ruin going on in the building used as officers' quarters aided in restraining the flames. The hallways were provided with iron water-tanks, which, being soon perforated by cannon-balls, deluged the chambers, and rendered the wood difficult to ignite.

Amid experience of this kind the eventful 12th of April, the first day of the Sumter bombardment, at length drew to a close. The fire of Sumter ceased; the direct fire of the

rebel batteries slackened, and was finally discontinued; only the mortars kept up a slow and sullen bombardment through the night at intervals of from ten to fifteen minutes. The work of sewing up cartridge-bags was continued until midnight; sentinels and lookouts were stationed to watch for the possible coming of boats from the fleet — possibly of boats bearing a storming party from the rebel camps. But the night proved dark and rainy, with a continuance of the prevailing gale, making the waters of the harbor too rough for either of these undertakings. Under cover of the thick gloom, Foster, the engineer, ventured outside the walls and satisfied himself "by personal inspection that the exterior of the work was not damaged to any considerable extent, and that all the facilities for taking in supplies in case they arrived were as complete as circumstances would admit." * Three United States men-of-war had been seen off the bar during the afternoon, and the fort had dipped its flag in signal to them. What was the fleet doing?

The several vessels of the Fox expedition were scarcely at sea when they encountered a driving gale. Captain Fox himself, who sailed in the *Baltic* on the morning of the 9th, was yet ignorant of the changed destination of the flag-ship *Powhatan*. This was doubtless an entirely unintentional omission, arising through the cares, the dangers, the confusion, the cross-purposes, the system of profound secrecy which for a few days prevailed at Washington. The *Baltic* reached the rendezvous off Charleston just in time to hear the opening guns of the bombardment. The *Harriet Lane* was already there. The *Pawnee* arrived at daylight. There was an apparent conflict of orders, and a hesitation to coöperate. The *Baltic* and the *Harriet Lane* stood in to offer to carry provisions to the fort; but as they neared the bar of the harbor, they saw by the quick-flashing rebel guns that the war was already begun. At this intelligence, the commander of the *Pawnee* declared his intention to go in and "share the fate of his brethren of the army." Fox, cool and practical, brought him back to reason by explaining the Government instructions, and induced him to await the chance of rendering more effective service. The two ships of war anchored near the bar, and the *Baltic* stood off and on to await the arrival of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. This, however, was a vain hope. The *Powhatan* was on her way to Pensacola, the tugs had been scattered by the storm. The *Freeborn* was not permitted to leave New York. The *Uncle Ben* was driven into Wilmington and fell into the hands of the rebels. The *Yankee* failed to reach the rendezvous till long after the whole affair was over. But, still ignorant of these disasters, and hoping hourly for the arrival of the missing vessels, the fleet waited and made signals all the long afternoon and through the dark and stormy night, while the lookouts in the garrison were anxiously scanning the turbulent waters of the bay for the coming of the boats, and the rebel gunners stood by their channel batteries in the drenching rain hoping to intercept and sink them.

Captain Fox and the officers of the fleet were sorely disappointed at the non-arrival of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. The former had on board the armed launches and the necessary sailors to man them; the tugs were to have carried the supplies and perhaps drawn the boats in tow. With these facilities for transportation, there is every probability that they would have reached the fort. The storm was both an advantage and a hindrance; it increased the friendly darkness to hide them from the rebel gunners, but at the same time it lashed the waters of the bay into fury. When morning came, such had been the pitchy gloom of the night and the roaring of the rain and the surf, that the commanders of the rebel batteries were unable to report that their watch and guard had been completely effective. "Opinions differ," wrote one of their best officers, "as to whether anything got into Sumter last night. They may or may not. The night was dark and occasionally stormy, and a heavy sea running. If anything did, it could not have been very extensive." †

With the morning of the 13th, Captain Fox and the officers began to despair of the *Powhatan* and the tugs. Unwilling to remain mere idle spectators of the fight, they cast about to use such expedients as presented themselves. Among the merchant vessels by this time collected at the bar, awaiting the issue of the contest, was an ice schooner; this they impressed and began to prepare for an attempt to enter the following night. There were plenty of volunteers among both officers and seamen for the hazardous duty; but long before nightfall the bombardment had come to an end. That Captain Fox's undertaking thus terminated without direct practical result was not his fault. With characteristic firmness and generosity, President Lincoln took upon himself the principal blame for its failure.

> The practicability of your plan [so he wrote to Fox soon afterward] was not in fact brought to a test. By reason of a gale well known in advance to be possible and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground; while, by an accident for which you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war-vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great im-

* Foster, journal, April 12, 1861. War Records.

† Whiting to Beauregard, April 13, 1861. MS.

portance to the enterprise. . . . You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.*

"Fort Sumter opened early and spitefully, and paid especial attention to Fort Moultrie — almost every shot grazing the crest of the parapet, and crashing through the quarters.†" This was the rebel report of the beginning of the second day's bombardment, April 13. The garrison of Sumter was refreshed by a night of comparatively secure rest in their casemates, and, no doubt, a hearty breakfast of pork and water, and, so long as the stock of cartridges made up during the night held out, they kept up so brisk a fire from their few guns that the rebels began to be confirmed in the opinion that the fort had really been reënforced. On their side the besiegers also increased both the speed of firing and their accuracy of aim, and seeing that they were making no headway in the test of breaching the walls, they began to pay more attention to the use of red-hot shot.‡

Thus far this unequal contest of nearly fifty concentrating guns, replied to by about six, had gone on without material damage to either party — showing, in proportion to the strength of each, nothing but indented brick walls or displaced sand-bags, battered chimneys and perforated barracks, a few slight contusions from splinters, and one or two disabled guns. According to all the reports, it might have proceeded at this rate the whole week, and the waste of ammunition would have been its most serious feature. But at this stage a new element entered into the strife, and soon turned the fortune of the day against the unlucky garrison of Sumter.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, the roof of the officers' quarters once more caught fire, either from a bursting shell or a red-hot shot; and this time a distance from water, and the exposure to the enemy's missiles, made it impossible to extinguish the flames. Worse than all, it quickly became evident that the fire would soon encircle the magazine and make it imperative to close it. At Captain Foster's suggestion, all hands not employed at the guns now sprang to the work of taking out a supply of powder. About fifty barrels were thus secured, distributed for safety in the various casemates, and covered with wet blankets, when the fire and heat so far increased that it was necessary to close the heavy metal doors of the magazine and bank it up with earth. The enemy, observing the smoke, redoubled the fire of the batteries; a strong south wind carried the flame to all the barracks inside the fort; and though the men fought the advance of the fire, they were at length compelled to give way and take refuge in the casemates. Even here they were not safe; the course of the wind was such as to fill every nook and corner of the fort with blinding, stifling smoke; the men crouched close down to the floors, covered their faces with wet handkerchiefs, or took exposed stations near the embrasures to obtain a breath of fresh air. As if this were not enough, a still subtler danger pursued them. The rapid conflagration and sweeping wind had filled the air with fire-flakes, and these drifted on the strong currents and counter-currents into the casemates to such an extent as to ignite the beds, boxes, and various small articles hastily collected there. Under such circumstances the fifty barrels of powder saved with so much exertion from the magazine could no longer be kept, and upon Anderson's order all but five barrels were thrown through the embrasures of the fort into the sea. Noon had meanwhile come, and, engaged in these pressing occupations, the garrison had ceased firing. By-and-by the wind changed a little, rendering the situation somewhat safer and more comfortable. There were but few cartridges left; still an occasional shot was fired, which the rebels themselves, roused to admiration of the garrison, received with cheers.

A new incident now engaged general attention. The flag-staff of the fort, struck seven different times during the first day and three the second, fell at about one o'clock in the afternoon. Lieutenant Snyder and a couple of men, without much delay, again hoisted the flag on a jury-mast extemporized on the parapet. The rebels had meanwhile noted the fall of the flag, and sent several different communications to Sumter. The first messenger was the ubiquitous and eccentric Senator Wigfall. Beauregard, to get rid of him, sent him as an aide to the commander of Morris Island. From there, after a short consultation among the rebel officers, he was dispatched to Fort Sumter to make inquiries. He crossed the bay dramatically in an open boat, with his handkerchief tied to his sword for a flag of truce, and clambered up the wall to an accessible embrasure, where, one account says, an astonished artilleryman, seeing this unique apparition, summarily made him a prisoner of war.§

Officers soon came, however, and after a somewhat spirited dialogue, and some further waving of Wigfall's sword and handkerchief out of an embrasure, to which the rebel batteries paid no attention, he was brought into

* Lincoln to Fox, May 1, 1861.
† Ripley, Report, April 16, 1861. War Records.
‡ Foster, journal, April 13, 1861. War Records.
§ Doubleday, "Forts Sumter and Moultrie."

Anderson's presence. He made a complimentary speech to Anderson, requesting that hostilities might be suspended and terms of evacuation arranged. What then occurred Captain Foster reports as follows:

> The commanding officer desiring to know what terms he came to offer, Mr. Wigfall replied, "Any terms that you may desire,— your own terms,— the precise nature of which General Beauregard will arrange with you." The commanding officer then accepted the conditions, saying that the terms he accepted were those proposed by General Beauregard on the 11th, namely: to evacuate the fort with his command, taking arms and all private and company property, saluting the United States flag as it was lowered, and being conveyed, if he desired it, to any Northern port. With this understanding Mr. Wigfall left, and the white flag was raised and the United States flag lowered by order of the commanding officer.

The officious Wigfall had not been gone a great while when two different messages arrived at Sumter from General Beauregard — the first to inquire whether Anderson needed assistance, and the second to tender him the use of a fire-engine and the services of a surgeon, both of which they had brought from the city. All of these Anderson declined with thanks, saying he had no wounded, that the fire was by this time nearly burned out, and that he thought the magazine safe. From these interviews Anderson now learned that Beauregard was entirely ignorant of Wigfall's mission or his own capitulation. He explained the circumstances, and threatened to hoist again his flag. He was persuaded, however, first to submit the matter to be fully reported at headquarters. General Beauregard, after some parley, ratified Wigfall's unauthorized proceeding and accepted Anderson's terms in detail. By eight o'clock on Saturday evening the capitulation was definitely arranged, and on the following day, Sunday, April 14, Anderson and his command sailed northward in the *Baltic*, which had come to the relief of Sumter.

In a military point of view, Anderson's capitulation was hasty. The defense of the fort can hardly be called heroic; there was not a man killed, not a casemate gun disabled, not a breach in the walls, plenty of ammunition in the magazine, and starvation not immediately impending.

> The burning of the quarters [says Captain Foster] produced a great effect on the defense while the fire lasted, inasmuch as the heat and smoke were almost stifling, and as the fire burned all around the magazines, obliging them to be closed, and thus preventing our getting powder to continue the firing. It also destroyed the main gates and the gun-carriages on the parapet of the gorge. But we could have resumed the firing as soon as the walls cooled sufficiently to open the magazine, and then, having blown down the wall left projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced. . . . The want of provisions would soon have caused the surrender of the fort, but with plenty of cartridges the men would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and, if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which we had a sufficient supply. I do not think that a breach could have been effected in the gorge at the distance of the battery on Cumming's Point within a week or ten days; and even then, with the small garrison to defend it and means for obstructing it at our disposal, the operation of assaulting it, with even vastly superior numbers, would have been very doubtful in its results.*

An ambitious and combative commander, therefore, carefully noting these elements of strength and resistance, and seeing a relieving fleet at the mouth of the harbor, would have "held the fort," and sent back a message of defiance. But when Anderson first took command of Sumter he wrote that "my position here is rather a politico-military than a military one," and on this assumption he seems to have acted throughout. Viewed in a political light, his conduct is perfectly justifiable. He had faithfully maintained the authority of the Government and the honor of the flag. He had repelled force by force. Obeying President Lincoln's instructions, he had incurred the ordinary risks of war, and now possessed full authority to save himself and his command by capitulation.

In the bombardment of Sumter the insurgents for the third time made active, aggressive war upon the United States, even if we leave out of sight the occupation of forts by simple entrance or by the show of force, the building of batteries to menace Sumter, and receiving the surrender made by Twiggs in Texas. In fact, since the 27th of December, a continued series of acts had been perpetrated by them, not only outraging the authority of, but levying actual war against, the United States.

The rebels indulged in great rejoicing over their victory. Charleston, which had for two days witnessed the bombardment almost *en masse*, was once more vociferous with speeches and ablaze with bonfires; while at Montgomery the insurgent Secretary of War ordered an official salute to celebrate the surrender, and to emphasize the prediction of the previous evening that the rebel flag would

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*The opinion of the rebel engineer, after the bombardment, agrees with that of Captain Foster. Major Whiting wrote as follows to Beauregard, on the 17th of April, proposing to abandon Morris Island: "Fort Sumter cannot be retaken from Morris Island alone. Your mortar batteries have accomplished that work. It cannot be touched from Cumming's Point. The late bombardment shows that. Let the enemy occupy it [Morris Island] entirely. We can shell him out from our remaining mortar batteries and keep him at a distance." Whiting to Beauregard, April 17, 1861. MS.

"float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the 1st of May." *

Looking back now at the events of the first month of Lincoln's administration, we must wonder at the impression which prevailed then, and which has so often been expressed by impulsive men since, that he was too slow in making his decision to provision and reenforce Fort Sumter.

We find that on the 15th of March, only ten days after his first information about the condition of the fort, he formally asked the written opinion of his Cabinet on the subject; and that on the 6th of April, only three weeks later, he gave his final order that the expedition should proceed on its mission. The intervening time was spent by him in consulting his Cabinet and his military and naval officers about possible plans for relief and reënforcement; about alternative policies to be pursued; watching the culminating treason in the South and the slowly swelling loyalty in the North; awaiting the end of the contradictory words and acts of the Virginia Convention, whose majority protested Unionism in public and at last voted secession in secret; allowing his Secretary of State, by an unofficial negotiation with the rebel commissioners, to disclose the attitude of the Montgomery cabinet; using the delay which the rebels supposed they had contrived for their own benefit for preparing the Sumter expedition; making the individual members of his Cabinet responsible to the party and to the country for the advice they gave; and finally, by all this, to gain a coveted "choice of position" and compel the rebels to attack and thus consolidate the North.

When he finally gave the order that the fleet should sail he was master of the situation; master of his Cabinet; master of the moral attitude and issues of the struggle; master of the public opinion which must arise out of the impending conflict; master if the rebels hesitated or repented, because they would thereby forfeit their prestige with the South; master if they persisted, for he would then command a united North. And all this was done, it must be remembered, not in the retirement which gives calm reflection, but after the rush and hurry of a triumphal journey and the parade of an inauguration, in the confusion of conflicting counsel, the worry of preliminary appointments, the prevalence of an atmosphere of treason and insurrection, the daily defection of Government officials.

In the face of such self-assertion and victory, the verdict of history can never be that he was tardy or remiss; to have acted more peremptorily in that strange crisis, when all men's minds were simply groping and drifting, would have brought upon him the just criticism of recklessness. No act of his will gain him greater credit than his kindly forbearance and patient wisdom in allowing full time and reflection for the final decision at this supreme juncture. He had said in his inaugural: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." This promise to the South he kept in its most vital spirit and meaning. An autocratic ruler might have acted more arbitrarily; but in a representative government it would have been imprudent to do otherwise than to await and rely upon the slow but mighty anger of an outraged patriotism.

THE CALL TO ARMS.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S decision and orders to prepare the Sumter and Pickens expeditions brought him face to face with the serious possibilities of civil war; and better to understand any military problems with which he might have to deal, he wrote to General Scott on the 1st of April, as follows:

> Would it impose too much labor on General Scott to make short, comprehensive, daily reports to me of what occurs in his department, including movements by himself, and under his orders, and the receipt of intelligence? If not, I will thank him to do so.†

General Scott at once complied with the request, and from the 1st of April to the 4th of May sent the President nearly every day a short memorandum in his own handwriting, inclosed in an envelope marked "confidential"— the whole series forming collectively a sort of historical journal of the highest interest and authenticity; and portions of it show better than any comment what was being done by the new Administration to meet the crisis which the Fort Sumter bombardment precipitated upon the country.

"General Scott's daily report, No. 3,"— so indorsed in Lincoln's handwriting and dated April 3, 1861,— in part runs thus:

> There will remain in Washington a detachment of cavalry recruits from Carlisle recruiting depot, about 80 men and horses; Magruder's horse artillery; Griffin's ditto, belonging to the Military Academy and now needed there; Elsey's foot artillery and Haskin's ditto. The companies of foot artillery are acting as infantry. The number of marines at the Washington Navy Yard varies. We heard to-day that the number now there is some 200. There is not another company of regulars within reach of Washington, except 7 at Fort Monroe, making about 400 men, the minimum force needed there under existing circumstances; one company at the Fayetteville arsenal, N. C., to guard arms and ammunition against a thick population of blacks; a garrison of recruits (50) at Ft. Washington, ten miles

* "Rebellion Record."

† Unpublished MS.

below us; a garrison of 100 recruits in Fort McHenry, Baltimore; about 750 recruits in New York harbor; 220 ditto at Newport Barracks opposite to Cincinnati, and about 350 men at Jefferson Barracks and the St. Louis arsenal near by, mostly recruits.*

This memorandum was supplemented two days later (April 5, 1861) by a detailed report from the Adjutant-General to the President, which showed the full strength of the army of the United States and its distribution to be as follows:

Department of the East, 3894; Department of the West, 3584; Department of Texas, 2258; Department of New Mexico, 2624; Department of Utah, 685; Department of the Pacific, 3382; miscellaneous, 686; grand total, officers and men, 17,113.*

General Scott's daily report, April 5, 1861:

I have nothing of special interest to report to-day; but that machinations against the Government and this capital are secretly going on all around us, in Virginia, in Maryland, and here, as well as farther south, I have no doubt. I cannot, however, say that they are as yet formidable, or are likely ever to come to a head. I have no policemen at my service, and no fund for the payment of detectives, but under the circumstances recommend that such agents should be at once employed in Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Richmond, and Norfolk. For the reasons stated, I am not prepared to suggest that a militia force should be called out to defend this Capital, under section 2 of the militia act, passed February 28, 1795. The necessity of such call, however, may not be very distant.*

General Scott's daily report, April 6, 1861:

A second steamer will arrive from Texas at New York in a day or two, with six troops of dismounted cavalry. In advance, I have ordered two of those companies or troops to proceed from the ship to this place, to be filled up with men (cavalry recruits) here. . . . The other four troops of cavalry I have ordered to proceed from the ship to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to be remounted there, whence they can be readily brought here if deemed necessary.*

General Scott's daily report, April 8, 1861:

For the defense of the Government, more troops are wanted. The steamer with the dismounted cavalry (six companies) from Texas, must be in New York to-day or to-morrow, to be followed by another steamer, with about the same number of troops, from Texas, in a week. There is a growing apprehension of danger here in the meantime. I rely on the presence of a third battery of flying artillery (Sherman's) by Saturday next. It is coming from Minnesota. Three other companies of artillery on foot, serving as infantry, will be at New York, from the same quarter, in fourteen days. All these reënforcements, excepting Sherman's battery, may be too late for this place. For the interval I have sent Colonel Smith (the immediate commander of all the forces in the District of Columbia) to learn what number of reliable volunteers can be obtained in this city, and have also desired him to see whether the companies already here may not be advantageously concentrated near to the President's square. I beg leave to suggest that a small war steamer, to cruise between Alexandria and the Long Bridge over the Potomac, would be of great importance to the system of defense that we are planning.*

* Unpublished MS.

General Scott's daily report, April 9, 1861;

I suggested to the Secretary of War yesterday the calling out, say ten companies, of the militia or (by substitution) uniformed volunteers of this city to aid in the defense of the public buildings and other public property of the Capital against "an invasion or insurrection, or probable prospect thereof." The necessity for this additional force, and the manner of employing it, were yesterday pretty fully discussed before the Secretary of War by Colonel Smith, Colonel Stone (two most excellent officers), and myself. Colonel Stone, inspector-general to Major-General Weightman's division, thinks that twice that number of loyal volunteers can be promptly furnished by the division, and I apprehend that the twenty companies may be deemed necessary in a few days. I hope that the President may give the Secretary of War the authority to make the call for ten companies at once. . . I have this moment received the President's instructions of this date, through the Secretary of War, on the safety of this District.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 9, 1861.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SCOTT.

Sir: I am instructed by the President of the United States to direct you to take all necessary precautions for protecting this Capital against a surprise or any assault whatever, and that for this object, among other means, you proceed forthwith to mature a plan under the 24th Section of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act more effectually to provide for the organization of the militia of the District of Columbia," approved March 3, 1803, and that you advise the President whenever in your judgment the occasion shall have arisen for the President's action under said section.

Very respectfully, SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJ.-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, April 9, 1861.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 9.

I. A Military Department to be taken from the Department of the East and called the Department of Washington is hereby constituted, to consist of the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia, according to its original boundary.

Brevet-Colonel C. F. Smith, 10th Infantry, is assigned to the command of this Department according to his brevet rank. Headquarters at Washington City. . . . By order:

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*†

General Scott's daily report, April 11, 1861:

Several companies of District volunteers were mustered into the pay and service of the United States yesterday and this forenoon, and the process is still going on. A few individuals in several companies declining to take the oath of allegiance to the United States were of course rejected; but I am happy to report that five or six other companies have sworn allegiance without excepting a man. The stripping of the rejected men yesterday of their arms, accoutrements and uniforms, by their own officers, has, I learn, had a fine effect upon the patriotism and devotion of the entire militia of the District. A fine company, not one of the ten called for, having presented itself this morning, of its own motion, and requested it might be accepted, I did not hesitate to consent, and hope for approval. Before night we shall have probably eleven companies sworn in. The Clerk of the House of Representatives having, through the Secretary of War, desired that a company might be assigned to guard the Capitol, I shall instruct Col. Smith to comply with that reasonable request.*

† War Records.

General Scott's daily report, April 13, 1861:

The two companies of dismounted cavalry arrived last night, as I had anticipated in my report of yesterday. At my instance the Secretary of War has called for four other companies of District volunteers, which will make in all fifteen companies of this description for the defense of the Capital, besides six companies of regulars, the marines at the Navy Yard, and (I hope very soon) the war steamer to cruise on the Potomac between the Long Bridge and a point a little below Alexandria. The next regular reënforcements to be expected here are: Sherman's battery of flying artillery from Minnesota, and the companies of foot artillery from the same quarter, in five and seven days; and a portion of the troops expected in the next steamer from Texas. From the same steamer I shall have the means of reënforcing Fort McHenry (at Baltimore), a most important point.*

These extracts show us the steps which were being quietly taken by the Government to meet the possible dangers growing out of the Fox expedition to Charleston. They included every resource which the regular army then afforded; and to call upon the militia of the States was, of course, at that moment out of the question, as it would have frustrated the very result the President had planned and anticipated.

The Sumter fleet finally at sea, the official notice sent to Governor Pickens, and the work of enrolling militia for the defense of Washington progressing so satisfactorily, Lincoln again set himself, during the brief respite, to the work of making the new appointments. Ordinarily this was only an act of official favor or partisan reward, which might be performed at leisure; but now it was also a work of pressing need, because of the imperative duty of substituting faithful and loyal agents for indifferent or treasonable ones in the public service. That such abounded, the numerous resignations and still more plentiful avowals made manifest beyond a doubt. The city was full of strangers; the White House full of applicants from the North. At any hour of the day one might see at the outer door and on the staircase one file going, one file coming. In the anteroom and in the broad corridor adjoining the President's office there was a restless and persistent crowd,— ten, twenty, sometimes fifty, varying with the day and hour,— each one in pursuit of one of the many crumbs of official patronage. They walked the floor; they talked in groups; they scowled at every arrival and blessed every departure; they wrangled with the door-keepers for right of entrance; they intrigued with them for surreptitious chances; they crowded forward to get even as much as an instant's glance through the half-opened door into the Executive chamber. They besieged the representatives and senators who had privilege of precedence; they glared with envy and growled with jealousy at the Cabinet ministers who, by right and usage, pushed through the throng and walked unquestioned through the doors. At that day the arrangement of the rooms compelled the President to pass through this corridor and the midst of this throng when he went to his meals in the other end of the Executive Mansion; and thus, once or twice a day, the waiting expectants would be rewarded by the chance of speaking a word, or handing a paper direct to the President himself — a chance which the more bold and persistent were not slow to improve.

At first, Lincoln bore it all with the admirable fortitude acquired in Western political campaigns. But two weeks of this experience on the trip from Springfield to Washington, and six weeks more of such beleaguering in the Executive office, began to tell on his nerves. What with the Sumter discussion, the rebel negotiation, the diplomatic correspondence, he had become worked into a mental strain and irritation that made him feel like a prisoner behind the Executive doors, and the audible and unending tramp of the applicants outside impressed him like an army of jailers. We can well imagine how it intensified the suspense with which he awaited the news from the fleet and the answer to his official communication to the governor of South Carolina.

Amid such surroundings and labors the President received the news which now reached the whole country from Sumter. It came very gradually — first the military scurry about Charleston; then Beauregard's demand for a surrender, followed by Anderson's prompt refusal; and finally, on the morning of Saturday, April 13, the newspapers of Washington, like those of every city in the Union, North and South, were filled with the startling head-lines and the thrilling details of the beginning and progress of an actual bombardment. That day, however, there was little change in the routine of the Executive office. Mr. Lincoln was never liable to sudden excitement or sudden activity. Through all his life, and through all the unexpected and stirring events of the rebellion, his personal manner was one of steadiness of word and act. It was this quality which, in the earlier stages of the war, conveyed to many of his visitors the false impression of his indifference. His sagacity gave him a marked advantage over other men in enabling him to forecast probable events; and when they took place, his great caution restrained his comments and controlled his outward bearing. Oftentimes, when men came to him in the rage and transport of a first indignation over some untoward incident,

* Unpublished MS.

they were surprised to find him quiet, even serene,— perhaps with a smile on his face and a jest on his lips,— engaged in routine work, and prone to talk of other and more commonplace matters. Of all things the strut and stagey exhibition of mock-heroism were foreign to his nature. Generally it happened that when others in this mood sought him, his own spirit had already been through the fiery trial of resentment — but giving no outward sign, except at times with lowered eyebrow, a slight nodding and shaking of the head, a muttering motion or hard compression of the lips, and, rarely, an emphatic downward gesture with the clenched right hand. His judgment, like his perception, far outran the average mind. While others fumed and fretted at things that were, all his inner consciousness was abroad in the wide realm of possibilities busily searching out the dim and difficult path towards things to be. His easy and natural attention to ordinary occupations afforded no indication of the double mental process which was habitual with him.

So, while the Sumter telegrams were on every tongue and revengeful indignation was in every heart, there was little variation in the business of the Executive Mansion on that eventful Saturday. The miscellaneous gathering was larger there, as it was larger at the Departments, the newspaper and telegraph offices, and the hotels. More leading men and officials called to learn or to impart news. The Cabinet, as by a common impulse, came together and deliberated awhile. All talk, however, was brief, sententious, informal. The issue had not yet been reached. Sumter was still under fire. Nevertheless, the main question required no discussion, not even decision, scarcely an announcement. Jefferson Davis's order and Beauregard's guns had sufficiently defined the coming action of the Government. After this, President, functionaries, and people had but a single purpose, a single duty. Lincoln said little beyond making inquiries about the current reports and criticising the probability or accuracy of their details, and went on receiving visitors, listening to suggestions or recommendations, and signing routine papers as usual throughout the day.

One important exception deserves to be noticed. A committee from the Virginia convention had an appointment for a formal audience with him that morning. The doubling and drifting attitude of the Old Dominion has already been described. The boasted conservatism of that convention was a sham. Its Unionism was vague and traditional; its complaint and contumacy were real and present. Day by day, with the loudest professions of loyalty on their lips, its majority was apologizing to its minority, and by labored argument against secession steadily convincing itself that treason was a necessity if not a duty. Recoiling from the fire of civil war, it yielded itself the more than half-willing cat's-paw of conspiracy. Bewailing the denial of shadowy claims of constitutional rights, it soon voluntarily put on the handcuffs of a grinding military despotism. A step in this road to political ruin was the appointment of a committee to visit Lincoln, requesting that he should define his policy, which request was only a covert and threatening demand for the evacuation of the Southern forts.

To this committee, Messrs. Preston, Stuart, and Randolph, respectively a "conservative," a "Unionist," and a "secessionist," the President read his reply just written,* on this morning of Saturday, April 13. The paper is temperate and dispassionate even to coldness, and indicates his ability to lift questions of public consideration out of the hot, blinding plane of personal feeling into the cool light of reason and expediency. While the rebel guns were still raining bombs and red-hot shot on Sumter, he had already mapped out his course of procedure, based on the facts within his knowledge, but free from all trace of excitement or feeling of revenge.

He told them he had distinctly defined his policy in the inaugural address. It was still the plain and unmistakable chart of his intentions. It had been his plan to hold only the forts still occupied by the Government when he became President.

> But if [he continued], as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these places an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the Government was devolved upon me. And in every event I shall, to the extent of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the States which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands this. I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and property situated within the States which claim to have seceded as yet belonging to the Government of the United States as much as they did before the supposed secession. Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon a border of the country. From the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it must not be inferred that I repudiate any other part, the whole of which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may be regarded as a modification.†

* Committee, Report. "Richmond Enquirer," April 16, 1861.

† Lincoln to committee, April 13, 1861. MS.

In this reply of the President we have his entire administrative policy regarding the rebellion; but it must be noted that it goes only to the extent of his actual information — it deals only with accomplished facts. The programme of the inaugural is already modified; the modification is slight but significant, and based not upon caprice or resentment, but on necessity. According to fair interpretation of language, the programme of the inaugural was that he would execute the laws of the Union in all the States to the extent of his ability; hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and collect the duties and imposts. This he would do, however, only so far as it was necessary to protect and defend the Federal authority, not merely against domestic violence, but more especially against foreign influence or aggression. He would not invade, subjugate, menace, or harass local communities. All boundaries of the nation, sea-board or inland, he must, of necessity, hold and guard; he must occupy and control every custom-house or an efficient equivalent for it. The favorite theory was that duties might be collected on ship-board in insurgent ports, and thus avoid the friction of customs officers with the local populace. On inland boundaries other substitutes might perhaps be devised. So, also, he explains in his reply, the military posts he had intended to "hold, occupy, and possess" were this cordon of forts on the exterior boundary, all of which were still in Union hands when he was inaugurated. The interior places seized under Buchanan's administration he would not immediately grasp at with the military hand; he would forego the exercise of Federal offices in disaffected districts in the interior; as a means of reassurance and reconciliation he would even send the malcontents their regular mails, if they would permit him. All this not as a surrender of a single Federal right, but to avoid violence, bloodshed, irritation; to create a feeling of safety; to induce calm reflection; to maintain peace; to restore fraternal sympathies and affections. "You can have no conflict," he had told them, "without being yourselves the aggressors."

But, in immediate connection with the tender of this benign policy, he had also warned them that it would be modified or changed if "current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper." That experience had now come. The rebels had rejected the tendered immunity, spurned the proffered peace, become the aggressors, opened the conflict in deliberate malice. He therefore modified his plan. He would repel force by force. He would withdraw the mails. He would recapture Sumter, taken since his inauguration, and, if he could, such other forts and places taken under his predecessor as were essential to safety. Thus much was necessary for protection and for precaution. Less he could not do and fulfill his oath of office. Once more he told them that while he now felt himself by their act compelled to close and bolt the strong doors of Federal authority, he would yet refrain from even the appearance of punishment. Though he gave them to understand that he might attack the rebel batteries on Morris Island, or recapture Pensacola Navy Yard, or build a fort on Arlington Heights to protect Washington, yet he would "not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country."

His reply to the committee must be received with the same qualification which he attached to his inaugural. He still reserved the right to use his best discretion in every exigency, and to change his acts under the inspiration of current events and experiences. The events of the day were his beacons; the necessities of the hour formed his chart. Throughout the tedious four-years' war he pretended to no prophecy and recorded no predictions. When souls of little faith and great fear came to him with pertinacious questioning, he might possibly tell them what he had done; he never told them what he intended to do. "My policy is to have no policy," was his pithy axiom oftentimes repeated; whence many illogically and most mistakenly inferred him to be without plans or expedients. His promise to the Virginia committee must therefore be regarded as binding under the conditions of that day, namely: seven cotton-States leagued in rebellion; actual war begun; seven thousand rebels in arms at Charleston; Sumter under fire with prospect of capitulation; Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and other border States yet in the Union under loud protestations of loyalty and unceasing deprecation of civil war. Lincoln's reservation was well considered. One week from that day these conditions were transformed almost beyond comparison, compelling him to a widely different line of action. On the day they received their answer, the Virginia committee had an engagement to dine with Secretary Seward; but in view of the Sumter telegrams, they excused themselves and hurried back to Richmond.

By the next morning (Sunday, April 14) the news of the close of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet, together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the

Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15 (Monday), but was made and completed on Sunday. This proclamation, by authority of the Act of 1795, called into service seventy-five thousand militia for three months, and convened Congress in extra session on the coming 4th of July. It commanded treasonable combinations to disperse within twenty days, and announced that the first object of this military force was to repossess the forts and places seized from the Union.* This limit of time was made obligatory by the terms of the second section of the Act of 1795, under which the call was issued. It was necessary to convene Congress, and the law only authorized the use of the militia "until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress."

In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger force should have been called at once. They forget that this was nearly five times the then existing regular army, and that in the Mexican war Scott had marched from Vera Cruz to the capital with twenty-five thousand men. They forget that only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies were in the Northern arsenals. They forget that the treasury was bankrupt, and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five.† They forget that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited scarcely a single spark of war feeling; that the great American public had suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the *Star of the West* with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the attacks from within, the sneers from without — that faith seemed gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was measurably changed. But it was under such circumstances that Lincoln issued his call for seventy-five thousand men to serve three months. Even that number appeared a hazardous experiment — an immense army, a startling expenditure. As matters stood, it seemed enough to cope with the then visible forces of the rebellion; the President had no means of estimating the yet undeveloped military power of the insurgent States. The ordinary *indicia* to accurate administration were wanting. To a certain degree the Government was compelled to sail in a fog. But it is precisely in such emergencies that men like Lincoln are the inestimable possession of free nations. Hopeful, moderate, steadfast, he never for an instant forgot that he was the pilot, not the ship. He remembered what he had said in the inaugural:

> If the Almighty Ruler of nations with his eternal truth and justice be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people.

He felt quite as confident that this popular justice would ultimately translate itself into armed might. But, holding this faith, he was not carried away by any too sanguine impulses. While discussing the proclamation, some of his advisers made a disparaging contrast of Southern enterprise and endurance with the Northern. This indulgent self-deception he checked at the very outset.

> We must not forget [he said] that the people of the seceded States, like those of the loyal ones, are American citizens, with essentially the same characteristics and powers. Exceptional advantages on one side are counterbalanced by exceptional advantages on the other. We must make up our minds that man for man the soldier from the South will be a match for the soldier from the North and *vice versâ*. ‡

The action of the Government brought in its train countless new duties and details. Both at the departments and the Executive Mansion the Sunday was one of labor, not of rest — no end of plans to be discussed, messages to be sent, orders to be signed. The President's room was filled all day as by a general reception. Already the patriotic echoes were coming in from an excited country. Governor Ramsey of Minnesota telegraphed that he could send a thousand men, and other localities made similar tenders. Senators and representatives yet in Washington felt authorized to pledge the support of their States by voice and arms. Of all such words of cheer, it is safe to say none were personally so welcome and significant as the unreserved encouragement and adhesion of Senator Douglas of Illinois.

* Lincoln, proclamation April 15, 1861.

† The following letter to President Lincoln, dated Treasury Department, April 2, 1861, is from unpublished MS.:

> My Dear Sir: The bids for the $8,000,000 loan exceed 33,000,000 — the average advance from Mr. Dix's loan is from 3 to 4 per cent. The highest bid — for only $1000 though — is par, and near $3,000,000 at 94; and I hardly think of taking any at lower rates. I am offered ⅛ per cent. premium on $2,000,000 treasury notes. All this shows decided improvement in finances and will gratify you.
>
> Yours, most truly, S. P. Chase.

‡ J. G. N., personal recollection.

Having, through a friend, signified his desire for an interview, Douglas went to the Executive Mansion between 7 and 8 o'clock on this same Sunday evening, April 14, and being privately received by the President, these two remarkable men sat in confidential interview, without a witness, nearly two hours. What a retrospect their singular careers must have forced into memory, if not into words, in this eventful meeting! — their contemporary beginnings in Illinois; the flat-boatman in Sangamon, the auctioneer's clerk in Scott county; their first meetings in country lawsuits; their encounters in the legislature; their greetings in society; their intellectual wrestlings on the stump; their emulation in local politics; their simultaneous leadership of opposing parties in the State; their champion contest for the Senate, ending in Douglas's triumph; their rival nominations for the Presidency, resulting in Lincoln's success. This was not the end. Both men were in the conscious prime of intellect; both believed themselves still in the undiminished vigor of physical manhood. Recognizing his defeat, Douglas was by no means conquered. If Lincoln was in the White House, he was yet in the Senate. Already in a Senate debate he had opened his trenches to undermine and wreck Lincoln's administration. Already he had set his subtle sophistry to demonstrate that the revenue laws gave the Executive no authority for coercion. His usual skill in debate, however, failed him on this occasion; and allowing himself to be carried along in a singularly weak and illogical argument, intended to force Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party into compromises to satisfy the border States and through their influence reclaim the cotton-States, he committed the serious blunder of declaring it unlawful and unwise to enforce the revenue laws in the insurrectionary ports or to recapture or hold their harbor defenses, except at Key West and Tortugas, which alone, he seemed to think, were "essentially national." He strongly deprecated the "reduction" and "subjugation" of the seceded States; and, declaring himself in favor of peace, said, with emphasis: "War is disunion. War is final, eternal separation." Perhaps intending merely to emphasize his attitude of mediation, he carelessly permitted himself to make a plea to tolerate accomplished secession.* All this was very far short of the language of his letter of acceptance, that "the laws must be administered, the constituted authorities upheld, and all unlawful resistance to these things must be put down with firmness, impartiality, and fidelity." The adjournment of the Senate had terminated the debate without issue. Douglas was still lingering in Washington, when suddenly the whole country was holding its breath at the report of the outrage in Charleston harbor.

Wedded too closely to the acts of the demagogue, Douglas nevertheless possessed the vision and power of the statesman in a high degree. Past failures had come to him not so much through lack of ability, as through adherence to vicious methods. Estimating success above principle, he had adopted reckless expedients, and leagued himself with questionable and dangerous combinations; and his speech of the 15th of March was only a new instance of his readiness to risk his consistency and his fame for a plausible but delusive trick in party strategy. Until this time, throughout all his minor heresies, he had kept himself true and unspotted on one high point of political doctrine. The Union must be preserved, the laws enforced. In the face of temptation and defeat, in New Orleans and in Norfolk as boldly as in New York, he had declared that if Lincoln were elected he must be inaugurated and obeyed. This was popular sovereignty, genuine and undefiled. It was against this principle that the challenge had been hurled at Sumter, and the incident furnished Douglas the opportunity to retrieve the serious mistake of his recent Senate speech. That assault could no longer be disguised as lawful complaint or constitutional redress — it was the spring of a wild beast at the throat of the nation. It changed the issue from coercion to anarchy.† No single act of Douglas's life so strongly marks his gift of leadership as that he now saw and accepted the new issue, and without a moment's hesitation came forward and placed himself beside Lincoln in defense of the Government — the first as well as the greatest "war Democrat." An army with banners, not a marshal with a writ, was now the constitutional remedy. In the face of unprovoked military assault Douglas waived all personal rivalry and party issues, and assured Lincoln, without questions or conditions, of his help to maintain the Union.

With frankness and generosity as Lincoln's ruling instincts, his long-continued political contests with Douglas had always been kept within the bounds of personal and social courtesy, if we except their Illinois joint debates, where the heat of discussion had once or twice carried them to the verge of a personal quarrel. Those passages, however, were long since

* Douglas, Senate speech, March 15, 1861. "Globe."

† The very existence of the people in this great valley depends upon maintaining inviolate and forever that great right secured by the Constitution, of freedom of trade, of transit, and of commerce, from the center of the continent to the ocean that surrounds it. . . .

forgotten by both. The present emergency was too grave for party feeling. Lincoln knew Douglas too well to underrate him. It was the President's method to apply the representative principle to problems of statesmanship. It did not need an instant's reflection to remember that next in value to the rank and file of the Republican party was the voluntary alliance of a great leader whom more than a million voters in the North had so lately followed unflinchingly to inevitable political defeat, and with whom that leader now offered to reënforce the defenders of the Union. If Lincoln had ever doubted the wisdom of his Sumter policy, which had kept open the road to this alliance, it was here vindicated. On the following morning, side by side with Lincoln's proclamation, the whole country read the telegraphic announcement of the interview and the authorized declaration that while Douglas was yet "unalterably opposed to the Administration on all its political issues, he was prepared to sustain the President in the exercise of all his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, and maintain the Government, and defend the Federal capital." * If there had been any possible uncertainty in the premises before, this was sufficient to make the whole North a unit in demanding the suppression of the rebellion.

The proposition now is to separate these United States into little petty confederacies. First, divide them into two; and then, when either party gets beaten at the next election, subdivide again; then, whenever one gets beaten again, another subdivision; and then, when you beat on governor's election, the discomfited will rebel again, and so it will go on. And if this new system of resistance by the sword and bayonet to the results of the ballot-box shall prevail here in this country of ours, the history of the United States is already written in the history of Mexico. . . . It is not a question of union or disunion. It is a question of order; of the stability of the Government; of the peace of communities. The whole social system is threatened with destruction and with disruption. Douglas, speech at Bellair, April 22, 1861.

* Press telegram, April 15, 1861.

Mch 1888

AN EASTERN LEGEND.

AT his Beloved's door he knocked, unheeding
The mocking echoes drifting idly by:
Then called a voice — the while his glad heart bounded —
"Ah, who is there?" He answered, "It is I."
"Think not these walls," the sweet, clear voice resounded,
"These palace walls will me and thee contain."
The shining door stood barred! His fervent pleading
Was spent in vain.

In solitude, where desert sands are gleaming,
Burned on his changeless love through patient years;
Once more he comes, and knocks with trembling fingers;
Once more his soul a thrilling music hears.
Once more that voice across the silence lingers —
"Ah, who is there?" He answers, "*It is thou!*"
The door flies back! The sudden splendor, streaming,
Enfolds him now!

Charlotte W. Thurston.

A FAR CRY TO HEAVEN.

WHAT! dost thou pray that the outgone tide be rolled back on the strand,
The flame be rekindled that mounted away from the smoldering brand,
The past-summer harvest flow golden through stubble-lands naked and sear,
The winter-gray woods up-gather and quicken the leaves of last year? —
Thy prayers are as clouds in a drouth; regardless, unfruitful, they roll;
For this, that thou prayest vain things, 't is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

Thou dreamest the word shall return, shot arrow-like into the air,
The wound in the breast where it lodged be balmed and closed for thy prayer,
The ear of the dead be unsealed till thou whisper a boon once denied,
Thy white hour of life be restored, that passed thee unprized, undescried! —
For this, that thou prayest fond things, thy prayers shall fall wide of the goal;
God bloweth them back with a breath, 't is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

And cravest thou fondly the quivering sands shall be firm to thy feet,
The brackish pool of the waste to thy lips be made wholesome and sweet?
And cravest thou subtly the bane thou desirest be wrought to thy good,
As forth from a poisonous flower a bee conveyeth safe food? —
For this, that thou prayest ill things, thy prayers are an anger-rent scroll;
The chamber of audit is closed,—'t is a far cry to Heaven, my soul,—
Oh, a far cry to Heaven!

Edith M. Thomas.

SOME PUPILS OF LISZT.

ONE sultry noonday in July, 1885, a small group of musical celebrities from Berlin stood hatless — having converted their head-covering into temporary fans — in the shade of a low, uneven row of ancient houses in the city of Weimar and expectantly watched the nearest turn in the street. Just as the heat was pronounced insupportable two well-known figures sauntered arm-in-arm around the corner — one, the venerable form of Franz Liszt, his flowing white locks surmounted by an old-fashioned tile hat, his shirt-collar thrown open revealing a throat which rivaled in color the high flush of his visage; and the other, Eugene d'Albert, a short youth with a round face and small black eyes, whose heavy shock of dark brown hair fell about his neck *à la* Liszt and was topped by an artist's wide-brimmed slouch hat, the crown of which just brushed the master's shoulder. It was not the odd contrasting couple which so forcibly impressed all beholders alike. It was the two great men of genius walking side by side — a tottering old man with one foot already in the grave, and his pupil, the younger by half a century and in the very spring-time of life: one, the greatest piano virtuoso of any time, behind whom lay an unprecedentedly brilliant career of more than three-score years; the other, though scarcely more than a lad, the most famous musical artist of his generation, with a future of unlimited possibilities just opening up for him. Little D'Albert had only three years previously severed his leading strings, and now with half Europe at his feet, the central figure in the musical world that his genius had conquered, he had returned to the guide and counselor of his student days. These two exchanged greetings with the gentlemen who had come, with D'Albert, on a twenty-four-hours' visit to the city, and then they crossed the stony way in a body to the cooler shade of Chemnitiuss' restaurant garden to partake of a dinner in Liszt's honor.

This noteworthy meeting of master and pupil always recurs to my mind when asked, "Do any of Liszt's later pupils give promise of greatness, or at least of proving themselves eminently worthy such a teacher?" If in reply I begin with Eugene d'Albert, it is because he was the first of the group to come prominently before the public; and justice to others compels me to add in the same sentence Arthur Friedheim, Alfred Reisenauer, Alexander Siloti, and Adèle aus der Ohe. It

Well, suh, he made dat tailor meck ev'ything bran' new;
He would n' wear one stitch he had on han'—
Jes th'owed 'em in de chip-box, an' says, "Sam, dem 's for you"—
Marse Phil, I tell you, wuz a gentleman!

So Marse Phil cotes de mistis, an' Sam he cotes de maid —
We al'ays sot we traps upon one parf;
An' when ole marster hear we bofe wuz gwine, he say'd,
"All right; we 'll have to kill de fatted calf."

An' dat wuz what dee did, suh; de Prodigal was home;—
Dee put de ring an' robe upon you' ma;
Den you wuz born, young marster, an' den de storm hit come —
An' den de darkness settled from afar.

De storm hit comed, an' wrenchted de branches from de tree,
De war,— you' pa,— he 's sleep dyah on de hill;
An' dough I know, young marster, de war hit sot me free,
I jes says, "Yes, but tell me, whar 's Marse Phil?"

—"A dollar"— thankee, marster, you sutney is his son;
His ve'y spi't-an'-image, I declar'!
What say, young marster? Yes, suh, you say, it 's "*fibe*, not one"
You favors, honey, bofe you' Pa an' Ma!

Thomas Nelson Page.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE NATIONAL UPRISING.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE NATIONAL UPRISING.

JOHN A. ANDREW, GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS (1861–66).

THE guns of the Sumter bombardment awoke the country from the political nightmare which had so long tormented and paralyzed it. The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted, outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering-ground; war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or town council; war preparations in every public or private workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries; cartridge-making in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields; parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting, bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington; within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the country were almost completely turned from the industries of peace to the activities of war. The very children abandoned their old-time school-games, and played only at soldiering.

From every governor of every free State to whom the President's proclamation and the requisition of the Secretary of War were addressed, most gratifying and loyal answers were promptly returned. They not only promised to obey the call and furnish the regiments asked for, but in their replies reflected the unanimity with which their people rallied to the defense of the assaulted Union. "The governor's call was published on yesterday, and he has already received the tender of forty companies,"† said Illinois. "Our citizens throughout the State will respond with great enthusiasm to any call for sustaining the Government against the designs of the conspirators,"‡ said Vermont. "Ten days ago we had two parties in this State; to-day we have but one, and that one is for the Constitution and Union unconditionally,"§ said Iowa. The war spirit rose above all anticipation, and the offer of volunteers went far beyond the call. "We have 6000 men in camp here and will have 8000 men by to-morrow night. . . . I have also made a tender of six additional regiments to which I have received no answer. I shall put the six additional regiments in camp and under discipline, and hold them subject to the Government's order at least for a time."‖ Such was the greeting from Indiana. A no less inspiring report was made by her sister State. "I find

† Governor Yates and others to Lincoln, April 17, 1861. War Records.

‡ Governor Fairbanks to Cameron, April 18, 1861. War Records.

§ Governor Kirkwood to Cameron, April 18, 1861. War Records.

‖ Governor Morton to Cameron, April 23, 1861. War Records.

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that I have already accepted and have in camp, or ready to march instantly to it, a larger force than the thirteen regiments named as the contingent of Ohio under the late requisition of the President. Indeed, without seriously repressing the ardor of the people, I can hardly stop short of twenty regiments."* The telegrams and letters here quoted from are fair samples of the language and spirit, the promptness and devotion, with which the people of the North answered the President's official summons. Especial mention deserves to be made of the untiring zeal and labors of the various executives of the free States in organizing and equipping troops, which earned for them the popular and honorable title of the "war governors."

If we would catch a glimpse of the dramatic forms in which popular fervor manifested itself in the President's own State, we need but read how the town of Quincy, Illinois, sent away her first company:

> Yesterday, Sunday, Captain Prentiss left with his command for Springfield. At 12 M. all the pastors of the city, with their congregations, met the gallant captain and his loyal company in Washington Square, to give them a parting benediction. Six or seven thousand persons were present. A banner was presented, a hymn was sung, prayer was made, and the soldiers addressed by one of the clergymen and myself. We then marched with them to the depot, where the "Star Spangled Banner" was sung, many thousands joining in the chorus. The scene altogether was the most solemn and impressive I have ever witnessed, and showed unmistakably how intensely the fires of patriotism are burning in the hearts of our people.†

In the Gulf States the revolutionary excitement rose to a similar height, but with contrary sentiment. All Union feeling and utterance instantly vanished; and, overawed by a terrorism which now found its culmination, no one dared breathe a thought or scarcely entertain a hope for the old flag. The so-called Government of the Confederate States, finally convinced that it must at length confront actual war, made such haste as it could to put an army in the field, manifesting meanwhile an outward gayety at the prospect which its members could hardly have felt at heart. Montgomery telegrams stated that the cabinet of the Confederate States read President Lincoln's proclamation "amid bursts of laughter."‡ Mr. A. H. Stephens was reported as saying in an Atlanta speech that it would require 75 times 75,000 men to intimidate the South. In addition to the 21,000 volunteers conditionally asked for on April 8, the rebel Secretary of War notified the governors of the seven cotton-States that 32,000 more must be immediately got ready to take the field,§ and also asked that the forts and military posts in their limits be formally turned over to the control of the Montgomery authorities.‖ Arkansas and Tennessee not yet being members of the Confederacy, permission was asked of their executives to plant batteries to blockade the Mississippi.¶ Spare guns from the captured Charleston forts were sent South, and extraordinary efforts were made to concentrate an army at Pensacola for the reduction of Fort Pickens.

It was at this time (April 17) that Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation, inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal, under which privateers were offered the opportunity to roam the high seas and ravage the commerce of the United States "under the seal of these Confederate States." The final hope of the rebel leaders was in cotton and free trade; and they believed that privateering was the easy stepping-stone to European intervention. The reasoning was plausible, and the time not ill-chosen; but the proclamation found itself confronted by the prompt precautionary act of the United States Government. Two days later (April 19) President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, setting on foot a blockade of the rebel ports "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the laws of nations," and declaring that offenders under the pretended letters of marque would be held amenable to the laws against piracy.

Thus sixteen States in the North and seven States in the South stood opposed in the attitude and preparation of war. Between these two extremes of sentiment lay the debatable land of the border slave-States, the greater portion of their citizens tormented with anxiety, with doubt, with their affections evenly balanced between the Union on one hand and slavery on the other; with ties of consanguinity permeating alike the North and the South; with the horrible realization that in the impending conflict they were between the upper and the nether millstones. To a certain extent the governors of these States had hitherto professed to share the irresolution of their people. Openly they had still expostulated with the cotton-States against precipitate disunion, and urged instead that all the slave States should join in a convention and demand constitutional guarantees from the North. All this, however, was largely a mere pretext, because

* Governor Dennison to Cameron, April 22, 1861. War Records.

† Browning to Lincoln, April 22, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Press telegrams.

§ Walker to the governors, April 16, 1861. War Records.

‖ Walker to Brown, April 17, 1861. War Records.

¶ Walker to Governor Rector, April 17, and Governor Harris, April 19, 1861. War Records.

WILLIAM SPRAGUE, RHODE ISLAND.



WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, CONNECTICUT.



WILLIAM DENNISON, OHIO.

RICHARD YATES, ILLINOIS.



ALEXANDER W. RANDALL, WISCONSIN.

EDWIN D. MORGAN, NEW YORK.

ANDREW G. CURTIN, PENNSYLVANIA.



OLIVER P. MORTON, INDIANA.

SOME WAR GOVERNORS.

they very well knew that the extreme demands which they formulated would not be granted. Secretly, most of them were in the revolutionary plot; and when, by the assault on Sumter and President Lincoln's call for troops, they were compelled to take sides, all save two immediately gave their voice and help more or less actively in aid of rebellion.

This course they began by refusing the regiments called for under the President's proclamation. "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States," answered Governor Magoffin. "I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina." So ran the response from Governor Ellis. "The people of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives, and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation," was the reply from Governor Rector of Arkansas. "In such unholy crusade no gallant son of Tennessee will ever draw his sword," wrote Governor Harris. "Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with," said Governor Jackson of Missouri.

Chief among the plotting border-State executives was Governor Letcher of Virginia. A former chapter has set forth the drift of that State towards revolution under his leadership and inspiration. The apparent Union majority in the Virginia convention had somewhat restrained and baffled him and his coadjutors; but now they adroitly turned the fresh war excitement to their own advantage. The Virginia Unionists, like those of the other border States, had illogically aided secession by clamoring for the unconditional evacuation of Sumter and other forts. Now that the Government and the North resolved to repel force by force, the ground necessarily sank from under them. They were overwhelmed with arguments and reproaches. One or two vainly essayed to stem the tide. But when Anderson's flag went down even their measured and conditional patriotism withered in Richmond like Jonah's gourd. There was nothing more but brass-bands, meetings, war speeches, and torchlight processions. The Virginia commissioners reported Lincoln's answer to the convention without comment, and shrinking Unionists admitted that "if the President meant subjugation of the South, Virginia had but one course to pursue." Governor Letcher did not need any stronger hint. With a dramatic affectation of incredulity and deliberation, to impress not only public opinion, but especially the wavering, dissolving majority, he waited a day before telegraphing his refusal to furnish troops — repeating the staple phrase about "subjugation." Then, in the face of his own avowed project to capture Fort Monroe, and with the assaulting guns of Beauregard still ringing in his ears, he replied to Cameron, "You have chosen to inaugurate civil war."*

Meanwhile, the fever heat of the populace communicated itself to the convention. An outside "States Rights" assemblage of prominent Virginia politicians, which thronged into Richmond at this juncture, added its not inconsiderable tribute of pressure to the sweeping tide of treason. Under such impulses the convention went into secret session on Wednesday, April 17, and by a vote of 88 to 55 passed an ordinance of secession — or, as they softly phrased it, "An ordinance to repeal the ratification of the Constitution of the United States." On the same day Governor Letcher signed a proclamation announcing the dissolution of the Union and the existence of the rebel Provisional Government, and calling on all the armed regiments and companies of volunteers in the State to hold themselves in readiness for orders. Nor did his zeal confine itself to paper edicts. Under his instructions, doubtless matured and prepared in advance, seizures of the custom-house and Government buildings in Richmond, of a private powder depot in Lynchburg, and of a number of steamers in the James River were hurriedly made, and military movements set on foot to capture the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the United States navy yard at Norfolk.

Of the two remaining border slave-States, Delaware lay in such an isolated geographical position, and had withal so few slaves within her limits, that she was practically a part of the North, though still dominated in her local politics by pro-slavery influence.† Allied to the South rather by tradition than by present interest, her executive took refuge in a course of inaction. He replied by saying that the laws of Delaware gave him no authority to comply with the requisition of the Secretary of War, and that the organized volunteer companies of the State might at their option tender their services to the United States;‡ and to this effect he issued his official proclama-

* Letcher to Cameron, April 16, 1861. War Records.

† It would seem from the following that Delaware was not altogether free from the taint of rebellion:

"I sent to New Castle a regiment with which I design seizing the arms of four companies of secessionists now drilling in that place and Wilmington."— Patterson to Townsend, May 27, 1861. War Records.

‡ Burton to Cameron, April 25, 1861. War Records.

tion.* The people took him at his word, and by their own action bore a patriotic and honorable part in the dangers and achievements of the Union army.

Of more immediate and vital importance, however, than that of any other border slave-State, was the course of Maryland in this crisis. Between that State and Virginia lay the District of Columbia, originally ten miles square of Federal territory, containing the capital, the Government, and the public archives. In her chief city, Baltimore, centered three of the great railroad routes by which troops must approach Washington. It was a piece of exceptional good fortune that the governor of Maryland was a friend of the Union, though hardly of that unflinching fearlessness needed in revolutionary emergencies. Whatever of hesitancy or vacillation he sometimes gave way to resulted from a constitutional timidity rather than from a want of patriotism; and, with brief exceptions, to be more fully narrated, he was active and energetic in behalf of the Government. The population of the State was divided by a sharp antagonism, the Unionists having the larger numbers, the secessionists the greater persistence and daring. The city of Baltimore was so far corrupted by treasonable influences that Wigfall had established a successful recruiting office there for the rebel armies.† As yet, disunion was working secretly; but this for the present increased rather than diminished its effectiveness.

Like the other border-State executives, Governor Hicks had urged concession, compromise, peace, and joint border-State action to maintain the Union. In this, while his colleagues for the greater part merely used such talk to cover their meditated treachery, he was entirely sincere and patriotic. When Lincoln's call for troops reached him, he had no thought of refusing or resisting, but nevertheless hurried over to Washington to deprecate civil war, and to ask that Maryland soldiers should not be sent to subjugate the South.‡ Since the President had never entertained any purpose of "subjugation," he readily promised that the Maryland regiments should be employed to defend Maryland itself and the Federal district and capital. The governor thereupon wrote to the Secretary of War: "The condition of affairs in this State at this time requires that arms shall be placed in the hands of true men and loyal to the United States Government alone," and requested arms "for arming four regiments of militia for the service of the United States and the Federal Government."§ Other prominent Marylanders were already combining for demonstrative action to sustain the Government. A congressional election in the State was near at hand. On the day of the President's proclamation Henry Winter Davis announced himself, in a Baltimore evening paper, as a candidate for Congress "upon the basis of the unconditional maintenance of the Union." But the official announcements and the exciting rumors with which the newspapers were filled had also stirred the disunion elements of Maryland into unwonted activity, and the pressure of sentiment hostile to Federal authority was quickly brought to bear on Governor Hicks, and developed the timid and hesitating qualities of his character. He issued his proclamation April 18, containing, among many sage counsels in behalf of quiet and peace, two paragraphs doubtless meant by him for good, but which were well calculated to furnish the disunionists hope and encouragement:

> I assure the people that no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense of the national capital. . . . The people of the State will in a short time have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election for members of the Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up. ‖

With this outline view of the political condition of the country at large, and especially of the border States of Virginia and Maryland, let us follow events at the Federal capital as recorded in the daily reports of General Scott to the President. On April 15, the day on which Lincoln issued his first call for 75,000 troops, the general says, in his report No. 13:

> I have but little of special interest to report to-day, except that Colonel Smith, the commander of the Department of Washington, like myself, thinks our means of defense, with vigilance, are sufficient to hold this city till reënforcements arrive. I have telegraphed the commander at Harper's Ferry armory to say whether he can station, to advantage, for the defense of that establishment, additional recruits from Carlisle. The ground about the armory is very contracted and rocky.¶

General Scott's daily report, No. 14, April 16, then proceeds:

> For the President. He has no doubt been informally made acquainted with the reply of the officer commanding at Harper's Ferry, yesterday, viz.: that he wants no reënforcement. Nevertheless, as soon as the capital, the railroad to the Delaware at Wilmington, and Fort Monroe are made secure, my next object of attention will be the security of Harper's Ferry — proposing, in the mean time, or rather suggesting that the spare marines from the navy yards of Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and Boston be promptly sent to

* Burton, April 26, 1861. "Rebellion Record."
† War Records.
‡ Hicks to Lincoln, April 17, 1861. War Records.
§ Hicks to Cameron, April 17, 1861. War Records.
‖ Hicks, April 18, 1861. "Rebellion Record."
¶ Unpublished MS.

the Gosport navy yard. This relief may serve, by compelling the secessionists to enlarge their preparations, to give us time to send a regiment of volunteers to that important point, in advance of any formidable attack upon it. With the authority of the Secretary of War we are engaged in mustering into the service eight additional companies of District volunteers. These, I think, place the capital a little ahead of impending dangers, and we will maintain, at least, that advantage, till by the arrival (in a week) of regulars and abundant volunteers our relative advantage will, I trust, be more than doubled.*

General Scott's daily report, No. 15, April 17, 1861:

I repeat in writing some details which I had the honor to submit verbally to the President this forenoon. Three or four regiments from Massachusetts (believed to be the first ready under the recent call) may be expected (three of them) to arrive here, and (one of them) at Fort Monroe in two or three days. One of the three may, I think, be safely spared for Harper's Ferry, if the danger there (and I shall know to-morrow) shall seem imminent. Captain Kingsbury, a most capable officer of the Ordnance Department, goes up this afternoon for that purpose, and to act a few days as superintendent; that is, till a new appointment (of a civilian) can be made. Two of the Massachusetts regiments are needed here; one of them I shall endeavor to intercept at Baltimore and direct it to Harper's Ferry. As soon as one of the four reaches Fort Monroe, it perhaps may be safe to detach thence for the Gosport Navy Yard two or three companies of regulars to assist in the defense of that establishment. By to-morrow, or certainly the next day, we shall have Colonel Delafield here, an excellent engineer, to send to Gosport (with a letter from the Secretary of the Navy giving the necessary authority) to devise, in conjunction with the naval commander there, a plan of defense. Colonel Delafield will take instructions to call for the two or three companies of regulars as mentioned above. Excepting the reënforcement of marines suggested yesterday, and until the arrival of more volunteers, I know not what else can be done for the security of the Gosport Navy Yard. To-night all the important avenues leading into Washington shall be well guarded.*

General Scott's daily report, No. 16, April 18, 1861, shows how the undefined yet thickening dangers made themselves felt at headquarters:

For the President. I am (placed between many fires, Fort Monroe, Harper's Ferry, Gosport Navy Yard, etc., etc.) much embarrassed by the non-arrival of troops. Monday, the 15th instant, Senator Wilson had the quota of Massachusetts doubled, and on the ground of being entirely ready (as I understood) got permission that it should be at once pushed (farthest) to the South. Though equal to any volunteers in the world, the preference of being in the advance must have been given on that ground. In reply to Governor Andrew's telegram, I said (Tuesday night, the 16th) "Send first regiment which is ready by rail here. The second by rail or sea, as you prefer, to Fort Monroe." (I had but an hour before pointed out the route via Baltimore and the Chesapeake.) When I sent those telegrams (late in the night) I did not know that the War Department had already telegraphed the governor for one of his regiments to take a fast steamer to Fort Monroe and to send the other three here by rail.

Two and a half o'clock P. M. I have not heard anything further respecting the Massachusetts quota. At this instant the War Department has a telegram from Philadelphia saying that "The Massachusetts troops are here this afternoon. Leave to-morrow (Friday) morning early." Also another telegram to this effect: "Tell General Cameron [we] think that troops must go through from here to Washington, by day, in numbers of about 2000 at a time, so as to be ready to meet any emergency on the way." The Philadelphia [dispatch] does not say whether three or four regiments are there. I hope but three, and that the fourth will be to-night in Fort Monroe.

Last night I received a telegram from Major-General Sandford (of the city of New York) saying that "Under the orders of the governor, the 7th regiment (a crack corps) is ready to report to me. How shall it be sent?" I instantly replied, by rail, and added, "Telegraph me the hour of departure." I have as yet heard nothing further from Gen. S.

In respect to Harper's Ferry and the Gosport Navy Yard, both of which are in great peril, I can do nothing before the arrival of troops, beyond the instructions given this morning to send the third regiment that might arrive at Baltimore to Harper's Ferry — the first and second to continue on to Washington.

(Here a report reaches me that the railroad bridge over the Gunpowder, 28 miles beyond Baltimore, has been burned. †)

Colonel Delafield, whom I intended to send to Fort Monroe and the Gosport Navy Yard, has not arrived. If he comes to-night I shall send him to-morrow, hoping that he will find a Massachusetts regiment in position.

If land batteries should be planted on the Potomac to cut off our water communication, we must send an expedition and capture them.*

The current demoralization of politics in the country had infected the army and the navy; deadened the energy of Anderson, misdirected the zeal of Adams, caused the dishonor of Twiggs; had struck high and low — in New Orleans as in Charleston, in Texas as in Washington, carrying off now a paymaster or a lieutenant, now the quartermaster-general and the adjutant-general of the army. Among these victims of the States Rights heresy was yet another individual destined to a melancholy prominence in the rebellion, whom a pitiless fate called to the maintenance of a principle and a policy, not only of itself false and monstrous, but by him so recognized and acknowledged. This was Robert E. Lee, a West Point graduate, an accomplished and experienced soldier, frequently recognized and promoted, the captor of John Brown at Harper's Ferry, and recently (March 16, 1861) made colonel of the First Cavalry by the Lincoln administration; of fine presence, ripe judgment, and mature manhood, being then about two years older than President Lincoln. Lee was a favorite of Scott: under the call for troops the General-in-Chief at once selected him in his own mind as the most capable and promising officer in the service to

* Unpublished MS.

† This rumor proved incorrect. Such an occurrence, however, took place two days later, as we shall see.

become the principal commander in the field; and of this intention he spoke at the time to many without reserve, having no misgiving as to his loyalty.

Scott's confidence proved to be sadly misplaced. Repeated resignations and defections had very naturally engendered in the minds of President and Cabinet a distrust of every officer of Southern birth. Lincoln therefore requested F. P. Blair, senior, an intimate friend, to ascertain Lee's feelings and intentions. On the 18th of April, the third day after the President's call for troops, the day after Virginia's secret secession ordinance, and the day before the Baltimore riot, Mr. Blair invited Lee to an interview, informed him of the promotion and duties to which he was soon likely to be called, and thus unofficially offered him the command of the Union army. A flat contradiction exists as to the character of Lee's answer. Cameron, then Secretary of War, says he accepted the offer.* Montgomery Blair, then Postmaster-General, says he was undecided what he would do.† Both these gentlemen apparently derived their information from the elder Blair. On the other hand, Lee himself asserts that he declined the proposition, because, "though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States."‡ He further explains his motive to have been an unwillingness to "take part against my native State," or to "raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home."§ But in his interview with Blair he also affirmed that secession was anarchy; that if he owned the whole four million slaves of the South he would sacrifice them all to the Union; and he appears to have substantially repeated the sentiment written to his son a few weeks before, as follows:

> Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom, and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the confederacy at will. It was intended for "Perpetual Union," so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession. Anarchy would have been established, and not a government, by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the other patriots of the Revolution.‖

Under a liberal interpretation, Lee's personal denial must be accepted; but the times, the circumstances, his qualifying declarations, and the strong statements of Cameron and Blair clearly reveal his hesitation and indecision. After his interview with Blair, Lee sought an interview with Scott, where the topics which filled men's hearts and occupied men's lips — Union, secession, Virginia, subjugation, duty and honor, defection and treason — were once more, we may be quite sure, thoroughly discussed. It is morally certain that Scott, also a Virginian, gave Lee a lesson in patriotism; but he caught no generous emulation from the voice and example of his great chief. From Scott's presence Lee seems to have retired to his home and family at Arlington, to wrestle with the haunting shadows of duty. Pregnant news came to him, thick and fast. The secession of Virginia was verified in Washington that same evening. The next evening the Massachusetts 6th marched in mingled pride and sorrow to the Capitol, having an immortal record of service to their country. Here were new and important elements to influence his decision. Virginia seceded, Maryland in revolt, Washington threatened, Sumter lost, the border States defiant, the Confederate States arming, and uttering a half-official threat that the rebel flag should float over the Capitol by the 1st of May. If the walls of Arlington heard secret or open conferences with conspirators from Washington, or conspirators from Richmond,

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* General Lee called on a gentleman who had my entire confidence, and intimated that he would like to have the command of the army. He assured that gentleman, who was a man in the confidence of the Administration, of his entire loyalty, and his devotion to the interests of the Administration and of the country. I consulted with General Scott, and General Scott approved of placing him at the head of the army. The place was offered to him unofficially with my approbation, and with the approbation of General Scott. It was accepted by him verbally, with the promise that he would go into Virginia and settle his business, and then come back to take command.—[Hon. Simon Cameron, debate in U. S. Senate, Feb. 19, 1868.]

† General Lee said to my father when he was sounded by him, at the request of President Lincoln, about taking command of our army against the rebellion, then hanging upon the decision of the Virginia convention, "Mr. Blair, I look upon secession as anarchy. If I owned four millions of slaves in the South, I would sacrifice them all to the Union; but how can I draw my sword upon Virginia, my native State?" He could not determine then; said he would consult with his friend General Scott, and went on the same day to Richmond, probably to arbitrate difficulties; and we see the result.—[Hon. Montgomery Blair to Bryant, "National Intelligencer," August 9, 1866.]

‡ I never intimated to any one that I desired the command of the United States army, nor did I ever have a conversation but with one gentleman, Mr. Francis Preston Blair, on the subject, which was at his invitation, and, as I understood, at the instance of President Lincoln. After listening to his remarks, I declined the offer he made me, to take command of the army that was to be brought into the field, stating, as candidly and as courteously as I could, that, though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States.—[Lee to Reverdy Johnson, Feb. 25, 1868. Jones, "Life of Lee," p. 141.]

§ Lee to his sister, April 20, 1861. Ibid., p. 139.

‖ Lee to his son, Jan. 23, 1861. Ibid., p. 137.

no record of them has come to light; but Saturday, April 20, Lee wrote to his old commander:

GENERAL: Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt that I ought not longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once, but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which I have devoted all the best years of my life and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native State, I never desire again to draw my sword.

Lee was at the time, in military phrase, "on leave of absence"; and without waiting to hear whether his resignation had been accepted, or even recommended for acceptance, as he himself had urged — without awaiting further orders, or permission, or discharge, or dismissal from service, on the 22d of April he was, by the governor and the convention of Virginia, appointed to, and on the 23d, in Richmond, publicly invested with, chief command of the Virginia Confederate forces under the secret secession ordinance and Letcher's revolutionary proclamation, with all his military obligations to the United States intact and uncanceled; thus rendering himself guilty of desertion and treason.* No danger whatever menaced his "native State" — the President had positively disclaimed all intention to invade it. In due course of events we find him not alone defending his native State, to which he owed nothing, but seeking to destroy the Union, which had done everything for him; opposing war by promoting "revolution," and redressing grievances by endeavoring to establish "anarchy."

In instructive contrast with the weakness and defects of Lee, we have the honorable conduct and example of General Scott. He, too, was a Virginian who loved his native State. He, too, was opposed to secession and deprecated war. He, too, as officer, commander, diplomatist, and statesman, had learned from books and from men the principles and practice of loyalty, and perhaps better than any American exemplar was competent to interpret a soldier's oath, a soldier's duty, a soldier's honor. His sympathies were at least as earnestly with the South as with the North. To avoid bloodshed he had declared his individual willingness to say to the seceded States, "Wayward sisters, depart in peace." But underneath pride of home, affection of kindred, and horror of war, on the solid substratum of consistency and character, lay his recognition of the principle of government, his real, not simulated, veneration of the Constitution, his acceptance of the binding force of law, his unswerving fidelity to his oath, his undying devotion to his flag. The conspirators had long hoped for the assistance of his great name and authority. They filled the air with rumors of his disaffection. Since its abrupt secession ordinance, the Virginia convention had sat with closed doors; but through a responsible witness, we know that on the day on which Lee wrote his resignation (April 20) a committee of that convention called on General Scott to tempt him with the offer of the command of the Virginia forces. Senator Stephen A. Douglas, on his way home to arouse the great West in aid of Lincoln's proclamation, told the circumstance in graphic language to excited listeners:

I have been asked whether there is any truth in the rumor that General Scott was about to retire from the American army. It is almost profanity to ask that question. I saw him only last Saturday. He was at his desk, pen in hand, writing his orders for the defense and safety of the American capital. Walking down the street I met a distinguished gentleman, a member of the Virginia convention, whom I knew personally, and had a few minutes' conversation with him. He told me that he had just had an interview with Lieutenant-General Scott; that he was chairman of the committee appointed by the Virginia convention to wait upon General Scott and tender him the command of the forces of Virginia in this struggle. General Scott received him kindly, listened to him patiently, and then said to him, "I have served my country under the flag of the Union for more than fifty years, and as long as God permits me to live I will defend that flag with my sword, even if my own native State assails it."

Other eye-witnesses report that the rebuke contained an additional feature of unusual impressiveness. When the spokesman of the committee, a man of venerable years and presence, had vaguely and cautiously so far unfolded the glittering lure of wealth and honor which Virginia held out that the general could catch the drift of the humiliating

* The Army Regulations of 1857, having the authority and force of law, contained the following provisions:

"24. No officer will be considered out of service on the tender of his resignation, until it shall have been duly accepted by the proper authority.

. . . . . .

"28. In time of war, or with an army in the field, resignations shall take effect within thirty days from the date of the order of acceptance."

For the offense thus defined by the Regulations of 1857, the Act of August 5, 1861, provided specific punishment, as follows:

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any commissioned officer of the army, navy, or marine corps, who, having tendered his resignation, shall, prior to due notice of acceptance of the same by the proper authority, and, without leave, quit his post or proper duties with the intent to remain permanently absent therefrom, shall be registered as a deserter, and punished as such."

If it be contended that Lee's offense was committed prior to this last statute, the answer is that his transgression was a much graver one, for he not only absented himself with intent to remain, but immediately entered into hostile service, an act punishable under the broad principles of general military law.

proposal, Scott held up his hand and said emphatically, "Friend Robertson, go no farther. It is best that we part here before you compel me to resent a mortal insult."* That same afternoon Scott also telegraphed to Senator Crittenden, in response to an anxious inquiry based on the false rumors set afloat about him, "I have not changed. I have not thought of changing. Always a Union man." And in that unshaken mood of sublime patriotism he lived and died, beloved of his country, and honored by the world.

The Virginia secession ordinance, though secretly adopted on the 17th, became quickly known to the people of Richmond. It was immediately announced to the States Rights convention in session in another hall, and Governor Letcher, Senator Mason, ex-President Tyler, and ex-Governor Wise, from the convention, soon appeared there and glorified the event with speeches — the latter lamenting the "blindness which had prevented Virginia from seizing Washington before the Republican hordes got possession of it." Nevertheless, an effort was still made to prevent the news from going North.† But that evening some of the unconditional Union delegates from West Virginia — then yet a part of the Old Dominion — deemed it prudent to shake the Richmond dust from their feet and secure their personal safety by prompt departure. Delegates Carlisle and Dent were in Washington on the 18th, and in all probability informed Mr. Seward and the President how irretrievably Virginia was committed to rebellion, even if Governor Letcher's reply and proclamation had left any doubt on that point. Ominous rumors came from Harper's Ferry, and also (as we have seen) a premature report of the burning of the railroad bridges beyond Baltimore. On that day, too, a detachment of 460 Pennsylvania volunteers, "almost entirely without arms," and a company of regulars from Minnesota had been hurriedly forwarded from Harrisburg to Washington.‡ The unruly elements of Baltimore were already in commotion, the cars containing these men being in their passage through that city cheered by the crowd at some points and hooted and stoned at others, though no casualties occurred.§ Noting all these rumors and acts of hostility, Secretary Cameron telegraphed to Governor Hicks that "the President is informed that threats are made and measures taken by unlawful combinations of misguided citizens of Maryland to prevent by force the transit of United States troops across Maryland on their way, pursuant to orders, for the defense of this capital" — and strongly intimated to the governor that the loyal authorities of Maryland ought to put them down.‖

The events of the week — the daily mustering of volunteers, the preparations for defense, the telegrams from the various State capitals — had thrown Washington into a military fever. All the social sympathies of the permanent population of Washington, and especially of its suburbs, Georgetown and Alexandria, were strongly Southern; but the personal interests of its inhabitants and property holders were necessarily bound up with the course and fate of the existing Government. The Union manifestations were for the moment dominant, and volunteers came forward readily, even somewhat enthusiastically, to fill up the District quota. The city was also yet full of office-seekers from various States north and west. Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky, and Senator-elect James H. Lane of Kansas, both men of mark and courage, after an evening or two of flaming speech-making, organized them into respectively the "Clay Battalion" and the "Frontier Guards." These companies, of from thirty to sixty men each, were what might be called irregular volunteers — recruits from East and West, of all ranks in the great army of politics, who came forward to shoulder a musket without enlistment, commission, paymaster, or commissariat. By this time the danger had become so threatening that every scrap and show of military force was welcome and really useful. The Government furnished them arms, and gave them in charge of Major (afterwards General) David Hunter, who, on the evening of the 18th, stationed Clay's company in Willard's Hall, with orders to patrol the streets, and took Lane's Frontier Guards to the post of honor at the Executive Mansion. At dusk they filed into the famous East Room, clad in citizens' dress, but carrying very new, untarnished muskets, and following Lane, brandishing a sword of irreproachable brightness. Here ammunition-boxes were opened and cartridges dealt out; and after spending the evening in an exceedingly rudimentary squad drill, under the light of the gorgeous gas chandeliers, they disposed themselves in picturesque bivouac on the brilliant-patterned velvet carpet — perhaps the most luxurious cantonment which American soldiers have ever enjoyed. Their motley composition, their too transparent motive, their anomalous surroundings, the extraordinary emergency, their mingled awkwardness and earnestness,

* Townsend, "Anecdotes of the Civil War," p. 5.
† Jones, "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., p. 23.
‡ J. D. C. to Cameron, April 18, 1861.
§ Scharf, "History of Maryland."
‖ Cameron to Hicks, April 18, 1861. War Records.

rendered the scene a medley of bizarre contradictions,— a blending of masquerade and tragedy, of grim humor and realistic seriousness,— a combination of Don Quixote and Daniel Boone altogether impossible to describe. However, their special guardianship of the East Room lasted only for a night or two, until more suitable quarters could be extemporized; and for many days they lent an important moral influence in repressing and overawing the lurking treason still present in a considerable fraction among the Washington inhabitants.

The graphic pen of Bayard Taylor, who happened to be in Washington on this same afternoon of April 18, has left us a sharp and strong historical picture of the city at the time:

> Everywhere around me the flag of the Union was waving; troops were patrolling the streets, and yonder the watchful Marshal Lamon was galloping on the second horse he had tired out since morning. Everybody seemed to be wide awake, alert, and active. On reaching Willard's Hotel, the scene changed. The passages were so crammed that I had some difficulty in reaching the office. To my surprise, half the faces were Southern — especially Virginian — and the conversation was carried on in whispers. Presently I was hailed by several Northern friends, and heard their loud, outspoken expressions of attachment to the Union. The whisperers near us became silent and listened attentively. I was earnestly questioned as to whether the delay of the mails was occasioned by rails being torn up or bridges destroyed. Every one seemed to suspect that a treasonable demonstration had taken place in or near Baltimore. The most exciting rumors were afloat. Harper's Ferry was taken — Virginia had secretly seceded — Wise was marching on Washington — always winding up with the impatient question, "Why don't the troops come on?"

From Willard's Bayard Taylor went to the State Department, and afterwards to make a call on Lincoln. He continues:

> I need not describe the President's personal appearance, for nearly everybody has seen him. Honesty, firmness, and sound common sense were the characteristics with which personally he impressed me. I was very glad to notice the tough, enduring vitality of his temperament — he needs it all. He does not appear to be worn or ill, as I have heard, but, on the contrary, very fresh and vigorous. His demeanor was thoroughly calm and collected, and he spoke of the present crisis with that solemn, earnest composure which is the sign of a soul not easily perturbed. I came away from his presence cheered and encouraged.

BALTIMORE.

BALTIMORE, in 1861, was the great gateway of military approach from the Northern States to Washington. Lying at the head of the magnificent Chesapeake Bay, impossible to close by forts, it was also the common center and terminus of three principal railroad routes — respectively, from the Ohio River and the west; from Harrisburg and the lake region northward; from Philadelphia, covering New York and New England. With the South in rebellion, Washington had but two established routes of transportation left her — the Potomac River, a fine water highway, but flowing through hostile territory, and liable to be quickly obstructed by land batteries at narrow points; and a single line of railway, a distance of forty miles to Baltimore, subject entirely to the will or caprice of that great city of over two hundred thousand inhabitants, somewhat notorious for disorderly tendencies. It is therefore no marvel that the authorities, both State and Federal, watched the temper of her people with anxious solicitude. Two days after the President's call, Cameron asked the president of the great Pennsylvania road to take charge of the military transportation,* who, going personally to Baltimore, reported the secession feeling very strong, and expressed fears lest the secession of Virginia might carry Maryland with her.†

The Massachusetts men were the first under arms. Governor Andrew of that State had quietly organized and equipped a few regiments of militia in view of possible emergencies. The President's proclamation was published in the Boston morning papers on Monday, April 15; on Tuesday forenoon the 6th Massachusetts began mustering on Boston Common; on Wednesday evening, April 17, the completed regiment, with new rifles and filled cartridge-boxes, with benedictions on the regimental flag and amid the silent blessings of the multitude, embarked in railroad cars. As they sped southward they witnessed the manifestation of the popular uprising in the New England towns, the literally packed streets and the demonstrations of honor in New York, and the crowning enthusiasm in Philadelphia, where they arrived on the evening of the 18th. Here Colonel Jones, commanding the regiment, found General Robert Patterson organizing the Pennsylvania militia, and received from the military and railroad officers warning of apprehended danger in Baltimore; but, in obedience to what he deemed imperative orders from his governor, he determined to go forward — only delaying his progress that his somewhat wearied men might bivouac until after midnight, which arrangement would also permit them to pass through Baltimore by day. Before daylight the men were roused, and the train started from Philadelphia. Reaching the Susquehanna River, it overtook a corps of Pennsylvania volunteers — Small's brigade, over a thousand men — which, by

* Cameron to Thomson, April 17, 1861. War Records.

† Thomson to Cameron, April 17, 1861. War Records.

some neglect or disobedience of orders, had started for Washington without uniforms or arms. This corps was also attached to the train, which thus numbered more than thirty cars. The railroad officials, to guard against accident or treachery, sent a pilot engine ahead, and had arranged an interchange of cipher messages with their Baltimore office, from which, at succeeding stations as the train safely approached the city, repeated assurances were received that all was quiet, and no trouble need be feared. Nevertheless, with due soldierly caution, Colonel Jones made deliberate preparation; his command loaded and capped their rifles, while he went personally through the cars and issued the following explicit order:

> The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front, and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; but if you are fired upon, and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds; but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.

This order clearly contemplated a march through the city by the regiment in a body, which by some misunderstanding or change of plan on the part of the railroad managers was not carried out.

The train arrived at the Philadelphia or President street station, and the troops were again to take cars for Washington at the latter station. Accordingly, it was at this point that danger was apprehended, and protection of the police had been asked. The Baltimore authorities assert that, though they only received about half an hour's notice, they responded promptly, and the mayor, chief of police, and a considerable force were on hand and rendered effective service in protecting the transfer of the troops at the Washington station.

When, therefore, the train first halted at the Philadelphia or President street station on its arrival, Colonel Jones, instead of being notified to form his regiment for a march, as he expected, was astonished to find the first few cars drawn rapidly and separately through the streets by horses, which had been attached before he was well aware of what was going on. His own and seven or eight succeeding cars thus made the transit safely, and arriving at the Washington station the troops began to change cars. Here an immense crowd was gathered, and demonstrations of hostility immediately began. Says a newspaper account:

> The scene, while the troops were changing cars, was indescribably fearful. Taunts clothed in the most outrageous language were hurled at them by the panting crowd, who, almost breathless with running, pressed up to the car windows, presenting knives and revolvers, and cursed up into the faces of the soldiers. The police were thrown in between the cars, and forming a barrier, the troops changed cars, many of them cocking their muskets as they stepped on the platform.*

The peaceful passage of the cars through the streets was not, however, of long duration. When the ninth† car, containing the seventh company, issued from the Philadelphia depot, it was greeted with riotous insults by the crowd which had, during the unavoidable delay, rapidly gathered; and while passing over a portion of Pratt street, where certain street repairs were going on, the mob gathered up a pile of loose paving-stones which they hurled at the car, smashing in the windows and blinds, and adding to this method of assault an occasional shot from a pistol or a gun. Says a trustworthy account:

> The men were very anxious to fire on their assailants, but Major Watson forbade them. One or two soldiers



FROM THE PHILADELPHIA TO THE CAMDEN STATION.

Washington or Camden station. The two depots were perhaps a mile apart, the track connecting them running for the greater distance straight westward along Pratt street, excepting a short bend to the north at the beginning, and a corresponding short bend to the south near the end. It seems at the last moment to have been decided to follow the ordinary method of hauling the loaded cars from the Philadelphia depot to the Washington depot with horses, and to make the troops change cars at the

* "Baltimore Sun," April 20, 1861.

† There are discrepancies between the different accounts.

were wounded by paving-stones and bricks, and at length one man's thumb was shot, when, holding up the wounded hand to the major, he asked leave to fire in return. Orders were then given to lie on the bottom of the car and load, and rising to fire from the windows at will. These orders were promptly obeyed.*

Three times during the passage obstructions were laid on the track, requiring the car to be stopped till they could be removed. Under such repeated attacks this car reached the Washington depot. It had been a fight at long range, and in the shelter of the car no death had resulted to the troops. It is apparently at this juncture that the various authorities at the Washington depot became aware of the serious character of the riot. Colonel Jones was informed by the railroad superintendent that cars could no longer be hauled across the city, and he hurriedly wrote an order to the missing companies to join him by a forced march.*

Mayor Brown started immediately on foot for the scene of the disturbance. Marshal Kane, Chief of Police, devolved his command on a subordinate, and, collecting as many policemen as could be spared, also hastened eastward to join the mayor.

Exciting scenes were meanwhile enacted about the Philadelphia depot. The car of the seventh company having escaped their clutches as described, the rioters bethought themselves of permanently breaking communication between the two stations. Certain street repairs were at the time in progress along a portion of Pratt street. They seized the laborers' picks and shovels and tried to pry up the rails, but without success. Then they piled loose stones, and at another place a load of sand, on the track. Elsewhere they laid on the rails a number of heavy anchors dragged from a neighboring wharf. At still another place, they partly tore up a bridge. While the remaining four companies were waiting their turn to proceed, two of the railroad men informed them of the condition of affairs. Colonel Jones's order had failed to reach them; but the officers consulted together and, placing Captain Follansbee in command, resolved to go forward. The companies filed out of their cars, formed deliberately on the sidewalk, and, calling a policeman to lead the way, started on the perilous march. Almost at the very outset they encountered a hastily improvised procession, following a secession flag and marching directly towards them, which refused to yield the way. In an instant there were crowding, hustling, confusion, groans, hooting, cries of "nigger thieves," and a struggle for the capture and possession of the rebel flag. The soldiers pushed doggedly ahead, and, thinking to pass the crowd, broke into a double-quick. This encouraged the rioters, who took it as a sign of fear. They redoubled their yells, called them cowards, and followed them with showers of clubs and stones. After two or three blocks of such progress the soldiers reached the torn-up bridge. "We had to play 'Scotch-hop' to get over it," says Captain Follansbee. "As soon as we had crossed the bridge, they commenced to fire upon us from the street and houses. I ordered the men to protect themselves, and then we returned their fire and laid a great many of them away." At this point Mayor Brown met the advancing column. He writes:

> An attack on them had begun, and the noise and excitement were great. I ran at once to the head of the column, some persons in the crowd shouting as I approached, "Here comes the mayor." I shook hands with the officer in command, saying, as I did so, "I am the mayor of Baltimore." I then placed myself at his side and marched with him as far as the head of Light street wharf, doing what I could by my presence and personal efforts to allay the tumult. The mob grew bolder and the attack became more violent. Various persons were killed and wounded on both sides. The troops had some time previously begun to fire in self-defense; and the firing, as the attack increased in violence, became more general.†

Captain Follansbee confirms this statement:

> The mayor of the city met us almost half-way. He said there would be no trouble, and that we could get through, and kept with me for about a hundred yards; but the stones and balls whistled too near his head, and he left. . . . That was the last I saw of him.*‡

The mayor's separation from the troops was probably caused by an important diversion which occurred at this point in their progress. Marshal Kane, hurrying to the rescue at the head of about fifty policemen, met the struggling and fighting column of soldiers, with Captain Follansbee and Mayor Brown at their head; and, taking in the situation and remedy at a glance, executed a movement which was evidently the turning-point in the affray. By his order the line of policemen opened their ranks, and, having allowed the column of troops to pass through, immediately closed again behind them, forming a firm line across the street. The marshal directed his men "to draw their revolvers and shoot down any man who dared to break their line."§ This opposed an effectual barrier to the farther advance of this portion of the mob, which the police continued to hold in check, while the column of

* Hanson, "The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment."

† Mayor's message, July 11, 1861. War Records.

‡ In his volume, "Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861," published in 1887, ex-Mayor Brown says (p. 51): "The statement in Colonel Jones's report that I seized a musket and killed one of the rioters is entirely incorrect."

§ Report of Marshal Kane, May 3, 1861. "Congressional Globe," July 18, 1861.

troops pursued its way to the Washington depot with only one or two further attacks. Arrived there, the four companies were hurried into cars. The trouble, however, was not yet over. The immense crowd gathered here manifested a dangerous turbulence. Their savage temper had only grown during the delay, the receipt of news and rumors, and by the final arrival of the harried rear-guard. More threatening than all, the crowd repeatedly rushed ahead of the standing train and piled heavy stones, telegraph poles, and other objects on the track, which the police as often succeeded in removing. Colonel Jones and his officers had their men well under control; they kept them still, the blinds of the cars well drawn down, and thus prevented any unnecessary challenge or irritation to the mob. All being at length ready, the train moved slowly and cautiously away; but as it did so, a discharge of muskets blazed from a window of the rear car, and a prominent citizen of Baltimore fell dying to the ground. The bystanders declared the act was without provocation; the soldiers and their officers maintained that it was in response to a volley of stones or a shot. The total casualties of the day were never accurately ascertained or published. The soldiers lost 4 men killed and 36 wounded; the citizens perhaps two or three times that number. The single death which thus occurred as the train moved out, however, created more subsequent excitement in Baltimore than the scores who were slain and wounded in the mêlée on Pratt street.

Marshal Kane, having stopped the progress of the mob along Pratt street, had marched his policemen back to the Washington depot, where he learned that the train was gone; and, supposing that all danger was at last over, dismissed his force and was proceeding to his office when he was notified that there were yet other troops at the Philadelphia depot. These proved to be the regimental band of the Massachusetts men, and Small's Pennsylvania brigade, all unarmed. It is probable that the great length of the train had compelled the halting, at a considerable distance from the depot, of the cars in which they were, and that they had remained in ignorance of the occurrences described. When Marshal Kane arrived there, he found that the members of the band were already driven from their car and dispersed, and that the Pennsylvania men were just coming into the depot. "Some of these troops," he says, "commenced jumping from the train just as I got there, and were immediately set upon by an infuriated populace. I fought hard for their protection; at first almost alone, but soon had the assistance of a part of my force who hurried from the neighboring beats."* Meanwhile the railroad officials at Philadelphia were hastily consulted by telegraph, and orders soon came to have the remainder of the train and troops withdrawn from Baltimore without unloading, and carried back on the railroad towards Philadelphia as far as the Susquehanna River. The dispersed members of the band and other stragglers for the most part found sympathy, shelter, and concealment among humane Baltimoreans not engaged in the riot, until rescued and sent home by the police.†

All this rioting occurred in the forenoon between 10 and 12 o'clock. During the remainder of the day mob feeling, if not mob violence, controlled the city of Baltimore. The military companies were ordered out, and a mass meeting called to meet at 4 o'clock in Monument Square. At the appointed time a huge gathering assembled: the speakers, for the greater part, delivered strong anti-coercion speeches; instead of the national banner, a flag was displayed bearing the arms of Maryland. In substance, the occasion was a great secession meeting. Mayor Brown and Governor Hicks were called to the rostrum and made professions and promises in the prevailing tone, the governor declaring that he bowed in submission to the people. "I am a Marylander," said he, "and I love my State, and I love the Union; but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I will raise it to strike a sister State."‡ How completely the city was in revolt is told by Governor Hicks in a dispatch sent on the following day to Secretary Cameron:

> Up to yesterday there appeared promise, but the outburst came; the turbulent passions of the riotous element prevailed; fear for safety became reality; what they had endeavored to conceal, but what was known to us, was no longer concealed, but made manifest; the rebellious element had the control of things. We were arranging and organizing forces to protect the city and

* Report of Marshal Kane, May 3, 1861.

† In response to a request from Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, the mayor and authorities of Baltimore took immediate steps to care for the wounded and to pay respect to the dead of the Massachusetts regiment, a courtesy which was properly acknowledged. One year later the legislature of Maryland appropriated $7000 for the families of Massachusetts soldiers killed or disabled by wounds in the riot.

‡ "Baltimore Sun," April 20, 1861. The "Baltimore American" gives a slightly different version of the governor's remarks. It is probable that both reports are somewhat inaccurate:

> The Union was now apparently broken, but he trusted that its reconstruction may yet be brought about [cries of "Never"]. Resuming, he said: "But if otherwise, I bow in submission to the mandate of the people. If submit we must, in God's name let us submit in peace; for I would rather this right arm should be separated from my body than raise it against a brother."—[Speech of Governor Hicks, April 19, 1861, as reported in the "Baltimore American" of April 20.]

preserve order, but want of organization and of arms prevented success. They had arms; they had the principal part of the organized military forces with them; and for us to have made the effort, under the circumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly element. They took possession of the armories, have the arms and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline (for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry.*

This temporary bending before the storm of riot by the powerless authorities might have been pardoned under the emergency; but now they proceeded to stultify their courageous conduct of the forenoon by an act, if not of treason, at least of cowardice. At midnight Mayor Brown, Marshal Kane, and the Board of Police, and, as these assert, also Governor Hicks, consulted together, and deliberately ordered the destruction of the railroad bridges between Baltimore and both Harrisburg and Philadelphia.† Two strong parties of men were sent out, one of them headed by Marshal Kane, who before daylight burned the bridges at Melvale, Relay House, and Cockeysville on the Harrisburg road, and over the Bush and Gunpowder rivers and Harris Creek on the Philadelphia road. Governor Hicks soon after totally denied his consent to, or complicity in, the business, while the others insist that he was equally responsible with themselves.‡ The fact remained that the authorities had, by an act of war, completely cut off the national capital from railroad communication with the North.

The authors of this destruction attempt to justify their conduct by the excuse that they were informed of the approach of another large body of Northern troops, and they feared that under prevailing excitement the troops would wreak vengeance on the city for that day's attack on the Massachusetts 6th. They however cite nothing in the form of such a threat reaching them before their order, except a telegram from the railroad officer at Philadelphia, "that it was impossible to prevent these troops from going through Baltimore; the Union men must be aroused to resist the mob." Angry and ugly threats did soon come from the North; but not till after the burning, and largely excited by that act itself. It is impossible to resist the conviction that Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane were secessionists at heart; and while they were too sagacious to have prompted or encouraged the mob of April 19, they were quite ready to join in any sweeping popular movement to precipitate Maryland into rebellion, even if they were not actually then in a secret conspiracy to that end. While on his way to burn the bridges, Marshal Kane sent a telegram to a kindred spirit, which leaves no doubt of his then treasonable intent:

> Thank you for your offer. Bring your men in by the first train, and we will arrange with the railroad afterwards. Streets red with Maryland blood. Send expresses over the mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the riflemen to come without delay. Fresh hordes will be down on us to-morrow (the 20th). We will fight them, and whip them or die.§

General Scott's report and Cameron's dispatch of the 18th, quoted in the last chapter, show the already serious apprehensions of the Administration about the condition of Maryland, and particularly Baltimore. The rumors and news received on the 19th made the outlook still worse. It was definitely ascertained in the forenoon that Harper's Ferry had been so threatened by the Virginia rebels as to induce Lieutenant Jones to burn the arsenal and armory and retreat into Maryland with his little handful of soldiers. Other news convinced the authorities that there was no reasonable prospect of saving the Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia; and that night the war steamer *Pawnee* was started on her mission, with discretionary authority to destroy that immense establishment with its millions' worth of Government property. Shortly after noon there came, both by telegraph and messenger, the dreaded dispatch from Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown:

> A collision between the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, and the excitement is fearful. Send no more troops here. We will endeavor to prevent all bloodshed. A public meeting of citizens has been called, and the troops of the State and the city have been called out to preserve the peace. They will be enough.

Carefully scrutinized, this dispatch was found to be, like an ancient oracle, capable of a twofold meaning. The President and part of the Cabinet supposed Hicks meant to say he needed no troops to put down the riot. On the other hand, General Scott and Mr. Seward, usually so hopeful, thought they could read between the lines that it was desired no more troops should be passed through Baltimore. The arrival of the assaulted Massachusetts 6th about 5 o'clock added nothing to the current information except to demonstrate the seriousness of the day's occurrences. A crowd of five thousand people received the

* Hicks to Cameron, April 20, 1861. War Records.

† Mayor's message, Report of Marshal Kane, and Report Board of Police, May 3, 1861; War Records. Also Brown, "Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861."

‡ Mayor Brown to the Maryland legislature, May 10, 1861. War Records.

§ Kane to Johnson, April 19, 1861. Marshal Kane, in his official report of May 3, 1861, admits the language of the dispatch, and offers no explanation of it but undue excitement.

regiment at the depot with enthusiastic cheers of welcome, and escorted its march to the rotunda of the Capitol, whence it went to quarters in the Senate Chamber. After tea that evening special messengers came from Governor Hicks to say that the Pikesville arsenal, eight miles from Baltimore, having been abandoned by the army officer in charge, the governor had caused it to be occupied and protected for the United States. The President showed them the dispatch; but they could give no explanation beyond reiterating the governor's and their own loyalty. The true interpretation soon came, though in a roundabout way. The riot had thrown all the railroad companies into a panic. Hicks and Brown had advised, and the Board of Police ordered, all troops en route to be sent back towards Pennsylvania.* To its compliance with this advice and order the Baltimore and Ohio road added a refusal to undertake any further transportation;† and to this refusal the Philadelphia and Wilmington road had also given its assent.‡ A few hours' reflection showed the Philadelphia railroad officials the suicidal nature of such refusal, not only to the Government, but especially to their own business, and they now telegraphed to Washington to know what was to be done — laying the blame rather more heavily than he deserved at the door of Governor Hicks. At Washington the question was pretty fully debated by the President, Cabinet, and General Scott, and a sharp dispatch in cipher sent back to Philadelphia:

> Governor Hicks has neither right nor authority to stop troops coming to Washington. Send them on, prepared to fight their way through, if necessary.§

This decision having been reached, the President and various officials sought their rest for the night, not by any means assured of a tranquil sleep. The possible contingencies of the hour are briefly expressed in a memorandum made on the night of the Baltimore riot by an occupant of the Executive Mansion:

> We are expecting more troops here by way of Baltimore, but are also fearful that the secessionists may at any hour cut the telegraph wires, tear up the railroad track, or burn the bridges, and thus prevent their reaching us and cut off all communication. We have rumors that 1500 men are under arms at Alexandria, seven miles below here, supposed to have hostile designs against this city; and an additional report that a vessel was late this evening seen landing men on the Maryland side of the river. All these things indicate that if we are to be attacked at all soon, it will happen to-night. On the other hand, we have some four to five thousand men under arms in the city, and a very vigilant watch out in all the probable directions of approach. The public buildings are strongly guarded; the Secretary of War will remain all night in his Department, and General Scott is within convenient reach. I do not think any force could be brought against the city to-night which our men could not easily repel.‖

Soon after midnight a special train brought a committee of Baltimoreans. The authorities of that unhappy city were, first by the riot, and afterwards by the public meeting and the popular demonstrations in the streets, worked into a high state of excitement. About an hour before their determination and order to burn the bridges, Mayor Brown wrote a request to the President to stop the transit of troops, saying, "It is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore, unless they fight their way at every step."¶ Being by this time in one of his yielding moods, Governor Hicks concurred in the request by a written note.** It was too late to see the President when the committee bearing the letter arrived; they therefore applied to Cameron at the War Department, who refused flatly to entertain their request, turning over on his sofa for another nap. From the chief clerk they learned that no troops were then actually on the way, and with this bit of relief they contented themselves till daylight.

Next morning (April 20) the President had just finished his breakfast when General Scott's carriage stopped under the White House portico. The general was suffering from gout, which made it painful for him to mount to the Executive chamber; and to save him this exertion, Lincoln came down to exchange a word with him at the door. At the foot of the staircase the President encountered the Baltimore committee, read their brief letter, and took them at once to General Scott's carriage, where they rehearsed their errand, eloquently portraying the danger — nay, the impossibility — of bringing soldiers through Baltimore; whereupon the general, looking solely to the extreme urgency of getting troops to the capital, and perceiving no present advantage in fighting a battle in that city, suggested promptly, "March them around" — the change from the dispatch sent the previous evening to Philadelphia being purely one of expediency under an alleged state of facts. The committee returned with the President to his office, where he wrote them a reply to Governor Hicks's and Mayor Brown's letters:

> For the future troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore. Without any military knowledge myself, of course I

* "Rebellion Record."

† Hicks, Brown, and Howard to Garrett, April 19, 1861. Garrett, reply, April 19, 1861.

‡ Felton to Hicks and Brown, April 19, 1861.

§ Thomas to Felton, April 19, 1861. War Records.

‖ J. G. N., personal memoranda. Unpublished MS.

¶ Brown to Lincoln, April 19, 1861. War Records.

** Hicks to Lincoln. War Records.

must leave details to General Scott. He hastily said this morning, in the presence of these gentlemen, "March them around Baltimore, and not through it." I sincerely hope the general, on fuller reflection, will consider this practical and proper, and that you will not object to it. By this a collision of the people of Baltimore with the troops will be avoided, unless they go out of the way to seek it.*

This arrangement was, on being communicated to the governor, duly accepted by him. He wrote:

I hoped they would send no more troops through Maryland; but as we have no right to demand that, I am glad no more are to be sent through Baltimore.†

"Give an inch, he'll take an ell." The proverb is especially applicable in times of revolution, when men act under impulse, and not on judgment. President Lincoln did not lose sight of this human weakness while dealing with the Baltimore committee. When about to write his letter for them, he said half playfully, "If I grant you this concession, that no troops shall pass through the city, you will be back here to-morrow demanding that none shall be marched around it."‡ They protested to the contrary; but the President's words were literally verified. When the committee returned to Baltimore, the alleged popular dread of invasion had already changed to extensive preparation for meditated but not yet avowed insurrection. So far from being thankful for their success in changing the march of Union troops, the incensed secessionists upbraided the committee for consenting to allow them to pollute the soil of Maryland. Two members of the legislature were sent back to the President§ to formulate new demands. This, with the governor's withdrawal of his offer to furnish the four regiments, already cited, and the scattering sensational telegrams received, induced Lincoln, on the afternoon of Saturday, April 20, to telegraph to Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown to come by special train, as he desired to consult them "relative to preserving the peace of Maryland." The governor had gone to Annapolis, and after the interchange of various messages, the mayor himself was asked to come.

So soon as the Baltimore route was closed by the riot of the 19th of April, the railroad authorities‖ at Philadelphia had with commendable energy devised and prepared a new

MAP OF THE APPROACHES TO WASHINGTON.

route—by rail to Perryville on the Susquehanna; thence by water on Chesapeake Bay to Annapolis; thence by railroad, or, if that were destroyed, common wagon-roads to Washington. This they suggested to General Scott on the 20th, and he ordered it adopted the same day. That same forenoon Hon. David Wilmot, making his way northward from Washington as best he could, wrote back from Baltimore to the General-in-Chief, confirming the rumor that some of the bridges of the Philadelphia road had been destroyed, the telegraph interrupted, and rapid communication with the North cut off; and added, "Troops coming on your road [from Harrisburg to Baltimore] could leave it about three miles from Baltimore, and by a march of five miles reach the Washington road some two

* Lincoln to Hicks and Brown, April 20, 1861.

† Hicks to Brown, April 20, 1861. War Records.

‡ J. G. N., personal memoranda. Unpublished MS.

§ Scharf, "History of Maryland."

‖ Great credit is due to Mr. S. M. Felton, then president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, the same who devised the precautions at the time of Mr. Lincoln's night journey through Baltimore. Mr. Felton, heartily seconded by J. Edgar Thomson, then president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, by intimate knowledge and control of facilities, railroad cars, and steam vessels, was able at once to order such new combinations on an extensive scale as were rendered necessary by the Baltimore riot and the requirements of the large numbers of troops hurrying to the defense of Washington. For this patriotic service the Secretary of War sent his official acknowledgment to these gentlemen, including also Mr. E. S. Sanford, president of the American Telegraph Company.

and a half miles from the city."* It was with some such idea that General Scott had first proposed the march around Baltimore; and strengthened by Wilmot's suggestion, he on the following day wrote to General Patterson, who held command in Philadelphia, that this Harrisburg and Baltimore route was perhaps the most important military avenue to Washington, closing with the injunction, "Give your attention in part to this line."† The Washington authorities were, however, not long in finding that this assumption was a vital error. General Scott wrote:

> In my letter to you yesterday, I intended that the railroad via Harrisburg and York towards Baltimore was more important, perhaps, for reënforcing Washington, than that from Philadelphia to Perryville, etc. That supposition was founded on the Secretary's belief that the distance from a certain point on the Harrisburg railroad to the Relay House, eight miles this side of Baltimore, was but some seven miles by a good wagon road, whereas there is no good common road between the two railroads of less than thirty miles. This fact renders the railroad from Harrisburg to Baltimore of no value to us here, without a force of perhaps ten thousand men to hold Baltimore, to protect the rails and bridges near it.‡

Bearing in mind this change of view, let us return to the affairs of Baltimore. Through various delays it happened that Mayor Brown did not reach Washington until Sunday morning, April 21, in obedience to Lincoln's request of the previous afternoon. The mayor brought with him two members of the first Baltimore committee, and besides these a prominent and active secessionist. Through all of Friday night and Saturday the secession feeling steadily rose in Baltimore; the city, to the full extent of its ability, made ready to resist the further passage of troops by force; and to a considerable degree the same excitement, and the same resolve and preparation, spread like wild-fire to the country villages of Maryland. Naturally, Mayor Brown and his committee-men, while they carefully kept secret their own official bridge-burning, did not undercolor their description of this insurrectionary mood of their people. The discussion was participated in by General Scott and the Cabinet, and took a wide range, lasting all Sunday forenoon (April 21). The President insisted that troops must come. General Scott explained that they could only come in one of three ways: First, through Baltimore; second, by the Harrisburg route and a march round Baltimore; and third, by the Annapolis route. The last two routes were therefore agreed upon.

General Scott said if the people would permit them to go by either of these routes uninterruptedly, the necessity of their passing through Baltimore would be avoided. If the people would not permit them a transit thus remote from the city, they must select their own best route, and, if need be, fight their way through Baltimore, a result which he earnestly deprecated. The President expressed his hearty concurrence in the desire to avoid a collision, and said that no more troops should be ordered through Baltimore if they were permitted to go uninterrupted by either of the other routes suggested. In this disposition the Secretary of War expressed his participation. Mayor Brown agreed to this arrangement, and promised on his part "that the city authorities would use all lawful means to prevent their citizens from leaving Baltimore to attack the troops in passing at a distance.§

With this agreement the committee took their leave, and the President proceeded to other pressing business, when, to his astonishment, Mayor Brown and his companions once more made their appearance, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They brought a highly sensational telegram just received by them at the depot from Mr. Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which read:

> Three thousand Northern troops are reported to be at Cockeysville; intense excitement prevails; churches have been dismissed, and the people are arming in mass. To prevent terrific bloodshed, the result of your interview and arrangement is awaited.‖

Cockeysville is on the Harrisburg route, fifteen miles from Baltimore; and because they had no previous notice of such approach, the committee now intimated that advantage had been taken of their presence in Washington to bring these forces within striking distance of Baltimore. The Cabinet and Scott were again summoned, and the whole discussion was opened up anew.

> The President, at once, in the most decided way urged the recall of the troops, saying he had no idea they would be there to-day, and lest there should be the slightest suspicion of bad faith on his part in summoning the mayor to Washington, and allowing troops to march on the city during his absence, he desired that the troops should, if it were practicable, be sent back at once to York or Harrisburg.§

Orders were accordingly issued to this effect, the President, however, notifying the committee that he should not again in any wise interfere with the military arrangements.

In this, as in his Sumter policy, Lincoln interposed his authority in pursuance of his constant exercise not alone of justice and firm-

* Wilmot to Scott, April 20, 1861. War Records.
† Scott to Patterson, April 21, 1861. War Records.
‡ Scott to Patterson, April 22, 1861. War Records.
§ Mayor Brown, Report, April 21, 1861. "Rebellion Record."
‖ Scharf, "Chronicles of Baltimore."

ness, but of the very utmost liberality and forbearance. He did not expect to appease the Maryland rebels, but to make them clearly responsible for further bloodshed, should any occur, and thereby to hold the Maryland Unionists; and the result vindicated his judgment. These were sufficient motives; and underlying them he had yet another, still more conclusive. All this examination of maps and discussion had brought the conviction to his quick penetration, in advance of any of his councilors, that the Harrisburg route was, in the present state of affairs, entirely impracticable and useless, which fact General Scott so fully set forth on the following day in his already cited letter to General Patterson.

WASHINGTON IN DANGER.

THANKS to the preparations and promptness of Governor Andrew, the Massachusetts 8th was not far behind the 6th. It assembled on Boston Common on Thursday morning, and was in Philadelphia on Friday evening, April 19, just in time to hear the authentic reports as well as the multiplied and exaggerated rumors of that day's doings of the Baltimore mob, and the tragic fate of some of their comrades of the 6th. Massachusetts having agreed to double her quota, the four regiments thus to be received formed a brigadier-general's command, and for this command Governor Andrew designated Benjamin F. Butler, who already held that office and rank under the State militia laws. He was a lawyer by profession, but possessed in an eminent degree the peculiarly American quality of ability to adapt himself to any circumstance or duty, with a quick perception to discover and a ready courage to seize opportunities. It must be noted in passing that he was a radical Democrat in politics, and could boast that he had voted fifty times in the late Charleston convention to make Jefferson Davis the Democratic candidate for President. But with the same positive zeal he denounced secession, and helped to prepare the Massachusetts regiments to join in suppressing it by the authority and with the power of the Federal Government. Arrived with the Massachusetts 8th at Philadelphia, General Butler that night telegraphed further news of the day's disaster to Governor Andrew.

> I have reason to believe that Colonel Jones has gone through to Washington. Two killed only of the Massachusetts men. We shall go through at once. The road is torn up through Baltimore. Will telegraph again.*

Later and more definite information caused him to modify his intention to press on: first, the Baltimore railroad refused to carry any more troops into that city; secondly, the burning of the bridges made it impossible for them to do so. In this dilemma, the Philadelphia railroad authorities had bethought them of a new route — that by Annapolis, previously described. This plan required not only much discussion, but great additional preparation; and Friday night and a part of Saturday passed before it was pronounced even probably feasible. By this time the 7th regiment of New York — the *corps d'élite* of the whole Union, which on Friday afternoon started its march down Broadway "through that tempest of cheers two miles long" — had also reached Philadelphia, where it too, like the Massachusetts 8th, was obliged seriously to study the further ways and means of getting to Washington. The various railroad and military officials of Philadelphia strongly advised the Annapolis route, and Colonel Lefferts, commanding the New York 7th, telegraphed to Cameron asking orders to go that way.† There was long delay in transmitting the dispatch and awaiting a reply; and before the requested permission came, Colonel Lefferts changed his purpose, chartered a steamship, placed his regiment on board, and started for Washington via the Delaware river and bay and the Potomac River — this decision being apparently not a little hastened by certain military rivalries and jealousies which instantly sprang up between Colonel Lefferts and Brigadier-General Butler, acting as yet under separate State authority, and being therefore independent of each other's control. Scott's reply to send troops by Havre de Grace and Annapolis,‡ as suggested, at length came through the somewhat deranged telegraph offices; and Lefferts being gone, the order was communicated to Butler.§ While the New York 7th, under Lefferts, was steaming down Delaware Bay on the transport *Boston*, the Massachusetts 8th, under Butler, proceeded by cars to Perryville (opposite Havre de Grace), and, embarking on the ferry-boat *Maryland*, steamed down Chesapeake Bay, and by midnight was anchored off Annapolis. As events turned out, this division of forces proved an advantage, since neither of the boats was capable of containing both regiments; and twenty-four hours later, as we shall see, the *Boston* joined the *Maryland* at Annapolis before either regiment had disembarked.

The small and antiquated town of Annapolis, the capital of Maryland and the seat of

* Butler to Andrew, April 19, 1861.

† Lefferts to Cameron. April 20, 1861. War Records.

‡ Thomas to Patterson, April 20, 1861. War Records.

§ Patterson to Thomas, April 21, 1861. War Records.

the United States Naval Academy, was for the moment in sympathy with secession. Governor Hicks had returned here from Baltimore, it being his official residence, to make ready for the coming special session of the Maryland legislature, which, in one of his moments of timidity, he had been prevailed upon to call together on the 26th. The governor and the mayor of Annapolis both strongly urged Butler not to land his men; to which he replied that he must land to get provisions, and in turn requested the governor's formal consent. Pending this diplomatic small-talk, he found a piece of work to do. The old frigate *Constitution*, of historic fame, was anchored off the grounds of the Naval Academy as a training-ship; a few boat-loads of Baltimore roughs might easily cut her out and convert her into a privateer. Commandant Blake, who, with the majority of his officers and cadets, remained loyal, asked Butler to help pull her farther out into the bay for better security against capture. In this enterprise the greater part of Sunday, the 21st of April, was spent.

The two Sunday interviews of the mayor of Baltimore with President Lincoln, and the resulting arrangement that troops should hereafter come by the Annapolis route, have been detailed. The telegraph, in the mean time, was still working, though with delays and interruptions. As an offset to the disagreeable necessity of ordering the Pennsylvania troops back from Cockeysville, the cheering news of Butler's arrival at Annapolis had come directly to hand. That same Sunday afternoon President Lincoln and his cabinet met at the Navy Department, where they might deliberate in greater seclusion, and the culminating dangers to the Government underwent scrutinizing inquiry and anxious comment. The events of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, as developed by the military reports and the conferences with the Baltimore committees, exhibited a degree of real peril such as had not menaced the capital since the British invasion in 1814. Virginia was in arms on one side, Maryland on the other; the railroad was broken; the Potomac was probably blockaded; a touch would sever the telegraph. Of this occasion the President afterwards said:

> It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.*

Surveying the emergency in its remote as well as merely present aspects, and assuming without hesitation the responsibilities which existing laws did not authorize, but which the needs of the hour imperatively demanded, Lincoln made a series of orders designed to meet, as well as might be, the new crisis in public affairs. A convoy was ordered out to guard the California steamers bringing heavy shipments of gold; fifteen merchant steamers were ordered to be purchased or chartered, and armed at the navy yards of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia for coast protection and blockade service; two million dollars were placed in the hands of three eminent citizens of New York, John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard M. Blatchford, to be in their judgment disbursed for the public defense; another commission of leading citizens of New York, George D. Morgan, William M. Evarts, Richard M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, in connection with Governor Morgan, was empowered to exercise practically the full authority of the War and Navy Departments in organizing troops and forwarding supplies; two of the ablest naval officers were authorized each to arm two additional merchant vessels to cruise in the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, together with sundry minor measures and precautions. Before these various orders could even be prepared for transmittal, the crowning embarrassment had already come upon the Government. On that Sunday night (April 21) the telegraph operator at Baltimore reported that the insurrectionary authorities had taken possession of his office; to which the Washington telegraph superintendent laconically added, "Of course this stops all."

So the prospect closed on Sunday night. Monday forenoon brought, not relief, but rather an exaggeration of the symptoms of danger. Governor Hicks, influenced by his secession surroundings at Annapolis, neither having consented to Butler's landing nor yet having dissuaded him from that purpose, now turned his appeals to the President. "I feel it my duty," he wrote, "most respectfully to advise you that no more troops be ordered or allowed to pass through Maryland, and that the troops now off Annapolis be sent elsewhere; and I most respectfully urge that a truce be offered by you, so that the effusion of blood may be prevented. I respectfully suggest that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediator between the contending parties of our country."† The suggestion was not only absurd in itself, but it awakened painful apprehension lest his hitherto friendly disposition might suddenly change to active hostility. This was a result to be avoided by all possible means; for, even in his present neutral mood, he was still an effective breakwater against

* Lincoln, special message, May 27, 1862.

† Hicks to Lincoln, April 22, 1861. War Records.

those who were striving day and night to force Maryland into some official act of insurrection. Mr. Seward therefore wrote the governor a very kindly worded and yet dignified rebuke, reminding him of the days "when a general of the American Union with forces designed for the defense of its capital was not unwelcome anywhere in the State of Maryland, and certainly not at Annapolis"; and suggesting at its close "that no domestic contention that may arise among the parties of this republic ought in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all to the arbitrament of an European monarchy."*

Meanwhile, as an additional evidence of the yet growing discontent, another large Baltimore committee found its way to the President — this time from one of the religious bodies of that city, with a Baptist clergyman as its spokesman, who bluntly proposed that Mr. Lincoln should "recognize the independence of the Southern States." Though such audacity greatly taxed his patience, he kept his temper, and replied that neither the President nor Congress possessed the power or authority to do this; and to the further request that no more troops be sent through Maryland, he answered in substance:

You, gentlemen, come here to me and ask for peace on any terms, and yet have no word of condemnation for those who are making war on us. You express great horror of bloodshed, and yet would not lay a straw in the way of those who are organizing in Virginia and elsewhere to capture this city. The rebels attack Fort Sumter, and your citizens attack troops sent to the defense of the Government, and the lives and property in Washington, and yet you would have me break my oath and surrender the Government without a blow. There is no Washington in that — no Jackson in that — there is no manhood or honor in that. I have no desire to invade the South; but I must have troops to defend this capital. Geographically it lies surrounded by the soil of Maryland; and mathematically the necessity exists that they should come over her territory. Our men are not moles, and can't dig under the earth; they are not birds, and can't fly through the air. There is no way but to march across, and that they must do. But in doing this, there is no need of collision. Keep your rowdies in Baltimore, and there will be no bloodshed. Go home and tell your people that if they will not attack us, we will not attack them; but if they do attack us, we will return it, and that severely.

Washington now began to take on some of the aspects of a siege. The large stores of flour and grain at the Georgetown mills, and even that already loaded for shipment on schooners, were seized, and long trains of carts were engaged in removing it to safer storage in the public buildings. Prices of provisions were rising. The little passenger steamers plying on the Potomac were taken possession of by the military officers to be used for guard and picket duty on the river. The doors, windows, and stairways of the public buildings were protected by barricades, and the approaches to them guarded by sentinels. All travel and nearly all business came to a standstill, and theaters and places of amusement were closed. With the first notice of the burning of the railroad bridges, the strangers, visitors, and transient sojourners in the city became possessed of an uncontrollable desire to get away. So long as the trains ran to Baltimore, they proceeded to that point; from there they sought to escape northward by whatever stray chances of transportation offered themselves. By some of these fugitives the Government had taken the precaution to send duplicates of important orders and dispatches to Northern cities. This *sauve qui peut* quickly denuded Washington of its redundant population. While the Unionist non-combatants were flying northward, the latent secessionists were making quite as hurried an escape to the South; for it was strongly rumored that the Government intended to impress the whole male population of Washington into military service for the defense of the city.

One incidental benefit grew out of the panic — the Government was quickly relieved of its treasonable servants. Some hundreds of clerks resigned out of the various departments on this Monday, April 22d, and the impending danger not only brought these to final decision, but also many officers of high grades and important functions. Commodore Buchanan, in charge of the Washington navy yard, together with nearly all the subordinate officers, suddenly discovered their unwillingness longer to keep their oaths and serve the United States; and that night this invaluable naval depot, with all its vast stores of material, its immense workshops and priceless machinery, was intrusted solely to the loyalty and watchfulness of Commander John A. Dahlgren and a little handful of marines, scarcely enough in numbers to have baffled half a dozen adroit incendiaries, or to ascertain the street gossip outside the walls of the establishment.† Among the scores of army and navy resignations reported the same day was that of Captain John B. Magruder, 1st Artillery, then in command of a light battery

* Seward to Hicks, April 22, 1861.

† Mem. for the War Department. The *Anacostia*, a small Potomac steamer, anchored off Gilsboro' Point, and after remaining a short time returned down the river. The *Harriet Lane*, supposed revenue cutter, is now off the Arsenal and has been there a short time. I have not been able to communicate with her. I should wish to have a company of Massachusetts or United States troops in the yard at night if they can be spared. — John A. Dahlgren, Acting Commandant, 22d April. MS.

on which General Scott had placed special reliance for the defense of Washington. No single case of defection gave Lincoln such astonishment and pain as this one. "Only three days ago," said he, when the fact was made known to him, "Magruder came voluntarily to me in this room, and with his own lips and in my presence repeated over and over again his asseverations and protestations of loyalty and fidelity." * It was not merely the loss of an officer, valuable and necessary though he might be in the emergency, but the significance of this crowning act of perfidy which troubled the President, and to the suggestiveness of which he could not close his eyes. Was there not only no patriotism left, but was all sense of personal obligation, of every-day honesty, and of manliness of character gone also? Was everything crumbling at his touch? In whom should he place confidence? To whom should he give orders, if clerks, and captains, and commodores, and quartermaster-generals, and governors of States, and justices of the Supreme Court proved false in the moment of need? If men of the character and rank of the Magruders, the Buchanans, the McCauleys, the Lees, the Johnstons, the Coopers, the Campbells were giving way, where might he not fear treachery? There was certainly no danger that all the officers of the Government would thus prove recreant; but might not the failure of a single one bearing an important trust cause a vital and irreparable disaster?

The perplexities and uncertain prospects of the hour are set forth with frank brevity by General Scott, in the report which was sent to the President that night of Monday, April 22:

I have but little that is certain to report, viz.: (1) That there are three or four steamers off Annapolis, with volunteers for Washington; (2) that their landing will be opposed by the citizens, reënforced from Baltimore; (3) that the landing may be effected nevertheless by good management; and (4) that the rails on the Annapolis road (20 miles) have been taken up. Several efforts to communicate with those troops to-day have failed; but three other detached persons are repeating the attempt, and one or more of them will, I think, succeed. Once ashore, the regiments (if but two, and there are probably more) would have no difficulty in reaching Washington on foot, other than the want of wagons to transport camp equipage, etc. The quartermaster that I have sent there (I do not know that he has arrived) has orders to hire wagons if he can, and if not, to impress, etc. Of rumors, the following are probable, viz.: (1) That from 1500 to 2000 troops are at the White House (4 miles below Mount Vernon, a narrow point in the Potomac) engaged in erectinga battery; (2) that an equal force is collected or in progress of assemblage on the two sides of the river to attack Fort Washington; and (3) that extra cars went up yesterday to bring down from Harper's Ferry about 2000 other troops to join in a general attack on this capital — that is, on many of its fronts at once. I feel confident that with our present forces we can defend the Capitol, the Arsenal, and all the executive buildings (seven) against ten thousand troops not better than our district volunteers.†

Tuesday morning came, but no news from Annapolis, no volunteers up the Potomac. It was Cabinet day; and about noon, after the President and his councilors were assembled, messengers announced the arrival of two steamers at the navy yard. There was a momentary hope that these might be the long-expected ships from New York; but inquiries proved them to be the *Pawnee* and a transport on their return from the expedition to Norfolk. The worst apprehensions concerning that important post were soon realized — it was irretrievably lost. The only bit of comfort to be derived from the affair was that the vessels brought back with them a number of marines and sailors, who would now add a little fraction of strength to the defense of the capital. The officers of the expedition were soon before the President and Cabinet, and related circumstantially the tale of disaster and destruction which the treachery of a few officers and the credulous duplicity of the commandant had rendered unavoidable.

The Gosport navy yard, at Norfolk, Virginia, was of such value and importance that its safety, from the very beginning of Mr. Lincoln's administration, had neither been neglected nor overlooked. But, like every other exposed or threatened point,— like Sumter, Pickens, Tortugas, Key West, Fort Monroe, Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, and Washington itself,— its fate was involved in the want of an army and navy of adequate strength. On the day that the President resolved on the Sumter expedition, two hundred and fifty seamen had been ordered from Brooklyn to Norfolk to render Gosport more safe. Instead of going there, it was immediately necessary to change their destination to Sumter and Pickens. And so, though the danger to Gosport was never lost sight of, the reënforcements to ward it off were never available. Officer after officer and letter after letter were sent by the department to enjoin vigilance, to prepare defenses, and to remove valuable ships. The officers of the navy yard professed loyalty; the commandant had grown gray in the service of his country, and enjoyed the full confidence of his equals and superiors. It was known that the secessionists had designs upon the post; but it was believed that the watchfulness which had been ordered and the measures of precaution which had been arranged under the special supervision of two

* J. H., Diary. Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

trusted officers of the Navy Department, who were carrying out the personal instructions of Secretary Welles, would meet the danger. At a critical moment, the hitherto correct judgment of Commandant McCauley committed a fatal mistake. The subordinate officers of the yard, professing loyalty, practiced treason, and lured him unwittingly into their designs.

Several valuable vessels lay at the navy yard. To secure them eventually for Virginia, Governor Letcher had, among his first acts of hostility, attempted to obstruct the channel from Norfolk to Fort Monroe by means of sunken vessels. But the effort failed; the passage still remained practicable. Ascertaining this, Commodore Alden and Chief Engineer Isherwood, specially sent for the task by Secretary Welles, had, with the help of the commandant of the yard, prepared the best ships — the *Merrimac*, the *Germantown*, the *Plymouth*, and the *Dolphin* — for quick removal to Fort Monroe. The engines of the *Merrimac* were put in order, the fires under her boilers were lighted, the moment of her departure had been announced, when suddenly a change came over the spirit of Commandant McCauley. Virginia passed her ordinance of secession; the traitorous officers of the navy yard were about to throw off their mask and desert their flag; and, as a parting stroke of intrigue, they persuaded the commandant that he must retain the *Merrimac* for the security of the yard. Yielding to this treacherous advice, he countermanded her permission to depart and ordered her fires to be put out. Thus baffled, Isherwood and Alden hastened back to Washington to obtain the superior orders of the Secretary over this most unexpected and astounding action of the commandant.

They reached Washington on this errand respectively on the 18th and 19th of April, just at the culminating point of insurrection and danger. Hasty consultations were held and energetic orders were issued. The *Pawnee*, just returned from her Sumter cruise, was again coaled, supplied, and fitted out — processes consuming precious hours, but which could not be omitted. On the evening of April 19 she steamed down the Potomac under command of Commodore Paulding, with discretionary orders to defend or to destroy. Next evening, April 20, having landed at Fort Monroe and taken on board three to five hundred men of the 3d Massachusetts, only that morning arrived from Boston, and who embarked without a single ration, the *Pawnee* proceeded to Norfolk, passing without difficulty through the seven sunken hulks in the Elizabeth River. But Commodore Paulding found that he had come too late to save anything. The commandant, once more successfully plied with insidious advice, had yielded to the second suggestion of his juniors, and had scuttled the removable ships — ostensibly to prevent their being seized and used by the rebels. As they were slowly sinking, no effort to remove them could succeed, and no resource was left but to destroy everything so far as could be done. Accordingly, there being bright moonlight, the greater part of that Saturday night was devoted to this work of destruction. Several parties were detailed to fire the ships and the buildings and to lay a mine to blow up the dry-dock, and the sky was soon lighted up from an immense conflagration. Yet, with all this effort, the sacrifice was left incomplete. Not more than half the buildings were consumed. The workshops, with their valuable machinery, escaped. The 1500 to 2000 heavy cannon in the yard could neither be removed nor rendered unserviceable. Some unforeseen accident finally prevented the explosion of the dry-dock. Of the seven ships burned to the water's edge, the hull of the *Merrimac* was soon afterwards raised, and in the course of events changed by the rebels into the iron-clad *Merrimac*, or, as they named her, the *Virginia*. At 5 o'clock on Sunday morning the *Pawnee* considered her work finished, and steamed away from Gosport, followed by the sailing-ship *Cumberland*.

No point of peril had been so clearly foreseen, so carefully provided for, and apparently so securely counteracted as the loss of the three or four valuable ships at Norfolk; and yet, in spite of foresight and precaution, they had gone to worse than ruin through the same train of circumstances which had lost Sumter and permitted the organization of the Montgomery rebellion. The loss of ships and guns was, however, not all; behind these was the damaging moral effect upon the Union cause and feeling. For four consecutive days each day had brought a great disaster — Virginia's secession on the 17th; the burning of Harper's Ferry on the 18th; the Baltimore riot and destruction of railroad bridges on the 19th; the abandonment and destruction of this great navy yard and its ships on the night of the 20th. This began to look like an irresistible current of fate. No popular sentiment could long stem such a tide of misfortune. The rebels of Virginia, Maryland, and especially of Washington began to feel that Providence wrought in their behalf, and that their cherished conspiracy was already crowned with success. Evidently with such a feeling, on this same Tuesday, Associate Justice John A. Campbell, still a member of the Supreme Court and under oath to support the Constitution of the United States, again sent a

letter of aid and comfort to Jefferson Davis. He wrote:

> Maryland is the object of chief anxiety with the North and the Administration. Their fondest hope will be to command the Chesapeake and relieve the capital. Their pride and their fanaticism would be sadly depressed by a contrary issue. This will be the great point of contest in all negotiations.
>
> . . . I incline to think that they are prepared to abandon the south of the Potomac. But not beyond. Maryland is weak. She has no military men of talents, and I did hear that Colonel Huger was offered command and declined it — however, his resignation had not been accepted. Huger is plainly not competent for such a purpose. Lee is in Virginia. Think of the condition of Baltimore and provide for it, for there is the place of danger. The events at Baltimore have placed a new aspect upon everything at the North. There is a perfect storm there. While it has to be met, no unnecessary addition should be made to increase it.*

Another night of feverish public unrest, another day of anxiety to the President — Wednesday, April 24. There was indeed no attack on the city; but, on the other hand, no arrival of troops to place its security beyond doubt. Repetition of routine duties; repetition of small, unsubstantial rumors; long faces in the streets; a holiday quiet over the city; closed shutters and locked doors of business houses; the occasional clatter of a squad of cavalry from point to point; sentinels about the departments; sentinels about the Executive Mansion; Willard's Hotel, which a week before was swarming with busy crowds, now deserted as if smitten by a plague — with only furtive servants to wake echoes along the vacant corridors, and in all its vast array of chambers and parlors but a single lady guest to recall the throng of fashion and beauty which had so lately made it a scene of unceasing festivity from midday to midnight. Ever since the telegraph stopped on Sunday night the Washington operators had been listening for the ticking of their instruments, and had occasionally caught fugitive dispatches passing between Maryland secessionists, which were for the greater part immediately known to be unreliable; for General Scott kept up a series of military scouts along the Baltimore railroad as far as Annapolis Junction, twenty miles from Washington, from which point a branch railroad ran at a right angle to the former, twenty miles to Annapolis, on Chesapeake Bay. The general dared not risk a detachment permanently to hold the junction; no considerable secession force had been encountered, and the railroad was yet safe. But it was known, or at least strongly probable, that the volunteers from the North had been at Annapolis since Sunday morning. Why did they not land? Why did they not advance? The Annapolis road was known to be damaged; but could they not march twenty miles? The previous day (April 23) had, by some lucky chance, brought a New York mail three days old. The newspapers in it contained breezy premonitions of the Northern storm — Anderson's enthusiastic reception; the departure of the New York 7th regiment; the sailing of Governor Sprague with his Rhode Islanders; the monster meeting in Union Square, with the outpouring of half a million of people in processions and listening to speeches from half a dozen different stands; the energetic measures of the New York Common Council; the formation of the Union Defense Committee; whole columns of orders and proclamations; the flag-raisings; the enlistments; the chartering and freighting of ships; and from all quarters news of the wild, jubilant uprising of the whole immense population of the Free States. All this was gratifying, pride-kindling, reassuring; and yet, read and re-read with avidity in Washington that day, it would always bring after it the galling reflection that all this magnificent outburst of patriotism was paralyzed by the obstacle of a twenty miles' march between Annapolis and the junction. Had the men of the North no legs?

Lincoln, by nature and habit so calm, so equable, so undemonstrative, nevertheless passed this period of interrupted communication and isolation from the North in a state of nervous tension which put all his great powers of mental and physical endurance to their severest trial. General Scott's reports, though invariably expressing his confidence in successful defense, frankly admitted the evident danger; and the President, with his acuteness of observation and his rapidity and correctness of inference, lost no single one of the external indications of doubt and apprehension. Day after day prediction failed and hope was deferred; troops did not come, ships did not arrive, railroads remained broken, messengers failed to reach their destination. That fact itself demonstrated that he was environed by the unknown — and that whether a Union or a Secession army would first reach the capital was at best an uncertainty. To a coarse or vulgar nature such a situation would have brought only one of two feelings — either overpowering personal fear, or overweening bravado. But Lincoln, almost a giant in physical stature and strength, combined in his intellectual nature a masculine courage and power of logic with a sentimental tenderness as delicate as a woman's, and an ideal sensitiveness of conscience. This presidential trust which he had assumed was to him not a mere regalia of rank and honor. Its terrible duties and responsibilities seemed rather a coat

* Campbell to Davis, April 23, 1861. MS.

of steel armor, not only heavy to bear, but cutting remorselessly into the quick flesh. That one of the successors of Washington should find himself even to this degree in the hands of his enemies was personally humiliating; but that the majesty of a great nation should be thus insulted and its visible symbols of authority be placed in jeopardy; above all, that the hitherto glorious example of the republic to other nations should stand in this peril of surprise and possible sudden collapse, the Constitution be scoffed and jeered, and human freedom become once more a by-word and reproach — this must have begot in him an anxiety approaching torture. In the eyes of his countrymen and of the world he was holding the scales of national destiny; he alone knew that for the moment the forces which made the beam vibrate with such uncertainty were beyond his control. In others' society he gave no sign of these inner emotions. But once, on the afternoon of the 23d, the business of the day being over, the Executive office deserted, after walking the floor alone in silent thought for nearly half an hour, he stopped and gazed long and wistfully out of the window down the Potomac in the direction of the expected ships; and, unconscious of any presence in the room, at length broke out with irrepressible anguish in the repeated exclamation, "Why don't they come! Why don't they come!"

One additional manifestation of this bitterness of soul occurred on the day following (April 24), though in a more subdued manner. The wounded soldiers of the Massachusetts 6th, including several officers, came to pay a visit to the President. They were a little shy when they entered the room — having the traditional New England awe of authorities and rulers. Lincoln received them with that sympathetic kindness and equality of bearing which put them at ease after the interchange of the first greetings. His words of sincere thanks for their patriotism and their suffering, his warm praise of their courage, his hearty recognition of their great service to the public, and his earnestly expressed confidence in their further devotion, quickly won their trust and respect. He spoke to them of the position and prospect of the city, contrasting their prompt arrival with the unexplained delay which seemed to have befallen the regiments from the various States supposed to be somewhere on the way. Pursuing this theme, he finally fell into a tone of irony to which only intense feeling ever drove him. "I begin to believe," said he, "that there is no North. The 7th regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is another. You are the only real thing."* There are few parchment brevets as precious as such a compliment, at such a time, from such a man.

However much the tardiness of the Annapolis reënforcements justified the President's sarcasm, they were at last actually on the way. We left Butler engaged in assisting the school-ship *Constitution* to a more secure position. The aid proved effectual; but the day's work ended by the ferry-boat *Maryland* — the Massachusetts 8th being still on board — getting hard aground in the shoal water of Annapolis Harbor. In this helpless predicament, with only hard pilot-bread and raw salt pork furnished from the *Constitution* to eat, and no water to drink, the regiment passed the night of Sunday. Early next morning (Monday, April 22) brought the arrival of another ship, which proved to be the *Boston*, containing the New York 7th; and thus these two regiments, so lately parted at Philadelphia, were once more united. Colonel Lefferts had proceeded on his independent course to Fort Monroe; but receiving no intelligence concerning the Potomac route, concluded, after all, to adopt the more prudent plan of steaming up Chesapeake Bay to Annapolis.

The *Boston* at once set to work, but without eventual success, to pull the *Maryland* into deeper water. Meanwhile the officers of the two regiments were holding interviews and correspondence with Commandant Blake of the Naval School on the one hand, and with the Maryland authorities on the other. Governor Hicks, in punctilious assertion of the paramount State sovereignty of Maryland, protested, in writing, against landing the troops. The mayor of Annapolis joined in the protest; though privately both declared Maryland was loyal to the Union, and that they would make no military resistance. That afternoon both regiments were landed. There was still a certain friction of military jealousy and refusal to coöperate between Butler and Lefferts; both were eager to proceed to Washington, but differed in their plans; and the many and apparently authentic rumors of the opposing force that would meet them from Baltimore caused discussion and delay. They had no transportation, few rations, and little ammunition. Butler took the first practical measures, by ordering the railroad depot and buildings to be occupied. Here an old locomotive was found, the machinery of which had been carefully disarranged. The mechanical skill of the Yankee militiamen now asserted its value. Private Charles Homans, of the Massachusetts 8th, at once recognized the locomotive as having been built in "our shop"; and calling to his help several machinists like himself from among the Massachusetts boys, they had no great difficulty in putting it in running or-

* J. H., Diary. Unpublished MS.

der. Tuesday morning (April 23) showing still no warlike demonstrations from any quarter, the surroundings of the town were reconnoitered, and two companies of the Massachusetts 8th pushed out three and a half miles along the railroad. A beginning was also made towards repairing the track, which was found torn up and displaced here and there. In this work, and in testing the newly repaired locomotive and improvising a train, another day slipped by. In the evening, however, two of the eight messengers sent out from Washington to Annapolis succeeded in reaching there, the second one bringing the definite orders of General Scott that Butler should remain and hold the place, and that the advancing troops should repair the railroad. That night, also, came four or more steamships with as many additional regiments of volunteers.

Wednesday morning, April 24, being the fourth day at Annapolis for the Massachusetts 8th and the third for the New York 7th, they started on their twenty miles' march to the junction. A couple of extemporized platform cars on which the "7th" mounted their little brass howitzers, the patched-up locomotive, and two rickety passenger cars constituted their artillery-baggage-supply-ambulance-and-construction train all in one. Thus provided, the two regiments marched, scouted, laid track, and built bridges as occasion required; now fraternizing and coöperating with hearty good-will. It was slow and tedious work; they were not inured to nor provided for even such holiday campaigning as this. Luckily they had fine weather — a warm, sunny, spring day, succeeded by a clear night with a full moon to light it. So they clung pluckily to their duty, hungry and sleepy though they were, all day and all night of Wednesday, and arrived at the junction about daybreak of Thursday. All the previous rumors had taught them that here they might expect a rebel force and a fight. The anticipation proved groundless; they learned, on the contrary, that a train from Washington had come to this place for them the day before. It soon again made its appearance; and quickly embarking on it, by noon the New York 7th was at its destination.

Those who were in the Federal capital on that Thursday, April 25, will never, during their lives, forget the event. An indescribable gloom and doubt had hung over Washington nearly a week, paralyzing its traffic and crushing out its very life. As soon as their coming was known, an immense crowd gathered at the depot to obtain ocular evidence that relief had at length reached the city. Promptly debarking and forming, the 7th marched from the Capitol up Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House. As they passed up the magnificent street, with their well-formed ranks, their exact military step, their soldierly bearing, their gayly floating flags, and the inspiring music of their splendid regimental band, they seemed to sweep all thought of danger and all taint of treason not only out of that great national thoroughfare, but out of every human heart in the Federal city. The presence of this single regiment seemed to turn the scales of fate. Cheer upon cheer greeted them, windows were thrown up, houses opened, the population came forth upon the streets as for a holiday. It was an epoch in American history. For the first time, the combined spirit and power of Liberty entered the nation's capital.

April 1888

LOVE'S IMAGINING.

DEAR Love, I sometimes think how it would be
If thou shouldst love me, if, on such a day,
O day of wonder! thou shouldst come and say
I love thee, or but let me guess thy plea —
If once thine eyes should brighten suddenly,
If once thy step should hasten or delay
Because of me, if once thy hand should stay
A needless instant in my own! Ah, me!
From such imaginings I wake and start,
And dull and worthless life's endeavors seem
Before the tender beauty of my dream —
And then I whisper my impatient heart,
"Be still, be comforted, O heart of mine,
Thou art not all bereft, the dream is thine."

Hopestill Goodwin.

and treated it, that praise, at any rate, is assured to him.

For the rest, justice is not at present done, in my opinion, to Milton's management of the inevitable matter of a Puritan epic, a matter full of difficulties, for a poet. Justice is not done to the *architectonics*, as Goethe would have called them, of "Paradise Lost"; in these, too, the power of Milton's art is remarkable. But this may be a proposition which requires discussion and development for establishing it, and they are impossible on an occasion like the present.

That Milton, of all our English race, is by his diction and rhythm the one artist of the highest rank in the great style whom we have; this I take as requiring no discussion, this I take as certain.

The mighty power of poetry and art is generally admitted. But where the soul of this power, of this power at its best, chiefly resides, very many of us fail to see. It resides chiefly in the refining and elevation wrought in us by the high and rare excellence of the great style. We may feel the effect without being able to give ourselves clear account of its cause, but the thing is so. Now, no race needs the influences mentioned, the influences of refining and elevation, more than ours; and in poetry and art our grand source for them is Milton.

To what does he owe this supreme distinction? To nature first and foremost, to that bent of nature for inequality which to the worshipers of the average man is so unacceptable; to a gift, a divine favor. "The older one grows," says Goethe, "the more one prizes natural gifts, because by no possibility can they be procured and stuck on." Nature formed Milton to be a great poet. But what other poet has shown so sincere a sense of the grandeur of his vocation, and a moral effort so constant and sublime to make and keep himself worthy of it? The Milton of religious and political controversy, and perhaps of domestic life also, is not seldom disfigured by want of amenity, by acerbity. The Milton of poetry, on the other hand is one of those great men, "who are modest" — to quote a fine remark of Leopardi, that gifted and stricken young Italian, who in his sense for poetic style is worthy to be named with Dante and Milton — "who are modest, because they continually compare themselves, not with other men, but with that idea of the perfect which they have before their mind." The Milton of poetry is the man, in his own magnificent phrase, of "devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit that can enrich with all utterance and knowledge, and sends out his Seraphim with the hallowed fire of his altar, to touch and purify the lips of whom he pleases." And finally, the Milton of poetry is, in his own words again, the man of "industrious and select reading." Continually he lived in companionship with high and rare excellence, with the great Hebrew poets and prophets, with the great poets of Greece and Rome. The Hebrew compositions were not in verse, and can be not inadequately represented by the grand, measured prose of our English Bible. The verse of the poets of Greece and Rome no translation can adequately reproduce. Prose cannot have the power of verse; verse-translation may give whatever of charm is in the soul and talent of the translator himself, but never the specific charm of the verse and poet translated. In our race are thousands of readers, presently there will be millions, who know not a word of Greek and Latin and will never learn those languages. If this host of readers are ever to gain any sense of the power and charm of the great poets of antiquity, their way to gain it is not through translations of the ancients, but through the original poetry of Milton, who has the like power and charm, because he has the like great style.

Through Milton they may gain it, for, in conclusion, Milton is English; this master in the great style of the ancients is English. Virgil, whom Milton loved and honored, has at the end of the "Æneid" a noble passage, where Juno, seeing the defeat of Turnus and the Italians imminent, the victory of the Trojan invaders assured, entreats Jupiter that Italy may nevertheless survive and be herself still, may retain her own mind, manners, and language, and not adopt those of the conqueror.

Sit Latium, sint Albani per secula reges!

Jupiter grants the prayer; he promises perpetuity and the future to Italy — Italy reënforced by whatever virtue the Trojan race has, but Italy, not Troy. This we may take as a sort of parable suiting ourselves. All the Anglo-Saxon contagion, all the flood of Anglo-Saxon commonness, beats vainly against the great style but cannot shake it, and has to accept its triumph. But it triumphs in Milton, in one of our own race, tongue, faith, and morals. Milton has made the great style no longer an exotic here; he has made it an inmate amongst us, a leaven, and a power. Nevertheless he, and his hearers on both sides of the Atlantic, are English and will remain English:

Sermonem Ausonii patrium moresque tenebunt.

The English race overspreads the world, and at the same time the ideal of an excellence the most high and the most rare abides a possession with it forever.

Matthew Arnold.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE BORDER STATES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

REBELLIOUS MARYLAND.

NO sooner had the secession ordinance been secretly passed by the convention of Virginia than Governor Letcher notified Jefferson Davis of the event, and (doubtless by preconcert) invited him to send a commissioner from Montgomery to Richmond to negotiate an alliance. The adhesion of Virginia was an affair of such magnitude and pressing need to the cotton-States, that Davis made the Vice-President of the new Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens, his plenipotentiary, who accordingly arrived at Richmond on the 22d of April. Here he found everything as favorable to his mission as he could possibly wish. The convention was filled with a newborn zeal of insurrection; many lately stubborn Union members were willingly accepting offices in the extemporized army of the State; the governor had that day appointed Robert E. Lee commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, which choice the convention immediately confirmed. Stephens was shrewd enough to perceive that his real negotiation lay neither with the governor nor the convention, but with this newly created military chieftain. That very evening he invited Lee to a conference, at which the late Federal colonel forgot the sentiment written by his own hand two days before, that he never again desired to draw his sword except in defense of his native State,† and now expressed great eagerness for the proposed alliance. Lee being willing, the remainder of the negotiation was easy; and two days afterward (April 24) Stephens and certain members of the convention signed a formal military league, making Virginia an immediate member of the "Confederate States," and placing her armies under the command of Jefferson Davis — thus treating with contempt the convention proviso that the secession ordinance should only take effect after ratification by the people, the vote on which had been set for the fourth Thursday of May. Lee and others endured this military usurpation, under which they became beneficiaries, without protest. No excuse for it could be urged. Up to this time not the slightest sign of hostility to Virginia had been made by the Lincoln administration — no threats, no invasion, no blockade; the burning of Harper's Ferry and Gosport were induced by the hostile action of Virginia herself. On the contrary, even after these, Mr. Lincoln repeated in writing, in a letter to Reverdy Johnson which will be presently quoted, the declarations made to the Virginia commissioners on the 13th, that he intended no war, no invasion, no subjugation — nothing but defense of the Government.

At the time of the Baltimore riot the telegraph was still undisturbed; and by its help, as well as by personal information and private letters, that startling occurrence and the succeeding insurrectionary uprising were speedily made known throughout the entire South, where they excited the liveliest satisfaction and most sanguine hopes. All the Southern newspapers immediately became clamorous for an advance on Washington; some of the most pronounced Richmond conspirators had all along been favorable to such an enterprise; and extravagant estimates of possibilities were telegraphed to Montgomery. They set forth that Baltimore was in arms, Maryland rising, Lincoln in a trap, and not more than 1200 regulars and 3000 volunteers in Washington; that the rebels had 3000 men at Harper's Ferry; that Governor Letcher had seized three to five steamers on the James River; that the connecting Southern railroads could carry 5000 to 7000 men daily at the rate of 350 miles per day.

> As a leader we want Davis. An hour now is worth years of common fighting. One dash, and Lincoln is taken, the country saved, and the leader who does it will be immortalized.‡

This, from a railroad superintendent supposed to have practical skill in transportation, looked plausible. The Montgomery cabinet caught the enthusiasm of the moment, and on April 22 Jefferson Davis telegraphed to Governor Letcher at Richmond:

> In addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions have been made for 13 regiments; 8 to rendezvous at Lynchburg, 4 at Richmond, and 1 at Harper's Ferry. Sustain Baltimore, if practicable. We reënforce you.

† Lee to General Scott, April 20, 1861.

‡ Bird to Walker, April 20, 1861. War Records.

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This dispatch shows us what a farce even the Virginia military league was, since two days before its conclusion "foreign" rebel troops were already ordered to the "sacred soil" of the Old Dominion. Governor Letcher was doubtless willing enough to respond to the suggestion of Davis, but apparently had neither the necessary troops nor preparation. He had as yet been able to muster but a shadowy force on the line of the Potomac, notwithstanding his adjutant-general's pretentious report of the previous December. Nevertheless, hoping that events might ripen the opportunity into better conditions for success, he lost no time in sending such encouragement and help as were at his control. The rebel commander at Harper's Ferry had already communicated with the Baltimore authorities and effected a cordial understanding with them, and they promised to notify him of hostile menace or approach.* Mason, late senator, appears thereupon to have been dispatched to Baltimore.† He seems to have agreed to supply the Maryland rebels with such arms as Virginia could spare; and some 2000 muskets actually found their way to Baltimore from this source during the following week,‡ though an arrangement to send twenty cannon (32-pounders) to the same city from the Gosport navy yard§ apparently failed.

But it would appear that the project of a dash at Washington found an unexpected obstacle in the counsels of Virginia's new military chief, Robert E. Lee, who assumed command of the State forces April 23.|| He instructed the officers at Alexandria and along the Potomac to act on the defensive, to establish camps of instruction, and collect men and provisions.¶ This course was little to the liking of some of the more ardent rebels. They telegraphed (in substance) that Davis's immediate presence at Richmond was essential; that his non-arrival was causing dissatisfaction; that the troops had no confidence in Lee and were murmuring; that there were signs of temporizing, hopes of a settlement without collision, and consequent danger of demoralization; that Lee "dwelt on enthusiasm North and against aggression from us." Said another dispatch:

> Have conversed with General Robert E. Lee. He wishes to repress enthusiasm of our people. His troops not ready, although pouring in every hour. They remain here. General Cocke has three hundred and no more. Corps of observation on Potomac near Alexandria. He considers Maryland helpless, needing encouragement and succor. Believes twenty thousand men in and near Washington.**

In no State were the secession plottings more determined or continuous than in Maryland. From the first a small but able and unwearying knot of Baltimore conspirators sought to commit her people to rebellion by the empty form of a secession ordinance. They made speeches, held conventions, besieged the governor with committees; they joined the Washington conspirators in treasonable caucus; they sent recruits to Charleston; they incited the Baltimore riot; and there is no doubt that in these doings they reflected a strong minority sentiment in the State. With such a man as Pickens or Letcher in the executive chair they might have succeeded, but in Governor Hicks they found a constant stumbling-block and an irremovable obstacle. He gave Southern commissioners the cold shoulder. He refused at first to call the legislature. He declined to order a vote on holding a convention. He informed General Scott of the rebel plots of Maryland, and testified of the treasonable designs before the investigating committee of Congress. His enemies have accused him of treachery, and cite in proof a letter which they allege he wrote a few days after Lincoln's election in which he inquired whether a certain militia company would be "good men to send out to kill Lincoln and his men." If the letter be not a forgery, it was at most an ill-judged and awkward piece of badinage; for his repeated declarations and acts leave no doubt that from first to last his heart was true to the Union. He had the serious fault of timidity, and in several instances foolishly gave way to popular clamor; but in every case he soon recovered and resumed his hostility to secession.

The Baltimore riot, as we have seen, put a stop to the governor's arrangements to raise and arm four regiments of Maryland volunteers, of picked Union men, for United States service within the State or at Washington. Instead of this, he, in the flurry of the uprising, called out the existing militia companies, mainly disloyal in sentiment and officered by secessionists. The Baltimore authorities collected arms, bought munitions, and improvised companies to resist the passage of troops; they forbade the export of provisions, regulated the departure of vessels, controlled the telegraph. General Stewart, commanding the State militia, established posts and patrols, and in effect Maryland became hostile territory to the North and to the Government. The Union flag disappeared from her soil. For three or

* Harper to Richardson, April 21, 1861. War Records.

† Blanchard to Howard, April 23, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

‡ Stuart to Police Board, May 2, 1861. Ibid., p. 394.

§ Watts to Lee, April 27, 1861. MS.

|| Lee, General Orders, April 23, 1861. War Records.

¶ Lee to Cocke, April 24, 1861. War Records.

** Duncan to Walker, April 26, 1861. MS.

four days treason was rampant; all Union men were intimidated; all Union expression or manifestation was suppressed by mob violence. The hitherto fearless Union newspapers, in order to save their offices and materials from destruction, were compelled to drift with the flood, and print editorials advising, in vague terms, that all must now unite in the defense of Maryland. It was in this storm and stress of insurrection that Governor Hicks protested against Butler's landing, and sent Lincoln his proposal of mediation;* and on the same day (April 22), and by the same influence, he was prevailed upon to notify the legislature to meet on the 26th. It so happened that the seats of the Baltimore members were vacant. A special election, dominated by the same passions, was held on the 24th. Only a "States Rights" ticket was voted for; and of the 30,000 electors in the city 9244, without opposition, elected the little knot of secession conspirators — the Union men not daring to nominate candidates or come to the polls.

For the moment the leading Unionists of Maryland deemed their true rôle one of patience and conciliation. In this spirit Reverdy Johnson, a lawyer and statesman of fame and influence both at home and abroad, came to Lincoln upon the stereotyped errand to obtain some assurance in writing that he meditated no invasion or subjugation of the South; to which the President confidentially replied:

> I forebore to answer yours of the 22d because of my aversion (which I thought you understood) to getting on paper and furnishing new grounds for misunderstanding. I do say the sole purpose of bringing troops here is to defend this Capital. I do say I have no purpose to invade Virginia with them or any other troops, as I understand the word invasion. But suppose Virginia sends her troops, or admits others through her borders, to assail this Capital, am I not to repel them even to the crossing of the Potomac, if I can? Suppose Virginia erects, or permits to be erected, batteries on the opposite shore to bombard the city, are we to stand still and see it done? In a word, if Virginia strikes us, are we not to strike back, and as effectively as we can? Again, are we not to hold Fort Monroe (for instance), if we can? I have no objection to declare a thousand times that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any other State, but I do not mean to let them invade us without striking back.†

Mr. Johnson replied, thanking the President for his frankness, and indorsing all his policy. "In a word," said he, "all that your note suggests would be my purpose were I intrusted with your high office." He also promised that the President's note should "be held perfectly confidential."‡ But it appears that Mr. Johnson chose his confidants with very poor judgment; for within four days its substance was written from Washington direct to Jefferson Davis.§

By no means the least of the difficult problems before Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet was the question how to deal with the Maryland legislature, so unexpectedly called to assemble. The special election in Baltimore,‖ held under secession terrorism, had resulted in the unopposed choice of ten delegates from the city, all believed to be disloyal, and several of them known to be conspicuous secessionists. With this fresh element of treason suddenly added to a legislative body so small in numbers, it seemed morally certain that its first act would be to arm the State, and pass something equivalent to a secession ordinance. Should this be permitted? How could it best be prevented? Ought the legislature to be arrested? Should it be dispersed by force? General Butler was at Annapolis, where it was expected that the session would be held, and signified his more than willingness to act in the matter. The plans were discussed in Cabinet with great contrariety of opinion. Some of the least belligerent of the President's councilors were by this time in hot blood over the repeated disasters and indignities which the Government had suffered, and began to indulge in the unreasoning temper and impatience of the irritated public opinion of the North, where one of the largest and most influential journals had already declared that the country needed a dictator. Mr. Bates filed a written opinion — in spirit a protest — declaring that the treasonable acts in Virginia and Maryland were encouraged by the fact that "we frighten nobody, we hurt nobody"; though he failed to suggest any other than merely vindictive remedies that were immediately feasible. Mr. Chase also partook of this frame of mind, and wrote the President a curt little note of querulous complaint, eminently prophetic of his future feelings towards and relations to Mr. Lincoln:

> Let me beg you to remember that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we

* War Records.

† Lincoln to Johnson, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Johnson to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Campbell to Davis, April 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‖ As the legislature, at its last session, had unseated the delegates from Baltimore, a special election was held in that city on April 24. But one ticket was presented, and 9244 ballots were cast for Messrs. John C. Brune, Ross Winans, Henry M. Warfield, J. Hanson Thomas, T. Parkin Scott, H. M. Morfitt, S. Teackle Wallis, Charles H. Pitts, Wm. G. Harrison, and Lawrence Sangston, the States Rights candidates. — Scharf, "History of Maryland," Vol. III., p. 424.

have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg you to remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland. The passage of that ordinance will be the signal for the entry of disunion forces into Maryland. It will give a color of law and regularity to rebellion and thereby triple its strength. The custom-house in Baltimore will be seized and Fort McHenry attacked—perhaps taken. What next? Do not, I pray you, let this new success of treason be inaugurated in the presence of American troops. Save us from this new humiliation. A word to the brave old commanding general will do the work of prevention. You alone can give the word.*

The bad taste and injustice of such language consisted in its assumption that the President was somehow culpable for what had already occurred, whereas Mr. Chase had in the beginning been more conciliatory towards the rebels than had Mr. Lincoln.

With a higher conception of the functions of the presidential office, Mr. Lincoln treated public clamor and the fretfulness of Cabinet ministers with the same quiet toleration. Again, as before, and as ever afterward, he listened attentively to such advice as his Cabinet had to give, but reserved the decision to himself. He looked over the Attorney-General's legal notes, weighed the points of political expediency, canvassed carefully the probabilities of military advantage, and embodied his final directions in a letter to General Scott:

My Dear Sir: The Maryland legislature assembles to-morrow at Annapolis, and not improbably will take action to arm the people of that State against the United States. The question has been submitted to and considered by me, whether it would not be justifiable, upon the ground of necessary defense, for you, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, to arrest or disperse the members of that body. I think it would not be justifiable, nor efficient for the desired object. *First*, they have a clearly legal right to assemble; and we cannot know in advance that their action will not be lawful and peaceful. And if we wait until they shall have acted, their arrest or dispersion will not lessen the effect of their action.

Secondly, we cannot permanently prevent their action. If we arrest them, we cannot long hold them as prisoners; and, when liberated, they will immediately reassemble and take their action. And precisely the same if we simply disperse them. They will immediately reassemble in some other place.

I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to the bombardment of their cities; and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. †

Thus directed, General Scott wrote to General Butler on the following day:

In the absence of the undersigned, the foregoing instructions are turned over to Brigadier-General B. F. Butler of the Massachusetts Volunteers, or other officer commanding at Annapolis, who will carry them out in a right spirit; that is, with moderation and firmness. In the case of arrested individuals notorious for their hostility to the United States, the prisoners will be safely kept and duly cared for, but not surrendered except on the order of the commander aforesaid. ‡

At the last moment, however, conscious of the offenses which some of their members were meditating against the Government, the Maryland legislature abandoned the idea of meeting at Annapolis, and induced the governor to convene their special session at the town of Frederick. Here Governor Hicks sent them his special message on the 27th, reciting the recent occurrences, transmitting his correspondence with the various Federal authorities, and expressing the conviction "that the only safety of Maryland lies in preserving a neutral position between our brethren of the North and of the South." At the same time he admitted the right of transit for Federal troops, and counseled "that we shall array ourselves for Union and peace." § The lack of coherence and consistency in the message was atoned for by its underlying spirit of loyalty.

Meanwhile the plentiful arrival of volunteers enabled the Government to strengthen its hold upon Annapolis and the railroad.‖ The military "Department of Annapolis" was created, and General Butler assigned to its command. This embraced twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to Washington; ¶ and all of Maryland not included in these limits was left in General Patterson's "Department of Pennsylvania." Measures were taken to concentrate sufficient troops at Harrisburg and at Philadelphia to approach Baltimore in force from those quarters and permanently to occupy the city; and to give the military ample authority for every contingency, the President issued the following additional order to General Scott:

You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.**

* Chase to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase."

† Lincoln to Scott, April 25, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Scott to Butler, April 26, 1861. War Records.

§ Hicks, Special Message, April 27, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

‖ Butler to Scott, April 27, 1861. War Records.

¶ General Orders, No. 12, April 27, 1861. War Records.

** Lincoln to Scott, April 27, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

Having run its course about a week or ten days, the secession frenzy of Baltimore rapidly subsided. The railroad managers of that city once more tendered their services to the War Department; but Secretary Cameron, instead of giving them immediate encouragement, ordered that the Annapolis route be opened for public travel and traffic. Their isolation, first created by the bridge-burning, was thus continued and soon began to tell seriously upon their business interests, as well as upon the general industries and comfort of the city. On the 4th of May General Butler, under Scott's orders, moved forward and took post with two regiments at the Relay House, eight miles from Baltimore, where he could control the westward trains and cut off communication with Harper's Ferry. The significance of all these circumstances did not escape the popular observation and instinct. The Union newspapers took courage and once more printed bold leaders; the city government dismissed the rebel militia and permitted bridges and telegraphs to be repaired. Governor Hicks issued a proclamation for the election of members of Congress to attend the coming special session on the 4th of July; and also, by special message to the legislature and publication in the newspapers, repudiated the charge that he had consented to the bridge-burning. More than all, the Unionists of both city and State, gaining confidence with the strong evidences of reaction, began to hold meetings and conventions vigorously to denounce secession, and to demonstrate that they were in a decided majority.

Little by little loyalty and authority asserted themselves. About the 1st of May General Scott began preparing to reëstablish the transit of troops through Baltimore, and on the 9th the first detachment since the riot of April 19 successfully made the journey. Some 1300 men in all, including Sherman's regular battery from Minnesota and 500 regulars from Texas, were brought in transports from Perryville and landed at Locust Point under the guns of the *Harriet Lane*, embarked in cars, and carried through South Baltimore. The city authorities, police, and a large concourse of people were present; and the precautions and arrangements were so thorough that not the slightest disturbance occurred. Four days after this (May 13) the railroad brought the first train from Philadelphia over its repaired track and restored bridges.

The Maryland legislature, finding its occupation gone, and yet nursing an obstinate secession sympathy, adjourned on May 14 to meet again on the 4th of June. About the same time the people of Baltimore underwent a surprise. Late on the evening of May 13, under cover of an opportune thunder-storm, General Butler moved from the Relay House into the city with about a thousand men, the bulk of his force being the famous Massachusetts 6th, which had been mobbed there on the 19th of April. The movement was entirely unauthorized and called forth a severe rebuke from General Scott; but it met no opposition and was loudly applauded by the impatient public opinion of the North, which could ill comprehend the serious military risk it involved. The general carried his spirit of bravado still farther. He made his camp on Federal Hill, which he proceeded to fortify; and on the afternoon of the 14th sent a detachment of only thirty-five men to seize a lot of arms stored near the locality of the riot. The little squad of volunteers found the warehouse and were given possession of the arms,— 2200 muskets sent from Virginia, and 4020 pikes of the John Brown pattern, made for the city by the Winans establishment during the riot week,— and loading them on thirty-five wagons and drays started for Fort McHenry over some of the identical streets where the Massachusetts men had been murdered by the mob. It was already late when this long procession got under way; large crowds collected, and riotous demonstrations of a threatening character were made at several points. Fortunately, the police gave efficient assistance, and what might easily have become an unnecessary sacrifice of life was by their vigilance averted.

Also coincident with this, the Union cause gained another signal advantage in Maryland. Governor Hicks's courage had risen with the ebb of disloyalty throughout the State; and as soon as the legislature was adjourned he issued his proclamation calling into the service of the United States the four regiments he originally promised under the President's call. These were rapidly formed, and became a part of the Union army under a new call. Amidst these fluctuations the more belligerent Maryland rebels also formed companies and went South — some to Richmond, some to the rebel camp at Harper's Ferry. But the fraction of military aid which Maryland finally gave to the rebellion rose to no special significance.

Out of these transactions, however, there arose a noteworthy judicial incident. A man named John Merryman, found recruiting as a lieutenant for one of these rebel companies, was arrested (May 25) and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Chief-Justice Taney, then in Baltimore, being applied to, issued a writ of *habeas corpus* to bring the prisoner before him.* General Cadwalader, at this time in command, made a respectful reply to the writ, alleging

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 640–642.



GOVERNOR T. H. HICKS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Merryman's treason, and stating further that the President had authorized him to suspend the writ in such cases; and requested the Chief-Justice to postpone further action till the matter could be referred to the President.* This avowal aroused all the political ire of the Chief-Justice; he was struck with a judicial blindness which put disloyalty, conspiracy, treason, and rebellion utterly beyond his official contemplation. He saw not with the eye of a great judge the offended majesty of the law commanding the obedience of all citizens of the republic, but only, with a lawyer's microscopic acuteness, the disregard of certain technical forms and doubtful professional dicta. The personal restraint of one traitor in arms became of more concern to him than the endangered fate of representative government to the world.

The Chief-Justice immediately ordered an attachment to issue against General Cadwalader for contempt; upon which the marshal made return that he was unable to serve it, being denied entrance to Fort McHenry. Thereupon the Chief-Justice admitted the existence of a superior military force, but declared "that the President, under the Constitution of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize a military officer to do it," and that Merryman ought therefore to be immediately discharged; and went on to say "that he should cause his opinion when filed, and all the proceedings, to be laid before the President, in order that he might perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws by securing obedience to the process of the United States."

To this general purport the Chief-Justice filed his written opinion on the 1st of June,† and caused a copy to be transmitted to the President.

Of that opinion it will not be irrelevant to quote the criticism of one of the profoundest and most impartial jurists of that day:

> Chief-Justice Taney's opinion in Merryman's case is not an authority. This, of course, is said in the judicial sense. But it is not even an argument, in the full sense. He does not argue the question from the language of the clause, nor from the history of the clause, nor from the principles of the Constitution, except by an elaborate depreciation of the President's office, even to the extent of making him, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, called from the States into the service of the United States, no more than an assistant to the marshal's posse — the deepest plunge of judicial rhetoric. The opinion, moreover, has a tone, not to say a ring, of disaffection to the President, and to the Northern and Western side of his house, which is not comfortable to suppose in the person who fills the central seat of impersonal justice. ‡

To this estimate of the spirit of Chief-Justice Taney's view we may properly, by way of anticipation, here add President Lincoln's own official answer to its substance. No attention was of course paid to the transmitted papers; but the President at the time of their receipt was already engaged in preparing his message to the coming special session of Congress, and in that document he presented the justification of his act. The original draft of the message, in Lincoln's autograph manuscript, thus defines the executive authority with that force of statement and strength of phraseology of which he was so consummate a master:

> Soon after the first call for militia, I felt it my duty to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* — or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. At my verbal request, as well as by the general's own inclination, this authority has been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned; and I have been reminded from a high quarter that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself be one to violate them. Of course I gave some consideration to the questions of power and

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 643, 644.

† Ibid., pp. 644-659.

‡ Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," Part I., p. 36.



GOVERNOR CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON.

propriety before I acted in this matter. The whole of the laws which I have sworn to take care that they be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing to be executed, in nearly one-third of the States. Must I have allowed them to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case I should consider my official oath broken, if I should allow the Government to be overthrown, when I might think the disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it. But in this case I was not, in my own judgment, driven to this ground. In my opinion, I violated no law. The provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision — is a provision — that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. I decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, which I authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision plainly was made for a dangerous emergency, I cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of that instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case by the rebellion.*

The alterations and corrections from this first draft into the more impersonal form as finally sent to Congress and officially printed, but nowise changing its argument or substance, are also entirely in Lincoln's handwriting. That second and corrected form better befits the measured solemnity of a State paper. But in the language quoted above we seem brought into direct contact with the living workings of Lincoln's mind, and in this light the autograph original possesses a peculiar biographical interest and value.

* Lincoln, Special Message, July 4, 1861. Autograph MS. of original draft.

MISSOURI.

THE governor of Missouri, Claiborne F. Jackson, was early engaged in the secession conspiracy, though, like other border-State executives, he successfully concealed his extreme designs from the public. There was an intolerant pro-slavery sentiment throughout the State; but, unlike other border States, it contained a positive and outspoken minority of equally strong antislavery citizens in a few localities, chiefly in the great commercial city of St. Louis, and made up mainly of its German residents and voters, numbering fully one-half the total population, which in 1860 was 160,000. This was the solitary exception to the general pro-slavery reaction in the whole South during the decade. Here, in 1856, a young, talented, courageous leader and skillful politician, Francis P. Blair, Jr., though himself a slaveholder, had dared to advocate the doctrine and policy of gradual emancipation, and on that issue secured an election to Congress. The same issue repeated in 1858 brought him sufficiently near an election to entitle him to contest his opponent's seat. In 1860 Blair and his followers, now fully acting with the Republican party, cast 17,028 votes for Lincoln, while the remaining votes in the State were divided as follows: Douglas, 58,801; Bell, 58,372; Breckinridge, 31,317. Blair was also again elected to Congress. The combined Lincoln, Douglas, and Bell vote showed an overwhelming Union majority; but the governor elected by the Douglas plurality almost immediately became a disunionist and secession conspirator.

With Blair as a leader, and such an organized minority at his call, the intrigues of Governor Jackson to force Missouri into secession met from the outset with many difficulties, notwithstanding the governor's official powers, influential following, and the prevalent pro-slavery opinion of the State. The legislature was sufficiently subservient; it contained a majority of radical secessionists, and only about fifteen unconditional Union members, who, however, were vigilant and active, and made the most of their minority influence. The same general expedients resorted to in other States by the conspirators were used in

Missouri — visits and speeches from Southern commissioners; messages and resolutions of "Southern" rights and sympathy and strong enunciation of the doctrine of non-coercion; military bills and measures to arm and control the State; finally, a "sovereign" State Convention. Here they overshot their mark. A strong majority of Union members was elected. The convention met at Jefferson City, the State capital, adjourned to the healthier atmosphere of St. Louis, and by an outspoken report and decided votes condemned secession and took a recess till December following.

The secession leaders, however, would not accept their popular defeat. In the interim Sumter fell, and Lincoln issued his call for troops. Governor Jackson, as we have seen, insultingly denounced the requisition as "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, and diabolical," and again convened his rebel legislature in extra session to do the revolutionary work which the "sovereign" Missouri convention had so recently condemned.

It was an essential feature of Governor Jackson's programme to obtain possession of the St. Louis arsenal, and as early as January he had well-nigh completed his intrigue for its surrender to the State by a treacherous officer. But suspicion was aroused, the commandant changed, and the arsenal reënforced; by the middle of February the garrison had been increased to 488 regulars and recruits. In the mean time local intrigue was active. The secessionists organized bodies of "Minute men" to capture it, while the Union men with equal alertness formed a safety committee, and companies of Home Guards to join in its defense. These latter were largely drawn from the German part of the city, to which the arsenal lay contiguous, and their guardianship over it was therefore more direct and effective. Lincoln was inaugurated, and making Montgomery Blair his postmaster-general and Edward Bates his attorney-general, Missouri had virtually two representatives in the Cabinet. Francis P. Blair, Jr., brother of Montgomery, therefore found no great difficulty in having the command of the arsenal given to Captain Nathaniel Lyon, not only a devoted soldier, but a man of thorough anti-slavery convictions. Lyon was eager to forestall the secession conspiracy by extensive preparation and swift repression; but the department commander, General Harney, and the ordnance officer, Major Hagner, whom Lyon had displaced, both of more slow and cautious temper, and reflecting the local political conservatism, thwarted and hampered Lyon and Blair, who from the beginning felt and acted in concert. No great difficulty grew out of this antagonism till the President's call for troops; then it created discussion, delay, want of coöperation. Blair could not get his volunteers mustered into service, and Governor Yates of Illinois could get no arms. The President finally grew impatient. Harney was relieved and called to Washington, and Lyon directed to muster-in and arm the four Missouri regiments of volunteers with all expedition, and to send the extra arms to Springfield, Illinois, while three Illinois regiments were ordered to St. Louis to assist in guarding the arsenal.



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS P. BLAIR, JR. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

These orders were issued in Washington on April 20. By this time St. Louis, like the whole Union, was seething with excitement, except that public opinion was more evenly divided than elsewhere. There were Union speeches and rebel speeches; cheers for Lin-

coln and cheers for Davis; Union flags and rebel flags; Union headquarters and rebel headquarters. With this also there was mingled a certain antipathy of nationality, all the Germans being determined Unionists. The antagonism quickly grew into armed organizations. The Unionists were mustered, armed, and drilled at the arsenal as United States volunteers. On the other hand Governor Jackson, having decided on revolution, formed at St. Louis a nominal camp of instruction under the State militia laws. The camp was established at Lindell's Grove, was christened "Camp Jackson," in honor of the governor, and was commanded by Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, a West Point graduate. Two regiments quickly assembled, and a third was in process of formation. The flag of the United States still floated over it and many Unionists were in the ranks of the old holiday parade militia companies, but the whole leadership and animating motive were in aid of rebellion: it was already literally one of Jefferson Davis's outposts. As soon as Governor Jackson had avowed his treason, he dispatched two confidential agents to Montgomery to solicit arms and aid, by whom Jefferson Davis wrote in reply:

> After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These from the commanding hills will be effective, both against the garrison and to breach the inclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the arsenal and securing its supplies, rendered doubly important by the means taken to obstruct your commerce and render you unarmed victims of a hostile invasion. We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the star of Missouri shall be added to the constellation of the Confederate States of America.*

In reality he already regarded the "star" as in the "constellation." Three days later the rebel Secretary of War wrote to the governor:

> Can you arm and equip one regiment of infantry for service in Virginia to rendezvous at Richmond? Transportation will be provided by this Government. The regiment to elect its own officers, and must enlist for not less than twelve months, unless sooner discharged.†

In face of the overwhelming Union sentiment of Missouri, so lately manifested by the action of the State convention, Governor Jackson was not prepared for so bold a proceeding, and therefore wrote in reply:

> Yours of the 26th ultimo, *via* Louisville, is received. I have no legal authority to furnish the men you desire. Missouri, you know, is yet under the tyranny of Lincoln's government — so far, at least, as forms go. We are wofully deficient here in arms and cannot furnish them at present; but so far as men are concerned we have plenty of them ready, willing, and anxious to march at any moment to the defense of the South. Our legislature has just met, and I doubt not will give me all necessary authority over the matter. If you can arm the men they will go whenever wanted, and to any point where they may be most needed. I send this to Memphis by private hand, being afraid to trust our mails or telegraphs. Let me hear from you by the same means. Missouri can and will put one hundred thousand men in the field if required. We are using every means to arm our people, and until we are better prepared must move cautiously. I write this in confidence. With my prayers for your success, etc.‡

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL LYON.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

* Davis to Jackson, April 23, 1861. War Records.
† Walker to Jackson, April 26, 1861. War Records.
‡ Jackson to Walker, May 5, 1861. War Records.

First to capture the arsenal and then to reënforce the armies of Jefferson Davis was doubtless the immediate object of Camp Jackson. It would be a convenient nucleus which at the given signal would draw to itself similar elements from different parts of the State. Already the arsenal at Liberty — the same one from which arms were stolen to overawe Kansas in 1855 — had been seized on April 20 and its contents appropriated by secessionists in western Missouri. Jeff M. Thompson had been for some weeks drilling a rebel camp at St. Joseph, and threatening the neighboring arsenal at Leavenworth. The legislature was maturing a comprehensive military bill which would give the governor power to concentrate and use these scattered fractions of regiments. Until this was passed, Camp Jackson had a lawful existence under the old militia laws.

But the Union Safety Committee, and especially Mr. Blair and Captain Lyon, followed the governor's intrigue at every step, and reporting the growing danger to Washington received from President Lincoln extraordinary powers to overcome it. An order to Captain Lyon read as follows:

> The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary for that purpose by yourself and by Messrs. Oliver T. Filley, John How, James O. Broadhead, Samuel T. Glover, J. Witzig, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis, etc.*

It was upon this order, with certain additional details, that General Scott made the indorsement, "It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

The Union Safety Committee soon had indisputable evidence of the insurrectionary purposes and preparations. On the night of May 8 cannon, ammunition, and several hundred muskets, sent by Jefferson Davis, were landed at the St. Louis levee from a New Orleans steamer, and at once transferred to Camp Jackson. They had been brought from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and were a part of the United States arms captured there in January by the governor of that State. The proceeding did not escape the vigilance of the Safety Committee, but the material of war was allowed to go unobstructed to the camp. The next day Captain Lyon visited Camp Jackson in disguise, and thus acquainting himself personally with its condition, strategical situation, and surroundings matured his plan for its immediate capture. All legal obstacles which had been urged against such a summary proceeding were now removed by the actual presence in the camp of the hostile supplies brought from Baton Rouge.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 10 a strong battalion of regulars with six pieces of artillery, four regiments of Missouri Volunteers, and two regiments of Home Guards, all under command of Captain Lyon, were rapidly marching through different streets to Camp Jackson. Arrived there, it was but a moment's work to gain the appointed positions surrounding the camp, and to plant the batteries, ready for action, on commanding elevations. General Frost heard of their coming, and undertook to avert the blow by sending Lyon a letter denying that he or his command, or "any other part of the State forces," meant any hostility to the United States — though it was himself who had endeavored to corrupt the commandant of the arsenal in January,† and who, in a letter to the governor,‡ had outlined and recommended these very military proceedings in Missouri, convening the legislature, obtaining heavy guns from Baton Rouge, seizing the Liberty arsenal, and establishing this camp of instruction, expressly to oppose President Lincoln.

So far from being deterred from his purpose, Lyon refused to receive Frost's letter; and, as soon as his regiments were posted, sent a written demand for the immediate surrender of Camp Jackson, "with no other condition than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated." The case presented no alternative; and seeing that he was dealing with a resolute man, Frost surrendered with the usual protest. Camp and property were taken in possession; arms were stacked, and preparation made to march the prisoners to the arsenal, where on the following day they were paroled and disbanded.

Up to this time everything had proceeded without casualty, or even turbulent disorder; but an immense assemblage of the street populace followed the march and crowded about the camp. Most of them were peaceful spectators whose idle curiosity rendered them forgetful of danger; but among the number was the usual proportion of lawless city rowdies, of combative instincts, whose very nature impelled them to become the foremost elements of disorder and revolution. Many of them had rushed to the scene of expected conflict with such weapons as they could seize; and now as the homeward march began they pressed defiantly upon the troops, with cheers for Jeff Davis and

* Cameron to Lyon, April 30, 1861. War Records.
† Frost to Jackson, January 24, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 43.
‡ Frost to Jackson, April 15, 1861. Ibid., p. 147.

insults and bitter imprecations upon the soldiers. It seems a fatality that when a city mob in anger and soldiers with loaded guns are by any circumstances thrown into close contact it produces the same incidents and results. There are insult and retort, a rush and a repulse; then comes a shower of missiles, finally a pistol-shot, and after it a return volley from the troops, followed by an irregular fusillade from both sides. Who began it, or how it was done, can never be ascertained. It so happened on this occasion, both at the head and rear of the marching column and during a momentary halt; and, as usual, the guilty escaped, and innocent men, women, and children fell in their blood, while the crowd fled pell-mell in mortal terror. Two or three soldiers and some fifteen citizens were killed and many wounded.

As at Baltimore, the event threw St. Louis into the excitement of a general riot. Gun stores were broken into and newspaper offices threatened; but the police checked the outbreak, though public tranquillity and safety were not entirely restored for several days.

Aside from its otherwise deplorable results, the riot produced, or rather magnified, a military and political complication. On the day after the capture of Camp Jackson, General Harney returned from Washington, and once more assumed command. His journey also was eventful. Arrested by the rebels at Harper's Ferry, he had been sent to Richmond; there the authorities, anxious to win him over to secession by kindness, set him at liberty. Proof against their blandishments, however, he merely thanked them for their courtesy, and, loyal soldier as he was, proceeded to his superiors and his duty at Washington. This circumstance greatly aided his explanations and excuses before General Scott, President Lincoln, and the Cabinet, and secured his restoration as Department Commander.

But his return to St. Louis proved ill timed. His arrival there in the midst of the excitement over the capture of Camp Jackson and the riot emphasized and augmented the antagonism between the radical Unionists, led by Blair and Lyon, and the pro-slavery and conservative Unionists, who now made the general their rallying point. Paying too much attention to the complaints and relying too blindly upon the false representations and promises of secession conspirators like Frost, and greatly underrating the active elements of rebellion in Missouri, Harney looked coldly upon the volunteers and talked of disbanding the Home Guards. This brought him into conflict with the Union Safety Committee and President Lincoln's orders. Delegations of equally influential citizens representing both sides went to Washington, in a stubborn mistrust of each other's motives. In their appeal to Lincoln, Lyon's friends found a ready advocate in Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, and Harney's friends in Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General; and the Missouri discord was thus in a certain degree, and at a very early date, transplanted into the Cabinet itself. This local embitterment in St. Louis beginning here ran on for several years, and in its varying and shifting phases gave the President no end of trouble in his endeavor from first to last to be just to each faction.

Harney was strongly intrenched in the personal friendship of General Scott; besides, he was greatly superior in army rank, being a brigadier-general, while Lyon was only a captain. On the other hand, Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson had shown his energy, courage, and usefulness, and had given him great popular éclat. Immediately to supersede him seemed like a public censure. It was one of the many cases where unforeseen circumstances created a dilemma, involving irritated personal susceptibilities and delicate questions of public expediency.

President Lincoln took action promptly and firmly, though tempered with that forbearance by which he was so constantly enabled to extract the greatest advantage out of the most perplexing complications. The delegations from Missouri with their letters arrived on May 16, a week after the Camp Jackson affair. Having heard both sides, Lincoln decided that in any event Lyon must be sustained. He therefore ordered that Harney should be relieved, and that Lyon be made a brigadier-general of volunteers. In order, however, that this change might not fall too harshly, Lincoln did not make his decision public, but wrote confidentially to Frank Blair, under date of May 18:

> My Dear Sir: We have a good deal of anxiety here about St. Louis. I understand an order has gone from the War Department to you, to be delivered or withheld in your discretion, relieving General Harney from his command. I was not quite satisfied with the order when it was made, though on the whole I thought it best to make it; but since then I have become more doubtful of its propriety. I do not write now to countermand it, but to say I wish you would withhold it, unless in your judgment the necessity to the contrary is very urgent. There are several reasons for this. We had better have him a friend than an enemy. It will dissatisfy a good many who otherwise would be quiet. More than all, we first relieve him, then restore him, and now if we relieve him again the public will ask, "Why all this vacillation?" Still, if in your judgment it is indispensable, let it be so.

Upon receipt of this letter both Blair and Lyon, with commendable prudence, determined to carry out the President's suggestion. Since Harney's return from Washington his words and acts had been more in conformity

with their own policy. He had published a proclamation defending and justifying the capture of Camp Jackson, and declaring that "Missouri must share the destiny of the Union," and that the whole power of the United States would be exerted to maintain her in it. Especially was the proclamation unsparing in its denunciation of the recent military bill of the rebel legislature.

This bill cannot be regarded in any other light than an indirect secession ordinance, ignoring even the forms resorted to by other States. Manifestly its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and cannot, and ought not to, be upheld. . . . Within the field and scope of my command and authority the supreme law of the land must and shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the form of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their persons and property from violations of every kind, and I shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military organizations, or otherwise.*

He also suggested to the War Department the enlistment of Home Guards and the need of additional troops in Missouri. So far as mere theory and intention could go, all this was without fault. There can be no question of Harney's entire loyalty, and of his skill and courage as a soldier dealing with open enemies. Unfortunately, he did not possess the adroitness and daring necessary to circumvent the secret machinations of traitors.

Governor Jackson, on the contrary, seems to have belonged by nature and instinct to the race of conspirators. He and his rebel legislature, convened in special session at Jefferson City, were panic-stricken by the news of the capture of Camp Jackson. On that night of May 10 the governor, still claiming and wielding the executive power of the State, sent out a train to destroy the telegraph and to burn the railroad bridge over the Osage River, in order to keep the bayonets of Lyon and Blair at a safe distance. At night the legislature met for business, the secession members belted with pistols and bowie-knives, with guns lying across their desks or leaning against chairs and walls, while sentinels and soldiers filled the corridors and approaches. The city was in an uproar; the young ladies of the female seminary and many families were moved across the river for security.† All night long the secession governor and his secession majority hurried their treasonable legislation through the mere machinery of parliamentary forms. It was under these conditions that the famous military bill and kindred acts were passed. It appropriated three millions; authorized the issue of bonds; diverted the school fund; anticipated two years' taxes; made the governor a military dictator, and ignored the Federal Government. It was in truth, as Harney called it, "an indirect secession ordinance."

Armed with these revolutionary enactments, but still parading his State authority, Governor Jackson undertook cautiously to consolidate his military power. Ex-Governor Sterling Price was appointed Major-General commanding the Missouri State Guard; who, more conveniently to cloak the whole conspiracy, now sought an interview with Harney, and entered with him into a public agreement, vague and general in its terms, "of restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in subordination to the laws of the general and State governments."

General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof, and General Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid.‡

Blinded and lulled by treacherous professions, Harney failed to see that this was evading the issue and committing the flock to the care of the wolf. Price's undertaking to "maintain order" was, in fact, nothing else than the organization of rebel companies at favorable points in the State, and immediately brought a shower of Union warnings and complaints to Harney. Within a week the information received caused him to notify Price of these complaints, and of his intention to organize Union Home Guards for protection.§ More serious still, reliable news came that an invasion was threatened from the Arkansas border. Price replied with his blandest assurances, denying everything. The aggressions, he said, were acts of irresponsible individuals. To organize Home Guards would produce neighborhood collision and civil war. He should carry out the agreement to the letter. Should troops enter Missouri from Arkansas or any other State he would "cause them to return instanter."‖

Harney, taking such declarations at their surface value, and yielding himself to the suggestions and advice of the St. Louis conservatives who disliked Lyon and hated Blair, remained inactive, notwithstanding a sharp

* Harney, Proclamation, May 14, 1861. War Records.
† Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," pp. 168–178.
‡ Price, Harney Agreement, May 21, 1861. War Records.
§ Harney to Price, May 27, 1861. War Records.
‖ Price to Harney, May 28 and May 29. War Records.

admonition from Washington. The Adjutant-General wrote:

> The President observes with concern that notwithstanding the pledge of the State authorities to coöperate in preserving peace in Missouri, loyal citizens in great numbers continue to be driven from their homes. . . . The professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of Missouri are not to be relied upon. They have already falsified their professions too often, and are too far committed to secession, to be entitled to your confidence, and you can only be sure of their desisting from their wicked purposes when it is out of their power to prosecute them. You will therefore be unceasingly watchful of their movements, and not permit the clamors of their partisans and opponents of the wise measures already taken to prevent you from checking every movement against the Government, however disguised, under the pretended State authority. The authority of the United States is paramount, and whenever it is apparent that a movement, whether by color of State authority or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate to put it down.*

Harney had announced this identical policy in his proclamation of May 14. The difficulty was that he failed to apply and enforce his own doctrines, or rather that he lacked penetration to discern the treachery of the State authorities. He replied to the War Department:

> My confidence in the honor and integrity of General Price, in the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the Government remains unimpaired. His course as President of the State Convention that voted by a large majority against submitting an ordinance of secession, and his efforts since that time to calm the elements of discord, have served to confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years entertained.†

Lyon and Blair were much better informed, and the latter wrote to Lincoln:

> . . . I have to-day delivered to General Harney the order of the 16th of May above mentioned relieving him, feeling that the progress of events and condition of affairs in this State make it incumbent upon me to assume the grave responsibility of this act, the discretionary power in the premises having been given me by the President.‡

The President and the Secretary of War duly sustained the act.

This change of command soon brought matters in Missouri to a crisis. The State authorities were quickly convinced that Lyon would tolerate no evasion, temporizing, or misunderstanding. They therefore asked an interview; and Lyon sent Governor Jackson and General Price a safeguard to visit St. Louis. They on the one part, and Lyon and Blair on the other, with one or two witnesses, held an interview of four hours on June 11. The governor proposed that the State should remain neutral; that he would not attempt to organize the militia under the military bill, on condition that the Union Home Guards should be disarmed and no further Federal troops should be stationed in Missouri. Lyon rejected this proposal, insisting that the governor's rebel "State Guards" should be disarmed and the military bill abandoned, and that the Federal Government should enjoy its unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the State, to repel invasion or protect its citizens. This the governor refused.

So the discussion terminated. Jackson and Price hurried by a special train back to Jefferson City, burning bridges as they went. Arrived at the capital, the governor at once published a proclamation of war. He recited the interview and its result, called fifty thousand militia into the active service of the State, and closed his proclamation by coupling together the preposterous and irreconcilable announcements of loyalty to the United States and declaration of war against them — a very marvel of impudence, even among the numerous kindred curiosities of secession literature.§

This sudden announcement of active hostility did not take Lyon by surprise. Thoroughly informed of the conspirators' plans, he had made his own preparations for equally energetic action. Though Jackson had crippled the railroad, the Missouri River was an open military highway, and numerous swift steamboats lay at the St. Louis wharf. On the afternoon of June 13 he embarked one of his regular batteries and several battalions of his Missouri Volunteers, and steamed with all possible speed up the river to Jefferson City, the capital of the State, leading the movement in person. He arrived on the 15th of June, and, landing, took possession of the town without resistance, and raised the Union flag over the State-house. The governor and his adherents hurriedly fled, his Secretary of State carrying off the great seal with which to certify future pretended official acts.

* Thomas to Harney, May 27, 1861. War Records.

† Harney to Thomas, June 5, 1861. War Records.

‡ F. P. Blair, Jr., to the President, May 30, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 223.

§ In issuing this proclamation I hold it to be my solemn duty to remind you that Missouri is still one of the United States; that the Executive Department of the State government does not arrogate to itself the power to disturb that relation; that that power has been wisely vested in a convention which will at the proper time express your sovereign will; and that meanwhile it is your duty to obey all *constitutional* requirements of the Federal Government.

> But it is equally my duty to advise you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the *unconstitutional* edicts of the military despotism which has enthroned itself at Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in this State. No brave and true-hearted Missourian will obey one or submit to the other. Rise, then, and drive out ignominiously the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have made fruitful, and which is consecrated by your homes. [Jackson, Proclamation, June 12, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 252.]

There had been no time for the rebellion to gather any head at the capital; but at the town of Boonville, fifty miles farther up the river, General Price was collecting some fragments of military companies. This nucleus of opposition Lyon determined also to destroy. Leaving but a slight guard at the capital, he reëmbarked his force next day, and reaching Boonville on the 17th landed without difficulty, and put the half-formed rebel militia to flight after a spirited but short skirmish. General Price prudently kept away from the encounter; and Governor Jackson, who had come hither, and who witnessed the disaster from a hill two miles distant, once more betook himself to flight. Two on the Union and fifteen on the rebel side were killed.

This affair at Boonville was the outbreak of open warfare in Missouri, though secret military aggression against the United States Government had been for nearly six months carried on by the treasonable State officials, aided as far as possible by the conspiracy in the cotton-States.

The local State government of Missouri, thus broken by the hostility of Governor Jackson and subordinate officials, was soon regularly restored. It happened that the Missouri State convention, chosen, as already related, with the design of carrying the State into rebellion, but which, unexpectedly to the conspirators, remained true to the Union, had, on adjourning its sessions from March to December, wisely created an emergency committee with power to call it together upon any necessary occasion. This committee now issued its call, under which the convention assembled in Jefferson City on the 22d of July. Many of its members had joined the rebellion, but a full constitutional quorum remained, and took up the task of reconstituting the disorganized machinery of civil administration. By a series of ordinances it declared the State offices vacant, abrogated the military bill and other treasonable legislation, provided for new elections, and finally, on the 31st of July, inaugurated a provisional government, which thereafter made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative, was made governor. He announced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his authority was immediately recognized by the greater portion of the State. Missouri thus remained through the entire war, both in form and in substance, a State in the Union.

Nevertheless a considerable minority of its population, scattered in many parts, was strongly tinctured with sympathy for the rebellion. The conspiracy so long nursed by Governor Jackson and his adherents had taken deep and pernicious root. An anomalous condition of affairs suddenly sprung up. Amidst a strongly dominant loyalty there smoldered the embers of rebellion, and during the whole civil war there blazed up fitfully, often where least expected, the flames of neighborhood strife and guerrilla warfare to an extent and with a fierceness not equaled in any other State. We shall have occasion to narrate how, under cover of this sentiment, the leaders of secession bands and armies made repeated and desolating incursions; and how, some months later, Governor Jackson with his perambulating State seal set up a pretended legislature and State government, and the Confederate authorities at Richmond enacted the farce of admitting Missouri to the Southern Confederacy. It was, however, from first to last, a palpable sham; the pretended Confederate officials in Missouri had no capital or archives, controlled no population, permanently held no territory, collected no taxes; and Governor Jackson was nothing more than a fugitive pretender, finding temporary refuge within Confederate camps.

KENTUCKY.

THE three States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, forming McClellan's department, were bounded south of the Ohio River by the single State of Kentucky, stretching from east to west, and occupying at least four-fifths of the entire Ohio line. Kentucky was a slave State. This domestic institution allied her naturally to the South, and created among her people a pervading sympathy with Southern complaints and demands. Her geographical position and her river commerce also connected her strongly with the South. On the other hand, the traditions of her local politics bound her indissolubly to the Union. The fame of her great statesman, Henry Clay, rested upon his lifelong efforts for its perpetuity. The compromise of 1850, which thwarted and for ten years postponed the Southern rebellion, was his crowning political triumph. But Henry Clay's teaching and example were being warped and perverted. A feebler generation of disciples, unable, as he would have done, to distinguish between honorable compromise and ruinous concession, undertook now to quell war by refusing to take up arms; desired an appeal from the battlefield to moral suasion; proposed to preserve the Government by leaving revolution unchecked.

The legislature, though appealing to the South to stay secession, and though firmly refusing to call a State convention, nevertheless protested against the use of force or

coercion by the General Government against the seceding States. John J. Crittenden took similar ground, counseling Kentucky to stand by the Union and correctly characterizing secession as simple revolution. Nevertheless he advised against the policy of coercion, and said of the seceded States, "Let them go on in peace with their experiment."* A public meeting of leading citizens at Louisville first denounced secession and then denounced the President for attempting to put down secession. They apostrophized the flag and vowed to maintain the Union, but were ready to fight Lincoln.† It makes one smile to read again the childish contradictions which eminent Kentucky statesmen uttered in all seriousness.

> A people that have prospered beyond example in the records of time, free and self-governed, without oppression, without taxation to be felt, are now going to cut each other's throats; and why? Because Presidents Lincoln and Davis could n't settle the etiquette upon which the troops were to be withdrawn from Fort Sumter. ‡

This was the analysis of one. Another was equally infelicitous:

> Why this war? . . . Because Mr. Lincoln has been elected President of the country and Mr. Davis could not be, and therefore a Southern Confederacy was to be formed by Southern demagogues, and now they are attempting to drag you on with them. . . . Let us not fight the North or South, but, firm in our position, tell our sister border States that with them we will stand to maintain the Union, to preserve the peace, and uphold our honor and our flag, which they would trail in the dust. . . . If we must fight, let us fight Lincoln and not our Government. §

The resolutions of the meeting were quite as illogical. They declared that

> the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the Administration, nor with the seceding States, but with the Union against them both; declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either; and, if necessary, to make the declaration good with her strong right arm. ‖

The preposterous assumption was also greatly strengthened in the popular mind by the simultaneous publication of an address of the same tenor in Tennessee, from John Bell and others. He had been one of the four candidates for President in the election of 1860 — the one for whom both Kentucky and Tennessee cast their electoral votes; and as the standard-bearer of the "Constitutional Union" party had in many ways reiterated his and their devotion to "the Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." The address distinctly disapproved secession; it condemned the policy of the Administration; it unequivocally avowed the duty of Tennessee to resist by force of arms the subjugation of the South.¶ What shall be said when men of reputed wisdom and experience proclaim such inconsistencies? All these incidents are the ever-recurring signs of that dangerous demoralization of public sentiment, of that utter confusion of political principles, of that helpless bewilderment of public thought, into which portions of the country had unconsciously lapsed.

Governor Magoffin of Kentucky and his personal adherents seem to have been ready to rush into overt rebellion. His official message declared that Kentucky would resist the principles and policy of the Republican party "to the death, if necessary"; that the Union had practically ceased to exist; and that she would not stand by with folded arms while the seceded States were being "subjugated to an anti-slavery Government." With open contumacy he replied to President Lincoln's official call, "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."** He applied to Jefferson Davis for arms, and to the Louisville banks for money, but neither effort succeeded. The existing legislature contained too many Union members to give him unchecked control of the public credit of the State. He was therefore perforce driven to adhere to the policy of "neutrality," as the best help he could give the rebellion. Nevertheless, he was not without power for mischief. The militia of Kentucky had recently been reorganized under the personal influence and direction of S. B. Buckner, who, as inspector-general, was the legal and actual general-in-chief. Buckner, like the governor, ex-Vice-President Breckinridge, and others, was an avowed "neutral" but a predetermined rebel, who in the following September entered the military service of Jefferson Davis. For the present his occupation was rather that of political intrigue to forward the secession of Kentucky, which he carried on under pretense of his formal and assumed instructions from the governor to employ the "State Guard," or rather its shadow of authority, to prevent the violation of "State neutrality" by either the Southern or the Northern armies.

The public declarations and manifestations in Kentucky were not reassuring to the people

* Crittenden, speech before Kentucky legislature, March 26, 1861. New York "Tribune," March 30.

† "Rebellion Record."

‡ James Guthrie, speech at Louisville, Ky., April 18, 1861. Ibid.

§ Archibald Dixon, speech at Louisville, April 18, 1861. Ibid.

‖ "Rebellion Record."

¶ Ibid.

** Magoffin to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.

north of the Ohio line. Governor Morton of Indiana wrote:

The country along the Ohio River bordering on Kentucky is in a state of intense alarm. The people entertain no doubt but that Kentucky will speedily go out of the Union. They are in daily fear that marauding parties from the other side of the river will plunder and burn their towns.*

Even after the lapse of some weeks this fear was not dissipated. General McClellan wrote:

The frontier of Indiana and Illinois is in a very excited and almost dangerous condition. In Ohio there is more calmness. I have been in more full communication with the people. A few arms have been supplied, and all means have been taken to quiet them along the frontier. Special messengers have reached me from the governors of Indiana and Illinois, demanding heavy guns and expressing great alarm. I sent Lieutenant Williams to confer with Governor Morton, to tell him that I have no heavy guns, and to explain to him the impropriety of placing them in position along the frontier just at the present time. I have promised Governor Yates some heavy guns at Cairo as soon as I can get them.

McClellan himself was not free from apprehension:

I am very anxious to learn the views of the General [Scott] in regard to western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. At any moment it may become necessary to act in some one of these directions. From reliable information I am sure that the governor of Kentucky is a traitor. Buckner is under his influence, so it is necessary to watch them. I hear to-night that one thousand secessionists are concentrating at a point opposite Gallipolis. Cairo is threatened.†

He proposed, therefore, to reënforce and fortify Cairo, place several gunboats on the river, and in case of need to cross into Kentucky and occupy Covington Heights for the better defense of Cincinnati.

This condition of affairs brought another important question to final decision. The governor of Illinois had ordered the summary seizure of war material at Cairo, and President Lincoln formally approved it. Ordinary river commerce was more tenderly dealt with. Colonel Prentiss wrote:

No boats have been searched unless I had been previously and reliably informed that they had on board munitions of war destined to the enemies of the Government, and in all cases where we have searched we have found such munitions. My policy has been such that no act of my command could be construed as an insult, or cause to any State for secession.‡

But the threatening demonstrations from the South were beginning to show that this was a dangerous leniency. McClellan therefore asked explicitly whether provisions destined for the seceded States or for the Southern army should longer be permitted to be sent,§ to which an official order came on May 8: "Since the order of the 2d, the Secretary of War decides that provisions must be stopped at Cairo."‖

In reality matters in Kentucky were not quite so bad as they appeared to the public eye. With sober second thought, the underlying loyalty of her people began to assert itself. Breckinridge and his extreme Southern doctrines had received only a little more than one-third the votes of the State.¶ Mr. Lincoln was a Kentuckian by birth, and had been a consistent Whig; their strong clanship could not quite give him up as hopelessly lost in abolitionism. Earnest Unionists also quickly perceived that "armed neutrality" must soon become a practical farce; many of them from the first used it as an artful contrivance to kill secession. The legislature indeed declared for "strict neutrality," and approved the governor's refusal to furnish troops to the President.** Superficially, this was placing the State in a contumacious and revolutionary attitude. But this official action was not a true exponent of the public feeling. The undercurrent of political movement is explained by a letter of John J. Crittenden, at that time the most influential single voice in the State. On the 17th of May he wrote to General Scott:

The position of Kentucky, and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union, is not, I fear, understood at Washington. It ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment. Unfortunately for us, our governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to the secession. His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in its terms hasty and unbecoming, and does not correspond with usual and gentlemanly courtesy. But while she regretted the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so, not because she loved the Union the less, but she feared that if she had parted with those troops, and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by the secessionists at home and severed from the Union; and it was to preserve, substantially and ultimately, our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our governor's refusal of the troops required. This was the most prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our State and among our own people. I could elaborate and strengthen all this, but I will leave the subject to your own reflection; with this only remark, that I think Kentucky's excuse

* Morton to Cameron, April 28, 1861. War Records.
† McClellan to Townsend, May 10, 1861. War Records.
‡ Prentiss to Headquarters.
§ McClellan to Scott, May 7, 1861. War Records.
‖ Townsend to McClellan, May 8, 1861. Ibid.

¶ The vote of Kentucky in 1860 was: Lincoln, 1364; Douglas, 25,651; Breckinridge, 53,143; Bell, 66,058. ["Tribune Almanac," 1861.]
** Resolutions, May 16, 1861. Van Horne, "History Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 7.

is a good one, and that, under all the circumstances of the complicated case, she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest.*

In truth, Kentucky was undergoing a severe political struggle. The governor was constantly stimulating the revolutionary sentiment. The legislature had once more met, on May 6, being a second time convened in special session by the governor's proclamation. The governor's special message now boldly accused the President of usurpation, and declared the Constitution violated, the Government subverted, the Union broken. He again urged that the State be armed and a convention be called. It was these more radical and dangerous measures which the Union members warded off with a legislative resolution of "neutrality." So also the military bill which was eventually passed was made to serve the Union instead of the secession cause. A Union Board of Commissioners was provided to control the governor's expenditures under it. A "Home Guard" was authorized, to check and offset Buckner's "State Guard" of rebellious proclivities. Privates and officers of both organizations were required to swear allegiance to both the State and the Union. Finally, it provided that the arms and munitions should be used neither against the United States nor against the Confederate States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion. Such an attitude of qualified loyalty can only be defended by the plea of its compulsory adoption as a lesser evil. But it served to defeat the conspiracy to assemble a "sovereignty convention" to inaugurate secession; and the progress of the Kentucky legislature, from its "anti-coercion" protest in January to its merely defensive "neutrality" resolutions and laws in May, was an immense gain.

From the beginning of the rebellion, Lincoln felt that Kentucky would be a turning weight in the scale of war. He believed he knew the temper and fidelity of his native State, and gave her his special care and confidence. Though Governor Magoffin refused him troops, there came to him from private sources the unmistakable assurance that many Kentuckians were ready to fight for the Union. His early and most intimate personal friend, Joshua F. Speed, was now an honored and influential citizen of Louisville. At Washington also he had taken into a cordial acquaintanceship a characteristic Kentuckian, William Nelson, a young, brave, and energetic lieutenant of the United States Navy. Nelson saw his usefulness, and perhaps also his opportunity, in an effort to redeem his State, rather than in active service on the quarter-deck. He possessed the social gifts, the free manners, the impulsive temperament peculiar to the South. Mr. Lincoln gave him leave of absence, and sent him to Kentucky without instructions. At the same time the President brought another personal influence to bear. Major Anderson was the hero of the hour, and being a Kentuckian, that State rang with the praise of his prudence and valor in defending Sumter. On the 7th of May, Lincoln gave him a special commission, "To receive into the army of the United States as many regiments of volunteer troops from the State of Kentucky, and from the western part of the State of Virginia, as shall be willing to engage in the service of the United States,"† etc., and sent him to Cincinnati, convenient to both fields of labor. These three persons, Speed and Nelson at Louisville, and Anderson within easy consulting distance, formed a reliable rallying-point and medium of communication with the President. The Unionists, thus encouraged, began the formation of Union Clubs and Home Guards, while the Government gave them assurance of protection in case of need. Wrote General McClellan:

> The Union men of Kentucky express a firm determination to fight it out. Yesterday Garrett Davis told me: "We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we will call on the General Government to aid us." He asked me what I would do if they called on me for assistance, and convinced me that the majority were in danger of being overpowered by a better-armed minority. I replied that if there were time I would refer to General Scott for orders. If there were not time, that I would cross the Ohio with 20,000 men. If that were not enough, with 30,000; and if necessary, with 40,000; but that I would not stand by and see the loyal Union men of Kentucky crushed. I have strong hopes that Kentucky will remain in the Union, and the most favorable feature of the whole matter is that the Union men are now ready to abandon the position of "armed neutrality," and to enter heart and soul into the contest by our side. ‡

In a short time Nelson quietly brought five thousand Government muskets to Louisville, under the auspices and control of a committee of leading citizens. Wrote Anderson to Lincoln:

> I had the pleasure to receive yesterday your letter of the 14th [May] introducing Mr. Joshua F. Speed, and giving me instructions about issuing arms to our friends in Kentucky. I will carefully attend to the performance of that duty. Mr. Speed and other gentlemen for whom he will vouch, viz., Hon. James Guthrie, Garrett Davis, and Charles A. Marshall, advise that I should not, at present, have anything to do with the raising of troops in Kentucky. The committee charged with that matter will go on with the organization and arming of the Home Guard, which they will see is composed of reliable men. §

* Unpublished MS.

† War Records.

‡ McClellan to Townsend, May 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Anderson to Lincoln, May 19, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Under date of May 28 Lincoln received further report of these somewhat confidential measures to counteract the conspiracy in his native State:

The undersigned, a private committee to distribute the arms brought to the State of Kentucky by Lieutenant William Nelson, of the United States Navy, among true, reliable Union men, represent to the Executive Department of the United States Government that members of this Board have superintended the distribution of the whole quantity of five thousand muskets and bayonets. We have been reliably informed and believe that they have been put in the hands of true and devoted Union men, who are pledged to support the Constitution of the United States and the enforcement of the laws; and, if the occasion should arise, to use them to put down all attempts to take Kentucky, by violence or fraud, out of the Union.*

The committee added that this had greatly strengthened the cause, that twenty thousand more could be safely intrusted to the Union men, who were applying for them and eager to get them, and recommended that this system of arming Kentucky be resumed and widely extended.†

The struggle between treason and loyalty in the Kentucky legislature had consumed the month of May, ending, as we have seen, by decided advantages gained for the Union, and attended by the important understanding and combination between prominent Kentucky citizens and President Lincoln whereby the loyalists were furnished with arms and assured of decisive military support. The Kentucky legislature adjourned *sine die* on May 24, and the issue was thereupon transferred to the people of the State. The contest took a double form: first an appeal to the ballot in an election for members of Congress, which the President's call for a special session on the 4th of July made necessary. A political campaign ensued of universal and intense excitement. Whatever the Union sentiment of the State had hitherto lacked of decision and boldness was largely aroused or created by this contest. The Unionists achieved a brilliant and conclusive triumph. The election was held on the 20th of June, and nine out of the ten Congressmen chosen were outspoken loyalists.

The second phase of the contest was, that it evoked a partial show of military force on both sides of the question. The military bill passed on the last day of the May session provided for organizing "Home Guards" for local defense. Whether by accident or design, Buckner's old militia law to organize the "State Guards" had required an oath of allegiance from the officers only. The new law required all the members to swear fidelity to both Kentucky and the United States, and a refusal terminated their membership.‡ This searching touchstone at once instituted a process of separating patriots from traitors. The organization of Home Guards and the reorganization of the State Guards went on simultaneously. It would perhaps be more correct to say disorganization of the State Guards; for many loyal members took advantage of the requirement to abandon the corps and to join the Home Guards, while disloyal ones seized the same chance to go to rebel camps in the South; and under the action of both public and private sentiment the State Guards languished and the Home Guards grew in numerical strength and moral influence.

Meanwhile, as a third military organization, Kentuckians were enlisting directly in the service of the United States. Even before the already mentioned commission to Anderson, Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff had established "Camp Clay," on the Ohio shore above Cincinnati, where a number of Kentuckians joined a yet larger proportion of Ohioans, and were mustered into the three-months' service as the 1st and 2d regiments Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.§ These regiments were afterward reorganized for the three-years' service; and this time, mainly filled with real Kentuckians, were on the 9th and 10th of June remustered under their old and now entirely appropriate designations. About this time also State Senator Rousseau, who had made a brilliant Union record in the legislature, obtained authority to raise a brigade. On consulting with the Union leaders, it was resolved still to humor the popular "neutrality" foible till after the congressional election; and to this end he established "Camp Joe Holt," on the Indiana shore, where he gathered his recruits.‖ The same policy kept the headquarters of Anderson yet in Cincinnati.

With the favorable change of public sentiment, and the happy issue of the congressional election, the Union men grew bolder. Nelson had all this while been busy, and had secretly appointed the officers and enrolled the recruits for four regiments from central Kentucky. At the beginning of July he threw off further concealment, and suddenly assembled his men in "Camp Dick Robinson," which he established between Danville and Lexington. His regiments were only partly full and indifferently armed, and the transmission of proper arms to his camp was persist-

* The report was signed by C. A. Wickliffe, Garrett Davis, J. H. Garrard, J. Harlan, James Speed, and Thornton F. Marshall; and also indorsed by J. F. Robinson, W. B. Houston, J. K. Goodloe, J. B. Brunner, and J. F. Speed.

† Committee, Report, May 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Act of May 24, 1861. "Session Laws," p. 6.

§ Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 14.

‖ Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 16.

ently opposed by rebel intrigue, threats, and forcible demonstrations. Nevertheless the camp held firm, and by equal alertness and courage secured its guns, and so far sustained and strengthened the loyal party that at the general election of the 5th of August a new legislature was chosen giving the Union members a majority of three-fourths in each branch.

Thus in a long and persistent contest, extending from January to August, the secession conspirators of Kentucky, starting with the advantage of the governor's coöperation, military control, and general acceptance of the "neutrality" delusion, were, nevertheless, outgeneraled and completely baffled. Meanwhile the customary usurpations had carried Tennessee into active rebellion; and now, despairing of success by argument and intrigue, and inspirited by the rebel success at Bull Run, the local conspiracy arranged to call in the assistance of military force. On the 17th of August the conspirators assembled in caucus in Scott county,* and, it is alleged, arranged a threefold programme: first, the governor should officially demand the removal of Union camps and troops from the State; secondly, under pretense of a popular "peace" agitation, a revolutionary rising in aid of secession should take place in central Kentucky; thirdly, a simultaneous invasion of rebel armies from Tennessee should crown and secure the work.

Whether or not the allegation was literally true, events developed themselves in at least an apparent conformity to the plan. Governor Magoffin wrote a letter to the President, under date of August 19, urging "the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the State." In reply to this, President Lincoln, on August 24, wrote the governor a temperate but emphatic refusal:

> I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky. In all I have done in the premises I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky. While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them or any other person, except your Excellency and the bearer of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky, or to disband it. One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time. Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits, and with this impression I must respectfully decline to so remove it. I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret I search and cannot find in your not very short letter any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

The other features of the general plot succeeded no better than Magoffin's application to Lincoln. Three public demonstrations were announced, in evident preparation and prompting of a popular rebel uprising in central Kentucky. Under pretense of an ovation to Vallandigham, an Ohio congressman and Democratic politician, who had already made himself notorious by speeches of a rebel tendency, a meeting was held in Owen county on September 5. On September 10 a large "peace" mass meeting was called at Frankfort, the capital, to overawe the newly assembled loyal legislature. Still a third gathering, of "States Rights" and "peace" men, was called at Lexington on September 20, to hold a camp drill of several days, under supervision of leading secessionists.†

The speeches and proceedings of these treacherous "peace" meetings sufficiently revealed their revolutionary object. They were officered and managed by men whose prior words and acts left no doubt of their sympathies and desires, and the most conspicuous of whom were soon after in important stations of command in the rebel armies. The resolutions were skillfully devised: though the phraseology was ambiguous, the arrangement and inference led to one inevitable conclusion. The substance and process were: Firstly, that peace should be maintained; secondly, to maintain peace we must preserve neutrality; thirdly, that it is incompatible with neutrality to tax the State "for a cause so hopeless as the military subjugation of the Confederate States"; fourthly, that a truce be called and commissioners appointed to treat for a permanent peace.

At the larger gatherings, where the proceedings were more critically scanned, prudence dictated that they should refrain from definite committal; but at some of the smaller preliminary meetings the full purpose was announced "that the recall of the invading armies, and the recognition of the separate independence of the Confederate States, is the true policy to restore peace and preserve the relations of fraternal love and amity between the States."

While these peace meetings were in course of development, the second branch of the plot was not neglected. In the county of Owen an

* "Danville Quarterly Review," June, 1862.

† "Danville Quarterly Review," June and September, 1862, pp. 245, 381, 385, and 388.

insurrectionary force was being organized by Humphrey Marshall. There was no concealment of his purpose to march upon Frankfort, where the legislature of the State had lately met, and by force of arms to scatter it and break up the session. Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky related the attendant circumstances in a speech in the United States Senate:

I reached there to attend a session of the Court of Appeals on the very evening that it was said Humphrey Marshall was to make his incursion into Franklin county, and to storm the capital. Some members, especially secession members of the legislature, and some citizens of the town of Frankfort, and one or two judges of our Court of Appeals, left Frankfort hurriedly in the expectation that it was to be sacked that night by Humphrey Marshall's insurgent hosts. I myself, with other gentlemen, provided ourselves with arms to take part in the defense of the legislature and the capital of the State. We sent to Lexington, where there were encamped three to five hundred Union troops, who had been enlisted in the Union service for the defense of the legislature and the capital of our State, and had them brought down at 3 o'clock in the morning.*

As events progressed, both these branches of the plot signally failed. The peace meetings did not result in a popular uprising; they served only to show the relative weakness of the secession conspiracy. Such manifestations excited the Union majority to greater vigilance and effort, and their preparation and boldness overawed the contemplated insurrectionary outbreak. A decisive turn of affairs had indeed come, but armed conflict was avoided. Instead of the Union legislature being driven from the capital and dispersed, Vice-President Breckinridge, General Buckner, William Preston, and other leaders of the conspiracy soon after hurriedly left Kentucky with their rebellious followers and joined the Confederate army, just beyond the Tennessee border, to take part in the third branch of the plot,—a simultaneous invasion of Kentucky at three different points.

THE CONFEDERATE MILITARY LEAGUE.

It was constantly assumed that secession was a movement of the entire South. The fallacy of this assumption becomes apparent when we remember the time required for the full organization and development of the rebellion. From the 12th of October, when Governor Gist issued his proclamation convening the South Carolina legislature to inaugurate secession, to January 26, when Louisiana passed her secession ordinance, is a period of three and a half months. In this first period, as it may be called, only the six cotton-States reached a positive attitude of insurrection; and they, as is believed, by less than a majority of their citizens. Texas, the seventh, did not finally join them till a week later. During all this time the eight remaining slave States, with certainly as good a claim to be considered the voice of the South, earnestly advised and protested against the precipitate and dangerous step. But secession had its active partisans in them. As in the cotton-States, their several capitals were the natural centers of disunion; and, with few exceptions, their State officials held radical opinions on the slavery question. With the gradual progress of insurrection therefore in the extreme South four of the interior slave States gravitated into secession. Their change was very gradual; perhaps principally because a majority of their people wished to remain in the Union, and it was necessary to wait until by slow degrees the public opinion could be overcome.

The anomalous condition and course of Virginia has already been described — its Union vote in January, the apparently overwhelming Union majority of its convention, its vacillating and contradictory votes during February and March, and its sudden plunge into a secession ordinance and a military league with Jefferson Davis immediately after the Sumter bombardment. The whole development of the change is explained when we remember that Richmond had been one of the chief centers of secession conspiracy since the Frémont and Buchanan campaign of 1856.

In the other interior slave States the secession movement underwent various forms, according to the greater obstacles which its advocates encountered. North Carolina, it will be remembered, gave a discouraging answer to the first proposal, and the earliest demonstrations of the conspiracy elicited no popular response. On the 9th and 10th of January an immature combination of State troops and citizens seized Forts Caswell and Johnston, but the governor immediately ordered their restoration to the Federal authorities. The governor excused the hostile act by alleging the popular apprehension that Federal garrisons were to be placed in them, and earnestly deprecated any show of coercion.† He received a conciliatory response from the War Department (January 15, 1861) that no occupation of them was intended unless they should be threatened.‡

Nevertheless conspiracy continued, and, as usual, under the guise of solicitude for peace; and in a constant clamor for additional guarantees, the revolutionary feeling was augmented little by little. There seems to have

* Garrett Davis, Senate speech, March 13, 1862. "Congressional Globe," p. 1214.

† Ellis to Buchanan, Jan. 12, 1861. War Records.
‡ Holt to Ellis, Jan. 15, 1861. Ibid.

been great fluctuation of public opinion. A convention was ordered by the legislature and subsequently voted down at the polls. Commissioners were sent to the peace convention at Washington, and also to the provisional rebel Congress at Montgomery, with instructions limiting their powers to an effort at mediation. At the same time the North Carolina House passed a unanimous resolution that if reconciliation failed, North Carolina must go with the slave States. Next a military bill was passed to reorganize the militia, and arm ten thousand volunteers.* In reality it seems to have been the same struggle which took place elsewhere; the State officials and radical politicians favoring secession, and the people clinging to the Union, but yielding finally to the arts and intrigues of their leaders. When Sumter was bombarded and President Lincoln called for troops, the governor threw his whole influence and authority into the insurrectionary movement. He sent an insulting refusal to Washington,† and the next day ordered his State troops to seize Forts Caswell and Johnston. A week later (April 22) he seized the Fayetteville arsenal, containing 37,000 stands of arms, 3000 kegs of powder, and an immense supply of shells and shot. We may also infer that he was in secret league with the Montgomery rebellion; for the rebel Secretary of War at once made a requisition upon him, and he placed his whole military preparation at the service of Jefferson Davis, sending troops and arms to Richmond and elsewhere. It was a bold usurpation of executive power. Neither legislature nor convention had ordered rebellion; but from that time on the State was arrayed in active hostility to the Union. It was not till the 1st of May that the legislature for the second time ordered a convention, which met and passed an ordinance of secession on the 20th of that month, also formally accepting the Confederate States Constitution.

In the State of Arkansas the approaches to secession were even slower and more difficult than in North Carolina. There seems to have been little disposition at first, among her own people or leaders, to embark in the disastrous undertaking. The movement appears to have been begun when, on December 20, 1860, a commissioner came from Alabama, and by an address to the legislature invited Arkansas to unite in the movement for separation. No direct success followed the request, and the deceitful expedient of a convention to ascertain the will of the people was resorted to. All parties joined in this measure; the fire-eaters to promote secession, the Unionists to thwart it. An election for or against a convention took place February 18, 1861, resulting in 27,412 votes for and 15,826 votes against it; though as compared with the presidential election it was estimated that at least 10,815 voters did not go to the polls. At a later election for delegates the returns indicated a Union vote of 23,626 against a secession vote of 17,927. When the convention was organized, March 4, 1861, the delegates are reported to have chosen Union officers by a majority of six;‡ many of the delegates must have already betrayed their constituents by a change of front. Revolutionary tricks had been employed, the United States arsenal at Little Rock had been seized (February 8), and the ordnance stores at Napoleon (February 12), while no doubt the insurrectionary influences from the neighboring cotton-States were indefinitely multiplied. With all this the progress of the conspirators was not rapid. A conditional secession ordinance was voted down by the convention, 39 to 35. This ought to have effectually killed the movement; but it shows the greater aggressiveness and persistence of the secession leaders, that, instead of yielding to their defeat, they kept alive their scheme, by the insidious proposal to take a new popular vote on the question in the following August. Meanwhile there were a continual loss of Union sentiment and growth of secession excitement; and, as in other States, when the Sumter catastrophe occurred, the governor and his satellites placed the State in an attitude of insurrection by the refusal to comply with Lincoln's call for troops, and by hostile military organization. Thereafter disunion had a free course. The convention was hastily called together April 20, and, meeting on the 6th of May, immediately passed the customary ordinance of secession.

In no other State did secession resort to such methods of usurpation as in Tennessee. The secession faction of the State was insignificant in numbers, but its audacity was perhaps not equaled in any other locality; and it may almost be said that Governor Harris carried the State into rebellion single handed. The whole range of his plottings cannot, of course, be known. He called a session of the legislature January 7, 1861, and sent them a highly inflammatory message. A convention bill was passed and approved January 19, 1861, which submitted the question of "convention" or "no convention," and which also provided that any ordinance of disunion should be ratified by popular vote before taking effect. At the election held on February 9 there appeared on the vote for delegates a Union majority of 64,114, and

* "Annual Cyclopedia," 1861, p. 538.
† Ellis to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.
‡ "Annual Cyclopedia," 1861, p. 22.

against holding the convention a majority of 11,875. This overwhelming popular decision for a time silenced the conspirators. The fall of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops afforded the governor a new pretext to continue his efforts. He sent the President a defiant refusal, and responded to a requisition from Montgomery for troops, being no doubt in secret league with the rebellion. In the revolutionary excitement which immediately followed, the governor's official authority, and the industrious local conspiracy of which he was the head, carried all before them. Since it was evident that he could not obtain a convention to do his bidding, he resolved to employ the legislature, which he once more called together. In secret sessions he was able to manipulate it at his will. On the 1st of May the legislature passed a joint resolution directing the governor to appoint commissioners "to enter into a military league with the authorities of the Confederate States," placing the whole force of the State at the control of Jefferson Davis, and on the 7th of the month a formal military league or treaty to this effect was signed.* Even after this the governor had difficult work. Eastern Tennessee was pervaded by so strong a Union sentiment that it continued to labor and protest against being dragged into rebellion contrary to its will, but the opposition was of little direct avail. Military organization had its grasp on the whole State, and citizens not in arms had no choice but to submit to the orders issued from Montgomery and Nashville.

It will be seen from this recital that the secession movement divides itself into two distinct periods. The first group, the cotton-States, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, took action mainly between the 12th of October, 1860, and February 4, 1861, a period of a little more than three and a half months. The second group, the interior slave States, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, was occupied by the struggle about three months longer, or a total of six months after Lincoln's election. So also these two periods exhibited separate characteristics in their formative processes. The first group, being more thoroughly permeated by the spirit of revolt, and acting with greater vigor and promptness, shows us the semblance at least of voluntary confederation, through its Provisional Congress at Montgomery. On the other hand, the action of the four interior slave States was, in each case, with more or less distinctness at first, merely that of joining the original nucleus in a military league, in which the excitement of military preparation and allurement of military glory, not the consideration of political expediency, turned the scale.

There remained still the third group, consisting of the border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. The efforts of the conspirators to involve Maryland in secession have already been detailed, as well as the persistence they employed to gain control of Kentucky and Missouri. In these three States, however, the attempt failed because of the direct and indirect military support which the Government was able to give immediately to the Union sentiment and organizations. Had it been possible to extend the same encouragement and help to Arkansas and Tennessee, they also might have been saved. This becomes more apparent when we remember how quickly half of Virginia was reclaimed and held steadfastly loyal during the war. The remaining slave State, Delaware, was so slightly tainted with treason that her attitude can scarcely be said to have been in doubt; moreover, her geographical position threw her destiny inseparably with the free States.

The adhesion which we have described of the four interior slave States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to the Confederate States at once wholly changed the scope and resources of the rebellion. It extended its territorial area nearly one-third, and almost doubled its population and resources. It could now claim to be a compact nation of eleven States, with a territory more than double the size of any European nation except Russia, and with a population of five and a half millions of whites and three and a half millions of blacks. It had a long sea-coast, several fine harbors, and many navigable rivers. It contained a great variety of lands, important diversities of climate, and a wide range of agricultural products. Its country was as yet sparsely inhabited, and was known to include very considerable mineral wealth, while its manufacturing capabilities were almost wholly untouched. The exultation and enthusiastic prophecies of the rebel chiefs at the successful beginning of their daring project were perhaps not unnatural when we reflect that their mischievous design and reprehensible cause had secured the support of such fair and substantial elements of national greatness and power.

* "Rebellion Record."

Century May 1888

[*BEGUN IN THE NOVEMBER NUMBER.*]

THE GRAYSONS: A STORY OF ILLINOIS.*

BY EDWARD EGGLESTON,

Author of "The Hoosier Schoolmaster," "The Circuit Rider," "Roxy," etc.

XX.

LINCOLN AND BOB.

EAST by the "City Hotel" in Moscow stood a beech-tree, as we have said, and under this tree were two or three benches. This umbrageous spot was the cool and favorite loafing-place of the villagers, the trysting-place for making bargains or meeting friends. The ground was beaten by many feet to the hardness of a floor, and the village boys delighted to play marbles in this convenient spot. Their cries of "rounses," "taw," "dubs," "back licks," and "vent" might often be heard there before and after school hours. On one of these benches under the beech-tree Bob McCord had an interview with Tom Grayson's lawyer, according to appointment, on the day of Lincoln's return from court at Perrysburg.

"What 's this about lynching Tom?" Lincoln inquired. "A lot of fellows rode into Perrysburg looking for him last Thursday night."

"Yes," said Bob, with a hearty chuckle; "I put 'em onto that air track myself. They wuz comin' down h-yer, but I made 'em think 't Tom wuz moved to Perrysburg."

"Are they going to try it again?" asked Lincoln.

"Not right off; they 're sort-uh discairaged like. A few uv 'em wuz cocked un primed to come a Sunday night,— sech uv 'em as had n't gin it up arter ridin' over to Perrysburg,—but we fooled 'em ag'in. Pete Markham, the deppitty sher'f, jes sidled over to camp-meetin' un let on 't he wuz a-lookin' fer somebody what knowed sumpin about a young feller weth red whiskers un one eye a leetle crossed-like. Magill, the clerk, went over to camp-meetin' un down onto the Run, un gin it out on the sly like zif he could n' keep it in, that they 'd diskivered the tracks uv a young feller from another k-younty weth red whiskers, un so on, that had done the shootin'. The story run like a perrary fire in a high wind un sort-uh mixed 'em up in the'r minds, like. I 've got it fixed so as they can't come down unbeknownst to me; un ef wust *comes* to wust, w'y, I 've got my eye sot onto a crowbar."

"A crowbar? What could you do with a crowbar, Bob?" asked Lincoln, with a puzzled contraction of the brows. "You would n't try to whale the whole crowd with it, would you?"

"W'y, Abe, I 'low, ef a rale tight pinch comes, to try a tussle weth that air jail. I don't know 's I could prize out one uv them air iron grates, but ef 't wuz to *come* to that, I 'd try to git Tom out uv harm's way. You say the word un I 'll find some way to let 'im out anyhow."

"No, no; don't do that. If he runs away he 'll be caught, and then he 'll be sure to be lynched, or hanged. Let me try the law first, and then it 'll be time enough to use crowbars afterward if I fail. Do you know Dave Sovine?"

"When I see 'im. He 's an ornery kind uv a cuss. I don't know 's he rickollecks me."

"So much the better if he does n't. You must get him to tell you all about the shooting—his story of it. Get him to tell more than was brought out at the inquest. Make him explain it, and find out if he 's going to clear out before the trial."

"I heern tell 't he won't talk," said Bob. "The prosecutin' attorney 's shut 'im up tight 'z bees-wax, they say."

Lincoln mused awhile. "If the prosecuting attorney has shut him up, you must open him. Contrive some way to get his story and find out what he means to do."

But it was not easy to encounter Dave in these days. Since he had acquired notoriety, as the only witness of the murder, he had been seized with an unprecedented diffidence, and kept himself out of public gaze. The boys about the village conjectured that he was "laying low for big game." Bob, however, had no objection to waiting for Sovine's coming. He liked this lurking for prey as a cat likes the watching at a mouse-hole. Besides, loafing of any sort suited Big Bob's genius. He could sit astride a barrel on the shady side of a grocery for hours with no sense of exhaustion. More than one day McCord had passed in

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ADVANCE.

SECESSION sophistry about oppression and subjugation was sufficiently answered by the practical logic of the Southern States in collecting armies and uniting in military leagues. Military necessity, not political expediency, was now the unavoidable rule of action. The Washington authorities had long foreseen that merely filling the National capital with Northern regiments would not by itself give security to the Government buildings and archives. The presidential mansion, the Capitol, and the various department offices all lay within easy reach of rebel batteries which might rise in a single night at commanding points on the southern bank of the Potomac, and from which hostile shot and shell could speedily reduce the whole city to ruins. As early, therefore, as the 3d of May, Scott instructed General Mansfield, the local commander, to seize and fortify Arlington Heights. Various causes produced a postponement of the design, urgent as was the necessity; but finally the needed reënforcements arrived. Under plans carefully matured, the Union forces commanded by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell on the morning of May 24 made their advance across the Potomac River and entered Virginia. Here was begun that formidable system of earth-works, crowning every hill in an irregular line for perhaps ten miles, extending from the river-bend above Georgetown to the bay into which Hunting Creek flows, below Alexandria, which constituted such an immense military strength, and so important a moral support to the Army of the Potomac, and, indeed, to the Union sentiment of the whole country during the entire war.

Three other movements of troops were begun about the same time. General Butler was transferred from Baltimore to Fort Monroe to collect nine or ten regiments for aggressive purposes. General Robert Patterson, who was organizing the Pennsylvania militia, assembled the contingent of that State with a view to a movement against Harper's Ferry. And General George B. McClellan, appointed to organize the contingent from the State of Ohio, had his earliest attention directed toward a movement into western Virginia.

Prompted by many different shades of feeling, there now arose throughout the North a demand for military action and military success. Assuming the undeniable preponderance of men and means in the free States, public opinion illogically also assumed that they could be made immediately victorious. Under bold head-lines a leading newspaper kept "The nation's war cry" standing in its columns: "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the National army!"† Though this was but a single voice, it brought responsive echoes from all parts of the North.

Two months of the first three-months' enlistment of the militia called into service were already gone; it seemed desirable that the remaining third of their term should be utilized in an energetic movement. General Scott's original idea had been that this energetic movement should occur at Harper's Ferry; but Johnston's evacuation of that place, and Patterson's over-caution and defensive strategy, frustrated the design. Under the increasing political pressure, the most promising alternative was thought to be a direct advance from Washington against Manassas Junction, the strategical importance of which the Confederates had instinctively recognized, especially its relation to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Cocke had written to Lee, May 15:

> These two columns, one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily coöperate and concentrate upon the one point or the other; either to make head against the enemy's columns advancing down the valley, should he force Harper's Ferry, or in case we repulse him at Harper's Ferry, the Winchester supporting column could throw itself on this side of the mountains to coöperate with the column at Manassas.

On the 29th of June President Lincoln called his Cabinet and principal military officers to a council of war at the Executive Mansion, to discuss a campaign against the rebels at Manassas. General Scott took occa-

† "New York Tribune," June 20, 1861.

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sion to say that he was not in favor of such a movement. "He did not believe in a little war by piecemeal. But he believed in a war of large bodies." He adhered to the "anaconda" policy, and a decisive campaign down the Mississippi River in the autumn and winter. "We were to go down, fight all the battles that were necessary, take all the positions we could find and garrison them, fight a battle at New Orleans and win it, and thus end the war."* But being overruled by the President and Cabinet in favor of an immediate movement, the old soldier gracefully yielded his preference, and gave his best counsel and cooperation to the new enterprise. He caused to be read the plan matured by General McDowell and approved by himself.

McDowell's plan stated that the secession forces then at Manassas Junction, under command of General Beauregard, and its dependencies, were estimated at twenty-five thousand. When threatened they would call up all reënforcements within reach.

> If General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men. So we must calculate on having to do with about thirty-five thousand men. . . . Leaving small garrisons in the defensive works, I propose to move against Manassas with a force of 30,000 of all arms, organized into 3 columns, with a reserve of 10,000. . . . After uniting the columns this side of it, I propose to attack the main position by turning it, if possible, so as to cut off communications by rail with the South. †

Before, however, the preparation for this advance had even been completed, the first campaign of the war, though not an extensive one, was already finished with a decided success to the Union arms.

When the Richmond convention by the secret secession ordinance of the 17th of April, and a few days later by a military league with Jefferson Davis, literally kidnapped Virginia and transferred her, bound hand and foot, to the rebel government at Montgomery, the western half of the State rose with an almost unanimous protest against the rude violation of self-government, and resolved to secede from secession. A series of popular meetings was held, with such success that on the 13th of May delegates from twenty-five counties met for consultation at Wheeling, and agreed on such further action and coöperation as would enable them to counteract and escape the treason and alienation to which they had been committed without their consent. The leaders made their designs known to President Lincoln at Washington, and to General McClellan at Cincinnati, commanding the Department of the Ohio, and were not only assured of earnest sympathy, but promised active help from the Ohio contingent of three-months' volunteers, whenever the decisive moment of need should arrive. In conformity with this understanding, an expedition under McClellan's orders moved against and dispersed a little nucleus of rebel troops at Philippi, in a secluded mountain valley about fifteen miles south of Grafton.

Under shelter and encouragement of this initial military success, the political scheme of forming a new State proceeded with accelerated ardor. As early as June 11 a delegate convention, representing about forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and the Ohio River, met and organized at Wheeling. On the 13th of June, after reciting the various treasonable usurpations of the Richmond convention and Governor Letcher, it adopted a formal declaration that all the acts of the convention and the executive were without authority and void, and declared vacated all executive, legislative, and judicial offices in the State held by those "who adhere to said convention and executive." On the 19th of June an ordinance was adopted creating a provisional State government, under which F. H. Peirpoint was appointed governor, to wield executive authority in conjunction with an executive council of five members. A legislature was constituted by calling together such members-elect as would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the United States and to the restored government of Virginia, and providing for filling the vacancies of those who refused. A similar provision continued or substituted other State and county officers. After adding sundry other ordinances to this groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took a recess till August. The newly constituted legislature soon met to enact laws for the provisional government; and on July 9 it elected two United States senators, who were admitted to seats four days later.

So far the work was simply a repudiation of secession and a restoration of the government of the whole State which had been usurped. But the main motive and purpose of the counter-revolution was not allowed to halt nor fail. In August the Wheeling convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha (afterward West Virginia) and providing for a popular vote to be taken in the following October on the question of ratification.

The Richmond government had no thought of surrendering western Virginia to the Union without a struggle. Toward the end of June

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

† McDowell to Townsend, June, 1861. War Records.

they sent General Garnett to oppose the Federal forces. He took position in a mountain-pass at Laurel Hill with 3 or 4 regiments, and stationed Colonel Pegram in another pass at Rich Mountain, 17 miles south, with a regiment and 6 guns. Early in July, General McClellan, learning the weakness of the rebels, resolved to drive them from their positions. He sent General Morris with 5 or 6 regiments against Garnett, and himself moved with some 7 regiments upon Pegram's intrenched camp. General Rosecrans, commanding McClellan's advance, was fortunate enough to obtain a Union mountaineer, thoroughly familiar with the locality, who led a detachment of 1900 men to the rear of the rebel position, where they easily dispersed an outpost of 300 men with 2 guns stationed near the summit. This victory made Pegram's position untenable; and, hastily abandoning his intrenched camp and guns, he sought to join Garnett at Laurel Hill by a northward march along the mountain-top. Garnett, however, was already retreating; and Pegram, unable to escape, surrendered his command of between 500 and 600 to McClellan on the morning of the 13th of July.

A difficult route of retreat to the northward still lay open to Garnett, and he made diligent efforts to impede the pursuit, which was pushed with vigor. About noon of July 13 Captain Benham with three Union regiments came up with the rebel wagon train at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of Cheat River, twenty-six miles north-west of Laurel Hill. Here Garnett deployed his rear-guard of a regiment with three guns to protect his train; but by a sharp attack the Union forces drove the enemy, capturing one of the guns. In a desultory skirmish a little farther on Garnett himself was killed by a sharpshooter, and that incident terminated the pursuit. The Unionists secured the wagon train, and the remnant of rebels successfully continued their farther retreat.

Large political and military results followed this series of comparatively slight encounters. They terminated the campaign for the possession of western Virginia, and the movement for the establishment of a separate State thereafter went on unchecked. The most important result was upon the personal fortunes of General McClellan. These were the first decided Union victories of the war, and they were hailed by the North with a feeling of triumph altogether disproportionate to their real magnitude. When on the following day McClellan summed up in a single laconic dispatch* the scattered and disconnected incidents of three different days, happening forty miles apart, the impression, without design on his part, was most naturally produced upon the authorities and the country that so sweeping and effective a campaign could only be the work of a military genius of the first order. McClellan was the unquestioned hero of the hour. The *éclat* of this achievement soon called him to Washington, and in a train of events which followed had no insignificant influence in securing his promotion, on the 1st of November following, without further victories, to the command of all the armies of the United States.

BULL RUN.†

It had been arranged that McDowell's advance against the enemy at Manassas should begin on July 9: by dint of extraordinary exertions he was ready and issued his marching orders on July 16.‡ But his organization was very imperfect and his preparations were far from complete. Many of his regiments reached him but two days before, and some only on the day he moved. He started with barely wagons enough for his ammunition and hospital supplies; tents, baggage, and rations were to follow.§ The utmost caution was enjoined to avoid another Vienna or Big Bethel disaster. Three things, his marching orders said, would be held unpardonable: *First*, to come upon a battery or a breastwork without knowledge of its position. *Second*, to be surprised. *Third*, to fall back. His army being a new, untried machine, his men unused to the fatigues and privations of a march, progress was slow. With a cumbersome movement it felt its way toward Fairfax Court House and Centreville, the outposts of the enemy having sufficient time to retire as it advanced. Tyler commanded his first division, of 4 brigades; Hunter the second division, of 2 brigades; Heintzelman the third division, of 3 brigades; and Miles the fifth division, of 2 brigades. The fourth division, under Runyon,

* HUNTSVILLE, VA., July 14, 1861.

COLONEL TOWNSEND: Garnett and forces routed; his baggage and one gun taken; his army demoralized; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in western Virginia, and have lost 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded. We have in all killed at least 200 of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at least 1000. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiments of eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Carolinians. Our success is complete and secession is killed in this country.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

[War Records.]

† For a more detailed account of the battle of Bull Run, see Nicolay, "The Outbreak of Rebellion," pp. 169–197.

‡ War Records.

§ Committee on Conduct of the War.

was left behind to guard his communications. His total command embraced an aggregate of 34,320 men; his marching column proper consisted of a little less than 28,000 men, including artillery, a total of 49 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry.

When, on the morning of July 18, Tyler reached Centreville, he found that the enemy had everywhere retired behind the line of Bull Run, a winding, sluggish stream flowing southeasterly toward the Potomac, about thirty-two miles south-east of Washington. While it is fordable in many places, it generally has steep and sometimes precipitous and rocky banks with wooded heights on the west. Three miles beyond the stream lies Manassas Junction on a high, open plateau. Here the railroads, from Richmond on the south and the Shenandoah Valley on the west, come together. To protect this junction the rebels had some slight field-works, armed with 14 or 15 heavy guns, and garrisoned by about 2000 men. Beauregard, in command since the 1st of June, had gathered an army of nearly 22,000 men and 29 guns. The independent command of Holmes, called up from Aquia Creek, augmented his force to a little over 23,000 men and 35 guns. Instead of keeping this about the Manassas earth-works he had brought it close down to the banks of Bull Run and posted it along a line some eight miles in length, extending from the Manassas railroad to the stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike, and guarding the five intermediate fords.

The enemy retired from Centreville as Tyler approached that place; and taking a light detachment to make a reconnaissance, he followed their main body toward the crossing of Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, near the center of Beauregard's extended line. Tyler was under express orders to observe well the roads, but not to bring on an engagement.* Apparently lured on, however, by the hitherto easy approach, his reconnaissance became a skirmish, and calling up support, the skirmish became a preliminary battle. Before he was well aware of it 60 men had fallen, 2 exposed field-pieces had been with difficulty extricated, 1 regiment had retreated in confusion, and 3 others were deployed in line of battle, to make a new charge. At this point Tyler remembered his instructions and called off his troops. This engagement at Blackburn's Ford, so apparently without necessity or advantage, greatly exasperated the men and officers engaged in it, and seriously chilled the fine spirit in which the army started on its march. The attacking detachment did not then know that the enemy had suffered equal loss and demoralization.†

McDowell began his campaign with the purpose of turning the flank of the enemy on the south; but the examinations made on the 18th satisfied him that the narrow roads and rough country in that direction made such a movement impracticable. When, in addition, he heard Tyler's cannonade on the same day, he hurried forward his divisions to Centreville; and the report of that day's engagement also seemed to prove it inexpedient to make a direct attack.† That night McDowell assembled his division commanders at Centreville and confidentially informed them that he had changed his original plan, and resolved to march northward and turn Beauregard's left flank.† All of Friday, the 19th, and Saturday, the 20th, were spent in an effort of the engineers to find an unfortified ford over Bull Run in that direction; and thus the main battle was postponed till Sunday, July 21. During those two days, while McDowell's army was refreshed by rest and supplied with rations, the strength of the enemy in his front was greatly increased.

McDowell's movement was based upon the understanding and promise that Patterson should hold Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, and General Scott made every exertion to redeem this promise. On the 13th he directed Patterson to detain Johnston "in the valley of Winchester"; and as the critical time approached, and hearing no official report from him for three whole days, he sent him a sharp admonition: "Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he reënforces the [Manassas] Junction with his main body."‡ And still more emphatically on the 18th, while the engagement of Blackburn's Ford was being fought by McDowell's troops: "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reënforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories."§ Patterson was touched by the implied censure, and answered restively: "The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in force have caused him to be reënforced."‖ But the facts did not bear out the assertion. He had been grossly outwitted, and the enemy was at that moment making the stolen march which Scott feared, and of which

* McDowell to Tyler, July 18, 1861. War Records.
† War Records.
‡ Scott to Patterson, July 17, 1861. War Records.
§ Scott to Patterson. War Records.
‖ Patterson to Scott, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Patterson remained in profound ignorance till two days later.

Since the 9th of July his readiness to "offer battle," or to "strike" when the proper moment should arrive, had oozed away. He became clamorous for reënforcements, and profuse of complaints. Making no energetic reconnaissance to learn the truth, and crediting every exaggerated rumor, he became impressed that he was "in face of an enemy far superior in numbers." Understanding perfectly the nature and importance of his assigned task, and admitting in his dispatches that "this force is the key-stone of the combined movements"; ambitious to perform a brilliant act, and commanding abundant means to execute his plan, his courage failed in the trying moment. "To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill," he reported on July 14, "preparatory to the other movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack."* Reaching Bunker Hill on the 15th, he was within nine miles of the enemy. His opportunity was at hand. Johnston had only 12,000 men all told; Patterson, from 18,000 to 22,000. All that and the following day he must have been torn by conflicting emotions. He was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had his orders written out for an attack. But it would appear that his chief of staff, Fitz-John Porter, together with Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas, at the last moment persuaded him to change his mind. Making only a slight reconnaissance on the 16th, he late that night countermanded his orders, and on July 17 marched to Charlestown — nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat. Johnston, the Confederate commander, was at Winchester, in daily anticipation of Patterson's attack, when at midnight of July 17 he received orders to go at once to the help of Beauregard at Manassas. By 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th his scouts brought him information that Patterson's army was at Charlestown. Relieved thus unexpectedly from a menace of danger which otherwise he could neither have resisted nor escaped, he lost no time. At noon of the same day he had his whole effective force of 9000 men on the march; by noon of Saturday, July 20, 6000 of them, with 20 guns, were in Beauregard's camp at Bull Run, ready to resist McDowell's attack.

The Union army lay encamped about Centreville; from there the Warrenton turnpike ran westward over a stone bridge, crossing Bull Run to Gainesville, several miles beyond. Unaware as yet that Johnston had joined Beauregard, McDowell desired to seize Gainesville, a station on the railroad, to prevent such a junction. The stone bridge was thought to be defended in force, besides being mined, ready to be blown up. The engineers, however, late on Saturday, obtained information that Sudley Ford, two or three miles above, could be readily carried and crossed by an attacking column.

On Saturday night, therefore, McDowell called his officers together and announced his plan of battle for the following day. Tyler's division was ordered to advance on the Warrenton turnpike and threaten the stone bridge; while Hunter and Heintzelman, with their divisions, should make a circuitous and secret night march, seize and cross Sudley Ford, and descending on the enemy's side of Bull Run should carry the batteries at the stone bridge by a rear attack, whereby Tyler would be able to cross and join in the main battle.

Beauregard, on his part, also planned an aggressive movement for that same Sunday morning. No sooner had Johnston arrived than he proposed that the Confederates should sally from their intrenchments, cross the five fords of Bull Run they were guarding, march by the various converging roads to Centreville, and surprise and crush the Union army in its camps. The orders for such an advance and attack were duly written out, and Johnston, as ranking officer, signed his approval of them in the gray twilight of Sunday morning. But it proved wasted labor. At sunrise Tyler's signal guns announced the Union advance and attack. The original plan was thereupon abandoned, and Beauregard proposed a modification — to stand on the defensive with their left flank at the stone bridge, and attack with their right from the region of Blackburn's Ford. This suggestion again Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out. There had been confusion and delay in the outset of McDowell's march, and the flanking route around by Sudley Ford proved unexpectedly long. Tyler's feigned attack at the stone bridge was so feeble and inefficient that it betrayed its object; the real attack by Hunter and Heintzelman, designed to begin at daylight, could not be made until near 11 o'clock. The first sharp encounter took place about a mile north of the Warrenton turnpike; some five regiments on each side being engaged. The rebels tenaciously held their line for an hour. But the Union column was constantly swelling with arriving batteries and regiments. Tyler's division found a ford, and crossing Bull Run a short distance above the stone bridge, three of its brigades joined Hunter and Heintzelman. About 12 o'clock the Confederate line, composed mainly of Johnston's troops, wavered and broke, and was swept back across and out of the valley of the Warrenton turnpike, and down the road

* Patterson to Townsend, July 14, 1861. War Records.

running southward from Sudley Ford to Manassas Junction.

The commanders and other officers on both sides were impressed with the conviction that this conflict of the forenoon had decided the fortunes of the day. Beauregard's plan to make a counter-attack from his right flank against Centreville had failed through a miscarriage of orders; and leaving Johnston at headquarters to watch the entire field, he hastened personally to endeavor to check the tide of defeat. Jackson, afterward known by the sobriquet of "Stonewall," had already formed his fresh brigade, also of Johnston's army, on the crest of a ridge half a mile south of the Warrenton turnpike. Other regiments and batteries were hurried up, until they constituted a semicircular line of 12 regiments, 22 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry, strongly posted and well hidden in the edge of a piece of woods behind the screen of a thick growth of young pines.

At half-past 2 o'clock in the afternoon, McDowell attacked this second position of the enemy with an immediately available force of about 14 regiments, 24 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry. Here the advantages of position were all strongly against him. The enemy was posted, concealed, and his artillery concentrated, while McDowell's brigades were at the foot of the hill; not only where the ascent must be made in open view, but where the nature of the ground rendered a united advance impossible. A series of successive and detached assaults followed. Two batteries were lost by mistaking a rebel for a Union regiment; and because of the lax organization and want of discipline in the raw volunteer regiments, the strength of McDowell's command melted away in a rapid demoralization and disintegration. The scales of victory, however, yet vibrated in uncertainty, when at 4 in the afternoon the remainder of Johnston's army arrived, and seven fresh rebel regiments were thrown against the extreme right and partly in rear of the Union line.

This heavy numerical overweight at a decisive time and place terminated the battle very suddenly. The abundant rumors that Johnston was coming to the help of Beauregard seemed verified; and the Union regiments, ignorant of the fact that they had been successfully fighting part of his force all day, were now seized with a panic, and began by a common impulse to move in retreat. The suddenness of their victory was as unexpected to the rebel as to the Union commanders. Jefferson Davis, who had come from Richmond, arriving at Manassas at 4 o'clock, was informed that the battle was lost, and was implored by his companions not to endanger his personal safety by riding to the front. Nevertheless he persisted, and was overjoyed to find that the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse, half marched, half run from the field. The rebel detachments of cavalry hung about the line of retreat, and by sudden dashes picked up a large harvest of trophies in guns and supplies, but they dared not venture a serious attack; and so unconvinced were they as yet of the final result, that that night the rebel commanders set a strong and vigilant guard in all directions against the expected return, and offensive operations, by McDowell next morning. The precaution was needless, for the Union army was so much demoralized that the commanders deemed it unsafe to make a stand at Centreville, where the reserves were posted; and a rapid though orderly retreat was continued through the night, and until all organized regiments or fragments reached their old camps within the fortifications on the Potomac, and the scattered fugitives made their way across the river into the city of Washington.

McDowell's defeat was wholly due to Patterson's inefficiency. He was charged with the task of defeating or holding Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley; he had a double force with which to perform his task. Had he done so, McDowell, who in that case would have been superior in numbers to Beauregard, and whose plans were in the main judicious, could easily have conquered. It was Johnston's army, which Patterson had permitted to escape, that principally fought the battle of Bull Run and defeated McDowell.* Nor is there any good sense in that criticism which lays the blame upon General Scott and the Administration for not having first united the two Federal armies. The Administration furnished a superior force against Beauregard at Bull Run, and an overwhelming force against Johnston at Winchester, and assured victory in each locality by the only reliable condition — other things being equal — an excess of numbers. Had Patterson held his foe, as he might, and McDowell defeated Beauregard, as he would have done, the capture of Johnston's force between the two Federal armies was practically certain, as General Scott intended. †

* The following analysis of the forces engaged in the main and decisive phases of the actual fighting shows it conclusively:

	JOHNSTON'S ARMY.		BEAUREGARD'S ARMY.	
	Regs.	*Guns.*	*Regs.*	*Guns.*
Battle of the morning	4	4	1	2
Battle of the afternoon.....	9	16	3	6
Final flank attack which created the panic	3	4	4	..
	16	24	8	8

† Scott to McClellan, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Scott was aware of the danger which Patterson's negligence had created. "It is known that a strong reënforcement left Winchester on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat," he telegraphed McDowell on the day of the battle, which it was then too late to countermand.* He also promised him immediate reënforcements. The confidence of the General-in-Chief remained unshaken, and he telegraphed McClellan: "McDowell is this forenoon forcing the passage of Bull Run. In two hours he will turn the Manassas Junction and storm it to-day with superior force." †

It may well be supposed that President Lincoln suffered great anxiety during that eventful Sunday; but General Scott talked confidently of success, and Lincoln bore his impatience without any visible sign, and quietly went to church at 11 o'clock. Soon after noon copies of telegrams began to come to him at the Executive Mansion from the War Department and from army headquarters. They brought, however, no certain information, as they came only from the nearest station to the battle-field, and simply gave what the operator saw and heard. Toward 3 o'clock they became more frequent, and reported considerable fluctuation in the apparent course and progress of the cannonade. The President went to the office of General Scott, where he found the general asleep, and woke him to talk over the news. Scott said such reports were worth nothing as indications either way — that the changes in the currents of wind and the variation of the echoes made it impossible for a distant listener to determine the course of a battle. He still expressed his confidence in a successful result, and composed himself for another nap when the President left.

Dispatches continued to come about every ten or fifteen minutes, still based on hearing and hearsay. But the rumors grew more cheering and definite. They reported that the battle had extended along nearly the whole line; that there had been considerable loss; but that the secession lines had been driven back two or three miles, some of the dispatches said, to the Junction. One of General Scott's aides now also came, bringing the telegram of an engineer, repeating that McDowell had driven the enemy before him, that he had ordered the reserves to cross Bull Run, and wanted reënforcements without delay.‡

The aide further stated substantially that the general was satisfied of the truth of this report, and that McDowell would immediately attack and capture the Junction, perhaps to-night, but certainly by to-morrow noon. Deeming all doubt at an end, President Lincoln ordered his carriage, and went out to take his usual evening drive.

He had not yet returned when, at 6 o'clock, Secretary Seward came to the Executive Mansion, pale and haggard. "Where is the President?" he asked hoarsely of the private secretaries. "Gone to drive," they answered. "Have you any late news?" he continued. They read him the telegrams which announced victory. "Tell no one," said he. "That is not true. The battle is lost. The telegraph says that McDowell is in full retreat, and calls on General Scott to save the capital. Find the President and tell him to come immediately to General Scott's." Half an hour later the President returned from his drive, and his private secretaries gave him Seward's message — the first intimation he received of the trying news. He listened in silence, without the slightest change of feature or expression, and walked away to army headquarters. There he read the unwelcome report in a telegram from a captain of engineers: "General McDowell's army in full retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army. . . . The routed troops will not re-form." § This information was such an irreconcilable contradiction of the former telegram that General Scott utterly refused to believe it. That one officer should report the army beyond Bull Run, driving the enemy and ordering up reserves, and another immediately report it three miles this side of Bull Run, in hopeless retreat and demoralization, seemed an impossibility. Yet the impossible had indeed come to pass; and the apparent change of fortune had been nearly as sudden on the battle-field as in Washington.

The President and the Cabinet met at General Scott's office, and awaited further news in feverish suspense, until a telegram from McDowell confirmed the disaster. ‖ Discussion was now necessarily turned to preparation for the future. All available troops were hurried forward to McDowell's support; Baltimore was put on the alert; telegrams were sent to the recruiting stations of the nearest Northern States to lose no time in sending all their organized regiments to Washington; McClellan was ordered to "come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as can be spared from western Virginia." ¶ A great number of

* Scott, Testimony, Committee on Conduct of the War.
† Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.
‡ Wendell to Thomas, July 21, 1861, 4 P. M. War Records.
§ Alexander, July 21, 1861. War Records.
‖ McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.
¶ Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.

civilians, newspaper correspondents, and several senators and representatives had followed McDowell's army to Centreville; one of the latter, Mr. Ely of New York, went to the battle-field itself, and was captured and sent for a long sojourn to Libby Prison in Richmond. Such of these non-combatants as had been fortunate enough to keep their horses and vehicles were the first to reach Washington, arriving about midnight. President Lincoln had by this time returned to the Executive Mansion, and reclining on a lounge in the Cabinet room he heard from several of these eye-witnesses their excited and exaggerated narratives, in which the rush and terror and unseemly stampede of lookers-on and army teamsters were altogether disproportionate and almost exclusive features. The President did not go to his bed that night; morning found him still on his lounge in the Executive office, hearing a repetition of these recitals and making memoranda of his own comments and conclusions.

As the night elapsed, the news seemed to grow worse. McDowell's first dispatch stated that he would hold Centreville. His second, that "the larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized"; but he said that he would attempt to make a stand at Fairfax Court House.* His third reported from that point that "many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. . . . I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac."† Reports from other points generally confirmed the prevalence of confusion and disorganization. Monday morning the scattered fugitives reached the bridges over the Potomac, and began rushing across them into Washington. It was a gloomy and dismal day. A drizzling rain set in which lasted thirty-six hours. Many a panic-stricken volunteer remembered afterward with gratitude, that when he was wandering footsore, exhausted, and hungry through the streets of the capital, her loyal families opened their cheerful doors to give him food, rest, and encouragement.

One of the principal reasons which prevented McDowell's making a stand at Centreville or Fairfax Court House was the important fact that the term of service of the three-months' militia, organized under President Lincoln's first proclamation, was about to expire. "In the next few days," says McDowell in his report, "day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army."‡ This vital consideration equally affected the armies at other points; and bearing it, as well as the local exigency, in mind, the President and the Cabinet determined on several changes of army leadership. McDowell was continued in command on the Virginia side of the Potomac, with fifteen regiments to defend and hold the forts. McClellan was called to Washington to take local command, and more especially to organize a new army out of the three-years' regiments which were just beginning to come in from the various States. Patterson was only a three-months' general, appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania; his time expired, and he was mustered out of service. Banks was sent to Harper's Ferry to succeed him. Dix was put in command at Baltimore, and Rosecrans in western Virginia.

By noon of Monday the worst aspects of the late defeat were known; and especially the reassuring fact that the enemy was making no pursuit; and so far as possible immediate dangers were provided against. The War Department was soon able to reply to anxious inquiries from New York:

> Our loss is much less than was at first represented, and the troops have reached the forts in much better condition than we expected. We are making most vigorous efforts to concentrate a large and irresistible army at this point. Regiments are arriving. . . . Our works on the south bank of the Potomac are impregnable, being well manned with reënforcements. The capital is safe. §

On the following day Lincoln in person visited some of the forts and camps about Arlington Heights, and addressed the regiments with words of cheer and confidence.

Compared with the later battles of the civil war, the battle of Bull Run involved but a very moderate loss || in men and material. Its political and moral results, however, were widespread and enduring. The fact that the rebel army suffered about equal damage in numbers of killed and wounded, and that it was crippled so as to be unable for months to resume the offensive, could not be immediately known. The flushed hope of the South magnified the achievement as a demonstration of Southern invincibility. The event of a pitched battle won gave the rebellion and the Confederate government a standing and a sudden respect-

* McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.

† McDowell to Townsend, July 22, 1861.

‡ McDowell, Report, August 4, 1861. War Records.

§ Cameron to Stetson, Grinell, and others, July 22, 1861. War Records.

|| The official reports show a loss to the Union side in the battle of Bull Run of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28), 481 men killed, 1011 men wounded, and 1460 (wounded and other Union soldiers) sent as prisoners to Richmond. On the Confederate side the loss was 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and a few prisoners taken.—War Records.

ability before foreign powers it had hardly dared hope for. With the then personal government of France, and with the commercial classes whose influence always rules the government of England, it gained at once a scarcely disguised active sympathy.

Upon the irritated susceptibilities, the wounded loyalty, the sanguine confidence of the North, the Bull Run defeat fell with a cruel bitterness. The eager hopes built on the victories of western Virginia were dashed to the ground. Here was a fresher and deeper humiliation than Sumter or Baltimore. But though her nerves winced, her will never faltered. She was both chastened and strengthened in the fiery trial. For the moment, however, irritation and disappointment found vent in loud complaint and blind recrimination. One or two curious incidents in this ordeal of criticism may perhaps be cited. A few days after the battle, in a conversation at the White House with several Illinois members of Congress, in the presence of the President and the Secretary of War, General Scott himself was so far nettled by the universal chagrin and fault-finding that he lost his temper and sought an entirely uncalled-for self-justification. "Sir, I am the greatest coward in America," said he. "I will prove it. I have fought this battle, sir, against my judgment; I think the President of the United States ought to remove me to-day for doing it. As God is my judge, after my superiors had determined to fight it I did all in my power to make the army efficient. I deserve removal because I did not stand up, when my army was not in a condition for fighting, and resist it to the last." The President said, "Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this battle." General Scott then said, "I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you have been." Richardson, who in a complaining speech in Congress related the scene, then drew the inference that Scott intended to pay a personal compliment to Mr. Lincoln, but that he did not mean to exonerate the Cabinet; and when pressed by questions, further explained: "Let us have no misunderstanding about this matter. My colleagues understood that I gave the language as near as I could. Whether I have been correctly reported or not I do not know. If I did not then make the correct statement, let me do it now. I did not understand General Scott, nor did I mean so to be understood, as implying that the President had forced him to fight that battle."* The incident illustrates how easily history may be perverted by hot-blooded criticism. Scott's petulance drove him to an inaccurate statement of events; Richardson's partisanship warped Scott's error to a still more unjustifiable deduction, and both reasoned from a changed condition of things. Two weeks before, Scott was confident of victory, and Richardson chafing at military inaction. The exact facts have already been stated. Scott advised against an offensive campaign into Virginia, but consented — was not forced — to prepare and direct it. He made success as certain as it ever can be made in war; but the inefficiency of Patterson foiled his plan and preparation. Even then victory was yet possible and probable but for the panic, against which there is no safeguard, and which has been fatal to armies in all times and in all countries.

Historical judgment of war is subject to an inflexible law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Military writers love to fight over the battles of history exclusively by the rules of the professional chess-board, always subordinating, often totally ignoring, the element of politics. This is a radical error. Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war — neither beginning nor end of methodical hostilities. War and politics, campaigns and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an Administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay, or rations. Applied to the Bull Run campaign, this law of historical criticism analyzes and fixes the relative responsibilities of government and commanders with easy precision. When Lincoln, on June 29, assembled his council of war, the commanders, as military experts, correctly decided that the existing armies could win a victory at Manassas and a victory at Winchester. General Scott correctly objected that these victories, if won, would not be decisive; and that in a military point of view it would be wiser to defer any offensive campaign until the following autumn. Here the President and the Cabinet, as political experts, intervened, and on their part decided, correctly, that the public temper would not admit of such a delay. Thus the Administration was responsible for the forward movement, Scott for the combined strategy of the two armies, McDowell for the conduct of the Bull Run battle, Patterson for the escape of Johnston, and Fate for the panic; for the opposing forces were equally raw, equally undisciplined, and as a whole fought the battle with equal courage and gallantry.

* "Globe," July 24 and Aug. 1, 1861, pp. 246 and 387.

But such an analysis of causes and such an apportionment of responsibilities could not be made by the public, or even by the best-informed individuals beyond Cabinet circles, in the first fortnight succeeding the Bull Run disaster. All was confused rumor, blind inference, seething passion. That the public at large and the touch-and-go newspaper writers should indulge in harsh and hasty language is scarcely to be wondered at; but the unseemly and precipitate judgments and criticisms of those holding the rank of leadership in public affairs are less to be excused. Men were not yet tempered to the fiery ordeal of revolution, and still thought and spoke under the strong impulse of personal prejudice, and with that untamed and visionary extravagance which made politics such a chaos in the preceding winter. That feeling, momentarily quelled and repressed by the rebel guns at Sumter, was now in danger of breaking out afresh. In illustration we need only to cite the words of prominent leaders in the three parties of the North, namely: Stanton, late Buchanan's attorney-general, and destined soon to become famous as Lincoln's War Secretary; Richardson, who had been the trusted lieutenant of Douglas, and now, since Douglas was dead, the ostensible spokesman of the faction which had followed that leader; and thirdly, Horace Greeley, exercising so prominent an influence upon the public opinion of the country through the columns of "The Tribune."

The Buchanan cabinet was still writhing under the odium which fell upon the late Administration, and much more severely upon the Breckinridge Democracy. Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet were eager to seize upon every shadow of self-justification, and naturally not slow to emphasize any apparent shortcoming of their successors. Stanton, with his impulsive nature, was especially severe on the new President and Administration. In his eyes the only hope of the country lay in the members of Buchanan's reconstructed Cabinet. Thus he wrote to his colleague Dix, on June 11, in language that resembled a stump speech of the presidential campaign:

> No one can imagine the deplorable condition of this city and the hazard of the Government, who did not witness the weakness and panic of the Administration, and the painful imbecility of Lincoln. We looked to New York in that dark hour as our only deliverance under Providence, and, thank God, it came. . . . But when we witness venality and corruption growing in power every day, and controlling the millions of money that should be a patriotic sacrifice for national deliverance, and treating the treasure of the nation as a booty to be divided among thieves, hope dies away: deliverance from this danger also must come from New York. . . . Of military affairs I can form no judgment. Every day affords fresh proof of the design to give the war a party direction. The army appointments appear (with two or three exceptions only) to be bestowed on persons whose only claim is their Republicanism — broken-down politicians without experience, ability, or any other merit. Democrats are rudely repulsed, or scowled upon with jealous and ill-concealed aversion. The Western Democracy are already becoming disgusted, and between the corruption of some of the Republican leaders and the self-seeking ambition of others some great disaster may soon befall the nation. How long will the Democracy of New York tolerate these things? . . . We hoped to see you here, especially after you had accepted the appointment of major-general. But now that the Administration has got over its panic, you are not the kind of man that would be welcome.*

This letter plainly enough shows Mr. Stanton's attitude toward the new Administration. His letter of the following day to ex-President Buchanan reveals the state of feeling entertained by Dix:

> The recent appointments in the army are generally spoken of with great disapprobation. General Dix is very much chagrined with the treatment he has received from the War Department, and on Saturday I had a letter declaring his intention to resign immediately.†

Again, July 16:

> General Dix is still here. He has been shamefully treated by the Administration. We are expecting a general battle to be commenced at Fairfax to-day, and conflicting opinions of the result are entertained.†

And once more, on July 26:

> The dreadful disaster of Sunday can scarcely be mentioned. The imbecility of this Administration culminated in that catastrophe: an irretrievable misfortune and national disgrace, never to be forgotten, are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and national bankruptcy as the result of Lincoln's "running the machine" for five months. You perceive that Bennett is for a change of the Cabinet, and proposes for one of the new Cabinet Mr. Holt. . . . It is not unlikely that some change in the War and Navy Departments may take place, but none beyond these two departments until Jefferson Davis turns out the whole concern. The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable: during the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without any resistance. The rout, overthrow, and utter demoralization of the whole army is complete. Even now I doubt whether any serious opposition to the entrance of the Confederate forces could be offered. While Lincoln, Scott, and the Cabinet are disputing who is to blame, the city is unguarded and the enemy at hand. General McClellan reached here last evening. But if he had the ability of Cæsar, Alexander, or Napoleon, what can he accomplish? Will not Scott's jealousy, Cabinet intrigues, Republican interference, thwart him at every step? While hoping for the best, I cannot shut my eyes against the dangers that beset the Government, and especially this city. It is certain that Davis was in the field on Sunday, and the secessionists here assert that he headed in person the last victorious charge. General Dix is in Baltimore. After three weeks' neglect and insult he was sent there.†

While Stanton and Dix were thus nursing their secret griefs on behalf of one of the late

* Dix, "Memoirs of John A. Dix."
† "North American Review," November, 1879.

political factions, Richardson, as the spokesman of the Douglas wing of the Democracy, was indulging in loud complaints for the other. Charging that the division of the Democratic party at Charleston had brought the present calamity upon the Union, he continued:

> This organization of the Breckinridge party was for the purpose of destroying the Government. That was its purpose and its object. What do we see? Without the aid and coöperation of the men of the North that party was powerless. The men from the Northern States who aided and encouraged this organization which is in rebellion are at the head to-day of our army. Butler of Massachusetts, Dix of New York and Patterson of Pennsylvania, and Cadwalader — all of them in this movement to break down and disorganize the Democratic party and the country. Why is it? This Douglas party furnished you one-half of your entire army. Where is your general, where is your man in command to-day who belongs to that party? Why is this? Have you Republicans sympathized with this Breckinridge party? Are you sympathizing with them, and lending your aid to the men who lead our armies into misfortune and disgrace?*

Richardson was easily answered. A member correctly replied that these and other three-months' generals had been selected by the governors of various States, and not by the President; moreover, that Patterson had been specially recommended by General Scott, whom Richardson was eulogizing, and that there would be plenty of opportunity before the war was over for the Douglas men to win honors in the field. But all this did not soothe Richardson's temper, which was roused mainly by his revived factional jealousy.

Unjust fault-finding was to be expected from party opponents; but it is not too much to say that it was a genuine surprise to the President to receive from a party friend, and the editor of the most influential newspaper in the Union, the following letter, conveying an indirect accusation of criminal indifference, and proposing an immediate surrender to rebellion and consent to permanent disunion:

> NEW YORK, Monday, July 29, 1861.
> Midnight.
>
> DEAR SIR: This is my seventh sleepless night — yours, too, doubtless — yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. But to business. You are not considered a great man, and I am a hopelessly broken one. You are now undergoing a terrible ordeal, and God has thrown the gravest responsibilities upon you. Do not fear to meet them. Can the rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late, awful disaster? If they can,— and it is your business to ascertain and decide,— write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And if they *cannot* be beaten,— if our recent disaster is fatal,— do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If the rebels are not to be beaten,— if that is your judgment in view of all the light you can get,— then every drop of blood hence-forth shed in this quarrel will be wantonly, wickedly shed, and the guilt will rest heavily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray you to decide quickly and let me know my duty.
>
> If the Union is irrevocably gone, an armistice for 30, 60, 90, 120 days — better still for a year — ought at once to be proposed, with a view to a peaceful adjustment. Then Congress should call a national convention, to meet at the earliest possible day. And there should be an immediate and mutual exchange or release of prisoners and a disbandment of forces. I do not consider myself at present a judge of anything but the public sentiment. That seems to me everywhere gathering and deepening against a prosecution of the war. The gloom in this city is funereal,— for our dead at Bull Run were many, and they lie unburied yet. On every brow sits sullen, scorching, black despair. It would be easy to have Mr. Crittenden move any proposition that ought to be adopted, or to have it come from any proper quarter. The first point is to ascertain what is best that can be done — which is the measure of our duty, and do that very thing at the earliest moment.
>
> This letter is written in the strictest confidence, and is for your eye alone. But you are at liberty to say to members of your Cabinet that you *know* I will second any move you may see fit to make. But do nothing timidly nor by halves. Send me word what to do. I will live till I can hear it at all events. If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that. But bear in mind the greatest truth: "Whoso would lose his life for my sake shall save it." Do the thing that is the highest right, and tell me how I am to second you.
>
> Yours, in the depths of bitterness,
> HORACE GREELEY.†

These few citations are noteworthy, because of the high quarters whence they emanated and the subsequent relations some of their authors bore to the war. They give us penetrating glimpses of how the Bull Run disaster was agitating the public opinion of the North. But it must not be hastily inferred that such was the preponderant feeling. The great tides of patriotism settled quickly back to their usual level. The army, Congress, and the people took up, a shade less buoyantly, but with a deeper energy, the determined prosecution of the war, and soon continued their cheerful confidence in the President, Cabinet, and military authorities. The war governors tendered more troops and hurried forward their equipped regiments; the Administration pushed the organization of the long-term volunteers; and out of the scattered débris of the Bull Run forces there sprang up that magnificent Army of the Potomac, which in a long and fluctuating career won such historic renown.

Meanwhile, in this first shadow of defeat, President Lincoln maintained his wonted equipoise of manner and speech. A calm and resolute patience was his most constant mood; to follow with watchfulness the details of the

* Richardson, Speech in House of Representatives, July 24, 1861.

† Unpublished Autograph MS.

accumulation of a new army was his most eager occupation. He smiled at frettings like those of Scott, Dix, and Richardson; but letters like that of Greeley made him sigh at the strange weakness of human character. Such things gave him pain, but they bred no resentment, and elicited no reply. Already at this period he began the display of that rare ability in administration which enabled him to smooth mountains of obstacles and bridge rivers of difficulty in his control of men. From this time onward to the end of the war his touch was daily and hourly amidst the vast machinery of command and coördination in Cabinet, Congress, army, navy, and the hosts of national politics. To still the quarrels of factions, to allay the jealousies of statesmen, to compose the rivalries of generals, to soothe the vanity of officials, to prompt the laggard, to curb the ardent, to sustain the faltering, was a substratum of daily routine underlying the great events of campaigns, battles, and high questions of state.

On the night following the battle of Bull Run, while Lincoln lay awake on a sofa in the Executive office, waiting to gather what personal information he could from the many officers and prominent civilians who were arriving at Washington after their flight from the battle-field, he already began sketching a pencil memorandum of the policy and military programme most expedient to be adopted in the new condition of affairs. This memorandum sketch or outline he added to from time to time during the succeeding days. On the 27th of July he seems to have matured his reflections on the late disaster, and with his own hand he carefully copied his memorandum in this completed form:

JULY 23, 1861.

1. Let the plan for making the blockade effective be pushed forward with all possible dispatch.

2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort Monroe and vicinity, under General Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined, and instructed without more for the present.

3. Let Baltimore be held as now, with a gentle but firm and certain hand.

4. Let the force now under Patterson or Banks be strengthened and made secure in its position.

5. Let the forces in western Virginia act till further orders according to instructions or orders from General McClellan.

6. General Frémont push forward his organization and operations in the West as rapidly as possible, giving rather special attention to Missouri.

7. Let the forces late before Manassas, except the three-months' men, be reorganized as rapidly as possible in their camps here and about Arlington.

8. Let the three-months' forces who decline to enter the longer service be discharged as rapidly as circumstances will permit.

9. Let the new volunteer forces be brought forward as fast as possible; and especially into the camps on the two sides of the river here.

JULY 27, 1861.

When the foregoing shall have been substantially attended to,

1. Let Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads nearest it) and Strasburg be seized, and permanently held, with an open line from Washington to Manassas, and an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg — the military men to find the way of doing these.

2. This done, a joint movement from Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati on east Tennessee.*

FRÉMONT.

MISSOURI had been saved from organized rebellion, but the smell and blackness of insurrectionary fire were strong upon her. While Governor Jackson and General Price, flying from the battle of Boonville as fugitives, were momentarily helpless, they nevertheless had reasonable hope of quick support. Whatever of latent rebellion and secret military preparation existed were set in motion by the governor's proclamation of June 12 and his order dividing the State into nine military districts and issuing commissions to a skeleton army under the provisions of the military bill passed by his rebel legislature before their expulsion from the capital by Lyon. Thus every one inclined to take up arms against the Union had the plausible excuse of authority and the guidance of a designated commander and rendezvous, and a simultaneous movement toward organization long preconcerted immediately began. Missouri is a large State. She had over 68,000 square miles of territory, and a population of over a million souls; a trifling percentage would yield a formidable force. The spirit and impulse of revolution were at fever heat, and all the fire of the Border-Ruffian days smoldered along the frontier. The governor's brigadier-generals designated camps, and the hot-blooded country lads flocked to them, finding a charm of adventure in the very privations they were compelled to undergo. For half a year disloyalty had gone unpunished; the recent reports of march and battle served rather to sharpen their zeal.

Three railroads radiated from St. Louis — one toward the west, with its terminus at Sedalia; one toward the south-west, with terminus at Rolla; one toward the south, with terminus at Ironton. The first of these reached only about three-fourths, the last two scarcely half-way, across the State. Western Missouri, therefore, seemed beyond any quick reach of a military expedition from St. Louis. General Price, proceeding westward from Boonville, found one of these camps at Lexington; the governor, proceeding southward, was attended by a little remnant of fugitives from the bat-

* Lincoln, Autograph MS.

tle of Boonville. With such following as each could gather both directed their course toward the Arkansas line, collecting adherents as they went. Their pathway was not entirely clear. Before leaving St. Louis, Lyon had sent an expedition numbering about twenty-five hundred, commanded by Sweeny, a captain of regulars, by rail to Rolla and thence by a week's march to Springfield, from which point he had advanced a part of his force under Sigel to Carthage, near the extreme south-western corner of the State. Jackson and Price, having previously united their forces, thus found Sigel directly in their path. As they greatly outnumbered him, by the battle of Carthage, July 5,—a sharp but indecisive engagement,—they drove him back upon Springfield, and effected a junction with the rebel force gathered in the north-western corner of Arkansas, which had already assisted them by demonstrations and by capturing one of Sigel's companies.

Delayed by the need of transportation, Lyon could not start from Boonville on his south-western march until the 3d of July. The improvised forces of Jackson and Price, moving rapidly, because made up largely of cavalry, or, rather, unorganized horsemen, were far in advance of him, and had overwhelmed Sigel before Lyon was well on his way. Nevertheless he pushed ahead with energy, having called to him a detachment of regulars from Fort Leavenworth, and volunteers from Kansas numbering about 2200. These increased his column to about 4600 men. By July 13 he was at Springfield, and with the forces he found there was at the head of an aggregate of between 7000 and 8000 men.

The Confederate authorities had ambitious plans for the West. They already possessed Arkansas; the Indian Territory was virtually in their grasp; Missouri they looked upon with somewhat confident eyes; even the ultimate conquest of Kansas seemed more than a remote possibility. Nor were such plans confined to mere speculation. Major-General Polk was stationed at Memphis early in July to command the Mississippi region. The neutrality policy in Kentucky for the moment left the Tennessee contingent idle. Being appealed to by Governor Jackson, Polk made immediate preparations for a campaign in Missouri. On July 23 he reported to the Confederate government his purpose to send two strong columns into that State — one under McCulloch, of about 25,000 men, against Lyon at Springfield; another, under Pillow and Hardee, to march upon Ironton in south-east Missouri, where he estimated they would collect a force of 18,000. He wrote:

> They are directed to pass in behind Lyon's force by land, or to proceed to St. Louis, seize it, and, taking possession of the boats at that point, to proceed up the river Missouri, raising the Missourians as they go; and at such point as may appear most suitable to detach a force to cut off Lyon's return from the west. . . . If, as I think, I can drive the enemy from Missouri with the force indicated, I will then enter Illinois and take Cairo in the rear on my return.*

He was obliged a few days later to curtail this extravagant programme. Governor Jackson, he learned, to his chagrin, had exaggerated the available forces fully one-half.† Although he had already sent Pillow to New Madrid, he now "paused" in the execution of his plan; and the rivalry of the various rebel commanders seems soon to have completely paralyzed it. The "neutrality" attitude of the governors of both Missouri and Kentucky greatly delayed the progress of the war in the West. The middle of June came before Lyon chased the rebels from Jefferson City, and in Kentucky open and positive military action was deferred till the first weeks of September. Meanwhile, however, it was felt that the beginning of serious hostilities was only a question of time. The Mississippi River was blockaded, commerce suspended, Cairo garrisoned and fortified, gun-boats were being built, regiments were being organized and sent hither and thither, mainly as yet to keep the neighborhood peace. In the East the several Virginia campaigns were in progress, and General Scott's "anaconda" plan was well understood in confidential circles.

This condition of affairs made the whole Mississippi Valley sensitive and restless. The governors of the North-west met, and, by memorial and delegation, urged the Administration to make the Ohio line secure by moving forward and occupying advanced posts in Kentucky and Tennessee. Especially did they urge the appointment of a competent commander who could combine the immense resources of the West, and make them effective in a grand campaign southward to open the Mississippi.

Almost universal public sentiment turned to John C. Frémont as the desired leader for this duty. He was about forty-eight years of age. As student, as explorer, as a prominent actor in making California a State of the Union, he had shown talent, displayed energy, and conquered success in situations of difficulty and peril. As senator for a brief term, his votes proved that the North could rely on his convictions and principles. As the presidential candidate of the Republican party in 1856, his name had broadened into national representative value. The post of honor then had brought him defeat. He might well claim the post of duty for a chance to win a victory.

* Polk to Walker, July 23, 1861. War Records.
† War Records.

The dash of romance in his career easily rekindled popular enthusiasm; political sagacity indicated that he should be encouraged to change this popularity into armies, and lead them to military success in aid of the imperiled nation. The inclination of the Administration coincided with the sentiment of the people. Seward had proposed him for Secretary of War, and Lincoln mentioned him for the French mission; but in the recent distribution of offices no place at once suitable to his abilities and adequate to his claims had been found available. This new crisis seemed to have carved out the work for the man.

He had passed the previous winter in France, but upon the outbreak of rebellion at once returned to his country. On his arrival in the city of New York, about the 1st of July, President Lincoln appointed him a major-general in the regular army, and on the 3d created the Western department, consisting of the State of Illinois and all the States and Territories between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, and placed it under his command, with headquarters at St. Louis.

For a man whose genius could have risen to the requirements of the occasion it was a magnificent opportunity, an imperial theater. Unfortunately, the country and the Administration had overrated Frémont's abilities. Instead of proceeding at once to his post of duty, he remained in New York, absorbed largely in his personal affairs. Two weeks passed before he sent his letter of acceptance and oath of office. "Please proceed to your command without coming here," telegraphed General Scott, two days later. Postmaster-General Blair testified:

> As soon as he was appointed, I urged him to go to his department. . . . The President questioned me every day about his movements. I told him so often that Frémont was off, or was going next day, according to my information, that I felt mortified when allusion was made to it, and dreaded a reference to the subject. Finally, on the receipt of a dispatch from Lyon by my brother, describing the condition of his command, I felt justified in telegraphing General Frémont that he must go at once. But he remained till after Bull Run; and even then, when he should have known the inspiration that would give the rebels, he traveled leisurely to St. Louis.*

When, on July 25, he finally reached his headquarters, and formally assumed command, he did not find his new charge a bed of roses. The splendid military strength of the North-west was only beginning its development. Recruiting offices were full; but commanders of departments and governors of States quarreled over the dribblets of arms and equipments remaining in the arsenals, and which were needed in a dozen places at once.

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

The educated and experienced officers and subalterns of the old regular army, familiar with organization and routine, did not suffice to furnish the needed brigadier-generals and colonels, much less adjutants, commissaries, quartermasters, and drill-sergeants. Error, extravagance, delay, and waste ensued. Regiments were rushed off to the front without uniforms, arms, or rations; sometimes without being mustered into service. Yet the latent resources were abundant in quantity and excellent in quality, and especially in the qualities of mind, ambition, earnestness, and talent competent through practical service to rise to every requirement of duty and sacrifice — genius which could lead, and patriotic devotion ready to serve, suffer, and die. What magnificent capabilities in those early Western volunteers; what illustrious talent in those first regiments found by Frémont and coming at his call! — Lyon, Grant, Blair, McClernand, Pope, Logan, Schofield, Curtis, Sturgis, Palmer, Hurlbut, and a hundred others whose names shine on the records of the war, to say nothing of the thousands who, unheralded, went gloriously to manful duty and patriotic death.

The three weeks loitered away in New York already served to quadruple Frémont's immediate task. Lyon had taken the field, and Blair had gone to Washington to take his seat in the special session of Congress as representative. The whole service immediately felt the absence from headquarters of these two inspiring and guiding leaders. At three points in Frémont's new department matters wore a threatening aspect. The plentiful seeds of rebellion sown by Governor Jackson throughout Missouri were springing up in noxious rankness. Amidst dominant loyalty existed a reckless and daring secession minority, unwilling to submit to the control of superior sentiment and force. Following the battle of Boonville there broke out in many parts of the State a destructive guerrilla warfare, degenerating into neighborhood and family feuds, and bloody personal reprisal and revenge, which became known under the term of "bushwhacking." Houses and bridges were burned, farms were plundered, railroads were obstructed and broken, men were kidnapped and assassinated. During the whole period of the war few organized campaigns disturbed the large territory of the State; but disorder, lawlessness, crime, and almost anarchy were with difficulty repressed from beginning to end.

The local administration charged with the eradication of these evils was greatly embarrassed and often thwarted through the unfortunate jealousy and rivalry between the

factions of radicals and conservatives, both adherents of the Union. Equally loyal, equally sincere in their devotion to the Government, they paralyzed each other's efforts by a blind opposition and recrimination. As events progressed these factions increased in their animosity toward each other, and their antagonistic attitude was continued throughout the whole war period. This conflict of local sentiment—personal, political, and military—produced no end of complications requiring the repeated direct interference of President Lincoln, and taxed to the utmost his abounding forbearance. Neighborhood troubles were growing in northern Missouri before Frémont left New York; and Lyon's adjutant selected Brigadier-General Pope to take command there and restore order. Frémont gave the permission by telegraph; and when he reached St. Louis, General Pope had eight Illinois regiments employed in this duty.*

Frémont's second point of difficulty was the strong report of danger to Cairo. The rebel general Polk, at Memphis, was in the midst of his preparations for his Missouri campaign, already mentioned. About the time of Frémont's arrival Pillow had just moved six thousand Tennesseeans to New Madrid, and reported his whole force "full of enthusiasm and eager for the 'Dutch hunt.'" News of this movement, and the brood of wild rumors which it engendered, made General Prentiss, the Union commander at Cairo, exceedingly uneasy, and he called urgently for assistance. Cairo, the strategic key of the whole Mississippi Valley, was too important to be for a moment neglected; and in a few days after his arrival Frémont gathered the nearest available reënforcements, about eight regiments in all, and, loading them on a fleet of steamboats, led them in person in a somewhat ostentatious expedition to Cairo; and the demonstration, greatly magnified by rumor, doubtless had much influence in checking the hopes of the rebel commanders for an early capture of Missouri and Illinois.

The reënforcement of Cairo was very proper as a measure of precaution. It turned out, however, that the need was much less urgent than Frémont's third point of trouble, namely, the safety of Lyon at Springfield, in southwestern Missouri. When Lyon left St. Louis he had conceived this campaign to the southwest, not merely to control that part of the State and to protect it against invasion, but also with the ultimate hope of extending his march into Arkansas. For this he knew his force in hand was inadequate; but he believed that from the troops being rapidly organized in the contiguous free States he would receive the necessary help as soon as it was needed. We have seen that he reached Springfield with an aggregate of about 7000 or 8000 men. It was, for those early days, a substantial, compact little army, somewhat seasoned, well commanded, self-reliant, and enthusiastic. Unfortunately it also, like the armies at every other point, was under the strain and discouragement of partial dissolution. The term of enlistment of the three-months' militia regiments, raised under the President's first proclamation, was about to expire. In every detachment, army, and at every post, throughout the whole country, there occurred about the middle of July, 1861, the incident of quick succession of companies and regiments going out of the service. Many of these corps immediately reorganized under the three-years' call; many remained temporarily in the field to take part in some impending battle. But despite such instances of generous patriotism, there was at all points a shrinkage of numbers, an interval of disorganization, a paralysis of action and movement.

On the whole, therefore, Lyon found his new position at Springfield discouraging. He was 120 miles from a railroad; provisions and supplies had not arrived as expected; half his army would within a brief period be mustered out of service; McClellan† was in western Virginia, Frémont in New York, Blair in Washington. He scarcely knew who commanded, or where to turn. The rebels were in formidable force just beyond the Arkansas line. The dispatches at this juncture take on an almost despairing tone.

> All idea of any farther advance movement, or of even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned, unless the Government furnish us promptly

* General Pope, under date of August 3, makes a graphic statement of the methods of the bushwhackers: "The only persons in arms, so far as I could learn, were a few reckless and violent men in parties of twenty or thirty, who were wandering about, committing depredations upon all whose sentiments were displeasing, and keeping this whole region in apprehension and uneasiness. . . . So soon as these marauders found that troops were approaching, which they easily did, from the very persons who ask for protection, they dispersed, each man going to his home, and, in many cases, that home in the very town occupied by the troops. . . . When troops were sent out against these marauders, they found only men quietly working in the field or sitting in their offices, who, as soon as the backs of the Federal soldiers were turned, were again in arms and menacing the peace." [Pope to Sturgeon, August 3, 1861. War Records.]

† While McClellan was yet at Cincinnati, organizing the Ohio contingent of three-months' men, Missouri had been temporarily attached to his department. Beyond a few suggestions by telegraph, however, he did not give it any attention in detail, because his hands were already full of work. His Virginia campaign soon required his presence and entire time.

with large reënforcements and supplies. Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed, and imperfectly supplied with tents. None of them have as yet been paid.*

Two days later Lyon wrote:

If it is the intention to give up the West, let it be so; it can only be the victim of imbecility or malice. Scott will cripple us if he can. Cannot you stir up this matter and secure us relief? See Frémont, if he has arrived. The want of supplies has crippled me so that I cannot move, and I do not know when I can. Everything seems to combine against me at this point. Stir up Blair.†

Lyon's innuendoes against the Administration and against General Scott were alike unjust. Both were eager to aid him, but there was here, as elsewhere, a limit to possibilities. It was Frémont who needed stirring up. Appointed by the President on July 1, he had not even sent his official acceptance till the 16th, the day before Lyon wrote this appeal; and, after final and emphatic urging by Postmaster-General Blair, it was the 25th before he entered on his duties at St. Louis. Three special messengers from Lyon awaited him on his arrival, and repeated the tale of need and of danger. But Fremont listened languidly and responded feebly. Urgent calls indeed came to him from other quarters. As already stated, Cairo was represented to be seriously threatened, and he had chosen first to insure its safety. He had the means, by a judicious rearrangement of his forces, to have aided effectually both these exposed points. Under the critical conditions fully pointed out to him, he could at least have recalled Lyon and assisted his safe withdrawal to his railroad base at Rolla. But he neither recalled him nor substantially reënforced him. Two regiments were set in motion toward him, but it proved the merest feint of help. No supplies and no troops reached Lyon in season to be of the slightest service. Lyon's danger lay in a junction of the various rebel leaders just beyond the Arkansas line. The Confederate government had sent Brigadier-General McCulloch to conciliate or conquer the Indian Territory as events might dictate, and had given him three regiments—one from Louisiana, one from Texas, and one from Arkansas—for the work. Finding it bad policy for the present to occupy the Indian Territory, he hovered about the border with permission to move into either Kansas or Missouri.

Even before Polk's ambitious programme was found to be impracticable, McCulloch made haste to organize a campaign on his own account. On July 30 he reported that he was on his way toward Springfield with his own brigade of 3200 troops, the command of General Pearce, with 2500 Arkansas State troops, and the somewhat heterogeneous gathering of Missourians under Price, which he thought could furnish about 7000 effective men, generally well mounted, but badly commanded, and armed only with common rifles and shotguns. It was the approach of this large force which had given Lyon such uneasiness, and with good cause. Moving steadily upon him, they soon approached so near that his position became critical. His own command had dwindled to less than five thousand effective men; the combined enemy had nearly treble that number of effectives, and probably more than three to one, counting the whole mass. If he remained stationary, they would slowly envelop and capture him. If he attempted to retreat through the 120 miles of barren mountainous country which lay between him and Rolla, they would follow and harass him and turn his retreat into a rout. Counting to the last upon reënforcements which did not come, he had allowed events to place him in an untenable position.

As a final and desperate resource, and the only one to save his army, he resolved to attack and cripple the enemy. As at Bull Run, and as so often happens, both armies, on the evening of August 9, were under orders to advance that night and attack each other. Some showers of rain in the evening caused McCulloch temporarily to suspend his order; but Lyon's little army, moving at nightfall, marched ten miles south of Springfield to Wilson's Creek. At midnight they halted for a brief bivouac. Dividing into two columns they fell upon the enemy's camp at daylight, Sigel, with 1200 men and a battery, marching against their right flank, in an endeavor to get to the rear, while Lyon in person led the remaining 3700 men, with two batteries, to a front attack against their left center. The movement was a most daring one, and the conflict soon became desperate. Sigel's attack, successful at first, was checked, his detachment put to flight, and 5 of his 6 guns captured and turned against Lyon.

Lyon, on the contrary, by an impetuous advance, not only quickly drove the enemy out of their camp, but gained and occupied a strong natural position, which he held with brave determination. His mixed force of regulars and volunteers fought with admirable coöperation. McCulloch, confident in his overwhelming numbers, sent forward line after line of attack, which Lyon's well-posted regular batteries threw back. The forenoon was already well spent when a final unusually heavy assault from the enemy was thus repulsed, largely by help of the inspiriting per-

* Schofield to Harding, July 15, 1861. War Records.
† Lyon to Harding, July 17, 1861. War Records.

sonal example of Lyon himself, who led some fragments of reserves in a bayonet charge. The charge ended the conflict; but it also caused the fall of the commander, who, pierced by a ball, almost immediately expired. It was his fourth wound received in the action. Though the battle was substantially won, Sturgis, upon whom the command devolved, deemed it too hazardous to attempt to hold the field, and a retreat to Springfield was agreed upon by a council of officers. An unmolested withdrawal was effected in the afternoon, and upon further consultation a definite retreat upon Rolla was begun the following day. As Lyon had anticipated, the enemy was too much crippled to follow. The Union forces had 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing. The Confederate loss was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing.

The battle of Wilson's Creek, the death of Lyon, and the retreat of the army to Rolla turned public attention and criticism sharply upon Frémont's department and administration, and that commander was suddenly awakened to his work and responsibility. He now made haste to dispatch reënforcements to Rolla, and sent urgent telegrams for help to Washington and to the governors of the neighboring free States. His new energy partook a little too much of the character of a panic. He declared martial law in the city of St. Louis, and began an extensive system of fortifications; which, together with directions to fortify Rolla, Jefferson City, and several other places, pointed so much to inaction, and a defensive policy, as to increase rather than allay public murmur.

His personal manners and methods excited still further and even deeper dissatisfaction. A passion for display and an inordinate love of power appeared to be growing upon him. He had established his headquarters in an elegant mansion belonging to a wealthy secessionist; his personal staff consisted largely of foreigners, new to the country, and unfamiliar with its language and laws. Their fantastic titles and gay trappings seemed devised for show rather than substantial service. He organized a special body-guard. Sentinels and subordinates unpleasantly hedged the approach to his offices. Instead of bringing order into the chaotic condition of military business, he was prone to set method and routine at defiance, issuing commissions and directing the giving out of contracts in so irregular a way as to bring a protest from the proper accounting officers of the Government. Though specially requested by the President to coöperate with the provisional governor, he continued to ignore him. A storm of complaint soon arose from all except the little knot of flatterers who abused his favor and the newspapers that were thriving on his patronage. The Unionists of Missouri became afraid that he was neglecting the present safety of the State for the future success of his intended Mississippi expedition, and wild rumors even floated in the air of a secret purpose to imitate the scheme of Aaron Burr and set up an independent dictatorship in the West.*

Reports came to President Lincoln from multiplied sources, bringing him a flood of embarrassment from the man to whom he had looked with such confidence for administrative aid and military success. It was his uniform habit, when he had once confided command and responsibility to an individual, to sustain him in the trust to the last possible degree. While he heard with pain the cumulating evidence of Frémont's unfitness, instead of immediately removing him from command, he sought rather to remedy the defect. In this spirit he wrote the following letter to General Hunter, which letter peculiarly illustrates his remarkable delicacy in managing the personal susceptibilities of men:

> My Dear Sir: General Frémont needs assistance which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal mistake is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to see him; and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily? †

With this letter of the President, Postmaster-General Blair — hitherto Frémont's warm personal friend — and Meigs, the quartermaster-general of the army, went to St. Louis, to make a brief inspection and report of matters, and to give friendly advice and admonition to the commander of the Department of the West. While they were on their way, Mrs. Frémont was journeying toward Washington, bearing her husband's reply to a letter from the President sent him by special messenger about a week before.

Her mind was less occupied with the subject of the missive she bore than with the portent of a recent quarrel which the general had imprudently allowed to grow up between Colonel Frank Blair and himself. Blair had finally become convinced of Frémont's incapacity, and in public print sharply criticised his doings. Indeed, the quarrel soon progressed so far that Frémont placed him under arrest; then Blair preferred formal charges against the general for maladministration, and

* Meigs, Diary. MS.

† Lincoln to Hunter, Sept. 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

the general in turn entered formal countercharges against Blair.

Arrived at her destination Mrs. Frémont took the opportunity, in her interview with Mr. Lincoln, to justify General Frémont in all he had done, and to denounce his accusers with impetuous earnestness. She even asked for copies of confidential correspondence concerning her husband's personal embroilment. In these circumstances it was no light task for Mr. Lincoln to be at once patient, polite, and just; yet the following letter will testify that he accomplished even this difficult feat:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 12, 1861.

MRS. GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR MADAM: Your two notes of to-day are before me. I answered the letter you bore me from General Frémont, on yesterday, and not hearing from you during the day, I sent the answer to him by mail. It is not exactly correct, as you say you were told by the elder Mr. Blair, to say that I sent Postmaster-General Blair to St. Louis to examine into that department and report. Postmaster-General Blair did go, with my approbation, to see and converse with General Frémont as a friend. I do not feel authorized to furnish you with copies of letters in my possession, without the consent of the writers. No impression has been made on my mind against the honor or integrity of General Frémont, and I now enter my protest against being understood as acting in any hostility towards him. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

It will be interesting to read in addition a graphic, verbal recapitulation of these incidents, made by President Lincoln in a confidential evening conversation with a few friends in the Executive office a little more than two years afterward, and which one of his secretaries recorded:

The Blairs have to an unusual degree the spirit of clan. Their family is a close corporation. Frank is their hope and pride. They have a way of going with a rush for anything they undertake; especially have Montgomery and the old gentleman. When this war first began they could think of nothing but Frémont; they expected everything from him, and upon their earnest solicitation he was made a general and sent to Missouri. I thought well of Frémont. Even now I think well of his impulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men, and I think he has absolutely no military capacity. He went to Missouri the pet and protégé of the Blairs. At first they corresponded with him and with Frank, who was with him, fully and confidentially, thinking his plans and his efforts would accomplish great things for the country. At last the tone of Frank's letters changed. It was a change from confidence to doubt and uncertainty. They were pervaded with a tone of sincere sorrow and of fear that Frémont would fail. Montgomery showed them to me, and we were both grieved at the prospect. Soon came the news that Frémont had issued his emancipation order, and had set up a bureau of abolition, giving free papers, and occupying his time apparently with little else. At last, at my suggestion, Montgomery Blair went to Missouri to look at and talk over matters. He went as the friend of Frémont. He passed, on the way, Mrs. Frémont, coming to see me. She sought an audience with me at midnight, and tasked me so violently with many things, that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarreling with her. She surprised me by asking why their enemy, Montgomery Blair, had been sent to Missouri. She more than once intimated that if General Frémont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself.†

MILITARY EMANCIPATION.

NOT only President Lincoln, but the country at large as well, was surprised to find, in the newspapers of August 30, a proclamation from the commander of the Department of the West of startling significance. The explanations of its necessity and purpose were altogether contradictory, and its mandatory orders so vaguely framed as to admit of dangerous variance in interpretation and enforcement. Reciting the disturbed condition of society, and defining the boundaries of army occupation, it contained the following important decrees:

Circumstances, in my judgment of sufficient urgency, render it necessary that the commanding general of this department should assume the administrative powers of the State. . . . In order, therefore, to suppress disorder, to maintain as far as now practicable the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. . . . All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared freemen. . . . The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of the military authorities the power to give instantaneous effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as the conditions of war demand. But this is not intended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law will be administered by the civil officers in the usual manner, and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably exercised.‡

Despite its verbiage and confusion of subjects, it was apparent that this extraordinary document was not a measure of military protection, but a political manœuvre. Since the first movement of the armies the slavery question had become a subject of new and vital contention, and the antislavery drift of public opinion throughout the North was unmistakably manifest. There was no room for doubt that General Frémont, apprehensive about his loss of prestige through the disaster to Lyon and the public clamors growing out of his mistakes and follies in administration, had made this appeal to the latent feeling in the public mind as a means of regaining his waning popularity. Full confirmation was afforded by his immediately convening under his

* Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Frémont, Proclamation. War Records.

proclamation a military commission to hear evidence, and beginning to issue personal deeds of manumission to slaves.* The proceeding strongly illustrates his want of practical sense: the delay and uncertainty of enforcement under this clumsy method would have rendered the theoretical boon of freedom held out to slaves rare and precarious, if not absolutely impracticable. As soon as an authentic text of the proclamation reached President Lincoln, he wrote and dispatched the following letter:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 2, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR SIR: Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me some anxiety:

First. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, the Confederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation; and so, man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having my approbation or consent.

Second. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you.

This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. I send it by special messenger, in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.†

It was the reply to the above which the general sent to Washington by the hand of Mrs. Frémont, and which contained a very lame apology for the dictatorial and precipitate step he had taken. He wrote:

Trusting to have your confidence, I have been leaving it to events themselves to show you whether or not I was shaping affairs here according to your ideas. The shortest communication between Washington and St. Louis generally involves two days, and the employment of two days in time of war goes largely towards success or disaster. I therefore went along according to my own judgment, leaving the result of my movements to justify me with you. And so in regard to my proclamation of the 30th. Between the rebel armies, the Provisional Government, and home traitors, I felt the position bad and saw danger. In the night I decided upon the proclamation and the form of it. I wrote it the next morning and printed it the same day. I did it without consultation or advice with any one, acting solely with my best judgment to serve the country and yourself, and perfectly willing to receive the amount of censure which should be thought due if I had made a false movement. This is as much a movement in the war as a battle, and in going into these I shall have to act according to my judgment of the ground before me, as I did on this occasion. If, upon reflection, your better judgment still decides that I am wrong in the article respecting the liberation of slaves, I have to ask that you will openly direct me to make the correction. The implied censure will be received as a soldier always should the reprimand of his chief. If I were to retract of my own accord, it would imply that I myself thought it wrong, and that I had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. But I did not. I acted with full deliberation, and upon the certain conviction that it was a measure right and necessary, and I think so still. In regard to the other point of the proclamation to which you refer, I desire to say that I do not think the enemy can either misconstrue or urge anything against it, or undertake to make unusual retaliation. The shooting of men who shall rise in arms against an army in the military occupation of a country is merely a necessary measure of defense, and entirely according to the usages of civilized warfare. The article does not at all refer to prisoners of war, and certainly our enemies have no ground for requiring that we should waive in their benefit any of the ordinary advantages which the usages of war allow to us.‡

Frémont thus chose deliberately to assume a position of political hostility to the President. Nevertheless Mr. Lincoln, acting still in his unfailing spirit of dispassionate fairness and courtesy, answered as follows:

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FRÉMONT.

SIR: Yours of the 8th in answer to mine of the 2d instant is just received. Assuming that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30 I perceived no general objection to it. The particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves appeared to me to be objectionable in its nonconformity to the act of Congress passed the 6th of last August upon the same subjects; and hence I wrote you, expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very cheerfully do. It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and that said act be published at length, with this order.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.§

As might have been expected, Frémont's proclamation of military emancipation, and Lincoln's order revoking it, produced a fresh and acrimonious discussion of the slavery question. The incident made the name of Frémont a rallying cry for men holding extreme anti-slavery opinions, and to a certain extent raised him to the position of a new party leader. The vital relation of slavery to the rebellion was making itself felt to a degree which the great body of the people, so long trained to a legal tolerance of the evil, could not yet bring themselves to acknowledge. Men hitherto conservative and prudent were swept along by the relentless logic of the nation's calamity

* "Rebellion Record."

† War Records.

‡ Frémont to Lincoln, Sept. 8, 1861. War Records.

§ War Records.

to a point where they were ready at once to accept and defend measures of even the last necessity for the nation's preservation.

With admirable prudence Lincoln himself added nothing to the public discussion, but a confidential letter written to a conservative friend who approved and defended Frémont's action will be found of enduring interest.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 1861.

HON. O. H. BROWNING.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 17th is just received; and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law, which you had assisted in making, and presenting to me, less than a month before, is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Frémont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is *purely political*, and not within the range of *military* law or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, and this, as well when the farm is *not* needed for military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them he can seize them and use them, but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by lawmakers, and not by military proclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply "dictatorship." It assumes that the general may do *anything* he pleases — confiscate the lands and free the slaves of *loyal* people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular, with some thoughtless people, than that which has been done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility.

You speak of it as being the only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the United States — any government of constitution and laws — wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?

I do not say Congress might not, with propriety, pass a law on the point, just such as General Frémont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the Government.

So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Frémont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probable that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital. On the contrary, if you will give up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other kind friends gave me the election, and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly.

You must not understand I took my course on the proclamation *because* of Kentucky. I took the same ground in a private letter to General Frémont before I heard from Kentucky.

You think I am inconsistent because I did not also forbid General Frémont to shoot men under the proclamation. I understand that part to be within military law, but I also think, and so privately wrote General Frémont, that it is impolitic in this, that our adversaries have the power, and will certainly exercise it, to shoot as many of our men as we shoot of theirs. I did not say this in the public letter, because it is a subject I prefer not to discuss in the hearing of our enemies.

There has been no thought of removing General Frémont on any ground connected with his proclamation, and if there has been any wish for his removal on any ground, our mutual friend Sam. Glover can probably tell you what it was. I hope no real necessity for it exists on any ground. . . .

Your friend, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.*

The reader will not fail to note that the argument of this letter seems diametrically opposed to the action of the President, when, exactly one year later, he issued his preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, as well as to that of the final one, on the first day of January, 1863. Did Mr. Lincoln change his mind in the interim? The answer is two-fold. He did not change his mind as to the principle; he did change his mind as to the policy of the case.

Rightly to interpret Mr. Lincoln's language we must imagine ourselves in his position, and examine the question as it presented itself to his mind. Congress, by the act of August 6, 1861, had authorized him to cause property used or employed in aid of insurrection to be "seized, confiscated, and condemned"; providing, however, that such condemnation should be by judicial proceeding. He saw that Frémont by mere proclamation assumed to confiscate all property, both real and personal, of rebels in arms, whether such property had been put to insurrectionary use or not, and, going a step further, had annexed a rule of property, by decreeing that their slaves should become free. This assumption of authority Lincoln rightly defined as "simply dictatorship," and as being, if permitted, the end of constitutional government. The case is still stronger when we remember that Frémont's proclamation began by broadly assuming "the administrative powers of the State"; that its declared object was mere individual punishment, and the measure a local police regulation to suppress disorder and maintain the peace; also that it was to operate throughout Missouri, as well within as without the

*MS. Also printed in "Proceedings of Illinois Bar Association, 1882," pp. 40, 41.

portions of the State under his immediate military control. Military necessity, therefore, could not be urged in justification. The act was purely administrative and political.

The difference between these extra-military decrees of Frémont's proclamation and Lincoln's acts of emancipation is broad and essential. Frémont's act was one of civil administration, Lincoln's a step in an active military campaign; Frémont's was local and individual, Lincoln's national and general; Frémont's partly within military lines, Lincoln's altogether beyond military lines; Frémont's an act of punishment, Lincoln's a means of war; Frémont's acting upon property, Lincoln's acting upon persons. National law, civil and military, knew nothing of slavery, and did not protect it as an institution. It only tolerated State laws to that effect, and only dealt with fugitive slaves as "persons held to service." Lincoln did not, as dictator, decree the abrogation of these State laws; but in order to call persons from the military aid of the rebellion to the military aid of the Union, he, as Commander-in-Chief, armed by military necessity, proclaimed that persons held as slaves within rebel lines should on a certain day become free unless rebellion ceased.

Thus no real distinction of principle exists between his criticism of Frémont's proclamation and the issuing of his own. On the other hand, there is a marked and acknowledged change of policy between the date of the Browning letter and the date of his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. In September, 1861, he stood upon the position laid down in the Chicago platform; upon that expressed in the constitutional amendment and indorsed in his inaugural; upon that declared by Congress in July, in the Crittenden resolution, namely: that the General Government would not interfere directly or indirectly with the institution of slavery in the several States. This policy Lincoln undertook in good faith to carry out, and he adhered to it so long as it was consistent with the safety of the Government. His Browning letter is but a reaffirmation of that purpose. At the time he wrote it military necessity was clearly against military emancipation, either local or general. The revocation of Frémont's decree saved Kentucky to the Union, and placed forty thousand Kentucky soldiers in the Federal army. But one year after the date of the Browning letter, the situation was entirely reversed. The Richmond campaign had utterly failed; Washington was menaced; the country was despondent; and military necessity now justified the policy of general military emancipation.

Whatever temporary popularity Frémont gained with antislavery people by his proclamation was quickly neutralized by the occurrence of a new military disaster in his department. The battle of Wilson's Creek and the retreat of the Union army to Rolla left the Confederate forces master of south-west Missouri. The junction of rebel leaders, however, which had served to gain that advantage was of short duration. Their loosely organized and badly supplied army was not only too much crippled to follow the Union retreat, but in no condition to remain together. Price, as major-general of Missouri State forces, had only temporarily waived his rank and consented to serve under McCulloch, holding but a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. Both the disagreement of the leaders and the necessities of the troops almost immediately compelled a separation of the rebel army. General Pearce with his Arkansas State forces returned home, and General McCulloch with his three Confederate regiments also marched back into Arkansas, taking up again his primary task of watching the Indian Territory. General Price held his numerous but heterogeneous Missouri followers together, and, busying himself for a time in gathering supplies, started back in a leisurely march northward from Springfield toward the Missouri River. The strong secession feeling of south-western Missouri rapidly increased his force, liberally furnished him supplies, and kept him fully informed of the numbers and location of the various Union detachments. There were none in his line of march till he neared the town of Lexington, on the Missouri River. The rebel governor, Jackson, had recently convened the rebel members of his legislature here, but a small Union detachment sent from Jefferson City occupied the place, dispersing them and capturing their records, and the great seal of the State, brought by the governor in his flight from the capital. About the 1st of September the Union commander at Jefferson City heard of the advance of Price, and sent forward the Chicago Irish Brigade under Colonel Mulligan to reënforce Lexington, with directions to fortify and hold it. Mulligan reached Lexington by forced marches, where he was soon joined by the Union detachment from Warrensburg retreating before Price. The united Federal force now numbered 2800 men, with 8 guns Price pushed forward his cavalry, and made a slight attack on the 12th, but was easily repulsed and retired to await the arrival of his main body, swelled by continual accessions to some 20,000 with 13 guns; and on the 18th he again approached and formally laid siege to Lexington.

Mulligan made good use of this interim,

gathering provisions and forage, casting shot, making ammunition for his guns, and inclosing the college building and the hill on which it stood, an area of some fifteen acres, with a strong line of breastworks. Price began his attack on the 18th, but for two days made little headway. Slowly, however, he gained favorable positions; his sharp-shooters, skilled riflemen of the frontier, drove the Federals into their principal redan, cut off their water supply by gaining and occupying the river shore, and finally adopted the novel and effective expedient of using movable breastworks, by gradually rolling forward bales of wet hemp. On September 20, after fifty-two hours of gallant defense, Mulligan's position became untenable. The reënforcements he had a right to expect did not come, his water cisterns were exhausted, the stench from dead animals burdened the air about his fort. Some one at length, without authority, displayed a white flag, and Price sent a note which asked, "Colonel, what has caused the cessation of the fight?" Mulligan's Irish wit was equal to the occasion, and he wrote on the back of it, "General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered." The pleasantry led to a formal parley; and Mulligan, with the advice of his officers, surrendered.*

The uncertainty which for several days hung over the fate of Lexington, and the dramatic incidents of the fight, excited the liveliest interest throughout the West. Newspaper discussion soon made it evident that this new Union loss might have been avoided by reasonable prudence and energy on the part of Frémont, as there were plenty of disposable troops at various points, which, during the slow approach and long-deferred attack of Price, could have been hurried to Mulligan's support. There were universal outcry and pressure that at least the disaster should be retrieved by a prompt movement to intercept and capture Price on his retreat. Frémont himself seems to have felt the sting of the disgrace, for, reporting the surrender, he added:

"I am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy, either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately."

"Your dispatch of this day is received," responded General Scott. "The President is glad you are hastening to the scene of action; his words are, 'he expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time.'"

This hope was not destined to reach a fulfillment. Price almost immediately retreated southward from Lexington with his captured booty, among which the pretentious great seal of the State figures as a conspicuous item in his report. On September 24 Frémont published his order, organizing his army of five divisions, under Pope at Boonville, McKinstry at Syracuse, Hunter at Versailles, Sigel at Georgetown, Asboth at Tipton. On paper it formed a respectable show of force, figuring as an aggregate of nearly 39,000; in reality it was at the moment well-nigh powerless, being scattered and totally unprepared for the field. Frémont's chronic inattention to details, and his entire lack of methodical administration, now fully revealed themselves. Even under the imperative orders of the general, nearly a month elapsed before the various divisions could be concentrated at Springfield; and they were generally in miserable plight as to transportation, supplies, and ammunition. Amidst a succession of sanguine newspaper reports setting forth the incidents and great expectations of Frémont's campaign, the convincing evidence could not be disguised that the whole movement would finally prove worthless and barren.

Meanwhile, acting on his growing solicitude, President Lincoln directed special inquiry, and about the 13th of October the Secretary of War, accompanied by the Adjutant-General of the Army, reached Frémont's camp at Tipton. His immediate report to the President confirmed his apprehension. Secretary Cameron wrote:

> I returned to this place last night from the headquarters of General Frémont at Tipton. I found there and in the immediate neighborhood some 40,000 troops, with 1 brigade (General McKinstry's) in good condition for the field and well provided; others not exhibiting good care, and but poorly supplied with munitions, arms, and clothing. I had an interview with General Frémont, and in conversation with him showed him an order for his removal. He was very much mortified, pained, and, I thought, humiliated. He made an earnest appeal to me, saying that he had come to Missouri, at the request of the Government, to assume a very responsible command, and that when he reached this State he found himself without troops and without any preparation for an army; that he had exerted himself, as he believed, with great energy, and had now around him a fine army, with everything to make success certain; that he was now in pursuit of the enemy, whom he believed were now within his reach; and that to recall him at this moment would not only destroy him, but render his whole expenditure useless. In reply to this appeal, I told him that I would withhold the order until my return to Washington, giving him the interim to prove the reality of his hopes as to reaching and capturing the enemy, giving him to understand that, should he fail, he must give place to some other officer. He assured me that, should he fail, he would resign at once.
>
> It is proper that I should state that after this conversation I met General Hunter, who, in very distinct terms, told me that his division of the army, although then under orders to march, and a part of his command actually on the road, could not be put in proper condition for marching for a number of days. To a question I put to him, "whether he believed General Frémont fit for the command," he replied that he did not think

* "Rebellion Record."

that he was; and informed me that though second in command, he knew nothing whatever of the purposes or plans of his chief.*

The opinion of another division commander, General Pope, was freely expressed in a letter of the previous day, which Hunter also exhibited to the Secretary:

I received at 1 o'clock last night the extraordinary order of General Frémont for a forward movement of his whole force. The wonderful manner in which the actual facts and condition of things here are ignored stupefies me. One would suppose from this order that divisions and brigades are organized, and are under immediate command of their officers; that transportation is in possession of all; that every arrangement of supply trains to follow the army has been made; in fact, that we are in a perfect state of preparation for a move.

You know, as well as I do, that the exact reverse is the fact; that neither brigades nor divisions have been brought together, and that if they were there is not transportation enough to move this army one hundred yards; that, in truth, not one solitary preparation of any kind has been made to enable this advance movement to be executed. I have never seen my division, nor do I suppose you have seen yours. I have no cavalry even for a personal escort, and yet this order requires me to send forward companies of pioneers protected by cavalry. Is it intended that this order be obeyed, or rather, that we try to obey it, or is the order only designed for Washington and the papers? . . . . I went to Jefferson City, the last time I saw you, for the express purpose of getting transportation for my division, and explained to General Frémont precisely what I have said above. How in the face of the fact that he knew no transportation was furnished, and that Kelton has none, he should coolly order such a movement, and expect it to be made, I cannot understand on any reasonable or common-sense hypothesis.

Another letter to the President from a more cautious and conservative officer, General Curtis, exercising a local command in St. Louis, gave an equally discouraging view of the situation:

Your Excellency's letter of the 7th inst., desiring me to express my views in regard to General Frémont frankly and confidentially to the Secretary of War, was presented by him yesterday, and I have complied with your Excellency's request. . . . Matters have gone from bad to worse, and I am greatly obliged to your Excellency's letter, which breaks the restraint of military law, and enables me to relieve myself of a painful silence. In my judgment General Frémont lacks the intelligence, the experience, and the sagacity necessary to his command. I have reluctantly and gradually been forced to this conclusion. His reserve evinces vanity or embarrassment, which I never could so far overcome as to fully penetrate his capacity. He would talk of plans, which, being explained, only related to some move of a general or some dash at a shadow, and I am now convinced he has no general plan. Forces are scattered and generally isolated without being in supporting distance or relation to each other, and when I have expressed apprehension as to some, I have seen no particular exertion to repel or relieve, till it was too late. I know the demand made on him for force everywhere is oppressive; but remote posts have improperly stood out, and some still stand, inviting assault, without power to retreat, fortify, or reënforce. Our forces should be concentrated, with the rivers as a base of operation; and these rivers and railroads afford means for sudden and salutary assaults on the enemy. . . . The question you propound, "Ought General Frémont to be relieved from or retained in his present command?" seems easily answered. It is only a question of manner and time. Public opinion is an element of war which must not be neglected. . . . It is not necessary to be precipitate. A few days are not of vast moment, but the pendency of the question and discussion must not be prolonged. Controversies in an army are almost as pernicious as a defeat. †

Thus the opinions of three trained and experienced army officers, who had every means of judging from actual personal observation, coincided with the general drift of evidence which had come to the President from civilian officials and citizens, high and low. Frémont had frittered away his opportunity for usefulness and fame; such an opportunity, indeed, as rarely comes to men. He had taken his command three months before with the universal good-will of almost every individual, every subordinate, every official, every community in his immense department. In his brief incumbency he not only lost the general public confidence, but incurred the special displeasure or direct enmity of those most prominent in influence or command next to him, and without whose friendship and hearty coöperation success was practically impossible.

Waiting and hoping till the last moment, President Lincoln at length felt himself forced to intervene. On the 24th of October, just three months after Frémont had assumed command, he directed an order to be made that Frémont should be relieved and General Hunter be called temporarily to take his command. This order he dispatched by the hand of a personal friend to General Curtis at St. Louis, with the following letter:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

DEAR SIR: On receipt of this, with the accompanying inclosures, you will take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Major-General Frémont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when General Frémont shall be reached by the messenger,—yourself or any one sent by you,—he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not till after, the delivery to General Frémont, let the inclosure addressed to General Hunter be delivered to him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.‡

It will be seen that the conditions attending the delivery of this order were somewhat peculiar. If General Frémont had just won a battle, or were on the eve of fighting one,

* Cameron to Lincoln, Oct. 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Curtis to Lincoln, Oct. 12, 1861. MS.

‡ War Records.

then both justice to himself, and more especially the risk or gain to the Union cause, rendered it inexpedient to make a sudden change in command. But the question also had another and possibly serious aspect. Amid all his loss of prestige and public confidence, Frémont had retained the clamorous adhesion and noisy demonstrative support of three distinct elements. First, a large number of officers to whom he had given irregular commissions, issued by himself, "subject to the approval of the President." These commissions for the moment gave their holders rank, pay, and power; and to some of them he had assigned extraordinary duties and trusts under special instructions, regardless of proper military usage and method. The second class was the large and respectable German population of St. Louis, and other portions of Missouri, forming the nucleus of the radical faction whose cause he had especially espoused. The third class comprised the men of strong antislavery convictions throughout the Union who hailed his act of military emancipation with unbounded approval. The first class composed about his person a clique of active sycophants, wielding power and dispensing patronage in his name; the other two supplied a convenient public echo. Out of such surroundings and conditions there began to come a cry of persecution and a vague hum of insubordination, coupled with adulations of the general. Some of his favorites talked imprudently of defiance and resistance to authority;* occasional acts of Frémont himself gave a color of plausibility to these mutterings. He had neglected to discontinue the expensive fortifications and barracks when directed to do so by the Secretary of War. Even since the President ordered him to modify his proclamation, he had on one occasion personally directed the original document to be printed and distributed. Several of his special appointees were stationed about the city of St. Louis, "so they should control every fort, arsenal, and communication, without regard to commanding officers or quartermasters."† Suspicions naturally arose, and were publicly expressed, that he would not freely yield up his command; or, if not actually resisting superior authority, that he might at least, upon some pretext, temporarily prolong his power.

There was, of course, no danger that he could successfully defy the orders of the President. The bulk of his army, officers and soldiers, would have spurned such a proposition. But the example of delay or doubt, any shadow of insubordination, would have had an extremely pernicious effect upon public opinion. General Curtis therefore sent a trusted bearer of dispatches, who, by an easy stratagem, entered Frémont's camp, gained a personal audience, and delivered the official order of removal. Duplicates of the President's letters were at the same time, and with equal care, dispatched to the camp of General Hunter, at a considerable distance, and he traveled all night to assume his new duties. When he reached Frémont's camp, on the following day, he learned that ostensible preparations had been made and orders issued for a battle, on the assumption that the enemy was at Wilson's Creek advancing to an attack. Taking command, Hunter sent a reconnaissance to Wilson's Creek, and obtained reliable evidence that no enemy whatever was there or expected there. Frémont had been duped by his own scouts; for it is hardly possible to conceive that he deliberately arranged this final bit of theatrical effect.

The actual fact was that while Price, retreating southward, by "slow and easy marches,"‡ kept well beyond any successful pursuit, his army of twenty thousand which had captured Lexington dwindled away as rapidly as it had grown. His movement partook more of the nature of a frontier foray than an organized campaign: the squirrel-hunters of western Missouri, whose accurate sharp-shooting drove Mulligan into his intrenchments to starvation or surrender, returned to their farms or their forest haunts to await the occasion of some new and exciting expedition; the whole present effort of General Price, now at the head of only 10,000 or 12,000 men, being to reach an easy junction with McCulloch on the Arkansas border, so that their united force might make a successful stand, or at least insure a safe retreat from the Union army.

President Lincoln, however, did not intend that the campaign to the south-west should be continued. Other plans were being discussed and matured. With the order to supersede Frémont he also sent the following letters, explaining his well-considered views and conveying his express directions:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

MY DEAR SIR: Herewith is a document — half letter, half order — which, wishing you to see, but not

* To remove Mr. Frémont will be a great wrong, as the necessary investigation following it will prove. It will make immense confusion, and require all his control over his friends and the army to get them to do as he will,— accept it as an act of authority, not of justice,— but in time of war it is treason to question authority. To leave him here without money, without the moral aid of the Government, is treason to the people. I cannot find smoother phrases, for it is the death struggle of our nationality, and no time for fair words. [Mrs. Frémont to Lamon, St. Louis, Oct. 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.]

† Curtis to Lincoln, Nov. 1, 1861. MS.

‡ Price, Official Report. War Records.

to make public, I send unsealed. Please read it, and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of the Department of the West at the time it reaches him. I cannot now know whether Frémont or Hunter will then be in command.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.*

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST.

SIR: The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon north-western Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the south-east of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reënforcements, that you should give up the pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both corps by reëstablishing and improving their discipline and instructions, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious coöperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel any army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the south-west that it is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reënforcing their main points, if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves. While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price, or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis, will be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged in it.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

The change of command occasioned neither trouble nor danger. Frémont himself acted with perfect propriety. He took leave of his army in a brief and temperate address, and returned to St. Louis, where he was welcomed by his admirers with a public meeting and eulogistic speeches. The demonstration was harmless and unimportant, though care had been taken to send authority to General Curtis to repress disorder, and specially to look to the safety of the city and the arsenal.†

In accordance with the policy outlined by the President, General Hunter soon drew back the Federal army from Springfield to Rolla, and the greater part of it was transferred to another field of operations. Hearing of this retrograde movement, McCulloch rapidly advanced, and for a season occupied Springfield. One of the distressing effects of these successive movements of contending forces is described in a sentence of his report, "The Union men have nearly all fled with the Federal troops, leaving this place almost deserted."‡

* War Records.

† Townsend to Curtis, Nov. 6, 1861. War Records.

‡ McCulloch to Cooper, Nov. 19, 1861. War Records.

Century June 1888

BY TELEPHONE.

IT was a suggestion of Hawthorne's — was it not? — that in these more modern days Cupid has no doubt discarded his bow and arrow in favor of a revolver. There are ladies of a beauty so destructive that in their presence the little god would find a Gatling gun his most useful weapon. It is safe to say that the son of Venus does not disdain the latest inventions of Vulcan for the use of Mars, and that he slips off his bandage whenever he goes forth to replenish his armory. Lovers are quick to follow his example, and the house of love has all the modern improvements. Nowadays the sighing swain may tryst by telegraph and the blushing bride must elope by the lightning-express; and if ever there were an Orlando in the streets of New York, he would have to carve his Rosalind's name on the telegraph poles.

If the appliances of modern science had been at the command of Cupid in the past as they are in the present, the story of many a pair of famous lovers would be other than it is. Leander surely would not have set out to swim to his mistress had international storm-warnings been sent across the Atlantic, which Hero could have conveyed to him by the

Hellespont Direct Cable Company. Paris might never have escaped scot-free with the fair Helen if the deserted husband and monarch had been able to pursue the fugitives at once in his swift steam yacht, the *Menelaus*. And had Friar Laurence been a subscriber to the Verona Telephone Association, that worthy priest would have been able to ring up Romeo and to warn him that the elixir of death which Juliet had taken was but a temporary narcotic, and then might Romeo find that

> Beauty's ensign yet
> Is crimson in thy lips and in thy cheeks,
> And death's pale flag is not advanced there.

II.

As the centuries succeed one another, society becomes more complicated and science develops in all directions; thus is an equilibrium maintained, and the modern lover is aided by the appliances of science as he is hampered by the intricacies of society. Even the charity fair, that final triumph of the amateur swindler, and the telephone, that unpoetic adjunct of the shop and the office, can be forced to do love's bidding and to serve as instruments in the cunning hands of Cupid.

When the young ladies who were spending the summer at the seaside hotel at Sandy Beach resolved to get up a fair for the benefit of the Society for the Supply of Missionaries to Cannibal Countries, they had no more hearty helper than Mr. Samuel Brassey, a young gentleman recently graduated from Columbia College. He was alert, energetic, ingenious, and untiring; and when at last the fair was opened the young ladies declared that they did not know what they would have done without him. He it was who helped to decorate the ball-room, and to arrange it as a mart for the vending of unconsidered trifles. He it was who devised the Japanese tea-stall for Mrs. Martin, and suggested that this portly and imposing dame should appear in a Japanese dressing-gown. He it was who aided the three Miss Pettitoes, then under Mrs. Martin's motherly wing, to set up their stands — the Well, where Miss Rebecca drew lemonade for every one that thirsted; the Old Curiosity Shop, where Miss Nelly displayed a helter-skelter lot of orts and ends; and the Indian Wigwam, in the dark recesses of which Miss Cassandra, in the garb of Pocahontas, told fortunes.

To Miss Cassandra, who was the eldest and most austere of the three Miss Pettitoes, he suggested certain predictions for certain young men and maidens who were sure to apply to the soothsayer,— predictions which seemed to her sufficiently vague and oracular, but which chanced to be pertinent enough to excite the liveliest emotions when they were imparted to the applicants. For Miss Nelly he wrote out many autographs of many famous persons, from Julius Cæsar and Cleopatra to Queen Elizabeth and George Washington; the signatures of Shakspere, of which there were a dozen, he declared to be eminently characteristic, as no two were spelled alike; and the sign-manual of Confucius he authorized her to proclaim absolutely unique, as he had copied it from the only tea-chest in the hotel. To him also the sirens of the bazar owed their absolute conviction of the necessity of giving no change. Furthermore, he elaborated a novel reversal of the principle of a reduction on taking a quantity: the autographs at the Old Curiosity Shop, the glasses of attenuated lemonade at the well, and the little fans at the Japanese tea-stall were all twenty-five cents each, three for a dollar. This device alone stamped him as a young man with a most promising head for business; and so Mr. Martin declared him, after asking if the autographs were genuine and being promptly offered a "written guarantee from the maker."

From these details it will be seen that Mr. Samuel Brassey was on most friendly terms, not to say familiar, with Mrs. Martin and with her charges, the three Miss Pettitoes. He was equally frank and open with all the other young ladies in the hotel, except, it may be, with Miss Bessy Martin. In his relations with Mrs. Martin's handsome niece a persistent observer might have detected a constraint, often cast aside and often recurring. The rest of the girls met him with the sincerity and the unthinking cordiality which are marked characteristics of the young women of America, especially when they chance to be at a summer hotel. So indeed did Miss Martin,— but to her his bearing was different. Towards the others he was kindly. To her he was devoted and yet reserved at times, as though under duress. The least bashful of young men ordinarily, in her presence he found himself shy and not always able to compel his tongue to do his bidding. If she looked at him — and he was a pleasant-faced young fellow — he found himself wondering whether he was blushing or not. Out of her sight he was often miserable; and under her eyes he suffered an exquisite agony. He hovered about her as though he had words of the deepest import trembling on his tongue, but when he sat by her side on the piazza, or danced a Virginia reel opposite to her of a Saturday night, or walked with her to church of a Sunday morning, he had nothing to say for himself.

Whether or not Miss Martin had noted

July 1888

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

N the day after the battle of Bull Run, General McClellan was ordered to Washington. He arrived there on the 26th of July, and the next day assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington on both banks of the river. In his report he says:

> There were about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with 9 imperfect field-batteries of 30 pieces. . . . There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization.†

This picture is naturally drawn in the darkest colors, but the outlines are substantially accurate. There was great need of everything which goes to the efficiency of an army. There was need of soldiers, of organization, of drill, of a young and vigorous commander to give impulse and direction to the course of affairs.

All these wants were speedily supplied. The energy of the Government and the patriotism of the North poured into the capital a constant stream of recruits. These were taken in hand by an energetic and intelligent staff, assigned to brigades and divisions, equipped and drilled, with the greatest order and celerity. The infantry levies, on their first arrival, were sent to the various camps in the suburbs, and being there formed into provisional brigades were thoroughly exercised and instructed before being transferred to the forces on the other side of the river. These provisional brigades were successively commanded by Generals Fitz John Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Silas Casey. The cavalry and the artillery, as they arrived, reported respectively to Generals George Stoneman and William F. Barry, chiefs of those arms. Colonel Andrew Porter was made Provost-Marshal of Washington, and soon reduced the place to perfect order, which was never again disturbed during the war. Deserters were arrested, stragglers sent back to their regiments, and the streets rendered more quiet and secure than those of most cities in profound peace.

A great army was speedily formed. The 50,000 that General McClellan found in Washington were reënforced by the stalwart men of the North as fast as steam could bring them by water or land. Nothing like it had ever before been seen on the continent. The grand total of officers and men of the regular army before the war consisted of 17,000 souls. On the 27th of October, exactly three months after General McClellan assumed command, he reported an aggregate of strength for the army under him of 168,318, of which there were, he said, present for duty 147,695;‡ and he reported several other bodies of troops *en route* to him. The Adjutant-General's report, three days later, shows present for duty with the Army of the Potomac, inclusive of troops in the Shenandoah, on the Potomac, and at Washington, 162,737, with an aggregate present and absent of 198,238. This vast army was of the best material the country could afford. The three-months' regiments—which were, as a rule, imperfectly organized and badly officered, their officers being, to a great extent, the product of politics and personal influence—had been succeeded by the volunteer army of three-years' men, which contained all the best elements of the militia, with very desirable additions. Only the most able of the militia generals, those whom the President had recognized as worthy of permanent employment, returned to the field after the expiration of their three-months' service. The militia organization of brigades and divisions had of course disappeared. The governors of the States organized the regiments, and appointed regimental and company officers only. The higher organization rested with the President, who also had the appointing of general and staff officers. A most valuable element of the new army was the old regular organization, largely increased and improved by the addition of eleven regiments, constituting two divisions of two brigades each. This

† McClellan, Report, p. 9. ‡ Ibid., p. 7.

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created a great many additional vacancies, which were filled partly from the old army and partly from civil life, giving to the service a large number of valuable officers. Two classes of cadets were that year graduated from the military academy at West Point, many of whom became useful and distinguished in the regular and the volunteer service.

In brief, for three months the Government placed at the disposal of the young general more than a regiment a day of excellent troops. The best equipments, the best arms, the best artillery, the most distinguished of the old officers, the most promising of the young, were given him. The armies in every other part of the country were stinted to supply this most important of all the departments; and at first it was with universal popular assent that this bountiful provision was made for him. He had gained for the country the only victory it had yet to its credit. He enjoyed a high character for military learning and science, founded upon the report of his friends. He was capable of great and long-continued industry in executive affairs. He was surrounded by an able and brilliant staff, all heartily devoted to him, and inclined to give him the greater share of the credit for their own work. His alert and gallant bearing, as he rode from camp to camp about Washington, surrounded by a company of aides in uniforms as yet untarnished by campaign life, impressed the imagination of tourists and newspaper correspondents, who at once gave him, on this insufficient evidence, the sobriquet of "the young Napoleon." In addition to these advantages, he was a man of extraordinary personal attractiveness; strangers instinctively liked him, and those who were thrown much in his company grew very fond of him. In every one, from the President of the United States to the humblest orderly who waited at his door, he inspired a remarkable affection and regard, a part of which sprang, it is true, from the intense desire prevalent at the time for success to our arms, which naturally included an impulse of good-will to our foremost military leaders; but this impulse, in the case of General McClellan, was given a peculiar warmth by his unusually winning personal characteristics. In consequence he was courted and caressed as few men in our history have been. His charm of manner, enhanced by his rising fame, made him the idol of the Washington drawing-rooms; and his high official position, his certainty of speedy promotion to supreme command, and the probability of great political influence to follow, made him the target of all the interests and ambitions that center in a capital in time of war.*

He can hardly be blamed if this sudden and dazzling elevation produced some effect upon his character and temper. Suddenly, as by a spell of enchantment, he had been put in command of one of the greatest armies of modern times; he had become one of the most conspicuous figures of the world; his portrait had grown as familiar as those of our great historic worthies; every word and act of his were taken up and spread broadcast by the thousand tongues of publicity. He saw himself treated with the utmost deference, his prejudices flattered, and his favor courted by statesmen and soldiers twice his age. We repeat that he can hardly be blamed if his temper and character suffered in the ordeal.

He has left in his memoirs and letters unquestionable evidence of a sudden and fatal degeneration of mind during the months he passed in Washington in the latter half of 1861.† At first everything was novel and delightful. On the 27th of July he wrote: "I find myself in a new and strange position here; President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land." Three days later he wrote: "They give me my way in everything, full swing and unbounded confidence. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?" A few days afterward: "I shall carry this thing on *en grand* and crush the rebels in one campaign." By the 9th of August his estimate of his own importance had taken such a morbid development that he was able to say: "I would cheerfully take

* General W. T. Sherman writes in his "Memoirs": "General McClellan arrived. . . . Instead of coming over the river, as we expected, he took a house in Washington, and only came over from time to time to have a review or inspection. . . . August was passing and troops were pouring in from all quarters; General McClellan told me he intended to organize an army of 100,000 men, with 100 field batteries, and I still hoped he would come on our side of the Potomac, pitch his tent, and prepare for real hard work, but his headquarters still remained in a house in Washington City." Vol. I., pp. 191, 192.

To show how differently another sort of general comprehended the duties before him at this time, we give another sentence from Sherman's "Memoirs": "I organized a system of drills, embracing the evolutions of the line, all of which was new to me, and I had to learn the tactics from books; but I was convinced that we had a long, hard war before us, and made up my mind to begin at the very beginning to prepare for it."

† "McClellan's Own Story," p. 82. We should hesitate to print these pathetic evidences of McClellan's weakness of character, contained as they are in private letters to his family, if they had not been published by Mr. W. C. Prime, with a singular misconception of their true bearing, as a basis for attacking the administration of Mr. Lincoln.

the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved"; yet he added in the same letter,* "I am not spoiled by my unexpected new position." This pleasing delirium lasted only a few weeks, and was succeeded by a strange and permanent hallucination upon two points: one was that the enemy, whose numbers were about one-third his own, vastly exceeded his army in strength; and the other, that the Government — which was doing everything in its power to support him — was hostile to him and desired his destruction. On the 16th of August he wrote: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force; the President, the old general, can not or will not see the true state of affairs." He was in terror for fear he should be attacked, in doubt whether his army would stand. "If my men will only fight I think I can thrash him, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. . . . I am weary of all this." Later on the same day he wrote with exultation that "a heavy rain is swelling the Potomac; if it can be made impassable for a week, we are saved." All through the month he expected battle "in a week." By the end of August his panic passed away; he said he was "ready for Beauregard," and a week later began to talk of attacking him.

By this time he had become, to use his own language, "disgusted with the Administration — perfectly sick of it." † His intimate friends and associates were among the political opponents of the men at the head of affairs, and their daily flatteries had easily convinced him that in him was the only hope of saving the country, in spite of its incapable rulers. He says in one place, with singular *naiveté*, that Mr. Stanton gained his confidence by professing friendship for himself while loading the President with abuse and ridicule. ‡ He professed especial contempt for the President; partly because Mr. Lincoln showed him "too much deference." § In October he wrote: "There are some of the greatest geese in the Cabinet I have ever seen — enough to tax the patience of Job." In November his disgust at the Government had become almost intolerable: "It is sickening in the extreme, and makes me feel heavy at heart, when I see the weakness and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this great country." The affair of Mason and Slidell, with which he had no concern, and upon which his advice was not asked, agitated him at this time. He feels that his wisdom alone must save the country in this crisis; he writes that he must spend the day in trying to get the Government to do its duty. He does not quite know what its duty is — but must first "go to Stanton's to ascertain what the law of nations" has to say on the matter, Stanton being at this time his friend, and, as he thinks, Lincoln's opponent. He had begun already to rank the President as among his enemies. He was in the habit of hiding at Stanton's when he had serious work to do, "to dodge," as he said, "all enemies in the shape of 'browsing' Presidents," etc. "I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn." ‖

He soon began to call and to consider the Army of the Potomac as his own. He assumed the habit, which he never relinquished, of asking that all desirable troops and stores be sent to him. Indeed, it may be observed that even before he came to Washington this tendency was discernible. While he remained in the West he was continually asking for men and money. But when he came to the Potomac he recognized no such need on the part of his successor, and telegraphed to Governor Dennison to "pay no attention to Rosecrans's demand" for reënforcements. ¶ In the plan of campaign which he laid before the President on the 4th of August, 1861, which was, in general objects and intentions, very much the same plan already adopted by General Scott and the Government, he assigned the scantiest detachments to the great work of conquering the Mississippi Valley; 20,000, he thought, would be enough, with what could be raised in Kentucky and Tennessee, "to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville" — while he demanded for himself the enormous aggregate of 273,000 men.** He wanted especially all the regular troops; the success of operations elsewhere, he said, was relatively unimportant compared with those in Virginia. These views of his were naturally adopted by his immediate associates, who carried them to an extent probably not contemplated by the general. They seemed to regard him as a kind of tribune, armed by the people with powers independent of and superior to the civil authorities. On the 20th of August his father-in-law, Colonel R. B. Marcy, being in New York, and not satisfied with what he saw in the way of recruitment, sent General McClellan a telegram urging him "to make a positive and unconditional demand for an immediate draft of the additional troops you require." "The people," he says, "will applaud such a course, rely upon it." The general, seeing

* "McClellan's Own Story," p. 85.
† Ibid., p. 168.
‡ Ibid., p. 152.
§ Ibid., p. 91.
‖ Ibid., p. 177.
¶ McClellan to Dennison, Aug. 12, 1861. War Records.
** McClellan to Lincoln. War Records.

nothing out of the way in this explosive communication of his staff-officer, sent it to the Secretary of War with this indorsement: "Colonel Marcy knows what he says, and is of the coolest judgment"; and recommended that his suggestion be carried into effect. All this time every avenue of transportation was filled with soldiers on their way to Washington.

In connection with his delusion as to the number of the enemy in front of him, it grew a fixed idea in his mind that all the best troops and all the officers of ability in the army should be placed under his orders. On the 8th of September he wrote a remarkable letter to the Secretary of War embodying these demands. He begins, in the manner which at an early day became habitual with him and continued to the end of his military career, by enormously exaggerating the strength of the enemy opposed to him. He reports his own force, in the immediate vicinity of Washington, at 85,000, and that of the enemy at 130,000, which he says is a low estimate, and draws the inevitable conclusion that "this army should be reënforced at once by all the disposable troops that the East and West and North can furnish. . . . I urgently recommend," he says, "that the whole of the regular army, old and new, be at once ordered to report here," with some trifling exceptions. He also demands that the choicest officers be assigned to him, especially that none of those recommended by him be sent anywhere else.* Most of these requests were granted, and General McClellan seems to have assumed a sort of proprietary right over every regiment that had once come under his command. When General T. W. Sherman's expedition was about sailing for the South, he made an earnest request to the Government for the 79th New York Highlanders. The matter being referred to General McClellan, he wrote in the most peremptory tone to the War Department, forbidding the detachment of those troops. "I will not consent," he says roundly, "to one other man being detached from this army for that expedition. I need far more than I now have, to save this country. . . . It is the task of the Army of the Potomac to decide the question at issue."† The President accepted this rebuke, and telegraphed to General Sherman that he had promised General McClellan "not to break his army here without his consent."‡

Such an attitude towards the military and civil authorities is rarely assumed by a general so young and so inexperienced, and to sustain it requires a degree of popular strength and confidence which is only gained by rapid and brilliant successes. In the case of General McClellan the faith of his friends and of the Government had no nourishment for a long time except his own promises, and several incidents during the late summer and autumn made heavy drafts upon the general confidence which was accorded him.

From the beginning of hostilities the blockade of the Potomac River below Washington was recognized on both sides as a great advantage to be gained by the Confederates, and a great danger to be guarded against by the national Government. For a while the navy had been able to keep the waters of the river clear by the employment of a few powerful light-draft steamers; but it soon became evident that this would not permanently be a sufficient protection, and even before the battle of Bull Run the Navy Department suggested a combined occupation, by the army and the navy, of Mathias Point, a bold and commanding promontory on the Virginia side, where the Potomac, after a horse-shoe bend to the east, flows southward again with its width greatly increased. On the 20th of August the Navy Department renewed its importunities to the War Department to coöperate in the seizure of this most important point, which was "absolutely essential to the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac."§ Eleven days later these suggestions were still more pressingly presented, without effect. In October, however, when rebel batteries were already appearing at different points on the river, and when it was in contemplation to send to Port Royal the steamers which had been policing the Potomac, an arrangement was entered into between the army and the navy to occupy Mathias Point. Orders were sent to Captain Craven to collect at that place the necessary boats for landing a force of 4000 men. He waited all night and no troops appeared. Captain Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had taken a great deal of interest in the expedition, went in deep chagrin to the President, who at once accompanied him to General McClellan's quarters to ask some explanation of this failure. The general informed him that he had become convinced it would not be practicable to land the troops, and that he had therefore not sent them. Captain Fox assured him that the navy would be responsible for that; and, after some discussion, it was concluded that the troops should go the next

* McClellan to Cameron. War Records.

† McClellan to Thomas A. Scott, Oct. 17, 1861. War Records.

‡ Lincoln to Sherman, October 18, 1861. War Records.

§ Welles to Cameron. War Records.

night. Captain Craven was again ordered to be in readiness; the troops did not go. Craven came to Washington in great agitation, threw up his command, and applied for sea-service, on the ground that his reputation as an officer would be ruined by the closing of the river while he was in command of the flotilla.* The vessels went out one by one; the rebels put up their batteries at their leisure, and the blockade of the river was complete. When General McClellan was examined as to this occurrence by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he did not remember the specific incidents as recited by Captain Fox, and as reported above, but said he never regarded the obstruction of the Potomac as of vital importance; its importance was more moral than physical.†

General McClellan was perhaps inclined to underrate moral effects. The affair at Ball's Bluff, which occurred on the 21st of October, produced an impression on the public mind and affected his relations with the leading spirits in Congress to an extent entirely out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. He had hitherto enjoyed unbounded popularity. The country saw the army rapidly growing in numbers and improving in equipment and discipline, and was content to allow the authorities their own time for accomplishing their purposes. The general looked forward to no such delays as afterward seemed to him necessary. He even assumed that the differences between himself and Scott arose from Scott's preference "for inaction and the defensive." ‡ On the 10th of October he said to the President: "I think we shall have our arrangements made for a strong reconnaissance about Monday to feel the strength of the enemy. I intend to be careful and do as well as possible. Don't let them hurry me, is all I ask." The President, pleased with the prospect of action, replied: "You shall have your own way in the matter, I assure you." § On the 12th he sent a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln from the front, saying that the enemy was before him in force, and would probably attack in the morning. "If they attack," he added, "I shall beat them." ‖ Nothing came of this. On the 16th the President was, as usual, at headquarters for a moment's conversation with General McClellan, who informed him that the enemy was massing at Manassas, and said that he was "not such a fool as to buck against that place in the spot designated by the rebels." But he seemed continually to be waiting merely for some slight additional increment of his force, and never intending any long postponement of the offensive; while he was apparently always ready, and even desirous, for the enemy to leave their works and attack him, being confident of defeating them.

In this condition of affairs, with all his force well in hand, he ordered, on the 19th of October, that General McCall should march from his camp at Langley to Dranesville, to cover a somewhat extensive series of reconnaissances for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of protecting the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of that region. The next day he received a dispatch from General Banks's adjutant-general, indicating that the enemy had moved away from Leesburg. This information turned out to be erroneous; but upon receiving it General McClellan sent a telegram to General Stone at Poolesville informing him that General McCall had occupied Dranesville the day before and was still there, that heavy reconnaissances would be sent out the same day in all directions from that point, and directing General Stone to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if that movement had the effect to drive them away. "Perhaps," he adds, "a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." ¶ General McClellan insists that this order contemplated nothing more than that General Stone should make some display of an intention to cross, and should watch the enemy more closely than usual. But General Stone gave it a much wider range, and at once reported to General McClellan that he had made a feint of crossing at Poolesville, and at the same time started a reconnoitering party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island, and that the enemy's pickets had retired to their intrenchments. Although General McClellan virtually holds that this was in effect a disobedience of his orders, he did not direct General Stone to retire his troops — on the contrary, he congratulated him upon the movement; but thinking that McCall would not be needed to coöperate with him, he ordered the former to fall back from Dranesville to his camp near Prospect Hill, which order, though contradicted by later instructions which did not reach him until his return to Langley, was executed during the morning of the 21st. But while McCall, having completed his reconnaissance, was marching at his leisure back to his camp, the little detachment which General Stone had sent across the river had blundered into battle.

A careful reading of all the accounts in the

* Report Committee on Conduct of the War. G. V. Fox, Testimony.

† Report Committee on Conduct of the War. McClellan, Testimony.

‡ "McClellan's Own Story," p. 170.

§ J. H., Diary.

‖ Ibid.

¶ McClellan, Report, p. 32.

archives of the War Department relating to this affair affords the best possible illustration of the lack of discipline and intelligent organization prevailing at that time in both armies. The reports of the different commanders seem hardly to refer to the same engagement; each side enormously exaggerates the strength of the enemy, and the descriptions of the carnage at critical moments of the fight read absurdly enough when compared with the meager official lists of killed and wounded. We will briefly state what really took place.

On the evening of the 20th General Gorman made a demonstration of crossing at Edwards Ferry, and a scouting party of the 20th Massachusetts crossed from Harrison's Island and went to within about a mile of Leesburg, returning with the report that they had found a small camp of the enemy in the woods. General Stone then ordered Colonel Charles Devens, commanding the 20th Massachusetts, to take four companies of his regiment over in the night to destroy this camp at daybreak. Colonel Devens proceeding to execute this order found that the report of the scouting party was erroneous, and reporting this fact waited in the woods for further orders. General Stone sent over a small additional detachment which he afterward reënforced by a larger body, the whole being in command of Colonel E. D. Baker of the California regiment—a Senator from Oregon, an officer of the highest personal and political distinction, and, as we have already related, not without experience in the Mexican war. General Stone had now evidently resolved upon a reconnaissance in force, and in case an engagement should result he confidently expected Colonel Baker to drive the enemy from his front, at which juncture General Stone expected to come in upon their right with Gorman's troops, which he was pushing over at Edwards Ferry, and capture or rout the entire command. He gave Colonel Baker discretionary authority to advance or to retire after crossing the river, as circumstances might seem to dictate.

Colonel Baker entered upon the work assigned to him with the greatest enthusiasm and intrepidity. The means of transportation were lamentably inadequate; but working energetically, though without system, the greater part of the troops assigned for the service were at last got over, and Baker took command on the field a little after 2 o'clock. The battle was already lost, though the brave and high-spirited orator did not suspect it, any more than did General Stone, who, at Edwards Ferry, was waiting for the moment to arrive when he should attack the enemy's right and convert his defeat into rout. Colonel Devens, who had been skirmishing briskly with continually increasing numbers of the Confederates all the morning, had by this time fallen back in line with Baker's, Lee's, and Cogswell's regiments, and a new disposition was made of all the troops on the ground to resist the advancing enemy. The disposition was as bad as it could well be made; both flanks were exposed, and the reserves were placed in an unprotected position immediately in rear of the center, where they were shot down without resistance, and were only dangerous to their comrades in front of them. Colonel Baker, whose bravery marked him for destruction, was killed about 4 o'clock, being struck at the same moment by several bullets while striving to encourage his men, and after a brief and ineffectual effort by Colonel Cogswell to move to the left, the National troops retreated to the river bank. They were closely followed by the Confederates; the wretched boats into which many of them rushed were swamped; some strong swimmers reached the Maryland shore, some were shot in the water, a large number threw their arms into the stream and, dispersing in the bushes, escaped in the twilight; but a great proportion of the entire command was captured. The losses on the Union side were 10 officers and 39 enlisted men killed, 15 officers and 143 enlisted men wounded, 26 officers and 688 enlisted men missing.* The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was almost as great—36 killed and 117 wounded.*

As soon as the news of the disaster began to reach General Stone, he hurried to the right, where the fugitives from the fight were arriving, did what he could to reëstablish order there, and sent instructions to Gorman to intrench himself at Edwards Ferry and act on the defensive. General Banks arrived with reënforcements at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 22d and assumed command. The Confederates made an attack upon Gorman the same day and were easily repulsed; but General McClellan, thinking "that the enemy were strengthening themselves at Leesburg, and that our means of crossing and recrossing were very insufficient," withdrew all the troops to the Maryland side.† It seems from the Confederate reports that he was mistaken in concluding that the enemy were strengthening themselves; they were also getting out of harm's way as rapidly as possible. General Evans, their commander, says:

> Finding my brigade very much exhausted, I left Colonel Barksdale with his regiment, with 2 pieces

* War Records.

† McClellan to Secretary of War. War Records.

of artillery and a cavalry force, as a grand guard, and I ordered the other 3 regiments to fall back towards Carter's Mills to rest and to be collected in order.*

The utter inadequacy of means for crossing was of course a sufficient reason to justify the cessation of active operations at that time and place.

Insignificant as was this engagement in itself, it was of very considerable importance in immediate effect and ultimate results. It was the occasion of enormous encouragement to the South. The reports of the Confederate officers engaged exaggerated their own prowess, and the numbers and losses of the National troops tenfold. General Beauregard, in his congratulatory order of the day, claimed that the result of this action proved that no disparity of numbers could avail anything as against Southern valor assisted by the "manifest aid of the God of battles."† It will probably never be possible to convince Confederate soldiers that here, as at Bull Run, the numbers engaged and the aggregate killed and wounded were about equal on both sides — a fact clearly shown by the respective official records. At the North the gloom and affliction occasioned by the defeat were equally out of proportion to the event. Among the killed and wounded were several young men of brilliant promise and distinguished social connections in New England, and the useless sacrifice of their lives made a deep impression upon wide circles of friends and kindred. The death of Colonel Baker greatly affected the public mind. He had been little known in the East when he came as Senator from Oregon, but from the moment that he began to appear in public his fluent and impassioned oratory, his graceful and dignified bearing, a certain youthful energy and fire which contrasted pleasantly with his silver hair, had made him extremely popular with all classes. He was one of Mr. Lincoln's dearest friends; he was especially liked in the Senate; he was one of the most desirable and effective speakers at all great mass-meetings. A cry of passionate anger went up from every part of the country over this precious blood wasted, this dishonor inflicted upon the National flag.

The first and most evident scape-goat was, naturally enough, General Stone. He cannot be acquitted of all blame, even in the calmest review of the facts; there was a lack of preparation for the fight, a lack of thorough supervision after it had begun. But these were the least of the charges made against him. The suspicions which civil war always breeds, and the calumnies resulting from them, were let loose upon him. They grew to such proportions by constant repetition, during the autumn and winter following, that many people actually thought he was one of a band of conspirators in the Union army working in the interest of rebellion. This impression seized upon the minds of some of the most active and energetic men in Congress, friends and associates of Colonel Baker. They succeeded in convincing the Secretary of War that General Stone was dangerous to the public welfare, and on the 28th of January an order was issued from the War Department to General McClellan directing him to arrest General Stone. He kept it for several days without executing it; but at last, being apparently impressed by the evidence of a refugee from Leesburg that there was some foundation for the charges made by the committee of Congress, he ordered the arrest of General Stone, saying at the same time to the Secretary of War that the case was too indefinite to warrant the framing of charges.‡ The arrest was made without consulting the President. When Mr. Stanton announced it to him the President said: "I suppose you have good reasons for it; and having good reasons, I am glad I knew nothing of it until it was done." General Stone was taken to Fort Lafayette, where he remained in confinement six months; he was then released and afterward restored to duty, but never received any satisfaction to his repeated demands for reparation or trial.

For the moment, at least, there seemed no disposition to censure General McClellan for this misfortune. Indeed, it was only a few days after the battle of Ball's Bluff that he gained his final promotion to the chief command of the armies of the United States. A brief review of his relations to his predecessor may be necessary to a proper understanding of the circumstances under which he succeeded to the supreme command.

Their intercourse, at first marked by great friendship, had soon become clouded by misunderstandings. The veteran had always had a high regard for his junior, had sent him his hearty congratulations upon his appointment to command the Ohio volunteers, and although he had felt compelled on one occasion to rebuke him for interference with matters beyond his jurisdiction,§ their relations remained perfectly friendly, and the old general warmly welcomed the young one to Washington. But once there, General McClellan began to treat the General-in-Chief with a neglect which, though probably unintentional, was none the less galling. On the 8th of August, General McClellan sent to

* Evans to Jordan, Oct. 3, 1861. War Records.
† Beauregard, Orders, Oct. 23, 1861. War Records.
‡ McClellan to Stone, Dec. 5, 1862. War Records.
§ War Records.

General Scott a letter* to the effect that he believed the capital "not only insecure," but "in imminent danger." As General McClellan had never personally communicated these views to his chief, but had, as Scott says, "propagated them in high quarters," so that they had come indirectly to the old general's ears, his temper, which was never one of the meekest, quite gave way, and declining to answer General McClellan's letter, he addressed an angry note to the Secretary of War, scouting the idea of Washington being in danger, calling attention to "the stream of new regiments pouring in upon us," complaining bitterly of the reticence and neglect with which his junior treated him, and begging the President, as soon as possible, to retire him from the active command of the army, for which his age, his wounds, and his infirmities had unfitted him.

Mr. Lincoln was greatly distressed by this altercation between the two officers. He prevailed upon General McClellan to write him a conciliatory note, withdrawing the letter of the 8th; and armed with this, he endeavored to soothe the irritation of Scott, and to induce him to withdraw his angry rejoinder of the 9th. But youth, sure of itself and the future, forgives more easily than age; and Scott refused, respectfully but firmly, to comply with the President's request. He waited two days and wrote again to the Secretary of War, giving his reasons for this refusal. He believed General McClellan had deliberately, and with the advice of certain members of the Cabinet, offended him by the letter in question, and that for the last week, though many regiments had arrived and several more or less important movements of troops had taken place, General McClellan had reported nothing to him, but had been frequently in conversation with various high officers of the Government. "That freedom of access and consultation," he continued, "has, very naturally, deluded the junior general into a feeling of indifference towards his senior." He argues that it would be "against the dignity of his years to be filing daily complaints against an ambitious junior," and closes by reiterating his unfitness for command.†

The two generals never became reconciled. The bickerings between them continued for two months, marked with a painful and growing bitterness on the part of Scott, and on the part of McClellan by a neglect akin to contempt. The elder officer, galled by his subordinate's persistent disrespect, published a general order on the 16th of September, which he says was intended "to suppress an irregularity more conspicuous in Major-General McClellan than in any other officer," forbidding junior officers on duty from corresponding with their superiors except through intermediate commanders; the same rule applying to correspondence with the President and the Secretary of War, unless by the President's request. General McClellan showed how little he cared for such an order by writing two important letters to the Secretary of War within three days after it was issued. On the same day a special order was given General

* This letter deserves a careful reading. It is extremely characteristic, as showing, in the first place, how early McClellan began to exaggerate the number of the enemy in front of him, and how large were his ideas as to the force necessary for the protection of Washington so long as the duty of protecting the capital devolved upon him.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE POTOMAC,
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8, 1861.

LIEUT.-GEN. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army.

GENERAL: Information from various sources reaching me to-day, through spies, letters, and telegrams, confirms my impressions, derived from previous advices, that the enemy intend attacking our positions on the other side of the river, as well as to cross the Potomac north of us. I have also received a telegram from a reliable agent just from Knoxville, Tenn., that large reënforcements are still passing through there to Richmond. I am induced to believe that the enemy has at least 100,000 men in front of us. Were I in Beauregard's place with that force at my disposal, I would attack the positions on the other side of the Potomac, and at the same time cross the river above this city in force. I feel confident that our present army in this vicinity is entirely insufficient for the emergency, and it is deficient in all the arms of the service — infantry, artillery, and cavalry. I therefore respectfully and most earnestly urge that the garrisons of all places in our rear be reduced at once to the minimum absolutely necessary to hold them, and that all the troops thus made available be forthwith forwarded to this city; that every company of regular artillery within reach be immediately ordered here to be mounted; that every possible means be used to expedite the forwarding of new regiments of volunteers to this capital without one hour's delay. I urge that nothing be left undone to bring up our force for the defense of this city to 100,000 men, before attending to any other point. I advise that at least eight or ten good Ohio and Indiana regiments may be telegraphed for from western Virginia, their places to be filled at once by the new troops from the same States, who will be at least reliable to fight behind the intrenchments which have been constructed there. The vital importance of rendering Washington at once perfectly secure, and its imminent danger, impel me to urge these requests with the utmost earnestness, and that not an hour be lost in carrying them into execution. A sense of duty which I cannot resist compels me to state that in my opinion military necessity demands that the departments of North-eastern Virginia, Washington, the Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, including Baltimore, and the one including Fort Monroe, should be merged into one department, under the immediate control of the commander of the main army of operations, and which should be known and designated as such.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[War Records.]

† Scott to the President, Aug. 12, 1861.

McClellan to report to army headquarters the number and position of troops under his command, to which order he paid no attention whatever. General Scott felt himself helpless in the face of this mute and persistent disobedience, but he was not able to bear it in silence. On the 4th of October he addressed another passionate remonstrance to the Secretary of War, setting forth these facts, asking whether there were no remedy for such offenses, adverting once more to his physical infirmities, and at last divulging the true reason why he had borne so long the contumely of his junior — that he was only awaiting the arrival of General Halleck, whose presence would give him increased confidence in the preservation of the Union, and thus permit him to retire.* On the 31st of October he took his final resolution, and addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

> For more than three years I have been unable, from a hurt, to mount a horse or to walk more than a few paces at a time, and that with much pain. Other and new infirmities — dropsy and vertigo — admonish me that repose of mind and body, with the appliances of surgery and medicine, are necessary to add a little more to a life already protracted much beyond the usual span of man. It is under such circumstances, made doubly painful by the unnatural and unjust rebellion now raging in the Southern States of our so late prosperous and happy Union, that I am compelled to request that my name be placed on the list of army officers retired from active service. As this request is founded on an absolute right granted by a recent act of Congress, I am entirely at liberty to say it is with deep regret that I withdraw myself, in these momentous times, from the orders of a President who has treated me with distinguished kindness and courtesy, whom I know among much personal intercourse to be patriotic, without sectional partialities or prejudices, to be highly conscientious in the performance of every duty, and of unrivaled activity and perseverance. And to you, Mr. Secretary, whom I now officially address for the last time, I beg to acknowledge my many obligations for the uniform high consideration I have received at your hands.*

His request was granted, with the usual compliments and ceremonies, the President and Cabinet waiting upon him in person at his residence. General McClellan succeeded him in command of the armies of the United States, and in his order of the 1st of November he praised in swelling periods the war-worn veteran† whose latest days of service he had so annoyed and embittered. When we consider the relative positions of the two officers — the years, the infirmities, the well-earned glory of Scott, his former friendship and kindness towards his junior; and, on the other hand, the youth, the strength, the marvelous good fortune of McClellan, his great promotion, his certainty of almost immediate succession to supreme command — it cannot be said that his demeanor towards his chief was magnanimous. Although General Scott's unfitness for command had become obvious, although his disposition, which in his youth had been arrogant and haughty, had been modified but not improved by age into irascibility, it would certainly not have been out of place for his heir presumptive to dissemble an impatience which was not unnatural, and preserve some appearance at least of a respect he did not feel. Standing in the full sunshine, there was something due from him to an old and illustrious soldier stepping reluctant into hopeless shadow.

The change was well received in all parts of the country. At Washington there was an immediate feeling of relief. The President called at General McClellan's headquarters on the night of the 1st of November and gave him warm congratulations. "I should feel perfectly satisfied," he said, "if I thought that this vast increase of responsibility would not embarrass you." "It is a great relief, sir," McClellan answered. "I feel as if several tons were taken from my shoulders to-day. I am now in contact with you and the Secretary. I am not embarrassed by intervention." "Very well," said the President; "draw on me for all the sense and information I have. In addition to your present command the supreme command of the army will entail an enormous labor upon you." "I can do it all," McClellan quickly answered.‡ Ten days later Blenker's brigade organized a torchlight procession, a sort of Fackel-tanz, in honor of the event. The President, after the show was over, went as usual to General McClellan's, and referring to the Port Royal expedition thought this "a good time to feel the enemy." "I have not been unmindful of that," McClellan answered; "we shall feel them to-morrow."§ Up to this time there was no importunity on the part of the President for an advance of the army, although for several weeks some of the leading men in Congress had been urging it. As early as the 26th of October, Senators Trumbull, Chandler, and Wade called upon the President and earnestly represented to him the importance of immediate action. Two days later they had another conference with the President and Mr. Seward, at the house of the latter. They spoke with some vehemence of the absolute necessity for energetic measures to drive the enemy from in front of Washington. The President and the Secretary of State both defended the general in his deliberate purpose not to move until he was ready. The zealous senators did not confine their visits to the civil authorities. They called upon General McClellan also,

* Scott to Cameron. War Records.
† McClellan, Order, Nov. 1, 1861. War Records.
‡ J. H., Diary, Nov. 1, 1861.
§ Ibid., Nov. 11, 1861.

and in the course of an animated conversation Mr. Wade said an unsuccessful battle was preferable to delay; a defeat would be easily repaired by the swarming recruits — a thrust which McClellan neatly parried by saying he would rather have a few recruits before a victory than a good many after a defeat.* There was as yet no apparent hostility to McClellan, even among "these wretched politicians," as he calls them. On the contrary, this conference of the 26th was not inharmonious; McClellan represented General Scott as the obstacle to immediate action, and skillfully diverted the zeal of the senators against the General-in-Chief. He wrote that night:

> For the last three hours I have been at Montgomery Blair's, talking with Senators Wade, Trumbull, and Chandler about war matters. They will make a desperate effort to-morrow to have General Scott retired at once; until this is accomplished, I can effect but little good. He is ever in my way, and I am sure does not desire effective action.†

The President, while defending the generals from the strictures of the senators, did not conceal from McClellan the fact of their urgency. He told him it was a reality not to be left out of the account; at the same time he was not to fight till he was ready. "I have everything at stake," the general replied. "If I fail, I will never see you again." At this period there was no question of more than a few days' delay.

The friendly visits of the President to army headquarters were continued almost every night until the 13th of November, when an incident occurred which virtually put an end to them.‡ On that evening Mr. Lincoln walked across the street as usual, accompanied by one of his household, to the residence of the Secretary of State, and after a short visit there both of them went to General McClellan's house, in H street. They were there told that the general had gone to the wedding of an officer and would soon return. They waited nearly an hour in the drawing-room, when the general returned, and, without paying any special attention to the orderly who told him the President was waiting to see him, went upstairs. The President, thinking his name had not been announced to the general, again sent a servant to his room and received the answer that he had gone to bed. Mr. Lincoln attached no special importance to this incident, and, so far as we know, never asked nor received any explanation of it. But it was not unnatural that he should conclude his frequent visits had become irksome to the general, and that he should discontinue them. There was no cessation of their friendly relations, though after this most of their conferences were held at the Executive Mansion.

On the 20th of November a grand review of the Army of the Potomac took place at Upton's Hill. There were about 50,000 men in line, drawn up on a wide, undulating plain, which displayed them to the best advantage, and a finer army has rarely been seen. The President, accompanied by Generals McClellan and McDowell, and followed by a brilliant cavalcade of a hundred general and staff officers, rode up and down the entire extent of the embattled host. Mr. Lincoln was a good horseman, and was received with hearty cheers by the troops, thousands of whom saw him that day for the first and last time. The reviewing officers then took their stand upon a gentle acclivity in the center of the plain, and the troops filed past in review through the autumnal afternoon until twilight. It had certainly all the appearance of a great army ready for battle, and there was little doubt that they would speedily be led into action. But after the review drilling was resumed; recruits continued to pour in, to be assigned and equipped and instructed. The general continued his organizing work; many hours of every day he passed in the saddle, riding from camp to camp with tireless industry, until at last he fell seriously ill, and for several weeks the army rested almost with folded hands awaiting his recovery.

EUROPEAN NEUTRALITY.

One of the gravest problems which beset the Lincoln administration on its advent to power was how foreign nations would deal with the fact of secession and rebellion in the United States; and the people of the North endured a grievous disappointment when they found that England and France were by active sympathy favorable to the South. This result does not seem strange when we consider by what insensible steps the news from America had shaped their opinion.

Europeans were at first prepared to accept the disunion threats of Southern leaders as mere transient party bravado. The non-coercion message of President Buchanan, however, was in their eyes an indication of serious import. Old World statesmanship had no faith in unsupported public sentiment as a lasting bond of nationality. The experience of a thousand years teaches them that, under their monarchical system, governments and laws by "divine right" are of accepted and permanent force only when competent physical power stands behind them to compel obedience. Mr. Buchanan's dogma that the Federal Government had no authority to keep a State in the Union was to them, in

* J. H., Diary, Oct. 26, 27, 1861. ‡ J. H., Diary.
† "McClellan's Own Story," p. 171.

theory at least, the end of the Government of the United States. When, further, they saw that this theory was being translated into practice by acquiescence in South Carolina's revolt; by the failure to reënforce Sumter; by the President's quasi-diplomacy with the South Carolina commissioners as foreign agents; and finally by his practical abdication of executive functions, in the message of January 8,* "referring the whole subject to Congress," and throwing upon it all "the responsibility,"— they naturally concluded that the only remaining question for them was one of new relations with the divided States. From the election of Lincoln until three days preceding his inauguration, a period of nearly four months, embracing the whole drama of public secession and the organization of the Montgomery confederacy, not a word of information, explanation, or protest on these momentous proceedings was sent by the Buchanan cabinet to foreign powers. They were left to draw their inferences exclusively from newspapers, the debates of Congress, and the President's messages till the last day of February, 1861, when Secretary Black, in a diplomatic circular, instructed our ministers at foreign courts "that this Government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those seceded States and does not desire to do so," and that a recognition of their independence must be opposed. France and England replied courteously that they would not act in haste, but quite emphatically that they could give no further binding promise.

Mr. Seward, on assuming the duties of Secretary of State, immediately transmitted a circular, repeating the injunction of his predecessor and stating the confidence of the President in the speedy restoration of the harmony and unity of the Government. Considerable delay occurred in settling upon the various foreign appointments. The new minister to France, Mr. Dayton, and the new minister to Great Britain, Mr. Adams, did not sail for Europe till about the 1st of May. Before either of them arrived at his post, both governments had violated in spirit their promise to act in no haste. On the day Mr. Adams sailed from Boston, his predecessor, Mr. Dallas, yet in London, was sent for by Lord John Russell, her Britannic Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs. "He told me," wrote Mr. Dallas, "that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, *unofficially*; that there existed an understanding between this Government and that of France which would lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be." The step here foreshadowed was soon taken. Three days later Lord Russell did receive the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy; and while he told them he could not communicate with them "officially," his language indicated that when the South could maintain its position England would not be unwilling to hear what terms they had to propose. When Mr. Adams landed in England he found, evidently to forestall his arrival, that the Ministry had published the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, raising the Confederate States at once to the position and privilege of a belligerent power; and France soon followed the example.

In taking this precipitate action, both powers probably thought it merely a preliminary step: the British ministers believed disunion to be complete and irrevocable, and were eager to take advantage of it to secure free trade and cheap cotton; while Napoleon III., Emperor of the French, already harboring far-reaching colonial designs, expected not only to recognize the South, but to assist her at no distant day by an armed intervention. For the present, of course, all such meditations were veiled under the bland phraseology of diplomatic regret at our misfortune. The object of these pages is, however, not so much to discuss international relations as to show what part President Lincoln personally took in framing the dispatch which announced the answering policy of the United States.

When the communication which Lord Russell made to Mr. Dallas was received at the State Department, the unfriendly act of the English Government, and more especially the half-insulting manner of its promulgation, filled Mr. Seward with indignation. In this mood he wrote a dispatch to Mr. Adams, which, if transmitted and delivered in its original form, could hardly have failed to endanger the peaceful relations of the two countries. The general tone and spirit of the paper were admirable; but portions of it were phrased with an exasperating bluntness, and certain directions were lacking in diplomatic prudence. This can be accounted for only by the irritation under which he wrote. It was Mr. Seward's ordinary habit personally to read his dispatches to the President before sending them. Mr. Lincoln, detecting the defects of the paper, retained it, and after careful scrutiny made such material corrections and alterations with his own hand as took from it all offensive crudeness without in the least lowering its tone, but, on the contrary, greatly increasing its dignity.

* "Globe," Jan. 9, 1861, p. 294.

SEWARD'S ORIGINAL DISPATCH, SHOWING MR. LINCOLN'S CORRECTIONS.

[All words by Lincoln in margin or in text are in italics. All matter between brackets was marked out.]

No. 10. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 21st, 1861.

SIR:

Mr. Dallas in a brief dispatch of May 2d (No. 333) tells us that Lord John Russell recently requested an interview with him on account of the solicitude which His Lordship felt concerning the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President. In that conversation the British Secretary told Mr. Dallas that the three Representatives of the Southern Confederacy were then in London, that Lord John Russell had not yet seen them, but that he was not unwilling to see them unofficially. He farther informed Mr. Dallas that an understanding exists between the British and French Governments which would lead both to take one and the same course as to recognition. His Lordship then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade by us of Southern ports, and a discontinuance of them as ports of entry. Mr. Dallas answered that he knew nothing on those topics and therefore could say nothing. He added that you were expected to arrive in two weeks. Upon this statement Lord John Russell acquiesced in the expediency of waiting for the full knowledge you were expected to bring.

Mr. Dallas transmitted to us some newspaper reports of Ministerial explanations made in Parliament.

You will base no proceedings on parliamentary debates farther than to seek explanations when necessary and communicate them to this Department. [We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue may arise between us and Great Britain.]

Leave out.

The President [is surprised and grieved] *regrets* that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents, [as well as against the demand for explanations made by the British Government]. It is due however to Mr. Dallas to say that our instructions had been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and fidelity, too rare in these times [among our late representatives abroad are confessed and] *are* appreciated.

Leave out, because it does not appear that such explanations were demanded.

Leave out.

Intercourse of any kind with the so-called Commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less [wrongful] *hurtful* to us, for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. Your own [present] antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official with the British Government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country, [confining yourself simply to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of State. After doing this]* you will communicate with this Department and receive farther directions.

Leave out.

Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the British and French Governments that they will act together in regard to our affairs. This communication however loses something of its value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially communicated to us, namely that other European States are apprized by France and England of their agreement and are expected to concur with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of recognition. The United States have been impartial and just in all their conduct towards the several

** When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause,*

nations of Europe. They will not complain however of the combination now announced by the two leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more independent if not a more friendly course from each of them. You will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the European governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us we shall be as heretofore frank and explicit in our reply.

As to the blockade, you will say that by [the] *our own* laws [of nature] and *the laws* of nature and the laws of nations this government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by the insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a proper means to that end. You will [admit] not insist that our blockade is [not] to be respected if it be not maintained by a competent force—but passing by that question as not now a practical or at least an urgent one you will add that [it] the blockade is now and it will continue to be so maintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked the exequatur of a Russian Consul who had enlisted in the Military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand the recall of every foreign agent, Consular or Diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is of course [*quasi*] direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is [*quasi*] direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, Ministers, agents, or commissioners officially. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will [be borne] *pass* [*unnoticed*] unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power. Now after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen to be a Power existing in pronunciamento only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended Capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention to create within our own territory a hostile state by overthrowing this Republic itself. [When this act of intervention is distinctly performed, we from that hour shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be enemies of Great Britain.] [*Leave out.*]

As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford an adequate and proper remedy, [and we shall avail ourselves of it. *And while you need not to say this in advance, be sure that you say nothing inconsistent with it.*]

Happily, however, Her Britannic Majesty's Government can avoid all these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself a member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and for ever. You *already* have our authority to propose to her our accession to that declaration. If she refuse to receive it, it can only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at our devastation.

These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.

[*Drop all from this line to the end, and in lieu of it write*

"*This paper is for your own guidance only, and not* [*sic*] *to be read or shown to any one.*]

We are not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States, and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own, that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances, and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of the British race. All who belong to that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believed that men of every race and kindred will deplore it. A war not unlike it between the same parties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat the same great error the social convulsions which will follow may not be so long but they will be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will, we think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered or its honestly obtained dominion in any degree abridged. Great Britain has but to wait a few months and all her present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course she will calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the only nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a natural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will involve the independence of nations, and the rights of human nature.

I am Sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, ESQ., etc., etc., etc. W. H. S.

[It is quite impossible to reproduce in type the exact form of the manuscript of the dispatch with all its interlineations and corrections; but the foregoing shows those made by Mr. Lincoln with sufficient accuracy. Such additional verbal alterations of Mr. Seward's as merely corrected ordinary slips of the pen or errors of the copyist are not noted. When the President returned the manuscript to his hands, Mr. Seward somewhat changed the form of the dispatch by prefixing to it two short introductory paragraphs in which he embodied, in his own phraseology, the President's direction that the paper was to be merely a confidential instruction not to be read or shown to any one, and that he should not in advance say anything inconsistent with its spirit. This also rendered unnecessary the President's direction to omit the last two paragraphs, and accordingly they remained in the dispatch as finally sent.]

THE mere perusal of this document shows how ill-advised was Mr. Seward's original direction to deliver a copy of it to the British foreign office without further explanation, or without requesting a reply in a limited time. Such a course would have left the American minister in a position of uncertainty whether he was still in diplomatic relations or not, and whether the point had been reached which would justify him in breaking off intercourse; nor would he have had any further pretext upon which to ascertain the disposition or intention of the British Government. It would have been wiser to close the legation at once and return to America. Happily, Mr. Lincoln saw the weak point of the instruction, and by his changes not only kept it within the range of personal and diplomatic courtesy, but left Mr. Adams free to choose for himself the best way of managing the delicate situation.

The main point in question, namely, that the United States would not suffer Great Britain to carry on a double diplomacy with Washington and with Montgomery at the same time — that if she became the active friend of the re-

bellion she must become the enemy of the United States, was partly disposed of before the arrival of the amended dispatch at London. Several days before it was written Mr. Adams had his first official interview (May 18) with Lord John Russell, and in the usual formal phraseology, but with emphatic distinctness, told him that if there existed on the part of Great Britain "an intention more or less marked to extend the struggle" by encouragement in any form to the rebels, "I was bound to acknowledge in all frankness that in that contingency I had nothing further left to do in Great Britain." The British minister denied any intention to aid the rebellion, and explained that the Queen's proclamation was issued merely to define their own attitude of strict neutrality, so that British naval officers and other officials might understand how to regulate their conduct.*

When the dispatch finally reached Mr. Adams, he obtained another interview with Lord John Russell, to ascertain definitely the status of the rebel commissioners in London. He told him that a continuance of their apparent relation with the British Government "could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action accordingly." Lord John Russell replied that he had only seen the rebel commissioners twice, and "had no expectation of seeing them any more."†

So early as the year 1854, when the shadow of the Crimean war was darkening over Europe, the Government of the United States submitted to the principal maritime nations the propositions, first, that free ships should make free goods, and second, that neutral property on board an enemy's vessel should not be subject to confiscation unless contraband of war. These propositions were not immediately accepted, but when the powers assembled in congress at Paris in 1856, for the purpose of making peace, Great Britain and the other nations which took part in the congress gave them their assent, adding to them, as principles of international law, the abolition of privateering and the obligation that blockades, to be respected, must be effective. The adhesion of the United States having been invited to these four propositions, the Government of that day answered that they would accede to them if the other powers would accept a fifth principle — that the goods of private persons, non-combatants, should be exempt from confiscation in maritime war. This proposition was rejected by the British Government, and the negotiations were then suspended until after Mr. Lincoln became President. A few weeks after his inauguration the suspended negotiations were taken up by Mr. Seward, who directed Mr. Adams to signify to the British Government that the United States were now ready to accept without reserve the four propositions adopted at the Congress of Paris.‡ After some delay, Lord John Russell remarked to Mr. Adams that in case of the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, the engagement on the part of Great Britain would be prospective and would not invalidate anything done. This singular reserve Mr. Adams reported to his Government, and was directed by Mr. Seward to ask some further elucidation of its meaning. But before this dispatch was received, the strange attitude of the British Government was explained by Lord Russell's§ submitting to Mr. Adams a draft of a supplementary declaration on the part of England that her Majesty did not intend, by the projected convention for the accession of the United States to the articles of the Congress of Paris, "to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States." The President, having been informed of this proposed declaration, at once instructed Mr. Adams‖ that it was inadmissible, as the Government of the United States could not accede to this great international act except upon the same equal footing upon which all the other parties stood. It afterward transpired that the British Government had, at the same time that these important negotiations were going on with the Government of the United States, approached the new Confederate Government upon the same subject, sending communications in a clandestine manner through the British Legation in Washington to Mr. Bunch, the English consul at Charleston, through whom they were in the same furtive and unofficial manner laid before the authorities at Richmond. The French Government joined in this proceeding, at the invitation of England. Mr. Davis at once recognized the great importance of such quasi-recognition of his Government, and he himself drafted resolutions declaring the purpose of the Confederates to observe the principles towards neutrals embodied in the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris — that blockades to be binding must be effectual, but

* Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.

† Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861.

‡ See Mr. Seward's dispatch to Mr. Adams, April 24, 1861; Seward to Adams, May 17, 1861; and papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 33, et seq.

§ Lord John Russell was raised to the peerage, under the title of Earl Russell, July 30, 1861.

‖ Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.

that they "maintained the right of privateering."* These resolutions were passed in the Confederate Congress, and Mr. Bunch, conveying the news of this result to Lord Lyons, said:

> The wishes of her Majesty's Government would seem to have been fully complied with, for as no proposal was made that the Confederate Government should abolish privateering, it could not be expected that they should do so of their own accord, particularly as it is the arm upon which they most rely for the injury of the extended commerce of their enemy.

The American Government held itself justly aggrieved, therefore, that its accession to the Declaration of Paris was impeded by conditions which it could not, consistently with its dignity, accept; that the British Government was secretly negotiating at the same time with the insurgents upon the same subject; that while the United States were invited to accede to all four of the articles of Paris the Confederate Government was given its choice by the British Cabinet to accept only three. The Government of the United States said afterward in its case at Geneva that

> The practical effect of this diplomacy, had it been successful, would have been the destruction of the commerce of the United States or its transfer to the British flag, and the loss of the principal resource of the United States upon the ocean should a continuation of this course of insincere neutrality unhappily force the United States into a war. Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain.

The action of Mr. Bunch in this matter was properly regarded by the President as a violation of the laws of the United States to which he was accredited, and his exequatur was revoked. A long discussion followed, in which neither side succeeded in convincing the other of its wrong; and the next year, pending an attack upon Charleston, a British man-of-war entered that port and took Mr. Bunch away.

THE "TRENT" AFFAIR.

THE public mind would probably have dwelt with more impatience and dissatisfaction upon the present and prospective inaction of the armies but for an event which turned all thoughts with deep solicitude into an entirely different channel. This was what is known as the *Trent* affair, which seriously threatened to embroil the nation in a war with Great Britain. The Confederate Government had appointed two new envoys to proceed to Europe and renew its application for recognition, which its former diplomatic agents had so far failed to obtain. For this duty ex-Senator Mason of Virginia and ex-Senator Slidell of Louisiana were selected, on account of their political prominence, as well as their recognized abilities. On the blockade runner *Theodora*, they, with their secretaries and families, succeeded in eluding the Union cruisers around Charleston, and in reaching Havana, Cuba. Deeming themselves beyond danger of capture, they made no concealment of their presence or mission, but endeavored rather to "magnify their office." The British consul showed them marked attention, and they sought to be presented officially to the Captain-General of Cuba; but that wary functionary explained that he received them only as "distinguished gentlemen." They took passage on board the British mail steamer *Trent* for St. Thomas, intending there to take the regular packet to England.

Captain Wilkes, commanding the United States war steamer *San Jacinto*, just returned from an African cruise, heard of the circumstance, and, going to Havana, fully informed himself of the details of their intended route. The *Trent*, he learned, was to leave Havana on November 7. That day found him stationed in the old Bahama channel, near the northern coast of Cuba, where he had reason to believe she would pass. At about noon of the 8th the lookout announced the approach of the *Trent*, and when she was sufficiently near, the *San Jacinto* fired a round-shot across her course, and displayed the American colors. The British steamer did not seem disposed to accept the warning and failed to slacken her speed, whereupon Captain Wilkes ordered a shell to be fired across her bows, which at once brought her to. Lieutenant Fairfax, with two officers and a guard of marines, left the *San Jacinto* and rowed to the mail steamer; the lieutenant mounted to the deck alone, leaving his officers and men in the boat. He was shown to the quarter-deck, where he met Captain Moir of the *Trent*, and, informing him who he was, asked to see his passenger-list. Captain Moir declined to show it. Lieutenant Fairfax then told him of his information that the rebel commissioners were on board and that he must satisfy himself on that point before allowing the steamer to proceed. The envoys and their secretaries came up, and, hearing their names mentioned, asked if they were wanted. Lieutenant Fairfax now made known in full the purport of his orders and the object of his visit.

The altercation and commotion called a

* Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 36.



CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY MAYALL, LENT BY THEODORE F. DWIGHT, ESQ.)

considerable number of passengers around the group. All of them manifested open secession sympathy, and some indulged in abusive language so loud and demonstrative that the lieutenant's two officers, and six or eight armed men from the boat, without being called, mounted to the lieutenant's assistance. In these unfriendly demonstrations the mail agent of the *Trent*, one Captain Williams, a retired British naval officer, made himself especially conspicuous with the declaration that he was the "Queen's representative," and with various threats of the consequences of the affair. The captain of the *Trent* firmly but quietly opposed all compliance or search, and the envoys and their secretaries protested against arrest, whereupon Lieutenant Fairfax sent one of his officers back to the *San Jacinto* for additional force. In perhaps half an hour the second boat returned from the *San Jacinto* with some twenty-four additional men. Lieutenant Fairfax now proceeded to execute his orders without actual violence, and with all the politeness possible under the circumstances. Mason and Slidell, and their secretaries, foreseeing the inevitable, had retired to their state-rooms to pack their luggage; thither it was necessary to follow them, and there the presence of the families of Slidell and Eustis created some slight confusion, and a few armed marines entered the cabin, but were sent back. The final act of capture and

removal was then carried out with formal stage solemnity.*

Captain Wilkes's first instruction to Lieutenant Fairfax was to seize the *Trent* as a prize, but, as he afterward explained:

> I forbore to seize her, however, in consequence of my being so reduced in officers and crew, and the derangement it would cause innocent persons, there being a large number of passengers, who would have been put to great loss and inconvenience as well as disappointment from the interruption it would have caused them in not being able to join the steamer from St. Thomas for Europe.†

The *Trent* was allowed to proceed on her voyage, while the *San Jacinto* steamed away for Boston, where she arrived on the 24th of

REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY ANTHONY.)

November, and transferred her prisoners to Fort Warren.

The whole country rang with exultation over the exploit. The feeling was greatly heightened by the general public indignation at the unfriendliness England had so far manifested to the Union cause; but perhaps more especially because the two persons seized had been among the most bitter and active of the secession conspirators. The public press lauded Captain Wilkes, Boston gave him a banquet, and the Secretary of the Navy wrote him a letter of emphatic approval. He congratulated him "on the great public service" he had rendered in the capture, and expressed only the reservation that his conduct in omitting to capture the vessel must not be allowed to constitute a precedent.‡ When Congress met on the 2d of December following, the House of Representatives immediately passed a resolution, without a dissenting voice, thanking Captain Wilkes for his "brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct"; while by other resolutions the President was requested to order the prisoners into close confinement, in retaliation for similar treatment by the rebels of certain prisoners of war. The whole strong current of public feeling approved the act without qualification, and manifested an instant and united readiness to defend it.

President Lincoln's usual cool judgment at once recognized the dangers and complications that might grow out of the occurrence. A well-known writer has recorded what he said in a confidential interview on the day the news was received:

> I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years.§ ‖

The Cabinet generally coincided in expressing gratification and approval. The international questions involved came upon them so suddenly that they were not ready with de-

* "When the marines and some armed men had been formed," reports Lieutenant Fairfax, "just outside of the main deck cabin, where these four gentlemen had gone to pack up their baggage, I renewed my efforts to induce them to accompany me on board, they still refusing to accompany me unless force was applied. I called in to my assistance four or five officers, and first taking hold of Mr. Mason's shoulder, with another officer on the opposite side, I went as far as the gang-way of the steamer, and delivered him over to Lieutenant Greer, to be placed in the boat. I then returned for Mr. Slidell, who insisted that I must apply considerable force to get him to go with me. Calling in at last three officers, he also was taken in charge and handed over to Mr. Greer. Mr. McFarland and Mr. Eustis, after protesting, went quietly into the boat." "There was a great deal of excitement on board at this time," says another report, "and the officers and passengers of the steamer were addressing us by numerous opprobrious epithets, such as calling us pirates, villains, traitors, etc." (Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.) The families of Slidell and Eustis had meanwhile been tendered the use of the cabin of the *San Jacinto*, if they preferred to accompany the prisoners; but they declined, and proceeded in the *Trent*.

† Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.

‡ Welles, in "The Galaxy," May, 1873, pp. 647-649.

§ Lossing, "Civil War in the United States," Vol. II., p. 156.

‖ Secretary of the Navy Welles corroborated the statement in "The Galaxy" for May, 1873, p. 647: "The President, with whom I had an interview immediately on receiving information that the emissaries were captured and on board the *San Jacinto*, before consultation with any other member of the Cabinet discussed with me some of the difficult points presented. His chief

cided opinions concerning the law and policy of the case; besides, the true course obviously was to await the action of Great Britain.

The passengers on board the *Trent*, as well as the reports of her officers, carried the news of the capture directly to England, where the incident raised a storm of public opinion even more violent than that in the United States, and very naturally on the opposite side. The Government of England relied for its information mainly upon the official report of the mail agent, Captain Williams, who had made himself so officious as the "Queen's representative," and who, true to the secession sympathies manifested by him on shipboard, gave his report a strong coloring of the same character. English public feeling, popular and official, smarted under the idea that the United States had perpetrated a gross outrage, and the clamor for instant redress left no room for any calm consideration of the far-reaching questions of international law involved. There seemed little possibility that a war could be avoided, and England began immediate preparations for such an emergency. Some eight thousand troops were dispatched to Canada, ships were ordered to join the English squadrons in American waters, and the usual proclamation issued prohibiting the export of arms and certain war supplies.



JOHN SLIDELL.

Two days after the receipt of the news Lord Palmerston, in a note to the Queen, formulated the substance of a demand to be sent to the United States. He wrote:

> The general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of the Cabinet would be, that the Washington Government should be told that what has been done is a violation of international law and of the rights of Great Britain, and that your Majesty's Government trusts that the act will be disavowed, and the prisoners set free and restored to British protection; and that Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if this demand is refused, he should retire from the United States.*

On the following day the formal draft of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was laid before the Queen, who, together with Prince Albert, examined it with unusual care. The critical character of the communication, and the imminent danger — the almost certainty — of a rupture and war with America which it revealed, made a profound impression upon both. Prince Albert was already suffering from the illness which terminated his life two weeks afterward. This new and grave political question gave him a sleepless night. "He could eat no breakfast," is the entry in her Majesty's diary, "and looked very wretched. But still he was well enough on getting up to make a draft for me to write to Lord Russell, in correction of his draft to Lord Lyons, sent me yesterday, which Albert did not approve."

> The Queen returns these important drafts, which upon the whole she approves; but she cannot help feeling that the main draft — that for communication to the American Government — is somewhat meager. She should have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that the American captain did not act under instructions, or, if he did, that he misapprehended them — that the United States Government must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow its flag to be insulted, and the security of her mail communications to be placed in jeopardy; and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that the United States Government intended wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add to their many distressing

anxiety — for his attention had never been turned to admiralty law and naval captures — was as to the disposition of the prisoners, who, to use his own expression, would be elephants on our hands, that we could not easily dispose of. Public indignation was so overwhelming against the chief conspirators that he feared it would be difficult to prevent severe and exemplary punishment, which he always deprecated."

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 420.



J. M. MASON.

complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us; and that we are therefore glad to believe that upon a full consideration of the circumstances of the undoubted breach of international law committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone could satisfy this country, viz., the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology. *

It proved to be the last political memorandum he ever wrote. The exact language of his correction, had it been sent, would not have been well calculated to soothe the irritated susceptibilities of Americans. To the charge of "violating international law," to which Palmerston's cold note confined itself, he added the accusation of "wanton insult," though disclaiming a belief that it was intended. But a kind and pacific spirit shines through his memorandum as a whole, and it is evident that both the Queen and himself, gratefully remembering the welcome America had lately accorded the Prince of Wales, shrank from the prospect of an angry war. In this the Queen unconsciously responded to the impulse of amity and goodwill which had induced the President to modify so materially his foreign secretary's dispatch of the 21st of May, the unpremeditated thought of the ruler, in each case, being at once wiser and more humane than the first intention of the diplomatists. It was from the intention rather than the words of the Prince that the Queen's ministers took their cue and modified the phraseology into more temperate shape. Earl Russell wrote:

Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States' naval officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him. †

In the private note accompanying this formal dispatch further instruction was given, that if the demand were not substantially complied with in seven days, Lord Lyons should break off diplomatic relations and return with his whole legation to London. Yet at the last moment Lord Russell himself seems to have become impressed with the brow-beating precipitancy of the whole proceeding, for he added another private note, better calculated than even the Queen's modification to soften the disagreeable announcement to the American Government. He wrote to Lord Lyons:

My wish would be, that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my dispatch with you, but should prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the President and the Cabinet what course they will propose. The next time you should bring my dispatch and read it to him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.‡

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 422.

† Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Nov. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Inclosure in No. 49. British "Blue Book."

This last diplomatic touch reveals that the Ministry, like the Queen, shrank from war, but that it desired to reap all the advantages of a public menace, even while privately disclaiming one.

The British demand reached Washington on the 19th of December. It happened, fortunately, that Lord Lyons and Mr. Seward were on excellent terms of personal friendship, and the British envoy was therefore able to present the affair with all the delicacy which had been suggested by Lord Russell. The Government at Washington had carefully abstained from any action other than that already mentioned. Lord Lyons wrote:

> Mr. Seward received my communication seriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequence of questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact character of the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to-morrow to consider the question, and to communicate with the President.*

Another dispatch from Lord Lyons shows that Mr. Seward asked a further delay, and that Lord Russell's communication was not formally read to him till Monday, the 23d of December.†

If we may credit the statement of Secretary Welles, Mr. Seward had not expected so serious a view of the affair by the British Government; and his own language implies as much when, in a private letter some months afterward, he mentions Lord Lyons's communication as "our first knowledge that the British Government proposed to make it a question of offense or insult, and so of war," adding: "If I had been as tame as you think would have been wise in my treatment of affairs with that country, I should have no standing in my own."‡ But while Mr. Seward, like most other Americans, was doubtless elated by the first news that the rebel envoys were captured, he readily discerned that the incident was one of great diplomatic gravity and likely to be fruitful of prolonged diplomatic contention. Evidently in this spirit, and for the purpose of reserving to the United States every advantage in the serious discussion which was unavoidable, he prudently wrote in a confidential dispatch to Mr. Adams, on November 27:

> I forbear from speaking of the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The act was done by Commodore Wilkes without instructions, and even without the knowledge of the Government. Lord Lyons has judiciously refrained from all communication with me on the subject, and I thought it equally wise to reserve ourselves until we hear what the British Government may have to say on the subject.

Of the confidential first interviews between the Secretary of State and the President on this important topic there is no record. From what remains we may easily infer that the President clearly saw the inevitable necessities surrounding the question, and was anxiously searching some method of preserving to the United States whatever of indirect advantage might accrue from compliance with the British demand, and of making that compliance as palatable as might be to American public opinion. In this spirit we may presume he wrote the following experimental draft of a dispatch, preserved in his autograph manuscript. Its chief proposal is to arbitrate the difficulty, or in the alternative seriously to examine the question in all its aspects, and out of them to formulate a binding rule for both nations to govern similar cases. It was an honest and practical suggestion to turn an accidental quarrel into a great and durable transaction for the betterment of international law.

> The dispatch of her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th of November, 1861, and of which your Lordship kindly furnished me a copy, has been carefully considered by the President; and he directs me to say that if there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case, beyond those stated in said dispatch, the reparation sought by Great Britain from the United States would be justly due, and should be promptly made. The President is unwilling to believe that her Majesty's Government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record, in the making up of which he has been allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, with no assurance that her Majesty's Government will consent to hear him; yet this much he directs me to say, that this Government has intended no affront to the British flag, or to the British nation; nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question, all which is evident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained of was done by the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the Government. But being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strict right; because we too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our Government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States Government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing.
>
> Accordingly I am instructed by the President to inquire whether her Majesty's Government will hear the United States upon the matter in question. The President desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including her Majesty's proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master of the *Trent* had of their relation to the United States, and of the object of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for the

* Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861.

† Lyons to Russell, Dec. 23, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Seward to Weed, March 2, 1862. "The Galaxy," August, 1870.

voyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respective positions assumed, in analogous cases, between Great Britain and the United States.

Upon a submission, containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth in the before-mentioned dispatch to your Lordship, together with all other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say, the Government of the United States will, if agreed to by her Majesty's Government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award.

Or, in the alternative, her Majesty's Government may, upon the same record, determine whether any, and if any, what, reparation is due from the United States; provided no such reparation shall be different in character from, nor transcend, that proposed by your Lordship, as instructed in and by the dispatch aforesaid; and provided further, that the determination thus made shall be the law for all future analagous cases between Great Britain and the United States.*

We may suppose that upon consultation with Mr. Seward, Mr. Lincoln decided that, desirable as this proceeding might be, it was precluded by the impatient, inflexible terms of the British demand. Only three days of the seven-days' grace remained; if they should not by the coming Thursday agree to deliver Mason and Slidell, the British legation would close its doors, and the consternation of a double war would fill the air. It is probable, therefore, that even while writing this draft, Lincoln had intimated to his Secretary of State the need of finding good diplomatic reasons for surrendering the prisoners.

A note of Mr. Seward shows us that the Cabinet meeting to consider finally the *Trent* question was appointed for Tuesday morning, December 24; but the Secretary says that, availing himself of the President's permission, he had postponed it to Wednesday morning at 10 A. M., adding, "I shall then be ready." It is probably true, as he afterward wrote,† that the whole framing of his dispatch was left to his own ingenuity and judgment, and that neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet had arrived at any final determination. The private diary of Attorney-General Bates supplies us some additional details:

Cabinet council at 10 A. M., December 25, to consider the relations with England on Lord Lyons's demand of the surrender of Mason and Slidell; a long and interesting session, lasting till 2 P. M. The instructions of the British Minister to Lord Lyons were read. . . . There was read a draft of answer by the Secretary of State.

The President's experimental draft quoted above was not read; there is no mention of either the reading or the points it raised. The whole discussion appears to have been confined to Seward's paper. There was some desultory talk, a general comparing of rumors and outside information, a reading of the few letters which had been received from Europe. Mr. Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was invited in, and read letters he had received from John Bright and Richard Cobden, liberal members of the British Parliament and devoted friends of the Union. During the session also there was handed in and read the dispatch just received from his Government by M. Mercier, the French minister, and which, in substance, took the English view of the matter. The diary continues:

Mr. Seward's draft of letter to Lord Lyons was submitted by him, and examined and criticised by us with apparently perfect candor and frankness. All of us were impressed with the magnitude of the subject, and believed that upon our decision depended the dearest interest, probably the existence, of the nation. I, waiving the question of legal right,— upon which all Europe is against us, and also many of our own best jurists,— urged the necessity of the case; that to go to war with England now is to abandon all hope of suppressing the rebellion, as we have not the possession of the land, nor any support of the people of the South. The maritime superiority of Britain would sweep us from all the Southern waters. Our trade would be utterly ruined, and our treasury bankrupt; in short, that we must not have war with England.

There was great reluctance on the part of some of the members of the Cabinet — and even the President himself — to acknowledge these obvious truths; but all yielded to, and unanimously concurred in, Mr. Seward's letter to Lord Lyons, after some verbal and formal amendments. The main fear, I believe, was the displeasure of our own people — lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England.‡

The published extracts from the diary of Secretary Chase give somewhat fully his opinion on the occasion:

Mr. Chase thought it certainly was not too much to expect of a friendly nation, and especially of a nation of the same blood, religion, and characteristic civilization as our own, that in consideration of the great rights she would overlook the little wrong; nor could he then persuade himself that, were all the circumstances known to the English Government as to ours, the surrender of the rebel commissioners would be insisted upon. The Secretary asserted that the technical right was undoubtedly with England. . . . Were the circumstances reversed, our Government would, Mr. Chase thought, accept the explanation, and let England keep her rebels; and he could not divest himself of the belief that, were the case fairly understood, the British Government would do likewise. "But," continued Secretary Chase, "we cannot afford delays. While

* Lincoln, unpublished MS.

† The consideration of the *Trent* case was crowded out by pressing domestic affairs until Christmas Day. It was considered on my presentation of it on the 25th and 26th of December. The Government, when it took the subject up, had no idea of the grounds upon which it would explain its action, nor did it believe it would concede the case. Yet it was heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days' examination, and in favor of the release. Remember that in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be reconciled. [Seward to Weed, Jan. 22, 1862. Weed, "Autobiography," Vol. II., p. 409.]

‡ Bates, Diary. Unpublished MS.

the matter hangs in uncertainty the public mind will remain disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered, and the restoration of our prosperity — largely identified with that of all nations — must be delayed. Better, then, to make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender of these rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations must occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion at which the Secretary of State has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men, I would sacrifice everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that while nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the surrender under existing circumstances is but simply doing right — simply proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptations to violate them; simply giving to England and the world the most signal proof that the American nation will not under any circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a technical wrong against neutrals." *

In these two recorded opinions are reflected the substantial tone and temper of the Cabinet discussion, which ended, as both Mr. Bates and Mr. Seward have stated, in a unanimous concurrence in the letter of reply as drawn up by the Secretary of State. That long and remarkably able document must be read in full, both to understand the wide range of the subject which he treated and the clearness and force of his language and argument. It constitutes one of his chief literary triumphs. There is room here only to indicate the conclusions arrived at in his examination. First, he held that the four persons seized and their dispatches were contraband of war; secondly, that Captain Wilkes had a right by the law of nations to detain and search the *Trent;* thirdly, that he exercised the right in a lawful and proper manner; fourthly, that he had a right to capture the contraband found. The real issue of the case centered in the fifth question: "Did Captain Wilkes exercise the right of capturing the contraband in conformity with the law of nations?" Reciting the deficiency of recognized rules on this point, Mr. Seward held that only by taking the vessel before a prize court could the existence of contraband be lawfully established; and that Captain Wilkes having released the vessel from capture, the necessary judicial examination was prevented, and the capture left unfinished or abandoned.

Mr. Seward's dispatch continued:

> I trust that I have shown to the satisfaction of the British Government, by a very simple and natural statement of the facts and analysis of the law applicable to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practiced, nor approved any deliberate wrong in the transaction to which they have called its attention, and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting in a departure by the naval officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation in a similar case. . . . If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. . . . The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated.†

With the formal delivery of Mason and Slidell and their secretaries to the custody of the British minister, the diplomatic incident was completed on the part of the United States. Lord Russell, on his part, while announcing that her Majesty's Government differed from Mr. Seward in some of the conclusions ‡ at which he had arrived, nevertheless acknowledged that the action of the American Government constituted "the reparation which her Majesty and the British nation had a right to expect." § It is not too much to say that not merely the rulers and Cabinets of both nations, but also those of all the great European powers, were relieved from an oppressive apprehension by this termination of the affair.

If from one point of view the United States suffered a certain diplomatic defeat and humiliation, it became, in another light, a real international victory. The turn of affairs placed not only England, but France and other nations as well, distinctly on their good behavior. In the face of this American example of moderation they could no longer so openly brave the liberal sentiment of their own people by the countenance they had hitherto given the rebellion. So far from improving or enhancing the hostile mission of Mason and Slidell, the adventure they had undergone served to diminish their importance and circumscribe their influence. The very act of their liberation compelled the British authorities sharply to define the hollow pretense under which they were sent. In his instructions to the British Government vessel which received them at Provincetown and conveyed them to England, Lord Lyons wrote:

> It is hardly necessary that I should remind you that these gentlemen have no official character. It will be

* Warden, "Life of Chase," pp. 393, 394.

† Seward to Lyons, Dec. 26, 1861.

‡ In a dispatch to Lord Lyons of Jan. 23, 1862, in which he discusses the questions at some length, Lord Russell held: first, that Mason and Slidell and their supposed dispatches, under the circumstances of their seizure, were not contraband; secondly, that the bringing of the *Trent* before a prize court, though it would alter the character would not diminish the offense against the law of nations.

§ Russell to Lyons, Jan. 10, 1862.

right for you to receive them with all courtesy and respect as private gentlemen of distinction; but it would be very improper to pay to them any of those honors which are paid to official persons.*

The same result in a larger degree awaited their advent in Europe. Under the intense publicity of which they had been the subject, officials of all degrees were in a measure compelled to avoid them as political "suspects." Mason was received in England with cold and studied neglect; while Slidell in France, though privately encouraged by the Emperor Napoleon III., finally found himself a victim instead of a beneficiary of his selfishness.

* Lyons to Commander Hewett, Dec. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."

July 1888

BIRD MUSIC: SPARROWS.

THE SONG SPARROW.

THE sparrow family is a large one. There may be twenty species, half of which, at least, spend their summer in New England. The song sparrows are the most numerous, sing the most, and exhibit the greatest variety of melody. Standing near a small pond recently, I heard a song sparrow sing four distinct songs within twenty minutes, repeating each several times.

I have more than twenty songs of this sparrow, and have heard him in many other forms. He generally gives a fine trill at the beginning or end of his song. Sometimes, however, it is introduced in the middle, and occasionally is omitted, especially in the latter part of the season. There is a marked difference in the quality and volume of the voices of different individuals. During the season of 1885 I listened almost daily to the strongest and best sparrow voice that I have ever heard. There was a fullness and richness, particularly in the trills, that reminded one of the bewitching tones of the wood-thrush. These are some of his songs:





That the singers of any species sing exactly alike, with the same voice and style, and in the same key always, is a great mistake.

when one o' that same seck of people name to me the very subjects I be'n a-thinkin' and a actuil' a-dreamin' about, ef it did n't 'pears like to me the good Lord sent him a-purpose."

With hand yet trembling, she took from her bosom a marriage-license, and, handing it to Mr. Hooks, said:

"There 's a paper for you, Mr. Hooks, which people is now ready and a-waitin' for you to 'tend to it."

Turning her face towards the dining-room, she called aloud:

"Mimy, you may come in, and the balance of 'em."

The door opened, Mimy and the other negroes, having on every item of Sunday clothes that that plantation had on hand, filed in and took position near the walls. After a decent moment, a-tiptoe, his arm already curved to receive that of his bride, stepped forth Mr. Abner Hines.

"And I do believe, on my soul," Mr. Hooks said some time afterwards, "that arfter I have jinded them two together, hard and fast, a'cordin' to law *and* gospul, that it were in me to make prob'ble the biggest, everlastin'est speech I ever spread myself before a augence; but the fact were, everybody got to laughin' and cryin' so they drownded my woices. Ah, well! it were a ruther egzitin' time all thoo. But everything have swaged down peaceable. The breth'en they forgive me for dancin', when Susan Ann give in the pootty expeunce she told, and it were give' out I would n't do so no more."

R. M. Johnston.

THE KNIGHT IN SILVER MAIL.

SHE left the needle in the rose
And put her broidery by,
And leaning from her casement tall
She heard the owlets cry.
The purple sky was thick with stars,
And in the moonlight pale
She saw come riding from the wood
A knight in silver mail.

His plume was like the snowy foam
That wreathes the roaring tide,
The glory of his golden locks
His helmet could not hide.
She took the lily from her breast
(Like hers, its beauty frail),
And dropped it as he rode beneath —
The knight in silver mail.

About her gown of crimson silk
She drew a mantle dark.
She saw the stately castle-towers
Uprising from the park,
And on the lake the mated swans,
Asleep in shadow, sail,
But left it all to follow him,
The knight in silver mail.

"Oh, I would see thy face, my love,
Oh, I would see thy face!
Why dost thou keep thy visor down?
It is a lonely place."
His voice was like the hollow reeds
That rustle in the gale:
"'T is lonelier in my castle," said
The knight in silver mail.

He let his steed go riderless,
He took her by the hand
And led her over brake and brier
Into a lonesome land.
"Oh, are they headstones all a-row
That glimmer in the vale?"
"My castle-walls are white," replied
The knight in silver mail.

"So close unto thy castle-doors
Why buryest thou the dead?"
"For ten long years I 've slept with them:
Ah, welcome home!" he said.
He clasped her dainty waist around,
And in the moonlight pale
Upraised his visor, and she saw
The knight in silver mail.

At dawn her father's men-at-arms
Went searching everywhere,
And found her with the churchyard dews
A-sparkle in her hair.
And lo! a sight to make the best
And bravest of them quail,
Beside her in the tangled grass,
A skeleton in mail.

Minna Irving.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

TENNESSEE AND KENTUCKY.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

HALLECK.

IN sending General Hunter to relieve Frémont, the President did not intend that he should remain in charge of the Department of the West. Out of its vast extent the Department of Kansas was created a few days afterward, embracing the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, and Hunter was transferred to its command. General Halleck was assigned to the Department of the Missouri, embracing the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

Henry Wager Halleck was born in Oneida County, New York, January 15, 1815. Educated at Union College, he entered the military academy at West Point, where he graduated third in a class of thirty-one, and was made second lieutenant of engineers July 1, 1839. While yet a cadet he was employed at the academy as assistant professor of engineering. From the first he devoted himself with constant industry to the more serious studies of his profession. He had attained a first lieutenancy when the Mexican war broke out, and was sent to the Pacific coast. Valuable services in the military and naval operations prosecuted there secured him the brevet of captain from May 1, 1847. On the conquest of California by the United States forces, he took part in the political organization of the new State, first as Secretary of State under the military governors, and afterward as leading member of the convention which framed the constitution under which California was admitted to the Union.

He remained in the army and in charge of various engineering duties on the Pacific coast until August 1, 1854, having been meanwhile promoted captain of engineers. At that date he resigned his commission to engage in civil pursuits. He became a member of a law firm, and was also interested in mines and railroads, when the outbreak of the rebellion called him again into the military service of the Government. He was not only practically accomplished in his profession as a soldier, but also distinguished as a writer on military art and science. Halleck's high qualifications were well understood and appreciated by General Scott, at whose suggestion he was appointed a major-general in the regular army to date from August 19, 1861, with orders to report himself at army headquarters in Washington. A phrase in one of Scott's letters, setting forth McClellan's disregard for his authority, creates the inference that the old general intended that Halleck should succeed him in chief command. But when the latter reached Washington, the confusion and disasters in the Department of the West were at their culmination, and urgent necessity required him to be sent thither to succeed Frémont.

General Halleck arrived at St. Louis on November 18, 1861, and assumed command on the 19th. His written instructions stated forcibly the reforms he was expected to bring about, and his earlier reports indicate that his difficulties had not been overstated—irregularities in contracts, great confusion in organization, everywhere a want of arms and supplies, absence of routine and discipline. Added to this was reported danger from the enemy. He telegraphs under date of November 29:

> I am satisfied that the enemy is operating in and against this State with a much larger force than was supposed when I left Washington, and also that a general insurrection is organizing in the counties near the Missouri River, between Boonville and Saint Joseph. A desperate effort will be made to supply and winter their troops in this State, so as to spare their own resources for a summer campaign.

An invasion was indeed in contemplation, but rumor had magnified its available strength. General Price had, since the battle of Lexington, lingered in south-western Missouri, and was once more preparing for a northward march. His method of campaigning was peculiar, and needed only the minimum of organization and preparation. His troops were made up mainly of young, reckless, hardy Missourians, to whom a campaign was

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an adventure of pastime and excitement, and who brought, each man, his own horse, gun, and indispensable equipments and clothing. The usual burdens of an army commissariat and transportation were of little moment to these partisans, who started up as if by magic from every farm and thicket, and gathered their supplies wherever they went. To quote the language of one of the Missouri rebel leaders: "Our forces, to combat or cut them off, would require only a haversack to where the enemy would require a wagon." The evil of the system was, that such forces vanished quite as rapidly as they appeared. The enthusiastic squads with which Price had won his victory at Lexington were scattered among their homes and haunts. The first step of a campaign, therefore, involved the gathering of a new army, and this proved not so easy in the opening storms of winter as it had in the fine midsummer weather. On the 26th of November, 1861, Price issued a call for 50,000 men. The language of his proclamation, however, breathed more of despair than of confidence. He reminded his adherents that only one in forty had answered to the former call, and that "Boys and small property-holders have in main fought the battles for the protection of your property." He repeated many times, with emphasis, "I must have 50,000 men."* His prospects were far from encouraging. McCulloch, in a mood of stubborn disagreement, was withdrawing his army to Arkansas, where he went into winter quarters. Later on, when Price formally requested his coöperation, McCulloch as formally refused. For the moment the Confederate cause in south-western Missouri was languishing. Governor Jackson made a show of keeping it alive by calling the fugitive remnant of his rebel legislature together at Neosho, and with the help of his sole official relic — the purloined State seal — enacting the well-worn farce of passing a secession ordinance, and making a military league with the Confederate States.

The Confederate Congress at Richmond responded to the sham with an act to admit Missouri to the Confederacy. An act of more promise at least, appropriating a million dollars to aid the Confederate cause in that State, had been passed in the preceding August. Such small installment of this fund, however, as was transmitted failed even to pay the soldiers, who for their long service had not as yet received a penny. In return the Richmond authorities asked the transfer of Missouri troops to the Confederate service; but with this request the rebel Missouri leaders were unable immediately to comply. When, under date of December 30, 1861, Governor Jackson complained of neglect and once more urged that Price be made commander in Missouri, Jefferson Davis responded sarcastically that not a regiment had been tendered, and that he could not appoint a general before he had troops for him.† From all these causes Price's projected winter campaign failed, and he attributed the failure to McCulloch's refusal to help him.‡

The second part of the rebel programme in Missouri, that of raising an insurrection north of the Missouri River, proved more effective. Halleck was scarcely in command when the stir and agitation of depredations and the burning of bridges, by small squads of secessionists in disguise, were reported from various counties of northern Missouri. Federal detachments went promptly in pursuit, and the perpetrators as usual disappeared, only however to break out with fresh outrages when quiet and safety had apparently been restored. It was soon evident that this was not merely a manifestation of neighborhood disloyalty, but that it was part of a deliberate system instigated by the principal rebel leaders. "Do you intend to regard men," wrote Price to Halleck, January 12, 1862, "whom I have specially dispatched to destroy roads, burn bridges, tear up culverts, etc., as amenable to an enemy's court-martial, or will you have them to be tried as usual, by the proper authorities, according to the statutes of the State?" § Halleck, who had placed the State under martial law, to enable him to deal more effectually with this class of offenders, stated his authority and his determination, with distinct emphasis, in his reply of January 22, 1862:

> You must be aware, general, that no orders of yours can save from punishment spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands, etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this point. If you send armed forces, wearing the garb of soldiers and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents, to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare; or, if we capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war. But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your adherents, in the garb of peaceful citizens and under false pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents, and to rob and plunder, and to commit arson and murder. They do not even act under the garb of soldiers, but under false pretenses and in the

* War Records.

† Davis to Jackson, Jan. 8, 1862. Ibid.

‡ Price to Polk, Dec. 23, 1861. Ibid.

§ Price to Halleck. Ibid.

guise of peaceful citizens. You certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes, although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners of war.

One important effect which Price hoped to produce by the guerrilla rising he was instigating was to fill his army with recruits. "The most populous and truest counties of the State," he wrote, "lie upon or north of the Missouri River. . . . I sent a detachment of 1100 men to Lexington, which after remaining only a part of one day gathered together about 2500 recruits, and escorted them in safety to me at Osceola." His statement was partly correct, but other causes contributed both to this partial success and the partial defeat that immediately followed. Just at the time this expedition went to Lexington, the various Federal detachments north of the Missouri River were engaged in driving a number of secession guerrilla bands southward across that stream. Halleck was directing the joint movements of the Union troops, and had stationed detachments of Pope's forces south of the Missouri River, with the design of intercepting and capturing the fugitive bands. A slight failure of some of the reports to reach him disconcerted and partly frustrated his design. The earliest guerrilla parties which crossed at and near Lexington escaped and made their way to Price, but the later ones were intercepted and captured as Halleck had planned. Pope reports, September 19:

Colonel Davis came upon the enemy near Milford late this afternoon, and having driven in his pickets assaulted him in force. A brisk skirmish ensued, when the enemy, finding himself surrounded and cut off, surrendered at discretion. One thousand three hundred prisoners, including 3 colonels and 17 captains, 1000 stand of arms, 1000 horses, 65 wagons, tents, baggage, and supplies have fallen into our hands. Our loss is 2 killed and 8 wounded.*

On the next day he found his capture was still larger, as he telegraphs: "Just arrived here. Troops much embarrassed with nearly 2000 prisoners and great quantity of captured property."

In anticipation of the capture or dispersion of these north-western detachments of rebels, Halleck had directed the collection of an army at and about Rolla, with the view to move in force against Price. General Samuel R. Curtis was, on December 25, assigned to the command of the Union troops to operate in the south-western district of Missouri. Some 10,000 men were gathered to form his column; and had he known Price's actual condition, the possibility of a short and successful campaign was before him. But the situation was also one of difficulty. The railroad ended at Rolla; Springfield, the supposed location of Price's camp, was a hundred and twenty miles to the south-west, with bad roads, through a mountainous country. Rebel sentiment and sympathy were strong throughout the whole region, and the favoring surroundings enabled Price to conceal his designs and magnify his numbers. Rumors came that he intended to fight at Springfield, and the estimates of his strength varied from 20,000 to 40,000. The greatest obstacle to a pursuit was the severity of the winter weather; nevertheless the Union soldiers bore their privations with admirable patience and fortitude, and Halleck urged a continuance of the movement through every hindrance and discouragement. He writes to McClellan, January 14, 1862:

I have ordered General Curtis to move forward, with all his infantry and artillery. His force will not be less than 12,000. The enemy is reported to have between 35 and 40 guns. General Curtis has only 24; but I send him 6 pieces to-morrow, and will send 6 more in a few days. I also propose placing a strong reserve at Rolla, which can be sent forward if necessary. The weather is intensely cold, and the troops, supplied as they are with very inferior clothing, blankets, and tents, must suffer greatly in a winter campaign, and yet I see no way of avoiding it. Unless Price is driven from the State, insurrections will continually occur in all the central and northern counties, so as to prevent the withdrawal of our troops.

A few days later (January 18) Halleck wrote to Curtis that he was about to reënforce him with an entire division from Pope's army, increasing his strength to fifteen thousand; that he would send him mittens for his soldiers:

Get as many hand-mills as you can for grinding corn. . . . Take the bull by the horns. I will back you in such forced requisitions when they become necessary for supplying the forces. We must have no failure in this movement against Price. It must be the last.

And once more, on January 27, he repeated his urgent admonition:

There is a strong pressure on us for troops, and all that are not absolutely necessary here must go elsewhere. Pope's command is entirely broken up; 4000 in Davis's reserve and 6000 ordered to Cairo. Push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price.

This trying winter campaign led by General Curtis, though successful in the end, did not terminate so quickly as General Halleck had hoped. Leaving the heroic Western soldiers camping and scouting in the snows and cutting winds of the bleak Missouri hills and prairies, attention must be called to other incidents in the Department of the Missouri. While Halleck was gratifying the Government and the Northern public with the ability and

* Pope to Halleck. War Records.

vigor of his measures, one point of his administration had excited a wide-spread dissatisfaction and vehement criticism. His military instincts and methods were so thorough that they caused him to treat too lightly the political aspects of the great conflict in which he was directing so large a share. Frémont's treatment of the slavery question had been too radical; Halleck's now became too conservative. It is not probable that this grew out of his mere wish to avoid the error of his predecessor, but out of his own personal conviction that the issue must be entirely eliminated from the military problem. He had noted the difficulties and discussions growing out of the dealings of the army with fugitive slaves, and hoping to rid himself of a perpetual dilemma, one of his first acts after assuming command was to issue his famous General Order No. 3 (November 20, 1861), the first paragraph of which ran as follows:

> It has been represented that important information respecting the numbers and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march, and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.*

This language brought upon him the indignant protest of the combined antislavery sentiment of the North. He was berated in newspapers and denounced in Congress, and the violence of public condemnation threatened seriously to impair his military usefulness. He had indeed gone too far. The country felt, and the army knew, that so far from being generally true that negroes carried valuable information to the enemy, the very reverse was the rule, and that the "contrabands" in reality constituted one of the most important and reliable sources of knowledge to the Union commanders in the various fields, which later in the war came to be jocosely designated as the "grape-vine telegraph." Halleck soon found himself put on the defensive, and wrote an explanatory letter to the newspapers. A little later he took occasion officially to define his intention:

> The object of these orders is to prevent any person in the army from acting in the capacity of negro-catcher or negro-stealer. The relation between the slave and his master, or pretended master, is not a matter to be determined by military officers, except in the single case provided for by Congress. This matter in all other cases must be decided by the civil authorities. One object in keeping fugitive slaves out of our camp is to keep clear of all such questions. . . . Orders No. 3 do not apply to the authorized private servants of officers nor the negroes employed by proper authority in the camps. It applies only to fugitive slaves. The prohibition to admit them within our lines does not prevent the exercise of all proper offices of humanity in giving them food and clothing outside where such offices are necessary to prevent suffering.†

It will be remembered that the Missouri State Convention in the month of July appointed and inaugurated a provisional State government. This action was merely designed to supply a temporary executive authority until the people could elect new loyal State officers, which election was ordered to be held on the first Monday in November. The convention also, when it finished the work of its summer session, adjourned to meet on the third Monday in December, 1861, but political and military affairs remained in so unsettled a condition during the whole autumn that anything like effective popular action was impracticable. The convention was therefore called together in a third session at an earlier date (October 11, 1861), when it wisely adopted an ordinance postponing the State election for the period of one year, and for continuing the provisional government in office until their successors should be duly appointed.

With his tenure of power thus prolonged, Governor Gamble, also by direction of the convention, proposed to the President to raise a special force of Missouri State militia for service within the State during the war there, but to act with the United States troops in military operations within the State or when necessary to its defense. President Lincoln accepted the plan upon the condition that whatever United States officer might be in command of the Department of the West should also be commissioned by the governor to command the Missouri State militia; and that if the President changed the former, the governor should make the corresponding change, in order that any conflict of authority or of military plans might be avoided. This agreement was entered into between President Lincoln and Governor Gamble on November 6, and on November 27 General Schofield received orders from Halleck to raise, organize, and command this special militia corps. The plan was attended with reasonable success, and by the 15th of April, 1862, General Schofield reports, "an active efficient force of 13,800 men was placed in the field," nearly all of cavalry.

The raising and organizing of this force, during the winter and spring of 1861–62, produced a certain degree of local military activity just at the season when the partisan and guerrilla operations of rebel sympathizers were necessarily impeded or wholly suspended by severe weather; and this, joined with the vigorous administration of General Hal-

* War Records.

† Halleck to Asboth, Dec. 26, 1861. Ibid.

leck, and the fact that Curtis was chasing the army of Price out of south-western Missouri, gave a delusive appearance of quiet and order throughout the State. We shall see how this security was rudely disturbed during the summer of 1862 by local efforts and uprisings, though the rebels were not able to bring about any formidable campaign of invasion, and Mis-


MAP OF
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES
10 30 50 100
Cincinnati
Alton
St. Louis
Madison
Jeffersonville
New Albany
Louisville
FRANKFORT
Maysville
Vanceburg
Cynthiana
Paris
Lexington
Evansville
Henderson
Owensboro
Bardstown
Elizabethtown
Perryville
Danville
Jackson
Mt. Vernon
Pilot Knob
Ironton
St. Genevieve
Commerce
Cairo
Paducah
Bird's Point
Belmont
Columbus
New Madrid
Hickman
Union City
Paris
Hopkinsville
Cave City
Somerset
London
Whitesburg
Jamestown
Barboursville
Glasgow
Bowling Green
Franklin
Mill Springs
Hazard
Clarksville
Gallatin
Dover
Livingston
Jacksboro
Tazewell
Jonesboro
Morristown
Greenville
NASHVILLE
Murfreesboro
Knoxville
New Market
Osceola
Jackson
Columbia
McMinnville
Loudon
Athens
Pittsburg Landing
Memphis
Bolivar
Savannah
Pulaski
Tullahoma
Winchester
Cleveland
Chattanooga
Shiloh
Corinth
Holly Springs
Iuka
Florence
Athens
Stevenson
Huntsville
Tuscumbia
Decatur
Dalton
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
SOUTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
NORTH CAROLINA
Ohio R.
Mississippi R.
Cumberland R.
Tennessee R.
Green R.
Big Barren R.
Obion R.
Duck R.
Stones R.
Harpeth R.
Elk R.
Big Sandy R.
Kentucky R.
Licking R.
Guyandotte R.
Kanawha R.
Big Creek Gap
Cumberland Gap
Holston R.
Clinch R.
French Broad R.
Hiwassee R.
Ocoee R.
Nolichucky R.
Watauga R.
Big Sandy R.
Pound Gap
Tug Fork
Levisa Fork
Cumberland Mts.
Lookout Mt.
Great Smoky Mts.
Unaka Mts.
Big Black R.
Yazoo R.
Coldwater R.
Tallahatchie R.
Yalobusha R.
Wolf R.
Hatchie R.
Forked Deer R.
Big Hatchie R.
Obion R.
Kentucky Lake
Pine Mt.
Cumberland Gap
Big Creek Gap

Polk's West Point education enabled him to realize.

But the Mississippi, with its generally level banks, afforded relatively few points capable of effective defense. The one most favorable to the Confederate needs was at Columbus, in the State of Kentucky, eighteen miles below Cairo, on a high bluff commanding the river for about five miles. Both the Union and Confederate commanders coveted this situation, for its natural advantages were such that when fully fortified it became familiarly known as the "Gibraltar of the West." So far, through the neutrality policy of Kentucky, it had remained unappropriated by either side. On the first day of September, the rebel General Polk, commanding at Memphis, sent a messenger to Governor Magoffin to obtain confidential information about the "future plans and policy of the Southern party in Kentucky," explaining his desire to "be ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah." Buckner at the same time was in Richmond, proposing to the Confederate authorities certain military movements in Kentucky, "in advance of the action of her governor." On September 3 they promised him, as definitely as they could, countenance and assistance in his scheme; and a week after, he accepted a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. While Buckner was negotiating, General Polk initiated the rebel invasion of Kentucky. Whether upon information from Governor Magoffin or elsewhere, he ordered Pillow with his detachment of six thousand men to move up the river from New Madrid and occupy the town of Columbus.

The Confederate movement created a general flurry in neutrality circles. Numerous protests went to both Polk and the Richmond authorities, and Governor Harris hastened to assure Governor Magoffin that he was in entire ignorance of it, and had appealed to Jefferson Davis to order the troops withdrawn. Even the rebel Secretary of War was mystified by the report, and directed Polk to order the troops withdrawn from Kentucky. Jefferson Davis however, either with prior knowledge or with truer instinct, telegraphed to Polk: "The necessity justifies the action."* In his letter to Davis, the general strongly argued the propriety of his course: "I believe, if we could have found a respectable pretext, it would have been better to have seized this place some months ago, as I am convinced we had more friends then in Kentucky than we have had since, and every hour's delay made against us. Kentucky was fast melting away under the influence of the Lincoln Government." He had little need to urge this view. Jefferson Davis had already written him, "We cannot permit the indeterminate quantities, the political elements, to control our action in cases of military necessity";† and to Governor Harris, "Security to Tennessee and other parts of the Confederacy is the primary object. To this all else must give way."‡

To strengthen further and consolidate the important military enterprises thus begun, Jefferson Davis now adopted a recommendation of Polk that

> They should be combined from west to east across the Mississippi Valley, and placed under the direction of one head, and that head should have large discretionary powers. Such a position is one of very great responsibility, involving and requiring large experience and extensive military knowledge, and I know of no one so well equal to that task as our friend General Albert S. Johnston.

Johnston, with the rank of general, was duly assigned, on September 10, to the command of Department No. 2, covering in general the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, part of Mississippi, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Proceeding at once to Nashville and conferring with the local authorities, he wrote back to Richmond, under date of September 16:

> So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once. . . . I design to-morrow (which is the earliest practicable moment) to take possession of Bowling Green with five thousand troops, and prepare to support the movement with such force as circumstances may indicate and the means at my command may allow.

The movement was promptly carried out. Buckner was put in command of the expedition; and seizing several railroad trains, he moved forward to Bowling Green on the morning of the 18th, having sent ahead five hundred men to occupy Munfordville, and issuing the usual proclamation, that his invasion was a measure of defense. Meanwhile the third column of invaders entered eastern Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. Brigadier-General Zollicoffer had eight or ten thousand men under his command in eastern Tennessee, but, as elsewhere, much scattered, and badly armed and supplied. Under his active supervision, during the month of August he somewhat improved the organization of his forces and acquainted himself with the intricate topography of the mountain region he was in. Prompted probably from Kentucky, he was ready early in September to join in the combined movement into that State. About the 10th he advanced with six regiments through

* Davis to Polk, Sept. 4, 1861. War Records.
† Davis to Polk, Sept. 15, 1861. Ibid.
‡ Davis to Harris, Sept. 13, 1861. Ibid.

Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford, and began planning further aggressive movements against the small Union force, principally Home Guards, which had been collected and organized at Camp Dick Robinson.

The strong Union legislature which Kentucky elected in August met in Frankfort, the capital, on the 2d of September. Polk, having securely established himself at Columbus, notified the governor of his presence, and offered as his only excuse the alleged intention of the Federal troops to occupy it. The legislature, not deeming the excuse sufficient, passed a joint resolution instructing the governor "to inform those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally."* The governor vetoed the resolution, on the ground that it did not also embrace the Union troops; the legislature passed it over his veto. Governor Magoffin now issued his proclamation, as directed. Polk and Jefferson Davis replied that the Confederate army would withdraw if the Union army would do the same. To this the legislature responded with another joint resolution, that the conditions prescribed were an insult to the dignity of the State, "to which Kentucky cannot listen without dishonor," and "that the invaders must be expelled." The resolution further required General Robert Anderson to take instant command, with authority to call out a volunteer force, in all of which the governor was required to lend his aid. Kentucky was thus officially taken out of her false attitude of neutrality, and placed in active coöperation with the Federal Government to maintain the Union. Every day increased the strength and zeal of her assistance. A little later in the session a law was enacted declaring enlistments under the Confederate flag a misdemeanor and the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and prescribing heavy penalties for both. Finally, the legislature authorized the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers to "repel invasion," providing also that they should be mustered into the service of the United States and coöperate with the armies of the Union. This was a complete revolution from the anti-coercion resolutions that the previous legislature had passed in January.

Hitherto there were no Federal forces in Kentucky except the brigade which Lieutenant Nelson had organized at Camp Dick Robinson; the Home Guards in various counties, though supplied with arms by the Federal Government, were acting under State militia laws. General Robert Anderson, commanding the military department which embraced Kentucky, still kept his headquarters at Cincinnati, and Rousseau, a prominent Kentuckian, engaged in organizing a brigade of Kentuckians, had purposely made his camp on the Indiana side of the Ohio River. Nevertheless President Lincoln, the governors of Ohio and Indiana, and the various military commanders had for months been ready to go to the assistance of the Kentucky Unionists whenever the emergency should arise. Even if the neutral attitude of Kentucky had not been brought to an end by the advance of the Confederate forces, it would have been by that of the Federals. A point had been reached where further inaction was impossible. Three days before General Pillow occupied Hickman, Frémont sent General Grant to south-eastern Missouri, to concentrate the several Federal detachments, drive out the enemy, and destroy a rumored rebel battery at Belmont. His order says finally, "It is intended, in connection with all these movements, to occupy Columbus, Kentucky, as soon as possible." It was in executing a part of this order that the gun-boats sent to Belmont extended their reconnaissance down the river, and discovered the advance of the Confederates on the Kentucky shore. An unexpected delay in the movement of one of Grant's detachments occurred at the same time; and that commander, with the military intuition which afterward rendered him famous, postponed the continuance of the local operations in Missouri, and instead immediately prepared an expedition into Kentucky, which became the initial step of his brilliant and fruitful campaign in that direction a few months later. He saw that Columbus, his primary objective point, was lost for the present; but he also perceived that another, of perhaps equal strategical value, yet lay within his grasp, though clearly there was no time to be wasted in seizing it. The gun-boat reconnaissance on the Mississippi River, which revealed the rebel occupation of Kentucky, was begun on September 4. On the following day General Grant, having telegraphed the information to Frémont and to the Kentucky legislature, hurriedly organized an expedition of 2 gun-boats, 1800 men, 16 cannon for batteries, and a supply of provisions and ammunition on transports. Taking personal command, he started with the expedition from Cairo at midnight of the 5th, and proceeded up the Ohio River to the town of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, where he arrived on the morning of the 6th. A contraband trade with the rebels, by means of small steamboats plying on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had called special attention to the easy communication between this point and central Tennessee. He landed without opposition and took possession, making

* War Records.

arrangements to fortify and permanently hold the place; having done which, he himself returned to Cairo the same afternoon, to report his advance and forward reënforcements. The importance of the seizure was appreciated by the rebels, for, on the 13th of September, Buckner wrote to Richmond, "Our possession of Columbus is already neutralized by that of Paducah."

The culmination of affairs in Kentucky had been carefully watched by the authorities in Washington. From a conference with President Lincoln, Anderson returned to Cincinnati on September 1, taking with him two subordinates of exceptional ability, Brigadier-Generals Sherman and Thomas. A delegation of prominent Kentuckians met him, to set forth the critical condition of their State. He dispatched Sherman to solicit help from Frémont and the governors of Indiana and Illinois, and a week later moved his headquarters to Louisville, also sending Thomas to Camp Dick Robinson, to take direction of affairs in that quarter. By the time that Sherman returned from his mission the crisis had already developed itself. The appearance of Polk's forces at Columbus, the action of the legislature, the occupation of Paducah by Grant, and the threatening rumors from Buckner's camp, created a high degree of excitement and apprehension. On September 16 Anderson reported Zollicoffer's invasion through Cumberland Gap, upon which the President telegraphed him to assume active command in Kentucky at once. Added to this, there came to Louisville on the 18th the positive news of Buckner's advance to Bowling Green. This information set all central Kentucky in a military ferment; for the widely published announcement that the State Guards, Buckner's secession militia, would meet at Lexington on September 20, to have a camp drill under supervision of Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and other leaders, seemed too plainly coincident with the triple invasion to be designed for a mere holiday. A rising at Lexington and a junction with Zollicoffer might end in a march upon Frankfort, the capital, to disperse the legislature; a simultaneous advance by Buckner in force and capture of Louisville would, in a brief campaign, complete the subjugation of Kentucky to the rebellion. There remains no record to show whether or not such a plan was among the movements, "in advance of the governor's action," which Buckner discussed with Jefferson Davis on September 3 at Richmond. The bare possibility roused the Unionists of Kentucky to vigorous action. With an evident distrust of Governor Magoffin, a caucus of the Union members of the legislature assumed quasi-executive authority, and through the speakers of the two Houses requested General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, to send a regiment, "fully prepared for fight," to Lexington in advance of the advertised "camp drill" of the State Guards; also promising that the Home Guards should rally in force to support him. Thomas ordered the movement, and, in spite of numerous obstacles, Colonel Bramlette brought his regiment to the Lexington fair ground on the night of the 19th of September. His advent was so sudden that he came near making important arrests. Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, Morgan, and other leaders were present, but, being warned, fled in different directions, and the "camp drill," shorn of its guiding spirits, proved powerless for the mischievous ends which had evidently been intended.

At Louisville, General Anderson lost no time in the effort to meet Buckner's advance. There were no organized troops in the city, but the brigade Rousseau had been collecting on the Indiana shore was hastily called across the river and joined to the Louisville Home Guards, making in all some 2500 men, who were sent out by the railroad towards Nashville, under the personal command of Sherman. An expedition of the enemy had already burned the important railroad bridges, apparently, however, with the simple object of creating delay. Nevertheless, Sherman went on and occupied Muldraugh's Hill, where he was soon reënforced; for the utmost efforts had been used by the governors of Ohio and Indiana to send to the help of Kentucky every available regiment. If Buckner meditated the capture of Louisville, this show of force caused him to pause; but he remained firm at Bowling Green, also increasing his army, and ready to take part in whatever movement events might render feasible.

No serious or decisive conflicts immediately followed these various moves on the military chess-board. For the present they served merely to define the hostile frontier. With Polk at Columbus, Buckner at Bowling Green, and Zollicoffer in front of Cumberland Gap, the Confederate frontier was practically along the northern Tennessee line. The Union line ran irregularly through the center of Kentucky. One direct result was rapidly to eliminate the armed secessionists. Humphrey Marshall, Breckinridge, and others who had set up rebel camps hastened with their followers within the protection of the Confederate line. Before further operations occurred, a change of Union commanders took place. The excitement, labors, and responsibilities proved too great for the physical strength of General Anderson. Relieved at his own re-

quest, on October 8, he relinquished the command to General Sherman, who was designated by General Scott to succeed him. The new and heavy duties which fell upon him were by no means to Sherman's liking. "I am forced into the command of this Department against my will," he wrote. Looking at his field with a purely professional eye, the disproportion between the magnitude of his task and the immediate means for its accomplishment oppressed him like a nightmare. There were no troops in Kentucky when he came. The recruits sent from other States were gradually growing into an army, but as yet without drill, equipments, or organization. Kentucky herself was in a curious transition. By vote of her people and her legislature, she had decided to adhere to the Union; but as a practical incident of war, many of her energetic and adventurous young men drifted to Southern camps, while the Union property-holders and heads of families were unfit or unwilling immediately to enlist in active service to sustain the cause they had espoused. The Home Guards, called into service for ten days, generally refused to extend their term. The arms furnished them became easily scattered, and, even if not seized or stolen by young secession recruits and carried to the enemy, were with difficulty recovered for use. Now that the General Government had assumed command and the State had ordered an army, many neighborhoods felt privileged to call for protection rather than furnish a quota for offense. Even where they were ready to serve, the enlistment of the State volunteers, recently authorized by the legislature, had yet scarcely begun.

About the middle of October, Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, returning from a visit to Frémont, passed through Louisville and held a military consultation with Sherman. General Sherman writes:

> I remember taking a large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them, showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less than 100 miles, and Frémont the right, about the same; whereas I, the center, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over 300 miles of frontier; that McClellan had 100,000 men, Frémont 60,000, whereas to me had only been allotted about 18,000. I argued that for the purpose of defense we should have 60,000 men at once, and for offense would need 200,000 before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands and exclaimed, "Great God! where are they to come from?" I asserted that there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing to come if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious that regiments had been formed in all the North-western States whose services had been refused by the War Department, on the ground that they would not be needed. We discussed all these matters fully, in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was before us, and was in fact upon us.*

While recognizing many of the needs which Sherman pointed out, the Secretary could not immediately promise him any great augmentation of his force.

Complaints and requests of this character were constantly coming to the Administration from all the commanders and governors, and a letter of President Lincoln, written in reply to a similar strain of fault-finding from Indiana, plainly indicates why such requirements in all quarters could not be immediately supplied:

> WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 29, 1861.
>
> HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. O. P. MORTON: Your letter by the hand of Mr. Prunk was received yesterday. I write this letter because I wish you to believe of us (as we certainly believe of you) that we are doing the very best we can. You do not receive arms from us as fast as you need them; but it is because we have not near enough to meet all the pressing demands, and we are obliged to share around what we have, sending the larger share to the points which appear to need them most. We have great hope that our own supply will be ample before long, so that you and all others can have as many as you need. I see an article in an Indianapolis newspaper denouncing me for not answering your letter sent by special messenger two or three weeks ago. I did make what I thought the best answer I could to that letter. As I remember, it asked for ten heavy guns to be distributed with some troops at Lawrenceburgh, Madison, New Albany, and Evansville; and I ordered the guns and directed you to send the troops if you had them. As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as more important than I do; but I am compelled to watch all points. While I write this I am if not in *range* at least in *hearing* of cannon shot, from an army of enemies more than a hundred thousand strong. I do not expect them to capture this city; but I know they would if I were to send the men and arms from here to defend Louisville, of which there is not a single hostile armed soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be moving upon it from any distance. It is true the army in our front may make a half-circle around southward and move on Louisville; but when they do, we will make a half-circle around northward and meet them; and in the mean time we will get up what forces we can from other sources to also meet them.
>
> I hope Zollicoffer has left Cumberland Gap (though I fear he has not), because, if he has, I rather infer he did it because of his dread of Camp Dick Robinson, reënforced from Cincinnati, moving on him, than because of his intention to move on Louisville. But if he does go round and reënforce Buckner, let Dick Robinson come round and reënforce Sherman, and the thing is substantially as it was when Zollicoffer left Cumberland Gap. I state this as an illustration; for in fact I think if the Gap is left open to us Dick Robinson should take it and hold it; while Indiana, and the vicinity of Louisville in Kentucky, can reënforce Sherman faster than Zollicoffer can Buckner. . . .
>
> Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.†

The conjectures of the President proved substantially correct. Great as was the need of arms for Union regiments, the scarcity among the rebels was much greater. Of the 30,000

* Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 203.

† Unpublished MS.

stands which Johnston asked for when he assumed command, the rebel War Department could only send him 1000. Ammunition and supplies were equally wanting. He called out 50,000 volunteers from Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas, but reënforcements from this and other sources were slow. His greatest immediate help came by transferring Hardee with his division from Missouri to Bowling Green. If, as Sherman surmised, a concentration of his detachments would have enabled him to make a successful march on Louisville, he was unwilling to take the risk. The contingency upon which the rebel invasion was probably based, the expected rising in Kentucky, had completely failed. Johnston wrote to Richmond:

> We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line; in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications.*

One of his recruiting brigadiers wrote:

> The Kentuckians still come in small squads; I have induced the most of them to go in for the war. This requires about three speeches a day. When thus stirred up they go, almost to a man. Since I have found that I can't be a general, I have turned recruiting agent and sensation speaker for the brief period that I shall remain.†

For the present Johnston's policy was purely defensive; he directed Cumberland Gap to be fortified, and completed the works at Columbus, "to meet the probable flotilla from the North, supposed to carry two hundred heavy guns," while Buckner was vigorously admonished to "Hold on to Bowling Green." He made this order when Buckner had six thousand men; but even when that number was doubled, after the arrival of Hardee, Johnston was occupied with calculations for defense and asking for further reënforcements.‡

LINCOLN DIRECTS COÖPERATION.

At the beginning of December, 1861, the President was forced to turn his serious personal attention to army matters. Except to organize, drill, and review the Army of the Potomac, to make an unfruitful reconnaissance and to suffer the lamentable Ball's Bluff disaster, McClellan had nothing to show for his six months of local and two months of chief command. The splendid autumn weather, the wholesome air and dry roads, had come and gone. Rain, snow, and mud, crippling clogs to military movements in all lands and epochs, were to be expected for a quarter if not for half of the coming year. Worse than all, McClellan had fallen seriously ill. With most urgent need of early action, every prospect of securing it seemed to be thus cut off. In this dilemma Lincoln turned to the Western commanders. "General McClellan is sick," he telegraphed to Halleck on the last day of the year. "Are General Buell and yourself in concert?" The following day, being New Year's, he repeated his inquiry, or rather his prompting suggestion, that, McClellan being incapable of work, Buell and Halleck should at once establish a vigorous and hearty cooperation. Their replies were not specially promising. "There is no arrangement between General Halleck and myself," responded Buell, adding that he depended on McClellan for instructions to this end; while Halleck said, "I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to coöperate with him"; adding, in his turn, that he had written to McClellan, and that too much haste would ruin everything. Plainly, therefore, the military machine, both East and West, was not only at a complete standstill, but was without a programme.

Of what avail, then, were McClellan's office and function of General-in-Chief, if such a contingency revealed either his incapacity or his neglect? The force of this question is immensely increased when we see how in the same episode McClellan's acts followed Lincoln's suggestions. However silent and confiding in the skill and energy of his generals, the President had studied the military situation with unremitting diligence. In his telegram of December 31 to Halleck, he started a pregnant inquiry. "When he [Buell] moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from Columbus?" And he asked the same question at the same time of Buell. Halleck seems to have had no answer to make; Buell sent the only reply that was possible: "There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reënforced from Columbus if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place."

Lincoln was not content to permit this know-nothing and do-nothing policy to continue. "I have just been with General McClellan, and he is much better," he wrote the day after New Year's; and in this interview the necessity for action and the telegrams from the Western commanders were fully discussed, as becomes evident from the fact that the following day McClellan wrote a letter to Halleck containing an earnest suggestion to remedy the neglect and need pointed out by Lincoln's dispatch of December 31. In this letter McClellan advised an expedition up the Cumberland River, a dem-

* War Records.
† Alcorn to Buckner, Oct. 21, 1861. Ibid.
‡ Johnston to Cooper, Oct. 17, 1861. Ibid.

onstration on Columbus, and a feint on the Tennessee River, all for the purpose of preventing reënforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston at Bowling Green, whom Buell was preparing to attack.

Meanwhile Lincoln's dispatch of inquiry had renewed the attention, and perhaps aroused the ambition, of Buell. He and Halleck had, after Lincoln's prompting, interchanged dispatches about concerted action. Halleck reported a withdrawal of troops from Missouri "almost impossible"; to which Buell replied that "the great power of the rebellion in the West is arrayed" on a line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and that two gun-boat expeditions with a support of 20,000 men should attack its center by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that "whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days." Halleck, however, did not favorably entertain the proposition. His reply discussed an altogether different question. He said it would be madness for him with his forces to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus; and that if Buell's Bowling Green movement required his help it ought to be delayed a few weeks, when he could probably furnish some troops. Leaving altogether unanswered Buell's suggestion for the movement up the Cumberland and the Tennessee, Halleck stated his strong disapproval of the Bowling Green movement, and on the same day he repeated these views a little more fully in a letter to the President. Premising that he could not at the present time withdraw any troops from Missouri, "without risking the loss of this State," he said:

> I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read. General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Lincoln, finding in these replies but a continuation of not only the system of delay, but also the want of plans, and especially of energetic joint action, which had thus far in a majority of cases marked the operations of the various commanders, was not disposed further to allow matters to remain in such unfruitful conditions. Under his prompting McClellan, on this same 6th of January, wrote to Buell, "Halleck, from his own account, will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of and without waiting for that?" And on the next day Lincoln followed this inquiry with a still more energetic monition: "Please name as early a day as you safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Major-General Halleck." This somewhat peremptory order seems to have brought nothing except a reply from Halleck: "I have asked General Buell to designate a day for a demonstration to assist him. It is all I can do till I get arms." Three days later, Halleck's already quoted letter of the 6th reached Washington by mail, and after its perusal the President indorsed upon it, with a heart-sickness easily discernible in the words, "The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."

Nevertheless, something was being done: very little at the moment, it is true, but enough to form the beginning of momentous results. On the same day on which Halleck had written the discouraging letter commented upon above by the President, he had also transmitted to Grant at Cairo the direction, "I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray." The object was, as he further explained, to prevent reënforcements being sent to Buckner at Bowling Green. He was to threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, to create the impression that not only was Dover (Fort Donelson) to be attacked, but that a great army to be gathered in the West was to sweep down towards Nashville, his own column being merely an advance guard. Flag-Officer Foote was to assist by a gun-boat demonstration. "Be very careful, however," added Halleck, "to avoid a battle; we are not ready for that; but cut off detached parties and give your men a little experience in skirmishing."

If Halleck's order for a demonstration against Mayfield and Murray, creating an indirect menace to Columbus and Dover, had gone to an unwilling or negligent officer, he could have found in his surrounding conditions abundant excuses for evasion or noncompliance. There existed at Cairo, as at every other army post, large or small, lack of officers, of organization, of arms, of equipments, of transportation, of that multitude of things considered necessary to the efficiency of moving troops. But in the West the sudden increase of armies brought to command,

and to direction and management, a large proportion of civilians, lacking methodical instruction and experience, which was without question a serious defect, but which left them free to invent and to adopt whatever expedients circumstances might suggest, or which rendered them satisfied, and willing to enter upon undertakings amidst a want of preparation and means that better information might have deemed indispensable.

The detailed reports and orders of the expedition we are describing clearly indicate these latter characteristics. We learn from them that the weather was bad, the roads heavy, the quartermaster's department and transportation deficient, and the gun-boats without adequate crews. Yet nowhere does it appear that these things were treated as impediments. Halleck's instructions dated January 6 were received by Grant on the morning of the 8th, and his answer was that immediate preparations were being made for carrying them out, and that Flag-Officer Foote would coöperate with three gun-boats. "The continuous rains for the last week or more," says Grant, "have rendered the roads extremely bad, and will necessarily make our movement slow. This however will operate worse upon the enemy, if he should come out to meet us, than upon us." The movement began on the evening of January 9, and its main delay occurred through Halleck's orders. It was fully resumed on the 12th. Brigadier-General McClernand, with five thousand men, marched southward, generally parallel to the Mississippi River, to Mayfield, midway between Fort Henry and Columbus, and pushed a reconnaissance closely up to the latter place. Brigadier-General Smith, starting from Paducah, marched a strong column southward, generally parallel to the Tennessee River, to Calloway, near Fort Henry. Foote and Grant, with three gun-boats, two of them new iron-clads, ascended the Tennessee to Fort Henry, drew the fire of the fort, and threw several shells into the works. It is needless to describe the routes, the precautions, the marching and counter-marching to mystify the enemy. While the rebels were yet expecting a further advance, the several detachments were already well on their return. "The expedition," says Grant, "if it had no other effect, served as a fine reconnaissance." But it had more positive results. Fort Henry and Columbus were thoroughly alarmed and drew in their outposts, while the Union forces learned from inspection that the route offered a feasible line of march to attack and invest Columbus, and demonstrated the inherent weakness and vulnerability of Fort Henry. This, be it remembered, was done with raw forces and without preparation, but with officers and men responding alike promptly to every order and executing their task more than cheerfully, even eagerly, with such means as were at hand when the order came. "The reconnaissance thus made," reports McClernand, "completed a march of 140 miles by the cavalry, and 75 miles by the infantry, over icy or miry roads, during a most inclement season." He further reports that the circumstances of the case "prevented me from taking, on leaving Cairo, the five-days' supply of rations and forage directed by the commanding officer of this district; hence the necessity of an early resort to other sources of supply. None other presented but to quarter upon the enemy or to purchase from loyal citizens. I accordingly resorted to both expedients as I had opportunity."

Lincoln's prompting did not end with merely having produced this reconnaissance. The President's patience was well-nigh exhausted; and while his uneasiness drove him to no act of rashness, it caused him to repeat his admonitions and suggestions. In addition to his telegrams and letters to the Western commanders between December 31 and January 6, he once more wrote to both, on January 13, to point out how advantage might be taken of the military condition as it then existed. Halleck had emphasized the danger of moving on "exterior lines," and insisted that it was merely repeating the error committed at Bull Run and would as inevitably produce disaster. Lincoln in his letter shows that the defeat at Bull Run did not result from movement on exterior lines, but from failure to use exterior lines with judgment and concert; and he further illustrated how the Western armies might now, by judicious coöperation, secure important military results.

MY DEAR SIR: * Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer, them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no

* This letter was addressed to Buell, but a copy of it was also sent to Halleck. [War Records.]

change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reënforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate, not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months' men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and east Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either; but seize Columbus and east Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the east Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

Buell made no reply to this letter of Lincoln's; but Halleck sent an indirect answer a week later, in a long letter to General McClellan, under date of January 20. The communication is by no means a model of correspondence when we remember that it emanates from a trained writer upon military science. It is long and somewhat rambling; it finds fault with politics and politicians in war, in evident ignorance of both politics and politicians. It charges that past want of success "is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals," in plain contradiction of the actual facts. It condemns "pepper-box strategy," and recommends detached operations in the same breath. The more noticeable point of the letter is that, while reiterating that the General-in-Chief had furnished no general plan, and while the principal commanders had neither unity of views nor concert of action, it ventures, though somewhat feebly, to recommend a combined system of operations for the West. Says Halleck, in this letter:

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. . . . This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base, and two good navigable rivers extending far into the interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force—not less than 60,000 effective men.

The idea was by no means new. Buell had tentatively suggested it to McClellan as early as November 27; McClellan had asked further details about it December 5; Buell had again specifically elaborated it, "as the most important strategical point in the whole field of operations," to McClellan on December 29, and as the "center" of the rebellion front in the West, to Halleck on January 3. Yet, recognizing this line as the enemy's chief weakness, McClellan at Washington, Buell at Louisville, and Halleck at St. Louis, holding the President's unlimited trust and authority, had allowed nearly two months to elapse, directing the Government power to other objects, to the neglect, not alone of military success, but of plans of coöperation, of counsel, of intention to use this great and recognized military advantage, until the country was fast losing confidence and even hope. Even now Halleck did not propose immediately to put his theory into practice. Like Buell, he was calling for more troops for the "politicians" to supply. It is impossible to guess when he might have been ready to move on his great strategic line, if subordinate officers, more watchful and enterprising, had not in a measure forced the necessity upon his attention.

GRANT AND THOMAS IN KENTUCKY.

In the early stage of military organization in the West, when so many volunteer colonels were called to immediate active duty in the field, the West Point education of Grant and his practical campaign training in the Mexican war made themselves immediately felt and appreciated at the department headquarters. His usefulness and superiority were at once evident by the clearness and brevity of his correspondence, the correctness of routine reports and promptness of their transmission, the pertinence and practical quality of his suggestions, the readiness and fertility of expedient with which he executed orders. Any one reading over his letters of this first period of his military service is struck by the fact that through him something was always accomplished. There was absence of excuse, complaint, or delay; always the report of a task performed. If his means or supplies were imperfect, he found or improvised the best available substitute; if he could not execute the full requirement, he performed so much of it as was possible. He always had an opinion, and that opinion was positive, intelligible, practical. We find therefore that his allotted tasks from the very first rose continually in importance. He gained in authority and usefulness, not by solicitation or intrigue, but by services rendered. He was sent to more and more difficult duties, to larger supervision, to heavier responsibilities. From guarding a station at Mexico on the North

Missouri railroad, to protecting a railroad terminus at Ironton in south-east Missouri; from there to brief inspection duty at Jefferson City, then to the command of the military district of south-east Missouri; finally to the command of the great military depot and rendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, with its several outlying posts and districts, and the supervision of its complicated details about troops, arms, and supplies to be collected and forwarded in all directions,—clearly it was not chance which brought him to such duties, but his fitness to perform them. It was from the vantage ground of this enlarged command that he had checkmated the rebel occupation of Columbus, by immediately seizing Paducah and Smithland. And from Cairo also he organized and led his first experiment in field fighting, at what is known as the battle of Belmont.

Just before Frémont was relieved, and while he was in the field in nominal pursuit of Price, he had ordered Grant to clear south-eastern Missouri of guerrillas, with the double view of restoring local authority and preventing reënforcements to Price. Movements were in progress to this end when it became apparent that the rebel stronghold at Columbus was preparing to send out a column.

Grant organized an expedition to counteract this design, and on the evening of November 6 left Cairo with about 3000 men on transports, under convoy of 2 gun-boats, and steamed down the river. Upon information gained while on his route, he determined to break up a rebel camp at Belmont Landing, on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, as the best means of making his expedition effective. On the morning of the 7th he had landed his troops at Hunter's Point, three miles above Belmont, and marched to a favorable place for attack back of the rebel encampment, which was situated in a large open field and was protected on the land side by a line of abatis. By the time Grant reached his position the rebel camp, originally consisting of a single regiment, had been reënforced by four regiments under General Pillow, from Columbus. A deliberate battle, with about equal forces, ensued. Though the Confederate line courageously contested the ground, the Union line, steadily advancing, swept the rebels back, penetrating the abatis and gaining the camp of the enemy, who took shelter in disorder under the steep river-bank. Grant's troops had gained a complete and substantial victory, but they now frittered it away by a disorderly exultation, and a greedy plunder of the camp they had stormed. The record does not show who was responsible for the unmilitary conduct, but it quickly brought its retribution. Before the Unionists were aware of it, General Polk had brought an additional reënforcement of several regiments across the river and hurriedly marched them to cut off the Federal retreat, which, instead of an orderly march from the battle-field, became a hasty scramble to get out of danger. Grant himself, unaware that the few companies left as a guard near the landing had already embarked, remained on shore to find them, and encountered instead the advancing rebel line. Discovering his mistake, he rode back to the landing, where "his horse slid down the river-bank on its haunches and trotted on board a transport over a plank thrust out for him."* Belmont was a drawn battle; or, rather, it was first a victory for the Federals and then a victory for the Confederates. The courage and the loss were nearly equal: 79 killed and 289 wounded on the Union side; 105 killed and 419 wounded on the Confederate side.

Brigadier-General McClernand, second in command in the battle of Belmont, was a fellow-townsman of the President, and to him Lincoln wrote the following letter of thanks and encouragement to the troops engaged:

> This is not an official but a social letter. You have had a battle, and without being able to judge as to the precise measure of its value, I think it is safe to say that you, and all with you, have done honor to yourselves and the flag, and service to the country. Most gratefully do I thank you and them. In my present position, I must care for the whole nation; but I hope it will be no injustice to any other State for me to indulge a little home pride, that Illinois does not disappoint us. I have just closed a long interview with Mr. Washburne, in which he has detailed the many difficulties you and those with you labor under. Be assured, we do not forget or neglect you. Much, very much, goes undone; but it is because we have not the power to do it faster than we do. Some of your forces are without arms; but the same is true here, and at every other place where we have considerable bodies of troops. The plain matter-of-fact is, our good people have rushed to the rescue of the Government faster than the Government can find arms to put into their hands. It would be agreeable to each division of the army to know its own precise destination; but the Government cannot immediately, nor inflexibly at any time, determine as to all; nor, if determined, can it tell its friends without at the same time telling its enemies. We know you do all as wisely and well as you can; and you will not be deceived if you conclude the same is true of us. Please give my respects and thanks to all.†

Belmont having been a mere episode, it drew after it no further movement in that direction. Grant and his command resumed their routine work of neighborhood police and observation. Buell and Halleck, both coming to their departments as new commanders shortly afterward, were absorbed with difficulties at other points. Secession was not yet

* Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth," p. 23.

† Lincoln to McClernand, Nov. 10, 1861. Unpublished MS.

quieted in Kentucky. The Union troops at Cairo, Paducah, Smithland, and other river towns yet stood on the defensive, fearing rebel attack rather than preparing to attack rebels. Columbus and Bowling Green were the principal Confederate camps, and attracted and received the main attention from the Union commanders.

The first noteworthy occurrence following Belmont, as well as the beginning of the succession of brilliant Union victories which distinguished the early months of the year 1862, was the battle of Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky. It had been the earnest desire of President Lincoln that a Union column should be sent to seize and hold east Tennessee, and General McClellan had urged such movement upon General Buell in several dispatches almost peremptory in their tone. At first Buell seemed to entertain the idea and promised compliance; but as his army increased in strength and discipline his plans and hopes centered themselves in an advance against Bowling Green, with the design to capture Nashville. General Thomas remained posted in eastern Kentucky, hoping that he might be called upon to form his column and lead it through the Cumberland Gap to Knoxville; but the weeks passed by, and the orders which he received only tended to scatter his few regiments for local defense and observation. With the hesitation of the Union army at this point, the Confederates became bolder. Zollicoffer established himself in a fortified camp on the north bank of the Cumberland River, where he could at the same time defend Cumberland Gap and incite eastern Kentucky to rebellion. Here he became so troublesome that Buell found it necessary to dislodge him, and late in December sent General Thomas orders to that effect. Thomas was weak in numbers, but strong in vigilance and courage. He made a difficult march during the early weeks of January, 1862, and halted at Logan's Cross Roads, within ten miles of the rebel camp, to await the junction of his few regiments. The enemy, under Zollicoffer and his district commander, Crittenden, resolved to advance and crush him before he could bring his force together. Thomas prepared for and accepted battle. The enemy had made a fatiguing night march of nine miles, through a cold rain and over muddy roads. On the morning of January 19 the battle, begun with spirit, soon had a dramatic incident. The rebel commander, Zollicoffer, mistaking a Union regiment, rode forward and told its commanding officer, Colonel Speed S. Fry, that he was firing upon friends. Fry, not aware that Zollicoffer was an enemy, turned away to order his men to stop firing. At this moment one of Zollicoffer's aides rode up, and seeing the true state of affairs drew his revolver and began firing at Fry, wounding his horse. Fry, wheeling in turn, drew his revolver and returned the fire, shooting Zollicoffer through the heart.* The fall of the rebel commander served to hasten and complete the defeat of the Confederates. They retreated in disorder to their fortified camp at Mill Springs. Thomas ordered immediate pursuit, and the same night invested their camp and made preparations to storm their intrenchments the following morning. When day came, however, it was found that the rebels had precipitately crossed the Cumberland River during the night, abandoning their wounded, twelve pieces of artillery, many small-arms, and extensive supplies, and had fled in utter dispersion to the mountains. It was one of the most remarkable Union victories of the war. General Thomas's forces consisted of a little over six regiments, those of Crittenden and Zollicoffer something over ten regiments.† It was more than a defeat for the Confederates. Their army was annihilated, and Cumberland Gap once more stood exposed, so that Buell might have sent a Union column and taken possession of eastern Tennessee with but feeble opposition. It is possible that the brilliant opportunity would at last have tempted him to comply with the urgent wishes of the President and the express orders of the General-in-Chief, had not unexpected events in another quarter diverted his attention and interest.

There was everywhere, about the months of December, 1861, and January, 1862, a perceptible increase of the Union armies by fresh regiments from the Northern States, a better supply of arms through recent importations, an increase of funds from new loans, and the delivery for use of various war material, the product of the summer's manufacture. Of prime importance to the military operations which centered at Cairo was the completion and equipment of the new gun-boats. A word of retrospect concerning this arm of the military service is here necessary. Commander John Rodgers was sent West in the month of May, 1861, to begin the construction of war vessels for Western rivers. Without definite plans he had purchased, and hastily converted, and armed as best he might, three river steamers. These were put into service in September. They were provided with cannon, but had no iron plating. They were the *Tyler*,‡ of 7 guns; the *Lexington*, of 6 guns; and the *Con-*

* Cist, "Army of the Cumberland," pp. 17, 18.

† Van Horne, "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 57.

‡ This vessel seems to have been named the *Tyler* at one time and the *Taylor* at another.

estoga, of 3 guns. Making Cairo their central station, they served admirably in the lighter duties of river police, in guarding transports, and in making hasty trips of reconnaissance. For the great expedition down the Mississippi, projected during the summer and fall of 1861, a more powerful class of vessels was provided.* The distinguished civil engineer James B. Eads designed and was authorized to build 7 new gun-boats, to carry 13 guns each, and to be protected about the bows with iron plating capable of resisting the fire of heavy artillery. They were named the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburg*, and *St. Louis*. Two additional gun-boats of the same type of construction, but of larger size,— the *Benton*, of 16 guns, and the *Essex*, of 5 guns,— were converted from other vessels about the same time. At the time Flag-Officer Foote finally accepted the first seven (January 15, 1862), it had been found impossible to supply them with crews of Eastern seamen. Resort was had to Western steamboatmen, and also to volunteers from infantry recruits. The joint reconnaissance of Grant and Foote to Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, January 14, has been related. A second examination was made by General Smith, who on January 22 reports that he had been within two miles and a half of the fort; that the river had risen fourteen feet since the last visit, giving a better opportunity to reconnoiter; more important, that the high water had drowned out a troublesome advance battery, and that, in his opinion, two iron-clad gun-boats could make short work of it. It is evident that, possessed of this additional information, Grant and Foote immediately resolved upon vigorous measures. Grant had already asked permission to visit Halleck at St. Louis. This was given; but Halleck refused to entertain his project. So firmly convinced was Grant, however, that his plan was good, that, though unsuccessful at first, he quickly renewed the request.† "Commanding-General Grant and myself," telegraphed Foote to Halleck (January 28, 1862), "are of opinion that Fort Henry on the Tennessee River can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?" To this Grant on the same day added the direct proposal, "With permission, I will take Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there." It would appear that no immediate answer was returned, for on the following day Grant renews his proposition with more emphasis.‡

It is easy to perceive what produced the sudden change in Halleck's mind. Grant's persistent urging was evidently the main influence, but two other events contributed essentially to the result. The first was the important victory gained by Thomas at Mill Springs in eastern Kentucky on January 19, the certain news of which was probably just reaching him; the second was a telegram from Washington, informing him that General Beauregard, with fifteen regiments from the Confederate army in Virginia, was being sent to Kentucky to be added to Johnston's army.§ "I was not ready to move," explains Halleck afterward, "but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces." It is well also to remember in this connection that two days before, President Lincoln's War Order No. 1 had been published, ordering a general movement of all the armies of the Union on the coming 22d of February. Whatever induced it, the permission now given was full and hearty. "Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry," Halleck telegraphed to Grant on the 30th of January. "I will send you written instructions by mail."

Grant and Foote had probably already begun their preparation. Receiving Halleck's instructions on February 1, Grant on the following day started his expedition of 15,000 men on transports, and Foote accompanied him with 7 gun-boats for convoy and attack. Their plan contemplated a bombardment by the fleet from the river, and assault on the land side by the troops. For this purpose General McClernand, with a division, was landed four miles below the fort on February 4. They made a reconnaissance on the 5th, and being joined by another division, under General Smith, were ordered forward to invest the fort on the 6th. This required a circuitous march of eight miles, during which the gun-boats of Flag-Officer Foote, having less than half the distance to go by the river, moved on and began the bombardment. The capture proved easier than was anticipated. General Tilghman, the Confederate commander of the

* To show the unremitting interest of the President in these preparations, and how his encouragement and prompting followed even their minor details, we quote from his autograph manuscript a note to the Secretary of War:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Jan. 24, 1862.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR SIR: On reflection I think you better make a peremptory order on the ordnance officer at Pittsburg to ship the ten mortars and two beds to Cairo instantly, and all others as fast as finished, till ordered to stop, reporting each shipment to the Department here. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

† Grant, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 287.

‡ Ibid.

§ McClellan to Halleck and Buell, January 29, 1862. War Records.

fort, had, early that morning, sent away his 3000 infantry to Fort Donelson, being convinced that he was beset by an overpowering force. He kept only one company of artillerists to work the eleven river guns of the fort; with these he defended the work about two hours, but without avail. Foote's 4 iron-plated gun-boats steamed boldly within 600 yards. The bombardment, though short, was well sustained on both sides, and not without its fluctuating chances. Two of the heaviest guns in the fort were soon silenced, one by bursting, the other being rendered useless by an accident with the priming wire. At this point a rebel shot passed through the casemate and the boiler of the gun-boat *Essex*, and she drifted helplessly out of the fight. But the remaining gun-boats continued their close and fierce attack, and five more of the rebel guns being speedily disabled, General Tilghman hauled down his flag and came on board to surrender the fort. McClernand's troops, from the land side, soon after entered the work and took formal possession. On the same day Grant telegraphed to Halleck, "Fort Henry is ours"; and his dispatch bore yet another significant announcement eminently characteristic of the man, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th."

FORT DONELSON.

THE news of the capture of Fort Henry created a sudden consternation among the Confederate commanders in Tennessee. It seemed as if the key-stone had unexpectedly fallen out of their arch of well-planned defenses. Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Hardee immediately met in a council of war at Bowling Green, and after full discussion united in a memorandum acknowledging the disaster and resolving on the measures which in their judgment it rendered necessary. They foresaw that Fort Donelson would probably also fall; that Johnston's army must retreat to Nashville to avoid capture; that since Columbus was now separated from Bowling Green, the main army at Columbus must retreat to Humboldt, or possibly to Grand Junction, leaving only a sufficient garrison to make a desperate defense of the works and the river;* and immediate orders were issued to prepare for these movements. Nevertheless, Johnston, to use his own language, resolved "to fight for Nashville at Donelson." For this purpose he divided the army at Bowling Green, starting 8000 of his men under Generals Buckner and Floyd, together with 4000 more under Pillow from other points, on a rapid march to reënforce the threatened fort,† while General Hardee led his remaining 14,000 men on their retreat to Nashville.‡ This retreat was not alone a choice of evils. Even if Fort Henry had not fallen and Donelson been so seriously menaced, the overwhelming force of Buell would have compelled a retrograde movement. Had Buell been a commander of enterprise he would have seized this chance of inflicting great damage upon the diminished enemy in retreat. His advance guard, indeed, followed; but Johnston's remnant, marching night and day, succeeded in reaching the Cumberland River opposite Nashville, where, after preparations to cross in haste, the rebel commander awaited with intense eagerness to hear the fate of Donelson.

Of the two commanders in the West, the idea of the movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers was more favorably thought of by Halleck than by Buell. Buell pointed out its value, but began no movement that looked to its execution. Halleck, on the contrary, not only realized its importance, but immediately entertained the design of ultimately availing himself of it; thus he wrote at the time he ordered the reconnaissance which demonstrated its practicability: "The demonstration which General Grant is now making I have no doubt will keep them [the enemy] in check till preparations can be made for operations on the Tennessee or Cumberland."§ His conception of the necessary preparations was, however, almost equivalent to the rejection of the plan. He thought that it would require a force of 60,000 men; and to delay it till that number and their requisite material of war could be gathered or detached under prevailing ideas would amount to indefinite postponement.

When at last, through Grant's importunity, the movement was actually begun by the advance to capture Fort Henry, a curious interest in the expedition and its capabilities developed itself among the commanders. Grant's original proposition was simply to capture Fort Henry and establish a large camp. Nothing further was proposed, and Halleck's instructions went only to the same extent, with one addition. As the reported arrival of Beauregard with reënforcements had been the turning influence in Halleck's consent, so he proposed that the capture of Fort Henry should be immediately followed by a dash at the railroad bridges across the Tennessee and their destruction, to prevent those reënforcements from reaching Johnston. But

* Beauregard, Memorandum, Feb. 7, 1862. War Records.

† Johnston to ———, March 17, 1862. War Records.

‡ Johnston to Benjamin, Feb. 8, 1862. War Records.

§ Halleck to McClellan, Jan. 14, 1862. War Records.

with the progress of Grant's movement the chances of success brightened, and the plan began correspondingly to expand. On the 2d of February, when Grant's troops were preparing to invest Fort Henry, Halleck's estimate of coming possibilities had risen a little. He wrote to Buell:

> At present it is only proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover [Donelson], and, if possible, cut the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green.

Here we have Donelson added to Henry in the intention of the department commander. That the same intention existed in Grant's mind is evident, for, as already related, on the fall of Henry on the 6th, he immediately telegraphed to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. . . . I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." It is to be noted, however, that in proposing to destroy Fort Donelson, he still limits himself to his original proposition of an intrenched camp at Fort Henry.

At the critical moment Halleck's confidence in success at Fort Henry wavered, and he called upon Buell with importunity for sufficient help to make sure work of it. Buell's confidence also seems to have been very weak; for, commanding 72,502 men,—46,150 of them "in the field,"—he could only bring himself to send a single brigade* to aid in a work which he had described as of such momentous consequence. Afterward, indeed, he sent eight regiments more; but these were not from his 70,000 in the field. They were raw troops from Ohio and Indiana, which McClellan, with curious misconception of their usefulness, had ordered to Buell, who did not need them, instead of to Halleck, who was trying to make every man do double duty.

Out of this uncertainty about the final result at Fort Henry, the indecision of Buell's character becomes deplorably manifest. McClellan, satisfied that Buell could not advance against Johnston's force at Bowling Green over the difficult winter roads, and having not yet heard of the surrender of Fort Henry, suggested to both Buell and Halleck the temporary suspension of operations on other lines in order to make a quick combined movement up the Tennessee and the Cumberland. This was on February 6. Buell's fancy at first caught at the proposal, for he replied that evening:

> This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation, preparative or concert, has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000, if not 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning.†

Halleck was more positive in his convictions. He telegraphed to McClellan on the same day:

> If you can give me, in addition to what I have in this department, 10,000 men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000, and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle.

News of the fall of Fort Henry having been received at Washington, McClellan twenty-four hours later telegraphed to Halleck: "Either Buell or yourself should soon go to the scene of operations. Why not have Buell take the line of [the] Tennessee and operate on Nashville, while your troops turn Columbus? These two points gained, a combined movement on Memphis will be next in order." The dispatch was in substance repeated to Buell, who by this time thought he had made up his mind, for two hours later he answered: "I cannot, on reflection, think a change of my line would be advisable. . . . I hope General Grant will not require further rëenforcements. I will go if necessary." Thus on the night of the 7th, with the single drilled brigade from Green River and the eight raw regiments from Ohio and Indiana, he proposed to leave the important central line on which Grant had started to its chances.

A night's reflection made him doubt the correctness of his decision, for he telegraphed on the morning of the 8th, "I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet." Halleck's views were less changeable: at noon on the 8th, he again urged that Buell should transfer the bulk of his forces to the Cumberland River, to move by water on Nashville. To secure this coöperation, he further proposed a modification of department lines to give Buell command on the Cumberland and Hitchcock or Sherman on the Tennessee, with superior command for himself over both.

No immediate response came from Washington, and three days elapsed when Halleck asked Buell specifically: "Can't you come with all your available forces and command the column up the Cumberland? I shall go to the Tennessee this week."‡ Buell's desire, vibrating like a pendulum between the two brilliant opportunities before him, now swings towards Halleck's proposal, but with provoking indefiniteness and fatal slowness. He answers that he will go either to the Cumberland or to the Tennessee, but that it will require ten days to transfer his troops.§ In this emergency,

* Buell to McClellan, Feb. 5, 1862. War Records.
† Buell to McClellan, Feb. 6, 1862. War Records.
‡ Halleck to Buell, Feb. 11, 1862. War Records.
§ Buell to Halleck, Feb. 12, 1862. War Records.

when hours counted as weeks, Buell showed himself almost as helpless and useless as a dismasted ship, rolling uneasily and idly in the trough of the sea. With, by this time, nearly 100,000 men* in the field, and with certainly a larger proportion of drilled and instructed regiments than could be found either in the camp of Grant or in the camps of the enemy, he could not make himself felt in any direction; he would neither attack the enemy in front nor send decisive help to Grant. He gives forth the everlasting cry of preparation, of delay, of danger.

During his painful hesitation, events forced him to a new conclusion. News came that the rebels had evacuated Bowling Green, and he telegraphed:

> The evacuation of Bowling Green, leaving the way open to Nashville, makes it proper to resume my original plan. I shall advance on Nashville with all the speed I can.

From this last determination, Halleck appealed beseechingly to the General-in-Chief. He announced that Grant had formally invested Fort Donelson and that the bombardment was progressing favorably, but he further explained that since the evacuation of Bowling Green, the enemy were concentrating against Grant. He claimed that it was bad strategy for Buell to advance on Nashville over broken bridges and bad roads, and this point he reiterated with emphasis. He telegraphed on February 16:

> I am still decidedly of the opinion that Buell should not advance on Nashville, but come to the Cumberland with his available forces. United to Grant we can take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, and by another central movement cut off both Columbus and Nashville. . . . Unless we can take Fort Donelson very soon we shall have the whole force of the enemy on us. Fort Donelson is the turning-point of the war, and we must take it, at whatever sacrifice.

But his appeal was unavailing. McClellan took sides with Buell, insisting that to occupy Nashville would be most decisive. Buell had, indeed, ordered Nelson's division to go to the help of Grant; but in the conflict of his own doubts and intentions the orders had been so tardy that Nelson's embarkation was only beginning on the day when Donelson surrendered. McClellan's further conditional order to Buell, to help Grant if it were necessary, offered a yet more distant prospect of succor. If the siege of Donelson had been prolonged, assistance from these directions would of course have been found useful. In the actual state of facts, however, they show both Buell and McClellan incapable, even under continued pressure, of seizing and utilizing the fleeting chances of war which so often turn the scale of success, and which so distinctly call out the higher quality of military leadership.

Amidst the sluggish counsels of commanders of departments, the energy of Grant and the courage and intrepidity of his raw Western soldiers had already decided one of the great crises of the war. Grant had announced to Halleck that he would storm Fort Donelson on the 8th of February, but he failed to count one of the chances of delay. "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone," reported he, "but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising waters."† This detention served to change the whole character of the undertaking. If he could have marched and attacked on the 8th, he would have found but 6000 men in the fort, which his own troops largely outnumbered; as it turned out, the half of Johnston's army sent from Bowling Green and other points, conducted by Generals Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner, arrived before the fort was invested, increasing the garrison to an aggregate of 17,000 and greatly extending the lines of rifle-pits and other defenses.‡ This presented an altogether different and more serious problem. The enemy before Grant was now, if not superior, at least equal in numbers, and had besides the protection of a large and well-constructed earth-work, armed with seventeen heavy and forty-eight field-guns. It is probable that this changed aspect of affairs was not immediately known to him; if it was, he depended on the reënforcements which Halleck had promised, and which soon began to arrive. Early on the morning of the 12th he started on his march, with the divisions of McClernand and Smith, numbering 15,000. At noon they were within two miles of Donelson. That afternoon and all the following day, February 13, were occupied in driving in the rebel pickets, finding the approaches, and drawing the lines of investment around the

* The following is the force in the whole of the late Department of the Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present: 92 regiments infantry, 60,882 for duty; 79,334 aggregate, present and absent. 11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies cavalry, 9222 for duty; 11,496 aggregate, present and absent. 28 field and 2 siege batteries, 3368 for duty; 3953 aggregate, present and absent. [Buell to Thomas, February 14, 1862. War Records.]

† Grant to Cullum, February 8, 1862. War Records.

‡ General Grant's estimate of the Confederate forces is 21,000. He says he marched against the fort with but 15,000, but that he received reënforcements before the attack, and their continued arrival had, at the time of the surrender, increased his army to about 27,000. Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., pp. 299 and 315.

fort. A gallant storming assault by four Illinois regiments upon one of the rebel batteries was an exciting incident of the afternoon's advance, but was unsuccessful.

To understand the full merit of the final achievement, the conditions under which the siege of Donelson was thus begun must be briefly mentioned. The principal fort, or earthwork which bore the military name, lay on the west bank of the Cumberland River, half a mile north of the little town of Dover. The fort occupied the terminal knoll of a high ridge ending in the angle between the river and the mouth of Hickman Creek. This main work consisted of two batteries of heavy guns, primarily designed to control the river navigation. But when General Johnston resolved to defend Nashville at Donelson and gathered an army of 17,000 men for the purpose, the original fort and the town of Dover, and all the intervening space, were inclosed by a long, irregular line of rifle-pits connecting more substantial breastworks and embankments on the favorable elevations, in which field-batteries were planted; the whole chain of intrenchments, extending from Hickman Creek on the north till it inclosed the town of Dover on the south, having a total length of about two and a half miles. Outside the rifle-pits were the usual obstructions of felled trees and abatis, forming an interlacing barrier difficult to penetrate.

The Union troops had had no fighting at Fort Henry; at that place the gun-boats had done the whole work. The debarkation on the Tennessee, the reconnaissance, the march towards Donelson, the picket skirmishing during the 12th and 13th, had only been such as to give them zest and exhilaration. When, on the morning of the 12th, the march began, the weather was mild and agreeable; but on the afternoon of the 13th, while the army was stretching itself cautiously around the rebel intrenchments, the thermometer suddenly went down, a winter storm set in with rain, snow, sleet, ice, and a piercing north-west wind, that made the men lament the imprudence they had committed in leaving overcoats and blankets behind. Grant's army was composed entirely of Western regiments; fifteen from the single State of Illinois, and a further aggregate of seventeen from the States of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa. Some of these regiments had seen guerrilla fighting in Missouri, some had been through the battle of Belmont, but many were new to the privations and dangers of an active campaign. Nearly all the officers came from civil life; but a common thought, energy, and will animated the whole mass. It was neither discipline nor mere military ambition; it was patriot work in its noblest and purest form. They had left their homes and varied peaceful occupations to defend the Government and put down rebellion. They were in the flush and exaltation of a common heroic impulse: in such a mood, the rawest recruit was as brave as the oldest veteran; and in this spirit they endured hunger and cold, faced snow and ice, held tenaciously the lines of the siege, climbed without flinching through the tangled abatis, and advanced into the deadly fire from the rifle-pits with a purpose and a devotion never excelled by soldiers of any nation or epoch.

Flag-Officer Foote, with six gun-boats, arrived the evening of the 13th; also six regiments sent by water. Fort Henry had been reduced by the gun-boats alone, and it was resolved first to try the effect of these new and powerful fighting machines upon the works of Donelson. Accordingly on Friday, February 14, the assault was begun by an attack from the six gun-boats. As before, the situation of the fort enabled the four iron-clads to advance up-stream towards the batteries, the engines holding them steadily against the swift current, presenting their heavily plated bows as a target for the enemy. The attack had lasted an hour and a half. The iron-clads were within 400 yards of the rebel embankments, the heavy armor was successfully resisting the shot and shell from the fort, the fire of the enemy was slackening, indicating that the water-batteries were becoming untenable, when two of the gun-boats were suddenly disabled and drifted out of the fight, one having her wheel carried away, and the other her tiller-ropes damaged.

These accidents, due to the weakness and exposure of the pilot-houses, compelled a cessation of the river attack and a withdrawal of the gun-boats for repairs, and gave the beleaguered garrison corresponding exultation and confidence. Flag-Officer Foote had been wounded in the attack, and deeming it necessary to take his disabled vessels temporarily back to Cairo, he requested Grant to visit him for consultation. Grant therefore went on board one of the gun-boats before dawn on the morning of the 15th, and it was arranged between the commanders that he should perfect his lines and hold the fort in siege until Foote could return from Cairo to assist in renewing the attack.

During all this time there had been a fluctuation of fear and hope in the garrison — from the repulse of McClernand's assault on the 13th, the prompt investment of the fort, the gun-boat attack and its repulse. There was want of harmony between Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, the three commanders within the fort.

Prior to the gun-boat attack a bold sortie was resolved upon, which project was, however, abandoned through the orders or non-compliance of Pillow. That night the second council of war determined to make a serious effort to extricate the garrison. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the divisions of Pillow and Buckner moved out to attack McClernand's division, and if possible open an avenue of retreat by the road running southward from Dover to Charlotte. The Confederates made their attack not only with spirit but with superior numbers. Driving back McClernand's right, they were by 11 o'clock in the forenoon in complete possession of the coveted Charlotte road. Buckner, who simultaneously attacked McClernand's left, did not fare so well. He was repulsed, and compelled to retire to the intrenchments from which he had issued. At this critical point Grant returned from his visit to Foote. What he found and what he did is stated with brevity in the message he hastily sent back:

> If all the gun-boats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gun-boats do not show themselves, it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge, to save appearances. I do not expect the gun-boats to go into action, but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range.*

In execution of the design here announced, Grant sent an order to General C. F. Smith, commanding the second division, who held the extreme left of the investing line, to storm the intrenchments in front of him. His men had as yet had no severe fighting, and now went forward enthusiastically to their allotted task, carrying an important outwork with impetuous gallantry. Learning of his success, Grant in turn ordered forward the entire remainder of his force under Wallace and McClernand. This order was also executed during the afternoon, and by nightfall the whole of the ground lost by the enemy's morning attack was fully regained. There is a conflict of testimony about the object of the attack of the enemy. Buckner says it was to effect the immediate escape of the garrison; Pillow says he had no such understanding, and that neither he nor any one else made preparation for departure. The opportunity, therefore, which his division had during the forenoon to retire by the open road to Charlotte was not improved. By evening the chance was gone, for the Federals had once more closed that avenue of escape.

* Grant to Foote, Feb. 15, 1862. War Records.

During the night of the 15th, the Confederate commanders met in council to decide what they should do. Buckner, the junior, very emphatically gave the others to understand that the situation of the garrison was desperate, and that it would require but an hour or two of assault on the next morning to capture his portion of the defenses. Such a contingency left them no practical alternative. Floyd and Pillow, however, had exaggerated ideas of the personal danger they would be in from the Government if they permitted themselves to become prisoners, and made known their great solicitude to get away. An agreement was therefore reached through which Floyd, the senior general, first turned over his command to Pillow; then Pillow, the second in command, in the same way relinquished his authority to Buckner, the junior general. This formality completed, Floyd and Pillow made hasty preparations, and taking advantage of the arrival of a rebel steamer boarded it, with their personal followers, during the night, and abandoned the fort and its garrison.

As usual, the active correspondents of Western newspapers were with the expedition, and through their telegrams something of the varying fortunes of the Kentucky campaign and the Donelson siege had become known to the country, while President Lincoln at Washington gleaned still further details from the scattering official reports which came to the War Department through army channels. His urgent admonitions to Buell and Halleck in the previous month to bring about efficient coöperation have already been related. The new and exciting events again aroused his most intense solicitude, and prompted him to send the following suggestion by telegraph to Halleck:

> You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside, to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gun-boat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

Before this telegram reached its destination, the siege of Donelson was terminated.

On Sunday morning, the 16th of February, when the troops composing the Federal line of investment were preparing for a final assault, a note came from Buckner to Grant, proposing an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation. The language of Grant's reply served to crown the fame of his achievement:

> Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

His resolute phrase gained him a prouder title than was ever bestowed by knightly accolade. Thereafter, the army and the country, with a fanciful play upon the initials of his name, spoke of him as "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Buckner had no other balm for the sting of his defeat than to say that Grant's terms were ungenerous and unchivalric, but the necessity compelled him to accept them. That day Grant was enabled to telegraph to Halleck:

> We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod R. Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2000 to 4000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores.

By this brilliant and important victory Grant's fame sprang suddenly into full and universal recognition. Congress was in session at Washington; his personal friend and representative, Hon. Elihu B. Washburne, member from the Galena district of Illinois, lost no time in proposing a resolution of thanks to Grant and his army, which was voted without delay and with generous gratitude. With even more heartiness, President Lincoln nominated him major-general of volunteers, and the Senate at once confirmed the appointment. The whole military service felt the inspiring event. Many of the colonels in Grant's army were made brigadier-generals; and promotion ran, like a quickening leaven, through the whole organization. Halleck also reminded the Government of his desire for larger power. "Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers," he telegraphed the day after the surrender, "and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson."

Aug 1888



LINCOLN CATHEDRAL.



SEAL OF THE SEE OF LINCOLN.

NO man by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature, but dignity of carriage and a masterful air may accomplish many inches; — the yard-stick bears false witness to a Louis Quatorze, a Napoleon, or a Nelson. And as it is with men, so it is with cities. Canterbury counts twenty thousand souls and looks small, weak, and rural. Lincoln counts only a few thousand more, but, domineering on its hill-top, makes so brave a show of municipal pride, has so truculent an air and attitude, that no tourist thinks to patronize it as a mere provincial town. It is a city to his eye; and the greatness of its church simply accentuates the fact. Canterbury's cathedral almost crushes Canterbury, asleep in its broad vale. Durham's rock-borne minster projects so boldly from the town behind it that it still seems what it really was in early years — at once the master of Durham and its bulwark against aggression. But Lincoln's church, though quite as big and as imperial as the others, seems but the crown and finish of the city which bears it aloft in a close, sturdy grasp. Like Durham cathedral, it stands on a promontory beneath which runs a river. But the hill is very much higher, and the town, instead of spreading away behind the church, tumbles steeply down the hill and far out beyond the stream. Here for the first time in England we feel as we almost always do in continental countries — not that the cathedral church has gathered a city about it, but that the city has built a cathedral church for its own glory and profit.

I.

IN truth, the importance of Lincoln as a town long antedates its importance as an ecclesiastical center. We cannot read far enough back in its history to find a record of its birth. When the Romans came — calling it *Lindum*

Colonia, making it mark the meeting-place of two of their great roads, and fortifying it as one of their chief stations — a British town was already lying a little to the northward of the spot they chose. After their departure and the coming of the English, Lindum flourished again, and still more conspicuously when the Danes took and kept it. At the advent of William the Norman it was one of the four chief towns in England, ruled in almost entire independence by a Danish oligarchy of twelve hereditary "lawmen," and containing 1150 inhabited houses, many of them mansions according to the standard of the age. William came from the north after his conquest of York and probably entered by that Roman gate-way which still stands not far from the cathedral; and with his coming began a new and yet more prosperous era for the town. In one corner of the Roman inclosure a great Norman castle soon began to rear its walls, and in another corner the first Norman bishop laid the foundations of a vast cathedral church.



PLAN OF LINCOLN CATHEDRAL.

SCALE 100 FEET TO 1 INCH.

A, Norman Recesses in West Front; B, C, D, Porches in Norman Front; E, Chapels in Early-English Wings; F, Nave; G, H, Chapels; K, Crossing under Central Tower; L, M, Great Transepts; N, Galilee-porch; O, Choir; P, Q, Choir-aisles; R, S, Minor (Eastern) Transepts; T, Retro-Choir; U, V, X, Chantries; W, South-east porch; Y, Cloisters; Z, Chapter-house; 28, Vestry; 33, Vestibule to Chapter-house; 34, Staircase to Library.

This part of England had received the gospel from Paulinus, the famous archbishop of the north, and was at first included in the wide diocese of Lichfield. In 678 a new see was formed which was called of Lindsey after the province, or of Sidnacester after the episcopal town — probably the modern town of Stow. Two years later it was divided, another chair being set up at Leicester. About the year 870 this chair was removed to Dorchester, and hither about 950 the chair of Sidnacester was likewise brought. When the Normans took control the chief place of the united sees was changed again, Lincoln being chosen because of that dominant station and that civic importance which to continental eyes seemed characteristic of the episcopal name.

II.

Remigius was the first Norman bishop of Dorchester, the first bishop of Lincoln; and about the year 1075, "in a place strong and fair," he began "a strong and fair church to the Virgin of virgins, which was both pleasant to God's servants and, as the time required, invincible to his enemies"; and he gave it in charge to secular canons, although he was himself a Benedictine. It was injured by a great fire in 1141, quickly repaired by Bishop Alexander in the later Norman style, and then almost utterly destroyed in 1185 by an earthquake which "split it in two from top to bottom." Nothing remains of the first cathedral of Lincoln to-day except a portion of Remigius's west-front (built into the vast Early-English façade), and the lower stages of the western towers, which, like the doorways in the front itself, were parts of Alexander's reconstructions.

Bishop Hugh of Avalon or of Burgundy — in the calendar, St. Hugh of Lincoln — began the present church, building the choir, the minor transepts, and a piece of the great transepts; and his immediate successors, by the middle of the thirteenth century, had completed these transepts, together with the nave, the west façade and its turrets and chapels, the great

made renders the concealment of shortcomings exceptionally difficult.

Though it is no part of my purpose to write a history of Uppingham, yet one episode in its later career it would be wrong to leave untold, unique as it is in school history, and illustrating at once the energy of its masters, the adaptability of its system to new conditions, and the loyal confidence inspired by its management. The record is valuable also as showing what may be done by a school in a great emergency.

In the autumn of 1875 an outbreak of fever took place in the town and the school, and some boys died. The school was broken up, and orders were given to make the sanitary arrangements of every portion of the school premises as perfect as possible, without regard to expense. This was done under the special direction of a government engineer, who certified to the completeness of the work. The authorities of the town, however, declined to join in this attempt at perfect sanitation. When the school reassembled, after Christmas, a new outbreak of fever proved that till everything was done nothing was done. It was a critical moment. Already it had begun to "rain" telegrams from anxious parents. It was plain that in a few days the houses might be empty, the large staff of teachers left without employment or means of support, and the grand results of twenty-five years of toil swept away at once. A bold step was conceived in Mr. Thring's resolute mind. Once more the school was broken up for a three-weeks' holiday. With the boys went to their parents an intimation that after Easter the school would reopen in some place then unknown, but which would at least be healthy. Meantime search was being made in many directions, and at length Borth, a small watering-place on the Welsh coast, was chosen as the temporary home of the school. The large summer hotel was leased, all the spare space in the village cottages taken, a temporary schoolroom erected, the stables turned into a carpentry, the coach-house into a gymnasium; special trains brought from Uppingham the household equipments for 30 masters, their families, and the 300 boys of the school; and on April 4, only 20 days after the site was secured, the school resumed its work on the wild Welsh coast, more than 100 miles from its forsaken home in the Midlands. The splendid faith of the masters in their own resources was rewarded by a grand tribute of confidence, when out of their whole number it was found that only three boys had failed to follow them in this great adventure. The three weeks of fierce race for life were followed by more than a year of quiet and excellent work at Borth, which thenceforth became famed far and wide as "Uppingham by the Sea"; and in April, 1877, the school returned to its now purified home in Rutland, amidst the rejoicings of the people, and with numbers greater than when it left. Among all the splendid traditions of English schools it may be doubted if there is any which tells of greater faith, courage, and loyalty of affection than does this year of adventurous exile in the records of Uppingham.

George R. Parkin.

EDWARD THRING.

THIS was a leader of the sons of light,
Of winsome cheer and strenuous command.
Upon the veteran hordes of Bigot-land
All day his vanguard spirit, flaming bright,
Bore up the brunt of unavailing fight.
Then, with the iron in his soul, one hand
Still on the hilt, he passed from that slim band
Out through the ranks to rearward and the night.
The day is lost, but not the day of days,
And ye his comrades in the losing war
Stand once again for liberty and love!
Close up the ranks; his deed your deeds let praise!
Against the front of dark where gleams one star,
Strive on to death as this great captain strove!

Bliss Carman.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE MISSISSIPPI AND SHILOH.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MISSISSIPPI.

AS a powerful supplement to the Union victories in Tennessee, the military operations west of the Mississippi River next demand our attention. Under the vigorous promptings of Halleck we left the army of General Curtis engaged in his trying midwinter campaign in south-western Missouri. He made ready with all haste to comply with the order to "push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price." His army obeyed every order with cheerful endurance. "They contend with mud, water, and snow and ice manfully," wrote Curtis under date of February 1, 1862, "and I trust they will not falter in the face of a more active foe." In the same spirit he encouraged his officers:

> The roads are indeed very bad, but they are worse for the enemy than for us if he attempts to retreat. . . . The men should help the teams out of difficulty when necessary, and all must understand that the elements are to be considered serious obstacles, which we have to encounter and overcome in this campaign. . . . Constant bad roads will be the rule, and a change for the better a rare exception.

As already remarked, Price had kept his situation and numbers well concealed. He was known to be at Springfield; but rumor exaggerated his force to 30,000, and it was uncertain whether he intended to retreat or advance. Reports also came that Van Dorn was marching to his support with 10,000 men. Curtis kept the offensive, however, pushing forward his outposts. By the 13th of February Price found his position untenable and ordered a retreat from Springfield. Since McCulloch would not come to Missouri to furnish Price assistance, Price was perforce compelled to go to Arkansas, where McCulloch might furnish him protection. Curtis pursued with vigor. "We continually take cattle, prisoners, wagons, and arms, which they leave in their flight," he wrote. Near the Arkansas line Price endeavored to make a stand with his rear-guard, but without success. On February 18, in a special order announcing the recent Union victories elsewhere, Curtis was able to congratulate his own troops as follows:

> You have moved in the most inclement weather, over the worst of roads, making extraordinary long marches, subsisting mainly on meat without salt, and for the past six days you have been under the fire of the fleeing enemy. You have driven him out of Missouri, restored the Union flag to the virgin soil of Arkansas, and triumphed in two contests.

The rebels were in no condition to withstand him, and he moved forward to Cross Hollow, where the enemy had hastily abandoned a large cantonment with extensive buildings, only a portion of which they stopped to burn. It was time for Curtis to pause. He was 240 miles from his railroad base at Rolla, where he had begun his laborious march. Orders soon came from Halleck not to penetrate farther into Arkansas, but to hold his position and keep the enemy south of the Boston Mountains. "Hold your position," wrote Halleck, March 7, "till I can turn the enemy." At that date Halleck expected to make a land march along what he had decided to be the central strategic line southward from Fort Donelson, turn the enemy at Memphis, and compel the Confederate forces to evacuate the whole Mississippi Valley down to that point.

There was, however, serious work yet in store for Curtis. To obviate the jealousies and bickerings among Trans-Mississippi Confederate commanders the Richmond authorities had combined the Indian Territory with portions of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri in the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. II., and had sent Major-General Earl Van Dorn to command the whole. His letters show that he went full of enthusiasm and brilliant anticipations. He did not dream of being kept on the defensive. He called for troops from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and ordered the armies of McCulloch and McIntosh, and Pike with his Indian regiments, to join him. From these various sources he hoped to collect a force of from 30,000 to 40,000 men at Pocahontas, Arkansas. Unaware that Price was then retreating from Springfield, he wrote to that commander, under date of February 14, proposing a quick and secret march against St. Louis, which he hoped to capture by assault. Holding that city would soon secure Missouri and relieve Johnston, seriously pressed in Tennessee. He

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would not wait to prepare, but would adopt the style of frontier equipment and supply:

> Flour, salt, and a little bacon in our wagons, and beef cattle driven with us, should be our commissariat. Grain-bags to contain two days' rations of corn, to be carried on our troopers' saddles, and money our paymaster's department, and sufficient ammunition our ordnance department.

But he did not have time enough to extemporize even this haversack campaign: he found his base of supplies menaced from the north-east, and information soon followed that Price was flying in confusion from the north-west. Ten days later we find him writing to Johnston:

> Price and McCulloch are concentrated at Cross Hollow. . . . Whole force of enemy [Union] from 35,000 to 40,000; ours about 20,000. Should Pike be able to join, our forces will be about 26,000. I leave this evening to go to the army, and will give battle, of course, if it does not take place before I arrive. I have no doubt of the result. If I succeed, I shall push on.

Van Dorn found the Confederate forces united in the Boston Mountains, fifty-five miles south of Sugar Creek, to which point Curtis had retired for better security. He immediately advanced with his whole force, attacking the Union position on the 6th of March. On the 7th was fought the principal contest, known as the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern. As usual, rumor exaggerated the forces on both sides. By the official reports it appears that Van Dorn's available command numbered 16,000. The Union troops under Curtis numbered only about 10,500; but they had the advantage of a defensive attitude and gained a complete victory, to which the vigilance and able strategy of the Union commander effectively contributed. Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, and other prominent rebel officers were killed early in the action, and Van Dorn's right wing was shattered.

The diminished and scattered forces of Van Dorn, retreating by different routes from the battle of Pea Ridge, were not again wholly united. Pike was ordered to conduct his Indian regiments back to the Indian Territory for local duty. The main remnant of the Confederate army followed Van Dorn to the eastward in the direction of Pocahontas, where he proposed to reorganize it, to resume the offensive. Halleck, cautioning Curtis to hold his position and keep well on his guard, speaks of Van Dorn as a "vigilant and energetic officer"; and Van Dorn's language certainly indicates activity, whatever may be thought of the discretion it betrays. He had hardly shaken from his feet the dust of his rout at Pea Ridge when he again began writing that he contemplated relieving the stress of Confederate disaster in Tennessee by attempting to capture the city of St. Louis, a will-o'-the-wisp project that had by turns dazzled the eyes of all the Confederate commanders in the Mississippi Valley; or, as another scheme, perhaps a mere prelude to this, he would march eastward against Pope and raise the siege of New Madrid, on the Mississippi River. This brings us to a narrative of events at that point.

WITH the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel stronghold at Columbus had become useless. Its evacuation soon followed (March 2, 1862), and the Confederates immediately turned their attention to holding the next barrier on the Mississippi River. This was at a point less than one hundred miles below Cairo, where the Father of Waters makes two large bends, which, joined together, lie like a reversed letter S placed horizontally. At the foot of this first bend lay Island No. 10;* from there the river flows northward to the town of New Madrid, Missouri, passing which it resumes its southward flow. The country is not only flat, as the bend indicates, but it is encompassed in almost all directions by nearly impassable swamps and bayous. Island No. 10, therefore, and its immediate neighborhood, seemed to offer unusual advantages to bar the Mississippi with warlike obstructions. As soon as the evacuation of Columbus was determined upon, all available rebel resources and skill were concentrated here. The island, the Tennessee shore of the river, and the town of New Madrid were all strongly fortified and occupied with considerable garrisons — about 3000 men at the former and some 5000 at the latter place.

General Halleck, studying the strategical conditions of the whole Mississippi Valley with tenfold interest since the victories of Grant, also had his eye on this position, and was now as eager to capture it as the rebels were to defend it. One of the quickest movements of the whole war ensued. General Pope was selected to lead the expedition, and the choice was not misplaced. On the 22d of February, six days after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Pope landed at the town of Commerce, Missouri, on the Mississippi River, with 140 men. On the 28th he was on the march at the head of 10,000, who had been sent him in the interim from St. Louis and Cairo. On the 3d of March, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he appeared before the town of New Madrid with his whole force, to which further reënforcements were soon added, raising his army to about 20,000. It would have required but a few hours to cap-

* See communication from John Banvard in "Open Letters" of this number of THE CENTURY.—EDITOR.

ture the place by assault; but the loss of life would have been great and the sacrifice virtually useless. It was the season of the early spring floods; the whole country was submerged, and the great river was at a very high stage between its levees. In addition to its earth-works and its garrison, New Madrid was guarded by a fleet of eight rebel gun-boats under command of Commodore George N. Hollins. The high water floated these vessels at such an elevation that their guns commanded every part of the town, and made its occupation by hostile troops impossible. Had Pope entered with his army, Hollins would have destroyed both town and troops at his leisure.

Pope therefore surrounded the place by siege-works in which he could protect his men; and sending a detachment to Point Pleasant on the river, nine miles below, secured a lodgment for batteries that closed the river to rebel transports and cut off the enemy's reënforcements and supplies. The movement proved effectual. Ten days later (March 13, 1862) the rebels evacuated New Madrid, leaving everything behind.

The Confederates now held Island No. 10 and the Tennessee shore; but their retreat was cut off by the swamps beyond and Pope's batteries below. The rebel gun-boat flotilla had retired down the river. Pope's forces held New Madrid and the Missouri shore, but they had neither transports nor gun-boats, and without these could not cross to the attack. In this dilemma Pope once more called upon Flag-Officer Foote to bring the Union fleet of gun-boats down the river, attack and silence the batteries of Island No. 10, and assist in capturing the rebel army, which his strategy had shut in a trap.

Foote, although commanding a fleet of nine Union gun-boats, objected that the difficulty and risk were too great. With all their formidable strength the gun-boats had two serious defects. Only their bows were protected by the heavier iron plating so as to be shot-proof; and their engines were not strong enough to back easily against the powerful current of the Mississippi. In their attacks on Forts Henry and Donelson they had fought up-stream; when disabled, the mere current carried them out of the enemy's reach. On the Mississippi this was reversed. Compelled to fight down-stream, they would, if disabled, be carried irresistibly directly to the enemy. A bombardment at long range from both gun and mortar boats had proved ineffectual to silence the rebel batteries. Pope's expedition seemed destined to prove fruitless, when a new expedient was the occasion of success.

The project of a canal to turn Island No. 10 was again revived. The floods of the Mississippi, pouring through breaks in the levees, inundated the surrounding country. Colonel Bissell of the engineer regiment, returning in a canoe with a guide from his unsuccessful visit to secure Foote's coöperation, learned that a bayou, from two and a half to three miles west of the Mississippi, ran irregularly to the south-west from the neighborhood of Island No. 8, the station of the Union gun-boat flotilla, to its junction with the river at New Madrid, a distance of twelve miles. An open corn-field and an opening in the woods, which marked the course of an old road, suggested to him the possibility of connecting the river with the bayou; but between the end of the road and the bayou lay a belt of heavy timber two miles in width.* How could he get a fleet of vessels over the ground thickly covered by trees of every size, from a sapling to a forest veteran three feet in diameter, whose roots stood six or seven feet under water? Modern mechanical appliances are not easily baffled by natural obstacles. Six hundred skillful mechanics working with the aid of steam and machinery, and directed by American inventive ingenuity, brought the wonder to pass. In a few days Colonel Bissell had a line of four light-draught steamboats and six coal-barges† crossing the corn-field and entering the open road. Great saws, bent in the form of an arc and fastened to frames swinging on pivots, severed the tree-trunks four and a half feet under water; ropes, pulleys, and capstans hauled the encumbering débris out of the path. In eight days the amphibious fleet was in the bayou. Here were new difficulties—to clean away the dams of accumulated and entangled drift-wood. In a few days more Bissell's boats and barges were ready to emerge into the Mississippi at New Madrid, but yet kept prudently concealed. Two gun-boats were needed to protect the transports in crossing troops. The sagacious judgment of Foote and the heroism of his subordinates supplied these at the opportune moment. Captain Walke of the *Carondelet* volunteered to run the batteries at Island No. 10; and now that the risk was justified, the flag-officer consented. On the night of the 4th of April, after the moon had gone down, the gun-boat *Carondelet*, moving with as little noise as

* See the article "Sawing Out the Channel Above Island No. 10" by J. W. Bissell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" (N. Y.: The Century Co.), Vol. I., p. 460.

† The barges used were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty wide, scow-shaped, with both ends alike. The sides were six inches thick, and of solid timber. [J. W. Bissell. *Ibid.*]

possible, swung into the stream from her moorings and started on her perilous voyage. It must have seemed an omen of success that a sudden thunder-storm with its additional gloom and noise came up to aid the attempt. The movement was unsuspected by the enemy till, by one of frequent flashes of lightning, the rebel sentries on the earth-works of Island No. 10 and the shore batteries opposite saw the huge turtle-shaped river craft stand out in vivid outline, to be in a second hidden again by the dense obscurity. Alarm cries rang out, musketry rattled, great guns resounded; the ship almost touched the shore in the drift of the crooked channel. But the Confederate guns could not be aimed amidst the swift succession of brilliant flash and total darkness. The rebel missiles flew wild, and a little after midnight the *Carondelet* lay unharmed at the New Madrid landing. Captain Walke had made the first successful experiment in a feat of daring and skill that was many times repeated after he had demonstrated its possibility.

The gun-boat *Pittsburgh*, also running past the rebel batteries at night, joined the *Carondelet* at New Madrid on the morning of April 7, and the problem of Pope's difficulties was solved. When he crossed his troops over the river by help of his gun-boats and transports, formidable attack was no longer necessary. Island No. 10 had surrendered to Flag-Officer Foote that morning, and the several rebel garrisons were using their utmost endeavors to effect a retreat southward. Pope easily intercepted their movement: on that and the following day he received the surrender of three general officers and six or seven thousand Confederate troops.

As General Pope's victory had been gained without loss or demoralization, he prepared immediately to push his operations farther south. "If transportation arrives to-morrow or next day," telegraphed Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with him at New Madrid, "we shall have Memphis within ten days." Halleck responded with the promise of ten large steamers to carry troops, and other suggestions indicating his approval of the movement "down the river." In the same dispatch Halleck gave news of the Union victory at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, and announced his intention to proceed thither, and asked Assistant-Secretary Scott to meet him at Cairo for consultation. The meeting took place on the 10th of April, by which time Halleck had become more impressed with the severity and the perils of the late battle on the Tennessee; for Scott asks the Washington authorities whether a reënforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men cannot be sent from the East to make good the loss. This conference probably originated the idea that soon interrupted the successful river operations, by withdrawing the army under Pope. Reënforcements could not be spared from the East, and Pope's army became the next resource. For the present, however, there was a continuation of the first plan. Pope's preliminary orders for embarkation were issued on the 10th, and on the 14th the combined land and naval forces which had reduced Island No. 10 reached Fort Pillow. Its works were found to be strong and extensive. The overflow of the whole country rendered land operations difficult; it was estimated that it would require two weeks to turn the position and reduce the works. Meanwhile information was obtained that Van Dorn's rebel army from Arkansas was about to reënforce Beauregard at Corinth. In view of all this, Assistant-Secretary Scott asked the question: "If General Pope finds, after careful examination, that he cannot capture Fort Pillow within ten days, had he not better reënforce General Halleck immediately, and let Commodore Foote continue to blockade below until forces can be returned and the position be turned by General Halleck beating Beauregard and marching upon Memphis from Corinth?" Before an answer came from the War Department at Washington, Halleck, who had for several days been with the army on the Tennessee River, decided the question for himself and telegraphed to Pope (April 15), "Move with your army to this place, leaving troops enough with Commodore Foote to land and hold Fort Pillow, should the enemy's forces withdraw." At the same time he sent the following suggestion to Flag-Officer Foote:

> I have ordered General Pope's army to this place, but I think you had best continue the bombardment of Fort Pillow; and if the enemy should abandon it, take possession or go down the river, as you may deem best. General Pope will leave forces enough to occupy any fortifications that may be taken.

The plan was forthwith carried into effect. The transports, instead of disembarking Pope's troops to invest Fort Pillow, were turned northward, and steaming up the Mississippi to Cairo, thence to Paducah, and from Paducah up the Tennessee River, landed the whole of Pope's army, except two regiments, at Pittsburg Landing on the 22d of April.

The flotilla under Foote and the two regiments left behind continued in front of Fort Pillow, keeping up a show of attack, by a bombardment from one of the mortar-boats and such reconnaissances as the little handful of troops could venture, to discover, if possible, some weak point in the enemy's defenses. On the other hand, the Confederates, watching what they thought a favorable opportunity,

brought up eight of their gun-boats and made a spirited attack on the Union vessels on the morning of May 10. In a short combat two of the Union gun-boats, which bore the brunt of the onset, were seriously disabled, though not until they had inflicted such damage on three Confederate vessels that they drifted helplessly out of the fight; after which the remainder of the rebel flotilla retired from the encounter. For nearly a month after this preliminary gun-boat battle the river operations, though full of exciting daily incident, were marked by no important historical event. Mention, however, needs to be here made of a change in the control of the Union fleet. Commodore Foote had been wounded in the ankle during his attack on Fort Donelson, and his injury now caused him so much suffering and exhaustion of strength that he was compelled to relinquish his command. He took leave of his flotilla on the 9th of May, and was succeeded by Commodore Charles H. Davis, who from that time onward had charge of the gun-boat operations on the upper Mississippi.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

THE fall of Fort Donelson hastened, almost to a panic, the retreat of the Confederates from other points. By that surrender about one-third of their fighting force in Tennessee vanished from the campaign, while their whole web of strategy was instantly dissolved. The full possession of the Tennessee River by the Union gun-boats for the moment hopelessly divided the Confederate commands, and like a flushed covey of birds the rebel generals started on their several lines of retreat without concert or rallying point. Albert Sidney Johnston, the department commander, moved south-east towards Chattanooga, abandoning Nashville to its fate; while Beauregard, left to his own discretion and resources, took measures to effect the evacuation of Columbus so as to save its armament and supplies, and then proceeded to the railroad crossings of northern Mississippi to collect and organize a new army.

It is now evident that if the Union forces could have been promptly moved forward in harmonious combination, with the facility which the opening of the Tennessee River afforded them, such an advance might have been made, and such strategic points gained and held, as would have saved at least an entire year of campaign and battle in the West. Unfortunately this great advantage was not seized, and in the condition of affairs could not be; and a delay of a fortnight or more enabled the insurgents to renew the confidence and gather the forces to establish another line farther to the south, and again to interpose a formidable resistance. One cause of this inefficiency and delay of the Union commanders may be easily gleaned from the dispatches interchanged by them within a few days succeeding the fall of Fort Donelson, and which, aside from their military bearings, form an interesting study of human nature.

General Buell, from his comfortable headquarters at Louisville, writes (February 17, 1862) that since the reënforcements (Nelson's division) started by him to assist at Fort Donelson are no longer needed, he has ordered them back. "The object of both our forces," he continues, "is, directly or indirectly, to strike at the power of the rebellion in its most vital point within our field. Nashville appears clearly, I think, to be that point." He thought further that heavy reënforcements would soon be thrown into it by the rebels. The leisurely manner in which he expected to strike at this heart of the rebellion appears from these words, in the same letter:

> To depend on wagons at this season for a large force seems out of the question, and I fear it may be two weeks before I can get a bridge over the Barren River, so as to use the railroad beyond. I shall endeavor, however, to make an advance in less or much force before that time. . . . Let me hear your views.

Halleck, at St. Louis, was agitated by more rapid emotions. Watching the distant and dangerous campaign under Curtis in south-western Missouri, beginning another of mingled hazard and brilliant promise under Pope on the Mississippi, beset by perplexities of local administration, flushed to fever heat by the unexpected success of Grant, his mind ran forward eagerly to new prospects. "I am not satisfied with present success," he telegraphed Sherman. "We must now prepare for a still more important movement. You will not be forgotten in this." But this preparation seems, in his mind, to have involved something more than orders from himself.

Before he received the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson he became seriously alarmed lest the rebels, using their river transportation, might rapidly concentrate, attack Grant in the rear, crush him before succor could reach him, and, returning quickly, be as ready as before to confront and oppose Buell. Even after the surrender Halleck manifests a continuing fear that some indefinite concentration will take place, and a quick reprisal be executed by a formidable expedition against Paducah or Cairo. His overstrained appeals to Buell for help do not seem justified in the full light of history. An undertone of suggestion and demand indicates that this urgency, ostensibly based on his patriotic eagerness for success, was not wholly free from personal ambition.

We have seen how when he heard of Grant's victory he generously asked that Buell, Grant, and Pope be made major-generals of volunteers, and with equal generosity to himself broadly added, "and give me command in the West." He could not agree with Buell that Nashville was the most vital point of the rebellion in the West, and that heavy rebel reënforcements would be thrown into it from all quarters east and south. Halleck develops his idea with great earnestness in replying to that suggestion from Buell. He says:

To remove all questions as to rank, I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be fought in that vicinity. You should be in it as the ranking general in immediate command. Don't hesitate. Come to Clarksville as rapidly as possible. Say that you will come, and I will have everything there for you. Beauregard threatens to attack either Cairo or Paducah; I must be ready for him. Don't stop any troops ordered down the Ohio. We want them all. You shall have them back in a few days. Assistant-Secretary of War Scott left here this afternoon to confer with you. He knows my plans and necessities. I am terribly hard pushed. Help me, and I will help you. Hunter has acted nobly, generously, bravely. Without his aid I should have failed before Fort Donelson. Honor to him. We came within an ace of being defeated. If the fragments which I sent down had not reached there on Saturday we should have gone in. A retreat at one time seemed almost inevitable. All right now. Help me to carry it out. Talk freely with Scott. It is evident to me that you and McClellan did not at last accounts appreciate the strait I have been in. I am certain you will when you understand it all. Help me, I beg of you. Throw all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland. Don't stop any one ordered here. You will not regret it. There will be no battle at Nashville.

In answer to an inquiry from Assistant-Secretary Scott, he explains further:

I mean that Buell should move on Clarksville with his present column: there unite his Kentucky army and move up the Cumberland, while I act on the Tennessee. We should then be able to coöperate.

This proposal was entirely judicious; but in Halleck's mind it was subordinated to another consideration, namely: that he should exercise superior command in the West. Again he telegraphed to McClellan (February 19), "Give it [the Western division] to me, and I will split secession in twain in one month." The same confidence is also expressed to Buell, in a simultaneous dispatch to Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with Buell. "If General Buell will come down and help me with all possible haste we can end the war in the West in less than a month." A day later Halleck becomes almost peremptory in a dispatch to McClellan: "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly."

To this direct interrogatory McClellan replied in the negative. The request, to say the least of it, was somewhat presumptuous, and hardly of proper tone to find ready acquiescence from a military superior. In this case, however, it was also calculated to rouse a twofold instinct of jealousy. Buell was a warm personal friend of McClellan, and the latter could not be expected to diminish the opportunities or endanger the chances of his favorite. But more important yet was the question how this sudden success in Halleck's department, and the extension of command and power so boldly demanded, might affect McClellan's own standing and authority. He was yet General-in-Chief, but the Administration was dissatisfied at his inaction, and the President had already indicated, in the general war order requiring all the armies of the United States to move on the 22d of February, that his patience had a limit. McClellan did not believe that the army under his own immediate care and command would be ready to fulfill the President's order. Should he permit a rival to arise in the West and grasp a great victory before he could move?

An hour after midnight McClellan answered Halleck as follows:

Buell at Bowling Green knows more of the state of affairs than you at St. Louis. Until I hear from him I cannot see necessity of giving you entire command. I expect to hear from Buell in a few minutes. I do not yet see that Buell cannot control his own line. I shall not lay your request before the Secretary until I hear definitely from Buell.

Halleck did not feel wholly baffled by the unfavorable response. That day he received a dispatch from Stanton, who said:

Your plan of organization has been transmitted to me by Mr. Scott and strikes me very favorably, but on account of the domestic affliction of the President I have not yet been able to submit it to him. The brilliant result of the energetic action in the West fills the nation with joy.

Encouraged by this friendly tone from the Secretary of War, Halleck ventured a final appeal:

One whole week has been lost already by hesitation and delay. There was, and I think there still is, a golden opportunity to strike a fatal blow, but I can't do it unless I can control Buell's army. I am perfectly willing to act as General McClellan dictates or to take any amount of responsibility. To succeed we must be prompt. I have explained everything to General McClellan and Assistant-Secretary Scott. There is not a moment to be lost. Give me authority and I will be responsible for results.

Doubtless Halleck felt that the fates were against him, for the reply chilled his lingering hopes:

Your telegram of yesterday, together with Mr. Scott's reports, have this morning been submitted to the Pres-

ident, who, after full consideration of the subject, does not think any change in the organization of the army or the military departments at present advisable. He desires and expects you and General Buell to coöperate fully and zealously with each other, and would be glad to know whether there has been any failure of coöperation in any particular.

Mr. Lincoln had been watching by the bedside of his dying son, and in his overwhelming grief probably felt disinclined to touch this new vexation of military selfishness — a class of questions from which he always shrank with the utmost distaste; besides, we shall see in due time how the President's momentary decision turned upon much more comprehensive changes already in contemplation.

Before McClellan's refusal to enlarge Halleck's command, he had indicated that his judgment and feelings were both with Buell. Thus he telegraphed the latter on February 20:

Halleck says Columbus reënforced from New Orleans, and steam up on their boats ready for move — probably on Cairo. Wishes to withdraw some troops from Donelson. I tell him improbable that rebels are reënforced from New Orleans or attack Cairo. Think [they] will abandon Columbus. . . . How soon can you be in front of Nashville, and in what force? What news of the rebels? If the force in West can take Nashville, or even hold its own for the present, I hope to have Richmond and Norfolk in from three to four weeks.

He sent a similar dispatch to Halleck, in which he pointed out Nashville as the pressing objective:

Buell has gone to Bowling Green. I will be in communication with him in a few minutes, and we will then arrange. The fall of Clarksville confirms my views. I think Cairo is not in danger, and we must now direct our efforts on Nashville. The rebels hold firm at Manassas. In less than two weeks I shall move the army of the Potomac, and hope to be in Richmond soon after you are in Nashville. I think Columbus will be abandoned within a week. We will have a desperate battle on this line.

While the three generals were discussing high strategy and grand campaigns by telegraph, and probably deliberating with more anxiety the possibilities of personal fame, the simple soldiering of Grant and Foote was solving some of the problems that confused scientific hypothesis. They quietly occupied Clarksville, which the enemy abandoned; and even while preparing to do so, Grant suggested in his dispatch of February 19, "If it is the desire of the general commanding department, I can have Nashville on Saturday week." Foote repeated the suggestion in a dispatch of February 21, but the coveted permission did not come in time.

Meanwhile Buell, having gone to Bowling Green to push forward his railroad bridge, and hearing of the fall of Clarksville and the probable abandonment of Nashville, moved on by forced marches with a single division, reaching the Cumberland opposite the city on the 25th. The enemy had burned the bridge and he could not cross; but almost simultaneously he witnessed the arrival of steamboats bringing General Nelson's division, which immediately landed and occupied the place. This officer and his troops, after several varying orders, were finally sent up the Cumberland to Grant, and ordered forward by him to occupy Nashville and join Buell. It was a curious illustration of dramatic justice that the struggle of the generals over the capture of the place should end in the possession of Nashville by the troops of Buell under the orders of Grant, whose name had not once been mentioned by the contending commanders.

For a few days succeeding the occupation of Nashville news and rumors of what the rebels were doing were very conflicting, and none of the Union commanders suggested any definite campaign. On February 26 Halleck ordered preparations for a movement up either the Tennessee or the Cumberland, as events might require; but for two days he could not determine which. Finally, on the 1st of March, he sent distinct orders to Grant to command an expedition up the Tennessee River, to destroy the railroad and cut the telegraph at Eastport, Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. This was to be, not a permanent army advance, but a temporary raid by gun-boats and troops on transports; all of which, after effecting what local destruction they could, were to return — the whole movement being merely auxiliary to the operations then in progress against New Madrid and Island No. 10, designed to hasten the fall of Columbus. It turned out that the preparations could not be made as quickly as Halleck had hoped; the delay arising, not from the fault or neglect of any officer, but mainly from the prevailing and constantly increasing floods in the Western waters, and especially from damage to telegraph lines that seriously hindered the prompt transmission of communications and orders. Out of this latter condition there also grew the episode of a serious misunderstanding between Halleck and Grant, which threatened to obscure the new and brilliant fame which the latter was earning.

Only a moment of vexation and ill temper can account for the harsh accusation Halleck sent to Washington, that Grant had left his post without leave, that he had failed to make reports, that he and his army were demoralized by the Donelson victory. Reply came back that generals must observe discipline as well as privates. "Do not hesitate to arrest him [Grant] at once," added McClellan, "if

the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command." Halleck immediately acted on the suggestion, ordered Grant to remain at Fort Henry, and gave the proposed Tennessee expedition to Smith. Grant obeyed, and at first explained, with an admirable control of temper, that he had not been in fault. Later on, however, feeling himself wronged, he several times asked to be relieved from duty. By this time Halleck was convinced that he had unjustly accused Grant and as peremptorily declined to relieve him, and ordered him to resume his former general command. "Instead of relieving you," he added, "I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories." In truth, while neither general had been unjust by intention, both had been blamable in conduct. Grant violated technical discipline in leaving his command without permission; Halleck, with undue haste, preferred an accusation which further information proved to be groundless. It is to the credit of both that they dismissed the incipient quarrel and with new zeal and generous confidence immediately joined in hearty public service.

While the Grant-Halleck controversy and preparations for the Tennessee River expedition were both still in progress, the military situation was day by day slowly defining itself, though as yet without very specific action or conclusion. Buell, becoming satisfied that the enemy had no immediate intention to return and attack him at Nashville, inquired on March 3 of Halleck: "What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus?" To this Halleck replied on the 4th with the information that Columbus had been evacuated, and asked, "Why not come to the Tennessee and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid?" Without committing himself definitely, Buell answered on the 6th, merely proposing that they should meet at Louisville to discuss details. Halleck, however, unable to spare the time, held tenaciously to his proposition, informing Assistant-Secretary Scott, at Cairo, of the situation in these words:

> I telegraphed to General Buell to reënforce me as strongly as possible at or near Savannah [Tennessee]. Their line of defense is now an oblique one, extending from Island No. 10 to Decatur or Chattanooga. Having destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, Johnston cannot return to Nashville. We must again pierce his center at Savannah or Florence. Buell should move immediately, and not come in too late, as he did at Donelson.

Feeling instinctively that he could get no effective voluntary help from Buell, Halleck turned again to McClellan, informing him of his intended expedition up the Tennessee River, that he had directed a landing to be made at Savannah, that he had sent intrenching tools, and would push forward reënforcements as rapidly as possible. On the following day, however, reporting the strength of Grant's forces, he said: "You will perceive from this that without Buell's aid I am too weak for operations on the Tennessee." The information received by him during the next twenty-four hours that Curtis had won a splendid victory at the battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas made a favorable change in his resources, and he explains his views and intentions to McClellan with more confidence:

> Reserves intended to support General Curtis will now be drawn in as rapidly as possible and sent to the Tennessee. I propose going there in a few days. That is now the great strategic line of the Western campaign, and I am surprised that General Buell should hesitate to reënforce me. He was too late at Fort Donelson, as Hunter has been in Arkansas. I am obliged to make my calculations independent of both. Believe me, general, you make a serious mistake in having three independent commands in the West. There never will and never can be any coöperation at the critical moment; all military history proves it. You will regret your decision against me on this point. Your friendship for individuals has influenced your judgment. Be it so. I shall soon fight a great battle on the Tennessee unsupported, as it seems; but if successful, it will settle the campaign in the West.

We may also conclude that another element of the confidence that prompted his language was the intimation lately received from the Secretary of War, who three days before had asked him to state "the limits of a military department that would place all the Western operations you deem expedient under your command." In fact, events in the East as well as in the West were culminating that rather suddenly ended existing military conditions. The naval battle between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, and the almost simultaneous evacuation of Manassas Junction by the rebel forces in Virginia, broke the long inactivity of the Army of the Potomac.

We cannot better illustrate how intently Mr. Lincoln was watching army operations, both in the East and the West, than by quoting his dispatch of March 10 to Buell:

> The evidence is very strong that the enemy in front of us here is breaking up and moving off. General McClellan is after him. Some part of the force may be destined to meet you. Look out, and be prepared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to assist you if needed.

McClellan's aimless march to capture a few scarecrow sentinels and quaker guns in the deserted rebel field-works, which had been his nightmare for half a year, afforded the opportunity for a redistribution of military leader-

ships, which the winter's experience plainly dictated. Slow and cautious in maturing his decisions, President Lincoln was prompt to announce them when they were once reached. On the 11th of March he issued his War Order No. 3, one of his most far-reaching acts of military authority. It relieved McClellan from the duties of General-in-Chief of all the armies, and sent him to the field charged with the single object of conducting the campaign against Richmond. This made possible a new combination for the West, and the same order united the three Western departments (as far east as Knoxville, Tennessee) under the command of Halleck. Under this arrangement was fought the great battle on the Tennessee that Halleck predicted, giving the Union arms a victory the decisive influence of which was felt throughout the remainder of the war; a success, however, due mainly to the gallantry of the troops, and not to any genius or brilliant generalship of Halleck or his subordinate commanders.

The Tennessee River expedition under Smith, which started on March 10, made good its landing at Savannah, and on the 14th Smith sent Sherman with a division on nineteen steamboats, preceded by gun-boats, to ascend the river towards Eastport and begin the work of destroying railroad communications, which had been the original object of the whole movement. Sherman made a landing to carry out his orders; but this was the season of spring freshets. A storm of rain and snow changed every ravine and rivulet to a torrent; the Tennessee River rose fifteen feet in twenty-four hours, covering most steamboat landings with deep water; and the intended raid by land and water was reduced to a mere river reconnaissance, which proved the enemy to be in considerable force about Iuka and Corinth, covering and guarding the important railroad crossings and communications. Sherman felt himself compelled to return to Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, nine miles above Savannah, which was on the east bank. The place was already well known to both armies, for a skirmish had occurred there on the 1st of March between Union gunboats and a rebel regiment.

It would seem that General Smith had fixed upon Pittsburg Landing as an available point from which to operate more at leisure upon the enemy's railroad communications, and hence had already sent Hurlbut's division thither, which Sherman found there on his return. The place was not selected as a battle-field, nor as a base of operations for a campaign, but merely to afford a temporary lodgment for raids upon the railroads. By a silent and gradual change of conditions, however, the intention and essential features of the whole Tennessee River movement underwent a complete transformation. What was begun as a provisional expedition became a strategic central campaign; and what was chosen for an outpost of detachments was almost imperceptibly turned into a principal point of concentration, and became, by the unexpected assault of the enemy, one of the hardest-fought battle-fields of the whole war.

Halleck assumed command of his combined departments by general orders dated March 13, and after explaining once more to Buell that all his available force not required to defend Nashville should be sent up the Tennessee, he telegraphed him on the 16th of March:

> Move your forces by land to the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. . . . Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march on that point so that the enemy cannot get between us.

The combined campaign thus set in motion was wise in conception, but its preliminary execution proved lamentably weak; and the blame is justly attributable, in about equal measure, to Halleck, Buell, and Grant. For a few days Halleck's orders were decided and firm; then there followed a slackening of opinion and a variance of direction that came near making a disastrous wreck of the whole enterprise. His positive orders to Buell to move as rapidly as possible and to concentrate at Savannah were twice repeated on the 17th; but on the 26th he directed him to concentrate at Savannah or Eastport, and on the 29th to concentrate at Savannah or Pittsburg, while on April 5 he pointedly consented to a concentration at Waynesborough. This was inexcusable uncertainty in the combinations of a great strategist, who complained that "hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity." These were the timid steps of a blind man feeling his way, and not the firm strides of a leader who promised to "split secession in twain in one month."

It can hardly be claimed that Buell's march fulfilled the injunction to move "as rapidly as possible." When his advanced division reached Duck River at Columbia on the 18th it found that stream swollen and the bridge destroyed, and set itself to the task of building a new frame bridge with a deliberateness better befitting the leisure of peace than the pressing hurry of war. Buell arrived in person at Columbia on the 26th.* He manifested his own dissatisfaction with the delay by ordering the construction of another bridge, this time of pontoons, which was completed simultaneously with the first on March 30.

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 491.

Still further delay was projected by a proposition to halt for concentration at Waynesborough. It must be said in justice to Buell, that Halleck did not complain of the slow bridge-building at Columbia, and that he consented to the concentration at Waynesborough. Had it taken place, Buell's army would again have been "too late" for a great battle. The excuse offered, that Buell supposed the Union army to be safe on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, can scarcely be admitted; for on the 23d Buell received a letter from Grant which said:

> I am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, Mississippi, and many at other points on the road towards Decatur.

This information, which Buell considered of no importance, appears to have excited the serious attention of General William Nelson, one of Buell's division commanders, who, already impatient at the tardy bridge-building, read the signs of danger in the conditions about him with a truer military instinct. Nelson finally obtained permission to ford the now falling waters of Duck River, crossed his division on the 29th and 30th, and began the march over the ninety miles remaining to be traversed with an enthusiasm and impetuosity that swept the whole army past the proposed halting-place at Waynesborough, bringing his own division to Savannah on the 5th, and others on the 6th, of April.

It reflects no credit on General Halleck or General Grant that during the interim of Buell's march the advanced post of Pittsburg Landing had been left in serious peril. Halleck was busy at St. Louis collecting reënforcements to send to Grant, with the announced intention to proceed to the field and take personal command on the Tennessee River. This implied a delay demanding either the concentration of the whole army at Savannah, as originally ordered by him, behind the safe barrier of the Tennessee, or strong fortifications for the exposed position of Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank. On the other hand, Grant, resuming his general command in person on March 17, and finding his five divisions separated, three at Savannah and two at Pittsburg Landing,— nine miles apart, with a river between them,— properly took alarm and immediately united them; but in doing this he committed the evident fault of defying danger by choosing the advanced position and of neglecting to raise the slightest intrenchments to protect his troops — which were without means of rapid retreat — against a possible assault from an enemy only twenty miles distant, and according to his own reports at all times his equal if not his superior in numbers. But one cause can be assigned for this palpable imprudence. Well instructed in the duties of an officer under orders, he was just beginning his higher education as a leader of armies, and he was about to receive the most impressive lesson of his very strange career.

It has been already stated that after the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel commanders fled southward in confusion and dismay. We have the high authority and calm judgment of General Grant, in the mature experience and reflection of after years, that "if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with the troops we then had"; * but the Secessionists of the South-west were still in the fervor of their early enthusiasm, and recovered rapidly from the stupefaction of unexpected disaster. In the delay of four or five weeks that the divided ambition and over-cautious hesitation of the Union generals afforded them, they had renewed their courage, and united and reënforced their scattered armies. The separation of the armies of Johnston from those of Beauregard, which seemed irreparable when the Tennessee River was opened, had not been maintained by the prompt advance that everybody pointed out but which nobody executed. By the 23d of March the two Confederate generals had once more, without opposition, effected a junction of their forces at and about Corinth, and thus reversed the pending military problem. In the last weeks of February it could have been the united Unionists pursuing the divided Confederates. In the last weeks of March it was the united Confederates preparing to attack the divided armies of Halleck and Buell. The whole situation and plan is summed up in the dispatch of General Albert Sidney Johnston to Jefferson Davis, dated April 3, 1862:

> General Buell is in motion, 30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah; Mitchell behind him with 10,000. Confederate forces, 40,000, ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville converge to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command; Polk, left; Hardee, center; Bragg, right wing; Breckinridge, reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.

The Confederate march took place as projected, and on the evening of April 5 their joint forces went into bivouac two miles from the Union camps. That evening also the Confederate commanders held an informal conference. Beauregard became impressed with impending defeat; their march had been slow, the rations they carried were exhausted, and

* Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 317.

their extra rations and ammunition were not yet at hand. They could no longer hope to effect the complete surprise that was an essential feature of their plan. Beauregard advised a change of programme — to abandon the projected attack and convert the movement into a "reconnaissance in force." General Johnston listened, but refused his assent, and orders were given to begin the battle next morning. No suspicion of such a march or attack entered the mind of any Union officer; and that same day Grant reported to Halleck, "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth."

The natural position occupied by the Union forces is admitted to have been unusually strong. The Tennessee River here runs nearly north. North of the camps, Snake Creek with an affluent, Owl Creek, formed a barrier stretching from the river bank in general direction towards the south-west. South of the camps, Lick Creek and river sloughs also formed an impassable obstruction for a considerable distance next to the Tennessee. The river on the east, and Snake and Owl creeks on the west, thus inclosed a high triangular plateau with sides three or four miles in length, crossed and intersected to some extent by smaller streams and ravines, though generally open towards the south. The roads from Pittsburg Landing towards Corinth followed the main ridge, also towards the south-west. A network of other roads, very irregular in direction, ran from the Corinth roads to various points in the neighborhood. Alternate patches of timber, thick undergrowth, and open fields covered the locality. Two miles from Pittsburg Landing, on one of the Corinth roads, stood a log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, which was destined to become the center of the battle-field and to give its name to the conflict.

Three of Grant's divisions were camped in an irregular line from Lick Creek to Owl Creek, closing the open side of the triangular plateau — Sherman's division in the center, near Shiloh Church; Prentiss to his left, towards the Tennessee River and somewhat in advance; McClernand to the right, towards Owl Creek and somewhat in rear. Half-way back from Shiloh Church to Pittsburg Landing were camped the divisions of Hurlbut and of Smith, the latter now commanded — owing to Smith's illness — by W. H. L. Wallace. Another division, under General Lew. Wallace, had been left at Crump's Landing, six miles to the north, as a guard against rebel raids, which threatened to gain possession of the banks of the Tennessee at that point to destroy the river communications. Grant had apprehensions of a raid of this character and cautioned his officers against it, an admonition that was the basis of such alertness and vigilance as had existed for several days.

Most of the particulars of the battle that followed will probably always form a subject of dispute. There were no combined or dramatic movements of masses that can be analyzed and located. The Union army had no prepared line of defense; three lines in which the rebel army had been arranged for the attack became quickly broken and mingled with one another. On the Union side the irregular alignment of the camps and the precipitancy of the attack compelled the formation of whatever line of battle could be most hurriedly improvised. General Force says:

> A combat made up of numberless separate encounters of detached portions of broken lines, continually shifting position and changing direction in the forest and across ravines, filling an entire day, is almost incapable of a connected narrative.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, 1862, the rebel lines moved forward to the attack. The time required to pass the intervening two miles, and the preliminary skirmishes with Union pickets and a reconnoitering Union regiment that began the fight, gradually put the whole Union front on the alert; and when the main lines closed with each other, the divisions of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClernand were sufficiently in position to offer a stubborn resistance. The Confederates found themselves foiled in the easy surprise and confusion that they had counted upon. It would be a tedious waste of time to attempt to follow the details of the fight, which, thus begun before sunrise, continued till near sunset.

Along the labyrinth of the local roads, over the mixed patchwork of woods, open fields, and almost impenetrable thickets, across stretches of level, broken by miry hollows and abrupt ravines, the swinging lines of conflict moved intermittently throughout the entire day. There was onset and repulse, yell of assault and cheer of defiance, screeching of shells and sputtering of volleys, advance and retreat. But steadily through the fluctuating changes the general progress was northward, the rebels gaining and pushing their advance, the Unionists stubbornly resisting, but little by little losing their ground. It was like the flux and reflux of ocean breakers, dashing themselves with tireless repetition against a yielding, crumbling shore. Beauregard, to whom the Confederate commander had committed the general direction of the battle, several times during the day advanced his headquarters from point to point, following the steady progress of his lines. The time consumed and the lists of dead and wounded are sufficient evidence of the brave conduct of officers and

the gallant courage of men on both sides. On the Union side the divisions of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace had early been brought forward to sustain those of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClernand. It was, to a degree seldom witnessed in a battle, the slow and sustained struggle, through an entire day, of one whole army against another whole army. The five Union divisions engaged in the battle of Sunday numbered 33,000.* The total force of the Confederates attacking them was 40,000.

It was in the latter half of the afternoon that the more noteworthy incidents of the contest took place. The first of these was the death of the Confederate commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell personally leading the charge of a brigade.† The knowledge of the loss was carefully kept from the Confederate army, and the management on their side of the conflict was not thereby impaired, because Beauregard had been mainly intrusted with it from the beginning. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon a serious loss fell upon the Unionists. General Prentiss, commanding the Sixth Division, and General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding the Third Division, whose united lines had held one of the key-points of the Federal left since 9 o'clock in the forenoon against numerous and well-concentrated assaults of the enemy, found that the withdrawal of troops both on the right and the left produced gaps that offered an opening to the enemy. Prentiss had been instructed by General Grant to hold his position at all hazards, and consulting with Wallace they determined to obey the order notwithstanding the now dangerous exposure. But the enemy seized the advantage; they quickly found themselves enveloped and surrounded; only portions of their command succeeded in cutting their way out; Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss and fragments of the two divisions, numbering 2200 men, were taken prisoners.

This wholesale capture left a wide opening in the left of the Federal lines, and probably would have given the victory to the rebels but for another circumstance which somewhat compensated for so abrupt a diminution of the Union forces. The Union lines had now been swept back more than a mile and a half, and the rebel attack was approaching the main Corinth road, running from Pittsburg Landing along the principal ridge, which here lay nearly at a right angle to the river. Colonel Webster of General Grant's staff, noting the steady retreat of the Union lines and foreseeing that the advancing attack of the enemy would eventually reach this ridge, busied himself to post a line of artillery — from thirty-five to fifty guns — along the crest, gathering whatever was available, among which were several heavy pieces. To man and support this extemporized battery he organized and posted, in conjunction with Hurlbut's division, such fragments of troops as had become useless at the front. To reach the crest of this ridge and this line of hastily planted cannon the enemy was obliged to cross a deep, broad hollow, extending to the river and partly filled with back-water. The topography of the place was such that the gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington* were also stationed in the Tennessee, abreast the valley and sheet of back-water, and their guns were thus enabled to assist the line of cannon on the ridge by a cross-fire of shells.

General Grant had passed the previous night at Savannah, where he had become aware of the arrival of the advance brigades of Nelson's division of Buell's army on the same day (April 5). He started by boat to Pittsburg Landing early Sunday morning, having heard the firing but not regarding it as an attack in force. Arrived there he became a witness of the serious nature of the attack, and remained on the battle-field, visiting the various division commanders and giving such orders as the broken and fluctuating course of the conflict suggested. But the defense, begun in uncertainty and haste before his arrival, could not thereafter be reduced to any order or system; it necessarily, all day long, merely followed the changes and the violence of the rebel attack. The blind and intricate battle-field offered little chance for careful planning; the haste and tumult of combat left no time for tactics. On neither side was the guidance of general command of much service; it was the division, brigade, and regimental commanders who fought the battle. About noon of Sunday General Grant began to have misgivings of the result, and dispatched a letter for help to Buell's forces at Savannah, saying, "If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the

* Throughout the history of the War of the Rebellion there is a marked disagreement in the estimate of numbers engaged in battles, as stated by the Unionists on one side and the Confederates on the other. This variance comes from a different manner of reporting those "present for duty" in the two armies, out of which arises a systematic diminution of Confederates and increase of Federals in the statements of Confederate writers. General Force, in his admirable little book "From Fort Henry to Corinth," analyzes these methods of computation as applied to the battle of Shiloh, and arrives at the conclusion that the actual number of "combatants engaged in the battle" of Sunday was fully 40,000 Confederates and between 32,000 and 33,000 Unionists.

The reënforcements of Monday numbered, of Buell's army, about 20,000; Lew. Wallace's, 6500; and other regiments, about 1400.

† W. P. Johnston in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 504.

river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us." He also sent an order to General Lew. Wallace, at Crump's Landing, to hasten his division to the right of the army.

So far as the Confederates had any distinct plan of battle, it was merely the simple one of forcing the Federals away from the river to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, cut off their means of retreat by seizing or destroying the transports, and compel Grant to capitulate. But the execution of this leading design was completely frustrated by the difficult nature of the ground and by the gallant resistance made by Prentiss and Wallace, who held their line on the Union left, unshaken and unmoved, from 9 o'clock in the forenoon until 5 o'clock in the evening. The principal advance made by the rebels was not next to the river, where they desired it, but on the Union right next to Owl Creek, where it was of least value. Even after they had captured the whole residue of Prentiss's and Wallace's divisions, and had cleared out that terrible center of the Union fire which they had ineffectually assaulted a dozen times, and which by bitter experience they themselves learned to know and designate as the "Hornets' Nest," and near which their Commander-in-Chief had fallen in death, they were not yet within reach of the coveted banks of Pittsburg Landing. Before them still yawned the broad valley, the back-water, the mire, the steep hills across which screeched the shells from the gunboats and from the long death-threatening line of Webster's reserve artillery, and behind which the bayonets of Hurlbut's division, yet solid in organization and strong in numbers, glinted in the evening sun. From Hurlbut's right the shattered but courageous remnants of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman stretched away in an unbroken line towards Owl Creek. Ground had been lost and ground had been won; the line of fire had moved a mile and a half to the north; the lines of combatants had been shortened from three miles in the morning to one mile in the evening; but now, after the day's conflict, when the sun approached his setting, the relations and the prospects of the bloody fight were but little changed. The Confederates held the field of battle, but the Unionists held their central position, their supplies, and their communications. The front of attack had become as weak as the front of defense. On each side from eight to ten thousand men had been lost, by death, wounds, and capture. From ten to fifteen thousand panic-stricken Union stragglers cowered under the shelter of the high river bank at Pittsburg Landing. From ten to fifteen thousand Confederate stragglers, some equally panic-stricken, others demoralized by the irresistible temptations of camp-pillage, encumbered the rear of Beauregard's army. The day was nearly gone and the battle was undecided.

A controversy has recently arisen as to the personal impressions and intentions of General Grant at this crisis. His "Memoirs" declare in substance that he was still so confident of victory that he gave orders that evening for a renewal of the fight on the following morning by a general attack. General Buell, on the other hand, makes a strong argument that the evidence is against this assumption.* It is possible, as in so many other cases, that the truth lies midway between the two statements. A famous newspaper correspondent who was on the battle-field made the following record of the affair long before this controversy arose:

> The tremendous roar to the left, momentarily nearer and nearer, told of an effort to cut him off from the river and from retreat. Grant sat his horse, quiet, thoughtful, almost stolid. Said one to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?" "Not at all," was the quiet reply. "They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night — it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack them with fresh troops and drive them, of course."

The correspondent adds, in a note: "I was myself a listener to this conversation, and from it I date, in my own case at least, the beginning of any belief in Grant's greatness."†

As this writer was one of Grant's most candid critics, his testimony on this point is all the more valuable.

The turning-point was at length reached. Whatever may have been the much-disputed intentions and hopes of commanders at that critical juncture that were not expressed and recorded, or what might have been the possibilities and consequence of acts that were not attempted, it is worse than useless to discuss upon hypothesis. Each reader for himself must interpret the significance of the three closing incidents of that momentous Sunday, which occurred almost simultaneously.

Some of the rebel division commanders, believing that victory would be insured by one more desperate assault against the Union left to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, made arrangements and gave orders for that object. It seems uncertain, however, whether the force could have been gathered and the movement made in any event. Only a single brigade made the attempt, and it was driven back in confusion. The officer of another

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 523, *et seq.*

† Whitelaw Reid, "Ohio in the Civil War."

detachment refused the desperate service. Still others were overtaken in their preparation by orders from General Beauregard to withdraw the whole Confederate army from the fight, and to go into bivouac until the following day. Eager as was that commander for victory, the conclusion had been forced on his mind, that, for that day at least, it was not within the power of his army to complete their undertaking; and accordingly he directed that the fight should cease. He reached this determination not knowing that Buell had arrived, and still hoping that he would not arrive, even on the morrow.

In this hope Beauregard was disappointed. While yet his orders to retire from the combat were being executed, and before the last desperate charge of the rebels towards Webster's reserve artillery was beaten back, the vanguard of Nelson's division, which had marched from Savannah and had been ferried across the river by transports, was mounting the bank at Pittsburg Landing and deploying in line of battle under the enemy's fire, Ammen's fresh brigade first coming to the support of the line of Union guns. A few men out of the brigade fell by the rebel bullets, and then came twilight, and soon after the darkness of night. The tide of victory was effectually turned. Whatever the single army of Grant might or might not have accomplished on the following day against the army of Beauregard is only speculation. Beauregard's attack had been ordered discontinued before the actual presence of Buell's troops on the battle-field. Had the attack been continued, however, that opportune arrival would have rendered its success impossible.

After sunset of Sunday all chances of a rebel victory vanished. The remainder of Nelson's division immediately crossed the river and followed Ammen's brigade to the field. Crittenden's division was next placed in position during the night. Finally McCook's division reached Pittsburg Landing early Monday morning and promptly advanced to the front. General Buell, who had come before the vanguard on Sunday evening, in person directed the placing and preparation of these three superb divisions of his army — a total of about twenty thousand fresh, well-equipped, and well-drilled troops — to renew an offensive conflict along the left of the Federal line. On the Federal right was stationed the fresh division of General Lew. Wallace, numbering 6500, which had arrived from Crump's Landing a little after nightfall, and which took position soon after midnight of Sunday. Along the Federal right center, Grant's reduced divisions which had fought the battle of Sunday were gathered and reorganized, McClernand and Sherman in front, Hurlbut and the escaped remnants of W. H. L. Wallace's division, with some new detachments, in reserve. Grant and Buell met on Sunday evening and agreed to take the offensive jointly on Monday morning; Buell to command his three divisions on the left, Grant to direct his own forces on the right. No special plan was adopted other than simultaneously to drive the enemy from the field. The plan was carried out in harmony and with entire success. With only temporary checks, brought about by the too great impetuosity of the newly arrived reënforcements, the two wings of the Union army advanced steadily, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon were in possession of all the ground from which they had been driven on the previous day; while the rebel army was in full retreat upon Corinth — foiled of its victory, dejected in spirit, and in a broken and almost hopeless state of disorganization. A little more genius and daring on the part of the Union commanders would have enabled them by vigorous pursuit to demolish or capture it; but they chose the more prudent alternative, and remained satisfied with only sufficient advance to assure themselves that the enemy had disappeared.

HALLECK'S CORINTH CAMPAIGN.

On Wednesday, April 9, two days after the battle of Shiloh, General Grant gave evidence that he had fully learned the severe lesson of that terrible encounter. Reporting to Halleck his information that the enemy was again concentrating all his forces at Corinth, he added:

> I do not like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing upon our troops here to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river, and unsafe to remain on this many weeks without large reënforcements.

If his mind had reached a conviction of this character two or three weeks earlier, the results of the battle of Shiloh would have given better testimony to his military efficiency.

Halleck's opinion probably coincided with that of Grant, and the fortunes of war enabled him immediately to fulfill his promise to come to his relief. The day which saw the conclusion of the fight at Shiloh (April 7, 1862) witnessed the surrender of the rebel works at Island No. 10, on the Mississippi River, and the quick capture of nearly their entire garrison of six or seven thousand men. This finished the task which General Pope had been sent to do and enabled Halleck to transfer him and his army, by water, from the Mississippi River to the Tennessee. Halleck's order was made on April 15, and on the 22d Pope landed at

Hamburg, four miles above the battle-field of Shiloh, with his compact force of twenty thousand men fully organized and equipped, and flushed with a signal victory.

Halleck had arrived before him. Reaching Pittsburg Landing on the 11th of April, he began with industry to cure the disorders produced by the recent battle. Critics who still accuse the Lincoln administration of ignorant meddling with military affairs are invited to remember the language of the Secretary of War to Halleck on this occasion: "I have no instructions to give you. Go ahead, and success attend you."

The arrival of Pope was utilized by Halleck to give his united command an easy and immediate organization into army corps. His special field orders of April 28 named the Army of the Tennessee the First Army Corps, commanded by Grant, and constituting his right wing; the Army of the Ohio the Second Army Corps, commanded by Buell, and constituting the center; and the newly arrived Army of the Mississippi the Third Army Corps, commanded by Pope, and forming the left wing. Two days later (April 30) another order gave command of the right wing to General Thomas, whose division of the Army of the Ohio was added to it; it also organized a reserve corps under General McClernand, and had this provision:

> Major-General Grant will retain the general command of the district of West Tennessee, including the Army Corps of the Tennessee, and reports will be made to him as heretofore; but in the present movements he will act as second in command under the major-general commanding the department.

The exact intent of this assignment remains to this day a matter of doubt. Nominally, it advanced Grant in rank and authority; practically, it deprived him of active and important duty. Halleck being on the field in person issued his orders directly to the corps commanders and received reports from them, and for about two months Grant found himself without serious occupation. The position became so irksome that he several times asked to be relieved, but Halleck refused; though he finally allowed him to go for a season into a species of honorable retirement, by removing his headquarters from the camp of the main army.

Coming to the front so soon after the great battle, Halleck seems to have been impressed with the seriousness of that conflict, for all his preparations to assume the offensive were made with the most deliberate caution. It was manifest that the enemy intended to defend Corinth, and necessarily that place became his first objective. With all the efforts that the Confederate Government could make, however, Beauregard succeeded in bringing together only about fifty thousand effective troops. Halleck's combined armies contained more than double that number; but such was his fear of another disaster, that his advance upon Corinth was not like an invading march, but like the investment of a fortress. An army carrying a hundred thousand bayonets, in the picturesque language of General Sherman, moved upon Corinth "with pick and shovel." Intrenching, bridge-building, road-making, were the order of the day. Former carelessness and temerity were succeeded by a fettering over-caution.

The Administration expected more energetic campaigning from a commander of Halleck's reputed skill and the brilliant results realized since his advent. The country seemed at the culmination of great events. Since the beginning of the year success had smiled almost continuously upon the Union cause. As the crowning inspiration, in the midst of his march there had come the joyful news of Farragut's triumph and the capture of New Orleans. "Troops cannot be detached from here on the eve of a great battle," telegraphed Halleck to Stanton. "We are now at the enemy's throat." To such encouraging assurances the Administration responded with every possible exertion of reënforcement and supply. But days succeeded days, and the President's hope remained deferred. Nearly a month later, when reports came that Halleck was awaiting the arrival of a fourth Union army,— that of Curtis from Arkansas,— and these reports were supplemented by intimations that he would like to be joined by a fifth army from somewhere else, Mr. Lincoln sent him a letter of so kindly an explanation, that, in the actual condition of things, every word was a stinging rebuke:

> Several dispatches from Assistant-Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton, asking reënforcements for you, have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the Upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

In reply Halleck resorted to the usual expedient of reading the Secretary of War a military lecture. May 26 he wrote:

> Permit me to remark that we are operating upon too many points. Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards.

His herculean effort expended itself without corresponding result, when, a week later, he marched into the empty intrenchments of Corinth, only to find that the fifty thousand men composing Beauregard's army — the vital strength of rebellion in the West — were retreating at leisure to Baldwin and Okalona, railroad towns some fifty miles to the south. It had required but two days for the rebel army to go from Corinth to the Shiloh battle-field. Halleck consumed thirty-seven days to pass over the same distance and the same ground, with an army twice as strong as that of his adversary. Pope had reached him April 22, and it was the 29th of May when the Union army was within assaulting distance of the rebel intrenchments. The campaign had advanced with scientific precision, and attained one object for which it was conducted: it gained the fortifications of Corinth. In the end, however, it proved to be but the shell of the expected victory. Beauregard had not only skillfully disputed the advance and deceived his antagonist, but at the critical moment had successfully withdrawn the rebel forces to wage more equal conflict on other fields. The enemy evacuated Corinth on the night of the 29th, and beyond the usual demoralization which attends such a retrograde movement suffered little, for Halleck ordered only pursuit enough to drive him to a convenient distance. The achievement was the triumph of a strategist, not the success of a general. Instead of seizing his opportunity to win a great battle or to capture an army by siege, he had simply manœuvred the enemy out of position.

In reporting his success to Washington, Halleck of course magnified its value to the utmost,* and for the moment the Administration, not having that full information which afterward so seriously diminished the estimate, accepted the report in good faith as a grand Union triumph. It was indeed a considerable measure of success. Besides its valuable moral effect in strengthening the patriotism and the confidence of the North, and the secondary military advantage that the combined Western armies gained in the two months' strict camp discipline and active practical instruction in the art of field fortification, there was the positive possession of an important railroad center, and the apparent security of western and central Tennessee from rebel occupation.

In addition to these it had one yet more immediate and valuable military result. The remaining rebel strongholds on the upper Mississippi were now so completely turned that they were no longer tenable. Forts Pillow and Randolph were hastily evacuated by the enemy, and the Union flotilla took possession of their deserted works on June 5. Halleck had been looking somewhat anxiously for help on the river, and had complained of the unwillingness of the gun-boats to run past the Fort Pillow batteries and destroy the river fleet of the rebels. Flag-Officer Davis had considered the risk too great and had remained above Fort Pillow, occupying his time in harassing the works by a continuous bombardment. Now that the way was opened he immediately advanced in force, and at night of June 5 came to anchor two miles above the city of Memphis. His flotilla had lately received a notable reënforcement. One of the many energetic impulses which Stanton gave to military operations in the first few months after he became Secretary of War was his employment of an engineer of genius and daring, Charles Ellet, Jr., to extemporize a fleet of steam rams for service on the Western rivers.

The single blow by which the iron prow of the *Merrimac* sunk the frigate *Congress* in Hampton Roads, during the famous sea-fight between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, had demonstrated the effectiveness of this novelty in marine warfare. Ellet's proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, to try it on the Western rivers, was not favorably entertained; probably because the Navy Department already had its officers and its appropriations engaged in other more methodical and permanent naval constructions. But the eager and impatient Secretary of War listened to Ellet's plans with interest, and commissioned him to collect such suitable river craft as he could find on the Ohio, and to convert them post-haste into steam rams, "the honorable Secretary," reports Ellet, "expressing the hope that not

* Pope, condensing into one dispatches from Rosecrans, Hamilton, and Granger, telegraphed to Halleck: "The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning, with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton with two divisions is at Rienzi and between there and Boonville, ready to move forward should they be needed. One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods, for miles, are full of stragglers from the enemy, who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thousand men are thus scattered about, who will come in within a day or two." General Halleck dispatched to the War Department: "General Pope, with 40,000 men, is 30 miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand of arms captured." This dispatch of General Halleck's made a great sensation. The expectation that the stragglers would come into the national camp was disappointed; the prisoners taken were few, and Pope was censured for making a statement of fact which he neither made nor authorized. [Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth."]

more than twenty days would be consumed in getting them ready for service." Ellet received his orders March 27.* On May 26 he joined the flotilla of Davis with a fleet of six vessels, formerly swift and strong river tugs and steamers, but now strengthened and converted for their new and peculiar service, and these accompanied the gun-boats in the advance against Memphis. On the morning of June 6 the rebel flotilla of eight gun-boats was discovered in front of the city preparing for fight, and there occurred another of the many dramatic naval combats of the war.

The eight rebel gun-boats ranged themselves in two lines abreast the city. The hills of Memphis were covered with thousands of spectators. With the dawn five of the Union gun-boats began backing down the Mississippi, holding their heads against the strong current to insure easier control and management of the vessel. The steam rams were yet tied up to the river bank. Soon the rebel flotilla opened fire on the Union gun-boats, to which the latter replied with spirit. Four of Ellet's rams, hearing the guns, cast loose to take part in the conflict. One of them disabled her rudder, and another, mistaking her orders, remained out of fighting distance. But the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*, passing swiftly between the gun-boats, dashed into the rebel line. The gun-boats, now turning their heads down the stream, hastily followed. There was a short and quick mêlée of these uncouth-looking river monsters, ram crashing into ram and gun-boat firing into gun-boat in a confusion of attack and destruction. In twenty minutes four rebel vessels and one Union ram were sunk or disabled. At this the other four rebel vessels turned and fled down-stream, and in a running pursuit of an hour, extending some ten miles, three additional vessels of the enemy were captured or destroyed. The Confederate fleet was almost annihilated; only one of their gun-boats escaped. The two disabled Union ships were soon raised and repaired, but the ram fleet had suffered an irreparable loss. Its commander, Ellet, was wounded by a pistol-shot, from the effect of which he died two weeks later. The combat was witnessed by Jeff. Thompson, commanding the city with a small detachment of rebel troops. In his report of the affair he mentions that "we were hurried in our retirement from Memphis," and that afternoon the Union flag floated over the city.

The naval victory of Memphis supplemented and completed the great Tennessee campaigns begun by Grant's reconnaissance of January 9. A division of Buell's army under General Mitchell had in the meanwhile occupied and held the line of the Tennessee River between Tuscumbia and Stevenson; and thus the frontier of rebellion had been pushed down from middle Kentucky below the southern boundary of the State of Tennessee.

But the invading movement following the line of the Tennessee River had expended its advantage; the initial point of a new campaign had been reached. We are left in doubt under what conviction Halleck formed his next plans, for he determined to dissolve and scatter the magnificent army of more than one hundred thousand men under his hand and eye; apparently in violation of the very military theory he had formulated two weeks before, when he said, "We are operating on too many points." In a dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 9th of June he announced his purpose to do three distinct things: First, to hold the Memphis and Charleston railroad; secondly, to send relief to Curtis in Arkansas; thirdly, to send troops to east Tennessee. To these three he added a fourth purpose in a dispatch of June 12:

> If the combined fleet of Farragut and Davis fail to take Vicksburg, I will send an expedition for that purpose as soon as I can reënforce General Curtis.

Up to this point the country's estimate of General Halleck's military ability had steadily risen, but several serious errors of judgment now arrested his success. The greatest of these errors, perhaps, was the minor importance he seems to have attached to a continuation of the operations on the Mississippi River.

We have mentioned the victory of Farragut, and we need now to follow the upward course of his fleet. After receiving the surrender of New Orleans in the last days of April, he promptly pushed on an advance section of his ships up the Mississippi, which successively, and without serious opposition, received the surrender of all the important cities below Vicksburg, where Farragut himself arrived on the 20th of May. Vicksburg proved to be the most defensible position on the Mississippi, by reason of the high bluffs at and about the city. The Confederates had placed such faith in their defenses of the upper river, at Columbus, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow, that no

* In response to that order I selected three of the strongest and swiftest stern-wheel coal tow-boats at Pittsburg, of which the average dimensions are about 170 feet length, 30 feet beam, and over 5 feet hold. At Cincinnati I selected two side-wheel boats, of which the largest is 180 feet long, 37½ feet beam in the widest part, and 8 feet hold. At New Albany I secured a boat of about the same length but rather less beam, and subsequently I selected another at Cincinnati, of about the same class as the last, and sent her to Madison to be fitted out. [Ellet to McGunnigle, April 27, 1862. War Records.]

early steps were taken to fortify Vicksburg; but when Farragut passed and captured the lower forts and the upper defenses fell, the rebels made what haste they could to create a formidable barrier to navigation at Vicksburg. Beauregard sent plans for fortifications while he was yet disputing Halleck's advance from Shiloh to Corinth; and Lovell at New Orleans, retreating before Farragut's invasion, shipped the heavy guns he could no longer keep, and sent five regiments of Confederate troops, which he could no longer use, to erect the works. These reached their destination on May 12, and continuing the labors and preparations already begun, he had six batteries ready for service on Farragut's arrival. Remembering these dates and numbers, we can realize the unfortunate results of Halleck's dilatory Corinth campaign. He had then been in command, for a whole month, of forces double those of his antagonist. If, instead of digging his way from Shiloh to Corinth "with pick and shovel," he had forced such a prompt march and battle as his overwhelming numbers gave him power to do, the inevitable defeat or retreat of his enemy would have enabled him to meet the advance of Farragut with an army detachment sufficient to effect the reduction of Vicksburg with only slight resistance and delay. Such a movement ought to have followed by all the rules of military and political logic. The opening of the Mississippi outranked every other Western military enterprise in importance and urgency. It would effectually sever four great States from the rebel Confederacy; it would silence doubt at home and extinguish smoldering intervention abroad; it would starve the rebel armies and feed the cotton operatives of Europe. There would have been ample time; for he was advised as early as the 27th of April that New Orleans had been captured and that Farragut had "orders to push up to Memphis immediately," and he ought to have prepared to meet him.

No such coöperation, however, greeted Farragut. Reaching Vicksburg, his demand for the surrender of the place was refused. The batteries were at such a height that his guns could have no effect against them. Only two regiments of land forces accompanied the fleet. There was nothing to be done but to return to New Orleans, which he reached about the 1st of June. Here he met orders from Washington communicating the great desire of the Administration to have the river opened, and directing further efforts on his part to that end. Farragut took immediate measures to comply with this requirement. His task had already become more difficult. The enemy quickly comprehended the advantage which the few high bluffs of the Mississippi afforded them, if not to obstruct, at least to harass and damage the operations of a fleet unsupported by land forces. The places which had been surrendered were, on the retirement of the ships, again occupied, and batteries were soon raised, which, though unable to cope with larger vessels, became troublesome and dangerous to transports, and were intermittently used or abandoned as the advantage or necessity of the enemy dictated.

Farragut again reached Vicksburg about June 25, accompanied this time by Porter with sixteen of his mortar-boats, and by General Williams at the head of three thousand Union troops. The mortar-sloops were placed in position and bombarded the rebel works on the 27th. On the morning of June 28, before daylight, Farragut's ships, with the aid of the continued bombardment, made an attack on the Vicksburg batteries, and most of them succeeded in passing up the river with comparatively small loss. Here he found Ellet — brother of him who was wounded at Memphis — with some vessels of the ram fleet, who carried the news to the gun-boat flotilla under Davis yet at Memphis. This flotilla now also descended the river and joined Farragut on the 1st of July.

We have seen, by the dispatch heretofore quoted, that Halleck expected the combined naval and gun-boat forces to reduce the Vicksburg defenses, but also that, in the event of their failure, he would send an army to help them. The lapse of two weeks served to modify this intention. The Secretary of War, who had probably received news of Farragut's first failure to pass the Vicksburg batteries, telegraphed him (on June 23) to examine the project of a canal to cut off Vicksburg, suggested by General Butler and others. Halleck replied (on June 28), "It is impossible to send forces to Vicksburg at present, but I will give the matter very full attention as soon as circumstances will permit." That same day Farragut passed above the batteries, and of this result Halleck was informed by Grant, who was at Memphis. Grant's dispatch added an erroneous item of news concerning the number of troops with Farragut, but more trustworthy information soon reached Halleck in the form of a direct application from Farragut for help. To this appeal Halleck again felt himself obliged to reply in the negative, July 3, 1862:

> The scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me, at the present, to detach any troops to coöperate with you on Vicksburg. Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated. This may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks.

The hopeful promise with which the telegram closed dwindled away during the eleven days that followed. On the 14th of July Stanton asked him the direct question:

> The Secretary of the Navy desires to know whether you have, or intend to have, any land force to coöperate in the operations at Vicksburg. Please inform me immediately, inasmuch as orders he intends to give will depend on your answer.

The answer this time was short and conclusive. "I cannot at present give Commodore Farragut any aid against Vicksburg."

A coöperative land force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, Farragut estimated in his report of June 28, would have been sufficient to take the works. If we compare the great end to be attained with the smallness of the detachment thought necessary, there remains no reasonable explanation why Halleck should not have promptly sent it. But the chance had been lost. The waters of the Mississippi were falling so rapidly that Farragut dared not tarry in the river; and in accordance with orders received from the Department on July 20, he again ran past the Vicksburg batteries and returned to New Orleans.

If Halleck's refusal to help Farragut take Vicksburg seems inexplicable, it is yet more difficult to understand the apparently sudden cessation of all his former military activity, and his proposal, just at the point when his army had gathered its greatest strength and efficiency, abruptly to terminate his main campaign, and, in effect, go into summer quarters. He no longer talked of splitting secession in twain in one month, or of being at the enemy's throat. He no longer pointed out the waste of precious time, and uttered no further complaint about his inability to control Buell's army. His desires had been gratified. He commanded half of the military area within the Union; he had three armies under his own eye; the enemy was in flight before him; he could throw double numbers of men at any given point. At least two campaigns of overshadowing importance invited his resistless march. But in the midst of his success, in the plenitude of his power, with fortune thrusting opportunity upon him, he came to a sudden halt, folded his contented arms, and imitated the conduct that he wrongfully imputed to Grant after Donelson—"Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without regard to the future." In a long letter to the Secretary of War, dated June 25, after reviewing the sanitary condition of the army and pronouncing it very good, he asks, apparently as the main question, "Can we carry on any summer campaign without having a large portion of our men on the sick-list?" This idea seems to dominate his thought and to decide his action. Buell had been ordered eastward on a leisurely march towards Chattanooga. Halleck proposed to plant the armies of Grant and of Pope on the healthy uplands of northern Mississippi and Alabama as mere corps of observation. Having personally wrested Corinth from the enemy, he exaggerated its strategical value. As a terminal point in the southward campaign, along the line of the Tennessee River, its chief use was to aid in opening the Mississippi River by turning the Confederate fortifications from Columbus to Memphis. Those strongholds once in Federal possession, Corinth inevitably fell into a secondary rôle, especially since the summer droughts rendered the Tennessee River useless as a military highway.

Carrying out this policy of Halleck, a large portion of the Western armies of the Union wasted time and strength guarding a great area of rebel territory unimportant for military uses, and which could have been better protected by an active forward movement. The security and the supply of Corinth appears to have been the central purpose. Buell was delayed in his march thoroughly to repair the railroad from Corinth eastward towards Chattanooga. Other detachments of the army were employed to repair the railroads westward from Corinth to Memphis, and northward from Corinth to Columbus. For several months all the energies of the combined armies were diverted from their more legitimate duty of offensive war to tedious labor on these local railroads;* much of the repairs being destroyed, almost as rapidly as performed, by daring guerrilla hostilities, engendered and screened amidst the surrounding sentiment of disloyalty.

It is impossible to guess what Halleck's personal supervision in these tasks might have produced, for at this juncture came a culmination of events that transferred him to another field of duty; but the legacy of policy, plans, and orders that he left behind contributed to render the whole Western campaign sterile throughout the second half of 1862.

The infatuation of Halleck in thus tying up the Western forces in mere defensive inaction comes out in still stronger light in the incident that follows, but it especially serves to show once more how, in the West as well as in the

* I inclose herewith a copy of a report of Brigadier-General McPherson, superintendent of railroads, from which it will be seen that we have opened 367 miles of road in less than one month, besides repairing a number of locomotives and cars which were captured from the enemy greatly injured. Indeed, the woodwork of most of the cars has been entirely rebuilt, and all this work has been done by details from the army. [Halleck to Stanton, July 7, 1862. War Records.]

East, President Lincoln treated his military commanders, not with ignorant interference, as has been so often alleged, but with the most fatherly indulgence. Future chapters will describe the complete failure in the East of the campaign undertaken by McClellan against Richmond, and which, on the 30th of June, brought to Halleck an order from the Secretary of War, dated the 28th, immediately to detach and send 25,000 men to assist that imperiled enterprise. The necessity was declared "imperative." "But in detaching your force," explained the order, "the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and east Tennessee." Halleck took instant measures to obey the order, but said in reply that it would jeopardize the ground gained in Tennessee and involve the necessity of abandoning Buell's east Tennessee expedition. This result the President had in advance declared inadmissible. He now telegraphed emphatically on June 30:

> Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry — no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in east Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.*

This request, but accompanied by the same caution and condition, was repeated by the President on July 2; and again, under the prompting of extreme need, Lincoln on July 4 sent a diminished request, still, however, insisting that no risk be incurred in the West:

> You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even ten thousand infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.

In Halleck's response on the following day it is important to notice the difference in the opinions entertained by the two men upon this point. Lincoln wished to gain east Tennessee, Halleck desired to hold west Tennessee. The distinction is essential, for we shall see that while Halleck's policy prevailed, it tended largely, if not principally, to thwart the realization of Lincoln's earnest wish. Halleck telegraphed:

> For the last week there has been great uneasiness among Union men in Tennessee on account of the secret organizations of insurgents to coöperate in any attack of the enemy on our lines. Every commanding officer from Nashville to Memphis has asked for reënforcements. Under these circumstances I submitted the question of sending troops to Richmond to the principal officers of my command. They are unanimous in opinion that if this army is seriously diminished the Chattanooga expedition must be revoked or the hope of holding south-west Tennessee abandoned. I must earnestly protest against surrendering what has cost so much blood and treasure, and which in a military point of view is worth more than Richmond.

* War Records.

He had already, in a previous telegram (July 1), acknowledged and exercised the discretion which Lincoln gave him, replying, "Your telegram, just received, saves western Tennessee."

It was found by the Washington authorities that the early reports of McClellan's reverses had been unduly exaggerated, and that by straining resources in the East, the Western armies might be left undiminished. But with this conviction President Lincoln also reached the decision that the failure of the Richmond campaign must be remedied by radical measures. To devise new plans, to elaborate and initiate new movements, he needed the help of the highest attainable professional skill. None seemed at the moment so available as that of Halleck. Under his administration order had come out of chaos in Missouri, and under his guiding control, however feeble in the particular cases that we have pointed out, the Western armies had won the victories of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island No. 10, and Corinth. It was a record of steady success, which justified the belief that a general had been found who might be intrusted with the direction of the war in its larger combinations. The weakness of his present plans had not yet been developed. Accordingly on the 11th of July this order was made by the President:

> That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department under his charge.

It seemed at the moment the best that could be done. In his short Corinth campaign Halleck had substantially demonstrated his unfitness for the leadership of an army in the field. He had made a grievous mistake in coming away from his department headquarters at St. Louis. He was a thinker and not a worker; his proper place was in the military study and not in the camp. No other soldier in active service equaled him in the technical and theoretical acquirements of his profession. The act of the President in bringing him to Washington restored him to his more natural duty.

In following the future career of Halleck, one of the incidents attending this transfer needs to be borne in mind. The first intimation of the change came in the President's dispatch of the 2d of July which asked: "Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit

for consultation without endangering the service in your department?" A few days later one of the President's friends went from Washington to Corinth bearing a letter of introduction to Halleck, explaining among other things:

> I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if in your judgment it could be done without endangering positions and operations in the Southwest.

To this Halleck replied on July 10:

> Governor Sprague is here. If I were to go to Washington I could advise but one thing — to place all the forces in North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington under one head and hold that head responsible for the result.

It is doubtful if Halleck measured fully the import of his language; or whether he realized the danger and burden of the responsibility which, if he did not invite, he at least thus voluntarily assumed. Nominally he became General-in-Chief, but in actual practice his genius fell short of the high requirements of that great station. While he rendered memorable service to the Union, his judgment and courage sometimes quailed before the momentous requirements of his office, and thrust back upon the President the critical acts which overawed him. In reality, therefore, he was from the first only what he afterward became by technical orders — the President's chief-of-staff.

Before Halleck's transfer to Washington he had ordered Buell to move into east Tennessee, but that commander never seemed to appreciate the great military and political importance of such a movement. He considered the defense of west Tennessee a more essential object; and while his mind was engaged in that direction, Bragg planned and carried into effect a campaign into Kentucky that threatened at one time the most disastrous consequences to the Union cause in that region. He moved northward early in September, 1862, Kirby Smith preceding him with a strong detachment by way of Cumberland Gap, which marched without successful opposition almost to the Ohio River. Buell, believing that Bragg's real object was Nashville, made such dispositions that Bragg got a long start before him in the race to Louisville. He would, in fact, have had that city at his mercy if he had not left the direct road and turned to the right to join Kirby Smith at Frankfort to assist in the melancholy farce of inaugurating a Confederate governor for Kentucky. Buell thus reached Louisville and immediately marched south in pursuit of Bragg. He overtook his army at Perryville and fought, on the 8th of October, a severe but indecisive battle; Buell kept the field and Bragg retired in the night, and hurried out of Kentucky at a pace that soon distanced his antagonist. The President renewed his earnest solicitations to Buell to occupy east Tennessee; Buell thought this impracticable, and was relieved of command on the 24th of October, and General Rosecrans was appointed to succeed him.

Rosecrans paid as little attention as Buell had done to the orders of the President for the occupation of east Tennessee. He established his headquarters at Nashville, completed and strengthened his communications, and in the latter part of December moved upon General Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro'. The two armies came within sight of each other on the night of the 30th of December, 1862, and the next morning at daybreak each general moved to the fight, in pursuance of plans that were the exact counterpart of each other — Rosecrans having ordered his left wing to strike Bragg's right, double it up and take the position at Murfreesboro' in reverse, while Bragg proposed to crush the right wing of Rosecrans, and swinging the Confederate army around pivoting on its right to cut the Union force off from Nashville. Bragg struck the first blow with so much vigor that Rosecrans was obliged to give up his movement on the Confederate right and devote all his energies to the defense of his own position; and in spite of his utmost efforts, and the distinguished bravery with which he was supported by Thomas, Sheridan, and others, he lost ground all day, and at night the lines of the two armies were almost perpendicular to those that they had occupied in the morning. But Bragg had lost so severely in this day's fighting that he was unable to pursue his advantage on the 1st of January, 1863; and on the 2d Rosecrans resumed the offensive on his left with such success that Bragg found himself forced to abandon the field in the night. The losses on both sides were appalling, and the result of the fight was so damaging to Bragg that he was unable to resume active operations during the winter or spring, and was, in fact, so weakened, that when, in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans at last marched against him, he gave up his positions one after another, until the Union army occupied, in September, without striking a blow, the coveted and important mountain fortress of Chattanooga.

Sep. 1888

well within the clump, and there the nest is built. If the cactus bed is preferred, the meadow-lark hollows out a little place in the ground, lines it with soft and curly buffalo-grass, and then builds over it a little canopy, pulling down the longer blades which grow even among the thick-set lobes of prickly-pear upon the uplands, and weaving them together until a small, conical covering is made, having in one side of it a round opening to serve for a door. The location of the nest is such as to afford protection from the tramping hoofs of cattle-herds that feed upon the plains, and which carefully avoid treading upon the long, sharp spines of the cactus. There the bird rears one, and sometimes two, broods of young, which are ready for self-sustenance and flight in July.

In August, when the mating season is ended, the songs of the meadow-lark of the West are heard more rarely, and then only in the early morning. In October the bird leaves this latitude, to pass the winter months in the warmer climes of New Mexico.

Charles N. Allen.

A RAINBOW STUDY.

BEHOLD the rainbow like a brilliant scroll
Of colors sevenfold,
From heaven's high dome unrolled!
Lift up thine eyes, lift up the adoring soul,
And read God's writing ere it passes by.
Fleet clouds of amethyst
Swim in a golden mist,
Hidden in dripping branches are the birds,
But for a moment gloriously gleams,
Through flying raindrops, bursting beams,
The legend of the sky —
Seven colors and seven words!

The dim, cold violet
Upon the outer margin set
Is sign of the veiled mystery of *pain;*
First bitter knowledge when young life is sweet,
And sun-bright hills seem near to eager feet.
And as the heavy purple overflows
The paler color, so the wayside grows
To midnight gloom when *sorrow* stoops to smite
And rend the heart's delight.
A path of thorns, but oh! no other way
Leads to the rosy fields of upper day.

But see! how soft and fair
The tender flower-like blue
Shines tremulously through
The broad, dark purple border of despair.
Rejoice! for out of anguish blossoms *hope!*
Again the brilliant, vivid green
Against the line of blue is seen,
Earth's color painted on the skies.
So, bringing strength to cope
With woes that in perpetual tide arise,
Life-giving *faith* descends,
And though beneath the storm the pilgrim bends,
His brow is bathed in dawn of paradise.

Oh, read in haste! the rain-cloud far has blown,
Brighter and broader are the sun-waves grown,
And the delirious birds
Their wild, wet wings in burning beams have dipped.
Interpret from the shining manuscript
The seven illumined words.

Warm, amber yellow in rich waves
The edge of emerald verdure laves,
Symbol of *joy* — when faith grows deep
And full and strong; when even death's sleep
Has lost its gloom, and eyes that weep
See starry splendors through the tears.
The blazing orange hue
Is *triumph's* own imperial sign,
The victory pure and true
Which falls on sunset years,
When slow unfold the gates divine —
When all the storms are spent, and lonely ways
Grow beautiful in warm, benignant praise.

Now in a radiant flush of crimson fire
The rainbow is caught up to heaven!
Behold the dearest symbol of the seven.
When at the long day's close,
Through pain and sorrow dire,
The loyal soul has won its true repose,
When hope and trust have blossomed into joy,
And victory comes at last without alloy,
Then in celestial *love*
Enfolded, borne as in a flame above,
Serene in homeward flight,
The spirit soars and vanishes in light.

The green sod sparkles with the fleeting shower,
Fresh odors pant from every breathing flower,
The sky effulgent glows!
What though the purple violet
Upon the grassy mound is wet
With dew of fond regret;
The rainbow reached from earth to heaven,
And the last color of the seven
Was love's transcendent rose.

Frances L. Mace.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

ABOUT the 1st of December, 1861, Mr. Lincoln, who saw more clearly than McClellan, then General-in-Chief, the urgent necessity for some movement of the army, suggested to him a plan of campaign which, afterward much debated and discussed and finally rejected, is now seen to have been eminently wise and sagacious. He made a brief autograph memorandum of his plan, which he handed to McClellan, who kept it for ten days and returned it to Mr. Lincoln, with a hurried memorandum in pencil, showing that it made little impression on his mind. The memorandum and answer are so illustrative of the two men that we give them here in full, copied from the original manuscript:

If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac, without waiting further increase of numbers, or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion? [Answer, in pencil: If bridge-trains ready by December 15th — probably 25th.]

After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from south-west of the river? [In pencil, 71,000.]

How many from north-east of it? [In pencil, 33,000.]

Suppose then that of those south-west of the river [in pencil, 50,000] move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville? The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria towards Richmond; there to be joined by the whole movable force from north-east of the river, having landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan, move by land up the south side of that stream, to the crossing-point named; then the whole move together, by the road thence to Brentville, and beyond, to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.

If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear; or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time. The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them. Armed vessels and transports should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.†

General McClellan returned the memorandum with this reply:

I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as you requested. In arriving at the numbers given, I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.

Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned towards another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people.‡

The general's information was, as usual, erroneous. Johnston reports his "effective total" at this time as about 47,000 men — less than one-third what McClellan imagined it. Lincoln, however, did not insist upon knowing what the general's "other plan" was; nor did he press further upon his attention the suggestion that had been so scantily considered and so curtly dismissed. But as the weeks went by in inaction, his thoughts naturally dwelt upon the opportunities afforded by an attack on the enemy's right, and the project took more and more definite shape in his mind.

Congress convened on the 2d of December, and one of its earliest subjects of discussion was the battle of Ball's Bluff. Roscoe Conkling in the House of Representatives, and Zachariah Chandler in the Senate, brought forward resolutions for the appointment of committees to investigate and determine the responsibility for that disaster; but on motion of Grimes the Senate chose to order a permanent joint committee of three senators and four representatives to inquire into the conduct of the war. This action was unanimously agreed to by the House, and the committee was appointed, consisting of senators Wade, Chandler, and Johnson, and of representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell. This committee, known as the Committee on the Conduct of the War, was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the government; it called soldiers and

† Lincoln to McClellan, autograph MS.

‡ McClellan to Lincoln, Dec. 10, 1861. Autograph MS.

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statesmen before it and questioned them like refractory school-boys. It claimed to speak for the loyal people of the United States, and this claim generally met with the sympathy and support of a majority of the people's representatives in Congress assembled. It was often hasty and unjust in its judgment, but always earnest, patriotic, and honest; it was assailed with furious denunciation and defended with headlong and indiscriminating eulogy; and on the whole it must be said to have merited more praise than blame.

Even before this committee was appointed, as we have seen, senators Chandler and Wade, representing the more ardent and eager spirits in Congress, had repeatedly pressed upon the Government the necessity of employing the Army of the Potomac in active operations; and now that they felt themselves formally intrusted with a mandate from the people to that effect, were still more urgent and persistent. General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan, and his deliberateness of preparation, before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. A free people, accustomed to considering public affairs as their own, can stand reverses and disappointments; they are capable of making great exertions and great sacrifices: the one thing that they cannot endure is inaction on the part of their rulers; the one thing that they insist upon is to see some result of their exertions and sacrifices. December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. As a matter of fact, the country did not believe the rebel army to be equal to the army of the Union in any of these particulars. It did not share the strange delusion of General McClellan and his staff in regard to the numbers of his adversary, and the common sense of the people was nearer right in its judgment than the computations of the general and his inefficient secret service. McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men! It was useless to try to convince General McClellan of the impossibility of such a concentration of troops in front of him; he simply added together the aggregates furnished by the guesses of his spies and implicitly believed the monstrous sum. It is worthy of notice that the Confederate general rarely fell into the corresponding error. At the time that McClellan was quadrupling, in his imagination, the rebel force, Johnston was estimating the army under McClellan at exactly its real strength.

Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, which, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested.

> Our military exercises had never been interrupted. No demonstrations were made by the troops of that army, except the occasional driving in of a Confederate cavalry picket by a large mixed force. The Federal cavalry rarely ventured beyond the protection of infantry, and the ground between the two armies had been less free to it than to that of the Confederate army.

There was at no time any serious thought of attacking the Union forces in front of Washington. In the latter part of September, General Johnston had thought it possible for the Richmond government to give him such additional troops as to enable him to take the offensive, and Jefferson Davis had come to headquarters at Fairfax Court House to confer with the principals on that subject. At this conference, held on the 1st of October, it was taken for granted that no attack could be made, with any chances of success, upon the Union army in its position before Washington; but it was thought that, if enough force could be concentrated for the purpose, the Potomac might be crossed at the nearer ford, Maryland brought into rebellion, and a battle delivered in rear of Washington, where McClellan would fight at a disadvantage. Mr. Davis asked the three generals present, Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith, beginning with the last, how many troops would be required for such a movement. Smith answered "fifty thousand"; Johnston and Beauregard both said "sixty thousand"; and all agreed that they would require a large increase of ammunition and means of transportation. Mr. Davis said it was impossible to reënforce them to that extent, and the plan was dropped. It is hard to believe that during this same month of October, General McClellan, in a careful letter to

the War Department, with an army, according to his own account, of "147,695 present for duty," should have bewailed his numerical inferiority to the enemy, and begged that all other departments should be stripped of their troops and stores to enable him to make a forward movement, which he professed himself anxious to make "not later than the 25th of November," if the Government would give him men enough to meet the enemy on equal terms. This singular infatuation, difficult to understand in a man of high intelligence and physically brave, as McClellan undoubtedly was, must not be lost sight of. It furnishes the sole explanation of many things otherwise inexplicable. He rarely estimated the force immediately opposed to him at less than double its actual strength, and in his correspondence with the Government he persistently minimized his own force. This rule he applied only to the enemy in his immediate vicinity. He had no sympathy with commanders at a distance who asked for reënforcements. When Rosecrans succeeded him in western Virginia, and wanted additional troops, General McClellan was shocked at the unreasonable request. When William Tecumseh Sherman telegraphed that 75,000 men were needed to defend the Ohio line, and to make a forward movement into Kentucky, he handed the dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, who was sitting in his headquarters at the moment, with the remark, "The man is crazy." Every man sent to any other department he regarded as a sort of robbery of the Army of the Potomac.

All his demands were complied with to the full extent of the power of the Government. Not only in a material, but in a moral sense as well, the President gave him everything that he could. In addition to that mighty army, he gave him his fullest confidence and support. All through the autumn he stood by him, urging him in private to lose no time, but defending him in public against the popular impatience; and when winter came on, and the voice of Congress, nearly unanimous in demanding active operations, added its authoritative tones to the clamor of the country, the President endangered his own popularity by insisting that the general should be allowed to take his own time for an advance. In the latter part of December, McClellan, as already stated, fell seriously ill, and the enforced paralysis of the army that resulted from this illness and lasted several weeks added a keener edge to the public anxiety. The President painfully appreciated how much of justice there was in the general criticism, which he was doing all that he could to allay. He gave himself, night and day, to the study of the military situation. He read a large number of strategical works. He pored over the reports from the various departments and districts of the field of war. He held long conferences with eminent generals and admirals, and astonished them by the extent of his special knowledge and the keen intelligence of his questions. He at last convinced himself that there was no necessity for any further delay; that the army of the Potomac was as nearly ready as it ever would be to take the field against the enemy; and, feeling that he could not wait any longer, on the 10th of January, after calling at General McClellan's house and learning that the general was unable to see him, he sent for Generals McDowell and Franklin, wishing to take counsel with them in regard to the possibility of beginning active operations with the army before Washington. General McDowell has preserved an accurate report of this conference. The President said that he was in great distress; to use his own expression:

> If something were not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it might be made to do something.

In answer to a direct question, put by the President to General McDowell, that accomplished soldier gave a frank and straightforward expression of his conviction that by an energetic movement upon both flanks of the enemy — a movement rendered entirely practicable by the superior numbers of the Union army — he could be forced from his works and compelled to accept battle on terms favorable to us. General Franklin rather favored an attack upon Richmond, by way of York River. A question arising as to the possibility of obtaining the necessary transportation, the President directed both generals to return the next evening, and in the mean time to inform themselves thoroughly as to the matter in question. They spent the following day in this duty and went the next evening to the Executive Mansion with what information they had been able to procure, and submitted a paper in which they both agreed that, in view of the time and means required to take the army to a distant base, operations could now best be undertaken from the present base substantially as proposed by McDowell. The Secretaries of State and of the Treasury, who were present, coincided in this view, and the Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair, alone opposed it. They separated to meet the next day at 3 o'clock. General Meigs, having been called into conference, concurred in the opinion that a movement from the present base was preferable; but no definite resolution was taken, as General McClellan was reported as fully

recovered from his illness, and another meeting was arranged for Monday, the 13th, at the White House, where the three members of the Cabinet already mentioned, with McDowell, Franklin, Meigs, and General McClellan himself, were present. At the request of the President, McDowell made a statement of what he and Franklin had done under Mr. Lincoln's orders, and gave his reasons for advising a movement to the front. He spoke with great courtesy and deference towards his superior officer, and made an apology for the position in which he stood. McClellan was not inclined to relieve the situation of any awkwardness there might be in it. He merely said, "coldly, if not curtly," to McDowell, "You are entitled to have any opinion you please," and made no further remark or comment. The President spoke somewhat at length on the matter, and General McClellan said very briefly "that the case was so clear a blind man could see it" and went off instinctively upon the inadequacy of his forces. The Secretary of the Treasury, whose sympathies were with that section of his party which had already lost all confidence in General McClellan, asked him point blank what he intended to do with the army, and when he intended doing it. A long silence ensued. Even if the question had been a proper one, it is doubtful whether General McClellan would have answered it; as it was, it must have required some self-control for him to have contented himself with merely evading it. He said that Buell in Kentucky must move first; and then refused to answer the question unless ordered to do so. The President asked him if he counted upon any particular time, not asking what the time was — but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be begun? This question was evidently put as affording a means of closing a conference which was becoming disagreeable if not dangerous. McClellan promptly answered in the affirmative, and the President rejoined, "Then I will adjourn this meeting."

It is a remarkable fact that although the plan recommended by these generals was exactly the plan suggested six weeks before by the President to McClellan, neither of them made the slightest reference to that incident. That Mr. Lincoln did not refer to a matter so close to his heart is a striking instance of his reticence and his magnanimity; that General McClellan never mentioned it would seem to show that he thought so little of the matter as to have forgotten it. He seemed also to have thought little of this conference; he makes no reference to it in his report. He says, referring to this period:

> About the middle of January, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration.

The last words of the phrase refer not only to the President, but to Mr. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, who began as soon as he took charge of his department to ply the commander of the army with continual incitements to activity. All suggestions of this sort, whether coming from the Government, Congress, or the press, General McClellan received with surprise and displeasure, and the resentment and vexation of his immediate friends and associates found vent in expressions of contempt for unmilitary critics, which, being reported, only increased the evil that provoked them. He at last laid before the President his plan for attacking Richmond by the lower Chesapeake, which the President disapproved, having previously convinced himself of the superior merit of the plan for a direct movement agreed upon by Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, who were ignorant of the fact that it was his. Further delay ensued, the President not being willing to accept a plan condemned by his own judgment and by the best professional opinions that he could obtain, and General McClellan being equally reluctant to adopt a plan that was not his own. The President at last, at the end of his patience, convinced that nothing would be done unless he intervened by a positive command, issued on the 27th of January his "General War Order, No. 1." He wrote it without consultation with any one, and read it to the Cabinet, not for their sanction, but for their information. The order directed

> that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces; that especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of western Virginia, the army near Munfordville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day; that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given; that the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

Four days later, as a necessary result of this general summons to action, a special instruction, called "President's Special War Order, No. 1," was issued to General McClellan, commanding

> that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im-

mediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

This is the President's suggestion of December 1, put at last in the form of a command.

It would not have been characteristic of General McClellan to accept such an order as final, nor of Mr. Lincoln to refuse to listen to his objections and to a full statement of his own views. The President even went so far as to give him, in the following note, dated February 3, a schedule of points on which he might base his objections and develop his views.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock, to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroads south-west of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours truly,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This elicited from General McClellan a long letter, dated the same day, in which he dwelt with great emphasis on all the possible objections that could lie against a direct movement from Washington, and insisted with equal energy upon the advantages of a campaign by the lower Chesapeake. He rejects without argument the suggestion of an attack on both flanks of the enemy, on the ground of insufficient force, a ground that we have seen to be visionary. He says that an attack on the left flank of the enemy is impracticable on account of the length of the line, and confines his statement to a detail of the dangers and difficulties of an attack on the Confederate right by the line of the Occoquan. He insists that he will be met at every point by a determined resistance. To use his own words, he

brings out, in bold relief, the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defense enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.

Even if he succeeded in such a movement, he thought little of its results; they would be merely "the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory."

They would not end the war, the result he seemed to propose to himself in the one decisive battle he expected to fight somewhere. Turning to his own plan, he hopes by moving from his new base on the lower Chesapeake to accomplish this enormous and final success — to force the enemy either "to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks." The point which he thought promised the most brilliant results was Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock; "but one march from West Point,— on the York River, at the junction of the Pamunkey and the Mattapony,— the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond." He enjoys the prospect of brilliant and rapid movements by which the rebel armies shall be cut off in detail, Richmond taken, and the rebellion brought to a close. He says finally:

My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this project. . . . So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a base — as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.

Most of the assumptions upon which this letter was based have since proved erroneous. The enormous force which McClellan ascribed to Johnston existed only in his imagination and in the wild stories of his spies. His force was about three times that of Johnston, and was therefore not insufficient for an attack upon one flank of the enemy while the other was held in check. It is now clearly known that the determined resistance that he counted upon, if he should attack by the line of the Occoquan, would not have been made. General Johnston says that about the middle of February he was sent for in great haste to Richmond, and on arriving there was told by Jefferson Davis that the Government thought of withdrawing the army to "a less exposed position." Johnston replied that the withdrawal of the army from Centreville would be necessary before McClellan's invasion,— which was to be looked for as soon as the roads were practicable,— but thought that it might be postponed for the present. He left Richmond, however, with the understanding on his part that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable, and the moment he returned to his camp he began his preparations to retire at once from a position which both he and the Richmond government considered absolutely untenable. On the 22d of February he says: "Orders were given to the chiefs of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments to remove the military property in the

depots at Manassas Junction and its dependencies to Gordonsville as quickly as possible." The railroads were urged to work to their utmost capacity. The line of the Occoquan, against which McClellan was arguing so strenuously to the President, was substantially the route by which Johnston expected him, believing, like the thorough soldier that he was, that it would be taken, because "invasion by that route would be the most difficult to meet"; and knowing that he could not cope with the Federal army north of the Rappahannock, he was ready to retire behind that stream at the first news of McClellan's advance. Everything now indicates that if McClellan had chosen to obey the President's order and to move upon the enemy in his front in the latter part of February* or the first days of March, one of the cheapest victories ever gained by a fortunate general awaited him. He would have struck an enemy greatly inferior in strength, equipment, and discipline, in the midst of a difficult retreat already begun, encumbered by a vast accumulation of provisions and stores,† which would have become the prize of the victor. He would not have won the battle that was to end the war. That sole battle was a dream of youth and ambition; the war was not of a size to be finished by one fight. But he would have gained, at slight cost, what would have been in reality a substantial success, and would have appeared, in its effect upon public opinion and the morale of the army, an achievement of great importance. The enemy, instead of quietly retiring at his own time, would have seemed to be driven beyond the Rapidan. The clearing the Potomac of hostile camps and batteries above and below Washington, and the capture of millions of pounds of stores, would have afforded a relief to the anxious public mind that the National cause sorely needed at that time, and which General McClellan needed most of all. ‡

These facts, that are now so clear to every one, were not so evident then; and although the President and the leading men in the Government and in Congress were strongly of the opinion that the plan favored by Mr. Lincoln and approved by McDowell, Meigs, and Franklin was the right one, it was a question of the utmost gravity whether he should force the General-in-Chief to adopt it against his obstinate protest. It would be too much to ask that any government should assume such a responsibility and risk. On the other hand, the removal of the general from the command of the Army of the Potomac would have been a measure not less serious. There was no successor ready at all his equal in accomplishments, in executive efficiency, or in popularity among the soldiers. Besides this, and in spite of his exasperating slowness, the President still entertained for him a strong feeling of personal regard. He therefore, after much deliberation and deep distress of mind, yielded his convictions, gave up his plan and adopted that of General McClellan for a movement by the lower Chesapeake. He never took a resolution which cost him more in his own feelings, and in the estimation of his supporters in Congress and in the country at large. He made no explanation of the reasons that induced this resolution; he thought it better to suffer any misrepresentation rather than to communicate his own grave misgivings to the country. The Committee on the Conduct of the War, who were profoundly grieved and displeased by this decision, made only this grim reference to it:

> Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued, or of the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President, that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862.

This council, which, the committee say, was the first ever called by McClellan, and then only at the direction of the President, was composed of twelve general officers — McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Barnard, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglee

* The following extract shows that General McClellan himself had some vague thought of moving at that time: "February came and on the 13th General McClellan said to me, 'In ten days I shall be in Richmond.' A little surprised at the near approach of a consummation so devoutly to be wished, I asked, 'What is your plan, General?' 'Oh,' said he, 'I mean to cross the river, attack and carry their batteries, and push on after the enemy.' 'Have you any gun-boats to aid in the attack on the batteries?' 'No, they are not needed; all I want is transportation and canal-boats, of which I have plenty that will answer.' I did not think it worth while to reply; but made a note of the date and waited. The ten days passed away; no movement, and no preparation for a movement, had been made." [From a memorandum written by Hon. S. P. Chase. Schucker's "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 446.]

† The subsistence department had collected at Manassas Junction more than three million pounds of provisions. They had also two million pounds of meat at Thoroughfare Gap, besides large herds of cattle and hogs. This accumulation was against the wish and to the great embarrassment of General Johnston. ["Johnston's Narrative," pp. 98 and 99.]

‡ Mr. William Swinton, who habitually takes sides with McClellan against the President where it is possible, says on this point: "Had Johnston stood, a battle with good prospect of success might have been delivered. But had he, as there was great likelihood he would do, and as it is now certain he would have done, fallen back from Manassas to the line of the Rapidan, his compulsory retirement would have been esteemed a positive victory to the Union arms." [Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 73.]

(from Hooker's division). The first four voted against the Urbana plan; Keyes only favored it on condition that the Potomac batteries should first be reduced. The rest voted for it without conditions. This was the council afterward referred to by Stanton when he said, "We saw ten generals afraid to fight."*

This plan of campaign having been definitely adopted, Mr. Lincoln urged it forward as eagerly as if it had been his own. John Tucker, one of the Assistant Secretaries of War, was charged by the President and Mr. Stanton with the entire task of transporting the Army of the Potomac to its new base, and the utmost diligence was enjoined upon him. Quartermasters Ingalls and Hodges were assigned to assist him. We shall see that he performed the prodigious task intrusted to him in a manner not excelled by any similar feat in the annals of the world.

But in the mean while there were two things that the President was anxious to have done, and General McClellan undertook them with apparent good-will. One was to reopen the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the other to clear out the rebel batteries that still obstructed the navigation of the Potomac. For the first, extensive preparations were made: a large body of troops was collected at Harper's Ferry; canal-boats were brought there in sufficient quantity to make a permanent bridge. General McClellan went to the place and, finding everything satisfactory for the operation, telegraphed for a large additional force of cavalry, artillery, and a division of infantry to rendezvous at once at Harper's Ferry, to cross as soon as the bridge was completed, which would be only the work of a day, and then to push on to Winchester and Strasburg. It was only on the morning of the next day, when the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock, that it was discovered they were some six inches too wide to go through. The general thus discovered that his permanent bridge, so long planned, and from which so much had been expected, was impossible.† He countermanded his order for the troops; contented himself with a reconnaissance to Charleston and Martinsburg; and returned to Washington, as he says, "well satisfied with what had been accomplished." He was much surprised at finding that his satisfaction was not shared by the President. Mr. Lincoln's slow anger was thoroughly roused at this ridiculous outcome of an important enterprise, and he received the general on his return in a manner that somewhat disturbed his complacency.

McClellan went on in his leisurely way, preparing for a movement upon the batteries near the Occoquan, undisturbed by the increasing signs of electric perturbation at the Executive Mansion and the Capitol, which answered but faintly to the growing excitement in the North. The accumulating hostility and distrust of General McClellan,—totally unjust as it affected his loyalty and honor and his ardent desire to serve his country in the way that he thought best,—though almost entirely unknown to him, was poured upon the President, the Government, and the leading members of Congress in letters, and conversations, and newspaper leaders. Mr. Lincoln felt the injustice of much of this criticism, but he also felt powerless to meet it, unless some measures were adopted to force the general into an activity which was as necessary to his own reputation as to the national cause. The 22d of February came and passed, and the President's order to move on that day was not obeyed. McClellan's inertia prevailed over the President's anxious eagerness. On the 8th of March, Mr. Lincoln issued two more important General Orders. The first directed General McClellan to divide the Army of the Potomac into four army corps, to be commanded respectively by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes; the forces to be left in front of Washington were to be placed in command of General Wadsworth. The Fifth Corps was to be formed, to be commanded by General N. P. Banks. For months this measure had been pressed upon General McClellan by the Government. An army of 150,000 men, it was admitted, could not be adequately commanded by the machinery of divisions and brigades alone. But though McClellan accepted this view in principle, he could not be brought to put it into practice. He said that he would prefer to command the army personally on its first campaign, and then select the corps commanders for their behavior in the field. The Government thought better to make the organization at once, giving the command of corps to the ranking division commanders. The fact that of the four generals chosen three had been in favor of an immediate movement against the enemy in front of Washington will of course be considered as possessing a certain significance. It is usually regarded as a grievance by the partisans of General McClellan.

The other order is of such importance that we give it entire:

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without

* J. H., Diary.

† Chase in his Diary said the expedition died of lockjaw.

leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

Ordered, That the Army and Navy coöperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*

This order has always been subject to the severest criticism from General McClellan's partisans; but if we admit that it was proper for the President to issue any order at all, there can be no valid objection made to the substance of this one. It was indispensable that Washington should be left secure; it would have been madness to allow General McClellan to take *all* the troops to the Peninsula, leaving the Potomac obstructed by the enemy's batteries, so near the capital; and the fixing of a date beyond which the beginning of the movement should not be postponed had been shown to be necessary by the exasperating experience of the past eight months. The criticism so often made, that a general who required to have such orders as these given him should have been dismissed the service, is the most difficult of all to meet. Nobody felt so deeply as Mr. Lincoln the terrible embarrassment of having a general in command of that magnificent army who was absolutely without initiative, who answered every suggestion of advance with demands for reënforcements, who met entreaties and reproaches with unending arguments to show the superiority of the enemy and the insufficiency of his own resources, and who yet possessed in an eminent degree the enthusiastic devotion of his friends and the general confidence of the rank and file. There was so much of executive efficiency and ability about him that the President kept on, hoping to the last that if he could once "get him started" he would then handle the army well and do great things with it.

MANASSAS EVACUATED.

SUNDAY, the 9th of March, was a day of swiftly succeeding emotions at the Executive Mansion. The news of the havoc wrought by the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads the day before arrived in the morning, and was received with profound chagrin by the calmest spirits and with something like consternation by the more excitable. But in the afternoon astonishing tidings came to reverse the morning's depression. The first was of the timely arrival of the *Monitor*, followed shortly, on the completion of the telegraph to Fort Monroe, by the news of her battle and victory. The exultation of the Government over this providential success was changed to amazement by the receipt of intelligence that the rebel batteries on the Potomac were already abandoned, and the tale of surprises was completed by the news which came in the evening that the Confederate army had abandoned their works at Manassas, retreating southward. General McClellan was with the President and the Secretary of War when this message arrived, and he received it, as might have been expected, with incredulity, which at last gave way to stupefaction. He started at once across the river, ostensibly to verify the intelligence, and in his bewilderment and confusion issued an order that night for an immediate advance of the army upon Centreville and Manassas. In the elaborate report by which he strove, a year after the fact, to shift from himself to others the responsibility of all his errors, occurs this remarkable sentence:

> The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but their adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary.

This was the theory immediately adopted by himself, propagated among his staff, communicated to the Prince de Joinville, who published it in France on his return there, and to the Comte de Paris, who after twenty years incorporated it in his history — that the enemy, having heard of his scheme for going to the Peninsula, through the indiscretion of the Government, had suddenly taken flight from Manassas. General McClellan asserts this in his report a dozen times; he reiterates it as if he felt that his reputation depended upon it. If it is not true, then in the long contest with the President in regard to a direct attack from Washington the President was right and McClellan was wrong.

The straightforward narrative of General Johnston, and the official orders and correspondence of the Confederate officers, show

that there is not the slightest foundation for this theory of General McClellan's. They show, on the contrary, that the rebel government, nearly a month before this, had concluded that Johnston's position was untenable; that Johnston had shared in the belief, and had begun his preparations to retire on the 22d of February; that instead of "ascertaining McClellan's intention to move to the lower Chesapeake," he had been of the opinion that McClellan would advance upon the line designated by Mr. Lincoln, because it was the best line for attack and the most difficult for the rebels to defend; that he knew McClellan's enormous superiority in numbers and did not purpose to risk everything in resisting him there; that on the 5th of March, having received information of unusual activity in our army in the direction of Dumfries, he gave his final orders, and on the 7th began to move. He proceeded with the greatest deliberation, writing to one of his generals on the 15th, "McClellan seems not to value time especially." His subordinates were equally convinced that the Confederate right was the object of the Union advance; Holmes wrote in that sense to Lee on the 14th of March. Lee, who was then directing military operations in Richmond, answered him on the 16th, concurring in this view, recognizing the "advantages" of such a plan, and saying, "That he will advance upon our line as soon as he can, I have no doubt." Until the 18th of March Johnston did not suspect that McClellan was not advancing to strike his right flank; he then fell back behind the Rapidan, to guard against other contingencies. Even while our vast army was passing down the Potomac he could not make out where it was going. So late as the early days of April, Jefferson Davis was in doubt as to McClellan's destination, and Johnston only heard of the advance upon Yorktown about the 5th of that month.

By the very test, therefore, to which General McClellan appeals in the paragraph quoted above, his conduct during the autumn and winter stands finally condemned. By their contemporaneous letters and orders, by their military movements in an important crisis, by their well-considered historical narratives, the Confederate government and generals have established these facts beyond all possibility of future refutation: that the plan for a direct attack suggested by Lincoln, and contemptuously rejected by McClellan, was a sound and practicable one; it was the plan they expected and dreaded to see adopted, because it was the one easiest to accomplish and hardest to resist. When they fancied that they saw the Army of the Potomac preparing to move, it was this plan alone of which they thought; and they immediately gave up their position, which McClellan thought impregnable, as they had been for weeks preparing to do at the first intimation of a forward movement. The long delay of five months, during three of which the roads were in unusually fine condition,* during all of which the Union forces were as three to one of the enemy, remains absolutely without excuse. It can only be explained by that strange idiosyncrasy of General McClellan which led him always to double or treble the number of an enemy and the obstacles in his immediate vicinity.

It is little blame to Confederate generals that they could not divine what General McClellan was doing with the grand army of the Union during the week that followed the evacuation of Manassas. No soldier could have been expected to guess the meaning of that mysterious promenade of a vast army to Centreville and Manassas, and back to Alexandria. In spite of the "impassable roads," they made the journey with ease and celerity. The question why the whole army was taken has never been satisfactorily answered. General McClellan started away in too much confusion of mind to know precisely what he intended; his explanation afterward was that he wanted the troops to have a little experience of marching and to "get rid of their *impedimenta*." He claims in his report to have found on this excursion a full justification of his extravagant estimate of the enemy's force, and speaks with indignation of the calumnious stories of "quaker guns" which were rife in the press at the time. Every one now knows how fatally false the estimate was; and as to the "quaker guns," this is what General Johnston says about them:

> As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. These were the quaker guns afterwards noticed in Northern papers.

Without further discussing where the fault

* Pollard's History, Vol. I., p. 184, says: "A long, lingering Indian summer, with roads more hard and skies more beautiful than Virginia had seen for many a year, invited the enemy to advance." "Johnston's Narrative" says that the roads were practicable until the last of December.

From the admirable monograph of Major-General A. S. Webb, Chief-of-Staff of the Army of the Potomac, entitled "The Peninsula," we quote a sentence on this subject: "During all the time Johnston's army lay at Centreville insolently menacing Washington . . . it never presented an effective strength of over 50,000 men. With more than twice that number, McClellan remained inactive for many precious weeks, under the delusion that he was confronted by a force nearly equal his own."

lay, the fact is beyond dispute that when the evacuation of Manassas was known throughout the country, the military reputation of General McClellan received serious damage. No explanation made at the time, and, we may add, none made since then, could account satisfactorily for such a mistake as to the condition of the enemy, such utter ignorance as to his movements. The first result of it was the removal of General McClellan from the command of the armies of the United States. This resolution was taken by the President himself, on the 11th of March. On that day he prepared the order known as "President's War Order, No. 3," and in the evening called together Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Stanton, and read it to them. It was in these words:

PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER, No. 3.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Frémont. That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

All the members of the Cabinet present heartily approved the order. The President gave his reason for issuing it while General McClellan was absent from Washington — a reason indeed apparent in the opening words, which were intended to take from the act any appearance of disfavor. The general's intimate biographers have agreed that it was because the President was afraid to do it while the general was in Washington! The manner of the order, which was meant as a kindness, was taken as a grievance. Mr. Seward advised that the order be issued in the name of the Secretary of War, but this proposition met with a decided protest from Mr. Stanton. He said there was some friction already between himself and the general's friends, and he feared that the act, if signed by him, would be attributed to personal feeling. The President decided to take the responsibility.* In a manly and courteous letter the next day, McClellan accepted the disposition thus made of him.

* J. H., Diary.

On the 13th of March, at Fairfax Court House, General McClellan called together the four corps commanders who were with him and submitted to them for discussion the President's order of the 8th. The results of the council cannot be more briefly stated than in the following memorandum, drawn up by the generals who took part in it:

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion:

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, provided —

First. That the enemy's vessel *Merrimac* can be neutralized;

Second. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

Third. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River.

Fourth. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.)

N. B.— That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

These conclusions of the council were conveyed to Washington, and the President on the same day sent back to General McClellan his approval, and his peremptory orders for the instant execution of the plan proposed, in these words, signed by the Secretary of War:

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution: First, leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. Second, leave Washington entirely secure. Third, move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

No commander could ask an order more unrestricted, more unhampered, than this. Choose your own route, your own course, only go; seek the enemy and fight him.

Under the orders of Mr. John Tucker, of

the War Department, a fleet of transports had been preparing since the 27th of February. It is one of the many grievances mentioned by General McClellan in his report, that this work was taken entirely out of his hands and committed to those of Mr. Tucker; he thus estops himself from claiming any credit for one of the most brilliant feats of logistics ever recorded. On the 27th of February, Mr. Tucker received his orders; on the 17th of March, the troops began their embarkation; on the 5th of April, Mr. Tucker made his final report, announcing that he had transported to Fort Monroe, from Washington, Perryville, and Alexandria, "121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss," he adds, "of which I have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved." He is certainly justified in closing his story with these words: "I respectfully but confidently submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record." *

The first corps to embark was Heintzelman's; he took with him from General McClellan the most stringent orders to do nothing more than to select camping-grounds, send out reconnaissances, engage guides and spies, "but to make no important move in advance." The other forces embarked in turn, McDowell's corps being left to the last; and before it was ready to sail, General McClellan himself started on the 1st of April, with the headquarters on the steamer *Commodore*, leaving behind him a state of things that made it necessary to delay the departure of McDowell's troops still further.

In all the orders of the President it had been clearly stated that, as an absolute condition precedent to the army being taken away to a new base, enough troops should be left at Washington to make that city absolutely safe, not only from capture, but from serious menace. The partisans of General McClellan then, and ever since then, have contended that, as Washington could not be seriously attacked without exposing Richmond to capture, undue importance was attached to it in these orders. It would be a waste of words to argue with people who place the political and strategic value of these two cities on a level. The capture of Richmond, without the previous virtual destruction of the rebel armies, would have been, it is true, an important achievement, but the seizure of Washington by the rebels would have been a fatal blow to the Union cause. General McClellan was in the habit of saying that if the rebel army should take Washington while he was at Richmond they could never get back; but it might be said that the general who would permit Washington to be taken could not be relied on to prevent the enemy from doing what they liked afterward. Mr. Lincoln was unquestionably right in insisting that Washington must not only be rendered safe from capture, but must also be without the possibility of serious danger. This view was adopted by the council of corps commanders, who met on the 13th of March at Fairfax Court House. They agreed unanimously upon this principle, and then, so as to leave no doubt as to details, three of the four gave the opinion that after the forts on the Virginia side were fully garrisoned, and those on the Maryland side occupied, a covering force of 25,000 men would be required.

The morning after General McClellan had sailed for Fort Monroe, the Secretary of War was astonished to hear from General Wadsworth, the military Governor of the District of Washington, that he had left him present for duty only 19,000 men, and that from that force he had orders to detach four good regiments to join General McClellan on the Peninsula, and four more to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. He further reported that his command was entirely "inadequate to the important duty to which it was assigned." As General Wadsworth was a man of the highest intelligence, courage, and calm judgment, the President was greatly concerned by this emphatic statement. Orders were at once given to General E. A. Hitchcock, an accomplished veteran officer on duty at the War Department, and to Adjutant-General Thomas, to investigate the statement made by General Wadsworth. They reported the same night that it would require 30,000 men to man and occupy the forts, which, with the covering force of 25,000, would make 55,000 necessary for the proper defense of the city, according to the judgment of the council of corps commanders. They confirmed the report of Wadsworth that his efficient force consisted of 19,000, from which General McClellan had ordered eight regiments away. They therefore concluded "that the requirement of the President that the city should be left entirely secure had not been fully complied with." In accordance with this report the President directed that General McDowell's corps should

* The means by which this work was done were as follows:

113 steamers at an average price per day	$215.10
188 schooners at an average price per day	24.45
88 barges at an average price per day	14.27

not be sent to the Peninsula until further orders.*

YORKTOWN.

GENERAL MCCLELLAN arrived at Fort Monroe on the morning of the 2d of April. According to his own report he had ready the next day to move 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. They were of the flower of the volunteer army, and included also Sykes's brigade of regulars, Hunt's artillery reserve, and several regiments of cavalry. These were all on the spot, prepared to march, and an almost equal number were on their way to join him. He seemed at first to appreciate the necessity for prompt and decisive action, and with only one day's delay issued his orders for the march up the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. The first obstacle that he expected to meet was the force of General J. B. Magruder at Yorktown, which McClellan estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000. Magruder says his force consisted of 11,000, of which 6000 were required for the fortifications of Yorktown and only 5000 were left to hold the line across the Peninsula, 13 miles in length. His only object was to delay as long as possible the advance of the National troops upon Richmond, and his dispositions were made to that end. If he had had troops enough, he says that he would have made his line of defense between Ship Point, on the York, and the mouth of the Warwick, on the James. But his force being insufficient for that purpose, he took up as a second line the Warwick River, which heads only a mile or so from Yorktown and empties into the James some thirteen miles to the south. Yorktown and its redoubts, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, formed the left of his line, which was continued by the Warwick River, a sluggish and boggy stream running through a dense wood fringed with swamps. The stream was dammed in two places, at Wynn's Mill and at Lee's Mill; and Magruder constructed three more dams to back up the river and make the fords impassable. Each of these dams was protected by artillery and earthworks.

General McClellan was absolutely ignorant not only of these preparations made to receive him, but also of the course of the river and the nature of the ground through which it ran. He knew something of the disposition of Magruder's outposts on his first line, and rightly conjectured that they would retire as he advanced. His orders for the 4th of April were therefore punctually carried out, and he seemed to have expected no greater difficulty in his plan for the next day.† He divided his force into two columns — Heintzelman to take the right and march directly to Yorktown; and Keyes, taking the road to the left, to push on to the Half-way House in the rear of Yorktown, on the Williamsburg road. He expected Keyes to be there the same day, to occupy the narrow ridge in that neighborhood, "to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and to prevent reënforcements from being thrown in." Heintzelman went forward to the place assigned him in front of Yorktown, meeting with little opposition. Keyes marched by the road assigned him until he came to the enemy's fortified position at Lee's Mill, which, to use General McClellan's words, "he found altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried by assault." The discovery of this "unexpected" obstacle exercised a paralyzing influence upon the General-in-Chief. The energetic and active campaign that day begun was at once given up. Two days of reconnaissances convinced him that he could not break through the line which Magruder's little army of 11,000 men had stretched across the Peninsula, and he resolved upon a regular siege of the place. He began at the same time that campaign of complaint and recrimination against the Government which he kept up as long as he remained in the service.

He always ascribed the failure of his campaign at this point to two causes; first, to the want of assistance by the navy in reducing Yorktown, and second, to the retention of McDowell's corps in front of Washington. If the navy had silenced the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, he contended, he could have gone up the Peninsula unchecked. This is unquestionably true; it would be equally true to say in general terms that if somebody else would do our work we would have no work to do. He brings no proof to show that he had any right to expect that the navy would do this for him. It is true that he asked before he left Washington that the navy might cooperate with him in this plan, and received in reply the assurance that the navy would render him all the assistance in its power. The sworn testimony of Mr. Fox, the Assistant-

* General McClellan made in his report an elaborate effort to explain away these facts. He claims to have left a force of 73,000 for the defense of Washington, including in the number all the troops under Dix in Maryland, under Banks in the Shenandoah, all those at Warrenton, at Manassas, and on the lower Potomac. But he does not deny the facts stated by Wadsworth and confirmed by Hitchcock and Thomas.

† In a letter on the 3d he wrote: "I hope to get possession of Yorktown day after to-morrow." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 307.]

Secretary of the Navy, and of Admiral Goldsborough, shows that nothing was promised that was not performed, and that the navy stood ready to give, and did give, all the assistance to the army which was possible. Mr. Fox said:

> Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success. The forts at Yorktown were situated too high, were beyond the reach of naval guns; and I understood that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made upon them by the navy.

Admiral Goldsborough's evidence is to the same effect: he promised that the *Merrimac* should never go up the York River, and she did not; he never heard that he was expected to coöperate with the army in attacking Yorktown; he did everything that General McClellan requested of him. His orders from the department were clear and urgent, though general; he was "to extend to the army, at all times, any and all aid that he could render"; and he never refused to honor any draft that was made upon him. General McClellan pursued in this matter his invariable system. He asked for impossibilities, and when they were not accomplished for him he cherished it ever after as a precious grievance — like a certain species of lawyer, who in a case that he expects to lose always takes care to provide himself with a long bill of exceptions on which to base his appeal.

The greatest of his grievances was the retention of McDowell's corps, and his clamor in regard to this was so loud and long as to blind many careless readers and writers to the facts in the case. We have stated them already, but they may be briefly recapitulated here. A council of war of General McClellan's corps commanders, called by himself, had decided that Washington could not be safely left without a covering force of 55,000, including the garrisons of the forts. When he had gone, General Wadsworth reported that he had left only 19,000, and had ordered away nearly half of these. Two eminent generals in the War Department investigated this statement and found it true, whereupon the President ordered that McDowell's corps should for the present remain within reach of Washington. McClellan took with him to the Peninsula an aggregate force of over 100,000 men, afterwards largely increased. His own morning report of the 13th of April, signed by himself and his adjutant-general, shows that he had with him actually present for duty 100,970. With this overwhelming superiority of numbers he could have detached 30,000 men at any moment to do the work that he had intended McDowell to do. But all the energy he might have employed in this work he diverted in attacking the Administration at Washington, which was doing all that it could do to support and provide for his army.

The attitude of the President towards him at this time may be seen from the following letter of the 9th of April, in which Mr. Lincoln answers his complaints with as much consideration and kindness as a father would use towards a querulous and petulant child:

> Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.
>
> Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My official order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.
>
> I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.
>
> There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? *
>
> As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your

* The discrepancy cannot be accounted for. General McClellan's official morning report of the 13th of April, four days after the date of the President's letter, gives the following: "Number of troops composing the Army of the Potomac after its disembarkation on the Peninsula: Aggregate present for duty, 100,970; on special duty, sick, and in arrest, 4265; aggregate absent, 12,486, — total aggregate, 117,721." Yet with statements like these on file in the War Department, over his own signature, he did not hesitate to inform the President that his force amounted to only 85,000; and even this sum dwindled so considerably, as years rolled by, that in his article in THE CENTURY, in May, 1885, on the Peninsula Campaign, he gives his available fighting force as "67,000 or 68,000."

own would have to do if that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you — that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reënforcements than you can by reënforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

These considerations produced no impression upon General McClellan. From the beginning to the end of the siege of Yorktown, his dispatches were one incessant cry for men and guns. These the Government furnished to the utmost extent possible, but nothing contented him. His hallucination of overwhelming forces opposed to him began again, as violent as it was during the winter. On the 8th of April he wrote to Admiral Goldsborough, "I am probably weaker than they are, or soon will be." His distress is sometimes comic in its expression. He writes on the 7th of April, "The Warwick River grows worse the more you look at it." While demanding McDowell's corps *en bloc* he asked on the 5th for Franklin's division, and on the 10th repeated this request, saying that although he wanted more, he would be responsible for the results if Franklin's division were sent him. The Government, overborne by his importunity, gave orders the same day that Franklin's division should go to him, and the arrangements for transporting them were made with the greatest diligence. He was delighted with this news; and although the weather was good and the roads improving, he did nothing but throw up earth-works until they came. They arrived on the 20th, and no use whatever was made of them! He kept them in the transports in which they had come down the bay more than two weeks — in fact, until the day before the siege ended. It is hard to speak with proper moderation of so ridiculous a disposition of this most valuable force, so clamorously demanded by General McClellan, and so generously sent him by the President. General Webb, the intimate friend and staff-officer of McClellan, thus speaks of it:

> Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander of the Corps of Engineers was instructed to devise the proper arrangements and superintend the landing of the troops; but, extraordinary as it may seem, more than two weeks were consumed in the preliminaries, and when everything was *nearly* ready for the disembarkation the enemy had vanished from the scene. . . . How long it would have taken the whole of McDowell's corps to disembark at this rate . . . the reader may judge; and yet for days it had been McClellan's pet project, in connection with his plan of campaign, to utilize McDowell in just this manner as a flanking column.

The simple truth is, there was never an hour during General McClellan's command of the army that he had not more troops than he knew what to do with; yet he was always instinctively calling for more. Mr. Stanton one day said of him, with natural hyperbole:

> If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three.

As usual with him, he entirely mistook the position, the strength, and the intentions of the enemy. He repeatedly telegraphed to Washington that he expected to fight an equal or greater force — in fact, "all the available force of the rebels" in the neighborhood of Yorktown. We have the concurrent testimony of all the Confederate authorities that no such plan was ever thought of. Magruder's intentions, as well as his orders from Richmond, were merely to delay McClellan's advance as long as practicable. His success in this purpose surpassed his most sanguine expectations. In the early days of April he was hourly expecting an attack at some point on his thinly defended line of 13 miles, guarded, as he says, by only 5000 men, exclusive of the 6000 who garrisoned Yorktown. "But to my utter surprise," he continues, "he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault." At last, no less to his astonishment than to his delight, Magruder discovered that McClellan was beginning a regular siege, which meant a gain of several weeks for the rebel defense of Richmond, and absolute safety for the concentration of rebel troops in the mean time.

It is now perfectly clear to all military critics not blinded by partisanship or personal partiality that McClellan could have carried the line of Magruder by assault at any time during the early days of April. From the mass of testimony to this effect before us we will take only two or three expressions, of the highest authority. General A. S. Webb says:

> That the Warwick line could have been readily broken within a week after the army's arrival before it, we now know.

General Heintzelman says, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

> I think if I had been permitted, when I first landed on the Peninsula, to advance, I could have isolated the

troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration.

General Barnard, McClellan's Chief of Engineers, says in his final report of the campaign that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted:

There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. . . . Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unrelieved by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there.

The testimony of the enemy is the same. Johnston, so soon as he came to examine it, regarded the position of Magruder as clearly untenable: saw that McClellan could not be defeated there; that the line was too long to be successfully defended; that the back-water was as much a protection to one side as the other; that there was a considerable unfortified space between Yorktown and the head of the stream, open to attack; and that the position could at any time be turned by way of York River. Every one seemed to see it except General McClellan. He went on sending dispatches every day to Washington for heavier guns and more men, digging a colossal system of earth-works for gradual approach upon one side of an intrenched camp of no strategic value whatever, the rear of which was entirely open; preparing with infinite labor and loss the capture of a place without a prisoner, the effect of which at the best would be merely to push an army back upon its reserves.

Even so late as the 16th of April, an opportunity to break Magruder's line was clearly presented to McClellan and rejected. He had ordered General W. F. Smith to reconnoiter a position known as Dam No. 1, between Lee's and Wynn's Mills, where there was a crossing covered by a one-gun battery of the enemy. For this purpose Smith pushed Brooks's Vermont brigade with Mott's battery somewhat close to the dam, carrying on a sharp fire. From this point he examined at his leisure, and in fact controlled, the position opposite, finding it feebly defended. A young officer of Brooks's staff, Lieutenant Noyes, crossed the river below the dam, where the water was only waist deep, and approached within fifty yards of the enemy's works. Returning after this daring feat, he repeated his observations to General Smith and to General McClellan, who had arrived on the ground and had ordered Smith to bring up his entire division to hold the advanced position occupied by Brooks's brigade. Smith, who perceived the importance of Noyes's intelligence, obtained permission to send a party across the stream to see if the enemy's works had been sufficiently denuded to enable a column to effect a lodgment. Four companies of the 3d Vermont, numbering 200 men, under Captain Harrington, were ordered to cross the river, to ascertain "the true state of affairs." They dashed through the stream, and in a few moments gained the enemy's rifle-pits, where they maintained themselves with the utmost gallantry for half an hour. The enemy was thrown into great confusion by this bold and utterly unexpected movement. There were still several hours of daylight left, and another attempt was made to cross at the same point with a force no larger than Harrington's, assisted by a diversion of an equal force at the dam above. But the enemy being now thoroughly aroused and concentrated, the crossing was not made. It appears from General Smith's report that "no attempt to mass the troops of the division for an assault was made"; the only intention seemed to be "to secure the enemy's works if we found them abandoned!" He adds:

The moment I found resistance serious, and the numbers opposed great, I acted in obedience to the warning instructions of the General-in-Chief, and withdrew the small number of troops exposed from under fire.

"Thus," says General Webb, "a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed."

The importance of this incident may be best appreciated by reading General Magruder's account of it. He calls it a serious attempt to break his line at the weakest part. If, instead of two hundred men, Smith had felt authorized to push over his entire division, the Peninsula campaign would have had a very different termination.

The little that was done greatly pleased General McClellan. He announced the movement of General Smith in a somewhat excited dispatch to the War Department, which Mr. Stanton answered with still more enthusiastic congratulation. "Good for the first lick!" he shouts; "Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery"—showing the intense eagerness of the Government to find motives for satisfaction and congratulation in McClellan's conduct. But there was no sequel to the movement; indeed, General McClellan's dispatches indicate considerable complacency that Smith was able to hold the position gained. General Webb says, "Reconnaissances were made, . . . but no assaulting columns were ever organized to take advantage of any opportunity offered."

No congratulations or encouragements from the Government now availed anything with

McClellan. Struggling with a command and a responsibility too heavy for him, he had fallen into a morbid state of mind in which prompt and energetic action was impossible. His double illusion of an overpowering force of the enemy in his front, and of a government at Washington that desired the destruction of his army, was always present with him, exerting its paralyzing influence on all his plans and actions. In his private letters he speaks of Washington as that "sink of iniquity"; of the people in authority as "those treacherous hounds"; of the predicament he is in, "the rebels on one side and the Abolitionists and other scoundrels on the other." "I feel," he says, "that the fate of a nation depends upon me, and I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of government"— this at a moment when the Government was straining every nerve to support him.

The Confederates, as Mr. Lincoln had said, were daily strengthening their position by fortification and reënforcement. On the 17th of April, General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the army of the Peninsula. He says that his force after the arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions amounted to about 53,000 men, including 3000 sick; he places the force of McClellan at 133,000, including Franklin's division of 13,000 floating idly on their transports.* He did nothing more than to observe the Union army closely, to complete the fortifications between Yorktown and the inundations of the Warwick, and to hold his own forces in readiness for a movement to the rear. He kept himself informed of the progress of McClellan's engineering work against Yorktown, as it was not his intention to remain long enough to spend an hour under fire. He did not expect to be hurried; he had long before that given his opinion that McClellan did not especially value time. Every day of delay was of course an advantage, but "an additional day or two gained by enduring a cannonade would have been dearly bought in blood," and he therefore determined to go before McClellan's powerful artillery should open upon him. Seeing, as we now can, what was occurring upon both sides of the Warwick River, there is something humiliating and not without a touch of the pathetic in the contrast between the clear vision of Johnston and the absolute blindness of McClellan, in relation to each other's attitude and purpose. While the former was simply watching for the flash of the first guns to take his departure, glad of every day that the firing was postponed, but entirely indifferent to the enormous development of the siege-works going on in his sight, the latter was toiling with prodigious industry and ability over his vast earth-works and his formidable batteries, only pausing to send importunate dispatches to Washington for more guns and more soldiers, forbidding the advance of a picket beyond specified limits, carefully concealing every battery until all should be finished, not allowing a gun to be fired until the whole thunderous chorus should open at once, firmly convinced that when he was entirely ready he would fight and destroy the whole rebel army.

Nearly one hundred heavy Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers were placed in battery against the town and camp of Yorktown and its outlying works, only fifteen hundred or two thousand yards away. Against the opinion of his ablest staff-officers, McClellan kept this immense armament silent for weeks while he was continually adding to it. Barnard, Chief of Engineers, says, "We should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed." Barry, Chief of Artillery, says:

> The ease with which the 100 and 200 pounders of this battery [Battery No. 1] were worked, the extraordinary accuracy of their fire, and the since ascertained effects produced upon the enemy by it, force upon me the conviction that the fire of guns of similar caliber and power in the other batteries at much shorter ranges, combined with the cross-vertical fire of the thirteen and ten inch sea-coast mortars, would have compelled the enemy to surrender or abandon his works in less than twelve hours.

General McClellan's only reason for refusing to allow the batteries to open fire as they were successively finished was the fear that they would be silenced by the converging fire of the enemy as soon as they betrayed their position. That this was a gross error is shown by the Confederate reports. They were perfectly cognizant of the progress and disposition of his batteries; the very good reason why they did not annoy him in their construction was that the Union lines were, to use Johnston's words, "beyond the range of our old-fashioned ship guns." A few experimental shots were fired from the shore batteries on the 1st of May; the effect of them convinced the Confederate general of the enormous surplus strength of the Federal artillery. The shots from their first volley fell on the camp of his reserve, a mile and a half beyond the village.†

* His own force is correctly given. He only slightly exaggerates that of McClellan.

† On the 23d of April, McClellan wrote to the President: "Do not misunderstand the apparent inaction here — not a day, not an hour, has been lost. Works have been constructed that may almost be called gigantic, roads built through swamps and difficult ravines, material brought up, batteries built. I have to-night in battery and ready for motion 5 100-pounder Parrott guns, 10 4½-inch ordnance guns, 18 20-pounder Par-

How long General McClellan would have continued this futile labor if he had been left alone, it is impossible to conjecture. If there was at first a limit in his own mind of the work to be done and the time to be given to it, it must have been continually moved forward until it passed out of sight. Up to the last moment he was still making demands which it would have taken weeks to fill. The completion of one work was simply an incentive to the beginning of another. Thus on the 28th of April,— a week after Franklin's arrival,— at a time when Johnston was already preparing to start for Richmond, he telegraphs to Washington as a pleasant bit of news that he "had commenced a new battery from right of first parallel," and adds: "Would be glad to have the 30-pounder Parrotts in the works around Washington at once. Am very short of that excellent gun." It is not difficult to imagine how such a dispatch at such a time smote upon the intense anxiety of the President. He answered in wonder and displeasure: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" But the general, busy with his trenches and his epaulements, paid no regard to this searching question. Two days later, May 1, he continued his cheery report of new batteries and rifle-pits, and adds, "Enemy still in force and working hard"; and these stereotyped phrases last with no premonition of any immediate change until on the 4th he telegraphed, "Yorktown is in our possession," and later in the day began to magnify his victory, telling what spoils he had captured, and ending with the sounding phrases, "No time shall be lost. I shall push the enemy to the wall."

Johnston had begun his preparations to move on the 27th of April, and on the 3d of May, finding that McClellan's batteries were now ready to open,— a fact apparently not yet known to McClellan,— he gave orders for the evacuation, which began at midnight. He marched away from Yorktown with about 50,000 men. General McClellan, by his own morning report of the 30th of April, had in his camps and trenches, and scrambling in haste on board the transports that they had quitted the day before, the magnificent aggregate of 112,392 present for duty, and a total aggregate of 130,378.

rotts, 6 Napoleon guns, and 6 10-pounder Parrotts; this not counting the batteries in front of Smith and on his left — 45 guns. I will add to it to-morrow night 5 30-pounder Parrotts, 6 20-pounder Parrotts, from 5 to 10 13-inch mortars, and — if they arrive in time — one 200-pounder Parrott. Before sundown to-morrow I will essentially complete the redoubt necessary to strengthen the first parallel as far as Wormley's Creek from the left, and probably all the way to York River to-morrow night. *I will then be secure against sorties.*" [McClellan to Lincoln, April 23. MS.] With a force of three to one he was wasting weeks in defensive works.

FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO FAIR OAKS.

THE evacuation of Yorktown took General McClellan so completely by surprise that a good deal of valuable time was lost in hurried preparation to pursue the retiring enemy. Franklin's division, after their fortnight of delay on the transports, had been disembarked. They were hastily returned to their boats. Says Webb:

> Several hours were consumed in having the commands properly provisioned for the march. The evacuation was discovered at dawn, and it was noon before the first column started in pursuit. Johnston by this time had taken his entire command to Williamsburg. Knowing that McClellan's advance would soon reach him, he made his dispositions at his leisure. He posted a strong rear-guard there under Longstreet to protect the movement of his trains. The Union cavalry under Sherman came into collision with this force about dark and was repulsed, losing one gun. The main body of the pursuing army came up during the night, under the command of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. It is strongly illustrative of General McClellan's relations with his corps commanders, that neither of these generals had any orders from him as to the conduct of the battle which was inevitable as soon as they overtook the enemy, and there was even serious doubt as to which among them was in command of the forces. Sumner had been ordered by the General-in-Chief to take command in his absence, but these orders had not been communicated to Heintzelman, who thought that he was to take control of the movement.

There was some confusion of orders as to the roads to be taken by the different commands, in consequence of which Hooker came into position on the left of the line and Smith on the right. The contrary disposition had been intended.

The morning of the 5th came with no definite plan of battle arranged. General Hooker, following his own martial instincts, moved forward and attacked the enemy at half-past 7 and was soon hotly engaged. He fought almost the entire rear-guard of Johnston during the whole forenoon. Heavy reënforcements thrown against him checked his advance and caused him to lose the ground he had gained. Hooker speaks in his report with much bitterness, not wholly unjustified, of the manner in which his division was left to fight an overwhelming force, "unaided in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands," and we search the reports of General McClellan and the corps commanders in vain for any adequate explanation of this state of things.

The whole day was bloody and expensive

and without adequate result. The heroism of Hooker and Hancock, and their brave troops, was well-nigh wasted. There was no head, no intelligent director, no understood plan. McClellan arrived late in the day and was unable to contribute anything to the result, although the cheers with which he was welcomed showed how fully he possessed the confidence and affection of his troops. He had not anticipated so early an engagement, and was spending the day at Yorktown to dispatch Franklin's division up the river.

Actual contact with the enemy, however, made, as it always did, an exaggerated impression upon him. The affair, which when he heard of it at Yorktown seemed to him a mere skirmish with a rear-guard, suddenly acquired a portentous importance when surveyed in the light of the bivouac at Williamsburg, amidst the actual and visible signs of a sanguinary conflict. His dispatch to the War Department, written at 10 o'clock the night of the battle, betrays great agitation, and his idiosyncrasy of multiplying the number of his enemy, as a matter of course, asserts itself. "I find General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own." After a compliment to Hancock he continues, "I learn from the prisoners taken that the rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond." One can only wonder what he expected them to say. "I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan. My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well." * Thus while Johnston was profiting by the darkness to prepare to continue his retrograde march at daybreak, McClellan was nerving himself to stand the risk of holding his ground at Williamsburg, while he "resumed the original plan" of a movement by water.

The next day, when he discovered that the enemy had moved away, leaving their wounded on the field of battle, his apprehension of attack subsided, but other difficulties rose before him. He telegraphed on the 7th to the Secretary of War that "until the roads improved both in front and rear no large body of troops could be moved." Johnston had apparently no difficulty in moving his troops, which McClellan thought a larger body than his own.

Reaching a place called Baltimore Cross-Roads, Johnston halted for five days, and, after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Norfolk and the destruction of the *Merrimac*, apprehending an attack upon Richmond by way of the James River, he ordered his forces to cross the Chickahominy on the 15th. Two days after this the rebel army encamped about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts that had been constructed the previous year. It was a time of great apprehension, almost of dismay, at Richmond. The Confederate President, and most of his cabinet, hastily sent their families to places of safety. Mr. Davis, whose religious feelings always took on a peculiar intensity in critical times, had himself baptized at home, and privately confirmed at St. Paul's Church. There was great doubt whether the city could be successfully defended; the most important archives of the Government were sent, some to Lynchburg and some to Columbia.†

But General Johnston had reason to confirm his opinion that McClellan cared little for time. He remained several days at Williamsburg after he had ascertained that the enemy had disappeared from in front of him. His visions of overwhelming forces of rebels were now transferred to Franklin's front. On the 8th he telegraphed the War Department a story of 80,000 to 120,000 opposed to Franklin, but in full retreat to the Chickahominy. On the 10th he sends an urgent appeal to Washington for more troops, claiming that the enemy "are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South." His own army will inevitably be reduced by sickness, casualties, garrisons, and guards — as if that of the enemy would not. He therefore implores large and immediate reënforcements in a tone which implies that the President could make armies by executive decree. "If I am not reënforced," he says, "it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched." In face of a morning report of over 100,000 men present for duty he says: "I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle." This last statement was in one sense true; he never did, and it is to be presumed he never could, handle that many men at once. All his battles were fought piecemeal with a part of his force at a time.

He still protested stoutly against the original organization of his army corps, and asked that he might be permitted to break it up or at least to suspend it. He disliked his corps

* On the 6th of May the veteran General Wool sent this dispatch to the War Department, showing how his elders regarded at the time these jeremiads of the young general: "The desponding tone of Major-General McClellan's dispatch of last evening more than surprises me. He says his entire force is undoubtedly considerably inferior to that of the rebels. If such is the fact, I am still more surprised that they should have abandoned Yorktown." [War Records.]

† J. B. Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," entries of May 8, May 10, and May 19.

commanders, and naturally wished his friends to exercise those important commands. He blamed the corps organization for all the trouble at Williamsburg, and said, if he had come on the field half an hour later, all would have been lost. The President was greatly wounded by this persistent manifestation of bad temper, but bore it after his fashion with untiring patience and kindness. He sent an official order, authorizing McClellan to suspend temporarily the corps organization in the Army of the Potomac, and to adopt any that he might see fit, until further orders. At the same time he wrote a private letter to the general, full of wise and kindly warning. He said:

I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself alone excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything? When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no great liberty with them. But to return. Are you strong enough — are you strong enough even with my help — to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you. The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

General McClellan accepted the authorization with alacrity and the sermon with indifference. He at once formed two provisional army corps, giving Fitz-John Porter the command of one and Franklin the other.

After leaving Williamsburg and joining his army at Cumberland, he reiterated his complaints and entreated for reënforcements that it was not in the power of the Government to send him. His morbid apprehension had grown to such an extent that on the 14th of May he telegraphed his conviction that he would be compelled, with 80,000 men, to fight 160,000 rebels in front of Richmond; and begged that the Government would send him "by water" — he did not want them to come overland — "all the disposable troops," "every man" that could be mustered. The President, anxious to leave nothing undone to help and encourage him, replied to these important demands first by a friendly private note, in which he said:

I have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of the James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our forces off the direct line between Richmond and here.

He afterwards sent a dispatch through the War Department, of which the essential points are as follows:

The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order therefore to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered — keeping himself always in position to save the Capital from all possible attack — so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to coöperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, . . . but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. . . . The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moved forward.

Events as little foreseen by General McClellan as by the Government, and which had by him been declared impossible,— the defeat of our forces in the Shenandoah and the movement of a large rebel force to the upper Potomac,— prevented the execution of this plan. But it is worthy of notice that immediately on the receipt of the President's instructions, while he was waiting for McDowell to join him, General McClellan evinced no gratification at this compliance with his wishes. On the contrary, he lost no time in making a grievance of it; he wrote a long and elaborate dispatch protesting against it, and asking that "McDowell should be placed explicitly under his orders in the ordinary way." In his report, and in all his subsequent apologies for his campaign, he makes this positive assertion:

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north.

This charge is an evident after-thought, and is no less lacking in adroitness than in candor. We will permit it to be answered by General

Webb, the ablest military writer on the Peninsula campaign, who is always the friend of McClellan, and his partisan wherever the writer's intelligence and conscience allow it. He says:

> It is but repeating the proper criticisms made by other writers that General McClellan had frequently mentioned the Pamunkey as his prospective base; that he made no representation to the Government, at the time, that he wished to be free to move by the James; and that it was within his power during the first three weeks of June, when he found that McDowell was again withheld from him, to follow the latter route. On one point there can be no question — that the position of his army, as already given, along the left bank of the Chickahominy from Bottom's towards New Bridge, on May 20, with the White House, on the Pamunkey, as the base of supplies, was one of McClellan's own choice, uninfluenced by McDowell's movements.

It required ten days after the fight at Williamsburg for McClellan's headquarters to reach Cumberland, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, and on the next day he established his permanent depot at the White House, near by. On the 21st the army was brought together and established in line on the Chickahominy, the right wing being about seven and the left about twelve miles from Richmond, from which they were separated by two formidable barriers — the rebel army, and the river with its environment of woods and swamps, its fever-breathing airs and its sudden floods. The latter was first attacked. General McClellan began at once with great energy the building of several bridges over the stream, a work of special difficulty on account of the boggy banks, which made long approaches necessary. In this work, and in a voluminous correspondence with the President in regard to reënforcements, which we shall notice when we come to treat of those movements of Jackson's in the valley that caused the division of McDowell's force, he passed ten days; he pushed the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman across the river, and retained those of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter on the north side.

The monotony of camp life was broken up on the 27th of May by a brilliant feat of arms performed by Fitz-John Porter and his corps at Hanover Court House, where he attacked and defeated a rebel force under General Branch. The chief value of this battle was its demonstration of the splendid marching and fighting qualities of the troops engaged. General McClellan was greatly annoyed that the President did not seem to attach sufficient importance to this action; but General Johnston in his "Narrative," while not diminishing the gallantry of Porter and his troops, or denying the complete defeat of Branch, treats it merely as an incident of Branch's march under orders to join Anderson, which was accomplished the same day at the point designated for this junction. There was no sequel to the fight. Porter and his victorious troops marched back to camp.

On the 26th of May, General McClellan informed the President that he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," and that he would be "free to strike" on the return of Porter. But several days elapsed without the blow being struck, until the enemy, as usual, accelerated matters by himself striking. It had been for some time the intention of General Johnston to attack the Union army before McDowell should join it; and learning, on the day of the battle of Hanover Court House, that McDowell was leaving Fredericksburg, he resolved at once to strike McClellan's force on both sides of the river. When we consider that the consolidated returns of the Army of the Potomac for the 31st of May showed an aggregate of 127,166 officers and men, of whom there were 98,000 present for duty, with 280 pieces of field artillery, and that General Johnston's force amounted to about 60,000 effectives, we cannot but think it was a fortunate circumstance for him that he did not attempt to carry this heroic plan into effect. At night, when he had called his general officers together for their instruction, Johnston was informed that McDowell's force, which had been marching southward, had returned to Fredericksburg. He then abandoned his idea of attacking McClellan on both sides of the river, and reverted to his former plan of assailing with his whole force the two corps on the south bank as soon as they had sufficiently increased the distance between themselves and the three corps on the north.

In this plan, as in the other one,— and we shall see, farther on, that the same was the case with General Lee,— General Johnston does not seem to have taken into the account the possible initiative of General McClellan. He makes his plans entirely without reference to it, choosing his time for attack absolutely at his own convenience. He takes it for granted that he will be met with a courageous and able defense — but nothing more. The worst he has to fear in any case is a repulse; there seems no thought of an offensive return in his mind. The Northern general, on the contrary, judged his adversary with more courtesy than justice. He evidently had no suspicion of Johnston's intentions. At the moment that the latter was calling his generals together to give orders for the assault, McClellan was telegraphing to Washington: "Richmond papers urge Johnston to attack, now that he has us away from gun-boats. I think he is too able for that."

Johnston's purpose was finally adopted and put in action with great decision and promptitude. On the 30th D. H. Hill informed him that the Federals were in force at Seven Pines, and that the indications were that all of Keyes's corps was south of the river; to which Johnston immediately responded by telling him he would attack the next morning. Within an hour or two his whole plan of battle was arranged. Orders were given to throw twenty-three of the twenty-seven brigades of which the Confederate army consisted against the two corps of Heintzelman and Keyes.* The rest were to observe the river by the Meadow and New bridges. After the plan of battle was arranged, a violent storm of rain came on and continued most of the night. This was a welcome incident to Johnston, as it inspired the hope that the river might overflow its banks and sever the communication between the two wings of the Federal army. He did not permit the rain to delay him.

The forces commanded by Longstreet and Hill attacked Casey's division of Keyes's corps with great impetuosity, and in overwhelming numbers, about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Keyes's corps, supported by those of Heintzelman, defended their ground with gallantry and pertinacity; but the numbers opposed to them were too great, and they gradually and sullenly gave way, retiring inch by inch, until, as night came on, they had been forced more than a mile and a half east of the position that they had occupied in the morning.

The forces under G. W. Smith, accompanied by Johnston in person, whose duty it had been to strike the right flank of the Union army as soon as the assault of Longstreet and Hill became fully developed on the left, were delayed for some time on account of a peculiar condition of the atmosphere, which prevented the sound of the musketry from reaching from Seven Pines to the headquarters of Smith on the Nine-mile road. But about 4 o'clock, Johnston, having been informed of the progress of affairs in Longstreet's front, determined to put Smith in upon the Union right flank, being by this time relieved of all fear of a reenforcement from the other side of the river. Fortunately for the Union cause, the forces immediately opposite this position were commanded by General Sumner, an officer whose strongest traits were soldierly ardor and generosity. He had been ordered, as soon as the firing began, to hold himself in readiness to move to the assistance of his comrades at Fair Oaks; but he gave these orders a liberal interpretation, and instead of merely preparing to move he at once marched with two divisions to the two bridges he had built and halted them, with his leading companies at the bridges. In this manner an hour of inestimable advantage was saved. The swollen river soon carried away one of the bridges, and the other was almost submerged when the order came to Sumner to cross.

Without delaying a moment on the west bank, Sumner marched through the thick mud in the direction of the heaviest firing and repulsed the attacks of Smith. This Union success was the result of Sumner's straightforward and unhesitating march. His appointment to the command of an army corps had been bitterly opposed and never forgiven by General McClellan; he had been treated by his commander with studied neglect and disrespect; and this magnificent service was his only revenge. About 7 o'clock the Confederates met their severest mischance of the day; General Johnston received at an interval of a few moments two severe and disabling wounds.

The firing ceased, "terminated by darkness only," Johnston is careful to say, before he had been borne a mile from the field. The command had devolved by seniority of rank upon General G. W. Smith.

There was great confusion and discouragement in the rebel councils. Jefferson Davis found hope in the suggestion that "the enemy might withdraw during the night, which would give the Confederates the moral effect of a victory." Early on June 1 the battle was renewed, and the Union troops reoccupied the ground lost on the day before. At 2 o'clock General Lee took command, and the battle died away by the gradual retirement of the Confederates.

A great battle had been fought absolutely without result. The Confederates had failed in their attempt to destroy McClellan's two outlying corps, but their failure entailed no other consequences. The losses were frightful upon both sides: the Union army lost 5000, and the Confederate loss was reported at something over 4000, which is generally considered an under-statement. But there was this enormous difference between the condition of the two armies: the Union troops south of the Chickahominy, though wearied by the conflict, with ranks thinned by death and wounds, had yet suffered no loss of *morale;* on the contrary, their spirits had been heightened by the stubborn fight of Saturday and the easy victory of Sunday. North of the river lay the larger portion of the army, which had not fired a gun nor lost a man in the action. It is hardly denied, at this day, by the most passionate of McClellan's partisans, that the way to Rich-

* In an article in THE CENTURY for May, 1885, General Johnston changes this statement to "twenty-two out of twenty-eight brigades."

mond was open before him on Saturday afternoon. It was his greatest opportunity.

Jackson was in the Valley of the Shenandoah detaching from Lee an army of 16,000 men. The enemy had thrown almost his whole force against McClellan's left wing, and had received more injury than he inflicted. Our right wing was intact; the material for bridging the upper Chickahominy had been ready for three days; the Confederate army was streaming back to Richmond in discouragement and disorder. Even so ardent a friend of McClellan as the Prince de Joinville writes:

> The Federals had had the defensive battle they desired; had repulsed the enemy; but arrested by natural obstacles which perhaps were not insurmountable, they had gained nothing by their success. They had missed an unique opportunity of striking a blow.
>
> If General McClellan had crossed his army, instead of one division, at the time that Johnston's entire force was engaged at Seven Pines, the rout of the Southern army would have been complete and the way to Richmond would have been a military promenade.* But the next day and during the week that followed the enterprise assumed so many difficulties in his eyes that he could not have been expected to attempt it. The rains continued; the sluggish river became a wide-spreading flood; the ground, a mixed mass of clay and quicksand, afforded no sure standing-place for horse, foot, or artillery; most of the bridges were carried away; the army, virtually cut in two by the river, occupied itself in the arduous work of intrenching. General Lee, the ablest officer in the Southern Confederacy, his mind put entirely at ease in regard to an immediate attack upon Richmond, had leisure to devote himself to restoring the organization and *morale* of his army, and bringing from every side the reënforcements that he was to use with such effect a month later in the bloody contests from the Chickahominy to the James.

* The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those "occasions" which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. [General Barnard]

Mr. William Henry Hurlbert, the translator of the Prince de Joinville's work, who was in Richmond during the battle, gives the following account of the condition of the Confederates on the morning of June 1:

They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments. The roads into Richmond were literally covered with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees, all with the same story that their regiments had been "cut to pieces"—that the "Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees," and "fighting like devils." In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected between 4000 and 5000 stragglers and sent them into camp. Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not indeed until several days after the battle that anything like military order was restored throughout the Confederate positions. Appendix, p. 113.

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"AS A BELL IN A CHIME."

AS a bell in a chime
Sets its twin-note a-ringing,
As one poet's rhyme
Wakes another to singing,
So, once she has smiled,
All your thoughts are beguiled
And flowers and song from your childhood are bringing.

Though moving through sorrow
As the star through the night,
She needs not to borrow,
She lavishes, light.
The path of yon star
Seemeth dark but afar:
Like hers it is sure, and like hers it is bright.

Each grace is a jewel
Would ransom the town,
Her speech has no cruel,
Her praise is renown;
'T is in her as though Beauty,
Resigning to Duty
The scepter, had still kept the purple and crown.

Robert Underwood Johnson.

OUR NATIONAL MILITARY SYSTEM.

I.— WHAT THE UNITED STATES ARMY SHOULD BE.

BEFORE submitting the following suggestions in regard to the possibilities of the future army of the United States, I will state some facts that pertain to the army as it exists to-day.

The law fixing the peace establishment of the army, passed in 1869, limited the strength to thirty thousand. The annual appropriation bill has of late years contained a proviso that no money thus appropriated shall be used for recruiting more than twenty-five thousand men. The cost of keeping up this force has always exceeded $30,000,000 and has often amounted to $40,000,000. The men enlisted for this force are mostly recruited in the large cities, and consist of a class who in the main have selected to enlist from other than patriotic motives or love of the military profession. A large proportion are foreigners who are not sufficiently acquainted with the country to find other employment. Many have found out their incapacity to make headway in civil life, the causes being as different as the characters and circumstances of the individuals. Too many belong to that large and unfortunate class known under the generic name of "tramps," who are wanderers by nature and who become the deserters from the army. Many are illiterate, few are educated and capable, and the great majority lack the necessary talents and capacity to take care of themselves and to advance in life. The smart and apparently capable man, when found in the ranks, is generally suspected of some moral taint or intemperate habit not tolerated among his friends, and the number who attain distinction in the army, or after leaving it, are few indeed. There is no opportunity afforded the enlisted man to become qualified to command in case of war, and the number who rise to a commission is remarkably small.

The law permits original enlistments from sixteen to thirty-five years of age. Reënlistments are not restricted by age, and can take place so long as the examining surgeon finds no objection. The duration of each enlistment is five years. The number of posts garrisoned by the regular army is about 125. They are scattered throughout the territory of the United States, and the duties of the troops occupying them are mainly confined to the simplest routine of garrison life, such as guard duty, target practice, and company and battalion drills. Their time is taken up in rehearsing these elementary lessons over and over, doing them as well, if not better, after the first few weeks of instruction as they ever do afterwards. This is the experience and attainment of the larger portion of the enlisted men. On the frontier there are occasional outbreaks of the Indians in the vicinity, but they are yearly becoming less frequent. When an outbreak does occur the troops have an opportunity to learn a little field service. This humdrum condition is less true of the cavalry than of the other two arms of the service, because the care and instruction of the horse adds a material task to the duties of the trooper. But his duties are also confined to a narrow sphere, and the training of the enlisted men of the army is limited to taking care of themselves and performing the elementary duties stated above. There is no provision for elevating the rank and file, no means held out to the soldier to enable him to rise in the profession of arms, and the longer he remains in service the more incapable he becomes of taking care of himself out of it. The great majority go through their first enlistment of five years making little or no progress after the first year, and when they are discharged, if they do not reënlist, they settle down on a homestead or in some frontier village, and are lost to the country, so far as any further military service to be derived from them is concerned. The most valuable service they have rendered is the opportunity they have afforded the commissioned officers to practice the administration of army affairs and to acquire the care and command of troops. Those who reënlist simply repeat this experience, and make no material progress. They may be good enough soldiers in case there is any actual service in the field to do, but all that they have acquired is limited to the individual.

While military knowledge is fairly maintained and practiced in the army, there is no provision for disseminating it, in order that we may have as many men as possible throughout the country who are themselves instructed and who are capable of giving instruction to others in the event of a war. If proper men were selected at the proper time of life, and the proper training furnished them, with such an end in view, they would at the end of five years' service be able to take a company

Who all time runnin' ole gobble roun' de yard?
Mammy's li'l' boy, Mammy's li'l' boy!
Who tek 'e stick 'n' hit ole possum dog so hard?
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Byo baby boy, oh bye,
By-o li'l' boy!
Oh, run ter es mammy
En climb up en 'er lap,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Who all time stumpin' es toe ergin er rock?
Mammy's li'l' boy, Mammy's li'l' boy!
Who all the time er-rippin' big hole en es frock?
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Byo baby boy, oh bye,
By-o li'l' boy!
Oh, run ter es mammy
En she wipe es li'l' eyes,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Who all time er-losin' de shovel en de rake?
Mammy's li'l' boy, Mammy's li'l' boy!
Who all de time tryin' ter ride 'e lazy drake?
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Byo baby boy, oh bye,
By-o li'l' boy!
Oh, scoot fer yer mammy
En she hide yer f'om yer ma,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Who all de time er-trottin' ter de kitchen fer er bite?
Mammy's li'l' boy, Mammy's li'l' boy!
Who mess 'esef wi' taters twell his clothes dey look er sight?
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Byo baby boy, oh bye,
By-o li'l' boy!
En 'e run ter es mammy
Fer ter git 'im out er trouble,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Who all time er-frettin' en de middle er de day?
Mammy's li'l' boy, Mammy's li'l' boy!
Who all time er-gettin' so sleepy 'e can' play,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.

Byo baby boy, oh bye,
By-o li'l' boy!
En 'e come ter es mammy
Ter rock 'im en 'er arms,
Mammy's li'l' baby boy.
Shoo, shoo, shoo-shoo-shoo,
Shoo, shoo, shoo!

Shoo, shoo, shoo-shoo-shoo,
Shoo, li'l' baby, shoo!
Shoo, shoo, shoo-shoo-shoo,
Shoo, shoo, shoo,
Shoo . . . .

Deir now, lay right down on Mammy's bed en go 'long back ter sleep,— shoo-shoo! . . . Look hyah, nigger, go way f'om dat do'! You wake dis chile up wid dat jewsharp, en I 'll wear yer out ter frazzles! — Sh-h-h-h —

H. S. Edwards.

A LAKE MEMORY.

THE lake comes throbbing in with voice of pain
Across these flats, athwart the sunset's glow.
I see her face, I know her voice again,
Her lips, her breath, O God, as long ago.

To live the sweet past over I would fain,
As lives the day in the red sunset's fire,
That all these wild wan marshlands now would stain,
With the dawn's memories, loves, and flushed desire.

I call her back across the vanished years,
Nor vain — a white-armed phantom fills her place;
Its eyes the wind-blown sunset fires, its tears
This rain of spray that blows about my face.

William Wilfred Campbell.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, AND THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

AS we have seen, it was the intention of the Administration to dispatch the whole of McDowell's corps to reënforce McClellan, as soon as the situation in northern Virginia would permit. Franklin's division was so dispatched, in ample time to have taken part in the operations against Yorktown, though General McClellan made no use whatever of that fine body of troops until Yorktown was evacuated. Preparations were vigorously made by the Government for the march of McDowell towards Richmond; and Shields's division, one of the best in Banks's corps, was ordered to reënforce him. The most important results were expected from such an attack as an officer of McDowell's ability and zeal would have made upon the left flank of the Confederate forces in front of Richmond. It is one of the admitted misfortunes of the war that this attack was never made, and the question as to who was responsible for it has given rise to much heated and more or less disingenuous discussion.

General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, commonly called "Stonewall," had won great credit at the battle of Bull Run, but his first independent campaign resulted in signal defeat. In April, 1862, he was ordered by General Johnston to occupy the attention of Banks in the Shenandoah Valley. He advanced rapidly in pursuance of what he understood to be the spirit of his orders, and came in view of Shields's division at Kernstown, near Winchester, on the 22d of April. A brief skirmish took place that evening, in the course of which General Shields was severely wounded, his arm being broken by the fragment of a shell. He retired to Winchester, and General Nathan Kimball remained on the field in active command of the division. The next day, although it was Sunday, Jackson, thinking he had his enemy at a disadvantage, and unaware either of his numbers or of his disposition, attacked Kimball with great impetuosity, but met with a severe repulse. Kimball, who was ably seconded by Colonels Carroll and Tyler, not only beat off the attack of Jackson from both his flanks, but at the right moment assumed the offensive, and after a hotly contested fight, lasting two hours, as night was closing in he completely defeated the Confederates, who were driven from the field, leaving their dead and wounded and several guns. Banks, coming down from Harper's

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Ferry the next day, continued the pursuit up the valley as far as Mount Jackson. Shields's division in this action numbered about 7000; Jackson reported his own force as between 3000 and 4000. The losses reported on each side are: Shields 590, Jackson 718. Jackson frankly acknowledged his defeat, saying to Johnston:

I engaged the enemy yesterday, about 3 P.M., near Winchester, and fought until dusk; but his forces were so superior to mine that he repulsed me with the loss of valuable officers and men killed and wounded. But from the obstinacy with which our troops fought, and from their advantageous position, I am of the opinion that his loss was greater than mine in troops, but I lost one piece of artillery and three caissons.

Jackson's second campaign in the Shenandoah, which gained him in full measure that fame and position which were so near to his heart, occupied about a month. It may be said to have begun in his attack upon General Milroy's forces at McDowell on the 8th of May. In this affair, as in every battle of this famous campaign, he had much larger forces than those opposed to him — a fact entirely to his credit; there were Union troops enough in the department, if they had been properly brought together, to have overwhelmed him. After a fight of several hours he defeated Milroy, who fell back to join Frémont at the town of Franklin, while Jackson moved eastward to Harrisonburg. On the way he sent dispatches to Richmond, detailing the position of the Union troops, and asking permission to attack them. This was granted, and he at once began a swift and stealthy march through New Market and Luray to Front Royal. It was at this time that McClellan was daily clamoring for reënforcements from Washington; and the Government, yielding to his importunity, had promised that McDowell's corps should march overland to join him. The reasons why this promise could not be kept are best set forth in the following dispatch from Mr. Lincoln, whose communications to his generals were always clearer and more definite than any that he received from them. It is dated May 25:

General Banks was at Strasburg with about 6000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered in various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back in full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. [In this Geary was mistaken. Jackson's and Ewell's forces amounted to about 16,000.] Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his force remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.[1]

Later in the day, the President, now sure that a large and formidable army was drawing near the Potomac, wrote a sharp dispatch to McClellan urging him either to take this opportunity "to attack Richmond, or give up the job"; to which the general, who was never disturbed by the presence of the enemy anywhere out of his sight, replied calmly that "the object of the movement was probably to prevent reënforcements being sent him," and that the time was very near when he would attack Richmond.

The campaign, opened thus inauspiciously for the Union arms, went rapidly from bad to worse. A series of doleful mischances succeeded, unrelieved by a ray of good fortune or good conduct. Mr. Lincoln, at Washington, was exerting himself to the utmost, sending a dozen dispatches a day to Banks, Frémont, McDowell, and McClellan — all admirable in clearness, intelligence, and temper, always directing the right thing to be done and the best way of doing it; but nothing seemed to avail.

The original surprise was inexcusable. On the 20th of May,[1] Frémont had reported to Banks that Jackson was on the way to attack him, but no proper preparation was made. After the defeat at Front Royal on the 23d, and at Winchester on the 25th, while Banks was in retreat to the Potomac, the only thought of the President was to stop Jackson at the river, and to detain him until a sufficient force could be gathered in the neighborhood of Strasburg to destroy or capture him on his return. Frémont was ordered to cross the mountains to Harrisonburg and come north down the valley with his force. McDowell, with a competent detachment under Shields, was ordered to Front Royal; a considerable army met the victorious forces of Jackson at the Potomac. These last were mostly of raw lev-

[1] War Records.

ies, not inured to marching or to fighting; but they accomplished their purpose of delaying for the moment the advance of Jackson towards Washington. His own intention, as well as his orders from Richmond, were, in the language of General Dabney,[1] "to press the enemy at Harper's Ferry, threaten an invasion of Maryland, and an assault upon the Federal capital." But on the 29th, while at Halltown,[2] preparing for an attack upon Harper's Ferry, he received information of the movement of troops that had been ordered by the President, which, as Dabney says, "imperiously required him to give up that attack and provide for his own safety." He then began his precipitate retreat up the valley, which by its celerity and success gained him even more credit than did his audacious advance.

It ought not to have been allowed to succeed; it was perfectly feasible to prevent it. Had the plain orders of the President been obeyed, Jackson could not have escaped from the predicament where his headlong energy and his contempt for his adversaries had placed him. It is idle to talk of his invincibility; he was generally whipped, like other men, when the conditions were not favorable to him. He was defeated severely at Kernstown in March, when he had been confident of victory; later, at Gaines's Mills, he did not particularly distinguish himself above others; Banks, with one-third his force, gave him all the work he could do at Cedar Mountain; while at Malvern Hill and White Oak Swamp his inefficiency in large tactics was recognized and severely criticized by generals on his own side. If Frémont and McDowell had met him at Strasburg, and Banks had followed upon his heels, as Mr. Lincoln had clearly and explicitly ordered, nothing could have prevented the capture or destruction of his entire command. Each of these generals had his task assigned him; it was in each case perfectly practicable. It involved only an expeditious march to the neighborhood of Strasburg, over roads more or less rough, undisturbed by the presence of an enemy in any considerable force.

General McDowell's part of the work was performed with his habitual energy and promptitude, notwithstanding the chagrin and displeasure with which he received his orders. On the evening of the 24th of May[3] the President sent him a dispatch informing him that Frémont had been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg, to relieve Banks, and to capture or destroy Jackson's or Ewell's forces. Mr. Lincoln continues:

> You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in advance of the line, of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in coöperation with General Frémont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force with which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him.

It is remarkable that the President saw the situation with such accuracy the day before Banks's defeat at Winchester.

This order McDowell, though he called it "a crushing blow,"[3] obeyed at once, directing Shields to take up his march to Catlett's, a station on the Orange and Alexandria road, about half-way between Fredericksburg and Front Royal, and reporting that he had done so. The President sent him an acknowledgment of his alacrity, at the same time expressing his regret at the change of his orders, and adding, "Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movements."[3] This encouraged the general to make an earnest though respectful protest, which he sent the same night to the President, setting forth his belief that coöperation between himself and Frémont was not to be counted upon; that it would take him a week or ten days to get to the valley; that by that time the enemy would have retired. We shall see later that these forebodings at least were not realized. At the same time he telegraphed to Wadsworth, in command at Washington, his deep disgust; he did not think the rebel force in the mountains amounted to five thousand men. But with all this grumbling his deeds were better than his words; he pushed Shields forward with the greatest celerity. Shields, who was burning to go to Richmond, marched obediently, but in very bad humor. The dispatches of this officer read like a burlesque of those of his superior. He is loud in contempt of both armies in the Shenandoah. He thought when the movement first began that there was nothing in it; that the enemy would never come north; that if they did, they would be hemmed in and destroyed. As late as the 10th of May he was sure "they were not there to fight."[3] As he went forward to Front Royal his boasting spirit asserted itself more and more. "I want no assistance," he said. He promised to "give Jackson a bloody reception," to "drive the enemy from the Shenandoah," and wanted to know if there was anything else he could do for the President — the task in question being unworthy of his powers.[4]

But neither the chagrin of McDowell nor the gasconading of Shields prevented them

[1] Dabney, p. 386. [2] Ibid., p. 387. [3] War Records. [4] May 26 and 27.

from striving with all their might to do the work assigned them. The President kept McDowell constantly informed of the condition of affairs, detailing the progress of Jackson northward, and urging the value and importance of the service expected of the Union troops. McDowell showed himself, as he always was, worthy of the confidence reposed in him. In spite of all obstacles,— accidents by rail, bad roads, and rough weather,— he got Shields's advance into Front Royal on the 30th of May; that is, in little more than half the time he thought he should require for the purpose. The same day the President sent him a dispatch from Frémont saying that he would be at Strasburg, or where the enemy was, at 4 P. M., May 31; and another from Saxton at Harper's Ferry, indicating that the enemy was still there. The President added, with justifiable exultation, "It seems the game is before you."

It remains to be seen how General Frémont executed his share of the task. On the 24th the President gave him an urgent order to move at once, by way of Harrisonburg, to the relief of Banks. He promptly replied that he "would move as ordered"; but made the unfortunate error of choosing an entirely different route from the one assigned him.[1] Thinking the road to Harrisonburg was more or less obstructed, and off his line of supplies, he moved northward by way of Petersburg and Moorefield, in the great valley lying west of the Shenandoah Mountains, and did not even inform the President of this discretionary modification of his orders, so that, on the 27th, when they were anxiously expecting at Washington to hear from him at Harrisonburg, they were astounded at receiving tidings from him at Moorefield, two good days' march from the line of Jackson's retreat, and separated by two counties and the Shenandoah range from the place where he was desired and expected to be. In response to the President's peremptory question why he was at Moorefield when he was ordered to Harrisonburg, he made an unsatisfactory reply, alleging the necessity of his choice of route, and his assumed discretion as to his orders. Dropping this matter, the President began again urging him forward to Strasburg. There was still time to repair the original error. Jackson was on the Potomac, much farther from the rendezvous than Frémont. But the latter could not be made to see the vital necessity of immediate action — his men were weary, his supplies were deficient, the roads were bad; Blenker's corps was straggling badly. Finally, on the 29th, his medical director told him his army needed a whole day's rest. He promptly accepted this suggestion, and wasted twenty-four hours in this manner, while Jackson was rushing his ragged troops, who had known no rest for a month, up the narrow valley that formed his only outlet from destruction or captivity. In one day, says Major Dabney, the Stonewall Brigade marched "from Halltown to the neighborhood of Newton, a distance of thirty-five miles; and the 2d Virginia accomplished a march of forty miles without rations, over muddy roads and amidst continual showers." The race was to the swift. As Frémont's advance entered Strasburg on the 1st of June the rear-guard of Jackson's force was still in sight, leaving the place. The plan of the President, well combined and reasonable as it was, had failed through no fault of his, and Jackson had escaped. It is the contention of General McClellan and his partisans that the plan could not possibly have succeeded. One critic[2] disposes of the matter by a sneer at the thought of "trapping that wily fox, who knew every gorge and pass of the mountain." But an army of 16,000 men of all arms is not a fox; it must have roads to cross mountains, and bridges to pass over rivers. If Frémont had obeyed orders and had been where he should have been on the 30th of May, and if Banks and Saxton had kept a closer watch at Harper's Ferry and followed more immediately upon Jackson's rear, Jackson would have been surrounded at Strasburg by three times his own force, and would have been captured or his army dispersed and destroyed. This would have been richly worth all its cost, and the most captious or malevolent critic would have had nothing to say against the President who ordered it.

There was little prospect of defeating Jackson after he had slipped through the gap between Frémont and McDowell at Strasburg; but nevertheless an energetic pursuit was begun by Frémont up the Shenandoah and by part of Shields's division up the Luray Valley on the east, the former harassing Jackson's rear with almost daily skirmishes, and the latter running a race with him on a parallel line. There was hardly a possibility now of regaining the lost opportunity. No matter how severely pressed, it was almost surely in Jackson's power to escape across Brown's Gap to Albemarle County, where he would for a time be safe from pursuit; and this course, says Major Dabney, was in his mind as a final resort.[3] But he was not even driven to this. There was one last chance of inflicting great damage upon him. One of Shields's brigades arrived at the bridge at Port Republic before him, and either should have taken and held or destroyed it.[4] The officer in

[1] War Records.
[2] Swinton, "Army of the Potomac."
[3] Dabney, p. 404.
[4] War Records.

command did neither, and the bridge immediately after fell into Jackson's hands, giving him command of both sides of the river. The Confederate general and his adjutant and biographer ascribed the capture of this important position to supernatural means.[1]

> As soon as Jackson uttered his command [to seize the bridge] he drew up his horse, and, dropping the reins upon his neck, raised both his hands towards the heavens, while the fire of battle in his face changed into a look of reverential awe. Even while he prayed, the God of battles heard; or ever he had withdrawn his uplifted hands, the bridge was gained.

It would perhaps be irreverent to add that the bridge was not defended. On the same day, June 8, he fought a sharp but indecisive battle with Frémont at Cross Keys, and retiring in the night, he attacked and defeated Shields's small detachment at Port Republic. The mismanagement of the Union generals had opposed to him on both days forces greatly inferior to his own. Before these battles were fought the President, seeing that further pursuit was useless, had ordered Shields back to McDowell, Frémont to halt at Harrisonburg for orders, and Banks to guard the posts of Port Royal and Luray. The orders came too late to prevent two unfortunate engagements, but they showed that the civilian at Washington was wiser than the two generals at the front. They both passed thereafter into the ranks of the malcontents — the men with grievances. Shields went back to Washington, where he was received with open arms by the habitual critics of the President. Among them were those of his own household; for we read in Mr. Chase's diary that Shields told him, when he was ordered back, that "Jackson's capture was certain," and the general and the Secretary held harmonious council together over the "terrible mistakes" of the President.[2] This was the last important service of Frémont. He remained in charge of his department a few weeks longer, until he was placed, with others of similar rank, under the general command of Pope. He refused to serve under his junior, and was relieved, not appearing again in any conspicuous position, except for a moment in the summer of 1864, as a candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Mr. Lincoln.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

After the battle of Fair Oaks, as well as before it, General McClellan kept up his continual cry for reënforcements. The hallucination that the enemy's force was double his own had become fixed upon him, and all his plans and combinations were poisoned by this fatal error. The President did everything in his power to satisfy the general's unreasonable demands. He resolved to give him absolute control of all the troops on the Peninsula; and knowing that General Wool would never consent to being placed under McClellan's orders,— that veteran having expressed himself with characteristic severity in regard to his junior's insatiable demand for troops,— the President thought best to remove General Wool to Baltimore, transferring General Dix to Fort Monroe and placing him under the direct command of McClellan — a proceeding which greatly displeased General Dix, but to which he yielded under protest.[3] His displeasure did not interfere with his convictions of duty. Immediately on arriving at Fort Monroe he sent to General McClellan a reënforcement of ten of the best regiments there.[3] No efforts were spared to help and to encourage McClellan; both the President and the Secretary of War were perpetually sending him kind and complimentary messages in addition to the troops and guns which they gathered in from every quarter for him. A few days after Fair Oaks, in response to his repeated entreaties, McCall's division of McDowell's corps, a splendid body of about ten thousand men, was dispatched to him. He was for the moment delighted at hearing that these troops were coming; and having thus obtained the greater part of McDowell's corps, he was quite gracious in his acknowledgments to the Government. He said, June 7:

> I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reënforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery.

McCall and his perfectly appointed division of ten thousand men and five batteries of artillery began to arrive on the 11th, and were all present for duty on the 13th; and as if Providence were uniting with the Government to satisfy both the general's requirements, he was able to telegraph on the 12th that the weather was good and the roads and the ground were rapidly drying. The weather continued remarkably fine for several days; General Keyes on the 15th reported White Oak Swamp dried up so as to be fordable in many places.[3] But the dry spell did not last forever, and on the night of the 15th General McClellan sends to Washington a note of lamentation[3] saying that the rain has begun again, which will "retard his movements somewhat." It is characteristic of him that he always regarded bad weather as exclusively injurious to him, and never to the other side. The President once said of him that he seemed to think, in defiance of Scripture, that Heaven sent its rain only on

1 Dabney, p. 413.
2 Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," pp. 444, 445.
3 War Records.

the just and not on the unjust. To an energetic general all kinds of weather have their uses. Johnston had embraced with alacrity the opportunity afforded by the terrible storm of May 30, and made it his ally in his attack on the 31st.

It must not be forgotten that, although McClellan and his apologists have been for years denouncing the Government for having withheld from him McDowell's corps, the best part of that corps was actually sent to him. Franklin's magnificent division went to him in April, and no use whatever was made of it for several weeks; McCall's equally fine division was dispatched to him before the middle of June. In each case he said he only awaited the arrival of that division to undertake immediate active operations; and in each case, on the arrival of the eagerly demanded reënforcements, he did nothing but wait the good pleasure of the enemy. His own official reports show that he received by way of reënforcements, after his arrival in the Peninsula and prior to the 15th of June, not less than 39,441 men, of whom there were 32,360 present for duty.[1] Yet all this counted for nothing with him; he let hardly a day pass without clamoring for more. He was not even inclined to allow the Administration any discretion in regard to the manner in which he was to be reënforced. He insisted that McDowell should be sent to him by water, and not by land, so that he should come in by his rear instead of by his right flank; and when he was informed that McCall's force was expected to be restored to McDowell's corps, when that army joined him, he bitterly resented it. He said it did not show a proper spirit in McDowell; and added sullenly, "If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them; but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results."[2] These selfish and petulant outbursts were met with unwearied patience and kindness on the part of the President. On the 15th of June he wrote:

> The Secretary of War has turned over to me your dispatch about sending McDowell to you by water, instead of by land. I now fear he cannot get to you either way in time. Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again. I expect to see McDowell within a day or two, when I will again talk with him about the mode of moving. McCall's division has nearly or quite reached you by now. This, with what you get from General Wool's old command, and the new regiments sent you, must give you an increase, since the late battles, of over twenty thousand. Doubtless the battles, and other causes, have decreased you half as much in the same time; but then the enemy have lost as many in the same way. I believe I would come and see you were it not that I fear my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters.[3]

From this it will be seen that McClellan had no right to delay operations an hour after McCall's arrival from any pretended expectation of the immediate coming of McDowell; and, indeed, he admits in his report[4] that as early as the 7th of June he had given up any such expectation. With no reason, therefore, for delay, but with every conceivable incentive to action, with an army amounting, after McCall joined him, to the imposing figure of 156,838, of whom an aggregate present of 127,327 is reported by McClellan himself as of the 20th of June,— though he makes a reduction to 114,691 of those "present for duty equipped," — he wasted the month of June in a busy and bustling activity which was in its results equivalent to mere idleness. He was directly invited to attack by the fine weather of the middle of the month, which he describes as "splendid" in a dispatch of the 17th, and by the absence of Stonewall Jackson in the valley with his 16,000 veterans, reënforced by 10,000 troops from Lee's army, as McClellan himself believed and reported on the 18th. The President, by a dispatch of the same date, urged him to take advantage of this opportunity, saying:

> If this is true, it is as good as a reënforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety.

The terms in which General McClellan answered this inquiry are worthy of quotation as an illustration of that false air of energy and determination which he so often introduced into the expression of his intentions, while leaving, as in the last lines of this dispatch, a loophole for indefinite delay:[5]

> Our army is well over the Chickahominy, except the very considerable forces necessary to protect our flanks and communications. Our whole line of pickets in front runs within six miles of Richmond. The rebel line runs within musket range of ours. Each has heavy support at hand. A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibits at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reënforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence.

This is a singularly characteristic view. The fact of a large detachment having left Lee affords him no encouragement; it simply impresses him all the more with the idea of his enemy's strength.

1 War Records. 2 McClellan's Report, June 14.

3 Lincoln, MS.

4 "As I did not think it probable that any reënforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing dispatch (of June 7) that I should be ready to move when General McCall's division joined me." War Records.

5 June 18.

After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.[1]

With these vague platitudes the President was forced to be content, and to wait, with the general, to see what Providence would ordain the day after to-morrow — or the next day.

As usual, it was the enemy that startled McClellan out of his procrastination. On the 13th of June, General J. E. B. Stuart, with some 1200 Confederate cavalry and a few guns, started to ride around McClellan's army; touching on his way the South Anna Railroad bridge, Hanover Court House, Tunstall's Station on the York River Railway, and thence to Jones's Bridge on the Chickahominy, which he stopped to repair, crossing it on the 15th, and entering Richmond by the river road the next day. It has rarely been the fortune of a general to inflict such an insult, without injury, upon an opponent. General McClellan did not seem to feel that any discredit attached to him for this performance. On the contrary he congratulated himself that Stuart had done so little harm.

The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen Government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *éclat*, were the precise results of this expedition.[2]

McClellan had for some time been vaguely meditating a change of base to the James River, and this raid of Stuart seems to have somewhat strengthened this purpose. Fitz John Porter, who more than any other possessed his confidence, says that he desired to effect this movement as soon as he gave up looking for McDowell to join him, which, we have seen from his report, was in the first week of June. "As early as June 18," Porter says, "he sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James River."[3] It is not intended to intimate that he was fully resolved upon this course; but he appears to have kept it constantly before him, in his undecided, irresolute way, all through the month. His communication with Commodore John Rodgers, who commanded on the James, indicates a purpose to move to some point on that river. He says on the 24th:

In a few days I hope to gain such a position as to enable me to place a force above Ball's and Drewry's bluffs, so that we can remove the obstructions and place ourselves in communication with you so that you can coöperate in the final attack. In the mean time please keep me some gun-boats as near Drewry's Bluff as prudence will permit.[1]

On the 25th he pushed forward his picket line in front of Seven Pines to within four miles of Richmond, a point farther in advance than he had yet reached. At the same time he issued orders to his corps commanders south of the river that they were not to regard these new positions as their field of battle, but were to fall back, if attacked, to their old intrenchments.[1] He had by this time heard of the arrival of Jackson's corps, and also credited a false and impossible rumor of the arrival of Beauregard and his troops from the West. He was fully informed of the attack threatened within a few hours, and yet he sent to Washington for more troops.[1] "If I had another good division I could laugh at Jackson,"[1] he said, while he knew that Jackson was marching upon his right. He made his usual complaint and threat of putting the responsibility where it belonged. These wanton accusations at such a time moved the President, not to anger, but to genuine sorrow. Yet he answered with almost incredible patience:

Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The latter one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reënforcements whenever I possibly can.

It is impossible to say how long his desultory preparations would have lasted if General McClellan had been left to himself; but after the 23d of June, the power of deciding upon what day he should attack had already passed out of his hands. General Lee had made, at his leisure, all his arrangements for attacking the Union army, and had chosen the time and the manner of onset,— as Johnston did a month before,— without the slightest reference to any possible initiative of McClellan. He had, during the month allowed him by the inactivity of his opponent, brought together from every available source a great army, almost equal in numbers to the Army of the Potomac. Though there is a great disparity in the accounts of the different Confederate officers who have written upon this subject, there is no reason to doubt that the official estimate quoted with approval by General Webb, which states Lee's force as 80,762, is substantially correct. Webb says that McClellan's effective force for the "seven days' battles" was 92,500[4] — considerably less than his own official report of the 20th of June gives him. The Confederate forces were, like the army opposed to them, of the best material the country could furnish;

[1] War Records.
[2] McClellan's Report. War Records.
[3] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 325.
[4] Webb, "The Peninsula," pp. 119, 120.

and no better men ever went to war, in any age or region. It is an unsolved and now an insolvable question whether the Confederates had gained or lost by the wounding of Johnston and the substitution of Lee as the commander of their principal army. They were both men of the best ability and highest character that the Southern States could produce; both trained soldiers, of calm temper, and great energy; and both equally honorable and magnanimous in their treatment of their subordinates. But General Lee had a great advantage over his predecessor in possessing the perfect confidence and personal friendship of Jefferson Davis, the head of the Confederate Government. He was always sure in his enterprises of what Johnston often lacked, the sincere and zealous support of the Richmond Government. He also enjoyed, to an unusual degree, the warm regard and esteem of those who were brought into personal or official relations with him. His handsome and attractive presence, his dignified yet cordial manner, a certain sincerity and gentleness which was apparent in all his words and actions, endeared him to his associates and made friends of strangers at first sight. Everything he asked for was given him. He had been the favorite of General Scott in the old army; he became the favorite of Mr. Davis in his new command. The army which Johnston gave up to him had been almost doubled in numbers by the time he considered himself ready to employ it against McClellan.[1]

Lee's preparations were promptly and energetically made. Immediately after Stuart's raid was completed he ordered Stonewall Jackson to join him by a letter of the 16th, which gave minute instructions for his march and enjoined upon him the greatest secrecy and swiftness. To mask this movement he ostentatiously sent Jackson two brigades from Richmond, with drums beating and colors flying, a proceeding which was promptly reported to McClellan and caused him at first some perplexity,[2] but which he explained by his usual conclusion that Lee had so overwhelming a force that a few brigades here or there made no difference to him. The manœuvre was of little practical account, however, as McClellan was fully informed of Jackson's approach in time to provide against it, or to anticipate his arrival by taking the offensive. He even knew as early as the 25th that Jackson was to come in on his right and rear,[2] but he made no use of this knowledge except to reproach the Government for not sending him more troops. Jackson reported at Richmond in person on the 23d of June, in advance of his corps; and in a conference with Longstreet and the two Hills the plan of attacking the Federal right wing, north of the Chickahominy, was agreed upon. As Jackson's troops had the greatest distance to march, it was left to him to say when the attack should be made. He named the morning of the 26th of June, giving himself, as it afterwards appeared, too little time.

General Lee matured his plan on the 24th, and issued his orders for the coming campaign. The most striking thing about them is his evident contempt for his opponent. He sent, in effect, almost his entire army to the north side of the Chickahominy to strike McClellan's right wing. The enemy is to be "driven from Mechanicsville"; the Confederates are to

> sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge; General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards Cold Harbor. They will then press forward towards the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy towards Richmond will be prevented by rigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress.

He anticipated the possibility of McClellan's abandoning his intrenchments on the south side of the river, in which case he is to be "closely pursued" by Huger and Magruder. Cavalry are to occupy the roads to arrest his flight "down the Chickahominy." General Lee's plan and expectation was, in short, to herd and drive down the Peninsula a magnificent army, superior in numbers to his own, and not inferior in any other respect — if we except the respective commanders-in-chief, who were at least equally distinguished engineers. In this enterprise he deserved and courted defeat by leaving the bulk of McClellan's army between himself and Richmond. When he laid his plan before Jefferson Davis, the latter saw at once this serious defect in it. He says:

> I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched line between the left flank of the enemy and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance; and if McClellan was the man I took him for, . . . as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old *esprit de corps* manifested itself in General Lee's first reponse that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes; but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchments, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there."[3]

But everything shows that he anticipated no

1 Johnston's "Narrative," pp. 145, 146.
2 War Records.
3 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 132.

such action on the part of McClellan. All his orders, all his dispositions, indicate clearly that he thought of nothing but driving him down the Chickahominy towards Yorktown, and capturing or dispersing his army. The measure of success he met with will always be, in the general judgment, a justification of his plan; but the opinion of the best military critics on both sides is that it never could have succeeded had it not been for McClellan's hallucination as to the numbers opposed to him. From the hour that Lee crossed his troops over the Chickahominy, leaving that river and McClellan's army between him and Richmond, he risked the fate of the Confederacy upon his belief that the Union general would make no forward movement. His confidence grew with every step of McClellan's retreat from Beaver Dam Creek to Malvern Hill, and was dearly paid for in the blood of his soldiers.

The first meeting between the two armies resulted in a terrible defeat for the Confederates. About 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, the rebel forces, commanded by Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, attacked the Union troops in position on the east side of Beaver Dam Creek, commanded by General McCall, whose division had been added to Fitz John Porter's corps, ably assisted by Seymour, Meade, and Reynolds. Of the last two, the one gained an undying fame and the other a glorious death at Gettysburg. The Confederates were in greatly superior force, but the Union troops had the advantage of position; and though both sides fought with equal valor, before night fell the rebels were repulsed with great slaughter. General McClellan visited Fitz John Porter's headquarters at night, after the battle. He found an exultant and victorious army, almost unscathed by the fierce conflict of the day. Porter reports his loss at 250 out of the 5000 engaged, and says the enemy lost nearly 2000 of their 10,000 attacking.[1] If Porter, instead of McClellan, had been in command of the army, Richmond might have been under the Union flag the next day. His soldierly spirit, flushed with the day's success, comprehended the full advantage of the situation. He urged McClellan to seize his opportunity; he proposed "to hold his own at the Beaver Dam line, slightly reënforced, while General McClellan moved the main body of his army upon Richmond."[2] The General-in-Chief had not resolution enough to accept or reject this proposition of his gallant subordinate. He returned to his own headquarters to make up his mind, and about "3 or 4 o'clock in the morning" sent his final order to Porter to retire to a position some four miles east, behind Boatswain Swamp, and there await the further attack of the enemy.

General Porter's personal devotion to McClellan, which was afterwards to bring him into lifelong trouble, has never allowed him to criticise this decision of his chief which overruled his own bold and intelligent plan. Let us see how the ablest and most efficient Confederate general engaged in this campaign regarded it. General Longstreet says:

> In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal commanders. We had attacked at Beaver Dam, and had failed to make an impression at that point, losing several thousand men and officers. This demonstrated that the position was safe. If the Federal commanders knew of Jackson's approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reënforce Porter's right before Friday morning, the 27th, with men and field defenses, to such extent as to make the remainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So that the Federals in withdrawing not only abandoned a strong position, but gave up the *morale* of their success, and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened forces; for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer.[3]

It is hard to understand what General McClellan means when he says in his report that the 26th was "the day he had decided on for our final advance." If he thought it safe to attack Richmond with Lee and his army in front of him, how much more advantageous would such an attack have been with Lee and his army engaged in a desperate battle north of the Chickahominy. There is no indication in his orders or dispatches of these days — if we except one order to Porter, hereafter to be mentioned — that he had any more definite purpose than to await the action of the enemy, and retreat to the James, if necessary. His mind was filled with that fantastic idea he had adopted of an army of 200,000 under Lee. In his report, written a year afterwards, he reiterates and dwells upon this absurd and already disproved fiction, basing his persistent belief on the reports of his ridiculous detective service. This is the only explanation possible of his action during this momentous week while he was flying from phantom myriads which existed only in his own brain, and his brave army was turning and checking Lee's pursuing forces at every halt it made.

On the morning of the 27th Porter withdrew to his new position, famous ever thereafter as the battlefield of Gaines's Mill, or of the Chickahominy, as it is called by Southern writers. His ground, like that of the day before, was admirably chosen for defense. He had less

[1] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 331.

[2] We are here quoting the language of General Webb, whose testimony is beyond question. "The Peninsula," p. 130.

[3] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 398.

than one-third the number of the host which was marching by every road on the west and north to destroy him.[1] He knew his force was too small to defend so long a line against such numbers, but his appeals to McClellan for reenforcements brought no response until late in the day, when Slocum's division was sent him. With the troops he had he made a magnificent fight, which, in spite of his subsequent history, makes us regret that he had not commanded the entire Army of the Potomac that day.

With the exception of the small detachments left on the south side of the river under Magruder to amuse McClellan, the whole army of General Lee, numbering over 60,000 men, was advancing upon Porter's single corps. It was led by the best generals of the South — Longstreet, the two Hills, Whiting, Hood, Ewell, and the redoubtable Jackson, whose corps, though marching with less than their usual celerity, had turned Beaver Dam Creek the night before, and had now arrived at the post assigned them opposite Porter's right. General Lee commanded on the field in person, and Jefferson Davis contributed whatever his presence was worth.

The battle began at noon, and as evening fell upon the desperately fought field the entire Confederate army, by a simultaneous advance, forced back the Union troops, overcome by numbers and wearied with seven hours of constant fighting.[2] There was no confusion except at the point on the right where Morell's line had been pierced by Hood's brigade, where two regiments were made prisoners. Everywhere else the Union soldiers retired fighting, turning from time to time to beat back the enemy, until night put an end to the conflict. Porter had lost 4000 in killed and wounded, one-sixth of his men; Lee something more, about one-twelfth of his. Lee had absolutely failed in his object — to dislodge the Union army from its position and "drive it down the Chickahominy."

Of the heroic valor of this sanguinary day's work there can be no question. There is much question of the wisdom of it. If McClellan had made up his mind to retreat to the James, he might have withdrawn Porter to the south side of the Chickahominy during the night of the 26th, after his signal victory at Beaver Dam.[3] But, as we have seen, he gave no definite orders until 3 o'clock the next morning, when he directed Porter to retire to Gaines's Mill. During all the terrible conflict of the 27th, he left his gallant subordinate to fight three times his force, with no intimation of his ultimate purpose. Porter had a right to think that the price of his tremendous sacrifice was to be the capture of Richmond. McClellan's orders to him on the 23d included these words:

> The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond.

In addition to this we have the most unimpeachable authority for saying that Porter on the battlefield was left with the same impression. General Webb, who was present with General Porter during the fight, ordered to that duty from McClellan's headquarters, says:

> He carried with him to General Porter the distinct impression, then prevailing at the headquarters of the army, that he was to hold this large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy in order that General McClellan, with the main army, might break through and take Richmond.

It was this inspiring thought which moved Porter and his 20,000 to such a prodigious feat of arms. General Webb says:

> The sacrifice at Gaines's Mill . . . was warranted, if we were to gain Richmond by making it; and the troops engaged in carrying out this plan, conceiving it to be the wish of the general commanding, were successful in holding the rebels on the left bank.[4]

But the general commanding was simply incapable of the effort of will necessary to carry

1 "Porter's force consisted of Morell's, McCall's, and Sykes's divisions; in all, 17,330 infantry for duty. There were present with him 2534 artillery, of which, from the nature of the ground, but a small portion could be used; and 671 of the regular cavalry guarded the bridges." [Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 129.]

2 Porter says: "The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries; in all, about 27,000 men [including the reënforcements received during the day]. Confederate, 129 regiments, 19 batteries; in all, about 65,000."

3 "At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps at least of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army, and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place; and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th — minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or, had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for the object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond." [From Report of General Barnard, Chief of Engineers, Army of the Potomac. War Records.]

4 Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 187.

out his share of the plan. He gives us to understand, in his report, and in subsequent articles, that he resolved upon his retreat to the James on the 25th of June. General Webb adopts this theory, and adds that McClellan thought that the capture of Richmond, with Lee beyond the Chickahominy, was not a proper military movement. It is not in the competence of any one to judge what were General McClellan's thoughts and intentions from the 23d to the 27th of June. So late as 8 o'clock on the night of the 27th, a dispatch from him to the War Department indicates that he thought the attack of Magruder on the right bank was more serious than that upon Porter on the left. "I may be forced," he says, "to give up my position during the night, but will not if it is possible to avoid it"; and as a matter of course the usual refrain follows: "Had I twenty thousand fresh and good troops, we would be sure of a splendid victory to-morrow."[1] Magruder, who had been left to guard Richmond with a thin curtain of troops, had been all day repeating the devices which were so successful at Yorktown. He had rattled about McClellan's entire front with so much noise and smoke as to create the impression of overwhelming numbers. Even the seasoned corps commanders were not unaffected by it. Franklin thought it not prudent to send any reënforcements from his line to Porter. Sumner offered to send two brigades, but thought it would be hazardous. The real state of the case can best be seen from Magruder's own report. He says:

> From Friday night until Sunday morning I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. The bridges had been all destroyed; but one was rebuilt (the New Bridge), which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Golding's; and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond. . . . Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle,— as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of any age,— though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success; and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently the city, might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent.[1]

D. H. Hill says the same thing:[2]

> During Lee's absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan. . . . The fortifications around Richmond at that time were very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the disadvantages of a precipitated movement.[3]

General McClellan did not visit the field of battle during the day.[4] At night he summoned Porter across the river, and there made known to him and the other corps commanders, for the first time, his intention to change his base to the James. Porter was ordered to retire to the south bank, and destroy the bridges after him. This was accomplished safely and in good order, and the bridges were destroyed soon after sunrise on the 28th. The movement to the James once resolved upon, it was executed with great energy and ability. General Keyes moved his corps, with artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp, and possessed himself of the ground on the other side, for the covering of the passage of the other troops and the trains, by noon of the 28th. General Porter's corps, during the same day and night, crossed the White Oak Swamp, and established itself in positions that covered the roads from Richmond. Franklin withdrew from the extreme right after a skirmish at Golding's Farm. Keyes and Porter continued in the advance, and established their two corps safely at Malvern Hill, thus securing the extreme left flank of the army in a commanding and important situation.

This movement took General Lee completely by surprise. Anticipating nothing but a retreat down the Chickahominy,[5] he had thrown his left wing and his entire cavalry force in that direction; and when he became aware of his mistake, a good deal of precious time was already lost, and he was deprived,

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1 War Records.

2 "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 361.

3 The following shows the opinion of two of the most prominent Confederate officers upon this matter. It is an extract from a letter of General J. E. Johnston to General Beauregard, dated Amelia Springs, August 4, 1862, immediately after the Seven Days' Battles:

"But for my confidence in McClellan's want of enterprise, I should on Thursday night, after three-fourths of the troops had crossed the Chickahominy, have apprehended that he would adopt the course you suggest for him. Had he done so, he might have been in Richmond on Friday before midday. By concentrating his troops on the south side of the river before daybreak on Friday he would have been between our main body and the city, with only one-fourth of our force in his way. This fraction he could have beaten in four hours, and marched to Richmond in two hours more." [Published in the "New York Times," June 17, 1883.]

4 "*Question.* Were you with the right or left wing of the army during the battle of Gaines's Mill?

"*Answer.* [General McClellan.] I was on the right bank of the river, at Dr. Trent's house, as the most central position." [Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.]

5 "General Lee, presuming that the Federalists would continue to withdraw, if overpowered, towards the York River Railroad and the White House, directed General Jackson to proceed with General D. H. Hill to a point a few miles north of Cold Harbor, and thence to march to that place and strike their line of retreat." [Dabney, p. 443.]

during the three days that followed, of Stuart's invaluable services. But having ascertained on the 29th that McClellan was marching to the James, he immediately started in pursuit, sending his whole force by parallel roads to intercept the Army of the Potomac near Charles City Cross-roads, midway between the White Oak Swamp and the James. Longstreet was to march with A. P. Hill by the Long Bridge road; while Huger was to come up at the same time by the Charles City road, and General Holmes was to take up position below him on the river road. Jackson, crossing the Grapevine Bridge, was to come in from the north on the rear of the Federal army.

Even the terrible lessons of Beaver Dam and Gaines's Mill had not convinced General Lee of the danger of attacking the Army of the Potomac in position. These lessons were repeated all along the line of march. Sumner repulsed Magruder at Allen's Farm, and then, retiring to Savage's Station, he and Franklin met another fierce onslaught from the same force, and completely defeated them. It was with the greatest difficulty that Franklin could induce the gallant old general to leave the field. McClellan's orders were positive that the White Oak Swamp must be crossed that night; but to all Franklin's representations Sumner answered: "No, General, you shall not go, nor will I." When shown McClellan's positive orders, he cried out, "McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and gain a victory."[1] He only gave way and reluctantly took up his line of march for the southward on the positive orders of an aide-de-camp, who had just left McClellan.[2]

The next day occurred the battle of Glendale, or Frayser's Farm, as it is sometimes called. Jackson, with unusual slowness, had arrived at Savage's Station the day before, too late to take part in the battle there; and when he came to White Oak Swamp the bridge was gone and Franklin occupied the heights beyond. His force was therefore paralyzed during the day. He made once or twice a feeble attempt to cross the swamp, but was promptly met and driven back by Franklin. Huger, on the Charles City road, failed to break through some slight obstruction there. Holmes was in terror of the gunboats near Malvern Hill and could give no assistance; so that Longstreet and A. P. Hill were forced to attack the Union center, at Glendale, on pretty nearly even terms. Here a savage and obstinate conflict took place, which was felt on both sides to be the crisis of the campaign. If the Union center had been pierced, the disaster would have been beyond calculation. On the other hand, if our army had been concentrated at that point, and had defeated the army of Lee, the city of Richmond would have been the prize of victory. General Franklin says that the Prince de Joinville, who was at that moment taking leave of the army to return to Europe, said to him with great earnestness, "Advise General McClellan to center his army at this point and fight the battle to-day. If he does, he will be in Richmond to-morrow." Neither side won the victory that day, though each deserved it by brave and persistent fighting. General McClellan, intent upon securing a defensive position for his army upon the James, left the field before the fighting began; while Longstreet, Lee, and Jefferson Davis himself were under the fire of the Union guns during the afternoon. When darkness put an end to the fighting the Federal generals, left to their discretion, had accomplished their purpose. The enemy had been held in check, the trains and artillery had gone safely forward by the road which the battle had protected, and on the next morning, July 1, the Army of the Potomac was awaiting its enemy in the natural fortress of Malvern Hill. It was at this place that General Lee's contempt for his enemy was to meet its last and severest chastisement.

The position strikingly resembled the battlefield of Gaines's Mill. The Union army was posted on a high position, covered on the right and on the left by swampy streams and winding ravines. Woods in front furnished a cover for the formation of the Confederate columns, but an open space intervening afforded full play for the terrible Federal artillery. It was not the place for a prudent general to attack, and Lee was usually one of the most prudent of generals. But he had his whole army well in hand, Jackson having come up in the night, and he decided to risk the venture. D. H. Hill took the liberty of representing the great strength of McClellan's position, and to give his opinion against an assault. Longstreet, who was present, laughed and said, "Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped." "It was this belief in the demoralization of the Federal army," Hill says, "that made our

[1] "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., p. 375.

[2] The corps commanders were left almost entirely without directions, as the following, from the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, shows:

"*Question.* By whom was the battle of Savage's Station fought? Did you yourself direct the movements of the troops, or were they directed by the corps commanders?

"*Answer.* [General McClellan.] I had given general orders for the movements of the troops; but the fighting was done under the direct orders of the corps commanders."

leader risk the attack." Lee evidently thought the position could be carried by a *coup de main*. The order to his generals of division is a curiosity of military literature:

> Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.

On the part of the Confederates the battle was as ill executed as it was ill conceived. There was a vast amount of blood and valor wasted by them; while on the Union side, under the admirable leadership of Porter, Morell, and Couch, not a drop of blood nor an ounce of powder was thrown away. Successive attacks made by the Confederates from 1 o'clock until 9 were promptly and bravely repulsed by the Union soldiers. Jackson's forces suffered severely in getting into position early in the afternoon. One of Huger's brigades charged upon Couch about 3 o'clock, and was driven back, roughly handled. D. H. Hill waited a long time for the "yell" from Armistead, which was to be his signal for onset. But Armistead's yell in that roar of artillery was but a feeble pipe, and was soon silenced; and when Hill at last heard some shouting on his right and concluded to advance, he was repulsed and fearfully punished by the immovable brigades of Couch and Heintzelman. The most picturesque, perhaps we may say the most sensational, charge of the day was that made by Magruder late in the afternoon. His nine brigades melted away like men of snow under the frightful fire of Sykes's batteries and the muskets of Morell's steadfast infantry. This charge closed the fighting for the day. The Union line had not been broken.

One remarkable feature of the battle of Malvern Hill was that neither of the commanders-in-chief exercised any definite control over the progress of the fight. General Lee, it is true, was on the field, accompanied by Jefferson Davis; but with the exception of that preposterous order about Armistead's yell, he seems to have allowed his corps commanders to fight the battle in their own way. Their reports are filled with angry recriminations, and show a gross lack of discipline and organization. Early in the afternoon Lee ordered Longstreet and Hill to move their forces by the left flank, intending to cut off the expected retreat of McClellan. Longstreet says:

> I issued my orders accordingly for the two division commanders to go around and turn the Federal right, when, in some way unknown to me, the battle was drawn on. We were repulsed at all points with fearful slaughter, losing six thousand men and accomplishing nothing.

General McClellan was seldom on the field. He left it in the morning before the fighting began and went to his camp at Haxall's, which was under the protection of the gunboats. He came back for a little while in the afternoon, but remained with the right wing, where there was no fighting; he said his anxiety was for the right wing, as he was perfectly sure of the left and the center. In this way he deprived himself of the pleasure of witnessing a great victory won by the troops under the command of his subordinate generals. It is not impossible that if he had seen with his own eyes the magnificent success of the Union arms during the day he would have held the ground which had been so gallantly defended. To judge from the accounts of the officers on both sides, nothing would have been easier. The defeat and consequent demoralization of the Confederate forces surpassed anything seen in the war, and it might have been completed by a vigorous offensive on the morning of the 2d. Even Major Dabney, of Jackson's staff, whose sturdy partisanship usually refuses to recognize the plainest facts unfavorable to his side, gives this picture of the feeling of the division commanders of Jackson's corps the night of the battle:

> After many details of loss and disaster, they all concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggressive in the morning, and that the Confederate army was in no condition to resist him.[1]

But impressed by the phantasm of 200,000 men before him, McClellan had already resolved to retire still farther down the James to Harrison's Landing, in order, as he says, to reach a point where his supplies could be brought to him with certainty. Commodore Rodgers, with whom he was in constant consultation, thought this could best be done below City Point. The victorious army, therefore, following the habit of the disastrous week, turned its back once more upon its beaten enemy, and established itself that day at Harrison's Bar, in a situation which Lee, having at last gained some information as to the fighting qualities of the Army of the Potomac, declined to attack, a decision in which Jackson agreed with him. After several days of reconnaissances he withdrew his army, on the 8th of July, to Richmond, and the Peninsular Campaign was at an end.

HARRISON'S LANDING.

GENERAL MCCLELLAN was greatly agitated by the battle of Gaines's Mill,[2] and by the emo-

1 Dabney, p. 473.

2 Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, gave the following sworn evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War [p. 592]. He said he saw, on the evening of the 28th, at General McClellan's headquarters at Savage's Station, an order

tions incident to his forced departure for the James. Under the influence of this feeling he sent to the Secretary of War from Savage's Station, on the 28th of June, an extraordinary dispatch, which we here insert in full, as it seems necessary to the comprehension of his attitude towards, and his relations with, the Government:

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost the battle because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reënforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If at this instant I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.[1]

It is probable that no other general ever retained his commission for twenty-four hours after the receipt of such a communication by his superiors; but it is easy to see the reason why he was never called to account for it. The evident panic and mental perturbation which pierces through its incoherence filled the President with such dismay that its mutinous insolence was entirely overlooked. He could only wonder what terrible catastrophe already accomplished, or to come, could have wrung such an outcry as this from the general commanding. Even the surrender of the army was not an impossible disaster to expect from a general capable of writing such a dispatch. Secretary Chase has left a memorandum showing that some such action was regarded as indicated by General McClellan's dispatches, and that even after his arrival at Harrison's Landing, General Marcy, his father-in-law and chief of staff, in a visit to Washington spoke of it as a possibility.[2] Not knowing the extent of the mischance which had fallen upon the army, the President hastened at once to send a kind and encouraging answer to McClellan's dispatches:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reënforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reënforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reënforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things.[1]

The President also, with the greatest diligence, sent dispatches on the same day to General Dix, at Fort Monroe, to Admiral Goldsborough, commanding the naval forces in the James, and to General Burnside, in North Carolina, directing all three of them to strain every nerve in order to go to McClellan's assistance. At the same time he ordered[3] Halleck to send a large portion of his forces to the rescue.

As the 29th and 30th of June passed with-

directing the destruction of the baggage of the officers and men, and he thought also the camp equipage; appealing to the officers and men to submit to this privation because it would be only for a few days, he thought the order stated. He went to the general at once, and remonstrated with him against allowing any such order to be issued, telling him he thought it would have a bad effect upon the army — would demoralize the officers and men; that it would tell them more plainly than in any other way that they were a defeated army, running for their lives. This led to some discussion among the officers at headquarters, and Colonel Alexander heard afterward that the order was never promulgated, but suppressed.

1 War Records.

2 This is the language of Mr. Chase's memorandum: "General McClellan himself, in his dispatches before reaching Harrison's Landing, referred to the possibility of being obliged to capitulate with his entire army; and after reaching that place, General Marcy, ... who had been sent up to explain personally the situation to the President, spoke of the possibility of his capitulation at once, or within two or three days." [Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 447.]

3 This order was afterwards revoked on Halleck's representation that the detachment of so large a force would be equivalent to the abandonment of Tennessee. [War Records.]

out news of any further catastrophe, the President and the Secretary of War began to think better of the situation, and concluded that it might possibly be improved by change of base to the James. Mr. Stanton telegraphed to General Wool that it looked "more like taking Richmond than at any time before." But on the 1st of July a dispatch, dated at Turkey Bridge, arrived from General McClellan, who was still under the influence of great agitation, announcing that he is "hard pressed by superior numbers," and fearing that he shall be forced to abandon his material and save his men under cover of the gunboats. "If none of us escape, we shall at least have done honor to the country. I shall do my best to save the army. Send more gunboats."[1] While waiting for his troops to come to the new position he had chosen for them, he continued asking for reënforcements. "I need," he says, "50,000 more men, and with them I will retrieve our fortunes." The Secretary of War at once answered that reënforcements were on the way, 5000 from McDowell and 25,000 from Halleck. "Hold your ground," he says encouragingly, "and you will be in Richmond before the month is over."[1] On the morning of the battle of Malvern, McClellan writes again, "I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. . . . I now pray for time." It has been seen that his dread was uncalled for. Meanwhile, before hearing of the battle, the President had telegraphed:

It is impossible to reënforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out.

On the 2d, the flurry of the week having somewhat subsided, the President sent him the following:

Your dispatch of Tuesday morning induced me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Frémont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington taken together do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly is simply absurd. If in your frequent mention of responsibility you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that, in like manner, you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material, and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

This quiet and reasonable statement produced no effect upon the general. On the 3d he wrote again in a strain of wilder exaggeration than ever. He says:

It is of course impossible to estimate, as yet, our losses; but I doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors. To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this rebellion, reënforcements should be sent to me, rather much over than much less than 100,000 men. I beg that you will be fully impressed by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed.[1]

The didactic, not to say magisterial, tone of this dispatch formed a not unnatural introduction to the general's next important communication to the President, laying before him an entire body of administrative and political doctrine, in which alone, he intimates, the salvation of the country can be found:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA,
July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front with the purpose of overwhelming us [2] by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither con-

1 War Records.

2 This was at a time when Lee had given up all thought of attacking the Union army at Harrison's Landing.

fiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.

In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessities of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments — constitutionally made — should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. McClellan,
Major-General Commanding.

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, *President.*[1]

This letter marks the beginning of General McClellan's distinctively political career. He had always been more or less in sympathy with the Democratic party, and consequently in an attitude of dormant opposition to the Administration; although, after the manner of officers of the regular service, he had taken no pronounced political attitude. In fact, on his first assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, he had seemed to be in full sympathy with the President and Cabinet in the proceedings they thought proper to adopt for the suppression of the rebellion. He had even entered heartily into some of the more extreme measures of the Government. His orders to General Banks directing the arrest of the secessionist members of the Maryland legislature might have been written by a zealous Republican. "When they meet on the 17th," he says, "you will please have everything prepared to arrest the whole party, and be sure that none escape." He urges upon him the "absolute necessity of secrecy and success"; speaks of the exceeding importance of the affair — "If it is successfully carried out it will go far towards breaking the backbone of the rebellion." This was in September, 1861.[2] Later in that year he was repeatedly urged by prominent Democratic politicians to declare himself openly as a member of their party. They thought it would be to his advantage and to theirs to have the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac decidedly with them. At this time he declined their overtures, but they were pressingly repeated at Yorktown and afterwards; and he appears finally to have yielded to their solicitations, and the foregoing letter was the result. It is not at all probable that this document was prepared during the flight from the Chickahominy, or during the first days of doubt and anxiety at Harrison's Landing. It had probably been prepared long before, and is doubtless referred to in the general's dispatch of the 20th of June, in which he says, "I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country." He had at that time some vague and indefinite hope of taking Richmond; and such a manifesto as this, coming from a general crowned with a great victory, would have had a far different importance and influence from that which it enjoyed issuing from his refuge at Harrison's Bar, after a discrediting retreat. But the choice of occasion was not left to him. The letter could not be delayed forever; and such as it was, it went forth to the country as the political platform of General McClellan, and to the President as a note of defiance and opposition from the general in command of the principal army of the United States. Though more moderate in form, this letter was as mutinous in substance as the dispatch from Savage's Station.

[1] Slight errors having crept into this letter in its manifold publications, we print it here from the original manuscript received by the President.

[2] McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 153.

He assumes to instruct the President as to his duties and the limits of his constitutional power. He takes it for granted that the President has no definite policy, and proceeds to give him one. Unless his advice is followed, "our cause will be lost." He postures as the protector of the people against threatened arbitrary outrage. He warns the President against any forcible interference with slavery. He lets him know he can have no more troops, except on conditions known and approved. He tells him plainly that "a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies." Finally, he directs him to appoint a commander-in-chief of the army, and thinks it necessary to inform him that he does not ask the place for himself.

The President, engrossed with more important affairs, paid no attention, then or afterwards, to this letter. He simply passed it by in good-natured silence. General McClellan continued his dispatches, constantly announcing an impending attack upon his position, and constantly asking for reënforcements. He continued this until General Lee withdrew his army to Richmond, a movement which General McClellan at once characterized as "a retreat."

During all the time that McClellan remained at Harrison's Landing his correspondence with the Government was full of recrimination and querulousness; and his private letters, which have been published since his death, show an almost indecent hostility to his superiors. He writes:

> Marcy and I have just been discussing people in Washington, and conclude they are a "mighty trifling set." . . . I begin to believe they wish this army to be destroyed.[1]
>
> When you contrast the policy I urge in my letter to the President with that of Congress and of Mr. Pope, you can readily agree with me that there can be little natural confidence between the Government and myself. We are the antipodes of each other.[2]
>
> I am satisfied that the dolts in Washington are bent on my destruction. . . . Halleck is not a gentleman.[3]

We need not multiply these utterances of a weak and petulant mind. They have already been judged by the highest authority. General Sherman says, referring to this period, "The temper of his correspondence, official and private, was indicative of a spirit not consistent with the duty of the commanding general of a great army."[4]

The President had been much disturbed by the conflicting reports that reached him as to the condition of the Army of the Potomac, and he therefore resolved by a personal visit to satisfy himself of the state of affairs. He reached Harrison's Landing on the 8th of July, and while there conferred freely, not only with General McClellan himself, but with many of the more prominent officers in command. With the exception of General McClellan, not one believed the enemy was then threatening his position. Sumner thought they had retired, much damaged; Keyes, that they had withdrawn to go towards Washington; Porter, that they dared not attack; Heintzelman and Franklin thought they had retired. Franklin and Keyes favored the withdrawal of the army from the James; the rest opposed it. Mr. Lincoln came back bearing a still heavier weight of care. One thing that gave him great trouble was the enormous amount of absenteeism in the army. On returning to Washington he wrote this note to General McClellan, which, like most of his notes, it is impossible to abridge:

> I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?

To this note the general replied in a letter which can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory answer to the President's searching questions. He says, in general terms, that there is always a difference between the returns and the effective force of armies. He thinks, but is not certain, that the force given to him is not so much as 160,000, but admits that he has at that moment, present for duty, 88,665; absent by authority, 34,472; without authority, nearly 4000. This is very far from the "50,000 with their colors" which he reported a few days before; and he gives no adequate reason for the vast aggregate of those absent by authority.[5]

But another question, far more important and more grievous, was, what was to be done with the Army of the Potomac? General McClellan would listen to nothing but an enormous reënforcement of his army and another chance to take Richmond. Many of his prominent officers, on the contrary, thought that an advance on Richmond under existing conditions would be ill-advised, and that for the army to remain in its present position during the months of August and September would be more disastrous than an unsuccessful battle. The President had already placed General John Pope at the head of the Army of

[1] July 31. [2] August 2. [3] August 10.
[4] In his paper on "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion," THE CENTURY for February, 1888.
[5] War Records.

Virginia, in front of Washington, and he now resolved to send to Corinth for General Halleck, whom he placed in chief command of the armies of the United States. This was done by an order of the 11th of July, and General Halleck was requested to start at once for Washington. As soon as he could place his command in the hands of General Grant, the next officer in rank in his department, he came on to Washington, assumed command of the army on the 23d, and the very next day was sent to the camp of General McClellan, where he arrived on the 25th. He asked the general his wishes and views in regard to future operations. McClellan answered that he purposed to cross the James River and take Petersburg. Halleck stated his impression of the danger and impracticability of the plan, to which McClellan finally agreed. The General-in-Chief then told him that he regarded it as a military necessity to concentrate Pope's army and his on some point where they could at the same time cover Washington and operate against Richmond; unless it should be that McClellan felt strong enough to take the latter place himself with such reënforcements as would be given him. McClellan thought he would require 30,000 more than he had. Halleck told him that the President could only promise 20,000; and that, if McClellan could not take Richmond with that number, some plan must be devised for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with General Pope without exposing Washington. McClellan thought that there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose; but he feared the demoralizing influence of such a movement on his troops, and preferred that they should stay where they were until sufficient reënforcements could be sent him. Halleck had no authority to consider that proposition, and told him that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to meet those of Pope, or an advance upon Richmond with such forces as the President could give him. Halleck gained the impression that McClellan's preference would be to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but after consultation with his officers, he informed Halleck the next morning that he would prefer to take Richmond. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance," and that he was "willing to try it." His officers were divided on the subject of withdrawing or of making an attack upon Richmond. McClellan's delusion as to the number of the enemy had infected many of the most intelligent generals in his command. General Keyes, in a letter to Quartermaster-General Meigs, assured him that the enemy "have 200,000 — more than double our number." At the same time General Meigs himself, simply from reading the Richmond newspapers and using his common sense in connection with their accounts, had formed an estimate of the rebel force very much nearer the truth than that made by the generals in front.[1] He found it to consist of 152 regiments, which, at an average of 700 men,— too high an average,— would give a total force of 105,000. By General McClellan's returns for the 10th of August he himself had an aggregate present of 113,000 men.[1]

Halleck's return to Washington was followed by a shower of telegrams from McClellan urging the reënforcement of his army. "Should it be determined to withdraw it," he says on the 30th of July, "I shall look upon our cause as lost, and the demoralization of the army certain"— a statement which certainly was lacking in reserve. The weight of opinion, however, among the generals of highest rank was on the other side. General Keyes wrote in the strongest terms urging the withdrawal of the army.[1] General Barnard, McClellan's chief of engineers, and General Franklin counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering the Capital.[1] Upon General Halleck's return to Washington this course was resolved upon. General Halleck's first order in that direction was dated the 30th of July, and requested McClellan to send away his sick as quickly as possible. Four days afterwards, without having taken in the mean while any steps to obey the order, he sent General Hooker to Malvern Hill. He drove the Confederates from there after a sharp cavalry skirmish. This so brightened McClellan's spirits that he telegraphed to Halleck on the 5th that "with reënforcements he could march his army to Richmond in five days" — a suggestion to which Halleck made the curt rejoinder, "I have no reënforcements to send you."[2]

1 War Records.

2 General Hooker told the Committee on the Conduct of the War a curious story about this affair. He said that after General McClellan received his orders to abandon Harrison's Landing he went to him voluntarily and suggested that, with the forces they had there, they could take Richmond, and urged him to do it. So confident was Hooker, that he was willing to take the advance, and so assured McClellan. On reaching his camp, about two hours after that interview, he says he found on his table an order from General McClellan to prepare himself with three days' rations and a supply of ammunition, and be ready to march at 2 o'clock the next day. "I firmly believe," said Hooker, "that order meant Richmond. I had said to McClellan that if we were unsuccessful it would probably cost him his head, but that he might as well die for an old sheep as for a lamb. But before the time arrived for executing that order it was countermanded." [Hooker, Testimony, Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.]

The order to dispose of the sick was not promptly obeyed, because General McClellan insisted upon knowing the intentions of the Government in regard to his army; and after being informed that it was to be withdrawn from the James, several days more were wasted in wearisome interchange of dispatches between himself and Halleck, McClellan protesting with the greatest energy and feeling against this movement, and Halleck replying with perfect logic and temper in defense of it. In a long and elaborate dispatch, in which Halleck considered the whole subject, he referred to the representation made to him by McClellan and some of his officers that the enemy's forces around Richmond amounted to 200,000, and that McClellan had reported that they had since received large reënforcements. He adds:

> General Pope's army is only about 40,000; your effective force, about 90,000. You are 30 miles from Richmond and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers on one or the other as he may elect. Pope's army could not be diminished to reënforce you; if your force is reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to hold your present position against the enemy. You say your withdrawal from your present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army. I cannot understand why this should be, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. You may reply, "Why not reënforce me here so that I can strike Richmond from my present position?" You told me that you would require 30,000 additional troops; you finally said that you would have "some chance of success" with 20,000; but you afterwards telegraphed me you would require 35,000. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reënforced would almost destroy it in that climate. In the mean time Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

He tells McClellan, in conclusion, that a large number of his highest officers are decidedly in favor of the movement.

Weary at last of arguments, Halleck became more and more peremptory in his orders; and this failing to infuse any activity into the movements of McClellan, he had recourse to sharp dispatches of censure which provoked only excuses and recriminations. In some of his replies to Halleck's urgent dispatches, enjoining the greatest haste and representing the grave aspect of affairs in northern Virginia, McClellan replied in terms that indicated as little respect for Halleck as he had shown for the President and the Secretary of War. On the 6th of August, in answer to an order insisting on the immediate dispatch of a battery of artillery to Burnside, he calmly replies, "I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My artillery is none too numerous now." On the 12th, little or no progress having yet been made, he says:

> There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now, this army could scarcely arrive in time to save it. It is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia.

At the same time the Quartermaster-General reported that "nearly every available steam vessel in the country was then under the control of General McClellan." Only on the 17th of August was McClellan able to telegraph that he had left his camp at Harrison's Bar, and only on the 27th of the month, when Pope's campaign had reached a critical and perilous stage, did he report himself for orders at Alexandria, near Washington.

"O YE SWEET HEAVENS!"

Nov 1888

O YE sweet heavens! your silence is to me
More than all music. With what full delight
I come down to my dwelling by the sea
And look out from the lattice on the night!
There the same glories burn serene and bright
As in my boyhood; and if I am old
Are they not also? Thus my spirit is bold
To think perhaps we are coeval. Who
Can tell when first my faculty began
Of thought? Who knows but I was there with you
When first your Maker's mind, celestial spheres,
Contrived your motion ere I was a man?
Else, wherefore do mine eyes thus fill with tears
As I, O Pleiades! your beauty scan?

T. W. Parsons.

turn you out on the stairway. She does not like a woman about, especially a pretty woman, and doubtless she will dismiss my Louise many times. But, madame, let me entreat you to return to sleep and have no fear. I will even lock the doors of her chambers. She will disturb you no more."

Claire listened aside to some outer sound, and then exclaimed:

"You did not tell me where the commandant is, Jacques. He has not gone back to his fortress without me?"

Jacques's face fell into creases of anguish.

"Madame, he said you were to sleep undisturbed till morning."

"He should have obtained Mademoiselle de Granville's consent to that. This is not answering a question I have already repeated to you."

"Madame, he has taken the Indians and gone in his boat. Soldiers must do all sorts of things, especially commandants. He would not expose you to the dangers of the route by night."

"Listen!" Her expression changed.

Jacques gladly listened.

"I was sure I heard some noise before! You see you are mistaken. He is not yet gone."

Mellow relief, powerful as sunshine, softened the swarthy pallor of Jacques's face. He caught his candle from the chimney shelf and jammed its charred wick against a glowing coral knot in the log.

"Madame, that 's m'sieur at the gate. I know his stroke and his call. I 'll bring him up."

No man can surely say, with all his ancestry at his back and his unproved nature within, what he can or cannot do in certain crises of his life.

"What is it, m'sieur?" exclaimed Jacques as he let Dollard through the gate.

"We went scarce a quarter of a league. I came back because I cannot leave her without telling her; it was a cowardly act!" exclaimed Dollard, darting into the house. "She must go with me to Montreal."

(To be continued.) *Mary Hartwell Catherwood.*

AD ASTRA.

IF thou hast drained to the lees
The cup of inglorious ease,
Think now on the mighty men;
Dream thou dost hear again
The voice of Miltiades
And the rustle of his laurels.

See the stern purpose rise
To Cortés' glittering eyes —
To cut off all retreat
See him sink every ship in his fleet,
Then sweep to his golden prize
With not one plank behind him.

Dost believe all is over and done,
And no hope is under the sun?
Then think on the mighty men;
Dream thou canst hear again
The great shouts of Timoleon
That rallied the flying army.

And yet not alone for the past
Was the mold of heroes cast:
Let the Alps and the Andes say
What breed there is to-day;
And the poles, and the ocean vast,
And the burning waste of Sahara.

Think of the soul that needs
No background for its deeds;
Of him who bravely bears
A mountain of lifelong cares;
Of the heart that aches and bleeds
And dies, but never surrenders.

O true man, bear thy pains
And count thy losses gains;
Believe in the brave whom alone
Heaven's eye hath seen and known;
For as surely as justice reigns,
Their reward will shine like their valor.

Henry Ames Blood.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

FIRST PLANS FOR EMANCIPATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.[2]

COMPENSATED ABOLISHMENT.

THE annual message of President Lincoln at the opening of Congress in December, 1861, treated many subjects of importance — foreign relations, the condition of the finances, a reorganization of the Supreme Court, questions of military administration, the building of a military railroad through Kentucky to east Tennessee, the newly organized Territories, a review of military progress towards the suppression of rebellion. It contained also a vigorous practical discussion of the relations between capital and labor, which pointed out with singular force that "the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government — the rights of the people." In addition to these topics, it treated another question of greater importance than all of them, but for the present in so moderate a tone, and with such tentative suggestions, that it excited less immediate comment than any other. This was the question of slavery.

It had not escaped Mr. Lincoln's notice that the relations of slavery to the war were producing rapidly increasing complications and molding public thought to new and radical changes of opinion. His revocation of Frémont's proclamation had momentarily checked the clamor of importunate agitators for military emancipation; but he saw clearly enough that a deep, though as yet undefined, public hope clung to the vague suggestion that slavery and rebellion might perish together. As a significant symptom of this undercurrent of public feeling, there came to him in November a letter from George Bancroft, the veteran Democratic politician and national historian; a man eminent not only for his writing upon the science of government, but who as a member of President Polk's cabinet had rendered signal and lasting service in national administration. Mr. Bancroft had lately presided at a meeting in New York called to collect contributions to aid the suffering loyalists of North Carolina. As it happened on all such occasions, the inflamed popular patriotism of the hour sprang forward to bold speech and radical argument. Even the moderate words of Mr. Bancroft on taking the chair reflected this reformatory spirit:

> If slavery and the Union are incompatible, listen to the words that come to you from the tomb of Andrew Jackson: "The Union must be preserved at all hazards." . . . If any one claims the compromises of the Constitution, let him begin by placing the Constitution in power by respecting it and upholding it.[3]

In the letter transmitting these remarks and the resolutions of the meeting to Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Bancroft made a yet more emphatic suggestion. He wrote:

> Your administration has fallen upon times which will be remembered as long as human events find a record. I sincerely wish to you the glory of perfect success. Civil war is the instrument of Divine Providence to root out social slavery; posterity will not be satisfied with the result, unless the consequences of the war shall effect an increase of free States. This is the universal expectation and hope of men of all parties.[4]

Such a letter, from a man having the learning, talent, and political standing of its author, is of itself historic; but Mr. Lincoln's reply gives it a special significance. November 18, 1861, he wrote:

> I esteem it a high honor to have received a note from Mr. Bancroft, inclosing the report of proceedings of a New York meeting taking measures for the relief of Union people of North Carolina. I thank you and all others participating for this benevolent and patriotic movement. The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one which does

[2] It will be remembered that in announcing editorially "Abraham Lincoln: A History," November, 1886, it was stated as follows: When "the military portion of this history is reached in magazine publication, care will be taken to avoid as much as possible the repetition of details already given in THE CENTURY'S war series, while fully presenting that part of the military narrative in which is explained the relation of the President to these events." In order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, this statement is here repeated. It is expected that, with the excisions referred to, the work will extend through twelve or thirteen numbers more of the magazine.—EDITOR OF THE CENTURY.

[3] "The New York Times," Nov. 8, 1861.

[4] Unpublished MS.

[1] Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all due caution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it.[1]

This language gives us the exact condition of Mr. Lincoln's mind on the subject of slavery at that time. He hoped and expected to effect an "increase of free States" through emancipation; but we shall see that this emancipation was to come through the voluntary action of the States, and that he desired by this policy to render unnecessary the compulsory military enfranchisement which Frémont had attempted and which his followers advocated.

The prudent caution and good judgment which President Lincoln applied to the solution of this dangerous problem becomes manifest when we reëxamine its treatment in his annual message mentioned above. Not referring directly to any general plan or hope of emancipation, he nevertheless approached the subject by discussing its immediate and practical necessities in phraseology which gave him limit for expansion into a more decisive policy. It is worth while, not merely to quote the whole passage, but to emphasize the sentences which were plainly designed to lead Congress and the country to the contemplation of new and possible contingencies.

> Under and by virtue of the act of Congress entitled "An Act to Confiscate Property used for Insurrectionary Purposes," approved August 6, 1861, the legal claims of certain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have become forfeited; and numbers of the latter, *thus liberated, are already dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way.* Besides this, it is not impossible *that some of the States will pass similar enactments* for their own benefit respectively, and by operation of which persons of the same class will be thrown upon them for disposal. In such case I recommend *that Congress provide for accepting such persons from such States,* according to some mode of valuation, *in lieu, pro tanto, of direct taxes,* or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General Government, *be at once deemed free;* and that, in any event, steps be taken *for colonizing both classes* (or the one first mentioned, if the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or places in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization. . . . The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have, therefore, in every case, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the legislature.
>
> In the exercise of my best discretion I have adhered to the blockade of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting in force, by proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the late session for closing those ports. So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence, as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending, I have adhered to the act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence, *all indispensable means must be employed.* We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.[2]

Apparently these propositions covered the simple recommendation of colonization, an old and familiar topic which had friends in both free and slave States; but the language, when closely scanned, is full of novel suggestions: that the war has already freed many slaves; that the war may free many more; that the President will impartially consider any new law of Congress increasing emancipation for rebellion; that he will not hastily adopt extreme and radical measures; but that, finally to preserve the Union, *all indispensable means* must be employed. These declarations, in fact, cover the whole of his subsequent treatment of the slavery question.

Congress was too busy with pressing practical legislation to find time for immediately elaborating by debate or enactment any of the recommendations thus made. It is not likely that the President expected early action from the national legislature, for he at once turned his own attention to certain initiatory efforts which he had probably carefully meditated. He believed that under the pressure of war necessities the border slave-States might be induced to take up the idea of voluntary emancipation if the General Government would pay their citizens the full property value of the slaves they were asked to liberate; and this experiment seemed to him most feasible in the small State of Delaware, which retained only the merest fragment of a property interest in the peculiar institution.

Owing to the division of its voters between Breckinridge, Bell, Lincoln, and Douglas, the electoral vote of Delaware had been cast for Breckinridge in the presidential election of 1860; but more adroit party management had succeeded in effecting a fusion of the Bell and Lincoln vote for member of Congress, and George P. Fisher had been elected by a small majority. It is of little importance to know the exact shade of Mr. Fisher's politics during the campaign: when the rebellion broke out he was an ardent Unionist, a steadfast friend of

[1] Unpublished MS.

[2] "Congressional Globe," Appendix, Dec. 3, 1861.

Mr. Lincoln, and perhaps more liberal on the subject of slavery than any other border State representative. He entered readily into Mr. Lincoln's views and plans, which were to induce the legislature of Delaware to pass an act of gradual emancipation of the 1798 slaves which it contained by the census of 1860, on condition that the United States would pay to Delaware, to be distributed among its slave owners in proper ratio, the sum of $400 for each slave, or a total of $719,200.

Mr. Lincoln during the month of November had with his own hand written drafts of two separate bills embracing the principal details of the scheme. By the first, all negroes in Delaware above the age of thirty-five years should become free on the passage of the act; all born after its passage should remain free; and all others, after suitable apprenticeship for children, should become free in the year 1893; also, that the State should meanwhile prevent any of its slaves being sold into servitude elsewhere.[1] The provisions of the second draft were slightly different. Lincoln's manuscript explains:

> On reflection I like No. 2 the better. By it the nation would pay the State $23,200 per annum for thirty-one years. All born after the passage of the act would be born free. All slaves above the age of thirty-five years would become free on the passage of the act. All others would become free on arriving at the age of thirty-five years until January, 1893, when all remaining of all ages would become free, subject to apprenticeship for minors born of slave mothers, up to the respective ages of twenty-one and eighteen.[1]

Upon consultation with the President, Mr. Fisher undertook to propose and commend the scheme to his influential party friends in Delaware, and if possible to induce the legislature of that State to adopt it.

One of the drafts prepared by Mr. Lincoln was rewritten by the friends of the measure in Delaware, embodying the necessary details to give it proper force and local application to become a law of that State. In this shape it was printed and circulated among the members of the legislature, then holding a special session at Dover. The legislature of Delaware is not a large body; nine members of the Senate and twenty-one members of the House constituted the whole number. No record remains of the discussions, formal or informal, which the proposition called forth. The final action, however, indicates the sentiment which prevailed. The friends of emancipation probably ascertained that a hostile majority would vote it down, and therefore the laboriously prepared bill was never introduced. The pro-slavery members, unwilling to lose the opportunity of airing their conservatism, immediately prepared a joint resolution reciting the bill at full length and then loading it with the strongest phrases of condemnation which their party zeal could invent. They said it would encourage the abolition element in Congress; that it evinced a design to abolish slavery in the States; that Congress had no right to appropriate a dollar for the purchase of slaves; that they were unwilling to make Delaware guarantee the public faith of the United States; that when the people of Delaware desired to abolish slavery within her borders they would do so in their own way; and intimated that the "suggestions of saving expense to the people" were a bribe, which they scornfully repelled. A majority of the twenty-one members of the House passed this joint resolution; but when it came to the Senate, on the 7th of February, four of its nine members voted "aye," four voted "no," and one was silent or absent; and so the joint resolution went back "non-concurred in."[2] This seems to have closed the legislative record on the subject.

Mr. Lincoln was doubtless disappointed at this failure to give his plan of compensated gradual abolishment a starting-point by the favorable action of the State of Delaware. But he did not abandon the project, and his next step was to bring it, through Congress, to the attention of the country and the States interested. On the 6th of March he sent to the Senate and the House of Representatives a special message, recommending the adoption of the following joint resolution:

> *Resolved,* That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.[3]

His message explained that this was merely the proposal of practical measures which he hoped would follow. He said:

> The point is not that all the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation" because, in my judgment, gradual, and not sudden, emancipation is better for all. . . . Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the

[1] Unpublished MS.

[2] Delaware Senate Journal, Special Session, 1861–62.

[3] "Congressional Globe," March 6, 1862, p. 1102.

State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual message last December, I thought fit to say, "The Union must be preserved; and hence, all indispensable means must be employed." I said this, not hastily, but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency towards ending the struggle, must and will come.[1]

To this public recommendation he added some cogent reasons in private letters to influential persons. Thus, three days after his message, he wrote to the editor of "The New York Times":

I am grateful to the New York journals, and not less so to "The Times" than to others, for their kind notices of the late special message to Congress. Your paper, however, intimates that the proposition, though well intentioned, must fail on the score of expense. I do hope you will reconsider this. Have you noticed the facts that less than one-half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware, at four hundred dollars per head?—that eighty-seven days' cost of this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the steps, do you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense? Please look at these things, and consider whether there should not be another article in "The Times."[2]

So again, to Senator McDougall, who was opposing the scheme with considerable earnestness in the Senate, he wrote privately on March 14:

As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation, with compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or two brief suggestions. Less than one-half day's cost of the war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head. Thus:

All the slaves in Delaware by the census of 1860 are	1798
	$400
Cost of slaves	$719,200
One day's cost of the war	$2,000,000

Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri. Thus:

Slaves in Delaware	1,798
" " Maryland	87,188
" " District of Columbia	3,181
" " Kentucky	225,490
" " Missouri	114,965
	432,622
	$400
Cost of slaves	$173,048,800
Eighty-seven days' cost of the war	$174,000,000

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those States and this District would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense? A word as to the *time* and *manner* of incurring the expense. Suppose, for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day—say January 1, 1882. Then let the sum to be paid to such State by the United States be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number of slaves within the State, and multiplying that number by four hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty equal annual installments, in six per cent. bonds of the United States. The sum thus given, as to *time* and *manner*, I think would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum raised *now* for the indefinite prosecution of the war; but of this you can judge as well as I.[2]

It was between the dates of these letters that President Lincoln made the most important personal effort to secure favorable action on his project of gradual abolishment. At his request such members of Congress from the border slave-States of Delaware, Maryland, [West] Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri as were present in Washington came in a body to the Executive Mansion on March 10, where a somewhat lengthy interview and discussion of this subject ensued, the substance of which was authentically reported by them. In reading the account of the interview, it must be remembered that Lincoln was addressing the representatives of such slave States as had remained loyal, and his phrases respecting his attitude and intention towards slavery were not intended by him to apply to the States whose persistent rebellion had forfeited the consideration and rights which the others could justly claim.

In explanation of his message the President recited to the assembled border State members the complications and embarrassments resulting from army operations among loyal or partly loyal communities, and the irritating conflicts of opinion produced thereby in the Northern States. Disclaiming any intention to injure or wound the loyal slave States, and recognizing that the right of emancipation was exclusively under their own control, he had proposed this offer in good faith—not as a threat, but as the shortest and easiest way to end the war by eliminating its cause and motive.

He did not ask an immediate answer, but pressed it upon their serious consideration, and hoped that after earnest conference and inquiry their views of duty and the interests of their constituents might enable them to accept it

1 "Congressional Globe," March 6, 1862, page 1102.

2 Unpublished MS.

voluntarily and in the same patriotic spirit in which it was made.[1]

It is not to be wondered at that his auditors were unable to give him affirmative replies, or even remote encouragement. Representing slaveholding constituencies, their natural attitude was one of unyielding conservatism. Their whole tone was one of doubt, of qualified protest, and of apprehensive inquiry. They had not failed to note that in his annual message of December 3, and his special message of March 6, he had announced his determination to use all "indispensable means" to preserve the Union, and had hinted that necessity might force him to employ extreme measures; and one of them asked pointedly "if the President looked to any policy beyond the acceptance or rejection of this scheme." His answer was frank and direct. Mr. Crisfield of Maryland writes:

> The President replied that he had no designs beyond the action of the States on this particular subject. He should lament their refusal to accept it, but he had no designs beyond their refusal of it. . . . Unless he was expelled by the act of God or the Confederate armies, he should occupy that house for three years, and as long as he remained there Maryland had nothing to fear, either for her institutions or her interests, on the points referred to.[2]

The day on which this interview was held, Roscoe Conkling introduced into the House of Representatives the exact joint resolution which the President had recommended in his message of the 6th, and debate on the subject was begun. The discussion developed a wide divergence of views among representatives. Moderate Republicans generally supported the resolution; even somewhat extreme antislavery men, such as Lovejoy in the House and Sumner in the Senate, indicated their willingness to join in the liberal compensation the President had proposed, if the loyal slave States would consent to relinquish their portion of the disturbing and dangerous evil. Since it was not a practical measure, but simply an announcement of policy, the opposition was not strenuous; a few border State representatives and the more obstinate Democrats from free States joined in a somewhat ill-natured dissent. The resolution was passed on the following day (yeas, 89; nays, 31). The action of the Senate was very similar, though the debate was a little more delayed. The resolution was passed in that body April 2 (yeas, 32; nays, 10), and received the President's signature on the 10th of April, 1862.

By his initiative and influence Mr. Lincoln thus committed the executive and legislative departments of the Government to the policy of compensated emancipation; and there is no doubt that, had his generous offer been accepted by the border States within a reasonable time, the pledge embodied in the joint resolution would have been promptly redeemed. Though it afterwards turned out that this action remained only sentimental and prospective, it nevertheless had no inconsiderable effect in bringing to pass a very important practical measure.

In its long contest for political supremacy,

[1] An extended quotation from the abstract of the President's remarks as written out by Mr. Crisfield, representative from Maryland, will be read with interest: "After the usual salutations and we were seated, the President said, in substance, that he had invited us to meet him to have some conversation with us in explanation of his message of the 6th; that since he had sent it in, several of the gentlemen then present had visited him, but had avoided any allusion to the message, and he therefore inferred that the import of the message had been misunderstood, and was regarded as inimical to the interests we represented; and he had resolved he would talk with us, and disabuse our minds of that erroneous opinion. The President then disclaimed any intent to injure the interests or wound the sensibilities of the slave States. On the contrary, his purpose was to protect the one and respect the other. That we were engaged in a terrible, wasting, and tedious war; immense armies were in the field, and must continue in the field as long as the war lasts; that these armies must, of necessity, be brought into contact with slaves in the States we represented, and in other States as they advanced; that slaves would come to the camps, and continual irritation was kept up. That he was constantly annoyed by conflicting and antagonistic complaints: on the one side, a certain class complained if the slave was not protected by the army — persons were frequently found who, participating in these views, acted in a way unfriendly to the slaveholder; on the other hand, slaveholders complained that their rights were interfered with, their slaves induced to abscond and protected within the lines. These complaints were numerous, loud, and deep; were a serious annoyance to him, and embarrassing to the progress of the war; that it kept alive a spirit hostile to the Government in the States we represented; strengthened the hopes of the Confederates that at some day the border States would unite with them and thus tend to prolong the war; and he was of opinion, if this resolution should be adopted by Congress and accepted by our States, these causes of irritation and these hopes would be removed, and more would be accomplished towards shortening the war than could be hoped from the greatest victory achieved by Union armies. That he made this proposition in good faith, and desired it to be accepted, if at all, voluntarily, and in the same patriotic spirit in which it was made; that emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the States, and must be adopted or rejected by each for itself; that he did not claim, nor had this Government, any right to coerce them for that purpose; that such was no part of his purpose in making this proposition, and he wished it to be clearly understood. That he did not expect us there to be prepared to give him an answer, but he hoped we would take the subject into serious consideration, confer with one another, and then take such course as we felt our duty and the interests of our constituents required of us." There followed after this much informal discussion, also reported in brief by Mr. Crisfield, for which there is not room in this note. The whole will be found in McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 210 *et seq.*

[2] McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 211.

slavery had clung with unyielding tenacity to its foothold in the District of Columbia, where it had been the most irritating eyesore to Northern sentiment. Whatever might be conceded to the doctrine of State sovereignty, antislavery men felt that the peculiar institution had no claim to the exclusive shelter of the Federal flag; on the other hand, proslavery men saw that to relinquish this claim would be fatal to their determination to push it to a national recognition and existence. Hence the abolition or the maintenance of slavery in the District of Columbia had become a frequent issue in party politics. The prohibition of the slave trade in the District was indeed effected in the great compromise of 1850; but this concession was more than counterbalanced by the proslavery gains of that political bargain, and since then the abolition of slavery itself in this central Federal jurisdiction seemed to have become impossible until rebellion provoked the change. Under the new conditions antislavery zeal was pushing its lance into every joint of the monster's armor, and this vulnerable point was not overlooked. The Constitution placed the District of Columbia exclusively under the legislation of Congress, and by their rebellious withdrawal from their seats in the two houses the Southern members and senators had voluntarily surrendered this citadel of their propagandism.

President Lincoln had not specifically recommended abolishment in the District in his annual message; but he had introduced a bill for such a purpose when he was a member of Congress in 1849, and it was well known that his views had undergone no change. Later on, the already recited special message of March 6 embraced the subject in its larger aspects and recommendations. Thus, with perfect knowledge that it would receive executive sanction, the House on April 11 (yeas, 92; nays, 38) and the Senate on April 3 (yeas, 29; nays, 14) passed an act of immediate emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia, with compensation to the owners, to be distributed by a commission, the whole not to exceed an aggregate of $300 per slave. The act also appropriated the sum of $100,000 for expenses of voluntary emigration to Hayti or Liberia.

President Lincoln signed the act on the 16th of April, and in his short message of approval said:

> I have never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District; and I have ever desired to see the National capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way. Hence there has never been in my mind any question upon the subject except the one of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances. . . . I am gratified that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act.[1]

Certain omissions in the law, which the President pointed out, were remedied by supplementary enactments, which among other safeguards and provisions added to the boon of freedom the privilege of education by opening public schools to colored children.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES.

BEFORE enough time had elapsed to judge of the probable effect of Lincoln's offer of compensation to the border States, a new incident occurred which further complicated the President's dealings with the slavery question. About the middle of May he was surprised to learn from the newspapers that General David Hunter, whom he had recently sent to command the Department of the South, had issued an order of military emancipation. Reciting that the Department of the South was under martial law, the order declared, "Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States — Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina — heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared free."

So far as can be judged, General Hunter was moved to this step by what seemed to him the requirements of his new surroundings and the simple dictates of natural justice. He was a warm personal and political friend of President Lincoln, was entirely free from motives of selfish ambition, and was not a man who would suffer himself to be made the instrument of a political combination. Of strong antislavery convictions, his duty as a soldier in the service of the Union was as single-hearted and as sacred as that of a crusader sent to rescue the Holy Sepulcher from the Infidel. In his eyes rebellion and slavery were intertwined abominations to be struck and conquered simultaneously.

When he took command of the Department of the South he found himself surrounded by new conditions. The capture of Port Royal in the preceding November had been followed by the flight of the whole white population, leaving the entire coast from North Edisto River to Warsaw Sound, a distance of sixty or seventy miles, in the hands of the captors. This was the region of the famous sea island cotton plantations, in which the slaves outnumbered the whites nearly five to one. In their sudden flight the whites were compelled to abandon their slaves as well as their homes, and a large negro population thus fell immediately to the care and protection of the Union army.

[1] "Congressional Globe," April 16, 1862.

The exercise of common humanity forced the military administration of the department beyond mere warlike objects. The commander, General Thomas W. Sherman, issued an address[1] to the white inhabitants, inviting them to return and reoccupy their lands and homes, and continue their peaceful vocations under the auspices and protection of the Government of the United States. Except in a very few instances the friendly invitation was defiantly refused. They not only preferred ruin and exile, but did such mischief as lay in their power by ordering their cotton to be burned[1] and circulating among the blacks the statement that the Yankees would seize them, send them away, and sell them into slavery in Cuba. Such was the distrust excited by the falsehood, that a month after the capture of Port Royal but about 320 blacks had ventured into Sherman's camps; nearly all these were decrepit, or were women and children, there being only sixty able-bodied men among them.[2]

For the present the slaves made most of their abrupt holiday. But their scanty clothing wore out, the small stock of provisions on the plantations was exhausted. At the time of their masters' flight much of the cotton crop was still in the fields. In the increasing demand for this product it became an object for the Government to collect and preserve what was left; and this work, begun under the joint orders of the War and Treasury departments, set on foot the first organization of the colored population for labor and government. Military orders divided the country into districts, with agents to superintend the plantations, to enroll and organize the blacks into working parties, to furnish them necessary food and clothing, and to pay them for their labor.

Private philanthropy also gave timely and valuable assistance. Relief societies, organized in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, collected funds and employed teachers, some fifty of whom reached Beaufort the 9th of March, 1862, and began a much-needed work of combined encouragement, guardianship, and instruction, thus replacing the elements of social government which the slaves had lost by the withdrawal of their masters and mistresses.

The control of the captured and abandoned cotton and other property fell to the Treasury Department, and in this connection Secretary Chase, at the President's request, gave the educational enterprise his official sanction and supervision; later on, the War Department assumed and continued the work. Compelled from the first to rely upon "contrabands" for information and assistance, and to a large extent for military labor, it gave them in return not only wages for the actual service performed, but necessary food and shelter for the destitute, and with the return of the spring season furnished them, so far as possible, seed and implements of husbandry, and encouraged them to renew their accustomed labor in the gardens and fields of the abandoned plantations, in order to provide for, or at least contribute to, their own maintenance. Under this treatment confidence was quickly established. In two months the number of blacks within the Union lines increased from 320 to over 9000.[3]

When General Hunter took command of the Department of the South, this industrial and educational organization of the blacks was just beginning. Military usefulness was of the first importance in his eyes, particularly as his forces were insufficient for offensive movement. It was not unnatural that, seeing the large colored population within his lines, much of it unemployed, his thoughts should turn to the idea of organizing, arming, and training regiments of colored soldiers; and assuming that the instructions of the War Department conferred the necessary authority, he began the experiment without delay. It was amid all these conditions, which at that time did not exist elsewhere, that General Hunter issued the already recited order announcing that slavery and martial law were incompatible, and declaring free all slaves in his department. The presence of the Union army had visibly created a new order of things, and he doubtless felt it a simple duty to proclaim officially what practically had come to pass.

The mails from the Department of the South could only come by sea; hence a week elapsed after the promulgation of Hunter's order before knowledge of it came to the President through its publication in the New York newspapers. The usual acrimonious comments immediately followed: radicals approved it, Democrats and conservatives denounced it; and the President was assailed for inaction on the one hand and for treachery on the other. Lincoln's own judgment of the act was definite and prompt. "No commanding general shall do such a thing, upon *my* responsibility, without consulting me," he wrote in answer to a note from Chase, who wished the order to stand.

Three days later (May 19, 1862) the President published a proclamation reciting that the Government had no knowledge or part in the issuing of Hunter's order of emancipation, that neither Hunter nor any other person had been authorized to declare free the slaves of any State, and that his order in that respect was altogether void. The President continued:

[1] War Records.

[2] T. W. Sherman to Thomas, Dec. 15, 1861. War Records.

[3] T. W. Sherman to Adjutant-General, Feb. 9, 1862. War Records.

I further make it known that whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether at any time, in any case it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

While the President thus drew a sharp distinction between the limited authority of commanders in the field and the full reservoir of executive powers in his own hands, for future contingencies, he utilized the occasion for a forcible admonition to the border slave-States. Reminding them that he by recommendation, and Congress by joint resolution, had made them a formal tender and pledge of payment for their slaves if they would voluntarily abolish the institution, he counseled them in words of parental wisdom and affection not to neglect this opportunity of financial security to themselves and patriotic benefit to their country. He said:

To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue; I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The changes it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven — not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past times as, in the providence of God, it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.[1]

The "signs of the times" were indeed multiplying to a degree that ought to have attracted the notice of the border States, even without the pointing finger of the President. How far the presence of the Confederate armies, embodying a compact proslavery sentiment, had up to that time interfered locally with the relations of master and slave we have no means of knowing; we do know that before the end of the rebellion the conditions of war — military necessity — brought even the rebel Government and the unconquered slave communities to the verge of emancipation and the general military employment of the blacks. But Northern armies, embodying a compact antislavery sentiment, stationed or moving in slave communities, acted on the "institution" as a disturbing, relaxing, and disintegrating force, constant in operation, which no vigilance could shut out and no regulations could remedy. Whether in Kentucky or Virginia, Missouri or Mississippi, the slave gave the Union soldiers his sympathy and his help; while for services rendered, and still more for services expected, the soldiers returned friendship and protection, finding no end of pretexts to evade any general orders to the contrary.

From the army this feeling communicated itself sometimes directly to Congress, sometimes to the soldier's Northern home, from which it was in turn reflected upon that body. The antislavery feeling at the North, excited by the ten-years' political contention, intensified by the outbreak of rebellion, was thus fed and stimulated, and grew with every day's duration of the war. Conservative opinion could not defend a system that had wrought the convulsion and disaster through which the nation was struggling. Radical opinion lost no opportunity to denounce it and attack its vulnerable points.

Of the operations of this sentiment the debates and enactments of Congress afford an approximate measure. During the long session from December 2, 1861, to July 17, 1862, the subject seemed to touch every topic at some point, while the affirmative propositions of which slavery was the central and vital object were of themselves sufficiently numerous to absorb a large share of the discussions. Leaving out of view the many resolutions and bills which received only passing attention, or which were at once rejected, this second session[2] of the Thirty-seventh Congress perfected and enacted a series of antislavery measures which amounted to a complete reversal of the policy of the General Government. At the date of the President's proclamation quoted above calling attention to the "signs of the times," only a portion of these measures had reached final enactment; but the drift and portent of their coming was unmistakable. In the restricted limits of these pages it is impossible to pass them in review separately or chronologically; nor does the date of their passage and approval always indicate the relation in which they engrossed the attention of Congress. The consideration of the general subject was, we may almost say, continuous, and the reader will obtain a better idea of their cumulative force and value from a generalized abstract, showing the importance and scope of the several acts and sections as related to each other.

First. One of the earliest forms of the discussion arose upon the constantly recurring question of returning to slave-owners such runaways as sought the protection of the Union camps, and regarding which various command-

[1] Proclamation, May 19, 1862.

[2] The first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress was the special session held in July and August, 1861, under President Lincoln's proclamation.

ers had issued such different and contradictory orders. It has already been stated that the President left his officers full discretion on this point, because it fell properly within the necessities of camp and police regulations. The somewhat harsh and arbitrary order No. 3, issued by General Halleck in Missouri, provoked widespread comment and indignation; and though the general insisted that the spirit of the order was purely military, and not political, it undoubtedly hastened and intensified congressional action. By an act approved March 13, 1862, a new article of war was added to the army regulations, which enjoined, under usual penalties, that "All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped," etc. Later, Section 10 of the Confiscation Act[1] was virtually an amendment of the fugitive-slave law; providing that the claimant might not use its authority until he had taken an oath of allegiance, and prohibiting any person in the army or navy from surrendering a fugitive slave, or presuming to decide the validity of the owner's claim.

Second. No less to fulfill the dictates of propriety and justice than for its salutary influence on the opinion of foreign nations, the annual message of the President had recommended a recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, and the appointment of diplomatic representatives to those new states. This was duly authorized by an act approved June 5, 1862. Similar reasons also secured the passage of "An act to carry into effect the treaty between the United States and her Britannic Majesty for the suppression of the African slave-trade," approved July 11, 1862. That this action betokened more than mere hollow profession and sentiment is evinced by the fact that under the prosecution of the Government, the slave-trader Nathaniel P. Gordon was convicted and hanged in New York on the 21st of February, 1862, this being the first execution for this offense under the laws of the United States, after their enforcement had been neglected and their extreme penalty defied for forty years.

Third. The third marked feature of congressional antislavery enactment was one which, in a period of peace, would have signalized the culmination of a great party triumph and taken its place as a distinctive political landmark. Now, however, in the clash and turmoil of war it was disposed of, not so much in the light of a present party conquest, as the simple necessary registration of accomplished facts, wrought beyond recall by passing events, recognized by public opinion, and requiring only the formality of parliamentary attestation. Its title was, "An act to secure freedom to all persons within territories of the United States," approved June 19, 1862. This was the realization of the purpose which had called the Republican party into being, namely, the restoration of the Missouri Compromise, its extension and application to all Territories of the United States, and as a logical result the rejection and condemnation of the proslavery doctrines of the Dred Scott decision, the demand for a congressional slave code, and the subversive "property theory" of Jefferson Davis. These were the issues which had caused the six-years' political contention between the North and the South; and upon its defeat at the ballot-box by the election of President Lincoln, the South had appealed to the sword.

Fourth. Still advancing another step in the prevalent antislavery progress, we come to the policy of compensated emancipation so strenuously urged by the President. Action on this point has already been described, namely, the joint resolution of Congress, approved April 10, 1862, virtually pledging the aid of the Government to any State which would adopt it, and the act, approved April 16, 1862, with its amendments, actually abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, with compensation to owners. The earnestness of Congress in this reform is marked by the additional step that under acts approved May 21 and July 11, 1862, certain provisions were made for the education of colored children in the cities of Washington and Georgetown, District of Columbia.

Fifth. By far the most important of all the antislavery laws of this period, both in scope and purpose, was a new Confiscation Act, perfected after much deliberation, passed at the close of the session, and approved by the President July 17, 1862. The act of August 6, 1861, only went to the extent of making free the slaves actually employed in rebel military service. The new law undertook to deal more generally with the subject, and indeed extended its provisions somewhat beyond the mere idea of confiscation. While other subjects were included, its spirit and object would have been better expressed by the title of "An act to destroy slavery under the powers of war." In addition to other and usual penalties for treason or rebellion, it declared that slaves of persons guilty and convicted of these crimes should be made free; that slaves of rebels escaping and taking refuge within the army lines, slaves captured from rebels or deserted by them and coming under the control of the United States Government, and slaves of rebels found in

[1] Approved July 17, 1862.

any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the Union army, should all be deemed captives of war and be forever free.

Sixth. Coupled with the foregoing sweeping provisions, intended to destroy title in slave property as a punishment for treason and rebellion, were other provisions, which, under guarded phraseology, looked to the active organized employment of slaves as a substantial military force — which military service should in its turn also, in specified cases, work enfranchisement from bondage. Thus, in certain amendments of the militia laws[1] it was enacted that the President might enroll and employ contrabands in such camp labor or military service as they were fitted for, and that their wives, mothers, and children, if they belonged to armed rebels, should become free by virtue of such service. Section 11 of the Confiscation Act, however, conferred a still broader authority upon the Government for this object. It provided:

> That the President of the United States is authorized to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.

This section allowed a latitude of construction which permitted the organization of a few of the earliest regiments of colored soldiers.

In tracing the antislavery policy of President Lincoln, his opinions upon some of the prominent features of these laws become of special interest. He followed the discussion and perfecting of the Confiscation Act with careful attention, and as it neared its passage prepared a veto message, pointing out several serious defects, which Congress hastily remedied in anticipation by an explanatory joint resolution. When the bill and resolution were submitted to him he signed both, as being substantially a single act, and, to place himself right upon the record, transmitted with his notice of approval a copy of the draft of his intended veto message. The constitutional objection and the imperfections of detail in the original bill do not require mention here, but his views on emancipation and military employment of slaves may not be omitted.

> There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective; and it touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particular it is just and proper. . . . It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression, rather than a substantial objection, in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation, and that Congress had then liberated him, the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property; and he forfeits both to the Government against which he offends. The Government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of some slaves by *escheat,* and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it would be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. . . . The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon the Executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now, I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.[2]

The number and variety of antislavery provisions cited above show how vulnerable was the peculiar institution in a state of war, and demonstrate again the folly and madness of the slaveholders' appeal to arms. All the penalties therein prescribed were clearly justifiable by the war powers of the nation and sustained by military necessity. So far the laws had not touched a single right of a loyal slaveholder in a slave State, either within or without the territory held by Confederate arms; but day by day it became manifest that the whole slave system was so ramified and intertwined with political and social conditions in slave States, both loyal and disloyal, that it must eventually stand or fall in mass. In short, the proof was more absolute in war than in peace that slavery was purely the creature of positive law in theory, and of universal police regulations unremittingly enforced in practice.

It must not be supposed that the discussion and enactment of these measures proceeded without decided opposition. The three factions of which Congress was composed maintained the same relative position on these topics that they had occupied since the beginning of the rebellion. The bulk of the resistance was furnished by the Democratic members,

[1] An act to amend the act calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, approved February 28, 1795, and the acts amendatory thereof, and for other purposes, approved July 17, 1862, sections 12 and 13.

[2] Senate Journal, July 17, 1862, pp. 872, 873.

who, while as a rule they condemned the rebellion, reiterated their previous accusations that the Republican party had provoked it. Now again at every antislavery proposition, no matter how necessary or justifiable, they charged that it was a violation of express or implied political faith, and a stumbling-block to reconciliation, which, against the plainest evidences, they assumed to be still possible. In a hopeless minority, and with no chance to affect legislation affirmatively even by indirection, they yet maintained the attitude of an ill-natured opposition, yielding assent only to the most necessary war measures, while with sophistical and irritating criticism they were industriously undermining public confidence in the President and his adherents by every party and parliamentary device they could invent.

There is little doubt that this action of the Democrats in Congress, in addition to its other pernicious effects, served to render the border-State delegations more stubborn and intractable against making any concessions towards the liberal and reformatory policy which President Lincoln so strongly urged. The statesmen and politicians of the border slave-States were quick enough to perceive the danger to their whole slave system, but not resolute enough to prepare to meet and endure its removal, and accept a money equivalent in exchange. Against evidence and conviction they clung tenaciously to the idea that the war ought to be prosecuted without damage to slavery; and their representatives and senators in Congress, with a very few brave exceptions, resisted from first to last all antislavery enactments. We may admit that in this course they represented truly the majority feeling and will of their several constituencies; but such an admission is fatal to any claim on their part to political foresight or leadership. Indeed, one of the noticeable and lamentable features of the earlier stages of the rebellion was the sudden loss of power among border-State leaders, both at home and in Congress. We can now see that their weakness resulted unavoidably from their defensive position. During the secession stage they only ventured to act defensively against that initial heresy, and as a rule the offensive and unscrupulous conspirators kept the advantage of an aggressive initiative. Now in the new stage of antislavery reaction they were again merely on the defensive and under the disadvantage which that attitude always brings with it. In Congress, as a faction, they were sadly diminished in numbers and shorn of personal prestige. They could count only a single conspicuous representative — the venerable John J. Crittenden; but burdened with the weight of years, and hedged by the tangles and pitfalls of his conservative obligations, he was timid, spiritless, despondent. The record of the border-State delegations, therefore, during this strong antislavery movement of congressional enactment is simply one of protests, excuses, appeals, and direful prophecies.

Against them the positive affirmative progress of antislavery sentiment gathered force and volume from every quarter. Whatever the momentary or individual outcry, it was easy to perceive that every antislavery speech, resolution, vote, or law received quick sustaining acceptance from public sentiment in the North and from the fighting Union armies in the South. The Republican majority in Congress noted and responded to these symptoms of approval, and the radical leaders in that body were constantly prompted by them to more advanced demands and votes. Antislavery opinion in Congress not only had the advantage of overpowering numbers, but also of conspicuous ability. A high average talent marked the Republican membership, which, as a rule, spoke and voted for the before-mentioned antislavery measures; while among those whose zeal gave them especial prominence in these debates, the names of Charles Sumner in the Senate and of Thaddeus Stevens and Owen Lovejoy in the House need only be mentioned to show what high qualities of zeal and talent pursued the peculiar institution with unrelenting warfare.

To the rebellious South, to the loyal population of the border slave-States, and to the extreme conservatism of the North, particularly that faction represented by Democratic members of Congress, President Lincoln's proposal of gradual compensated abolishment doubtless seemed a remarkable if not a dangerous innovation upon the practical politics of half a century. But this conservatism failed to comprehend the mighty sweep and power of the revolution of opinion which slavery had put in motion by its needless appeal to arms. In point of fact, the President stood sagaciously midway between headlong reform and blind reaction. His steady, cautious direction and control of the average public sentiment of the country alike held back rash experiment and spurred lagging opinion. Congress, with a strong Republican majority in both branches, was stirred by hot debate on the new issues. The indirect influence of the Executive was much greater than in times of peace: a reckless President could have done infinite damage to the delicate structure of constitutional government. As it was, antislavery resentment was restrained and confined to such changes of legislation as were plainly necessary to vindicate the Constitution, laws, and traditions which the rebellion had wantonly violated; but these were sufficiently numerous and pointed to mark a pro-

found transformation of public policy in little more than a year. Under the occasion and spur which the rebellion furnished, a twelvemonth wrought that which had not been dreamed of in a decade, or which would otherwise have been scarcely possible to achieve in a century.

Four months had now elapsed since President Lincoln proposed and Congress sanctioned the policy of compensated emancipation in the border slave-States. Except in its indirect influence upon public opinion, no definite result had as yet attended the proposal. Great fluctuations had occurred in the war and great strides had been made in legislation; but the tendency so far had been rather to complicate than simplify the political situation, to exasperate rather than appease contending factions and conflicting opinions. This condition of things, while it might have endured for a while, could not prolong itself indefinitely. Little by little the war was draining the lifeblood of the republic. However effectually the smoke and dust of the conflict might shut the view from the general eye, or however flippantly small politicians might hide the question under the heat and invective of factional quarrel, President Lincoln, looking to the future, saw that, to replenish the waste of armies and maintain a compact popular support, the North must be united in a sentiment and policy affording a plain, practical aim and solution, both political and military. The policy he decided upon was not yet ripe for announcement, but the time had arrived to prepare the way for its avowal and acceptance. As the next proper step in such a preparation, the President, on the 12th of July, 1862, again convened the border-State delegations at the Executive Mansion, and read to them the following carefully prepared second appeal to accept compensation for slaves in their respective States:

GENTLEMEN: After the adjournment of Congress, now near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual emancipation message of last March the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration, and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, "Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge?" Discarding punctilios and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty, in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion — by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war, and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event. How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war. How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it. How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats. I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned — one which threatens division among those who, united, are not too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be freed. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point. Upon these considerations I have again begged your attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the capital, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition; and at the least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest

views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.

It is doubtful whether the President expected any more satisfactory result from this last appeal to the border-State representatives than had attended his previous one. He had had abundant occasion to observe their course in the congressional debates; the opportunity had been long before them and they had not taken advantage of it; amid the revolutionary impulse and action which were moving the whole country their inaction on this subject was equivalent to resistance. This effort therefore, like the former one, proved barren: most of them answered with a qualified refusal; twenty of them [1] signed a written reply on July 14, which, while it pledged an unchangeable continuance of their loyalty, set forth a number of mixed and inconsequential reasons against adopting the President's recommendation. They thought the project too expensive. They said slavery was a right which they ought not to be asked to relinquish, that the proposition had never been offered them in a tangible shape, that a different policy had been announced at the beginning of the war, that radical doctrines had been proclaimed and subversive measures proposed in Congress. In short, it was a general plea for non-action. Seven others [2] of their number drew up an address dissenting from the conservative views of the majority, and promising that "We will, as far as may be in our power, ask the people of the border States calmly, deliberately, and fairly to consider your recommendations." Two others [3] wrote separate replies in the same spirit; but with only a minority to urge the proposition upon their people, it was plain from the first that no hope of success could be entertained.

EMANCIPATION PROPOSED AND POSTPONED.

Military events underwent great fluctuations in the first half of the year 1862. During the first three months Union victories followed each other with a rapidity and decisiveness which inspired the most sanguine hopes for the early and complete suppression of the rebellion. Cheering news of important successes came from all quarters — Mill Springs in Kentucky, Roanoke Island in North Carolina, Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee, Pea Ridge in Arkansas, Shiloh in Tennessee, Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River, the reduction of Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the lower Mississippi, the capture of New Orleans in Louisiana, and, finally, what seemed the beginning of a victorious advance by McClellan's army upon Richmond. In the month of May, however, this tide of success began to change. Stonewall Jackson's raid initiated a series of discouraging Union defeats, and McClellan's formidable advance gradually changed into disastrous retreat.

No one noted this blighting of a longed-for fruition with a keener watchfulness and more sensitive suffering than did President Lincoln. As the military interest and expectancy gradually lessened at the circumference and slowly centered itself upon the fatal circles around the rebel capital, his thoughts by day and anxiety by night fed upon the intelligence which the telegraph brought from the Union camps on the Chickahominy and the James. It is safe to say that no general in the army studied his maps and scanned his telegrams with half the industry — and, it may be added, with half the intelligence — which Mr. Lincoln gave to his. It is not surprising, therefore, that before the catastrophe finally came the President was already convinced of the substantial failure of McClellan's campaign as first projected, though he still framed his letters and telegrams in the most hopeful and encouraging language that the situation would admit. But aware of the impending danger, he took steps to secure such a reënforcement of the army, and provide for such a readjustment of the campaign, as might yet secure the final and complete victory which had lain so temptingly within McClellan's grasp. A part of this programme was the consolidation of an army under Pope. The culmination of disaster doubtless came sooner than he thought possible. McClellan himself did not seem apprehensive of sudden danger when on June 26 he telegraphed:

> The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to outmaneuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discour-

[1] From Kentucky, Senator Garrett Davis and Representatives Henry Grider, Aaron Harding, Charles A. Wickliffe, George W. Dunlap, Robert Mallory, John J. Crittenden, John W. Menzies, and James S. Jackson; from Missouri, Senator Robert Wilson and Representatives James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, Thomas L. Price, and John S. Phelps; from Maryland, Representatives John W. Crisfield, Edwin H. Webster, Cornelius L. L. Leary, Francis Thomas, and Charles B. Calvert; from Virginia, Senator John S. Carlile.

[2] From Missouri, Representative John W. Noell; from Kentucky, Representative Samuel L. Casey; from Tennessee, Representative Andrew J. Clements; from Delaware, Representative George P. Fisher; from Virginia, Senator Waiteman T. Willey and Representatives William G. Brown and Jacob B. Blair.

[3] Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri and Representative Horace Maynard of Tennessee.

aged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.[1]

This was the language of a man still possessing courage and faith, but the events of the two days following robbed him of both. Early on the morning of the 28th he sent the Secretary of War his memorable telegram already quoted, which was a mere blind cry of despair and insubordination:

I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

The kind and patient words with which President Lincoln replied to this unsoldierly and unmanly petulance, and the vigorous exertions put forth by the War Department to mitigate the danger with all available supplies and reënforcements, have been related. The incident is repeated here to show that the President and Cabinet promptly put into execution a measure which had probably been already debated during the preceding days. The needs of the hour, and Lincoln's plan to provide for them, cannot be more briefly stated than in the two letters which follow, the first of which, written on this 28th day of June, he addressed to his Secretary of State. It was evidently written in a moment of profound emotion produced by McClellan's telegram, for nowhere in all his utterances is there to be found a stronger announcement of his determination to persevere unfalteringly in the public and patriotic task before him:

My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows: The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact, there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the Western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and east Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should, in every event, be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.[2]

This letter was of course not needed for the personal information of Mr. Seward, but was placed in his hands to enable him to reassure those who might doubt the President's courage and determination. The other letter, written in advance and dated the 30th, was addressed to the governors of the loyal States. It ran as follows:

The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the National forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force except at Richmond. With so large an army there the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have reëstablished the National authority, all these places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of Washington. But this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy and success. Rather than herald the misapprehension of our military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated, we require, without delay, one hundred and fifty thousand men, including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reënforced, our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the Government and the people.[2]

Armed with these letters, Mr. Seward proceeded hastily to New York City. The brief correspondence which ensued indicates the progressive steps and success of his mission. On this same 30th of June he telegraphed from New York to Secretary Stanton:

Am getting a foundation for an increase of one hundred and fifty thousand. Shall have an important step to communicate to-night or to-morrow morning. Governors Morgan and Curtin here, and communicate with others by telegraph. Let me have reliable information when convenient, as it steadies my operations. . . . Will you authorize me to promise an advance to recruits of $25 of the $100 bounty? It is thought here and in Massachusetts that without such payment recruiting will be very difficult, and with it probably entirely successful.[2]

To this the Secretary of War replied on the following day:

The existing law does not authorize an advance of the bounty. . . . Discreet persons here suggest that the call should be for 300,000 men,—double the number you propose,—as the waste will

[1] McClellan to Stanton, June 26, 1862, 12 M. War Records.

[2] Unpublished MS.

be large. Consider the matter. The President has not come into town yet; when he arrives you will receive his answer.

Later in the day he added to the above:

The President approves your plan, but suggests 200,000, if it can be done as well as the number you mention.[1]

It is probable that a further discussion, and perhaps also further information of the disaster and despondency on the Peninsula, brought more fully to the minds of President and Secretary of War the gravity of the crisis and the need of decisive action; for Mr. Stanton sent a third telegram to Mr. Seward, saying:

Your telegram received. I will take the responsibility of ordering the $25 bounty out of the nine millions [appropriation] at all hazards, and you may go on that basis. I will make and telegraph the order in an hour. The President's answer has already gone.[1]

Mr. Seward's answer to this was all that could be desired under the circumstances:

The Governors respond, and the Union Committee approve earnestly and unanimously. . . Let the President make the order, and let both papers come out [in] to-morrow morning's papers, if possible. The number of troops to be called is left to the President to fix. No one proposes less than 200,000; make it 300,000 if you wish. They say it may be 500,000 if the President desires. Get the $25 advance fixed, and let the terms be made known.[1]

Accordingly, on the morning of July 2 there appeared in the newspapers a formal correspondence, purporting to be the voluntary request of eighteen governors of loyal States to the President,

that you at once call upon the several States for such numbers of men as may be required to fill up all military organizations now in the field, and add to the army heretofore organized such additional numbers of men as may, in your judgment, be necessary to garrison and hold all of the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies. . . . All believe that the decisive moment is near at hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reënforcements that you may deem needful to sustain our Government.

To which the President's reply announced:

GENTLEMEN: Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you in the communication of the 28th day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of 300,000 men.

"It was thought safest to mark high enough,"[1] said Mr. Lincoln in a private telegram to Governor Morgan of New York; while in another private circular to all the governors he explained his desire a little more fully.

[1] Unpublished MS.

I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything; and if I get 50,000 new men in a month I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything; please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.[1]

It was doubtless the sudden collapse of McClellan's Richmond campaign which brought President Lincoln to the determination to adopt his policy of general military emancipation much sooner than he would otherwise have done. The necessity of a comprehensive rearrangement of military affairs was upon him, and it was but natural that it should involve a revision of political policy. The immediate present was provided for in the call just issued for 300,000 volunteers; but he had learned by experience that he must count new possibilities of delays and defeats, and that his determination, so recently recorded, to "maintain this contest" to ultimate triumph, compelled him to open new sources of military strength. He recognized, and had often declared, that in a republic the talisman which wrought the wonders of statesmanship and the changes of national destiny was public opinion. We now know that in the use of this talisman he was the most consummate master whose skill history has recorded. We are justified in the inference that his foresight had perceived and estimated the great and decisive element of military strength which lay as yet untouched and unappropriated in the slave population of the South. To its use, however, there existed two great obstacles — prejudice on the part of the whites, the want of a motive on the part of the blacks. His problem was to remove the one and to supply the other. For the first of these difficulties the time was specially propitious in one respect. In the momentary check and embarrassment of all the armies of the Union, generals, soldiers, and conservative politicians would tolerate reprisal upon rebels with forbearance if not with favor; and for their consent to the full military employment of the blacks he might trust to the further change of popular sentiment, the drift of which was already so manifest. The motive which would call the slaves to the active help of the Union armies lay ready made for his use — indeed, it had been in steadily increasing action from the beginning of hostilities till now, as far and as effectively as the Government would permit.

McClellan's change of base occurred about the 1st of July, 1862. Lincoln's final appeal to the border States took place shortly afterward, on July 12; and his vivid portrayal of the inevitable wreck of slavery in the stress of war doubtless gathered color and force from recent military events. Already, before the border-State delegations gave him their written replies, he knew from their words and bearing that they would in effect refuse the generous tender of compensation; and he decided in his own mind that he would at an early day give notice of his intention to emancipate the slaves of rebellious States by military proclamation. His first confidential announcement of the new departure occurred on the day following his interview with the border-State representatives, and is thus recorded in the diary of Secretary Welles:

On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time, for a summer residence, the house of a naval officer, I think Hazzard, some two or three miles west or north-westerly of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement; said he had given it much thought, and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc. This was, he said, the first occasion where he had mentioned the subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer; but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject, which was of course an absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to, and before separating, the President desired us to give the subject special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local domestic question appertaining to the States respectively who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the slave States and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed by them.

Within the next four days Congress finished its business and adjourned, the Confiscation Act being an important part of its final work. The President, as we have seen, signed the bill with its amendatory resolution, and the Government was thus brought face to face with the practical duty of enforcing its provisions through military directions and orders in further detail. It has been explained how the Confiscation Act and other laws broadened and multiplied the forfeitures of title to slaves for the crimes of treason and rebellion. We have the evidence of the President's written comments that he considered these penalties just and the imposition of them constitutional. In the administration of the laws thus enacted there therefore remained to be examined only the convenience of their practical enforcement and the general effect upon public opinion of the policy they established.

We have no record of the specific reasoning of President Lincoln upon these points. We only know that within the five days following the adjournment of Congress (July 17 to July 22, 1862) his mind reached its final conclusions. The diary of Secretary Chase contains the following record of what occurred at the Cabinet meeting at the Executive Mansion on July 21:

I went at the appointed hour, and found that the President had been profoundly concerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had determined to take some definite steps in respect to military action and slavery. He had prepared several orders,[1] the first

[1] WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 22, 1862.

First. Ordered that military commanders within the States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies, or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

Second. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

Third. That as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of

of which contemplated authority to commanders to subsist their troops in the hostile territory; the second, authority to employ negroes as laborers; the third, requiring that both in the case of property taken and of negroes employed accounts should be kept with such degree of certainty as would enable compensation to be made in proper cases. Another provided for the colonization of negroes in some tropical country. A good deal of discussion took place upon these points. The first order was universally approved. The second was approved entirely, and the third by all except myself. I doubted the expediency of attempting to keep account for the benefit of the inhabitants of rebel States. The colonization project was not much discussed. The Secretary of War presented some letters from General Hunter, in which he advised the department that the withdrawal of a large proportion of his troops to reënforce General McClellan rendered it highly important that he should be immediately authorized to enlist all loyal persons, without reference to complexion. Messrs. Stanton, Seward, and myself expressed ourselves in favor of this plan, and no one expressed himself against it. (Mr. Blair was not present.) The President was not prepared to decide the question, but expressed himself as averse to arming negroes.[1]

This Cabinet discussion came to no final conclusion, and we learn from the same diary that on the following day, Tuesday, July 22, 1862,— which was regular Cabinet day,— the subject was resumed. Further conference was had on organizing negro regiments, but Lincoln decided that the moment had not yet arrived when this policy could be safely entered upon. Writes Chase:

> The impression left upon my mind by the whole discussion was, that while the President thought that the organization, equipment, and arming of negroes like other soldiers would be productive of more evil than good, he was not unwilling that commanders should, at their discretion, arm, for purely defensive purposes, slaves coming within their lines.

But on the kindred policy of emancipation the President had reached a decision which appears to have been in advance of the views of his entire Cabinet. Probably greatly to their surprise, he read to them the following draft of a proclamation warning the rebels of the pains and penalties of the Confiscation Act, and while renewing his tender of compensation to loyal States which would adopt gradual abolishment, adding a summary military order, as Commander-in-Chief, declaring free the slaves of all States which might be in rebellion on January 1, 1863. The text of this first draft of the Emancipation Proclamation is here printed for the first time:

> this Government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts towards the execution of these orders.
>
> By order of the President,
>
> EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

[1] Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 439.

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion against the Government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures, as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection of any and all States, which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual abolishment of slavery within such State or States; that the object is to practically restore, thenceforward to be maintained, the constitutional relation between the General Government and each and all the States wherein that relation is now suspended or disturbed; and that for this object the war, as it has been, will be prosecuted. And as a fit and necessary military measure for effecting this object, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever be free.[2]

Of the Cabinet proceedings which followed the reading of this momentous document we have unfortunately only very brief memoranda. Every member of the council was, we may infer, bewildered by the magnitude and boldness of the proposal. The sudden consideration of this critical question reveals to us with vividness the difference in mental reach, readiness, and decision between the President and his constitutional advisers. Only two of the number gave the measure their unreserved concurrence, even after discussion. It is strange that one of these was the cautious Attorney-General, the representative of the conservative faction of the slaveholding State of Missouri, and that the member who opposed the measure as a whole, and proposed to achieve the result indirectly through the scattered and divided action of local commanders in military departments, was the antislavery Secretary

[2] The indorsement on the above paper, also in Lincoln's own handwriting, is as follows: "Emancipation proclamation as first sketched and shown to the Cabinet in July, 1862." The diary of Secretary Chase shows the exact date to have been July 22, 1862.

of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, representing perhaps more nearly than any other the abolition faction of the free State of Ohio. All were astonished, except the two to whom it had been mentioned a week before. None of the others had even considered such a step. But from the mind and will of President Lincoln the determination and announcement to his Cabinet came almost as complete in form and certain in intention on that memorable Tuesday of July as when, two months later, it was given to the public, or as officially proclaimed on the succeeding New Year's Day, an irrevocable executive act.

A fragmentary memorandum in the handwriting of Secretary Stanton shows us distinctly the effect produced upon the assembled council. The manuscript is here reproduced as nearly as the types conveniently permit. The very form of the record shows the Secretary's strong emotion and interest in the discussion:

Tuesday, July 22.

The President proposes to issue an order declaring that, all Slaves in states in rebellion on the —— day of —— —— ——

The Attorney-General and Stanton are for its immediate promulgation.

Seward against it; argues strongly in favor of cotton and foreign governments.

Chase silent.

Welles ——

Seward argues —— That foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery for sake of cotton. Argues in a long speech against its immediate promulgation. Wants to wait for troops. Wants Halleck here. Wants drum and fife and public spirit. We break up our relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty years.

Chase —— Thinks it a measure of great danger, and would lead to universal emancipation —— The measure goes beyond anything I have recommended.

The omissions in this bit of historical manuscript are exceedingly provoking, but some of them are supplied by President Lincoln's own narrative, recorded and published by the artist Carpenter, whose application for permission to paint his historical picture of the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation called it forth:

"It had got to be," said he [Mr. Lincoln], "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game. I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy; and without consultation with, or the knowledge of, the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. . . . All were present excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them, suggestions as to which would be in order after they had heard it read. Mr. Lovejoy was in error when he informed you that it excited no comment excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered."[1]

At this point we interrupt the President's relation a moment to quote in its proper sequence the exact comment offered by Secretary Chase,[2] as recorded in his diary:

I [Chase] said that I should give to such a measure my cordial support, but I should prefer that no new expression on the subject of compensation should be made; and I thought that the measure of emancipation could be much better and more quietly accomplished by allowing generals to organize and arm the slaves (thus avoiding depredation and massacre on one hand, and support to the insurrection on the other), and by directing the commanders of departments to proclaim emancipation within their districts as soon as practicable. But I regarded this as so much better than inaction on the subject, that I should give it my entire support.[3]

The President's narrative continues:

"Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not fully anticipated and settled in my own mind until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance, 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the Government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the Government.' His idea," said the President, "was that it would be considered our last *shriek,* on the retreat. [This was his precise expression.] 'Now,' continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war.'" Mr. Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The

[1] Carpenter, "Six Months at the White House," pp. 20–23.

[2] On this point the President is reported as saying: "Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks." (Carpenter, "Six Months at the White House," p. 21.) If these were his words, his memory was slightly at fault. There was nothing in the proposed proclamation of emancipation about arming the blacks. That branch of the discussion, while it occurred at the same time, had exclusive reference to the military order quoted on page 291, also then under consideration.

[3] Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 440.

result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for victory."

Instead of the proclamation thus laid away, a short one was issued three days after, simply containing the warning required by the sixth section of the Confiscation Act. The already quoted military order to make seizures under the act had been issued on the day when the proclamation was discussed and postponed; meanwhile the Government, by its new military arrangements, sending reënforcements to McClellan, organizing a new army under Pope, and calling Halleck from the West to exercise a superior and guiding control over a combined campaign towards Richmond, seemed to have provided the needful requirements for early and substantial success.

Dec 1888

"MINC"—A PLOT.

By the author of "Two Runaways," "Sister Todhunter's Heart," "De Valley an' de Shadder," etc.

THE trim little steamboat that plies Lake Harris, the loveliest of all Florida waters, emerged from the picturesque avenue of cypress and trailing moss called Dead River, which leads out of Eustis, and glided as a shadow betwixt sea and sky towards its harbor, fourteen miles away. It had been the perfection of a May day, and the excursionists, wearied at last of sight-seeing, were gathered upon the forward deck. The water-slopes of the highlands on the right, with their dark lines of orange-trees and their nestling cottages, lay restful in the evening shadow fast stretching out towards the boat, for the sun was dipping below the horizon with the stately pines in silhouette upon his broad red face. "Home, Sweet Home," "Old Kentucky Home," and "Old Folks at Home" had been rendered by the singers of the party with that queer mixture of pathos and bathos so inseparably connected with excursion songs, and a species of nothing-else-to-be-done silence settled over the group, broken only by the soft throb of the engine and the swish of dividing waters. Suddenly some one began a dissertation upon negro songs, and by easy stages the conversation drifted to negro stories. Among the excursionists sat a gray-haired, tall, soldierly looking gentleman whom every one called "Colonel," and whose kindly eyes beamed out from under his soft felt hat in paternal friendliness upon all.

"It is somewhat singular," he said at length, when there had come a lull in the conversation, "that none of the story-writers have ever dealt with the negro as a resident of two continents. Why could not a good story be written, the scene laid partly in Africa and partly in the South? I am not familiar enough with the literature of this kind and the romances that have been written about our darkies to say positively that it has not been already done, but it seems to me that the opportunity to develop a character from the savage to the civilized state is very fine and would take well. Victor Hugo has a negro in one of his West India romances whose name I forget now — the story used to be familiar — "

"Bug-Jargal," suggested some one.

"So it was. But in this reference is made only to the man's ancestry; and I never thought the character true to life. Hugo did not know the negro."

"But, Colonel, is it not true that these people were the veriest savages, and would it not be too great a strain upon the realistic ideas of the day to venture into Africa for a hero, especially since Rider Haggard has idealized it?"

"I don't think so. We have no way of ascertaining just how much the imported slaves really knew, but it is a fact that a few were remarkable for some kind of skill and intelligence. They were not communicative, and soon drifted into the dialect of their new neighbors, forgetting their own. I had a negro on my plantation who undoubtedly came from Africa. I was present when my father bought him upon the streets of Savannah, becoming interested in his story soon after he was landed. His mother

^ Jan 1889

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF EMANCIPATION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

IN order to understand the unfortunate consequence of the long delay of McClellan in moving his army from the James to the Potomac, a few words of retrospect are here necessary. On June 26, 1862, General John Pope was appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. Frémont, having refused to serve under his junior, was relieved of his command, and his place taken by General Franz Sigel. McDowell and Banks, who might with much more reason have objected to the arrangement, accepted it with soldierly and patriotic promptness. General Pope, though still a young man, was a veteran soldier. He was a graduate of the class of 1842 at West Point, had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and had had a great success in the capture of Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River in the spring of 1862. He had made a very favorable impression, not only upon the President but upon most members of the Cabinet. He remained in Washington for several weeks after having been assigned to his new command, awaiting the arrival of General Halleck, the new General-in-Chief, and only left there to put himself at the head of his troops on the 29th of July.

In the latter part of June the President, being deeply anxious in regard to the military situation, and desiring to obtain the best advice in his power, had made as privately as possible a visit to General Scott in his retirement to ask his counsel. The only record of this visit is a memorandum from Scott approving the President's own plan of sending McDowell's command to reënforce McClellan before Richmond, a plan the execution of which was prevented by Lee's attack. It is probable that at this same interview the appointment of Halleck as General-in-Chief was again suggested by General Scott. Secretary Chase says in his diary that so far as he knew no member of the Cabinet was consulted in regard to it.[2] The appointment when made was received with general approval. Halleck was not McClellan, which was sufficient for the more vehement opponents of that general; and he was not a Republican, which pleased the other party. In fact he shocked the Secretary of the Treasury by saying at the first Cabinet meeting he attended, "I confess I do not think much of the negro." If Halleck never fulfilled the high expectations at first entertained of him, he at least discharged the duties of his great office with intelligence and fidelity. His integrity and his ability were alike undoubted. His deficiencies were rather those of temperament. In great crises he lacked determination and self-confidence, and was always more ready to avoid than to assume embarrassing responsibility.

General Halleck had arrived from the West, had taken command of all the armies of the Republic on July 23, and started at once on a visit to the Army of the Potomac. After his return from the James the question of McClellan's removal from command of the Army of the Potomac was much discussed in Administration circles. The President himself was averse to it. Secretary Chase was the most prominent member of the Government in its favor. He urged it strongly upon General Halleck, thinking it necessary to the revival of the credit of the country. Halleck agreed with him in condemning McClellan's military operations, but thought that "under his orders" McClellan "would do very well." Pope, in conversation with the Secretary of the Treasury, said he had warned the President that he could not safely command the Army of Virginia if its success was to depend on the cooperation of McClellan, for he felt assured that his coöperation would fail at some time when it would be most important. But the resolution was taken, upon Halleck's report, to withdraw McClellan with his army. On the 30th, as we have seen, McClellan was ordered to send away his sick. On the 3d of August he was directed to move his army to Aquia Creek. Reiterated orders, entreaties, arguments, and reproaches were all powerless to hasten his

2 Secretary Welles says Scott, Stanton, and Pope favored Halleck's appointment.— *Lincoln and Seward.*

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movements or to bring him to the Potomac in less than three weeks. His first troops, Reynolds's division, joined the Army of Virginia on the 23d of August.

In the mean time Pope had begun his campaign with an error of taste more serious than any error of conduct he ever committed. He had issued an address to his army containing a few expressions which had made almost all the officers of the Army of the Potomac his enemies.[1]

This address, which had no other purpose than to encourage and inspirit his men, was received, to Pope's amazement, with a storm of angry ridicule which lasted as long as he remained in command of the Army of Virginia, and very seriously weakened his hold upon the confidence of his troops and the respect of the public. As a matter of course it rendered impossible any sincere sympathy and support from General McClellan and those nearest to him. It may even be doubted whether there had been from the beginning any probability of a good understanding between them. From the moment Pope arrived from the West he was regarded with jealousy by the friends of McClellan as a certain rival and possible successor.

In the last days of June, when McClellan made his first intimation of a change of base, Pope had suggested, and the President had conveyed his suggestion to McClellan, that it would be better for the latter, if forced to leave the line of the Chickahominy, to fall back on the Pamunkey. The source from which the suggestion came was sufficient to insure its rejection if there had been no other reason. Pope had taken great pains to establish friendly relations with McClellan, writing him, as soon as he assumed command, a long and cordial letter giving him a full account of his situation and intentions, and inviting his confidence and sympathy in return. McClellan answered a few days later in a briefer letter, in which he clearly foreshadowed an intention to resist the withdrawal of his army from its present position. Handicapped by this lack of cordial sympathy for him in the Army of the Potomac, Pope left Washington on the 29th of July to begin his work, the first object of which was to make a demonstration in the direction of Gordonsville to assist in the withdrawal of McClellan's army from the James. In pursuance of this intention Generals Banks and Sigel were ordered to move to Culpeper Court House. Banks promptly obeyed his orders, arriving there shortly before midnight on the 8th of August. Sigel, from some mistake as to the road, did not get there until the evening of the next day. By that time Banks had gone forward to Cedar Mountain, and at that point, with a force of less than 8000 men of all arms, he attacked the army corps of Stonewall Jackson, consisting of Ewell's, Hill's, and Jackson's divisions, with such vigor and impetuosity that he came near defeating them. He inflicted such a blow upon Jackson as to give him an exaggerated idea of his numbers; and hearing two days afterwards that Banks had been reënforced, Jackson thought best to retire to the Rapidan.

By this time General Lee, having become convinced that McClellan was about to leave the Peninsula, concluded to concentrate a large force upon Pope's advance, to attack and if possible to destroy it. On the 13th of August General Longstreet was ordered to the Rapidan with the divisions of Longstreet and Jackson, and Stuart's cavalry corps. General Lee disposed of an army of about 55,000 men. Pope, finding himself so greatly outnumbered, wisely retreated behind the Rappahannock, where he established himself without loss on the 20th of August.

Thus far Pope had made no mistake. He had succeeded in checking the advance of Jackson, in withdrawing such a force of the enemy from Richmond as to leave McClellan's retreat unmolested, and had established his army in good condition on the north bank of the Rappahannock. Under orders from General Halleck he held the line of this river for eight days, repulsing several attempts of the enemy to cross, in hope, as the General-in-Chief said, "that during this time sufficient forces from the Army of the Potomac would reach Aquia Creek to enable us to prevent any further advance of Lee, and eventually, with the combined armies, to drive him back upon Richmond."[2] Baffled in his repeated attempts to cross the Rappahannock in front of Pope's position, General Lee resolved upon a flank movement to the left and intrusted it to Stone-

[1] . . . I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when found — whose policy has been attack, and not defense. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy; and it is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and holding them; of lines of retreat, and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position that a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance; disaster and shame lurk in the rear. . . . [Pope's address "To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia," July 14, 1862.]

[2] Halleck, Report of Nov. 25, 1862. War Records.

wall Jackson. The latter executed the task with amazing audacity and swiftness, marching round the left and rear of the Union army through the villages of Amissville, Orlean, and Salem, pouring his forces through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains and striking Pope's line of communication and a valuable depot of supplies at Manassas Junction. Jackson retired from this place and took up his position in the morning of the 28th of August just north of the Warrenton Turnpike, near the old battlefield of Bull Run. Longstreet's corps was so far behind Jackson that a rapid change of front and concentration of all the troops at Pope's and Halleck's disposal ought to have destroyed Jackson, isolated as he was from the rest of Lee's army. But his position was not ascertained as soon as it should have been. Owing to causes which have led to infinite controversy, the Union forces were not brought together with the energy and celerity required, and therefore it came about that in the morning of August 29 Pope's main army confronted Jackson on the Warrenton Pike at Groveton; Porter was some three miles on the left near the Manassas Gap Railroad, and Longstreet was on the march from Thoroughfare Gap to effect his junction with Jackson's right. There was still an opportunity to win a great victory.

General Fitz John Porter, when at Warrenton Junction on the evening of the 27th of August, had received an order from General Pope to march at 1 A. M. to Bristoe Station; but, in the exercise of his own discretion, he did not march until dawn. This delay, however, had as yet no specially disastrous results, and would probably never have been brought into such prominence as it afterwards assumed had it not been for the light which it was supposed to cast upon subsequent events. Porter was, however, in his place on the morning of the 29th, with his splendid corps in fighting trim some distance from General Pope's left and a little in rear of his line of battle. He had been ordered to Centreville the night before, but his orders had been changed, early in the morning, to proceed to Gainesville instead. No time had been lost by this change, as his new order found him, on his march, at Manassas Junction, whence he pushed out his column on the Gainesville road to a little stream called Dawkins Branch, where he halted.

About 9 o'clock General Pope issued to McDowell and Porter a joint order[1] directing them to move their commands towards Gainesville, and to establish communication between themselves and the main body on the Warrenton Turnpike. General McDowell relates in his testimony before the general court-martial of Fitz John Porter that he met General Porter near the little stream just mentioned, about five miles from Manassas Junction and three miles from Gainesville. They had some conversation in regard to the joint order, and McDowell communicated to Porter a dispatch he had just received from General Buford, to the effect that a considerable body of Confederate troops was approaching from the direction of Gainesville. Concluding from this and other circumstances that there was immediate need of the presence of one of them on the left flank of the main body of the Union army then engaged with the enemy at Groveton, McDowell resolved to take his troops in that direction. On leaving General Porter he said to him, "You put your force in here and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point." McDowell reached Pope about 5 P. M. and reported to him with King's division, commanded by Hatch, as King was suffering from a severe illness.

The battle which had raged all day between Pope's and Jackson's armies was ebbing to its close, neither side having gained any decided advantage. McDowell's men were put in at the left of the line for the last sharp hour of fighting; they lost heavily, but fought with the greatest gallantry. They finally retired in good order, leaving one gun in the hands of the enemy, which had "continued to fire," says the Confederate Colonel Law, "until my men were so near it as to have their faces burnt by its discharges." At 4:30 Pope, who had waited all day for Porter's flanking attack upon Jackson's right and rear, sent Porter a peremptory order directing him to push forward into action, keeping his right in communication with Pope's left.

There is much discussion whether this order was delivered at 5 or 6 o'clock. Captain Douglas Pope, who bore it, says it was delivered at the earlier hour; General Porter claims that it was an hour later; but, at all events, Porter, who had found indications of a strong force in his front, waited in position till it grew dark and then retired in the direction of Manassas Junction. That night General Pope in deep exasperation sent an order to Porter, couched in harsh and peremptory terms, directing him to report in person with his command on the field for orders. Early next morning, August 30, Porter reported with all of his command but one brigade; and on this day one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war, the second battle of Bull Run, was fought. It was a battle which General Pope was under no necessity of fighting. He might easily have retired behind Bull Run and waited until Franklin's corps, which had been moving from Alexandria with inexplicable slowness, had joined him and replenished his supplies. But the reports of a retreat by the enemy, the

[1] War Records.

admirable fighting qualities of his troops displayed on the 29th before his eyes, and the fact that on the 30th he had Porter's magnificent corps under his immediate orders, and more than all perhaps the temperament of the man, who was always ready to fight when there was a fair chance for him, determined him to stay where he was and to risk a new battle on that historic field. He made a mistake in supposing that the principal force against him was north of the Warrenton Turnpike. He placed, therefore, the bulk of his own army on that side and attacked with great energy early in the afternoon. Porter's corps fought with its old-time bravery; but his troops having come within the range of the enfilading fire of Longstreet's guns, the attack failed on the left. Later, Longstreet advanced on the Confederate right. A furious struggle took place for the position of Bald Hill, west of the Sudley Springs road; and later Sykes's regulars, successfully defending into the night the Henry House Hill from the assault of the Confederates, covered the retreat of the Union army across the Stone bridge to Centreville. On both sides it was one of the hardest fought battles of the war.

The day after the battle General Lee made no attempt to pursue or molest Pope's army; but on the evening of the 1st of September he essayed his usual flanking experiment with Jackson's corps upon the Union right wing at Chantilly. Pope had foreseen this, and prepared for it, and a very severe action took place, beginning at sunset and terminating in the darkness, in the midst of a furious thunder-storm. Jackson had gone too fast and too far. He was readily repulsed, but the Union army met with a heavy loss in the death of Generals Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stevens. There were few men in the service more able, industrious, modest, and faithful than Stevens; and Kearny was an ideal soldier — brave, cool, patient, and loyal.

On the morning of the 1st, Pope, who seemed far more dispirited and discouraged by the evident hostility towards him existing among the officers of the Army of the Potomac than by any of his losses in battle, had telegraphed to General Halleck his opinion that the army should be withdrawn to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and in that secure place reorganized and rearranged. "When there is no heart in their leaders," he says, "and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men."[1] These orders were given the next day, and the army was brought back without molestation.

General Pope attributed the failure of this campaign to General Porter's inaction and his disobedience of orders upon the 27th and 29th, and in this opinion many officers of the highest rank and integrity agreed. The general court-martial by which the charges were considered found General Porter guilty and sentenced him to be cashiered. He, assured of his own integrity, persistently protested against the injustice of this sentence and sought in every possible way to have it reversed.[2] It became in a certain sense a political question; and when, a quarter of a century later, the Democratic party had gained control of the House of Representatives and the Presidency, General Porter was restored to his former position in the army. With all the testimony adduced, it is probable that Porter would not have been convicted had it not been for his own letters written during the progress of the campaign. These show a spirit of contempt and scorn for his superior officer which go far to explain his behavior on this occasion.[3] It was these letters which furnished the theory of the prosecution of Porter: that he sincerely felt the good of the army and of the country required that Pope should be deposed from the command for which he honestly believed him unfit, and that McClellan should have his old army back again. His magnificent courage and conduct on other fields have a tendency to blind the eyes of just criticism in this matter; but there seems no resemblance between this languid soldier of the 29th of August and that son of thunder who at Beaver Dam and Gaines's Mill withstood the

1 War Records.

2 A board of three general officers appointed by President Hayes to reëxamine the case acquitted General Porter of all blame except for indiscreet and unkind criticism of his superior officer. A bill was passed by Congress restoring him to the army, but it was vetoed by President Arthur, who, however, removed Porter's continuing disabilities by an Executive order. After the accession of President Cleveland the bill was once more passed and this time approved by the President, and General Porter was restored to his place in the army and honorably retired.

3 In a letter of August 27th to Burnside from Warrenton Junction he says: "I find a vast difference between these troops and ours. . . . I hear that they are much demoralized, and need some good troops to give heart and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run, and I presume will be there in a few days if strategy does not use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in an inverse proportion. . . . I would like to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg. . . . I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. . . . If you can get me away, please do so." Later he indulges in a pardonable pleasantry at the expense of his commander's magniloquent address to his troops: "Our line of communication is taking care of itself, in compliance with orders." On the morning of the 29th he wrote: "I hope Mac is at work and we shall soon be ordered out of this. It would seem, from proper statements of the enemy, that he was wandering round loose; but I expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows."

onset of Lee and his army from noon to night of a long summer's day, with the same men and guns who were idling in the shade that afternoon by Dawkins Branch. What he gallantly and gladly did for the glory and honor of a commander he loved and admired he was incapable of doing when the glory and honor was to inure to the benefit of a commander whom he hated and despised.

General Pope regarded the inefficiency of McClellan in forwarding reënforcements to him from Alexandria as another important factor in his failure. He says in his report that Reynolds's division, which joined him on the 23d of August at Rappahannock station, and the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 between them, which arrived on the 26th and 27th at Warrenton Junction, were "all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command." Franklin and Sumner with 20,000 effectives reported to him at Centreville too late to redeem the campaign. It is a fact not without significance that the last troops which joined him before the hard fighting began did so before McClellan took charge at Alexandria. General Sumner, that brave old warrior who considered it a personal injury to be kept from any battlefield within his reach, broke out in hot anger when he learned that McClellan had said his corps was not in a condition for fighting. "If I had been ordered to advance right on," he said afterwards,[1] "from Alexandria by the Little River Turnpike, I should have been in that Second Bull Run battle with my whole force." He was made to waste forty-eight hours in camp and in a fruitless march to the Aqueduct bridge.

In the matter of Franklin's corps the correspondence of General McClellan himself furnishes the most undeniable evidence that he did not think best to hurry matters in reenforcing Pope. Halleck on the 27th had telegraphed him the probability of a general battle. "Franklin's corps," he said, "should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions." This order was repeated later in the day in more urgent terms, that "Franklin's corps should move in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible." McClellan answered, not that Franklin had started, but that he had sent orders to him to "prepare to march." He afterwards discovered that Franklin was in Washington, and gave orders to place the corps in "readiness to move." In the afternoon he sent dispatches indicating his belief that it might be better for Franklin not to go, and questioning whether Washington was safe; and in the evening of the same day this conviction had gained such strength in his mind that he squarely recommended that the troops in hand be held for the defense of the capital. On the morning of the 28th Halleck telegraphed direct an order to Franklin to move towards Manassas, but at 1 o'clock in the afternoon General McClellan replied, "The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery, he shall go." At 4:10 o'clock he added: "General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning." Halleck, in despair at this inertia, had telegraphed at 3:30 o'clock: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reënforced." To this, after the lapse of an hour, McClellan answered:

> Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin or Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them now. . . .

At night General Halleck, with vehement earnestness, ordered —

> There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or be victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.

At last McClellan answered that he had ordered Franklin to march at 6 in the morning of the 29th. He then enumerated the force he had in hand, amounting to about thirty thousand men, and added, with a naïveté which in view of Halleck's urgent telegrams for two days would be comical if the consequences had not been so serious, "If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me."

On the 29th of August he got Franklin started, but still protested against the order to move him, and continually through the day sent dispatches suggesting that Franklin should go no farther, until at last Halleck, even his excessive patience giving way, replied at 3 o'clock, "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. . . . I am tired of guesses." At a quarter before 3 in the afternoon of the 29th, General McClellan sent the following extraordinary dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, which to do him justice must be given entire:

> The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring

[1] Sumner's testimony. Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

towards Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer.

There can be no mistaking the transparent menace of this dispatch. Of the alternatives he suggested, he meant but one. By his protests of the last three days, as well as by his actions, he had clearly shown his disinclination to attempt to open communication with Pope. There is but one course, therefore, left which commends itself to his judgment; that is, to leave the Army of Virginia to its fate. This dispatch was sent directly to the President in answer to a request from him for news, and the President replied, one must confess, with more of magnanimity than of dignity:

I think your first alternative, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

During the two entire days, the 29th and 30th, while Pope was engaged in his desperate struggle at Bull Run with the whole of Lee's army, the singular interchange of telegrams between Halleck and McClellan continued — the one giving orders growing more and more peremptory every hour, and the other giving excuses more or less unsatisfactory for not obeying them. But late at night of the 31st of August, when the fighting was virtually over, General Halleck, upon whom the fatigue and excitement of the past week had had a most depressing effect, suddenly betrayed that weakness of character which so often surprised his friends, and sent to McClellan a dispatch breathing discouragement in every word, in which, saying that he was "utterly tired out," he begged McClellan "to assist him in this crisis with his ability and experience." To this General McClellan replied with unusual promptness a few minutes after receiving it, asking for an interview to settle his position. In a letter an hour later he gave his decided opinion that Pope had been totally defeated and that everything available should be drawn in at once: he thinks such orders should be sent immediately; he has no confidence in Pope's dispositions; "to speak frankly," he says,—"and the occasion requires it,— there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear a total destruction of the army." He falls back again into his sententious strain:

The occasion is grave and demands grave measures. The question is the salvation of the country. . . . It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope shall fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost.

The same advice was repeated by Pope the next morning, and Halleck at once gave the necessary orders. On September 1, General McClellan visited Washington and conversed with Halleck and the President. Mr. Lincoln had been greatly distressed and shocked by the account Pope had given of the demoralization of the Army of the Potomac, which in his opinion proceeded from the spirit of hostility and insubordination displayed openly by some of its most prominent officers. He requested McClellan to use his great personal influence with his immediate friends in that army to correct this evil. McClellan, while not crediting the report of Pope, nevertheless complied with the request of the President, and sent a letter to Porter urging him and all his friends, for his sake, to extend to General Pope the same support they had always given him, to which Porter replied in loyal and soldierly terms. On the next day (September 2), Mr. Lincoln placed the defenses of Washington and the command of the troops as they arrived from the front in the hands of General McClellan. There is no other official act of his life for which he has been more severely criticised, but we need not go far to find a motive for it.

The restoration of McClellan to command was Mr. Lincoln's own act. The majority of the Cabinet were strongly opposed to it. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury agreed, upon the 29th of August, in a remonstrance against McClellan's continuance in command of any army of the Union. They reduced it to writing; it was signed by themselves and the Attorney-General, and afterwards by the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the Navy concurred in the judgment of his colleagues, but declined to sign it, on the ground that it might seem unfriendly to the President. In the Cabinet meeting of the 2d of September the whole subject was freely discussed. The Secretary of War disclaimed any responsibility for the action taken, saying that the order to McClellan was given him directly by the President and that General Halleck considered himself relieved from responsibility by it, although he acquiesced and approved the order. He thought that McClellan was now in a position where he could shirk all responsibility, shielding himself under Halleck, while Halleck would shield himself under the President. Mr. Lincoln took a dif-

ferent view of the transaction, saying that he considered General Halleck as much in command of the army as ever, and that General McClellan had been charged with special functions, to command the troops for the defense of Washington, and that he placed him there because he could see no one who could do so well the work required.[1] The Secretary of the Treasury in recording this proceeding does not disguise his scorn for the lack of spirit displayed by the President, and on a later date he adds:

> It is indeed humiliating, but prompted I believe by a sincere desire to serve the country, and a fear that should he supersede McClellan by any other commander no advantage would be gained in leadership, but much harm in the disaffection of officers and troops.

Mr. Lincoln certainly had the defects of his great qualities. His unbounded magnanimity made him incapable sometimes even of just resentments. In regard to offenses committed against himself he used laughingly to say, "I am in favor of short statutes of limitations." General McClellan's worst offenses had been committed against the President in person. The insulting dispatch from Savage's Station and the letter from Harrison's Landing, in which he took the President to task for the whole course of his civil and military administration, would probably have been pardoned by no other ruler that ever lived; yet Mr. Lincoln never appeared to bear the slightest ill-will to the general on account of these affronts. He did feel deeply the conduct of McClellan towards Pope. He was outraged at McClellan's suggestion to leave Pope to his fate. He said to one of his household on the 30th of August, "He has acted badly towards Pope; he really wanted him to fail";[2] and after he had placed him again in command of the Army of the Potomac he repeated this severe judgment, but he added, "There is no one in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he can." Again he said, "We must use the tools we have; if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight." In the interests of the country he condoned the offenses against Pope as readily as those against himself.

It may perhaps even be said that McClellan, so far from suffering at the President's hands for his unbecoming conduct towards him, gained a positive advantage by it. It was not alone for his undoubted talents as an organizer and drill-master that he was restored to his command. It was a time of gloom and doubt in the political as well as in the military situation. The factious spirit was stronger among the politicians and the press of the Democratic party than at any other time during the war. Not only in the States of the border, but in many Northern States, there were signs of sullen discontent among a large body of the people that could not escape the notice of a statesman so vigilant as Lincoln. It was of the greatest importance, not only in the interest of recruiting, but also in the interest of that wider support which a popular government requires from the general body of its citizens, that causes of offense against any large portion of the community should be sedulously avoided by those in power. General McClellan had made himself, by his demonstration against the President's policy, the leader of the Democratic party. Mr. Lincoln, for these reasons, was especially anxious to take no action against McClellan which might seem to be dictated by personal jealousy or pique; and besides, as General Pope had himself reported, there was a personal devotion to McClellan among those in high command in the Army of the Potomac which rendered it almost impossible for any other general to get its best work out of it. General Hitchcock, one of the most accomplished officers of the old army, gave this as the reason for his declining the command of that army.

It is difficult to regard without indignation the treatment, however necessary and justifiable, which the principal actors in this great transaction received. McClellan, whose conduct from beginning to end can only be condemned, received command of a great army, reorganized and reënforced, and with it a chance for magnificent achievement, if he had been able to improve it, which no officer before or since ever enjoyed on this continent. Pope, who had fought with the greatest bravery and perseverance a losing battle against Lee's entire army all the way from the Rapidan to the Potomac, encouraged at every point with the hope of reënforcements which only reached him too late, and finally by his misfortunes adding a new illustration to the prestige of his rival and enemy, received simply the compliments and congratulations of his superiors and was then removed to a distant department of the frontier, to take no further part in the stirring scenes of a war in which he was so well qualified to bear an honorable part. McDowell, a perfect soldier, among the bravest, ablest, and most loyal officers of the army, who had done his whole duty and much more, who zealously went before and beyond the orders of his superiors, always seeking the post of utmost danger and toil, was found at the close of this campaign, of which he was the true hero, with his reputa-

[1] Chase's Diary. Warden, p. 456 et seq.
[2] J. H., Diary.

tion so smirched and tarnished by senseless and malignant calumny that he was never after during the war considered available for those high and important employments for which he was better equipped than almost any of his comrades. A court of inquiry, it is true, vindicated him completely from every charge that malice or ignorance had invented against him; but the two disasters of Bull Run, in successive summers, for neither of which he was to blame, remained in the general mind inseparably connected with his name.

General McClellan himself never appreciated the magnanimity with which he had been treated. In fact, he thought the magnanimity was all upon his side. As time wore on he continually exaggerated in his own mind the services he had rendered and the needs of the Government at the time he had been placed in command, until he created for himself the fantastic delusion that he had saved the Administration from despair! In the last lines he ever wrote, shortly before his death, he gives this absolutely new and most remarkable account of the visit which Lincoln and Halleck made to him on the 2d of September:

> He [the President] then said that he regarded Washington as lost, and asked me if I would, under the circumstances, as a favor to him, resume command and do the best that could be done. Without one moment's hesitation, and without making any conditions whatever, I at once said that I would accept the command and would stake my life that I would save the city. Both the President and Halleck again asserted that it was impossible to save the city, and I repeated my firm conviction that I could and would save it. They then left, the President verbally placing me in entire command of the city and of the troops falling back upon it from the front.[1]

It is possible that in the lapse of twenty years General McClellan's memory had become so distorted by constant dwelling upon imagined wrongs that he was at last capable of believing this absurd fiction. It was a fancy adopted in the last years of his life. A year after his removal from command he wrote a voluminous report of his entire military history, filling an octavo volume. He was then the acknowledged favorite of the Democratic party, the predestined candidate for the Presidency in opposition to Lincoln. He embodied in that report every incident or argument he could think of to justify his own conduct and to condemn that of the Government. Yet in this interminable document there is no hint that Lincoln or Halleck thought the capital was lost. He apparently never dreamed of such a thing while Lincoln lived; he gave no intimation of such a charge while Halleck survived, although their relations were frankly hostile. Only after both these witnesses had passed away, and a direct contradiction was thus rendered impossible, did it occur to him to report this conversation between his patriotic heroism and their craven despair!

There is another proof that this story was an after-thought. In a letter to his family, written on the 2d, the very morning of this pretended conversation, he merely says:

> I was surprised this morning, when at breakfast, by a visit from the President and Halleck, in which the former expressed the opinion that the troubles now impending could be overcome better by me than by any one else. Pope is ordered to fall back upon Washington, and as he reënters everything is to come under my command again.

When we consider that in these private letters he never omits an opportunity for heroic posturing, it is impossible to believe that if Lincoln and Halleck an hour or two before had been imploring him to save the capital, he would not have mentioned it. The truth is, McClellan himself has left evidence of the fact that he thought Washington in danger. He wrote to his wife:

> I do not regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there I will send your silver off.

If it was worth while to cumber these pages with the refutation of a calumny so transparently false, we could bring the testimony of a score of witnesses to show that Mr. Lincoln, during the first days of September, was unusually cool and determined. Grieved and disappointed as he was at the failure of Pope's campaign, his principal preoccupation was not at any time the safety of Washington. It was that Lee's army, as he frequently expressed it, "should not get away without being hurt." On Monday morning he said: "They must be whipped here and now. Pope must fight them; and if they are too strong for him, he can gradually get back to these fortifications." At the time McClellan falsely represents him as hopeless of saving Washington he had no thought of the safety of that place in his mind, except as a secondary and permanent consideration. He was making ready a force to attack the enemy. On the 3d of September he wrote with his own hand this order, which sufficiently shows the mood he was in:

> *Ordered*, that the General-in-Chief, Major-General Halleck, immediately commence and proceed with all possible dispatch to organize an army for active operations from all the material within and coming within his control, independent of the forces he may deem necessary for the defense of Washington, when such active army shall take the field.

[1] THE CENTURY, May, 1886. "McClellan's Own Story," p. 535.

This order, countersigned by the Secretary of War, was delivered to Halleck by General Townsend, and the work of preparing the army for the offensive was at once begun. McClellan, under Halleck's direction, went heartily to work to execute these orders of the President. He had none of the protecting airs he gives himself in his memoirs; his conduct was exemplary. "McClellan," said Lincoln on the 5th, "is working like a beaver. He seems to be aroused to doing something by the sort of snubbing he got last week." The work he was now engaged upon was congenial staff work, and he performed it with great zeal and efficiency. It suited him in after years to pretend that he was acting without orders and without communication with the Government. It was his favorite phrase that he went to Antietam with a "halter about his neck." But his letters written at the time contradict those assertions. He wrote from Washington, on the 7th of September:

> I leave here this afternoon to take command of the troops in the field. The feeling of the Government towards me, I am sure, is kind and trusting.

ANTIETAM.

As soon as General McClellan was replaced in command of the Army of the Potomac he began to put the forces in order; and the ease and rapidity with which this was accomplished show that both he and General Pope, with very different intentions, had equally exaggerated the state of their demoralization. The troops were not in so bad a condition at Centreville as Pope imagined, and the army that Mr. Lincoln handed over to McClellan at Washington was both in numbers and morale a formidable host. Its morning returns show an aggregate of over 100,000 men, and General McClellan himself reports that he had at Antietam 87,000. But the vast discrepancy between the force on paper and the effectives in battle gives a margin of which writers sometimes avail themselves according to their prejudices or prepossessions. General Palfrey, who took part in the campaign and who has since examined the reports on both sides with scrupulous care, says that in this single instance McClellan overstated the number of his troops in action, and that 70,000 would be nearer the mark. It is true he could afford it, as in the same estimate he very nearly doubled the number of the enemy. The Confederate rosters show some forty-five brigades of infantry, exclusive of cavalry and artillery. Lee says in his report that he commanded at Antietam about 40,000 troops.[1]

McClellan's time for training and drilling his recovered army was brief; for within a few days the news came that Lee had crossed the Potomac into Maryland. There was no time now for indecision, and Lincoln's stern and constantly repeated injunction, "You must find and hurt this enemy now," had to be obeyed.

General Lee has given in his own report a sufficiently clear statement of what he hoped to accomplish by his invasion of Maryland. The supplies of rich and productive districts were thus made accessible to his army, and he wished to "prolong this state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy." He also makes an acknowledgment which shows that he, in common with others at Richmond, had been grossly deceived by the accounts which rebel refugees from Maryland, and their sympathizing correspondents at home, had given of the oppressive tyranny of Lincoln, and the resentment it had caused in that commonwealth. He says:

> The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course towards the people of that State had given it reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington Government than from active demonstration on the part of the people, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection.

In a hasty note he informed the Richmond Government of his purpose, and took the initial steps to execute it with great promptness. He crossed his entire army between the 4th and 7th of September near Leesburg, and camped in the vicinity of Frederick. He took it for granted that our force at Harper's Ferry would be at once withdrawn; thereafter he intended to move the army into western Maryland, establish his communications with Richmond through the Shenandoah Valley, and then to move into Pennsylvania and draw McClellan from his base to fight in a field of his own selection. If all his surmises had been correct, if Miles had been withdrawn from Harper's Ferry, if Maryland had risen in revolt, if McClellan had allowed him to range through western Maryland at his leisure, the plan would have been an admirable one and the results of it most fruitful; but all these expectations failed. After two days at Frederick he found that Maryland was contented

[1] War Records.

with the oppressor's yoke, and that Miles remained at Harper's Ferry. He therefore considered it necessary to detach a large portion of his force under Jackson, McLaws, and Walker to surround and capture the garrison at that place: the rest of the army withdrew from Frederick to Boonsboro'.

Meantime McClellan was slowly approaching. He felt, of course, the need of more troops. With an army about him so enormous that, as he says in his report,[1] it would occupy fifty miles of road in marching order, he still paused on the 11th to write to General Halleck, begging for reënforcements. He first assures him that the capital is in no danger and that all the troops there may safely be sent to him; but in order to guard against any possible rejoinder he adds, "Even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each other this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disaster which would follow the defeat of this army," an opinion which has no especial value except as showing what General McClellan's judgment was worth in such a matter. Except when he was in Washington, he always regarded its possible capture as a trifling affair. But his demand was complied with: Porter's corps was ordered to join him, with a kind message from the President, which he acknowledged courteously, and then — asked for Keyes's corps! He was in no haste; he ordered his officers beforehand to avoid collisions. He attempts in his report to account for his tardy marching on the ground that the authorities at Washington wished him not to go too far from the capital. General Halleck says that no order capable of bearing this construction was ever given. He says:

> I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac. . . . I thought he should keep more upon the Potomac and press forward his left rather than his right, so as more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most danger.[2]

But two days after the above-mentioned letter asking for reënforcements, McClellan received information which was enough to put a soul of enterprise into the veriest laggard that ever breathed. There never was a general so fruitlessly favored by fortune as McClellan, and never was such a piece of good luck offered, even to him, as that which fell into his hands on the 13th of September. He had been advancing in his leisurely manner from Washington on parallel roads, making only about six miles a day, when on the 13th he arrived at Frederick and one of his officers brought to him Lee's special order of the 9th, that a private soldier had found, containing his entire plan of campaign. By this he learned that his enemy was before him, a day's march away; that his whole force was inferior to his own; and that it was divided into two portions, one in camp near Boonsboro' and the other besieging Miles at Harper's Ferry. It is not too much to say that his enemy had been delivered into his hands. After he had read this order the contest between him and Lee, other things being equal, would have been like a fight between a man blindfolded and one having use of his eyes. He not only knew of the division of his enemy's army in half, but he knew where his trains, his rear-guard, his cavalry, were to march and to halt, and where the detached commands were to join the main body.[3]

He seemed to appreciate the importance of his discovery,[4] but it was not in his nature to act promptly enough. Franklin was at Buckeystown, about twelve miles east of South Mountain, a prolongation northward of the Blue Ridge, beyond which Lee's army lay. Instead of giving him immediate orders to march with all possible speed to Harper's Ferry, he wrote at his leisure a long and judicious instruction directing him to march to that point the next day. The weather was perfect; the roads were in good order. McClellan knew there was no enemy between him and Crampton's Gap. Every possible consideration urged him to make use of every instant of time.[5] The precious opportunity was neglected, and it was noon the next day, the 14th of September, when Franklin stormed the crest of the mountain after a brilliant and easy victory over General Cobb's detachment of McLaws's division, which had been left to guard the pass. The Union right wing spent the whole of the same day in a stubborn fight for the position of Fox's and Turner's Gaps, some six miles farther north.

1 McClellan, "Army of the Potomac," p. 188.

2 Halleck's testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

3 Palfrey, "The Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 20 et seq.

4 He telegraphed to the President: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost. . . . I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. . . . I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency." [War Records.]

5 If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson in his advance on Harper's Ferry, the passes of South Mountain would have been carried before the evening of the 13th, at which time they were very feebly guarded; and then, debouching into Pleasant Valley, the Union commander might next morning have fallen upon the rear of McLaws at Maryland Heights and relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender till the morning of the 15th. But he did not arrive at South Mountain until the morning of the 14th, and by that time the Confederates, forewarned of his approach, had recalled a considerable force to dispute the passage. [Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 202.]

After sharp fighting, in which General Reno, an officer of the highest merit, was killed, and Colonel Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, was wounded, advanced positions were secured. At neither Crampton's nor Turner's was the victory pushed to advantage. Franklin did nothing to relieve the beleaguered garrison at Harper's Ferry, and the force at Turner's Gap rested on the ground that they had won until, when the mists of the morning cleared away on the 15th, they saw the enemy had retreated from their front. Much valuable time had been lost, and more than time; for early on the morning of the 15th the blundering and bewildered defense of Harper's Ferry had ceased by the surrender of the garrison, its unhappy commander having been killed after he had displayed the white flag.

But McClellan had not yet lost all his advantage; and the sacrifice of Harper's Ferry would have been amply compensated if he had moved at once with all possible speed upon Lee, who, with only Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's troops, had taken up his position at Sharpsburg. Jackson was still south of the Potomac. He had no fear of night marches, and was making all possible speed to join Lee through the day and night of the 15th. The force of McLaws got away from in front of Franklin, and, though making a long détour and crossing the Potomac twice, still joined the main army at Sharpsburg on the 17th. All this time, while the scattered detachments of Lee were moving with the utmost expedition to join their main body, making two or three times the distance which separated Lee from McClellan, the latter made his preparations for an attack, as if, to quote Johnston again, "time was of no especial value to him." On the 15th he marched down to Antietam Creek and placed his soldiers in position. He rode from end to end of his line, enjoying one of the grandest greetings ever given by an army to its commander. The thunder of cheers which met him at every point showed that there was no lack of morale in that mighty army, and that they were equal to any service their beloved commander might choose to require of them.

It seems almost incredible, as we write it, and it will appear inexplicable to such readers as may come after us, that McClellan made no movement during the afternoon[1] of Monday, the 15th, and did nothing during the entire day of the 16th but to advance a portion of his right wing across Antietam Creek, and this while the ragged legions of Lee were streaming in from across the Potomac to take up their positions for the impending conflict. Every minute which he thus let slip was paid for in the blood of Union soldiers next day. Never had McClellan's habit of procrastination served him so ill a turn as during the whole day of the 16th. Lee's error of dividing his army would have been fatal to him if even on the morning of the 16th McClellan had advanced upon him in force. The loss of the afternoon of the 15th in that case would scarcely have been felt. The reduction of Harper's Ferry had taken a day longer than Lee expected, and when night fell the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, A. P. Hill, and Walker were still beyond the Potomac.[2] He would have been compelled to withstand the attack of McClellan's whole army with nothing but the divisions of D. R. Jones and D. H. Hill on the right and center, and of Hood, Ewell, and J. R. Jones on the left. But before noon of the 17th most of Lee's forces were on the ground, and the rest arrived during the battle. McClellan had rejected the proffered favors of fortune. His delay had given back to Lee all the advantages afforded McClellan by the separation of Lee's army and the discovery of his plan of campaign. Lee had had unbroken leisure for forty-eight hours to study his ground and the dispositions of his antagonist, which had been made in plain view under his eyes. Lee's advantage of position was fully equal to McClellan's advantage of numbers; and it was therefore on even terms between the two armies that the battle of Antietam began.

The ground was highly favorable to Lee. In front of him was Antietam Creek, the high wooded ground affording an advantageous position and cover for his batteries. There was little field for maneuvering, and little was attempted. From daylight till dark of the 17th the battle went on. There was nothing of it but sheer, persistent, brutal slaughter. McClellan's plan was to throw forward his right wing, the corps of Hooker leading, supported by that of Mansfield, and by those of Sumner and Franklin if necessary; when the battle became well engaged on the right, the left wing, under Burnside, was to cross the lower bridge to try to turn the enemy's right. On this simple plan the battle was contested. Hooker advanced early in the morning and fought until his corps, giving and receiving about equal injuries, was shattered to pieces, and himself borne from the field, severely wounded. General Meade succeeding him in command, Mansfield came to his assistance. His corps also did heroic service, and its veteran commander was killed in the front of his foremost line. His corps was led during the rest of the day by General A. S. Williams. As our left remained entirely inactive, Lee was able to use most of his force

[1] McClellan in his memoirs, p. 586, blames Burnside for the slowness of the march on the 15th.

[2] Lee to Davis, September 18, 1862. War Records.

on our right, and his resistance was so obstinate that Sumner's corps was drawn into the conflict, where it met with heavy losses; Richardson, one of the best division commanders in the army, received a mortal hurt, and Sedgwick was twice wounded. Before the battle ended on the right even Franklin's corps, which it had been intended to hold in reserve, was drawn into the whirlpool of blood and fire. Corps by corps, division by division, one might almost say brigade by brigade, those brave and devoted troops were hurled in succession, without intelligent plan, without any special concert of action, against Lee's left. The carnage was frightful, the result in no proportion to the terrible expense. It was afternoon before the left wing, under Burnside, began its part of the work. The lower bridge was crossed about 1 o'clock and the west bank gained, but no farther advance was made by Burnside until after 3. He then moved forward his forces, under General Cox's command, upon the enemy's right, making good progress, until, late in the afternoon, as if good fortune, weary of having her favors rejected by General McClellan, had turned to the other side, the Light Division of A. P. Hill, which had marched seventeen miles in seven hours, arrived on the field from Harper's Ferry and made a vigorous attack upon our extreme left, killed General Rodman, and threw his division into some disorder. This unlooked-for demonstration checked the advance of the Federal column, and it fell back a little distance to the hills on the west of the Antietam. Night came on, and the long, desperate battle was at an end. The tactical advantage was with General McClellan. On his left, his center, and his right he had gained a little ground. Both armies had suffered losses which it shocks the sense to contemplate. They were almost equal — over 12,000 killed and wounded on the Union side, over 11,000 on the Confederate;[1] but Lee's loss was more than one-fourth of his army, while McClellan's was only one-sixth of his. In his report General McClellan says:

> The night brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me.

There could be little doubt of his decision of the question. He was keenly alive to the sufferings of his army. He loved them, and was loved by them in return. The piled heaps of the slain, the thousands of wounded and dying, the wreck and havoc of the conquered field, all impressed his imagination so powerfully that he was unable to conceive the worse condition of the enemy. There rose before his mind also an appalling picture of the consequences that would ensue if he risked another battle and lost it. He saw Lee's army marching in triumph on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, the country ravaged, the cause lost.[2] Every impulse of his heart and conscience forbade him to assume so enormous a responsibility. He would not absolutely decide which course to adopt, but, after his habit, concluded to wait until the 19th before making a final decision.[3]

The occasion, however, would not wait for him. General Lee knew, if McClellan did not, that his army was in no condition to risk another battle. The straggling of McClellan's force was one of the reasons that induced him to delay. No doubt there was a great deal of it in his command. One day President Lincoln, exasperated at the discrepancy between the aggregate of troops he had sent to McClellan and the number McClellan reported as having been received, exclaimed in a simile of concise grotesqueness, "Sending men to that army is like shoveling fleas across a barnyard; not half of them get there." But the case on the other side was worse still. Lee reported to Jefferson Davis on the 21st of September that the efficiency of his army was "paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers."[4] "On the morning after the battle," he says, "General Evans reported to me on the field, where he was holding the front position, that he had but 120 of his brigade present, and that the next brigade to his, that of General Garnett, consisted of but 100 men. General Pendleton reported that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Armistead, left to guard the ford at Shepherdstown, together contained but 600 men. This," he adds feelingly, "is a woful condition of affairs." But of course General McClellan had no personal knowledge of this; and, as we have seen in the course of this narrative, he was utterly destitute of those intuitions of the situation and the intention of his enemy which we find in all great commanders. The fight of the day before had been so terri-

[1] On the Union side 12,410 at Antietam and 15,203 in the campaign, not including the losses at Harper's Ferry, which were 12,737. The closest estimate that can be made shows a loss of about 11,172 to the Confederates at Antietam, and of 13,964 during the campaign.

[2] McClellan, "Army of the Potomac," p. 211.

[3] It is hard to say whether these words, from a letter written by General McClellan on the 18th, are more comic or pathetic: "Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly and that it was a masterpiece of art. . . . God has been good in sparing the lives of all my staff. Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, Dana, Richardson, and Hartsuff, and several other general officers, wounded. Mansfield is dead, I fear." On the 20th he wrote: "I feel that I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 612.]

[4] War Records.

ble in the struggle and carnage, he had made his personal influence so little felt on the field,[1] he had gained so little advantage in comparison with his frightful losses, that it would be unjust to expect to find in him on the morning of the 18th that alacrity and elation of victory which would have impelled him in pursuit of his shattered enemy. Beaten as Lee was, his promising campaign brought to a disastrous failure by his own error, he was still less affected by it than was McClellan by his victory. He even thought for the moment, before twilight had settled on the battle on the 17th, of executing with his usual instrument his usual movement, of sending Stonewall Jackson by the left to attack the right flank of McClellan's army.[2] He opposed a bold front to his ill fortune, and closes his description of the battle by saying that he deemed it injudicious to push his advantage further.

McClellan was almost alone in his decision not to continue the battle on the 18th. General Burnside, who commanded on the left, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War[3] that he thought the attack should be renewed at early dawn, and gave this opinion to McClellan the night of the battle. General McClellan said he would think the matter over and make up his mind before morning, and a staff-officer of Burnside's was kept in waiting through the night at McClellan's headquarters to learn his decision.

General Franklin, in command of the center, also testified that he showed McClellan a position on our right of great importance, and advised an attack on that place in the morning. He says there was no doubt that we could carry it, as we had plenty of artillery bearing on it. He thought that by this means the whole left flank of the enemy would have been uncovered. When asked what reasons were given for rejecting this plan,[4] he repeated McClellan's customary fatal excuse for delay, that he would prefer to wait for reënforcements. Hooker, who had commanded the right wing, was also of the opinion that the attack should be resumed, although his wounds would have prevented his taking part in it.

But it was too much to expect of General McClellan that he should follow such advice. He had had, it is true, a moment of elation on the morning of the 15th after the engagement at South Mountain. To attack an enemy in position, and drive him, was to McClellan so new a sensation that he was evidently greatly exhilarated by his success at Turner's Gap. He reported Lee as admitting "that he had been shockingly whipped" and "making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic."[5] But after the terrible conflict at Antietam the cold fit came on, and his only dispatches to Washington were of his heavy losses and of holding what he had gained. He evidently thought more of being attacked on that day than of attacking. "The battle," he says, "will probably be renewed today. Send all the troops you can, by the most expeditious route."[6] It was therefore with feelings of the greatest relief that he saw Lee's rear-guard disappear across the Potomac, and in the forenoon of the 19th he joyfully telegraphed to Washington, "Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe."[7]

The President received this news, as was natural, with mingled gratitude and disappointment. He was glad and thankful for the measure of success which had been achieved, but the high hope he had entertained of destroying Lee's army before it recrossed the Potomac was baffled. His constant entreaty to McClellan, from the time he put him in command of the army up to the day of the battle, was, "Please do not let him get off without being hurt."[8] It was with this hope and purpose that he had given McClellan everything he asked for, infusing his own indomitable spirit into all the details of work at the War Department and the headquarters of the army. It was by his order that McClellan had been pushed forward, that Porter had been detached from the defense of Washington, that the militia of Pennsylvania had been hurried down to the border. He did not share General McClellan's illusion as to the monstrous number of the enemy opposed to him; and when he looked at the vast aggregate of the Army of the Potomac by the morning report on the 20th of September, "93,149 present for duty," he could not but feel that the result was not commensurate with the efforts made and the resources employed.

1 He did very little in the way of compelling the execution of the orders which he did give. He passed the whole day till towards the middle of the afternoon, when all the fighting was over, on the high ground near Fry's house, where he had some glasses strapped to the fence. . . . He made absolutely no use of the magnificent enthusiasm which the army then felt for him. [Palfrey, "The Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 119.]

2 While the attack on our center was progressing, General Jackson had been directed to endeavor to turn the enemy's right, but found it extending nearly to the Potomac, and so strongly defended with artillery that the attempt had to be abandoned. [Report of General Lee. War Records.]

3 General McClellan in his memoirs contradicts this testimony.

4 Franklin, testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War.

5 War Records.

6 McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 18, 1862. War Records.

7 McClellan to Halleck. War Records.

8 Lincoln to McClellan, Sept. 12, 1862. War Records.

EMANCIPATION ANNOUNCED.

When, on the 22d of July, after full Cabinet discussion, President Lincoln decided to postpone the proclamation of emancipation which he had first prepared, in order to wait for a victory, all indications afforded a reasonable hope that the delay would not be a long one. The union of the armies of McClellan and Pope had been ordered, and once combined they would outnumber any force they were likely to meet. Halleck had been called to Washington to exercise chief command and secure unity of orders and movements. The new call for volunteers was expected to bring quick reënforcements.

We have seen through what deplorable shortcomings of McClellan and some of his officers this reasonable hope was frustrated, and how, instead of an expected victory, an unnecessary and most disheartening defeat augmented President Lincoln's difficulties and responsibilities; how the combined armies were forced back upon Washington in such disaster and discouragement that the President felt compelled to intrust their reorganization to the very man whose weakness and jealousy had been the main cause of the result.

The damaging effect of these reverses extended beyond mere military results; they gave a new and serious character to the political conditions and complications which were an inseparable part of the President's great task. They sharpened anew the underlying prejudice and distrust between the two factions of his supporters — radicals and conservatives, as they began to be called; or, more properly speaking, those who were anxious to destroy and those who were willing to preserve slavery. Each faction loudly charged the other with being the cause of failure, and clamored vehemently for a change of policy to conform to their own views. Outside of both was the important faction of those Democrats who either yielded the war only a sullen support or opposed it as openly as they safely might, and who, on the slavery issue, directed their denunciations wholly against the radicals. It may be safely said that at no time were political questions so critical and embarrassing to Mr. Lincoln as during this period. His own decision had been reached; his own course was clearly and unalterably marked out. But the circumstances surrounding him did not permit his making it known, and he was compelled to keep up an appearance of indecision which only brought upon him a greater flood of importunities. During no part of his administration were his acts and words so persistently misconstrued as in this interim by men who gave his words the color and meaning of their own eager desires and expectations. To interpret properly Mr. Lincoln's language it must be constantly borne in mind that its single object was to curb and restrain the impatience of zealots from either faction. If we group together his several letters and addresses of this period, we may see that his admonitions and rebukes were given to both with equal earnestness and impartiality. Occasions were not wanting; for all request and advice which came to him was warped to one side or the other by the culminating contest, in which he alone could give the final and deciding word. On the 26th of July, 1862, he wrote the following letter to Reverdy Johnson, then on public business at New Orleans, who had made communications touching affairs in the Department of the Gulf:

> Yours of the 16th, by the hand of Governor Shepley, is received. It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that it is a false pretense. The people of Louisiana — all intelligent people everywhere — know full well that I never had a wish to touch the foundations of their society, or any right of theirs. With perfect knowledge of this they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among them, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy — know how to be cured of General Phelps. Remove the necessity of his presence. And might it not be well for them to consider whether they have not already had time enough to do this? If they can conceive of anything worse than General Phelps within my power, would they not better be looking out for it? They very well know the way to avert all this is simply to take their place in the Union upon the old terms. If they will not do this, should they not receive harder blows rather than lighter ones? You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies. I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States Senator![1] I am a patient man — always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this Government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.[2]

Two days later to a citizen of Louisiana he sent another letter, full of phrases quite as positive and significant. He wrote:

1 Mr. Reverdy Johnson himself.
2 Unpublished MS.

Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither, in sufficient numbers or amounts, if we keep from, or drive from, our lines slaves coming to them. . . . He speaks of no duty—apparently thinks of none—resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers,—dead-heads at that,—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed, right side up. Nay, more; even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the Government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. . . . If they will not do this, if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the Government, it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the Government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can to save the Government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.[1]

In these two letters the President's reproof was addressed to conservatives to correct ill-timed complaints that the interests of slaveholders were allowed to suffer in the rude necessities of military operations and administration. But complaints equally unreasonable were assailing him from the other side. Mr. Greeley of the "New York Tribune" was criticising the President for exactly the alleged fault of not doing more of that which had brought these complaints from Louisiana. In his paper of August 20 he addressed a long open letter to Mr. Lincoln, accusing him of failure to execute the Confiscation Act "from mistaken deference to rebel slavery," and alleging that he was "unduly influenced by the counsels, the representations, the menaces of certain fossil politicians hailing from the border slave-States." "We complain," he continued, "that a large proportion of our regular army officers, with many of the volunteers, evince far more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion." These phrases are samples of two columns or more of equally unjust censure. Mr. Lincoln always sought, and generally with success, to turn a dilemma into an advantage; and shrewdly seizing the opportunity which Mr. Greeley had created, he in turn addressed him the following open letter through the newspapers in reply, by which he not merely warded off his present personal accusation, but skillfully laid the foundation in public sentiment for the very radical step he was about to take on the slavery question.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, August 22, 1862.

HON. HORACE GREELEY.

DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the "New York Tribune." If there be in it any statements, or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be—"the Union as it was."[2] If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors,

[1] Lincoln to Bullitt, July 28, 1862. MS.; also incorrectly printed in several works.

[2] This letter was first printed in the "National Intelligencer" of August 23, 1862. As originally written it contained after the words, "the Union as it was," the phrase, "Broken eggs can never be mended, and the longer the breaking proceeds the more will be broken," which "was erased, with some reluctance, by the President, on the representation, made to him by the editors, that it seemed somewhat exceptionable, on rhetorical grounds, in a paper of such dignity." [Welling in "North American Review," February, 1880, p. 168.]

and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

Yours, A. LINCOLN.

When Mr. Lincoln wrote the foregoing letter the defeat of General Pope at the second battle of Bull Run had not yet taken place; on the contrary, every probability pointed to an easy victory for the Union troops in the battle which was plainly seen to be impending. We may therefore infer that he hoped soon to be able to supplement the above declarations by issuing his postponed proclamation, which would give the country knowledge of his final designs respecting the slavery question. But instead of the expected victory came a sad and demoralizing defeat, which prolonged, instead of shortening, the anxiety and uncertainty hanging over the intentions of the Administration. Under this enforced necessity for further postponement of his fixed purpose, in addition to his many other perplexities, the President grew sensitive and even irritable upon this point. He was by nature so frank and direct, he was so conscientious in all his official responsibilities, that he made the complaints and implied reproaches of even his humblest petitioner his own. The severe impartiality of his self-judgment sometimes became almost a feeling of self-accusation, from which he relieved himself only by a most searching analysis and review of his own motives in self-justification. In the period under review this state of feeling was several times manifested. Individuals and delegations came to him to urge one side or the other of a decision, which, though already made in his own mind, forced upon him a re-examination of its justness and its possibilities for good or evil. Imperceptibly these mental processes became a species of self-torment, and well-meaning inquirers or advisers affected his overstrung nerves like so many persecuting inquisitors. A phlegmatic nature would have turned them away in sullen silence, or at most with an evasive commonplace. But Lincoln felt himself under compulsion, which he could not resist, to state somewhat precisely the difficulties and perplexities under which he was acting, or, rather, apparently refusing to act; and in such statements his public argument, upon hypothesis assumed for illustration, was liable to outrun his private conclusions upon facts which had controlled his judgment.

It is in the light of this mental condition that we must judge the well-known reply made by him on the 13th of September to a deputation from the religious denominations of Chicago requesting him to issue at once a proclamation of universal emancipation. He said:

The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right. . . . What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. . . . Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. . . . Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views I have not in any respect injured your feelings.

This interview of the Chicago delegation with the President lasted more than an hour, during which a long memorial was read, interspersed with much discursive conversation and interchange of questions and replies. The report of his remarks, which was written out and published by the delegation after their return home, is not a verbatim reproduction, but merely a

condensed abstract of what was said on the occasion.[1] Much adverse criticism has been indulged in because of his assumed declaration that an emancipation proclamation would be as inoperative as "the Pope's bull against the comet," and that he nevertheless issued so preposterous a document within two weeks after the interview. The error lies in the assumption that his words were literally reported. To measure rightly his utterance as a whole, the conditions under which the interview occurred must continually be kept in mind. The Administration and the country were still in the shadow of the great disasters of the Peninsula and of the second Bull Run. With corresponding elation the rebels had taken the aggressive and crossed the Potomac to invade Maryland. A new campaign was opening, and a new battle-cloud was gathering. Whether victory or fresh defeat was enfolded in its gloom was a question of uncertainty and of fearful anxiety to the President, straining his thought and imagination to an abnormal and almost unendurable tension. It was at such a moment that the Chicago delegation had appeared with a repetition of a request which seemed to him inopportune. Habitually open and patient to every appeal, he was nevertheless becoming restive under the unremitting and unreasoning pressure regarding this single point. Could no one exercise patience but himself? Could antislavery people not realize and rest content with the undreamed-of progress their cause had already made — slavery abolished in the District of Columbia, the Territories restored to freedom, almost wholesale emancipation provided through the Confiscation Act? Had he not aided these measures, signed these laws, ordered their enforcement, and was he not, day and night, laboring to secure compensated emancipation in the border States? Had he not the very proclamation they sought lying written in his desk, waiting only the favorable moment when he might announce it? Why must they push him to the wall, and compel him to an avowal which might blight the ripening public sentiment and imperil the desired consummation? We may infer that with some such feelings he listened to the dogmatic memorial of the delegation; for his whole answer is in the nature of a friendly protest and polite rebuke against their impolitic urgency, and the impressive rhetorical figure he employs was not intended to foreshadow his decision, but to illustrate the absurdity of attempting to pluck the fruit before it was ripe. The great pith and point of the interview is his strong and unqualified declaration that he held the subject under advisement, and that he regarded his military authority clear and ample. He said:

> Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy.

Three days after this interview the great battle of Antietam was begun, which resulted in a victory for the Union forces. The events of war had abruptly changed political conditions, and the President seized the earliest possible opportunity to announce the policy which he had decided upon exactly two months before. His manner and language on this momentous occasion have been minutely recorded in the diaries of two members of the Cabinet, and liberal quotations from both will form the most valuable historical presentation of the event that can be made. The diary of Secretary Chase reads as follows:

> MONDAY, Sept. 22, 1862.
>
> To Department about 9. State Department messenger came with notice to heads of Departments to meet at 12. Received sundry callers. Went to the White House. All the members of the Cabinet were in attendance. There was some general talk, and the President mentioned that Artemus Ward had sent him his book. Proposed to read a chapter which he thought very funny. Read it, and seemed to enjoy it very much; the heads also (except Stanton), of course. The chapter was "High-handed Outrage at Utica." The President then took a graver tone, and said, "Gentlemen, I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself, and [hesitating a little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfill that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in

[1] "Chicago Tribune," Sept. 23, 1862, and "National Intelligencer," Sept. 26, 1862.

the expressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any one of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take."[1]

The foregoing account written by Mr. Chase is fully corroborated by the following extract from the diary of Secretary Welles, in which the same event is described:

SEPTEMBER 22.

A special Cabinet meeting. The subject was the proclamation for emancipating the slaves, after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the President says never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up the proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided,— the act and the consequences were his,— but that he felt it due to us to make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticisms on the paper which he had prepared. There were, he had found, not unexpectedly, some differences in the Cabinet; but he had, after ascertaining in his own way the views of each and all, individually and collectively, formed his own conclusions and made his own decisions. In the course of the discussion on this paper, which was long, earnest, and, on the general principle involved, harmonious, he remarked that he had made a vow — a covenant — that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle he would consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal of matters when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right — was confirmed and strengthened in his action by the vow and results. His mind was fixed, his decision made, but he wished his paper announcing his course as correct in terms as it could be made without any change in his determination.[2]

In addition to its record of the President's language, the diary of Secretary Chase proceeds with the following account of what was said by several members of the Cabinet:

The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went on, and showing that he had fully considered the whole subject, in all the lights under which it had been presented to him. After he had closed, Governor Seward said: "The general question having been decided, nothing can be said farther about that. Would it not, however, make the proclamation more clear and decided to leave out all reference to the act being sustained during the incumbency of the present President; and not merely say that the Government 'recognizes,' but that it will maintain, the freedom it proclaims?" I followed, saying: "What you have said, Mr. President, fully satisfies me that you have given to every proposition which has been made a kind and candid consideration. And you have now expressed the conclusion to which you have arrived clearly and distinctly. This it was your right, and, under your oath of office, your duty, to do. The proclamation does not, indeed, mark out exactly the course I would myself prefer. But I am ready to take it just as it is written, and to stand by it with all my heart. I think, however, the suggestions of Governor Seward very judicious, and shall be glad to have them adopted." The President then asked us severally our opinions as to the modification proposed, saying that he did not care much about the phrases he had used. Every one favored the modification, and it was adopted. Governor Seward then proposed that in the passage relating to colonization some language should be introduced to show that the colonization proposed was to be only with the consent of the colonists and the consent of the States in which colonies might be attempted. This, too, was agreed to, and no other modification was proposed. Mr. Blair then said that, the question having been decided, he would make no objection to issuing the proclamation; but he would ask to have his paper, presented some days since, against the policy, filed with the proclamation.[3] The President consented to this readily. And then Mr. Blair went on to say that he was afraid of the influence of the proclamation on the border States and on the army, and stated, at some length, the grounds of his apprehensions. He disclaimed most expressly, however, all objection to emancipation *per se*, saying he had always been personally in favor of it — always ready for immediate emancipation in the midst of slave States, rather than submit to the perpetuation of the system.[4]

The statement of Mr. Welles which relates the Cabinet proceedings is as follows:

All listened with profound attention to the reading, and it was, I believe, assented to by every member. Mr. Bates repeated the opinions he had previously expressed in regard to the deportation of the colored race. Mr. Seward proposed two slight verbal alterations, which were adopted. A general discussion then took place, covering the whole ground — the constitutional question, the war

[1] Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," pp. 481, 482.

[2] Welles, Diary. Unpublished MS.

[3] Hay's Diary (MS.) contains the following record: "September 23, 1862. The President rewrote the proclamation on Sunday morning carefully. He called the Cabinet together on Monday, made a little talk to them, and read the momentous document. Mr. Blair and Mr. Bates made slight objections; otherwise the Cabinet was unanimous. The next day Mr. Blair, who had promised to file his objections, sent a note stating that as they referred only to the time of the act, he would not file them, lest they should be subject to misconstruction."

[4] Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 482.

power, the expediency and the effect of the movement. After the matter had been very fully debated, Mr. Stanton made a very emphatic speech sustaining the measure, and in closing said the act was so important, and involved consequences so vast, that he hoped each member would give distinctly and unequivocally his own individual opinion, whatever that opinion might be. Two gentlemen, he thought, had not been sufficiently explicit, although they had discussed the question freely, and it was understood that they concurred in the measure. He referred, he said, to the Secretary of the Treasury and (hesitating a moment) the Secretary of the Navy. It was understood, I believe, by all present that he had allusion to another member, with whom he was not in full accord. Mr. Chase admitted that the subject had come upon him unexpectedly and with some surprise. It was going a step further than he had ever proposed, but he was prepared to accept and support it. He was glad the President had made this advance, which he should sustain from his heart, and he proceeded to make an able impromptu argument in its favor. I stated that the President did not misunderstand my position, nor any other member; that I assented most unequivocally to the measure as a war necessity, and had acted upon it. Mr. Blair took occasion to say that he was an emancipationist from principle; that he had for years, here and in Missouri, where he formerly resided, openly advocated it; but he had doubts of the expediency of this executive action at this particular juncture. We ought not, he thought, to put in jeopardy the patriotic element in the border States, already severely tried. This proclamation would, as soon as it reached them, be likely to carry over those States to the secessionists. There were also party men in the free States who were striving to revive old party lines and distinctions, into whose hand we were putting a club to be used against us. The measure he approved, but the time was inopportune. He should wish, therefore, to file his objections. This, the President said, Mr. Blair could do. He had, however, considered the danger to be apprehended from the first objection mentioned, which was undoubtedly serious, but the difficulty was as great not to act as to act. There were two sides to that question. For months he had labored to get those States to move in this matter, convinced in his own mind that it was their true interest to do so, but his labors were vain. We must make the forward movement. They would acquiesce, if not immediately, soon; for they must be satisfied that slavery had received its death-blow from slave-owners — it could not survive the rebellion. As regarded the other objection, it had not much weight with him; their clubs would be used against us take what course we might.[1]

The Cabinet discussion of the proclamation being completed, Mr. Seward carried the document with him to the State Department, where the formal phraseology of attestation and the great seal were added. The President signed it the same afternoon, and it was published in full by the leading newspapers of the country on the morning of September 23d. As elsewhere, the reading of the official announcement created a profound interest in Washington, and a serenade was organized the next evening, which came to the Executive Mansion and called on the President for a speech. His reference to the great event was very brief. He said:

> I appear before you to do little more than acknowledge the courtesy you pay me, and to thank you for it. I have not been distinctly informed why it is that on this occasion you appear to do me this honor, though I suppose it is because of the proclamation. What I did, I did after a very full deliberation, and under a very heavy and solemn sense of responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. I shall make no attempt on this occasion to sustain what I have done or said by any comment. It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment, and maybe take action upon it.

Two days after the proclamation was issued a number of the governors of loyal States met for conference at Altoona, Pennsylvania; and it was charged at the time that this occurrence had some occult relation to the President's action. There was no truth whatever in the allegation. It was directly contradicted by the President himself. He said to the Hon. George S. Boutwell, who mentioned the rumor to him a few weeks after the occurrence:

> I never thought of the meeting of the governors. The truth is just this: When Lee came over the river, I made a resolution that if McClellan drove him back I would send the proclamation after him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, and until Saturday I could not find out whether we had gained a victory or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue the proclamation that day; and the fact is I fixed it up a little Sunday, and Monday I let them have it.[2]

The collateral evidence is also conclusive on this point. The Altoona meeting originated with Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, who, warned that Lee's army was about to cross the Potomac, was with all diligence preparing his State to resist the expected invasion. On the 6th of September he telegraphed to the governor of Massachusetts and others:

> In the present emergency would it not be well that the loyal governors should meet at some point in the border States to take measures for the more active support of the Government?

Receiving favorable replies, the governors of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia united in a joint invitation, under date of September 14, for such a meeting to be held at Altoona on the 24th. The object was simply to consult on the best means of common

[1] Welles in "Galaxy," December, 1862, pp. 846, 847.

[2] Boutwell, "The Lawyer, the Statesman, and the Soldier," pp. 116, 117.

defense and the vigorous prosecution of the war. There was no design to organize any pressure upon the President, either about the question of slavery or about the removal of McClellan from command, and the President neither anticipated nor feared any interference of this character. Several members of the body, differing in political sentiment, indignantly denied the accusation of a political plot, which, indeed, would have been impossible in a gathering of men of such strong individual traits, holding diverse views, and clothed with greatly varying interests and responsibilities.

The Proclamation of Emancipation was as great a surprise to them as to the general public, gratifying some and displeasing others. It was not strange that it should immediately engage their eager interest and call out some sort of joint response. The proclamation had been printed on the 23d; the Altoona gathering was called on the 14th and held on the 24th. Between the date of the call and the day of the meeting the military situation was altogether changed. The battle of Antietam had driven Lee's army in retreat back across the Potomac. Instead of emergency measures for defense, the assembled governors could now quietly discuss points of general and mutual interest, relating to the recruiting, organization, equipment, and transportation of troops, the granting of furloughs, and the care and removal of the sick and wounded. Their conference passed in entire harmony; and a day or two later they nearly all proceeded to Washington for a personal interview with the President and the Secretary of War. They presented a written address to the President, signed then and within a few days afterward by the governors of sixteen of the free States and the governor of West Virginia, reiterating devotion to the Union, loyalty to the Constitution and laws, and earnest support to the President in suppressing rebellion; and embracing only the single specific recommendation that a reserve army of 100,000 men ought constantly to be kept on foot, to be raised, armed, equipped, and trained at home, ready for emergencies. The written address also contained a hearty indorsement of the new emancipation policy announced in the President's proclamation. This declaration, as was to have been expected, developed the only antagonism of views which grew out of the whole transaction. The address was written at Washington, and was therefore not discussed at Altoona. Properly speaking, it was the supplementary action of only a portion of the assembled delegates. It was, however, transmitted for signature to all the loyal executives; but the governors of the States of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri replied, that while concurring in the other declarations of the address, they declined signing it, because they dissented from that portion of it which indorsed the Proclamation of Emancipation.

Coming as it did immediately after the announcement of his new policy, President Lincoln could not but be gratified at the public declarations emanating from the Altoona meeting. On his military policy it assured him of the continuation of an individual official support. On his emancipation policy it gave him a public approval from the present official power of seventeen States, as against the dissent of only five States of the border, where indeed he had no right to expect, for the present at least, any more favorable official sentiment. Nevertheless, it did not free the experiment from uncertainty and danger. It was precisely this balance of power, political and military, wielded by these hesitating border States, which was essential to the success of the Union cause; but he had measured the probability with an acuteness of judgment and timed his proceeding with a prudence of action that merited success, and in due time triumphantly justified his faith.

Every thoughtful reader will have more than a passing curiosity to examine the exact phraseology of a document which ushered in the great political regeneration of the American people. It reads as follows:

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their

actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

Then, after reciting the language of "An act to make an additional article of war," approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9 and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military and naval service, the proclamation concludes:

And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and the people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

A careful reading and analysis of the document shows it to have contained four leading propositions: (1.) A renewal of the plan of compensated abolishment. (2.) A continuance of the effort at voluntary colonization. (3.) The announcement of peremptory military emancipation of all slaves in States in rebellion at the expiration of the warning notice. (4.) A promise to recommend ultimate compensation to loyal owners.

The political test of the experiment of military emancipation thus announced by the President came almost immediately in the autumn elections for State officers and State legislatures, and especially for representatives to the thirty-eighth Congress. The decided failure of McClellan's Richmond campaign and the inaction of the Western army had already produced much popular discontent, which was only partly relieved by the victory of Antietam. The canvass had been inaugurated by the Democratic party with violent protests against the antislavery legislation of Congress, and it now added the loud outcry that the Administration had changed the war for the Union to a war for abolition. The party conflict became active and bitter, and the Democrats, having all the advantage of an aggressive issue, made great popular gains, not only throughout the middle belt of States, but in New York, where they elected their governor, thus gaining control of the executive machinery, which greatly embarrassed the Administration in its later measures to maintain the army. The number of Democrats in the House of Representatives was increased from forty-four to seventy-five, and the reaction threatened for a time to deprive Mr. Lincoln of the support of the House.

But against this temporary adverse political current the leaders and the bulk of the Republican party followed Mr. Lincoln with loyal adhesion, accepting and defending his emancipation policy with earnestness and enthusiasm. In his annual message of December 1, 1862, the President did not discuss his Emancipation Proclamation, but renewed and made an elaborate argument to recommend his plan of compensated abolishment, "not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union." Meanwhile the Democratic minority in the House, joined by the pro-slavery conservatives from the border slave-States, lost no opportunity to oppose emancipation in every form. On the 11th of December Mr. Yeaman of Kentucky offered resolutions declaring the President's proclamation unwarranted by the Constitution and a useless and dangerous war measure. But these propositions were only supported by a vote of forty-seven, while they were promptly laid on the table by a vote of ninety-five members. The Republicans were unwilling to remain in this attitude of giving emancipation a merely negative support. A few days later (December 15), Mr. S. C. Fessenden of Maine put the identical phraseology in an affirmative form, and by a test vote of seventy-eight to fifty-two the House resolved:

That the proclamation of the President of the United States, of the date of 22d September, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution, and that the policy of emancipation, as indicated in that proclamation, is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, was well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard for the rights of the States and the perpetuity of free government.

With the proclamation thus heartily indorsed by nearly every free State governor and nearly two-thirds of the loyal representatives, Mr. Lincoln, who had accurately foreseen the dangers as well as the benefits of the critical step he had taken, could well afford to wait for the full tide of approval, for which he looked with confidence and which came to him from that time onward with steadiness and ever-growing volume, both from the armies in the field and the people in their homes throughout the loyal North.

Jan 1889

A REGRET.

OH, could we but have seen, while they were ours,
The grace of days forever passed away;
Had we but felt the beauty of the flowers
That bloomed for us — before they knew decay;
Could we have known how we should yearn in vain
For looks and smiles no more to greet our sight,
Or how the fruitless tears would fall like rain
For hours of sweet communion, vanished quite;
Their worth to us — had we but better known,
Then had we held them dearer, while our own,
Had kept some salvage from the joys o'erthrown,
And loneliness itself had found us less alone!

Agnes Maule Machar.

THE SHERIFF'S POSSE.

PICTURES OF THE FAR WEST. III.

THIS picture is not so sincere as it might be. The artist, in the course of many rides over these mountain pastures, by daylight or twilight or moonrise, has never yet encountered anything so sensational as a troop of armed men on the track of a criminal. Yet rumors are passing, from turbulent camps above us in the mountains or from the seductive valley towns, that easily suggest some such night journey as this. The riders make haste slowly, breasting slope after slope of the interminable cattle-ranges, on the alert, as they climb out of gulch after gulch of shadow, for the next long outlook ahead.

It may be mentioned that by far the greater number of criminals confined in the jails of the far West are there for a class of offenses peculiar to the country. They are men dangerous in one direction, perhaps, but generally not depraved. The "trusties" are often domesticated upon ranches near the town, and apparently are unwatched, and on the best of terms with the ranchman's family. They have a simple faith in the necessity for a certain sort of action, under given circumstances, which supports them under sentence of the law, and serves instead of a clear conscience. They have done nothing of which they are ashamed.

For example, a cattle-man meets a sheep-man on the hills. The sheep-man represents to the cattle-man that his only possible course is to take his band across the cattle-man's range — to "sheep" him, in the local phrase. A sheep-man makes no treaty with the owners of the land he crosses that he will not "turn into the fields, or into the vineyards"; that he will not "drink of the water of the well"; but go by the highway until he has passed on. The land belongs to him as much as to the cattle-man who has pitched in its borders. But it is a perfectly clear case to the cattle-man that the sheep-man's multitude will lick up all before them, and that his own multitude must starve on what is left. He does not waste time praying, "Curse me this sheep-man!" He goes out against the sheep-man, without prayerful preliminaries. He "lays for him" at night, when he has lighted his solitary fire in the sage-brush. The next day a disorganized band of sheep, minus a grimy shepherd, goes wandering back to the river, to the despair of a masterless dog.

The case is tried in the valley town and the murderer is acquitted, the sentiment of the community being with him to a much greater extent than would be generally admitted. No judge nor jury nor term of punishment could have altered his personal conviction and that of his friends that his deed was only an effort in self-defense and an act of public justice.

If such a fugitive as this is overhauled in a night-chase by the sheriff and his men, he is treated as a comrade "in trouble." To quote a description, given in Hibernian good faith, of a young man at large with the murder of his father — in defense of his mother, it is claimed — on his head, "He is a perfect gentleman if he is n't crossed."

* * *

by which we can separate the work of one from that of the other, and we may imagine them associated in all the work attributed to either, except that at Avignon.

W. J. Stillman.

NOTES BY TIMOTHY COLE, ENGRAVER.

ST. CATHERINE OF ALEXANDRIA.

NOVEMBER 5, 1887. — At Pisa I found undoubtedly the finest work of Simone Memmi — small panels of single saints. Such rare and delicate work I had not supposed him capable of. The finish of these paintings is most exquisite, and reminds me much of the treatment of Duccio, whom he succeeded. Of these I had begun to engrave the Santa Chiara, but subsequently abandoned it for the St. Catherine.

MAY 25, 1888. — "St. Catherine of Alexandria," by Simone Martini, called Simone Memmi, is a detail from a panel in the library of the Seminario at Pisa. The panel itself is a detail of what was once a large and beautiful work. It is now dismembered, and some of its parts are found in the Pisa Academy and the others at the Seminario; none of the panels, however, are lost. It was painted in the year 1320 for the high altar of the Church of St. Catherine, Pisa, and was composed of seven principal compartments representing half-length figures of apostles and saints. One of these, a Madonna and Child, occupied the center, the others being disposed on each side. They are about two feet high, and are each inclosed in a handsome framework. Above each are two small half-lengths, and above and between each of these two is a smaller medallion, the whole forming a panel about four feet high. These seven principal panels represent, besides the Madonna and Child, the following saints: St. John the Evangelist, St. Mary Magdalene, St. Peter, St. John the Baptist, St. Catherine of Alexandria, and St. Dominic.

The predella to the picture consisted of an Ecce Homo in the center, and twelve saints, male and female, six on each side — half-lengths, perhaps nine inches high. The whole when complete must have measured some 14 or 15 feet long by 6 or 7 feet high.

It is painted in tempera upon wood. The backgrounds and glories are of gold, as well as much of the trimming and ornamentation of the draperies. The drapery of St. Catherine is richly ornamented, and the painting of this is exquisite for delicacy and cleanness, as is the engraved work in the glory around the head — far too delicate and neat to be done justice to in any engraving. It will be noticed that the execution of the patterns in the drapery is flat, without regard to foreshortening in the folds. Attention does not appear to have been directed to this foreshortening until a century later, in the time of Pietro della Francesca (1415–1492). The color of the drapery is of a warm gray tone, yellowish in the lighter portions, and the dark folds of a neutral or bluish tint. The flesh tints are similar in tone, but darker. The book is red, but of a soft, agreeable tone; the hand which holds it has been restored. St. Catherine, as patron saint and martyr, has several attributes. The crown is hers by right as sovereign princess; she bears the palm as martyr; she holds the book as significant of her learning.

THE ALL-KIND MOTHER.

LO, whatever is at hand
Is full meet for the demand:
Nature ofttimes giveth best
When she seemeth chariest.
She hath shapen shower and sun
To the need of every one —
Summer bland and winter drear,
Dimpled pool and frozen mere.
All thou lackest she hath still,
Near thy finding and thy fill.
Yield her fullest faith, and she
Will endow thee royally.

Loveless weed and lily fair
She attendeth, here and there —
Kindly to the weed as to
The lorn lily teared with dew.
Each to her hath use as dear
As the other; an thou clear
Thy cloyed senses thou may'st see
Haply all the mystery.
Thou shalt see the lily get
Its divinest blossom; yet
Shall the weed's tip bloom no less
With the song-bird's gleefulness.

Thou art poor, or thou art rich —
Never lightest matter which:
All the glad gold of the noon,
All the silver of the moon,
She doth lavish on thee, while
Thou withholdest any smile
Of thy gratitude to her,
Baser used than usurer.
Shame be on thee an thou seek
Not her pardon, with hot cheek,
And bowed head, and brimming eyes,
At her merciful "Arise!

James Whitcomb Riley.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE REMOVAL OF McCLELLAN.—FINANCIAL MEASURES.—SEWARD AND CHASE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE latter part of September wore away in resting the exhausted Army of the Potomac, and beginning anew the endless work of equipment and supply — work which from the nature of the case can never be finished in an army of 200,000 men, any more than in a city of the same size. But this was a lesson which McClellan appeared never able to learn. So long as a single brigade commander complained that some of his men needed new shoes it seemed impossible for McClellan to undertake active operations until that special want was supplied. When that was done some company of cavalry was short a few horses, and the vicious circle of importunate demand and slow supply continued. On the 23d of September, General McClellan discovered signs of heavy reënforcements moving towards the enemy from Winchester and Charlestown. The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in his front, instead of appearing to him as a renewed opportunity, only excited in him the apprehension that he would be again attacked. He therefore set up a new clamor for reënforcements. "A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. . . General Sumner with his corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupy Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights. I think," is the doleful plaint with which the dispatch closes, "he will be able to hold his position till reënforcements arrive." Four days afterwards he writes again in the same strain:

> This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign. . . My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side.

He is full of apprehension in regard to an attack upon Maryland, and prays that the river may rise so that the enemy may not cross.

The President, sick at heart at this exasperating delay, resolved at the end of the month to make a visit to McClellan's camp to see if in a personal interview he could not inspire him with some sense of the necessity for action. The morning report of the 30th of September showed the enormous aggregate of the Army of the Potomac, present and absent, including Banks's command in Washington, as 303,959. Of this number over 100,000 were absent, 28,000 on special duty, and 73,000 present for duty in Banks's command, leaving 100,000 present for duty under McClellan's immediate command. This vast multitude in arms was visited by the President in the first days of October. So far as he could see, it was a great army ready for any work that could be asked of it. During all his visit he urged with as much energy as was consistent with his habitual courtesy the necessity for an immediate employment of this force.[2] McClellan met all his suggestions and entreaties with an amiable inertia, which deeply discouraged the President. After a day and a night spent in such an interchange of views the President left his tent early in the morning and walked with a friend[3] to an eminence which commanded a view of a great part of the camp. For miles beneath them, glistening in the rising sun, spread the white tents of the mighty hosts. The President gazed for a while in silence upon the scene, then turned to his friend and said: "Do you know what that is?" He answered in some astonishment, "It is the Army of the Potomac." "So it is called," responded the President; "but that is a mistake: it is only McClellan's body-guard." He went back to Washington taking little comfort from his visit; and after a few days of painful deliberation, getting no news of any movement, he sent McClellan the following positive instructions:

> WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.
>
> MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN: I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy

2 In his memoirs McClellan tries to create the impression that the President was satisfied with his delay at this time; but his private letters printed in the same volume leave no doubt of the contrary. He says, referring to the President's visit, October 2, "His ostensible purpose is to see the troops and the battle-field; I incline to think that the real purpose of his visit is to push me into a premature advance into Virginia."

3 Hon. O. M. Hatch of Illinois, from whom we have this story.

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or drive him South. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington and cover the latter by your operations, you can be reënforced by 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reënforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

These orders were emphasized a few days later by a repetition of the same stinging insult which Lee had once before inflicted upon McClellan on the Peninsula. Stuart's cavalry crossed the Potomac, rode entirely around the Union army, recrossed the river lower down, and joined Lee again without damage. McClellan seems to have felt no mortification from this disgraceful occurrence, which he used merely as a pretext for new complaints against the Government. He seemed to think that he had presented a satisfactory excuse for his inefficiency when he reported to Halleck that his cavalry had "marched 78 miles in 24 hours while Stuart's was marching 90." He pretended that he had at the time only a thousand cavalry. This led to a remarkable correspondence [1] between him and the Government, which shows the waste and destruction of military material under McClellan. By the reports from the Quartermaster-General's office, there were sent to the Army of the Potomac, during the six weeks ending the 14th of October, 10,254 horses and a very large number of mules. "The cost of the horses issued within the last six weeks to the Army of the Potomac," says General Meigs, "is probably not less than $1,200,000." We may well ask in the words used by the Quartermaster-General in another place: Is there an instance on record of such a drain and destruction of horses "in a country not a desert"? Day after day the tedious controversy went on. This frightful waste of horses was turned by McClellan, as he turned everything, into a subject of reproach against the Government. To one of his complaining dispatches the President sent this sharp rejoinder: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" And again: "Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the Peninsula and everywhere since." These dispatches elicited only new complaints, vindications, and explanations.

It was not alone the pretended lack of horses which kept him idle. In his dispatches to Washington he continually complained — and the complaint was echoed in the correspondence of his satellites and by his adherents in the press — that the army was unable to improve the fine weather on account of the deficiency of all manner of supplies.[2] The Secretary of War, thinking it necessary at last to take notice of this widespread rumor, addressed [1] a letter to the General-in-Chief demanding a report upon the subject. General Halleck reported that on several occasions where General McClellan had telegraphed that his army was deficient in certain supplies it was ascertained that in every instance the requisition had been immediately filled, except in one, where the Quartermaster-General was forced to send to Philadelphia for the articles needed. He reported that there had been no neglect or delay in issuing all the supplies asked for, and added his belief "that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours." The General-in-Chief further reported that there had been no such want of supplies as to prevent General McClellan's compliance with the orders, issued four weeks before, to advance against the enemy; that "had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side." He then goes at some length into a detailed and categorical contradiction of General McClellan's complaining dispatches. But we need not go outside of the General's own staff for a direct denial of his accusations. General Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, makes this just and sensible statement in a letter to the Quartermaster-General dated the 26th of October:

I have seen no real suffering for want of clothing, and do not believe there has been any only where it can be laid directly to the charge of regimental and brigade commanders and their quartermasters, and I have labored, I hope with some effect, in trying to instruct them. I have frequently remarked that an army will never move if it waits until all the different commanders report that they are ready and want no more supplies. It has been my pride

1 War Records.

2 This mania of General McClellan's for providing camp material sometimes assumed an almost ludicrous form. It suddenly occurred to him on the 7th of October to telegraph to the Quartermaster-General asking how long it would take to give him three or four thousand hospital tents. Meigs answered that a sufficient supply had already been sent him, and that to provide the additional number he spoke of would take a long time and half a million of dollars.

to know the fact that no army was ever more perfectly supplied than this has been, as a general rule.

The President, weary of the controversy, at last replies:

Most certainly I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more than five weeks' total inaction of the army, and during which period we have sent to the army every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting in the whole to 7,918,[1] that the cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheerless, almost hopeless, prospect for the future, and it may have forced something of impatience in my dispatch. If not recruited and rested then, when could they ever be?

General Halleck, in a letter on the 7th of October, had urged McClellan to follow and seek to punish the enemy. He says:

There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something, but the real difficulty is, they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long. After a hard march one day is time enough to rest. Lying still beyond that time does not rest the men.[2]

The President's proclamation of emancipation had been promulgated to the army in general orders on the 24th of September. It will be remembered that General McClellan, in his manifesto from Harrison's Landing, had admonished the President against any such action. His subsequent negotiations with the Democratic politicians in the North had not tended to make him any more favorably disposed towards such radical action. His first impulse was to range himself openly against the proclamation. We are informed by General W. F. Smith that McClellan prepared a protest against it, which he read to some of his intimate friends in the army. The advice of Smith, and perhaps of others, induced him not to commit so fatal a breach of discipline. For a moment he thought of throwing up his commission. In a private letter of September 25 he said:

The President's late proclamation, the continuation of Stanton and Halleck in office, render it almost impossible for me to retain my commission and self-respect at the same time.[3]

He could not, however, pass over with entire silence an order of such momentous importance; and so after two weeks of meditation, having heard from his friends in New York,[4] he issued on the 7th of October a singular document calling the attention of the officers and soldiers of his army to the President's proclamation. He made absolutely no reference to the proclamation itself. He used it, as he says, simply as an opportunity for "defining the relations borne by all persons in the military service towards the civil authorities," a relation which most of his army understood already at least as well as himself. In a few commonplace phrases he restates the political axiom that the civil authority is paramount in our government and that the military is subordinate to it. He therefore deprecated any intemperate discussion of "public measures determined upon and declared by the Government" "as tending to impair and destroy the efficiency of troops"; and significantly adds, "The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls." There is no reason to believe that this order of General McClellan's was issued with any but the best intentions. He believed, and he thought the army believed, that the President's antislavery policy was ill-advised and might prove disastrous. He therefore issued this order commanding his soldiers to be moderate in their criticisms and condemnations of the President, and to leave to the people at the polls the work of correcting or punishing him. When the troops of the Army of the Potomac had an opportunity of expressing at the polls their sense of the political question at issue between Lincoln and McClellan, the latter had occasion to discover that there was a difference between the sentiment of staff headquarters and the sentiment of the rank and file.

The President's peremptory order to move, which we have mentioned as having been issued on the 6th of October, having produced no effect, he wrote to General McClellan on the 13th of the month a letter so important in its substance and in its relations to subsequent events that it must be printed entire. Having already given the general his orders and told him what to do, he now not only tells him how to do it, but furnishes him unanswerable reasons why it should be done.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 13, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in

1 It was really many more than this.
2 War Records.
3 "McClellan's Own Story," p. 615.
4 He wrote, October 5: "Mr. Aspinwall [then at McClellan's camp] is decidedly of the opinion that it is my duty to submit to the President's proclamation." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 655.]

working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which can not and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit.

If he should move northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present; and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try"; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable — as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack, if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

In the absence of any definite plan or purpose of his own, General McClellan accepted this plan of the President's, giving in his report a characteristic reason, that "it would secure him the largest accession of force." But even after he adopted this decision the usual delays supervened; and on the 21st, after describing the wretched condition of his cavalry, he asked whether the President desired him "to march on the enemy at once or to await the reception of new horses," to which, on the same day, the President directed the General-in-Chief to send the following reply:

Your telegram of 12 M. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move and on what lines you propose to march.

With the exercise of a very little sagacity General McClellan should have discovered from the tone of this dispatch that the President's mood was taking on a certain tinge of austerity. Nevertheless he continued his preparations at perfect leisure, and four days afterwards he sent a long letter asking for definite instructions in regard to the details of guards to be left on the upper Potomac; to which he received a reply saying that "the Government had intrusted him with defeating and driving back the rebel army in his front," and directing him to use his own discretion as to the matters in question. As General McClellan in his dispatch had referred with some apprehension to the probable march of Bragg's army

eastward, General Halleck concluded his answer with this significant intimation: "You are within twenty miles of Lee, while Bragg is distant about four hundred miles."

He finally got his army across the Potomac on the 1st of November. It had begun crossing on the 26th of October, and as the several detachments arrived in Virginia, they were slowly distributed on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge under the vigilant and now distrustful eye of the President.

There is no doubt that the President's regard and confidence, which had withstood so much from General McClellan, was now giving way. The President had resisted in his behalf, for more than a year, the earnest and bitter opposition of the most powerful and trusted friends of the Administration. McClellan had hardly a supporter left among the Republican senators, and few among the most prominent members of the majority in the House of Representatives. In the Cabinet there was the same unanimous hostility to the young general. In the meeting of the 2d of September, when the President announced that he had placed McClellan in command of the forces in Washington, he was met by an outbreak of protest and criticism from the leading members of the Government which might well have shaken the nerves of any ruler. But the President stood manfully by his action.[1] He admitted the infirmities of McClellan, his lack of energy and initiative; but for this exigency he considered him the best man in the service, and the country must have the benefit of his talents, although he had behaved badly. We need not refer again to the magnanimity with which the President had overlooked the insolent dispatches of General McClellan from Savage's Station and Harrison's Landing. He closed his ears persistently during all the months of the winter and spring to the stories which came to him from every quarter in regard to the tone of factious hostility to himself which prevailed at McClellan's headquarters. But these stories increased to such an extent during the summer and autumn that even in his mind, so slow to believe evil, they occasioned some trouble. Soon after the battle of Antietam an incident came to his hearing of which he felt himself obliged to take notice. Major John J. Key, brother to Colonel Thomas M. Key, of McClellan's staff, was reported to have said, in reply to the question, put by a brother officer, "Why was not the rebel army bagged immediately after the battle near Sharpsburg?" "That is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise and save slavery." The President sent an aide-de-camp to Major Key to inform him of this grave charge, and to invite him to disprove it within twenty-four hours. A few minutes after this notice was sent, the Major appeared at the Executive Mansion in company with Major Turner, the officer to whom the remark had been made. A trial, as prompt as those of St. Louis dispensing justice under the oak at Vincennes, then took place. The President was judge and jury, attorney for the prosecution and for the defense, and he added to these functions that of clerk of the court, and made a record of the proceedings with his own hand, which we copy from his manuscript:

At about 11 o'clock A. M., September 27, 1862, Major Key and Major Turner appear before me. Major Turner says: "As I remember it, the conversation was, I asked the question why we did not bag them after the battle at Sharpsburg. Major Key's reply was, 'That was not the game: we should tire the rebels out and ourselves; that that was the only way the Union could be preserved, we come together fraternally, and slavery be saved.'" On cross-examination Major Turner says he has frequently heard Major Key converse in regard to the present trouble, and never heard him utter a sentiment unfavorable to the maintenance of the Union. He has never uttered anything which he, Major T., would call disloyalty. The particular conversation detailed was a private one.

Upon the reverse of this record the President made the following indorsement:

In my view it is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done. Therefore let Major John J. Key be forthwith dismissed from the military service of the United States.

The President's memorandum continues:

At the interview of Major Key and Major Turner with the President, Major Key did not attempt to controvert the statement of Major Turner, but simply insisted and tried to prove that he was true to the Union. The substance of the President's reply was that if there was a game even among Union men to have our army not take any advantage of the enemy when it could, it was his object to break up that game.

Speaking of the matter afterwards the President said, "I dismissed Major Key because I thought his silly, treasonable expressions were 'staff talk,' and I wished to make an example."[2]

He was still not ready to condemn General McClellan. He determined to give him one more chance. If McClellan, after Antietam, had destroyed the army of Lee, his official position would have been impregnable. If, after Lee had recrossed the Potomac, McClellan

[1] Welles, "Lincoln and Seward," pp. 195, 196.

[2] J. H., Diary.

had followed and delivered a successful battle in Virginia, nothing could afterwards have prevented his standing as the foremost man of his time. The President, in his intense anxiety for the success of the national arms, would have welcomed McClellan as his own presumptive successor if he could have won that position by successful battle. But the general's inexplicable slowness had at last excited the President's distrust. He began to think, before the end of October, that McClellan had no real desire to beat the enemy. He set in his own mind the limit of his own forbearance. He adopted for his own guidance a test which he communicated to no one until long afterwards, on which he determined to base his final judgment of McClellan. If he should permit Lee to cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond and the Army of the Potomac, he would remove him from command.[1]

When it was reported in Washington that Lee and Longstreet were at Culpeper Court House, the President sent an order, dated the 5th of November, to General McClellan, which reached him at Rectortown on the 7th, directing him to report for further orders at Trenton, New Jersey, and to turn the command of the Army of the Potomac over to General Burnside. General Buckingham delivered his message first to Burnside and then came with him to McClellan's tent. McClellan says in his memoirs that with the eyes of the two generals upon him he "read the papers with a smile"; but when they were gone, he turned to finish a letter he had been writing, and broke out in the heartfelt ejaculation, "Alas for my poor country!"[2] He took credit to himself in after years for not heading a mutiny of the troops. He said, "Many were in favor of my refusing to obey the order, and of marching upon Washington to take possession of the Government."[3]

Thus ended the military career of George Brinton McClellan. Now that the fierce passions of the war, its suspicions and its animosities, have passed away, we are able to judge him more accurately and more justly than was possible amid that moral and material tumult and confusion. He was as far from being the traitor and craven that many thought him as from being the martyr and hero that others would like to have him appear. It would be unfair to deny that he rendered, to the full measure of his capacity, sincere and honest service to the Republic. His technical knowledge was extensive, his industry untiring; his private character was pure and upright, his integrity without stain. In the private life to which he retired he carried with him the general respect and esteem and the affection of a troop of friends; and when by their partiality he was afterwards called to the exercise of important official functions, every office he held he adorned with the highest civic virtues and accomplishments. No one now can doubt his patriotism or his honor, and the fact that it was once doubted illustrates merely the part which the blackest suspicions play in a great civil war, and the stress to which the public mind was driven in the effort to account for the lack of results he gave the country in return for the vast resources which were so lavishly placed in his hands.

It was in this native inability to use great means to great ends that his failure as a general lies. It was in his temperament to exaggerate the obstacles in front of him, and this, added to his constitutional aversion to prompt decisions, caused those endless delays which wasted the army, exasperated the country, and gave the enemy unbroken leisure for maturing his plans and constant opportunity for executing them. His lethargy of six months in front of Washington, to the wonder and scorn of the Southern generals; his standing at gaze at Yorktown, halted with his vast army by Magruder's men in buckram; his innocent astonishment at Williamsburg at finding that the rebels would not give up Richmond without a fight; his station astride the Chickahominy, waiting for the enemy to grow strong enough to attack him, while his brave soldiers were fading to specters with the marsh fevers; his refusal to assume the offensive after the Confederate repulse at Seven Pines; his second refusal of the favors of the fortune of war when Lee took his army north of the Chickahominy and Porter fought him all day with little more than one corps, but with splendid courage; his starting for the James, in this crisis of his fate, when he should have marched upon the scantily guarded city of Richmond; his final retreat from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing, breaking the hearts of the soldiers who had won on that field a victory so complete and so glorious — all these mistakes proved how utterly incapable he was of leading a great army in a grand war. No general had ever been offered such wonderful opportunities, and they continued to be offered to him to the end. When Pope had drawn away the enemy from Richmond, and given him an unmolested embarkation, and had fought with undaunted valor against Lee's army, before which at last he was forced to give way for the want of relief which he had the right to expect from McClellan, the President, magnanimously ignoring all his own causes of quarrel, gave to McClellan

[1] These are the President's own words, taken down at the time they were uttered.
[2] "McClellan's Own Story," p. 660.
[3] Ibid., p. 652.

once more his old army, reënforced by Pope's, and sent him against an enemy who, in a contempt for his antagonist acquired in the Peninsula, had crossed the Potomac and then divided his army in half. As a crowning favor of chance this was made known to McClellan, and even this incalculable advantage he frittered away, and gave Lee forty-eight hours in which to call in his scattered battalions. After Antietam, for six long weeks of beautiful autumn weather he lingered on the north bank of the Potomac, under the constant pressure of the President's persuasions, and afterwards under the lash of his orders and reproaches, unable to make up his mind to pursue the enemy so long as he could find excuse for delay in a missing shoelace or a broken limber.

The devoted affection which he received from his army was strange when we consider how lacking he was in those qualities which generally excite the admiration of soldiers. When Sumner, swinging his hat, charged in front of his lines at Savage's Station, his white hair blowing in the wind; when Phil. Kearney, who had lost his bridle arm in Mexico, rode in the storm of bullets with his reins in his teeth, his sword in his right hand, there was something which struck the imagination of their troopers more than far more serious merits would have done. But no one ever saw General McClellan rejoicing in battle. At Williamsburg, the first Peninsula fight, while Hooker and Kearney and Hancock were in the thick of the conflict, he was at the wharf at Yorktown, very busy, doing an assistant quartermaster's duty; the day of Fair Oaks he spent on the north side of the river; when at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines's Mill the current of war rolled to the north side, he staid on the south bank; during the retreat to the James he was far in advance, selecting with his intelligent engineer's eye the spots where Sumner, Franklin, and the rest were to fight their daily battles; and even in the fury and thunder of Malvern Hill — the most splendid feat of arms ever performed by the Army of the Potomac, a sight which a man with the true soldier blood in his veins might give his life to see — he spent the greater part of those glorious hours, the diapason of his greatest victory booming in his ears, in his camp at Haxall's or on board the gun-boats, coldly and calmly making his arrangements for the morrow's retreat and for the coöperation of the navy; and at Antietam, the only battle where he really saw his own troops attacking the enemy, he enjoyed that wonderful sight "all day," says General Palfrey, "till towards the middle of the afternoon, when all the fighting was over, on the high ground near Fry's house, where he had some glasses strapped to the fence, so that he could look in different directions." We make no imputation on his courage: he was a brave man; but he was too much cumbered with other things to take part in his own battles.

With such limitations as these it is not likely that posterity will rank him among the leading generals of our war. The most his apologists ask for him is a place among the respectable, painstaking officers of the second order of talent, the "middle category of meritorious commanders";[1] but when we see such ardent friends and admirers of his person as General Webb and General Palfrey brought by a conscientious and careful study of his career to such a conviction of his continuous mistakes as they have expressed, we may well conclude that the candid historian of the future will have no sentiment but wonder when he comes to tell the story of McClellan's long mismanagement of a great, brave, and devoted army, backed by a government which strained every nerve to support him, and by a people whose fiery zeal would have made him the idol of the nation if he had given them the successes which their sacrifices deserved, and which were a dozen times within his grasp.

We have evidence from a candid and intelligent, if not altogether impartial, witness of the impression made upon the peace party of the North by the dismissal of General McClellan from command. On the 8th of November, 1862, Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, arrived in New York from a visit to England. The Democrats, or the Conservatives, as he called them, had carried the State and elected Mr. Seymour governor. He found them in great exultation over their victory. They imagined that the Government would at once desist from the measures which they had denounced as arbitrary or illegal; or, if not at once, they were certain that after the 1st of January, when Mr. Seymour would be inaugurated, the Government would not dare to exercise its war powers within the limits of the State of New York. They confided to the urbane and genial representative of the British Government much more specious hopes than these — hopes which they were not yet ready to avow to their own countrymen:[2] that the President would "seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South and renounce the idea

1 Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 229.

2 I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was plain it was not thought prudent to avow the desire. [Letter of Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 17, 1862.]

of subjugating or exterminating them."[1] But these rising hopes, Lord Lyons says, "were dashed by the next day's news." The dismissal of General McClellan caused "an irritation not unmixed with consternation and despondency. The general had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of him had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and an attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in." The "party" and the "policy" referred to were, of course, the Republican party of the nation and the policy of carrying the war through to the end, and saving the Union intact by all the means within the power of the Government; and in this forecast the Conservative gentlemen of New York, who sought the accomplished envoy of Great Britain to unbosom to him their joys and their griefs, showed that however they may have been lacking in patriotism or self-respect, they were not deficient in either logic or sagacity.

FINANCIAL MEASURES.

THE wisdom displayed by Mr. Lincoln in choosing his Cabinet, not from among his personal adherents, but from among the most eminent representatives of the Republicans of the country, shone out more and more clearly as the war went on, and its enormous exigencies tested the utmost powers of each member of the Government. A great orator and statesman has said that in this respect Mr. Lincoln showed at the outset that nature had fitted him for a ruler, and accident only had hid his earlier life in obscurity.

> I cannot hesitate [says Mr. Evarts] to think that the presence of Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase in the great offices of State and Treasury, and their faithful concurrence in the public service, and the public repute of the President's conduct of the Government, gave to the people all the benefits which might have justly been expected from the election of either to be himself the head of the Government, and much else besides. I know of no warrant in the qualities of human nature to have hoped that either of these great political leaders would have made as good a minister under the administration of the other, as President, as both of them did under the administration of Mr. Lincoln. I see nothing in Mr. Lincoln's great qualities and great authority with this people which could have commensurately served our need in any place, in the conduct of affairs, except at their head.[2]

We do not question that posterity will confirm this sober and impartial judgment of one of the most intelligent of contemporary observers. Lincoln, Chase, and Seward were, by a long interval, the first three Republicans of their time, and each, by what would almost appear a special favor of Providence, was placed in a position where he could be of most unquestioned service to the country. Had either of the three, except Lincoln, been President, the nation must have lost the inestimable services of the other two. We have already dwelt at some length upon the responsibility which devolved during these years upon the Secretary of State, and upon the unfailing courage, sagacity, and industry with which he met it. Before recounting an incident which threatened for a time to deprive the President of the powerful assistance of his two great subordinates, it will be necessary to review, in a manner however brief and inadequate, some of the main points in the administration of the finances during the war.

The Republican party came to power at a time when its adversaries had reduced the credit of the country to a point which now appears difficult to believe. Even before the election of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, was compelled to pay twelve per cent. for the use of the small sums necessary to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government, and early in the session of Congress which began in December, 1860, after the election of Mr. Lincoln, amid the gathering gloom of imminent civil war, Congress authorized the issue of ten millions of Treasury notes, payable in one year, to be issued at the best rate obtainable by the Secretary of the Treasury. That officer having advertised for bids for half the amount authorized, only a small sum was offered, the rates ranging from twelve to thirty-six per cent. The Secretary accepted the offers at twelve, obtaining, even at that exorbitant rate, the meager sum of half a million dollars. Afterwards a syndicate of bankers, upon hard conditions proposed by themselves, took the remaining four and a half millions at twelve per cent. A month after, when Mr. Cobb had retired and Mr. Dix had assumed the charge of the Treasury, the slight increase of public confidence derived from the character of the new Secretary enabled him to dispose of the other five millions at an average of ten and five-eighths per cent. In February, Congress having authorized a further loan of twenty-five millions at six per cent., Mr. Dix was able to obtain eight millions at a discount of ten per cent. It was in this depressed and discouraging state of the public finances that Mr. Chase took charge of the Treasury. Without any special previous experience, without any other

[1] Letter of Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 17, 1862.

[2] W. M. Evarts, Eulogy on Chase delivered at Dartmouth College.

preparation for his exacting task than great natural abilities, unswerving integrity and fidelity, and unwearying industry, he grappled with the difficulties of the situation in a manner which won him the plaudits of the civilized world and will forever enshrine his name in the memory of his fellow-citizens. To quote Mr. Evarts again:

> The exactions of the place knew no limits. A people wholly unaccustomed to the pressure of taxation, and with an absolute horror of a national debt, was to be rapidly subjected to the first without stint, and to be buried under a mountain of the last. Taxes which should support military operations on the largest scale, and yet not break the back of industry, which alone could pay them; loans, in every form that financial skill could devise, and to the farthest verge of the public credit; and finally, the extreme resort of governments under the last stress and necessity, of the subversion of the legal tender, by the substitution of what has been aptly and accurately called the coined credit of the Government for its coined money — all these exigencies and all these expedients made up the daily problems of the Secretary's life. . . . Whether the genius of Hamilton, dealing with great difficulties, transcended that of Chase, meeting the largest exigencies with greater resources, is an unprofitable speculation. They stand together, in the judgment of their countrymen, the great financiers of our history.

Immediately upon assuming office Mr. Chase addressed himself to the difficult work before him. The only provisions which had been made by law for the support of the Government were the fragments of the loan, authorized but unsold, of his predecessor. Satisfied that the rates at which money had been borrowed both by Cobb and by Dix were unnecessarily degrading to the national credit, he firmly refused terms similar to those which they had accepted, and succeeded in borrowing $8,000,000, none of it at a lower rate than ninety-four, and a few days later he borrowed $5,000,000 more at par. Even in May, after the outbreak of the war, he was able to place some $9,000,000 of Government loans at a rate only a little below their face value. These were of course but temporary make-shifts, based upon previous legislation; but when Congress met on the Fourth of July, in that first special session called by President Lincoln, an entirely new system of finance had to be instituted. The national debt on the 1st of July was $90,000,000, and there was a balance in the Treasury of only $2,000,000.

There was something appalling in the sudden and monstrous increase of the expenses of the Government as a consequence of the war. The appropriations for the fiscal year 1860–61 were but $79,000,000, and the estimates for the year following, notwithstanding the threatening outlook, were only for $75,000,000. Nobody foresaw the coming exigencies, no provision was made to meet them. Mr. Chase's estimates for the first fiscal year of his administration reached the astounding aggregate of $318,500,000, but before the short session of Congress adjourned even this enormous sum was found inadequate. To meet these immense demands he proposed to raise $80,000,000 by taxes and $240,000,000 by loans. By increasing the taxes upon imports he expected to add $27,000,000 to the $30,000,000 already derived from the tariff, and $3,000,000 from miscellaneous sources made up $60,000,000, leaving $20,000,000 to be derived from direct taxes and the excise.[1] Congress responded with the greatest decision and patriotism to the proposition of the Secretary. They authorized, on the 17th of July, a loan of $250,000,000, and passed laws increasing duties on a great number of articles; they apportioned a direct tax of $20,000,000 among the States, which was cheerfully paid by the loyal States, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to enforce it by commissioners for the States in rebellion. The estimates voted for the army were $207,000,000; for the navy, $56,000,000; and only $1,300,000 for civil and miscellaneous purposes. Every day during the summer and autumn the expenses of the war increased; for the last quarter of the year they averaged nearly $50,000,000 a month.

One of the first measures of relief adopted by the Secretary under the authority of Congress was the issue of the so-called "demand notes," payable in coin, for the payment of salaries or other debts of the United States, and by a later act made receivable for public dues. There was, at first, a great distrust of this form of paper money, and the Secretary of the Treasury and other public officers, in order to create confidence, joined in an agreement to receive them in payment of their salaries. General Scott issued a circular to the army announcing the issue of paper money and advising its acceptance. Several corporations declined to accept them in payment of freight. There is an instance recorded where a bank in New York refused to accept a large amount of them except as a special deposit, which deposit was afterwards withdrawn, the value of the notes having increased with the rise of gold, in which they were payable, to fifty per cent. premium in other paper money. But this and other like expedients gave only temporary relief. For the permanent and wholesome administration of financial affairs a great national loan was necessary, and Mr. Chase held, in the city of New York, on the 19th of August, 1861, a conference with the representatives of the principal bankers of the United States. He laid before them, with

[1] Round numbers are used in this chapter.

equal eloquence and judgment, not only the needs of the Government, but the safety and value of its securities; and after a long and earnest discussion, during the course of which it seemed at one time possible that his mission would result in failure, he formed a syndicate of banks which advanced the Government $50,000,000, and after this loan was successfully placed $50,000,000 more were derived from the same source, the Government paying seven and three-tenths per cent. for the money, and later he used the authority conferred upon him by the act of July 17, 1861, to issue $50,000,000 more of six per cent. bonds at a rate making them equivalent to seven per cents.

When Congress met in December and the Secretary in his first annual report gave an account of his stewardship, he reported an aggregate of $197,000,000 realized from loans in all forms. The receipts from customs were less than had been expected, and on the other hand the expenditures had grown to a sum much larger than in June had been imagined possible. The estimates of the summer session were based upon an army of 300,000 men; double that number were now under arms. The pay and the rations of soldiers and sailors had also been augmented, and the Secretary found himself under the necessity of asking increased appropriations to the amount of $200,000,000. To meet this needed sum he proposed to increase the tariff and the direct tax, to impose duties on liquors and tobacco, on notes and deeds, and to modify the income tax to the advantage of the Government. In the presence of the vast obligations devolving upon the Administration he did not hesitate to face the facts, and with a courage unusual in history, and a sagacity as surprising as his courage, he announced to Congress that the public debt, which on the 1st of July, 1860, was but $64,000,000, and on the 1st of July, 1861, was $90,000,000, would probably amount on the 1st of July, 1862, to $517,000,000.[1]

It was apparent that the volume of currency in the country was not sufficient for the enormous requirements of the public expenditure. The banks could neither pay coin to the Government for bonds, nor dispose of them to their customers for specie. The weaker institutions were already tottering, and the stronger ones feared a crisis which would result in universal disaster. They met in convention on the 27th of December and agreed upon a suspension of specie payments, which took place the following day. The Government necessarily followed the example of the banks, and the new year began with the melancholy spectacle of all the public and private institutions of the country redeeming their broken promises with new ones.

The public debt had risen to $300,000,000; the treasury was almost empty; the daily expenditures amounted to nearly $2,000,000. It was estimated that $350,000,000 were needed to pay the expenses of the Government to the close of the fiscal year, and the treasury had means for meeting the drafts of the Government for less than two months. In the world of finance, as well as in the world of politics, it was generally agreed that the only resort of the Government was paper money. Leading bankers throughout the United States urged this upon the Secretary of the Treasury as the only practicable expedient. The leading statesmen in both houses of Congress were brought with extreme reluctance to the same conclusion. To no one was this decision more painful than to the Secretary of the Treasury. He agreed with the greatest of his predecessors, in that famous report which has become a classic in our politics and our finances, that—

> The emitting of paper money by the authority of the Government is wisely prohibited to the individual States by the Constitution, and the spirit of that prohibition ought not to be disregarded by the Government of the United States. . . . The wisdom of the Government will be shown in never trusting itself with the use of so seducing and dangerous an expedient. . . . The stamping of paper is an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, that a government in the practice of paper emissions would rarely fail in any such emergency to indulge itself too far in that resource to avoid as much as possible one less auspicious to present popularity. If it should not even be carried so far as to be rendered an absolute bubble, it would at least be likely to be extended to a degree which would occasion an inflated and artificial state of things incompatible with the regular and prosperous course of the political economy.

But in spite of all this reluctance Mr. Chase felt that an emergency was upon the Government from which this was the only issue. He saw that the corporate institutions of the country would not receive the notes of the Government unless they were made a legal tender by act of Congress.

"This state of things," he wrote, "was the high road to ruin, and I did not hesitate as to the remedy." He threw the entire weight of his influence upon his friends in Congress and urged them to prompt and thorough action. In a letter to Mr. Stevens, of the Committee of Ways and Means, he said:

> The provision making the United States notes a legal tender has doubtless been well considered by

[1] It actually was $524,000,000 on the 1st of July, 1862, and on the 1st of July following it was $1,100,000,000; Mr. Chase having estimated it in his report of December at $1,000,000,000.

the committee, and their conclusion needs no support from any observation of mine. I think it my duty to say, however, that in respect to this provision my reflections have conducted me to the same conclusion they have reached. It is not unknown to them that I have felt, nor do I wish to conceal that I now feel, a great aversion to making anything but legal coin a payment of debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is at present impossible, however, in consequence of the large expenditures entailed by the war and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for current disbursements. It has therefore become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes. The making them a legal tender might still be avoided if the willingness manifested by the people generally, by railroad companies, and by many of the banking institutions, to receive and pay them as money in all transactions were absolutely, or practically, universal; but, unfortunately, there are some persons and some institutions which refuse to receive and pay them, and whose action tends not merely to the unnecessary depreciation of the notes, but to establish discriminations in business against those who in this matter give a cordial support to the Government and in favor of those who do not. Such discriminations should, if possible, be prevented, and the provision making notes a legal tender in a great measure at least prevents it by putting all citizens in this respect upon the same level both in respect to rights and duties.[1]

And several days later, on hearing some intimation that the committee thought he was not specially earnest in desiring the passage of the bill, he wrote to Mr. Spaulding:

It is true that I came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I came to it decidedly and I support it earnestly. . . . Immediate action is of great importance; the treasury is nearly empty. I have been obliged to draw for the last installment of the November loan. As soon as it is paid I fear the banks generally will refuse to receive United States notes. You will see the necessity of urging the bill through without more delay.

In both houses of Congress the measure received the most violent denunciation on the part of those opposed to it, and even those who voted in favor of it explained their votes in speeches filled with deprecation of the necessity which demanded it. Mr. Sumner, after reciting in an eloquent and impassioned speech the evil which he thought would result from such a measure, concluded by saying:

If I mention these things it is because of the unfeigned solicitude I feel with regard to this measure, and not with the view of arguing against the exercise of a constitutional power, when in the opinion of the Government in which I place trust the necessity for its exercise has arrived.

[1] Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 244.

Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Morrill spoke in the same strain of sorrowful apprehension, but the bill became a law on the 25th of February, 1862.

This important law, which Mr. Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, urged upon Congress, and which Mr. Chase, as Chief-Justice of the United States, afterwards decided to be unconstitutional, authorized the issue of $150,000,000 of United States notes not bearing interest, payable at the Treasury of the United States, in denominations of not less than five dollars. These notes were to be received in payment of all debts and demands of every kind due to the United States, except duties on imports, which were payable in coin; and they were to be paid by the United States in satisfaction of all claims against the Government, except for interest upon the public debt, which also was to be paid in coin, the receipts from customs being devoted to this purpose; and these notes were to be lawful money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, with the exceptions above mentioned, and they were to be received at par in exchange for Government bonds. By a later act the demand notes were also made a legal tender, as some of the banks had refused to receive them without such provision. It was thought in February that $150,000,000 of this currency would be enough, but in June it was evident that this would not be the case; $150,000,000 more were demanded by the Secretary and at once authorized by Congress. $35,000,000 of this last issue were to be in denominations less than five dollars.

Even this vast volume of currency did not satisfy the insatiable demands of the time, and the rapidly increasing popularity of the United States notes, or greenbacks, as they were called, induced the Government to ask, and Congress to grant, a wide extension of the authority to issue them, so that before the war ended $1,250,000,000 of legal tender had been authorized by Congress. Of this $450,000,000 were in legal-tender United States notes; $400,000,000 in Treasury notes payable not more than three years from date, and bearing interest not exceeding six per cent.; $400,000,000 in Treasury notes redeemable after three years, bearing a currency interest not exceeding seven and three-tenths per cent. This full authority was not availed of by the Secretary of the Treasury. The legal tenders outstanding on the 30th of June, 1864, amounted to $600,000,000, and a year later, under the administration of Mr. Fessenden, they amounted to $669,000,000. The public debt at the close of the fiscal year 1864 was $1,740,000,000, and the next year $2,682,000,000, which was increased some

$200,000,000 by the necessary expenses that followed as a sequel of the war.[1]

This is not the place to reopen the controversy which outlasted the war and for years afterwards was an element of disorganization in politics and of a bitter and somewhat demoralizing dispute in both houses of the Congress of the United States. It will probably be the verdict of posterity, as it was the opinion of the ablest statesmen of the time, that a legal-tender act was a necessary exercise of the powers of the Government in a time of supreme emergency; that the result of that act was all that its advocates hoped for in sustaining the Government in a period of vast and compulsory expenditure; and that the evils which grew out of it, great as they unquestionably were, were not so disastrous as the fears of intelligent economists at the time apprehended.

Gold, having been driven from circulation by the legal-tender notes, became at once the favorite stock for speculation in Wall street, and while the premium upon it rose to a certain extent in proportion to the increase of volume of paper money, and was subject to violent fluctuations in consequence of military successes or disasters, there was no such method in the course of its quotations as to render them explicable by either of these influences. It had become, so to speak, a fancy stock, and there was no more reason for its wilder fluctuations than for those of other securities which rise and fall in obedience to the currents of Wall street and without reference to intrinsic values. Just before the passage of the legal-tender bill the premium upon gold was 4⅜ per cent., and shortly after it became a law the premium fell to 1½; but it gradually rose until in the middle of July it was 17, in the middle of October, 32½, and at the end of the year, 34. On the 25th of February, 1863, after the legal-tender law had been in operation for a year, the premium on gold had risen to 72½; the brilliant successes of the National cause at Gettysburg and Vicksburg reduced it to 23½; it rose again in October to 56⅜, and rose no higher than that until the following spring, when on the 14th of April, 1864, it was quoted at 88, and on the 22d of June, as the consequence of an ill-advised bill passed by Congress to prevent speculation in gold, the premium climbed at once to the frightful altitude of 130, falling the day afterwards to 115. On the 1st of July it jumped to 185, on the 2d it fell back to 130, and on the 6th the unfortunate law, born of a short-sighted patriotism, was repealed. The mischief, however, was not yet over, for five days later there was a rise to 185,—the highest figure attained during the war,—followed by a sharp fall, which continued until gold was quoted on the 26th of September at 87, thus falling nearly 100 per cent. in less than three months. There was no warrant in the financial or the military condition of the country for these wild fluctuations. They were the offspring of the desperate efforts of cupidity and enterprise which found their predestined prey in the fears and apprehensions of more timid speculators. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized in March, 1864, to sell surplus gold for the purpose of checking this speculation; and in April, the premium having risen to 75, Mr. Chase went in person to New York to try the effect of the sale of "cash gold" upon the trade in phantom gold.[2] The day he arrived the speculators defied him by running the premium to 88. He sold in a few days about $11,000,000, reducing the premium to 65, with convulsive fluctuations; but the moment the pressure of the Treasury was removed the price of gold mounted as before. The same experiment was frequently tried afterwards, with more or less success.

The troubles of the time, which had reduced the treasury of the United States to a condition of impoverishment, had exercised, as was natural, exactly the contrary effect upon the banks of New York. The timidity of capital had accumulated a great surplus of money in these institutions, with a far smaller number of loans and discounts than usual. The deposits amounted at the end of 1861 to $146,000,000. At the suggestion of Mr. Cisco, the Assistant Treasurer in New York, the Secretary of the Treasury adopted a system of temporary loans which was sanctioned by Congress in a clause of the legal-tender law, and the authority thus given was increased by successive acts until the limit was fixed at $150,000,000. These loans were not only of great advantage to the Government as well as to the lenders, but they also served as a useful balance to the money market. In times of severe pressure the reimbursement of large sums was often the means of temporary relief. Another expedient authorized by Congress, on the 1st of March, 1862, was the issuing of certificates of indebtedness to such creditors of the United States as chose to receive them in payment of audited accounts. They were payable one year from date, with interest at six per cent. The power to issue them was unlimited, and their extensive issue

[1] The cost of conducting the war, after it was fully inaugurated, was scarcely at any time less than $30,000,000 a month. At many times it far exceeded that amount. Sometimes it was not less than $90,000,000 a month; and the average expenses of the war, from its inception to its conclusion, may be said to have been about $2,000,000 each day. The public debt reached its maximum on August 31, 1865, on which day it amounted to $2,845,907,626.56. [J. J. Knox, "United States Notes."]

[2] Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 358.

led at last to their serious depreciation. Another important clause of the legal-tender act, in addition to those we have mentioned, was that which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue coupon or registered bonds to an amount not exceeding $500,000,000, redeemable at the pleasure of the United States after five years and payable twenty years from date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually. They were to be exempt from taxation by State authority, and the coin from duties on imports was to be set aside as a special fund for the payment of interest on the bonds and notes of the United States and for other specified purposes. These were the famous "five twenty" bonds, which, issued at first at a slight discount below par in paper, justified the faith and the sagacity of their earliest purchasers by a steady rise during all the years of their existence and were all paid in gold, or converted into other securities, long before the time fixed for their redemption. "All these measures," the Secretary said in his annual report of December, 1862, "worked well." If Congress had passed at the previous session the national banking law which he urged upon it, he thought that no financial necessity would at that time have demanded additional legislation. But the bill which had been introduced for that purpose the year before had found few supporters. Its only prominent advocate in the House of Representatives was Mr. Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts, a gentleman whose sound judgment and whose large knowledge of financial subjects gave great and deserved weight to his opinions. He could do nothing more at the moment than to obtain leave to bring in a bill for that purpose; but in the course of the year that followed, the absolute necessity for some such measure became every day more apparent. The coin in the country, variously estimated at from $150,000,000 to $210,000,000, was absolutely inadequate to the demands of the time. The system of State banks in existence at the beginning of the war was not only incommensurate to the needs of the country, but radically vicious in itself. There was no uniformity of credit, no guaranty whatever of authenticity in circulation. Out of 1500 banks there were said to be fewer than 300 whose notes were not counterfeited. There was but a comparatively small number whose notes were not subject to discount outside of the State in which they were issued, and a citizen traveling from the Mississippi to the Hudson found the contents of his wallet changing in value whenever he crossed a State line. Of course with the immense demand for currency created by the war all these evils were greatly increased and aggravated, and when Congress met again in December, 1862, the Secretary urged anew, with the added weight of authority which came from a more fully matured plan and an enlarged experience, the scheme, which had been treated with neglect the year before, for establishing a safe and uniform currency throughout the nation.

The National Bank Act was prepared in accordance with the views of Mr. Chase by E. G. Spaulding of New York and Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts, who were members of the Committee of Ways and Means, and during the month of December, 1861, it was printed for the use of that committee. The bill encountered most earnest opposition in the committee, which was busily engaged on the loan and internal-revenue bills and other important work, and it was finally laid aside. In his report for 1862, Mr. Chase again, notwithstanding the suspension of specie payments, earnestly advocated the measure. He said that among the advantages which would arise from its passage would be "that the United States bonds would be required for banking purposes, a steady market would be established, and their negotiation greatly facilitated. . . . It is not easy to appreciate the full benefits of such conditions to a Government obliged to borrow"; it will "reconcile as far as practicable the interests of existing institutions with those of the whole people," and will supply "a firm anchorage to the union of the States."

The bill is understood to have had the sanction of every member of the Administration, and President Lincoln earnestly advocated its passage in his annual message in 1862; and in 1863 he said, "The enactment by Congress of a national banking law has proved a valuable support of the public credit, and the general legislation in relation to loans has fully answered the expectations of its favorers. Some amendments may be required to perfect existing laws, but no change in their principles or general scope is believed to be needed." Again, in 1864, he favored the taxation of the issues of State banks and the substitution of national-bank notes therefor. About fourteen months thereafter the same bill which had been printed for the use of the Committee of Ways and Means was introduced by Mr. Sherman and referred to the Finance Committee of the Senate, from which it was reported by him on February 2, 1863, with amendments. Ten days later it passed that body by a vote of 23 to 21; and on the 20th, same month, it also passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 78 to 64.[1]

It was warmly advocated by those who appreciated its advantages, and as earnestly opposed by those who thought they foresaw the growth of a powerful monetary system dangerous to the popular liberties. Its chief opponent in the Senate was Mr. Collamer, who ably represented the traditions of the past; it was most efficiently advocated by Mr. John Sherman of Ohio, to whom was reserved a part of great

[1] Address of Comptroller Knox before the Merchants' Association of Boston, Nov. 27, 1880. "Bankers' Magazine," Vol. XV., p. 545.

honor and usefulness in bringing to a close the financial history of the war.

> The bill was thoroughly revised, discussed, and repassed a little more than one year afterwards (June 3, 1864). . . . The vote in the Senate was 30 in favor and 9 against the bill, and in the House the vote was 78 to 63.[1]

The principal features of this comprehensive scheme were to open to private capital the business of national banking so freely that there could be no reasonable accusation of privilege or monopoly; to give to the whole system of banks a homogeneous circulation of notes, having a common impression, authenticated by a common authority, made safe by an adequate provision of specie, and secured for redemption by the pledge of United States bonds deposited in Washington; and finally by the Act of March 3, 1865, to tax out of existence the circulation of the banks organized under State laws. The whole system being thus based upon Government bonds, several hundreds of millions of United States notes were funded in bonds. It was the Secretary's belief, afterwards fully justified under the wise and masterly administration of Mr. Sherman, that this system of national banks would be of invaluable assistance in the resumption of specie payments by the Government. He said:

> If temporarily these associations redeem their issues with United States notes, resumption of specie payment will not thereby be delayed or endangered, but hastened and secured; for, just as soon as victory shall restore peace, the ample revenue already secured by wise legislation will enable the Government through advantageous purchases of specie to replace at once large amounts, and at no distant day the whole of this circulation, by coin, without detriment to any interest, but, on the contrary, with great and manifest benefit to all interests.

The bill was constantly amended and improved, and, although it might be too much to say that it was ever rendered entirely perfect, it is perhaps now unquestioned that few more wise and beneficent measures have ever been devised by American statesmanship.

No financial operations so prodigious as those which we have thus briefly sketched had ever before been known. The largest loans ever made by England were those which she negotiated in the terrible years of 1812–13 when she was fighting at the same time Napoleon and the United States. The British Government borrowed in those years $534,000,000, only a little more than Mr. Chase borrowed in nine months. The estimated wealth of the United Kingdom at that time, and of the loyal States in 1860, was almost exactly the same, in each case something over $100,000,000,000. Nowhere, we believe, do the annals of the world record such an appreciation of the public credit as that which is seen from the time of Mr. Lincoln's accession to the presidency until the period of the resumption of specie payment after the close of the war. It was hard for Mr. Buchanan's Secretaries of the Treasury to borrow money to pay the ordinary expenses of the Government at twelve per cent. Mr. Chase, as soon as Congress had given him command of the machinery required, in the legal-tender currency, the popular loan, and the national banking law, found no great difficulty in supplying at six per cent. the ravenous wants of a most costly war; and under the operation of the laws provided for him and similar legislation called for by his successors the Government credit gradually rose until its four per cents. sold at 130, and its three per cents. commanded a premium. At the beginning the Secretary was forced to rely more upon individual patriotism than upon public confidence; but long before the war ended he had hundreds of millions at his command.

In all these important labors Mr. Chase had the constant support of the President. Mr. Lincoln exercised less control and a less constant supervision over the work of the Treasury than over some other departments. But he rated at their true value the industry and the ability of the Secretary and the immense responsibility devolved upon his department, and contributed to its success in every way in his power. He sometimes made suggestions of financial measures,[2] but did not insist on their being adopted, and when the Secretary needed his powerful assistance with Congress he always gave it ungrudgingly. In regular and special messages he urged upon Congress the measures which the Secretary thought important,[3] and in frequent and informal conferences at the Executive Mansion with the leading members of both houses he exerted all his powers of influence and persuasion to assist the Secretary in obtaining what legislation was needed.

SEWARD AND CHASE.

Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase became at an early day, and continued to be, respectively, the representatives in the Cabinet of the more conservative and the more radical elements of the Republican party. Each exerted himself with equal zeal and equal energy in the branch of the public service committed to his charge; but their relative attitudes towards the President soon became entirely different. Mr. Seward, while doing everything possible to

1 Address of Comptroller Knox.

2 Lincoln to Chase, May 18, 1864.

3 Especially the message of January 19, 1863, in favor of the funding bill and the bill to provide a national currency.

serve the national cause, and thus unconsciously building for himself an enduring monument in the respect and regard of the country, was, so far as can be discerned, absolutely free from any ambition or afterthought personal to himself. He was, during the early part of the war, so intent upon the work immediately in hand that he had no leisure for political combinations; and later, when the subject of the next Presidential nomination began to be considered and discussed, he recognized the fact that Mr. Lincoln was best qualified by his abilities, his experience, and his standing in the country to be his own successor.

The attitude of Mr. Chase was altogether unlike this. As we have seen, he did all that man could do to grapple with the problem of supplying the ways and means of the gigantic war. With untiring zeal and perfect integrity he devoted his extraordinary ability to the work of raising the thousands of millions expended in the great struggle which was crowned with a colossal success. But his attitude towards the President, it is hardly too much to say, was one which varied between the limits of active hostility and benevolent contempt. He apparently never changed his opinion that a great mistake had been committed at Chicago, and the predominant thought which was present to him through three years of his administration was that it was his duty to counteract, as far as possible, the evil results of that mistake. He felt himself alone in the Cabinet. He looked upon the President and all his colleagues as his inferiors in capacity, in zeal, in devotion to liberty and the general welfare. He sincerely persuaded himself that every disaster which happened to the country happened because his advice was not followed, and that every piece of good fortune was due to his having been able, from time to time, to rescue the President and the rest of the Cabinet from the consequences of their own errors. He kept up a voluminous correspondence with friends in all sections of the country, to which we should hesitate to refer had it not been that he retained copies of his letters, and many years afterwards gave them into the hands of a biographer for publication. These letters are pervaded by a constant tone of slight and criticism towards his chief and his colleagues. He continually disavows all responsibility for the conduct of the war. "My recommendations," he says, "before [Halleck] came in were generally disregarded, and since have been seldom ventured. . . . Those who reject my counsels ought to know better than I do."[1] "I do not wonder that dissatisfaction prevails. . . . It is sad to think of the delay and inaction which have marked the past."[2] To Senator Sherman he wrote:

> The future does not look promising to me. . . . We, who are called members of the Cabinet, but are in reality only separate heads of departments, meeting now and then for talk on whatever happens to come uppermost, not for grave consultation on matters concerning the salvation of the country — we have as little to do with it as if we were the heads of factories supplying shoes or clothing. . . . It is painful to hear complaints of remissness, delays, discords, and dangers, and feel that there must be ground for such complaints, and know, at the same time, that one has no power to remedy the evils complained of, and yet be thought to have.[3]

To another he said:

> Some consolation, in the review of the disasters we have experienced, may perhaps be found in the supposition that they were necessary to convince the President and the country that a decided measure in relation to slavery was absolutely necessary. . . . Though charged with the responsibility of providing means for the vast expenditures of the war, I have little more voice in its conduct than a stranger to the Administration.[4]

He says if his judgment had more weight the war would be prosecuted with more vigor and success. The letters in this strain are innumerable. In all of them he labors to keep himself distinct and separate from the rest of the Government, protesting against its faults and errors, and taking credit for the good advice he wastes upon them. He says:

> We have fallen on very evil days. . . . The President has hitherto refused to sanction any adequate measures for the liberation of the loyal population of the South from slavery to the rebels. . . . Then we have placed and continued in command generals who have never manifested the slightest sympathy with our cause as related to the controlling question of slavery. . . . All these causes tend to demoralization, and we are demoralized. . . . It is some consolation to me that my voice, and, so far as opportunity has allowed, my example, has been steadily opposed to all this. I have urged my ideas on the President and my associates till I begin to feel that they are irksome to the first and to one or two at least of the second.[5]

All this time, with the most facile self-deception, he believed in his own loyalty and friendship for the President, and nightly recorded in his diary his sorrow for Mr. Lincoln's fatal course. September 12 he writes:

> The Secretary of War informed me that he had heard from General Halleck that the President is going out to see General McClellan, and commented with some severity on his humiliating submissive-

1 Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 443.
2 Ibid., p. 458.
3 Ibid., 379.
4 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 491.
5 Ibid., pp. 453, 454.

ness to that officer. It is indeed humiliating, but prompted, I believe, by a sincere desire to serve the country. . . . I think that the President, with the most honest intentions in the world, and a naturally clear judgment and a true, unselfish patriotism, has yielded so much to border State and negrophobic counsels that he now finds it difficult to arrest his own descent towards the most fatal concessions. He has already separated himself from the great body of the party which elected him; distrusts most those who represent its spirit, and waits — for what?[1]

He says in another place:

September 11th. How singularly all our worst defeats have followed administrative cr— no, blunders. McDowell defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration would not supersede Patterson by a general of more capacity, vigor, and devotion to the cause; McClellan defeated at Richmond, because the Administration recalled Shields and forced Frémont to retire from the pursuit of Jackson; . . . Pope defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration persisted in keeping McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac.[2]

He never lost an opportunity for ingratiating himself with the general in favor, or the general in disgrace. He paid equally assiduous homage to the rising and the setting sun. In the dawn of McClellan's first successes in the West he made haste to write to him:

The country was indebted to me . . . in some considerable degree for the change of your commission from Ohio into a commission of major-general of the army of the Union, and your assignment to the command of the Department of the Ohio. I drew with my own hand the order extending it into Virginia. . . . It was my wish that you should remain in command of the Mississippi, but in this I was overruled.[3]

His present command, however, he says, is a more important one, and he wishes Kentucky and Tennessee to be included in it, and thinks both will be done. When McClellan was appointed General-in-Chief, the Secretary, eager to be the first to tell the good news, immediately wrote a note to Colonel Key, McClellan's judge-advocate: "McClellan is Commander-in-Chief. Let us thank God and take courage."[4] To newly appointed and promoted generals he wrote in the same strain.[5] Even when he had become estranged from a prominent officer the slightest appeal to his *amour propre* was sufficient to bring about a reconciliation. After he had lost all confidence in McClellan and almost given up the President for not dismissing him, General John Cochran came to him and said McClellan would like to retire from active command if he could do so without disgrace — which could be accomplished, and a more active general secured, by restoring him to the chief command, "where he could act in unison with myself," says the Secretary.[6] He entered at once into *pour-parlers*, saying how much he had once admired and confided in McClellan; how the general came to lose his confidence; how heartily he had supported him with supplies and reënforcements, notwithstanding his mistrust; his entire willingness to receive any correction which facts would warrant; his absolute freedom from personal ill-will. When the amiable ambassador told him that Colonel Key had often expressed his regret that McClellan had not conferred and acted in concert with the Secretary, he replied, "I think if he had, that the rebellion would be ended now."[7] Further letters followed between them which are faithfully recorded in his diary; but during these platonic negotiations McClellan was finally removed from command.

Mr. Chase cultivated, however, the closest relations with those generals who imagined they had a grievance against the Administration. He took General Shields to his arms when he returned from the Shenandoah after his disastrous experience with Jackson. Shields's account of how he would have destroyed Stonewall Jackson if the President had permitted him did not apparently touch the Secretary's sense of humor. He received it all in good faith; assured Shields that if he had had his way he should have been supported, and wrote in his diary: "Sad! sad! yet nobody seems to heed. General Shields and I talked all this over, deploring the strange fatality which seemed to preside over the whole transaction. He dined with us and after dinner rode out." To Hooker, after the failure of the Chickahominy campaign, he said, "General, if my advice had been followed, you would have commanded the army after the retreat to the James River, if not before";[8] to which Fighting Joe of course responded, "If I had commanded, Richmond would have been ours." He warmly sympathized with General Hunter after the revocation of his emancipation order in South Carolina, and allowed his preference for military emancipation to carry him, in one instance, to the point of absolute disloyalty to the President. On the 31st of July, 1862, he wrote a long letter to General Butler in New Orleans striving to controvert the views of the President in relation to slavery in the Gulf States, and urging in place of them his own opinions, "to which,"

1 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 470.
2 Ibid., p. 469.
3 Shuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 427.
4 Ibid., p. 445.
5 Ibid., p. 457.
6 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 499.
7 Ibid., p. 500.
8 Ibid., p. 487.

he said, "I am just as sure the masses will and the politicians must come, as I am sure that both politicians and masses have come to opinions expressed by me when they found few concurrents"; and he concluded his letter with this rash and mischievous advice:

> Of course, if some prudential consideration did not forbid, I should at once, if I were in your place, notify the slaveholders of Louisiana that henceforth they must be content to pay their laborers wages. . . . It is quite true that such an order could not be enforced by military power beyond military lines, but it would enforce itself by degrees a good way beyond them, and would make the extension of military lines comparatively quite easy.[1]

Here the obvious objection presented itself, that such a course would be in direct contravention to the President's known policy, and would be immediately repudiated and revoked by him. The Secretary foresaw this, and added a prediction so reckless, and so disloyal to his constitutional chief, that if it were not printed by his authority it would be difficult to believe he had written it: "It may be said that such an order would be annulled. I think not. It is plain enough that the annulling of Hunter's order was a mistake. It will not be repeated." A volume could not more clearly show the Secretary's opinion of the President.

The surest way to his confidence and regard was to approach him with conversation derogatory to Mr. Lincoln. He records in his diary an after-dinner conversation with an officer whom he seems to have met for the first time: "I asked him what he thought of the President."[2] He apparently had no perception of the gross impropriety of such a question coming from him. The officer evidently knew what sort of reply was expected. He said:

> A man irresolute, but of honest intentions; born a poor white, in a slave State, and of course among aristocrats; kind in spirit and not envious, but anxious for approval, especially of those to whom he has been accustomed to look up — hence solicitous of support of the slaveholders in the border States, and unwilling to offend them; without the large mind necessary to grasp great questions, uncertain of himself, and in many things ready to lean too much on others.[3]

Of course, after a dictum so thoroughly in harmony with his own opinions, the Secretary naïvely records that he "found this gentleman well read and extremely intelligent." In reply to a correspondent, whose letters were filled with the most violent abuse of the President and other officers of the Government, he had no word of rebuke. He simply replied:

> I am not responsible for the management of the war and have no voice in it, except that I am not forbidden to make suggestions; and do so now and then when I can't help it.[4]

He had no defense for his colleagues against the attacks of his correspondent, except to say:

> Nor should you forget that a war managed by a President, a commanding general, and a secretary, cannot, especially when the great differences of temperament, wishes, and intellectual characteristics of these three are taken into account, reasonably be expected to be conducted in the best possible manner. This condition can only be remedied by the President, and, as yet, he fears the remedy most.

The President was not unaware of this disposition of his minister of finance towards him. Presidents in even a greater degree than kings are kept informed of all currents of favor and hostility about them; for besides being to an equal degree the source of favors and of power, they are not surrounded by any of that divinity which hedges the hereditary ruler, and they are compelled to listen to the crude truth from the hundreds of statesmen and politicians who surround them. And, besides this, the Secretary of the Treasury was a man too direct and too straightforward to work in the darkness. He records in his diary a singular conversation which he held with Mr. Thurlow Weed, an intimate and trusted counselor of the President and the bosom friend of the Secretary of State:

> Weed called, and we had a long talk. . . . I told him I did not doubt Mr. Seward's fidelity to his ideas of progress, amelioration, and freedom, but that I thought he adhered too tenaciously to men who proved themselves unworthy and dangerous, such as McClellan; that he resisted too persistently decided measures; that his influence encouraged the irresolution and inaction of the President in respect to men and measures, although personally he was as decided as anybody in favor of vigorous prosecution of the war, and as active as anybody in concerting plans of action against the rebels.[5]

It is altogether probable that Mr. Weed would consider it his duty to communicate to his friends this disparaging view entertained of them by the Secretary of the Treasury; and when we consider that Mr. Chase talked and wrote in this strain to hundreds of people in regard to his associates, it is likely that they were as thoroughly aware of his opinions and utterances as if he had made them in Cabinet meeting. But Seward was, as the President once said of him, "a man without gall"; and it was the lifelong habit of Mr. Lincoln to disregard slights that were personal to himself.

1 Shuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 377.

2 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 505.

3 It is doubtless by a slip of the pen that the Secretary attributed this conversation to General Hunter. It was evidently General Halpine, who called with General Hunter, that gave him this highly satisfactory view of the President's character.

4 Warden, p. 549.

5 Ibid., p. 475.

He had the greatest respect and admiration for Mr. Chase's capacity; he believed thoroughly in his devotion to the national cause; and seeing every day the proof of his pure and able management of the finances of the Government, he steadily refused to consider the question of the Secretary's feelings towards himself.

It was near the end of the year 1862 that an incident occurred which threatened for a time to deprive the Government of the services of the Secretaries both of State and of the Treasury. A strong feeling of discontent, gradually ripening into one of hostility, had grown up in the Senate against Mr. Seward. It was founded principally upon the ground formulated by Mr. Chase in his interview with Weed that he "adhered too tenaciously to men who proved themselves unworthy and dangerous, such as McClellan; that he resisted too persistently decided measures; that his influence encouraged the irresolution and inaction of the President in respect to men and measures"; and Mr. Sumner, who had up to this time been friendly rather than otherwise to Mr. Seward, was suddenly brought into sympathy with his opponents by discovering in the diplomatic correspondence a phrase bracketing together the secessionists and the extreme antislavery men for equal condemnation and criticism.[1]

The feeling against the Secretary of State at last attained such a height in the Senate that a caucus was called to consider the matter, which resulted in a vote being taken demanding of the President the dismissal of Mr. Seward from his Cabinet. As a matter of taste and expediency this resolution later in the evening was withdrawn and another adopted in its place requesting the President to reconstruct the Cabinet, in which, although Mr. Seward's name was not mentioned, the intention of the Republican senators remained equally clear. A committee was appointed to present the sense of the caucus to the President; but before this was carried into effect, Senator King of New York, meeting the Secretary of State, acquainted him with these proceedings, and he, with his son, the Assistant-Secretary of State, at once presented their resignations to the President.

On the morning of the 19th of December a committee of nine waited upon the President and presented him the resolutions adopted the day before. A long and earnest conference took place between the President and the committee, which was marked on both sides by unusual candor and moderation. They attacked, one by one, the Secretary of State, not for any specific wrong-doing, but for a supposed lukewarmness in the conduct of affairs, and especially for a lack of interest in the antislavery measures of the Administration, which they considered essential to a successful prosecution of the war. When the President reported this conference to his Cabinet afterwards he said, in his own peculiar imagery:

> While they seemed to believe in my honesty, they also appeared to think that when I had in me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived.

The conference ended without other result than an appointment for the committee to call again in the evening. Lincoln at once called the Cabinet together and laid the entire matter before them. He gave them distinctly to understand that in this proceeding he was not inviting or intimating that he desired the resignation of any of them. He said he could not afford to lose any of them; that he did not see how he could get on with a Cabinet composed of new material; and he dismissed the council with the request that they also should meet him that evening. The committee and the Cabinet — Seward of course being absent — came together in accordance with the President's instruction, and each party was greatly surprised to find the other there. Mr. Lincoln was determined, however, to have a thorough and frank discussion, so that hereafter neither in his government nor in the Senate should it be possible to say that there were any points between them concealed or unexplained. The President stated the case and read the resolutions of the senators, commenting upon parts of it with some gentle severity. A general discussion then took place, marked with singular frankness, both in the attack and the defense, Collamer and Fessenden speaking with more mildness than the others, but Grimes, Sumner,

[1] Mr. Seward, writing to Mr. Adams on the 5th of July, 1862, had used this phrase: "It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war — the former by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the Federal Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of saving the Union." When we reflect that only eight days after these words were written the President informed Mr. Seward of his intention to issue his emancipating edict, we may imagine how far the Secretary was from penetrating the mind of his chief — a fault for which he ought not perhaps to be blamed, considering the extreme reticence which the President observed at that time in regard to his intentions. Still, the dispatch was unnecessary, and the critics of the Secretary contended, not without reason, that it should not have been sent before being submitted to the President's approval. He had also said, writing to Mr. Dayton on the 22d of April, that "the rights of the States and the condition of every human being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." This also had given great offense to the radical antislavery men.

and Trumbull attacking the Cabinet generally, and Mr. Seward particularly, with considerable sharpness. The Cabinet defended themselves in general and their absent colleague with equal energy but with unruffled temper. Mr. Chase alone seemed to feel himself in a false position. As we have seen in his interview with Weed, he was in the habit of using precisely the same expressions in regard to the Secretary of State as those employed by the senators. Brought to bay thus unexpectedly and summoned to speak before both parties to the controversy, he naturally felt the embarrassment of the situation. He could not join the Senate in their attack upon the Administration and he could not effectively defend his colleagues in the presence of eight senators, to all of whom he had probably spoken in derogation of the President and the Secretary of State. He protested with some heat against the attitude in which he was placed, and said he would not have come if he had expected to be arraigned. When the fire of the discussion had burned itself out, Mr. Lincoln then took a formal vote. "Do you, gentlemen," he said, "still think Seward ought to be excused?" Grimes, Trumbull, Sumner, and Pomeroy said "Yes." Collamer, Fessenden, and Howard declined to commit themselves. Harris was opposed to it and Wade was absent. The meeting broke up late at night, says Secretary Welles, "in a milder spirit than it met." The free talk had cleared the air somewhat, and both parties to the controversy respected each other more than before. As the senators were retiring, Mr. Trumbull paused for a moment at the door, then, turning, walked rapidly back to the President and said to him privately, but with great vehemence, that the Secretary of the Treasury had held a very different tone the last time he had spoken with him.

The news of this stormy meeting quickly transpired, and the next morning there was great discussion and excitement in the town. The resignation of Seward was regarded as irrevocable, and all the amateur Cabinet-makers were busy in the preparation of a new Administration. The hopes of all the enemies of the Government were greatly stimulated by this indication of divided counsels, and the partisans of General McClellan in particular thought they saw in this conjuncture the occasion for his return to power. In fact, they felt so sure of his speedy restoration to command that they began to stipulate as the price of their adhesion to him that he should dictate his own terms on his return; that he must insist upon the disposal of all the important commands in the army.[1] They imagined that the President would be so helpless that the friends of McClellan might demand any terms they thought good.

[1] Welles, Diary.

The President, though deeply distressed at the turn which affairs had taken, preserved his coolness and kept his own counsel. On the morning of the 20th, in the presence of several other members of the Cabinet who had called for further discussion of the crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury tendered his resignation. He held the written paper in his hand, but did not advance to deliver it. The President stepped forward and took it with an alacrity that surprised and, it must be said, disappointed Mr. Chase. He then at once dismissed the meeting. From the moment when he saw Mr. Chase holding his resignation in his hand, his way was clear before him. He at once sent an identical note to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, saying:

> You have respectively tendered me your resignations as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but after most anxious consideration my deliberate judgment is that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your Departments respectively.
>
> Your obedient servant,
>
> A. LINCOLN.

The next morning Mr. Seward addressed a brief note to the President, dated at the Department of State, and saying: "I have cheerfully resumed the functions of this Department, in obedience to your command"; and inclosed a copy of this note to the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Chase found his position not quite so simple as that of the Secretary of State. He did not follow Mr. Seward's example in returning to the Cabinet as promptly as he did in leaving it. He wrote him a brief letter, saying:

> I have received your note and also a call from Mr. Nicolay, to whom I have promised an answer to the President to-morrow morning. My reflections strengthen my conviction that being once honorably out of the Cabinet no important public interest now requires my return to it. If I yield this judgment, it will be in deference to apprehensions which really seem to me unfounded. I will sleep on it.

He had seen in the face of the President the gratification which the tender of his resignation had imparted, and returning to his house, while not entirely comprehending what had happened, he seemed conscious that he had made a misstep. He wrote a letter to the President, from which we take a few paragraphs:

> Will you allow me to say that something you said or looked when I handed you my resignation this morning made on my mind the impression

that having received the resignations both of Governor Seward and myself you felt that you could relieve yourself from trouble by declining to accept either, and that this feeling was one of gratification.

He then went on to say that he was glad of any opportunity to promote the comfort of the President, but that he did not desire him to decline accepting his resignation. He said:

Recent events have too rudely jostled the unity of your Cabinet and disclosed an opinion too deeply seated, and too generally received in Congress and in the country, to be safely disregarded, that the concord in judgment and action essential to successful administration does not prevail among its members. By some the embarrassment of Administration is attributed to me; by others, to Mr. Seward; by others still, to other heads of Departments. Now neither Mr. Seward nor myself is essential to you or to the country. We both earnestly wish to be relieved from the oppressive charge of our respective Departments, and we have both placed our resignations in your hands.

He concluded by saying he thought both himself and Mr. Seward could better serve the country at that time as private citizens than in the Cabinet. He did not immediately transmit this letter to the President, and after hearing from Mr. Seward that he had gone back to the Cabinet his suggestion that both would better retire was no longer practicable. After a Sunday passed in very serious consideration, he resolved to withdraw his resignation. He was unable, even then, to imitate the brevity of Mr. Seward's note. He sent to the President his note of the 20th inclosed in another, in which he said that reflection had not much, if at all, changed his original impression, but that it had led him to the conclusion that he had in this matter to conform his action to the President's judgment. He would therefore resume his post as Secretary of the Treasury, ready, however, to retire at any moment if, in the President's judgment, the success of the Administration might be in the slightest degree promoted thereby.

The untrained diplomatist of Illinois had thus met and conjured away, with unsurpassed courage and skill, one of the severest crises that ever threatened the integrity of his Administration. He had to meet it absolutely unaided: from the nature of the case he could take no advice from those who were nearest him in the Government. By his bold and original expedient of confronting the senators with the Cabinet, and having them discuss their mutual misunderstandings under his own eye, he cleared up many dangerous misconceptions, and, as usually happens when both parties are men of intelligence and good-will, brought about a friendlier and more considerate feeling between his government and the Republican leaders than had ever before existed. By placing Mr. Chase in such an attitude that his resignation became necessary to his own sense of dignity he made himself absolute master of the situation; by treating the resignations and the return to the Cabinet of both ministers as one and the same transaction he saved for the nation the invaluable services of both, and preserved his own position of entire impartiality between the two wings of the Union party. The results of this achievement were not merely temporary. From that hour there was a certain loosening of the hitherto close alliance between Mr. Chase and the Republican opposition to the President, while a kind of comradeship, born of their joint sortie and reëntrance into the Government, gave thereafter a greater semblance of cordiality to the relations between the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury. But above all, the incident left the President seated more firmly than ever in the saddle. When the Cabinet had retired, and left the President with the resignation of Mr. Chase in his hands, he said to a friend who entered soon after, in one of those graphic metaphors so often suggested to him by the memories of his pioneer childhood, and which revealed his careless greatness perhaps more clearly than his most labored official utterances, "Now I can ride; I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag."[1]

Nearly a year later he said in a conversation relating to this matter:

I do not see how it could have been done better. I am sure it was right. If I had yielded to that storm and dismissed Seward the thing would all have slumped over one way, and we should have been left with a scanty handful of supporters. When Chase gave in his resignation I saw that the game was in my hands, and I put it through.

Though the opposition to Mr. Seward did not immediately come to an end,[2] it never exhibited such vitality again, and its later manifestations were treated far more cavalierly by Mr. Lincoln. He had even before this dismissed one very respectable committee from New York who had called to express an unfavorable opinion of the premier, by saying with unwonted harshness, "You would be willing to see the country ruined if you could turn out Seward"; [3] and after this incident he never again allowed the Secretary of State to be attacked in his presence.

[1] J. H., Diary.

[2] There was a long and heated discussion between Mr. Greeley and Mr. Raymond, in the columns of the "Tribune" and "Times," in regard to the culpability of the Secretary of State in the matter of his dispatches.

[3] Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 468.

Feb 1889

SLOW-BURNING CONSTRUCTION.[1]

THE fearful losses of life and property by fire in the United States have lately attracted the attention which is due to the causes of such loss and to the means for preventing them. Coincidently with these investigations a very profound change in the conduct of the business of fire insurance companies is in progress. Until within a very recent period the management of an insurance company issuing policies of indemnity against loss by fire has consisted mainly in taking risks as they might happen to be, a more or less careful inspection having been made into the condition of the property before issuing a policy, for the purpose of estimating the rate of premium to be charged rather than with a view to improving such conditions.

The notice of the owners or occupants has sometimes been called to glaring defects, and a somewhat desultory inspection has been maintained; not so much with the intention of informing the owner or occupant how to protect the property against fire so as to reduce the loss to the lowest terms, but rather for the purpose of informing the underwriters, that they may not take or maintain too low a rate of premium. In fact, there has been until recently a passive indifference and sometimes a frankly acknowledged objection on the part of prominent underwriters to the introduction of the most effective safeguards, lest the reduction of premiums that might be demanded should diminish the profits of the insurance companies.

It may be admitted that under this system many fire insurance companies have been established and conducted by men of conspicuous ability, with great profit to the stockholders and indirectly with great benefit to the assured. These companies have done a world-wide business, scattering their risks, and by the very breadth of their operations and income they have been enabled to reduce their premiums to the very lowest terms that the system itself would permit, subject as it has been to an excessive expense; but as the amount of property at risk has increased in recent years with very great rapidity, the companies of a safe kind have been unable to carry the full lines required in the concentrated hazards of our great cities. Owners have therefore been obliged to seek insurance wherever they could get it, sometimes exhausting all the fire insurance companies of the world. At the same time an unwholesome competition has grown up among the underwriters themselves by which their previously heavy expenses in the conduct of their business have been increased, while badly managed or small companies have been led to take risks at less than cost — a method ending inevitably in bankruptcy or in withdrawal from business.

In the opinion of competent experts from eighty to ninety per cent. of all the stock fire insurance companies organized to transact business within the limits of the United States, or empowered thereto, have agencies in the State of New York, which renders it incumbent on them to make returns to the Commissioner of Insurance of that State giving a statement of all their transactions in the United States. There could be no better indication of the rapid growth of wealth in this country during the last twenty-five or thirty years than a comparison of the sum of the insurance written by these companies. In 1859, before the civil war, the sum of the risks taken by companies making these returns was a fraction under $1,500,000,000. In the year 1887 the amount in round numbers was $12,250,000,000.

The proportion of loss to the value of the property insured has slowly diminished: there has been a little improvement in the construction of buildings in some of the great cities, though not much elsewhere, so that the loss by fire now ranges from $100,000,000 to $130,000,000 a year. The cost of sustaining fire insurance companies whose function is simply to distribute this loss over a wider field is about $65,000,000 a year; to this must be added the cost of sustaining expensive fire departments, which may be computed at a minimum at not less than $25,000,000 a year, and is probably more, to say nothing of the additional cost of water supply for fire purposes. The fire tax of the United States may therefore be estimated at a minimum of $180,000,000, or at a maximum of over $200,000,000, in a normal year in which no great conflagration occurs.

Within the last five years a great change has taken place in the views of the leading men who conduct the business of the fire insurance companies, and a system is rapidly coming into vogue for the frequent inspection of buildings with a view to the prevention of loss by protecting them, so far as their generally bad construction will permit, from the dangers which must occur from fires that are unavoidable, by installing apparatus to check the rapid spread of fires when they do oc-

[1] Copyright, 1888, by Edward Atkinson.

Mar. 1886

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE EDICT OF FREEDOM.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

IN his preliminary proclamation of September 22 President Lincoln had announced his intention to urge once more upon Congress his policy of compensated abolishment. Accordingly his annual message of December 1, 1862, was in great part devoted to a discussion of this question. "Without slavery," he premised, "the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue." His argument presented anew, with broad prophetic forecast, the folly of disunion, the brilliant destiny of the Republic as a single nation, the safety of building with wise statesmanship upon its coming population and wealth. He stated that by the law of increase shown in the census tables the country might expect to number over two hundred millions of people in less than a century.

> And we will reach this too [he continued] if we do not ourselves relinquish the chance, by the folly and evils of disunion, or by long and exhausting war springing from the only great element of national discord among us. While it cannot be foreseen exactly how much one huge example of secession, breeding lesser ones indefinitely, would retard population, civilization, and prosperity, no one can doubt that the extent of it would be very great and injurious. The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and proportionately the wealth of the country. With these we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other debt without it.

He therefore recommended that Congress should propose to the legislatures of the several States a constitutional amendment, consisting of three articles, namely: one providing compensation in bonds for every State which should abolish slavery before the year 1900; another securing freedom to all slaves who during the rebellion had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war—also providing compensation to loyal owners; the third authorizing Congress to provide for colonization.

> The plan [continued the message] consisting of these articles is recommended, not but that a restoration of the national authority would be accepted without its adoption. Nor will the war, nor proceedings under the proclamation of September 22, 1862, be stayed because of the recommendation of this plan. Its timely adoption, I doubt not, would bring restoration, and thereby stay both. And, notwithstanding this plan, the recommendation that Congress provide by law for compensating any State which may adopt emancipation before this plan shall have been acted upon is hereby earnestly renewed. Such would be only an advance part of the plan, and the same arguments apply to both. This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union. . . . The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law. It cannot become such without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and, afterwards, three-fourths of the States. The requisite three-fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the slave States. Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting emancipation at no very distant day upon the new constitutional terms. This assurance would end the struggle now and save the Union forever. . . . We can succeed only by concert. It is not, "Can any of us imagine better?" but, "Can we all do better?" Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs, "Can we do better?" The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves, and then we shall save our country.
>
> Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We, of this Congress and this Administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even we here—hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.[2]

No immediate action followed this patriotic appeal. No indications of reviving unionism were manifested in the distinctively rebel States. No popular expression of a willingness to abandon slavery and accept compensation came from the loyal border-slave States, ex-

[2] Annual Message, December 1, 1862.

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FAC-SIMILE (FROM THE ORIGINAL MS. IN POSSESSION OF THE AUTHORS) OF THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, SHOWN TO THE CABINET IN JULY, 1862. (SEE "THE CENTURY" FOR DECEMBER, 1888, P. 292.)

In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes" Approved July 17. 1862, and which act, and the joint Resolution explanatory thereof, are hereunto published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to, and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion, or any rebellion against the government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures, as within and by said sixth section provided.

And I hereby make known that it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure for tendering pecuniary aid to the free choice or rejection, of any and all States which may then be recognizing and practically sustaining the authority of the United States, and which may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, gradual ~~adoption~~ abolishment of slavery within such State or States— that the object is to practically restore, thenceforward to maintain, the constitutional relation between the general government, and each, and all the States, wherein that relation

is now suspended, or disturbed; and that,
for this object, the war, as it has been, will
be, prosecuted. And, as a fit and necessa-
ry Military measure for effecting this object,
I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, do order and de-
clare that on the first day of January in the
year of Our Lord one thousand, eight hundred
and sixty-three, all persons, held as slaves with-
in any State or states, wherein the Constitution-
al authority of the United States shall not
then be practically recognized, submitted to,
and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and
forever, be free.

Emancipation Proclamation
as first sketched and
shown to the Cabinet on
July 1862.

INDORSEMENT ON THE DOCUMENT GIVEN ABOVE.

cept, perhaps, in a qualified way from Missouri, where the emancipation sentiment was steadily progressing, though with somewhat convulsive action owing to the quarrel which divided the unionists of that State. Thus the month of December wore away and the day approached when it became necessary for the President to execute the announcement of emancipation made in his preliminary proclamation of September 22. That he was ready at the appointed time is shown by an entry in the diary of Secretary Welles:

At the meeting to-day [December 30, 1862], the President read the draft of his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and finally directed that copies should be furnished to each. It is a good and well prepared paper, but I suggested that a part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted. Chase advised that fractional parts of States ought not to be exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Practically there would be difficulty in freeing parts of States and not freeing others — a clashing between central and local authorities.[1]

[1] Unpublished MS.

It will be remembered that when the President proposed emancipation on the 22d of July and again when he announced emancipation on the 22d of September he informed his Cabinet that he had decided the main matter for himself and that he asked their advice only upon subordinate points. In now taking up the subject for the third and final review there was neither doubt nor hesitation in regard to the central policy and act about to be consummated. But there were several important minor questions upon which, as before, he wished the advice of his Cabinet, and it was to present these in concise form for discussion that he wrote his draft and furnished each of them a copy on the 30th of December, as Mr. Welles relates. This draft, omitting its mere routine phraseology and quotations from the former proclamation, continued as follows:

Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a proper and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my intention so to do, publicly proclaimed for one hundred days as aforesaid, order and designate as the States and parts of States in which the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States the follow-

By the President of the
United States of America
A Proclamation

I Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relations between the United States, and each of the states, and the people thereof, in which states that relation is, or may be suspended, or disturbed.

That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave-states, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which states, may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate, or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent with their consent upon this continent, or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the Governments existing there, will be continued.

That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will, ~~during the continuance in office of the present incumbent~~, recognize, and maintain the freedom of such persons, ~~and will not repress~~, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

That the executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States, and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof shall, on that day be, in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the

qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

That attention is hereby called to an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to make an additional Article of War" Approved March 13. 1862, and which Act is in the words and figure following.

> *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the army of the United States and shall be obeyed and observed as such:
>
> Article —. All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.
>
> SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.

Also to the ninth and tenth sections of an Act entitled An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," Approved July 17. 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following.

> SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*. That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found on [or] being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the forces of the United States shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.
>
> SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted*. That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other State, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or some offence against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present rebellion nor in any way given aid and comfort therein: and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretence whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service.

And I do hereby enjoin upon and orders all persons engaged in the Military and Naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the act, and sections above recited.

And the executive will, in due time ~~at the next Session of Congress~~ recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the Constitutional relation between the United States, and their respective states, and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States including the loss of slaves.

In witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

A. L.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty second day of September, in the year of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and sixty two, and sixty two, and of the Independence of the United States, the eighty seventh.

Abraham Lincoln.

By the President
William H. Seward,
Secretary of State

INDORSEMENT.

WASHINGTON, JANUARY 4, 1864. MY DEAR MRS. BARNES: I have the pleasure of sending you, with the President's permission, the original draft of his September proclamation. The body of it is in his own handwriting, the pencilled additions in the hand of the Secretary of State, and the final beginning and ending in the hand of the chief clerk. Yours very sincerely, F. W. SEWARD.
MRS. EMILY W. BARNES, ALBANY, N. Y.

By the President of the United States of America:

A Proclamation.

Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States."

Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate

as the States and parts of States wherein the peoples thereof respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:

Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South-Carolina, North-Carolina, and Virginia, (except the fortyeight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth-City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk & Portsmouth; and which excepted parts are, for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and hencefoward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, including the Military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three, and of the



ing, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, except the Parishes of

Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of

And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order, and declare, that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward forever shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons, and will do no act, or acts, to repress said persons, or any of them, in any suitable efforts they may make for their actual freedom. And I hereby appeal to the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder, tumult, and violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for wages.

And I further declare, and make known, that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison and defend forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.[1]

It will be seen that this draft presented for discussion, in addition to mere verbal criticism, the question of defining the fractional portions of Virginia and Louisiana under Federal control and the yet more important policy, now for the first time announced by the President, of his intention to incorporate a portion of the newly liberated slaves into the armies of the Union.

Mr. Welles's diary for Wednesday, December 31, 1862, thus continues:

We had an early and special Cabinet meeting—convened at 10 A. M. The subject was the proclamation of to-morrow to emancipate the slaves in the rebel States. Seward proposed two amendments. One included mine, and one enjoining upon, instead of appealing to, those emancipated to forbear from tumult. Blair had, like Seward and myself, proposed the omission of a part of a sentence and made other suggestions which I thought improvements. Chase made some good criticisms and proposed a felicitous closing sentence. The President took the suggestions, written in order, and said he would complete the document.[1]

From the manuscript letters and memoranda we glean more fully the modifications of the amendments proposed by the several members of the Cabinet. The changes suggested in Mr. Seward's note were all verbal, and were three in number. *First:* Following the declaration that "the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons," he proposed to omit the further words which had been used in the September proclamation, "and will do no act, or acts, to repress said persons, or any of them, in any suitable efforts they may make for their actual freedom." Mr. Welles had suggested the same change. *Secondly:* The next sentence, which read, "And I hereby appeal to the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder," etc., Mr. Seward proposed should read, "And I hereby command and require the people so declared to be free to abstain from all disorder," etc. *Thirdly:* The phrase, "and in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for wages," he proposed should read, "and I do recommend to them in all cases, when allowed, to labor faithfully for just and reasonable wages."[1]

The criticisms submitted by Mr. Chase were quite long and full, and since they suggested the most distinctive divergence from the President's plan, namely, that of making no exceptions of fractional portions of States, except the forty-eight counties of West Virginia, his letter needs to be quoted in full:

[1] Unpublished MS.

In accordance with your verbal direction of yesterday I most respectfully submit the following observations in respect to the draft of a proclamation designating the States and parts of States within which the proclamation of September 22, 1862, is to take effect according to the terms thereof.

I. It seems to me wisest to make no exceptions of parts of States from the operation of the proclamation other than the forty-eight counties of West Virginia. My reasons are these:

1. Such exceptions will impair, in the public estimation, the moral effect of the proclamation, and invite censure which it would be well, if possible, to avoid.

2. Such exceptions must necessarily be confined to some few parishes and counties in Louisiana and Virginia, and can have no practically useful effect. Through the operation of various acts of Congress the slaves of disloyal masters in those parts are already enfranchised, and the slaves of loyal masters are practically so. Some of the latter have already commenced paying wages to their laborers, formerly slaves; and it is to be feared that if, by exceptions, slavery is practically reëstablished in favor of some masters, while abolished by law and by the necessary effect of military occupation as to others, very serious inconveniences may arise.

3. No intimation of exceptions of this kind is given in the September proclamation, nor does it appear that any intimations otherwise given have been taken into account by those who have participated in recent elections, or that any exceptions of their particular localities are desired by them.

II. I think it would be expedient to omit from the proposed proclamation the declaration that the Executive Government of the United States will do no act to repress the enfranchised in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. This clause in the September proclamation has been widely quoted as an incitement to servile insurrection. In lieu of it, and for the purpose of shaming these misrepresentations, I think it would be well to insert some such clause as this: "not encouraging or countenancing, however, any disorderly or licentious conduct." If this alteration is made, the appeal to the enslaved may, properly enough, be omitted. It does not appear to be necessary, and may furnish a topic to the evil-disposed for censure and ridicule.

III. I think it absolutely certain that the rebellion can in no way be so certainly, speedily, and economically suppressed as by the organized military force of the loyal population of the insurgent regions, of whatever complexion. In no way can irregular violence and servile insurrection be so surely prevented as by the regular organization and regular military employment of those who might otherwise probably resort to such courses. Such organization is now in successful progress, and the concurrent testimony of all connected with the colored regiments in Louisiana and South Carolina is that they are brave, orderly, and efficient. General Butler declares that without his colored regiments he could not have attempted his recent important movements in the Lafourche region; and General Saxton bears equally explicit testimony to the good credit and efficiency of the colored troops recently sent on an expedition along the coast of Georgia. Considering these facts, it seems to me that it would be best to omit from the proclamation all reference to military employment of the enfranchised population, leaving it to the natural course of things already well begun; or to state distinctly that, in order to secure the suppression of the rebellion without servile insurrection or licentious marauding, such numbers of the population declared free as may be found convenient will be employed in the military and naval service of the United States.

Finally, I respectfully suggest, on an occasion of such interest, there can be no imputation of affectation against a solemn recognition of responsibility before men and before God; and that some such close as follows will be proper:

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice warranted by the Constitution, and of duty demanded by the circumstances of the country, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God."[1]

It is not remembered whether Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, was present at the Cabinet meeting, but he appears to have left no written memorandum of his suggestions, if he offered any. Stanton was preëminently a man of action, and the probability is that he agreed to the President's draft without amendment. The Cabinet also lacked one member of being complete. Mr. Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, had lately been transferred to the vacant bench of the United States District Court of Indiana, and his successor, Mr. Usher, was not appointed until about a week after the date of which we write.

The unpublished memorandum of Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, proposed a condensation of several of the paragraphs in the President's draft as follows:

I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States shall be free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And, in order that they may render all the aid they are willing to give to this object and to the support of the Government, authority will be given to receive them into the service whenever they can be usefully employed, and they may be armed to garrison forts, to defend positions and stations, and to man vessels. And I appeal to them to show themselves worthy of freedom by fidelity and diligence in the employments which may be given to them, by the observance of order, and by abstaining from all violence not required by duty or for self-defense. It is due to them to say that the conduct of large numbers of these people since the war began justifies confidence in their fidelity and humanity generally.[1]

The unpublished memorandum of Attorney-General Bates is also quite full, and combats the recommendation of Secretary Chase concerning fractions of States.

I respectfully suggest [he wrote] that: 1. The President issue the proclamation "by virtue of the power in him vested as Commander-in-Chief of

[1] MS.

the army and navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion," etc., "and as a proper and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion."—Date, January, 1863. 2. It is done in accordance with the first proclamation of September 22, 1862. 3. It distinguishes between States and parts of States, and designates those States and parts of States "in which the people thereof, respectively, are this day (January 1, 1863) in rebellion against the United States."

These three propositions being true, I think they ought to be followed out, without excess or diminution, by action, not by the declaration of a principle nor the establishment of a law for the future guidance of others. It is a war measure by the President, —a matter of fact,—not a law by the legislature. And as to what is proposed to be done in the future the least said the better. Better leave yourself free to act in the emergencies as they arise, with as few embarrassing committals as possible. Whether a particular State or part of a State is or is not in actual rebellion on the 1st of January, 1863, is a simple matter of fact which the President in the first proclamation has promised to declare in the record. Of course it must be truly declared. It is no longer open to be determined as a matter of policy or prudence independently of the fact. And this applies with particular force to Virginia. The eastern shore of Virginia and the region round about Norfolk are now (December 31, 1862) more free from actual rebellion than are several of the forty-eight counties spoken of as West Virginia. If the latter be exempt from the proclamation, so also ought the former. And so in all the States that are considered in parts. The last paragraph of the draft I consider wholly useless, and probably injurious—being a needless pledge of future action, which may be quite as well done without as with the pledge.

In rewriting the proclamation for signature Mr. Lincoln in substance followed the suggestions made by the several members of the Cabinet as to mere verbal improvements; but in regard to the two important changes which had been proposed he adhered rigidly to his own draft. He could not consent to the view urged by Secretary Chase, that to omit the exemption of fractional parts of States would have no practical bearing. In his view this would touch the whole underlying theory and legal validity of his act and change its essential character. The second proposition favored by several members of the Cabinet, to omit any declaration of intention to enlist the freedmen in military service, while it was not so vital, yet partook of the same general effect as tending to weaken and discredit his main central act of authority.

Mr. Lincoln took the various manuscript notes and memoranda which his Cabinet advisers brought him on the 31st of December, and during that afternoon and the following morning with his own hand carefully rewrote the entire body of the draft of the proclamation. The blanks left to designate fractional parts of States he filled according to latest official advices of military limits;[1] and in the closing paragraph suggested by Chase he added, after the words "warranted by the Constitution," his own important qualifying correction, "upon military necessity."

It is a custom in the Executive Mansion to hold on New Year's Day an official and public reception, beginning at 11 o'clock in the morning, which keeps the President at his post in the Blue Room until 2 in the afternoon. The hour for this reception came before Mr. Lincoln had entirely finished revising the engrossed copy of the proclamation, and he was compelled to hurry away from his office to friendly handshaking and festal greeting with the rapidly arriving official and diplomatic guests. The rigid laws of etiquette held him to this duty for the space of three hours. Had actual necessity required it he could of course have left such mere social occupation at any moment; but the President saw no occasion for precipitancy. On the other hand, he probably deemed it wise that the completion of this momentous executive act should be attended by every circumstance of deliberation. Vast as were its consequences, the act itself was only the simplest and briefest formality. It could in no wise be made sensational or dramatic. Those characteristics attached, if at all, only to the long past decisions and announcements of July 22 and September 22 of the previous year. Those dates had witnessed the mental conflict and the moral victory. No ceremony was attempted or made of this final official signing. The afternoon was well advanced when Mr. Lincoln went back from his New Year's greetings, with his right hand so fatigued that it was an effort to hold the pen. There was no special convocation of the Cabinet or of prominent officials. Those who were in the house came to the executive office merely from the personal impulse of curiosity joined to momentary convenience. His signature was attached to one of the greatest and most beneficent military decrees of history in the presence of less than a dozen persons; after which it was carried to the Department of State to be attested by the great seal and deposited among the official archives.

Since several eminent lawyers have publicly questioned the legal validity of Mr. Lincoln's

[1] The fractional parts of States excepted in the proclamation were as follows: In Louisiana, the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans; in Virginia, the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth.

Edict of Freedom,—as his final Emancipation Proclamation may be properly styled,—it is worth while to gather, if possible, Mr. Lincoln's own conception and explanation of the constitutional and legal bearings of his act. There is little difficulty in arriving at this. His language, embodied in a number of letters and documents, contains such a distinct and logical exposition of the whole process of his thought and action, from the somewhat extreme conservatism of his first inaugural to his great edict of January 1, 1863, and the subsequent policy of its practical enforcement, that we need but arrange them in their obvious sequence.

The proper beginning is to be found in his letter of April 4, 1864, to A. G. Hodges, Esq., of Frankfort, Kentucky. In this he says:

> I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution together. When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter.

The question of legal and constitutional validity he discusses briefly, but conclusively, in his letter of August 26, 1863, to James C. Conkling, of Springfield, Illinois. In this, addressing himself to his critics, he says:

> You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that, by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies the world over destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy.

Admitting the general principle of international law, of the right of a belligerent to appropriate or destroy enemies' property, there came next the question of how his military decree of enfranchisement was practically to be applied.

This point, though not fully discussed, is sufficiently indicated in several extracts. In the draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson he wrote, August 17, 1864:

> The way these measures were to help the cause was not by magic or miracles, but by inducing the colored people to come bodily over from the rebel side to ours.[1]

And in his letter to James C. Conkling of August 26, 1863, he says:

> But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The actual tangible military result which he declares was his constitutional and legal warrant for his edict of military emancipation is set forth in the following extracts. Whether we judge it by the narrow technical rules of applied jurisprudence, or by the broader principles of the legal philosophy of Christian nations, it forms equally his complete vindication. In the draft of a letter to Isaac M. Schermerhorn he wrote, September 12, 1864:

> Any different policy in regard to the colored man deprives us of his help, and this is more than we can bear. We cannot spare the hundred and forty

[1] Unpublished MS.

or fifty thousand now serving us as soldiers, seamen, and laborers. This is not a question of sentiment or taste, but one of physical force, which may be measured and estimated as horse-power and steam-power are measured and estimated. Keep it, and you can save the Union. Throw it away, and the Union goes with it.[1]

And in the one already quoted, to Robinson, August 17, 1864:

Drive back to the support of the rebellion the physical force which the colored people now give and promise us, and neither the present nor any coming Administration can save the Union. Take from us and give to the enemy the hundred and thirty, forty, or fifty thousand colored persons now serving as soldiers, seamen, and laborers and we cannot longer maintain the contest.

So also in an interview with John T. Mills he said:

But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion. Freedom has given 200,000 men, raised on Southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much it has subtracted from the enemy. . . . Let my enemies prove to the contrary that the destruction of slavery is not necessary to a restoration of the Union. I will abide the issue.

We might stop here and assume that President Lincoln's argument is complete. But he was by nature so singularly frank and conscientious, and by mental constitution so unavoidably logical, that he could not, if he had desired, do things or even seem to do them by indirection or subterfuge. This, the most weighty of his responsibilities and the most difficult of his trials, he could not permit to rest upon doubt or misconstruction. In addition to what we have already quoted he has left us a naked and final restatement of the main question, with the unequivocal answer of his motive and conviction. It has been shown above how Mr. Chase, in the discussions of the final phraseology of the January proclamation, urged him to omit his former exemptions of certain fractional parts of insurrectionary States. Despite the President's adverse decision, Mr. Chase continued from time to time to urge this measure during the year 1863. To these requests the President finally replied as follows on the 2d of September:

Knowing your great anxiety that the Emancipation Proclamation shall now be applied to certain parts of Virginia and Louisiana which were exempted from it last January, I state briefly what appear to me to be difficulties in the way of such a step. The original proclamation has no constitutional or legal justification, except as a military measure. The exemptions were made because the military necessity did not apply to the exempted localities. Nor does that necessity apply to them now any more than it did then. If I take the step must I not do so without the argument of military necessity, and so without any argument except the one that I think the measure politically expedient and morally right? Would I not thus give up all footing upon Constitution or law? Would I not thus be in the boundless field of absolutism? Could this pass unnoticed or unresisted? Could it fail to be perceived, that without any further stretch I might do the same in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, and even change any law in any State?[1]

[1] Unpublished MS.

In these extracts we have the President's outline explanation of the legal validity of the proclamation. Like all his reasoning, it is simple and strong, resting its authority on the powers of war and its justification upon military necessity. As to the minor subtleties of interpretation or comment which it might provoke from lawyers or judges after the war should be ended, we may infer that he had his opinions, but that they did not enter into his motives of action. On subsequent occasions, while continuing to declare his belief that the proclamation was valid in law, he nevertheless frankly admitted that what the courts might ultimately decide was beyond his knowledge as well as beyond his control.

For the moment he was dealing with two mighty forces of national destiny, civil war and public opinion; forces which paid little heed to theories of public, constitutional, or international law where they contravened their will and power. In fact it was the impotence of legislative machinery, and the insufficiency of legal dicta to govern or terminate the conflicts of public opinion on this identical question of slavery, which brought on civil strife. In the South slavery had taken up arms to assert its nationality and perpetuity; in the North freedom had risen first in mere defensive resistance, then the varying fortunes of war had rendered the combat implacable and mortal. It was not from the moldering volumes of ancient precedents, but from the issues of the present wager of battle, that future judges of courts would draw their doctrines to interpret to posterity whether the Edict of Freedom was void or valid.

When in the preceding July the crisis of the McClellan campaign had come upon the President he had written his well-considered resolve: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me." Grand as was the historical act of signing his decree of liberation, it was but an incident in the grander contest he was commissioned and resolved to maintain. That was an issue, not alone of the bondage of a race, but of the life of a nation, a principle of government, a question of primary human right.

Was this act, this step, this incident in the

contest, wise or unwise? Would it bring success or failure? Would it fill the army, weaken the enemy, inspirit the country, unite public opinion? These, we may assume, and not a lawyer's criticisms of phrase or text, dictum or precedent, were the queries which filled his mind when he wrote his name at the bottom of the famous document. If the rebellion should triumph, establishing a government founded on slavery as its corner-stone, manifestly his proclamation would be but waste paper, though every court in Christendom outside the Confederate States should assert its official authority. If, on the other hand, the Union arms were victorious, every step of that victory would become clothed with the mantle of law. But if, in addition, it should turn out that the Union arms had been rendered victorious through the help of the negro soldiers, called to the field by the promise of freedom contained in the proclamation, then the decree and its promise might rest secure in the certainty of legal execution and fulfillment. To restore the Union by the help of black soldiers under pledge of liberty, and then, for the Union, under whatever legal doctrine or construction, to attempt to reënslave them, would be a wrong at which morality would revolt. "You cannot," said Mr. Lincoln in one of his early speeches, "repeal human nature."

The problem of statesmanship therefore was not one of theory, but of practice. Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under his guidance as to render the conception practical and the decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force, leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision, the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom.

But for the execution of the sentence, for the accomplishment of this result, he had yet many weary months to hope and to wait. Of its slow and tantalizing fruition, of the gradual dawning of that full day of promise, we cannot get a better description than that in his own words in his annual message to Congress nearly a year after the proclamation was signed:

> When Congress assembled a year ago the war had already lasted nearly twenty months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea, with varying results. The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past, indicated uneasiness among ourselves; while amid much that was cold and menacing the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores, and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European governments anything hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary emancipation proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation and of employing black soldiers gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration the General Government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State, and for a long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that if it should the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed we are permitted to take another review. The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and by the complete opening of the Mississippi the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits.
>
> Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now in the United States military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection or tendency to violence or cruelty has marked the measures of emancipation and arming the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary with such discussion the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.[1]

[1] Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1863.

March 1889

April 1889

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

RETALIATION.—THE ENROLLMENT AND THE DRAFT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

RETALIATION.

THE policy of arming the blacks having been officially announced in the final Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, steps were taken as rapidly as the nature of the case permitted to put the plan into practical execution. Mr. Lincoln not only watched these efforts with great interest, but from time to time personally wrote letters to several of his commanders urging them to active efforts in organizing negro regiments. If a single argument were needed to point out his great practical wisdom in the management of this difficult question, that argument is found in the mere summing up of its tangible military results.

We have seen that at the beginning of December, 1863, less than a year after the President first proclaimed the policy, he was able to announce in his annual message that about fifty thousand men formerly slaves were then actually bearing arms in the ranks of the Union forces. A report made by the Secretary of War on April 2, 1864, shows that the number of negro troops then mustered into the service of the United States as soldiers had increased to 71,976,[2] and we learn further from the report of the Provost-Marshal General that at the close of the war there were in the service of the United States, of colored troops, 120 regiments of infantry, 12 regiments of heavy artillery, 10 companies of light artillery, and 7 regiments of cavalry, making a grand aggregate of 123,156 men. This was the largest number in service at any one time, but it does not represent all of them. The entire number commissioned and enlisted in this branch of the service during the war, or, more properly speaking, during the last two years of the war, was 186,017 men.[3]

This magnificent exhibit is a testimony to Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship which can hardly be overvalued. If he had adopted the policy when it was first urged upon him by impulsive enthusiasts it would have brought his administration to political wreck, as was clearly indicated by the serious election reverses of 1862; but disregarding the impatience and the bad judgment of his advisers, and using that policy at the opportune moment, he made it not only a powerful lever to effect emancipation, but a military overweight, aiding effectually to crush the remaining rebel armies and bring the rebellion as a whole to a speedy and sudden collapse.

One point of doubt about employing negroes as soldiers was happily removed almost imperceptibly by the actual experiment. It had been a serious question with many thoughtful men whether the negro would fight. It was apprehended that his comparatively recent transition from barbarism to civilization and the inherited habits of subjection and dependence imposed upon him by two centuries of enslavement had left his manhood so dwarfed and deadened as to render him incapable of the steady and sustained physical and moral courage needful to armies in modern warfare. Practical trial in skirmish and battle gave an immediate and successful refutation to this fear, and proved the gallantry and trustworthiness of the black soldier in the severest trials of devotion and heroism. Within half a year after Lincoln's order of enlistment the black regiments had furnished such examples of bravery on many fields that commanders gave them unstinted praise, and white officers and soldiers heartily accepted them as worthy companions-in-arms.

The rebel authorities watched the experiment of arming the blacks with the keenest apprehension and hostility. In Mr. Lincoln's order of July 22, 1862, directing military commanders to seize and use property, real or personal, for military purposes, and to employ "persons of African descent as laborers," Jefferson Davis professed already to discover a wicked violation of the laws of war, apparently forgetting that his own generals were everywhere using such persons in military labor. When it was learned that Hunter and Phelps were endeavoring to organize negro regiments, the language employed to express Southern affectation of surprise and protest borders on the ludicrous. "The best authenticated news-

[2] Stanton's Report, April 2, 1864, unpublished MS.

[3] Report of the Provost-Marshal General.

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papers received from the United States," writes General Lee, "announce as a fact that Major-General Hunter has armed slaves for the murder of their masters, and has thus done all in his power to inaugurate a servile war, which is worse than that of the savage, inasmuch as it superadds other horrors to the indiscriminate slaughter of ages, sexes, and conditions"; and Phelps is charged with imitating the bad example.[1] Halleck very properly returned this and another letter, as insulting to the Government of the United States. A little later the Confederate War Department issued a formal order:

> That Major-General Hunter and Brigadier-General Phelps be no longer held and treated as public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws; and that in the event of the capture of either of them, or that of any other commissioned officer employed in drilling, organizing, or instructing slaves, with a view to their armed service in this war, he shall not be regarded as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such time and place as the President shall order.[2]

Mr. Davis seems to have cultivated a sort of literary pride in these formulas of invective, for in his sensational proclamation of outlawry against General Butler and all commissioned officers in his command he repeats: "African slaves have not only been incited to insurrection by every license and encouragement, but numbers of them have actually been armed for a servile war — a war in its nature far exceeding the horrors and most merciless atrocities of savages." In this it was ordered that "negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States"; and that Butler and his commissioned officers, "robbers and criminals deserving death, be whenever captured reserved for execution."[3]

President Lincoln's two proclamations of emancipation excited similar threats. About a week after the first was issued it was made a subject of discussion in the Confederate senate at Richmond, and a Confederate writer recorded in his diary the next day: "Some of the gravest of our senators favor the raising of the black flag, asking and giving no quarter hereafter."[4] When the final proclamation reached Richmond, Jefferson Davis was writing his annual message to the rebel Congress, and he ransacked his dictionary for terms to stigmatize it. "Our detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it discloses."[5] This new provocation also broadened his field of retaliation. He now declared that he would deliver "such criminals as may attempt its execution" — all commissioned officers of the United States captured in States embraced in the proclamation — to the executives of such States, to be punished for exciting servile insurrection.

The Confederate Congress, while responding to the full degree of the proposed retaliation, nevertheless preferred to keep the power of such punishment in the hands of the central military authorities, apparently as promising a more certain and summary execution. That body passed a joint resolution, approved by Davis May 1, 1863, which prescribed that white officers of negro Union soldiers "shall, if captured, be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court," the trial to take place "before the military court attached to the army or corps" making the capture, or such other military court as the Confederate President should designate.[6]

When the Confederate threats regarding negro soldiers were first launched the experiment had not yet been formally authorized by the Government; and as there was no probability that any early capture of such persons would be made by the enemy, no attention was paid to rebel orders and proclamations on the subject. A year later, however, when negro regiments were springing into full organization simultaneously in many places, the matter became one of grave import. As a rule, the black regiments were commanded by white officers, often selected, as was specially the case with the 54th Massachusetts, from the very best material, whose bravery in incurring this additional risk deserved the extra watchfulness and protection of the Government. The most elementary justice required that if it called the black man to do a soldier's duty it must cover him with a soldier's right, and Northern sentiment was prompt in urging the claim. Frederick Douglass has related how he pressed the point upon Mr. Lincoln, and the President's reply:

> As to the exchange and general treatment of colored soldiers when taken prisoners of war, he should insist on their being entitled to all privileges of such prisoners. Mr. Lincoln admitted the justice of my demand for the promotion of colored soldiers for good conduct in the field, but on the matter

[1] Lee to Halleck, August 2, 1862. "Rebellion Record," Vol. IX., p. 246.

[2] General Orders, Aug. 21, 1862.

[3] Davis, Proclamation, December 23, 1862. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1862, p. 738.

[4] Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., p. 159.

[5] Davis, Annual Message, January 12, 1863. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 786.

[6] C. S. Statutes-at-Large for 1863, p. 167.

of retaliation he differed from me entirely. I shall never forget the benignant expression of his face, the tearful look of his eye, and the quiver in his voice when he deprecated a resort to retaliatory measures. "Once begun," said he, "I do not know where such a measure would stop." He said he could not take men out and kill them in cold blood for what was done by others. If he could get hold of the persons who were guilty of killing the colored prisoners in cold blood, the case would be different, but he could not kill the innocent for the guilty.[1]

Nevertheless, in view of the great success which attended the enlistment of black recruits, it became necessary for the Government to adopt a settled policy on the question, and on July 30, 1863, the President issued the following comprehensive order:

It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.

The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy, or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.[2]

It is a gratification to record that the rebel Government did not persist in the barbarous conduct it had officially announced, and that sanguinary retaliation did not become necessary. There were indeed some unimportant instances of imprisonment of captured blacks, as hostages for which, a few rebel soldiers were ordered into confinement by General Halleck, but the cases were not pushed to extremity under executive sanction on either side. Much more serious excesses, however, occurred under the responsibility and conduct of individual officers growing out of mistaken zeal or uncurbed passion; it is probable that most of them went unrecorded. In October, 1862, when the guerrilla outrages in Missouri were in one of their moments of fiercest activity, a Union citizen of Palmyra was abducted and murdered under circumstances which clearly marked it as an instance of concerted and deliberate partisan revenge. In retaliation for this, Colonel John McNeil, the Union officer in local command, having demanded the perpetrators, which demand was not complied with, ordered the execution of ten rebel guerrillas of the same neighborhood, and carried out the order with military publicity and formality.[3] Even admitting the strong provocation, modern sentiment cannot justify a punishment tenfold as severe as that demanded by the Mosaic law. Less than a month later there was brief mention in a letter of the rebel Major-General Holmes to the Confederate War Department of an analogous occurrence in northern Texas. "A secret organization," he wrote, "to resist the [Confederate] conscript act in northern Texas, has resulted in the citizens organizing a jury of investigation, and I am informed they have tried and executed forty of those convicted, and thus this summary procedure has probably crushed the incipient rebellion."[4] Even without details the incident is a convincing explanation of the seeming unanimity for rebellion in that region.

The most shocking occurrence of this character, however, followed the employment of negro soldiers. We cannot in our day adequately picture the vindictive rage of many rebel masters at seeing recent slaves uniformed and armed in defense of a government which had set them free. Under the barbarous institution, to perpetuate which they committed treason and were ready to die, they had punished their human chattels with the unchecked lash, sold them on the auction-block, hunted them with bloodhounds; and it is hardly to be wondered at that amid the license of war individuals among them now and then thought to restore their domination by the aid of military slaughter. As an evidence that such thoughts existed here and there we need only cite the language of Major-General John C. Breckinridge, late Vice-President of the United States. Writing under date of August 14, 1862, to the Union commander at Baton Rouge, he recites in a list of alleged "outrages" that "information has reached these headquarters that negro slaves are being organized and armed to be employed against us"; and adds, "I am

1 Frederick Douglass, Reminiscences, "New York Tribune," July 5, 1885.

2 Report Provost-Marshal General, March 17, 1866. Mess. and Doc., 1865-66, Part III., p. 63.

3 It is proper to mention that this retaliatory action was under the authority of the State of Missouri. General Curtis, commanding the Department of the Missouri at that time, wrote under date of December 24, 1862: "General McNeil is a State general, and his column was mainly State troops: the matter has therefore never come to my official notice. . . . When persons are condemned to be shot by Federal authority, the proceedings have to be approved by the President, but no case of this sort has arisen under my command."—War Records, Vol. XXII. Part I., pp. 860-1.

4 War Records, Vol. XIII., p. 908.

authorized by Major-General Van Dorn, commanding this department, to inform you that the above acts are regarded as in violation of the usage of civilized warfare, and that in future, upon any departure from these usages, he will raise the black flag and neither give nor ask quarter." [1]

Mere official bravado, from however conspicuous a personage, only deserves mention when, as in this instance, it illustrates a type of feeling which in one case at least manifested itself in an incident of shocking barbarity.

In the spring of the year 1864 President Lincoln went to Baltimore to attend the opening of a large fair for the benefit of the Sanitary Commission. In concluding the address which he was called upon to make on that occasion he said:

A painful rumor, true, I fear, has reached us of the massacre, by the rebel forces at Fort Pillow, in the west end of Tennessee, on the Mississippi River, of some three hundred colored soldiers and white officers, who had just been overpowered by their assailants. There seems to be some anxiety in the public mind whether the Government is doing its duty to the colored soldier, and to the service, at this point. At the beginning of the war, and for some time, the use of colored troops was not contemplated; and how the change of purpose was wrought I will not now take time to explain. Upon a clear conviction of duty, I resolved to turn that element of strength to account; and I am responsible for it to the American people, to the Christian world, to history, and on my final account to God. Having determined to use the negro as a soldier, there is no way but to give him all the protection given to any other soldier. The difficulty is not in stating the principle, but in practically applying it. It is a mistake to suppose the Government is indifferent to this matter, or is not doing the best it can in regard to it. We do not to-day *know* that a colored soldier, or white officer commanding colored soldiers, has been massacred by the rebels when made a prisoner. We fear it, believe it, I may say, but we do not *know* it. To take the life of one of their prisoners on the assumption that they murder ours, when it is short of certainty that they do murder ours, might be too serious, too cruel, a mistake. We are having the Fort Pillow affair thoroughly investigated; and such investigation will probably show conclusively how the truth is. If after all that has been said it shall turn out that there has been no massacre at Fort Pillow it will be almost safe to say there has been none, and will be none, elsewhere. If there has been the massacre of three hundred there, or even the tenth part of three hundred, it will be conclusively proven; and, being so proven, the retribution shall as surely come. It will be matter of grave consideration in what exact course to apply the retribution; but in the supposed case it must come.[2]

The investigation referred to by the President was made by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and included the sworn testimony of about eighty witnesses, mostly actual participants in the occurrence. The committee found that Fort Pillow, Tennessee, situated on the Mississippi River, and garrisoned by about 557 Union troops, of whom 262 were colored, was captured by assault, by an overwhelming force of Confederates under General Forrest, on April 12, 1864, and that "of the men from 300 to 400 are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least 300 were murdered in cold blood after the post was in possession of the rebels and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance."

It further appears that this inhumanity was directed principally against the colored soldiers. The rebel general and his subordinates stoutly denied the accusation of vindictiveness, but their explanations and later evidence failed to shake the general substance of the committee's allegation and proof. Indeed it would be difficult to refute the conclusiveness of the first report of General Forrest himself. On the third day after his exploit he telegraphed to General Polk:

I attacked Fort Pillow on the morning of the 12th instant with a part of Bell's and McCulloch's brigades, numbering ————, under Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers. After a short fight we drove the enemy, seven hundred strong, into the fort under cover of their gun-boats, and demanded a surrender, which was declined by Major L. W. Booth, commanding United States forces. I stormed the fort, and after a contest of thirty minutes captured the entire garrison, killing five hundred and taking one hundred prisoners, and a large amount of quartermaster's stores. The officers in the fort were killed, including Major Booth. I sustained a loss of twenty killed and sixty wounded. The Confederate flag now floats over the fort.[3]

The astonishing result is further explained by the contemporaneous threats made officially by these Confederate officers. On the 25th of March preceding, in demanding the surrender of Paducah, Kentucky, General Forrest wrote: "If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter." [4]

And on the day following the Fort Pillow massacre, General A. Buford, one of Forrest's brigadiers, said in his demand for the surrender of Columbus, Kentucky:

Should you surrender, the negroes now in arms will be returned to their masters. Should I, however, be compelled to take the place, no quarter will be shown to the negro troops whatever; the white troops will be treated as prisoners of war.

And in a subsequent correspondence Forrest wrote, under date of June 20, to the Union general, C. C. Washburn: "I regard captured

[1] W. R., Vol. XV., pp. 550 and 551.
[2] Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," pp. 502-3.
[3] "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 189.
[4] "Rebellion Record," Vol. VIII., p. 73.

negroes as I do other captured property, and not as captured soldiers."[1] The language of these officers at Paducah and Columbus is a sufficient commentary on their achievement at Fort Pillow.

President Lincoln formally took up the consideration of the subject on the 3d of May by writing to the several members of his Cabinet:

> It is now quite certain that a large number of our colored soldiers, with their white officers, were, by the rebel force, massacred after they had surrendered at the recent capture of Fort Pillow. So much is known, though the evidence is not yet quite ready to be laid before me. Meanwhile I will thank you to prepare, and give me in writing, your opinion as to what course the Government should take in the case.[2]

The answers of his advisers differed widely. Mr. Seward affirmed the duty of the Government to vindicate the right of all its soldiers to be regarded and treated as prisoners of war; nevertheless he urged great caution in any proceedings looking to retaliation, and advised for the present only the setting apart and rigorous confinement of an equal number of Confederate prisoners as hostages until the rebel Government could be called upon to explain or disavow the cruelties and give pledges that they should not be repeated. Mr. Chase held the same view, except that he advised that the hostages should be selected from rebel prisoners of highest rank, in number equivalent, according to the rules of exchange, to the officers and men murdered at Fort Pillow. Mr. Stanton also advised that the hostages be selected from rebel officers; that Forrest, Chalmers, and all officers and men concerned in the Fort Pillow massacre be excluded from the benefit of the President's proclamation of amnesty and from the privilege of exchange, and their delivery for punishment be demanded from the Richmond authorities, in default of which delivery the President should take such measures against the hostages as the state of things then existing might make necessary. The advice of Mr. Welles was essentially the same as that of Mr. Stanton. Mr. Blair, on the contrary, took different ground.

> There are two reasons [he wrote] which would prevent me from ordering the execution of prisoners, man for man, in retaliation for the massacre at Fort Pillow. *First*. That I do not think the measure would be justified by the rules of civilized warfare, even in a contest between alien enemies. *Second*. Because even if allowable in such a contest it would not be just in itself or expedient in the present contest. . . . And the inclination of my mind is, to pursue the actual offenders alone in such cases as the present; to order the most energetic measures for their capture, and the most summary punishment when captured. . . . A proclamation or order that the guilty individuals are to be hunted down will have far greater terror and be far more effectual to prevent the repetition of the crime than the punishment of parties not concerned in that crime.

Mr. Bates agreed in opinion with Mr. Blair. He would demand of the enemy a disavowal or avowal of the act. If he disavow it, then demand the surrender of the generals guilty of the Fort Pillow massacre to be dealt with at your discretion. If he avow and justify the act, then instruct your commanders to cause instant execution upon any and all participants in the massacre, whether officers or privates, who should fall into their power. He added:

> I would have no compact with the enemy for mutual slaughter; no cartel of blood and murder; no stipulation to the effect that if you murder one of my men I will murder one of yours! Retaliation is not mere justice. It is avowedly revenge; and it is wholly unjustifiable, in law and conscience, unless adopted for the sole purpose of punishing past crime and of giving a salutary and blood-saving warning against its repetition.

Mr. Usher also joined in the opinion that punishment should not be visited upon innocent persons, but he urged

> that the Government should set apart for execution an equal number of prisoners who since the massacre have been, or may hereafter from time to time be, captured from Forrest's command.

He also urged another reason:

> We are upon the eve of an impending battle. Until the result shall have been known it seems to me to be inexpedient to take any extreme action in the premises. If favorable to our arms, we may retaliate as far as the laws of war and humanity will permit. If disastrous and extreme measures should have been adopted, we may be placed in a position of great embarrassment, and forced to forego our threatened purpose in order to avoid a worse calamity.

It is probable that this view took a deep hold upon the Cabinet. Grant was about entering upon his Wilderness campaign, and its rapid succession of bloody conflicts crowded out of view and consideration a topic so difficult and so hazardous as wholesale retaliation for the Fort Pillow barbarity, which, on one hand, strict justice demanded, and which, on the other, enlightened humanity forbade. In these opposing duties there could be little doubt as to which the kind heart of the President would incline. He had long since laid down for himself a rule of conduct applicable to

[1] "Rebellion Record," Vol. X., p. 724.
[2] Lincoln to the Cabinet, May 3, 1864. Unpublished MS.

this class of cases. In his annual message of December 3, 1861, he had declared:

> In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle.

It does not appear that the Fort Pillow question was ever seriously renewed in the Cabinet or definitely concluded by the President.

The proceedings relating to retaliation which we have thus far sketched bring us back to another and by no means the least interesting phase of the general subject of negro soldiers. We may here anticipate the course of events so far as to say that in the autumn and winter of 1864 the cause of the South was already lost and the collapse of the Confederate Government plainly foreshadowed to all except the leaders, whose infatuation and wounded vanity made them unwilling to acknowledge and accept defeat. Yet this effort to avoid confession of error in one direction compelled them to admit it in another. They had seceded for slavery, had made it the corner-stone of their government, had anathematized President Lincoln for his decrees of emancipation, had pronounced the ban of outlawry and had prescribed the sentence of death against every white officer who might dare to command negro troops; but now in their extremity some of them proposed to throw consistency to the winds and themselves commit the acts upon which they had invoked the reprobation of mankind and for which they had ordained extreme punishment.

It would be difficult to estimate the benefit they had derived from the direct military labor of the slave, especially in building fortifications. They now proposed not only to put arms in his hands and make him a soldier to fight in the ranks, but also, as a final step, to emancipate him for the service. Even the flexible political conscience of Jefferson Davis, however, winced a little at the bold abandonment of principle which this policy involved, and in his message of November 7, 1864, to the Confederate Congress he argues the question with the reluctance of a man preparing to walk over live coals. We have not space to abridge his hair-splitting arguments to justify the South in what they had so vociferously denounced when done by the North. The sum of his recommendation is that the 20,000 slaves then employed in various labors in the Confederate army should be increased to 40,000, be drilled in "encamping, marching, and parking trains," and "employed as a pioneer and engineer laborer." He says:

> I must dissent from those who advise a general levy and arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers. Until our white population shall prove insufficient for the armies we require and can afford to keep in the field, to employ as a soldier the negro, who has merely been trained to labor, and as a laborer,— the white man accustomed from his youth to the use of firearms,— would scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous by any; and this is the question now before us. But should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision.[1]

While he dwells on the "improbable contingency of our need of resorting to this element of resistance," he nevertheless points out that the Confederate Government might buy the slave from his master and engage to liberate him as a reward for faithful military service.

Mr. Davis's hesitating and tentative recommendation was seed sown on barren ground. If the dose was unpalatable to him it appears to have been yet more bitter to the members of the Confederate Congress, who doubtless felt, as has been pithily expressed by a Confederate writer, that it was an admission of the inherent injustice of slavery; that "if the negro was fit to be a soldier he was not fit to be a slave"; that the proposition "cut under the traditions and theories of three generations in the South"; and that "by a few strokes of the pen the Confederate Government had subscribed to the main tenet of the abolition party in the North and all its consequences, standing exposed and stultified before the world."[2] They debated the unwelcome subject with qualms and grimaces through November, December, January, and most of February. On the 11th of January and again on the 18th of February the proposal received a notable championship in letters from General Lee, in which he declared the measure of employing negro soldiers "not only expedient but necessary," and recommended that the Confederate President be empowered "to call upon individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with the condition of emancipation to all enrolled."[3] Even under this pressure, however, the rebel lawmakers could not wholly conquer their repugnance. Nearly six weeks more elapsed, and the fall of Richmond was already imminent, when on the 30th of March, 1865,[4] the Confederate Congress passed an act upon the subject. The writer already quoted sums up the result as follows:

1 "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 697.
2 Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis," pp. 453-4.
3 Lee to Hunter, Jan. 11, 1865. (THE CENTURY, August, 1888), and Lee to Barksdale, Feb. 18, 1865 (McCabe, "Life of Lee," p. 574).
4 Report of Provost-Marshal General Fry.

The law, as finally enacted, was merely to authorize the President to receive into the military service such able-bodied slaves as might be patriotically tendered by their masters, to be employed in whatever capacity he might direct; no change to be made in the relation of owners of slaves, at least so far as it appeared in the bill. The fruits of this emasculated measure were two companies of blacks, organized from some negro vagabonds in Richmond, which were allowed to give balls at the Libby Prison and were exhibited in fine fresh uniforms on Capitol Square as decoys to obtain sable recruits. But the mass of their colored brethren looked on the parade with unenvious eyes, and little boys exhibited the early prejudices of race by pelting the fine uniforms with mud.[1]

THE ENROLLMENT AND THE DRAFT.

THE successive steps by which the army of the United States, numbering some seventeen thousand men when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, grew to the vast aggregate of a million soldiers deserve a word of notice. We can do no more than to summarize briefly the process, referring those of our readers who may wish to study the matter more in detail to the admirable historical statement of General Fry appended to the report of the Secretary of War to the Thirty-ninth Congress. The first troops mustered into the service were the militia of the District of Columbia; thirty-eight companies were thus obtained. On the 15th of April was issued, under the law of 1803, the President's proclamation calling for 75,000 troops for ninety days. Their work was the protection of the capital; their service mainly ended with the battle of Bull Run. On the 3d of May the President issued a call for 42,000 volunteers to serve three years, unless sooner discharged; he increased at the same time the regular army by eight regiments, and directed the enlistment of 18,000 seamen. This was done without authority from Congress, but the act was legalized when that body came together. The volunteers called for were immediately raised and many more were offered; but the recruits for the regular army came in slowly, and the new regiments were in fact never fully organized until the close of the war. After the disastrous battle of Bull Run the patriotism of Congress promptly rose to the emergency, and within a few days successive acts were passed giving the President authority to raise an army of a million men.

So enthusiastic was the response of the people in those early days that the chief embarrassment of the Government was at first to check and repress the offers of volunteers. Some regions were more liberal in their tenders of troops than others; individuals and companies rejected from one State whose quota was full enlisted from another; pious frauds were practiced to get a place under the colors. Much confusion and annoyance afterwards resulted from these causes. Under authority of the acts of Congress referred to, a force of 637,126 men was in the service in the spring of 1862. This, it was thought, would be adequate for the work of suppressing the insurrection: the expenses of the military establishment had risen to appalling proportions, and the ill-advised resolution was taken of putting a stop to volunteer recruiting on the 3d of April. As the waste of the armies went on without corresponding successes, the error which had been committed was recognized, and recruiting was resumed in June; but before much progress was made, the ill fortune of McClellan[2] in the Peninsula, and its unfavorable effect on the public mind, chilled and discouraged recruitment. The necessity for more troops was as evident to the country as to the Government.

While General McClellan was on his retreat to the James, the governors of the loyal States signed a letter to the President requesting him to issue a call for additional troops, and it was in response to this that Mr. Lincoln issued his call, on the 2d of July, 1862, for 300,000 volunteers. The need of troops continuing and becoming more and more pressing, the call for 300,000 nine months' militia was issued on the 4th of August, and in some of the States a draft from the militia was ordered, the results of which were not especially satisfactory. Only about 87,000 of the 300,000 required were reported as obtained in this way, and this number was greatly reduced by desertion before the men could be got out of their respective States.

In Pennsylvania a somewhat serious organization was formed in several counties for resisting the draft. Governor Curtin reported several thousand recusants in arms. They would not permit the drafted men who were willing to go to their duty to leave their homes, and even forced them to get out of the railway trains after they had embarked. By the prompt and energetic action of the State and National Governments, working in harmony, this disorder was soon suppressed. But there, as elsewhere, the enrollment was inefficient and the results entirely inadequate.

Early in the year 1863 it became evident that the armies necessary for an effective prosecution of the war could not be filled by volunteering, nor by State action alone, and a bill for enrolling and calling out the national forces was introduced in the Senate in the beginning of February, and at once gave rise in that body to a hot discussion. It was attacked by the Democratic senators, who were mostly from the border States, with the greatest en-

[1] Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 456.

[2] Report of Provost-Marshal General, Part I., p. 9.

ergy and feeling. They contended that it was in direct violation of the Constitution, and, if passed, would be subversive of the liberties of the country. They were joined by Mr. Richardson, who had succeeded Mr. Douglas as senator from Illinois, and who warned his colleagues that they were plunging the country into civil war.[1] The bill was principally defended by Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts and Mr. Collamer of Vermont, the former laying most stress upon the necessities of the country, and the latter characteristically advocating the measure on legal and constitutional grounds. The bill passed the Senate, and came up in the House on the 23d of February. Mr. Olin, who had charge of it, announced at the beginning, with a somewhat crude candor, that he proposed to permit discussion of the merits of the bill for a reasonable time and then to demand a vote upon it. He was not willing to hazard the loss of a bill he deemed so important by opening it to propositions for amendment. But in spite of this warning, perhaps by reason of it, an animated discussion at once sprung up and many amendments were offered, some in good faith, and some with the purpose of nullifying the bill. The measure was attacked with great violence. The object and purpose of the President was proclaimed by Democratic members to be the establishment of an irresponsible despotism, and the destruction of constitutional liberty was prophesied as certain in case the bill should pass. There was a great difference of tone between the opponents and the supporters of the Administration; the latter, confident in their strength, were far more moderate in their expressions than the former, but there were reproaches and recriminations on both sides. Democrats, like Mr. Cox of Ohio, Mr. Biddle of Pennsylvania, and Messrs. Mallory and Wickliffe of Kentucky, claimed that the antislavery measures of the Administration were the sole cause of military failure, and that if the President would return to constitutional ways the armies would soon be filled by volunteering; to which the Republicans answered that the cessation of volunteering was due to the treasonable speech and conduct of the opposition. Some unimportant amendments were attached to the bill, which was sent back to the Senate for concurrence, and after another debate, scarcely less passionate than the first, the amendments of the House were adopted, and the measure became a law by the approval of the President, on the 3d of March, 1863. It was the first law enacted by Congress by which the Government of the United States, without the intervention of the authorities of the several States, appealed directly to the nation to create large armies. The act declared that, with certain exceptions especially set forth, all able-bodied male citizens, and persons of foreign birth who had declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of 20 and 45, should constitute the national forces, and empowered the President to call them forth by draft. All were to be called out if necessary: the first call was actually for one-fifth, but that was a measure of expediency. The act provided for the appointment or detail, by the President, of a Provost-Marshal General, who was to be the head of a bureau in the War Department, and for dividing the States into districts coinciding with those for the election of congressmen. The District of Columbia and the Territories formed additional districts. A provost-marshal was authorized for each of these districts, with whom were associated a commissioner and a surgeon. The board thus formed was required to divide its district into as many subdistricts as might be found necessary, to appoint an enrolling officer for each, and to make an enrollment immediately. Colonel James B. Fry, an assistant adjutant-general of the army, who had formerly been chief-of-staff to General Buell, and who was not only an accomplished soldier but an executive officer of extraordinary tact, ability, and industry, was made Provost-Marshal General. Officers of the army, selected for their administrative capacity, were appointed provost-marshals for the several States. The enrollment began the latter part of May, and was pushed forward with great energy, except in the border States, where some difficulty was found in selecting the proper boards of enrollment. While there was more or less opposition, General Fry says:

> It could not be said to be serious. Some of the officers were maltreated, and one or two assassinated, but prompt action on the part of the civil authorities, aided when necessary by military patrols, secured the arrest of guilty parties and checked these outrages.

Those who attempted to obstruct enrollment officers were promptly punished, and orders from the War Department gave a clear definition of what constituted impediments to the drafts. Not only the assaulting or obstructing of officers was cause for punishment, but even standing mute and the giving of false names subjected the offender to summary arrest.

In addition to the duties of enrolling all citizens capable of bearing arms, of drafting from these the numbers required for military service, and of arresting deserters and returning them to the army, the Provost-Marshal General was also charged with the entire work of recruiting volunteers. This insured harmony and systematic action in the two methods of raising troops, and the work was carried on

[1] "Congressional Globe," Feb. 4, 1863, p. 709.

with constantly increasing efficiency and success. A comparatively small number of men was obtained strictly by the draft, but the draft powerfully stimulated enlistments, and the money obtained by commutation furnished an ample fund for all the expenses of the bureaus of recruitment. Improvements in the law and the modes of executing it were constantly made, until at the close of the war the system was probably as perfect as human ingenuity could make it under the peculiar conditions of American life. The result proved the vast military resources of the nation. In April, 1865, with a million soldiers in the field, the enrollment showed that the national forces not called out consisted of 2,245,000 more. We need not cumber these pages with the figures of the successive calls and their results; we quote the aggregates from General Fry's final report (p. 46). The quotas charged against the States, under all calls made by the President during the four years from the 15th of April, 1861, when his first proclamation echoed the guns at Sumter, to the 14th of April, 1865, when Lincoln died and recruiting ceased, amounted to 2,759,049, the terms of service varying from three months to three years. The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, and put into service in the army, navy, and marines, was 2,690,401. This left a deficiency of 68,648, which would have been readily filled if the war had not closed. In addition to these some 70,000 "emergency men" were from first to last called into service.[1]

During the progress of the work an infinite variety of questions arose as to the quotas and the credits of the several States, and the President was overwhelmed by complaints and reclamations from various governors in the North. Even the most loyal supporters of the Administration exerted themselves to the utmost to have the demands upon them reduced and their credits for troops furnished raised to the highest possible figure; while in those States which were politically under the control of the opposition these natural importunities were aggravated by what seemed a deliberate intention to frustrate so far as possible the efforts of the Government to fill its depleted armies.[2] The most serious controversy that arose during the progress of the enrollment was that begun and carried on by Governor Seymour of New York.

So long as the administration of Governor E. D. Morgan lasted, the Government received most zealous and efficient support from the State of New York. It is true that at the close of Governor Morgan's term, the last day of 1862, the Adjutant-General reported the State deficient some 28,000 men in volunteers under the various calls of the Government, 18,000 of which deficiency belonged to the city of New York. But in spite of this deficiency there had never been any lack of cordial coöperation on the part of the State government with that of the nation. In the autumn of that year, however, in the period of doubt and discouragement which generally prevailed throughout the Union, General Wadsworth, the Republican candidate for governor, had been defeated after a most acrimonious contest by Horatio Seymour, then, and until his death, the most honored and prominent Democratic politician of the State. He came into power upon a platform denouncing almost every measure which the Government had found it necessary to adopt for the suppression of the rebellion; and upon his inauguration, on the first day of 1863, he clearly intimated that his principal duty would be "to maintain and defend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of his State."

The President, anxious to work in harmony

1 The following details of the several calls and their results are taken from the report made to Congress by the Secretary of War in the session of 1865–66:

	Number of Men.	*Term of Service.*
Call of April 15, 1861, for 75,000 men, produced	98,235	3 months
Calls of May 3, July 22 and 25, 1861, for 500,000	2,715	6 months
	9,056	1 year
	30,952	2 years
	657,863	3 years
Call of July 2, 1862, for 500,000	419,627	3 years
Call of August 4, 1862, for 300,000	86,960	9 months
Proclamation of June 15, 1863, for militia (100,000)	16,361	6 months
Calls of October 15, 1863, and February 1, 1864, for 500,000	374,807	3 years
Call of March 14, 1864, for 200,000	284,021	3 years
Militia mustered in the spring of 1864	83,612	100 days
Call of July 18, 1864, for 500,000	149,356	1 & 2 yrs.
	234,798	3 years
	728	4 years
Call of December 19, 1864, for 300,000	151,105	1 year
	5,076	2 years
	48,065	3 years
	312	4 years

The aggregate shows a great many more soldiers than ever served, as a large number enlisted more than once. Veteran volunteers to the number of 150,000 reënlisted in 1863–64. Deserters and bounty-jumpers must also be deducted.

2 Though the President knew that fairness and accuracy prevailed in the demands made upon the different localities for their proportion of troops, he was so much embarrassed by complaints that he found it necessary at last to constitute a board, consisting of Attorney-General Speed, General Delafield, Chief of Engineers, and Colonel Foster, Assistant Adjutant-General, to examine into the proper quotas and credits, and to report errors if they found any therein, and he announced in the order constituting the board that its determination should be final and conclusive. The board went carefully over the whole subject, explained the mode of proceeding adopted by the Provost-Marshal General, and said, "The rule is in conformity to the requirements of the laws of Congress and is just and equitable; we have carefully examined and proved the work done under this rule by the Provost-Marshal General and find it has been done with fairness." This report was formally approved by the President.

with the governors of all the loyal States, and especially desirous on public grounds to secure the cordial coöperation in war matters of the State administration in New York, had written to Mr. Seymour soon after his inauguration as governor, inviting his confidence and friendship.

You and I [he said] are substantially strangers, and I write this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, for the time being, am at the head of a nation which is in great peril, and you are at the head of the greatest State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot be a difference of purpose between you and me. If we should differ as to the means it is important that such difference should be as small as possible; that it should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one side or the other. In the performance of my duty the coöperation of your State, as that of others, is needed — in fact, is indispensable. This alone is sufficient reason why I should wish to be at a good understanding with you. Please write me at least as long a letter as this, of course saying in it just what you think fit.[1]

The governor waited three weeks and then made a cold and guarded reply, retaining in this private communication the attitude of reserve and distrust he had publicly assumed.

I have delayed [he said] answering your letter for some days with a view of preparing a paper in which I wished to state clearly the aspect of public affairs from the standpoint I occupy. I do not claim any superior wisdom, but I am confident the opinions I hold are entertained by one-half of the population of the Northern States. I have been prevented from giving my views in the manner I intended by a pressure of official duties, which at the present stage of the legislative session of this State confines me to the executive chamber until each midnight.

After the adjournment, which will soon take place, I will give you without reserve my opinion and purpose with regard to the condition of our unhappy country. In the meanwhile I assure you that no political resentments or no personal objects will turn me aside from the pathway I have marked out for myself. I intend to show to those charged with the administration of public affairs a due deference and respect, and to yield them a just and generous support in all measures they may adopt within the scope of their constitutional powers. For the preservation of this Union I am ready to make any sacrifice of interest, passion, or prejudice.[2]

This closed the personal correspondence between them. The governor never wrote the promised letter; he did not desire to commit himself to any friendly relations with the President. With the narrowness of a bitterly prejudiced mind he had given an interpretation to the President's cordial overture as false as it was unfavorable. In an article,[3] published with his sanction many years afterwards, he is represented as expressing his conviction that at the time of this correspondence there was a conspiracy of prominent Republicans to force Lincoln out of the White House; that the President was aware of it, and that this was "the cause of the anxiety which he displayed to be on intimate friendly terms with Mr. Seymour." There could be no intimate understanding between two such men. Mr. Lincoln could no more comprehend the partisan bitterness and suspicion which lay at the basis of Mr. Seymour's character than the latter could appreciate the motives which induced Lincoln to seek his cordial coöperation in public work for the general welfare. He gave the same base interpretation to a complimentary message which Stanton sent him in June, 1863, thanking him for the energy with which he had sent forward troops for the defense of Pennsylvania, and when, a year later, Stanton invited him to Washington for a consultation,[3] he refused either to go or to reply to the invitation.

Mr. Thurlow Weed is quoted as saying in his later years that Mr. Lincoln, after Seymour's election and before his inauguration, authorized Mr. Weed to say to him that holding his position he could wheel the Democratic party into line and put down the rebellion; and that if he would render this great service to the country Mr. Lincoln would cheerfully make way for him as his successor.[4] Mr. Weed says he made this suggestion to Seymour; but that he preferred to administer his office as an irreconcilable and conscientious partisan. It is probable that Mr. Weed, as is customary with elderly men, exaggerated the definiteness of the proposition; but these letters show how anxious Lincoln was that Seymour should give a loyal support to the Government, and in how friendly and self-effacing a spirit he would have met him.

In what must be said in regard to the controversy in which Governor Seymour soon found himself engaged with the National Government there is no question of his personal integrity or his patriotism. He doubtless considered that he was only doing his duty to his State and his party in opposing almost every specific act of the National Government. The key to all his actions in respect to the draft is to be found in his own words: "It is believed," he said, "by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the conscription act is in itself a violation of the supreme constitutional

1 Lincoln to Seymour, March 23, 1863. MS.
2 Seymour to Lincoln, April 14, 1863. MS.
3 "New York Times," Aug. 18, 1879.
4 Memoir by T. W. Barnes, p. 428.

law."[1] This belief he heartily shared, and no moral blame attaches to him for trying to give it effect in his official action. His conduct led to disastrous results; his views of government were shown to be mistaken and unsound. The nation went on its triumphant way over all the obstacles interposed by him and those who believed with him, and during the quarter of a century which elapsed before his death his chief concern was to throw upon the Government the blame of his own factious proceedings. He constantly accused the Administration of Mr. Lincoln of an unfair and partisan execution of the law, which he regarded in itself as unconstitutional. He assumed that because the enrollment of the arms-bearing population of New York City, which had given a majority for him, showed an excess over the enrollment in the rural districts, which had given a large majority for Wadsworth, the city was to be punished for being Democratic and the country rewarded for being Republican; to which the most natural reply was that the volunteering had been far more active in the Republican districts than it had been in the Democratic. He attacked all the proceedings of the provost-marshals. He accused them of neglect and contumacy towards himself. All these accusations were wholly unfounded. General Fry was a man as nearly without politics as a patriotic American can be. He came of a distinguished Democratic family, and during a life passed in the military service his only preoccupation had been the punctual fulfillment of every duty confided to him. The district provost-marshals for the city of New York were selected with especial care from those recommended by citizens of the highest character in the place. Three provost-marshal generals were appointed for New York, and great pains were taken to choose "those who would be likely to secure the favor and coöperation of the authorities and the people of New York."[2] They were Major Townsend, Colonel Nugent, and Major Diven. Nugent and Diven were war Democrats, and the last "an intimate acquaintance and personal friend of Governor Seymour." Townsend was a well-known resident of Albany. They were specially charged to put themselves in communication with the Governor, to acquaint themselves with his views and wishes, and to give them due weight in determining the best interests of the Government; and to endeavor, by all means in their power, to secure for the execution of the enrollment act the aid and hearty coöperation of the Governor, the State officers, and the people. A letter was at the same time written to the Governor by the Provost-Marshal General commending these officers to him and asking for them his coöperation. A similar letter was sent to the mayor of New York City. The Government exhausted all its powers in endeavoring to commend the enrollment to the favorable consideration of the civil officers of the State. "But Governor Seymour," says General Fry, "gave no assistance; in fact, so far as the Government officers engaged in the enrollment could learn, he gave the subject no attention." Without the aid or countenance of the Governor, in face of his quiet hostility, the enrollment was carried forward as rapidly as possible. The work was impeded by numerous and important obstacles; the large floating population of the city threw great difficulties in the way of the enrollment; opposition was encountered in almost every house that the enrolling officers entered. Where artifice did not succeed violence was sometimes attempted. In some places organized bodies of men opposed the enrollment, in others secret societies waged a furtive warfare against the officers. But in spite of all these drawbacks the enrollment was made with remarkable fairness and substantial success. It was no more imperfect than was inevitable, and the draft which followed it was conducted in such a manner as to neutralize to a great extent the irregularities and hardship that might have resulted from the errors it contained.[3] The enrollment having been completed, orders for the draft in the State of New York were issued on the 1st of July. At that date drafting had been going on for some time in New England. Colonel Nugent was left at liberty, if thought expedient, to execute the draft in New York City by districts, and in one or more at a given time, rather than all at once, throughout the city. Governor Seymour was notified in almost daily letters, from the 1st to the 13th of July, of the drafts which had been

[1] The attacks upon the constitutionality of the enrollment act were mainly political. Several attempts were made to have it declared invalid by the courts, but these were generally unsuccessful. In the United States circuit courts of Pennsylvania and Illinois two important decisions were rendered, the one by Judge Cadwalader and the other by Judge Treat (Judge Davis concurring), affirming the constitutionality of the law. Only one important decision in the contrary sense was obtained, and that was in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, Chief-Justice Lowrie and Justices Woodward and Thompson concurring in the decision that the law was unconstitutional, Justices Strong and Read dissenting. This decision was afterwards reversed. Chief-Justice Lowrie was a candidate for reëlection and Justice Woodward ran for governor the next year. The main issue in the canvass was this decision. They were both defeated by large majorities, A. G. Curtin being reëlected governor, and Daniel Agnew taking the place of Lowrie on the bench. The court, thus reconstituted, reversed the former decision, Woodward and Thompson dissenting.

[2] General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."

[3] Official Report of Provost-Marshal General.

ordered in the several districts. The Provost-Marshal General begged him to do all in his power to enable the officers to complete the drafts promptly, effectually, fairly, and successfully.[1] He paid no attention to these requests further than to send his adjutant-general to Washington on the 11th of July for the purpose of urging the suspension of the draft. But while this officer was away upon his mission the evil passions excited in the breasts of the lowest class of Democrats in New York City by the denunciations of the enrollment act and of the legally constituted authorities who were endeavoring to enforce it, broke out in the most terrible riot which this Western Continent has ever witnessed.

The state of popular distrust and excitement which naturally arose from the discussion of the enrollment was greatly increased by the vehement utterances of the more violent Democratic politicians and newspapers. Governor Seymour, in a speech delivered on the Fourth of July, which was filled with denunciations of the party in power, said:

> The Democratic organization look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises.

The "Journal of Commerce" accused the Administration of prolonging the war for its own purposes, and added, "Such men are neither more nor less than murderers." "The World," denouncing "the weak and reckless men who temporarily administer the Federal Government," attacked especially the enrollment bill as an illegal and despotic measure. The "Daily News," which reached a larger number of the masses of New York than any other journal, quoted Governor Seymour as saying that neither the President nor Congress, without the consent of the State authorities, had the right to force a single individual against his will "to take part in the ungodly conflict which is distracting the land." It condemned the manner in which the draft was being executed as "an outrage on all decency and fairness," the object of it being to "kill off Democrats and stuff the ballot-boxes with bogus soldier votes." Incendiary hand-bills in the same sense were distributed through the northern districts of the city, thickly populated with laboring men of foreign birth.

Although there had been for several days mutterings of discontent in the streets and even threats uttered against the enrolling officers, these demonstrations had been mostly confined to the drinking-saloons, and no apprehensions of popular tumult were entertained. Even on Saturday morning, the 11th of July, when the draft was to begin at the corner of Forty-third street and Third Avenue, there was no symptom of disturbance. The day passed pleasantly away, the draft was carried on regularly and good-humoredly, and at night the superintendent of police, as he left the office, said "the Rubicon was passed and all would go well."[2] But the next day, being Sunday, afforded leisure for the ferment of suspicion and anger. Every foreigner who was drafted became a center of sympathy and excitement. There were secret meetings in many places on Sunday night, and on the next morning parties of men went from shop to shop compelling workmen to join them and swell the processions which were moving to the offices of the enrollment board. The commissioner proceeded quietly with his work, the wheel was beginning to turn, a few names were called and recorded, when suddenly a large paving-stone came crashing through the window and landed upon the reporters' table, shivering the inkstands and knocking over one or two bystanders; and with hardly a moment's interval a volley of stones flew through the windows, putting a stop to the proceedings. The crowd, kindled into fury by its own act, speedily became a howling mob; the rioters burst through the doors and windows, smashed the furniture of the office into splinters, sprinkled camphene upon the floor, and set the building on fire. When the fire department arrived they found the mob in possession of the hydrants, and the building was soon reduced to ashes. This furious outburst took the authorities completely by surprise.[3] The most trustworthy portion of the organized militia had been ordered to Pennsylvania to resist the invasion of General Lee. There was only a handful of troops in the harbor, and the mob, having possession of the street railways, prevented for a time the rapid concentration of these, while the police, who were admirable in organization and efficiency, being at the time under Repub-

[1] General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."

[2] "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 811.

[3] General Fry, in his valuable treatise, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," gives the following as reasons why no large military force was assembled to preserve the public peace in New York: "On the occasion of the first draft these questions were carefully weighed by the President and the War Department. The conclusions were that no exception in the application of the law should be made in New York, that no presumption that the State or city authorities would fail to coöperate with the Government should be admitted, that a Federal military force ought not to be assembled in New York City on the mere assumption that a law of the United States would be violently and extensively resisted, and that if it were thought best to assemble such a force there was none to be had without losing campaigns then going on or battles then impending."

lican control,[1] were of course inadequate, during the first hours of the outbreak, to deal with an army of excited and ignorant men, recruited in an instant from hundreds of workshops and excited by drink and passionate declamation. The agitation and disorder spread so rapidly that the upper part of the city was in a few hours in full possession of the maddened crowd, the majority of them filled with that aimless thirst for destruction which rises so naturally in a mob when the restraints of order are withdrawn. They were led by wild zealots, excited by political hates and fears, or by common thieves, who found in the tumult their opportunity for plunder. By 3 o'clock in the afternoon the body of rioters in the upper part of the city numbered several thousand. Their first fury was naturally directed against the enrolling offices. After the destruction of the building in the Ninth District they attacked the block of stores in which the enrolling office of the Eighth District stood.[2] The adjoining shops were filled with jewelry and other costly goods, and were speedily swept clean by the thievish hands of the rioters, and then set on fire; here, as before, the firemen were not permitted to play on the flames. But the political animus of the mob was shown most clearly by the brutal and cowardly outrages inflicted upon negroes. They dashed with the merriment of fiends at every colored face they saw, taking special delight in the maiming and murdering of women and children. Late in the afternoon of the 13th the mob made a rush for the fine building of the Colored Orphan Asylum.[3] This estimable charity was founded and carried on by a society of kind-hearted ladies; it gave not only shelter but instruction and Christian training to several hundred colored orphans. A force of policemen was hastily gathered together, but could defend the asylum for a few minutes only, giving time for most of the inmates to escape. The policemen were then disabled by the brutal mob, who rushed into the building, stealing everything which was portable, and setting the house on fire. They burned the residences of several Government officers, and a large hotel which refused them liquor.

For three days these horrible scenes of unchained fury and hatred lasted. An attack upon the "New York Tribune" office was a further evidence of the political passion of the mob,[4] headed at this point by a lame secessionist barber who had just before been heard to express the hope that he "might soon shave Jeff. Davis in New York," and who led on the rioters with loud cheers for General McClellan; but after dismantling the counting-room they were attacked and driven away by the police. From beginning to end they showed little courage; they were composed, in great number, of the most degraded class of foreigners, and as a rule they made no stand when attacked in any number by either the police or the military. The only exception to this rule was in the case of a squad of marines who foolishly fired into the air when confronting the rioters. Colonel O'Brien, having sprained his ankle while gallantly resisting the mob, stepped into a drug store for assistance while his detachment passed on. The druggist, fearing the rioters, begged O'Brien to leave his shop, and the brave soldier went out among the howling mob. In a moment they were upon him and beat and trampled him into unconsciousness. For several hours the savages dragged the still breathing body of their own countryman up and down the streets, inflicting every indignity upon his helpless form, and then, shouting and yelling, conveyed him to his own door. There a courageous priest sought to subdue their savagery by reading the last offices for the dying over the unfortunate officer; then the climax of horror was reached by the brutal ruffians jostling the priest aside and closing the ceremonies by dancing upon the corpse. But a squad of fifty regulars was able to work its will against thousands of them. The city government, the trusty and courageous police force, and the troops in the harbor at last came into harmonious action and gradually established order throughout the city.

The State government was of little avail from beginning to end of the disturbance. Governor Seymour, having done all he could to embarrass the Government and rouse the people against it, had left the city on the 11th and gone to Long Branch in New Jersey. On the receipt of the frightful news of the 13th he returned to the city a prey to the most terrible agitation. He was hurried by his friends to the City Hall, where a great crowd soon gathered, and there, in sight of the besieged "Tribune" office, he made the memorable address the discredit of which justly clung to him all his days. His terror and his sympathy with the mob, in conflict with his convictions of public duty, completely unmanned him. He addressed the rioters in affectionate tones as his "friends," and assured them that he had "come to show them a test of his friendship." He informed them that he had sent his adjutant to Washington to confer with the authorities

1 Several years afterwards Governor Seymour said: "The draft riots of 1863 were put down mainly by the energy, boldness, and skill of the police department. In saying this I am certainly not influenced by prejudice, for the force was politically and in some degree personally unfriendly to myself."

2 Broadway, near Twenty-eighth street.

3 Fifth Avenue and Forty-fourth street.

4 Trial of J. H. Whittier, Aug. 12, 1863.

there and to have the draft suspended. This assurance was received with the most vociferous cheers. He urged them to act as good citizens, leaving their interests to him. "Wait until my adjutant returns from Washington," he said, "and you shall be satisfied." The words in this extraordinary speech for which the governor was most blamed were those in which he addressed the mob as his friends; but this was a venial fault, pardonable in view of his extreme agitation. The serious matter was his intimation that the draft justified the riot, and that if the rioters would cease from their violence the draft would be stopped.[1] He issued two proclamations on the 14th, the one mildly condemning the riot and calling upon the persons engaged in it to retire to their homes and employments, and the other, somewhat sterner in tone, declaring the city and county of New York to be in a state of insurrection, and warning all who might resist the State authorities of their liability to the penalties prescribed by law. It is questionable if the rioters ever heard of the proclamations, and if they did the effect of these official utterances was entirely nullified by the governor's sympathetic speeches. The riots came to a bloody close on the night of Thursday, the fourth day. A small detachment of soldiers[2] met the principal body of rioters at Third Avenue and Twenty-first street, killed thirteen and wounded eighteen more, taking some dozens of prisoners. The fire of passion had burned itself out by this time, and the tired mob, now thoroughly dominated, slunk away to its hiding-places. During that night and the next day the militia were returning from Pennsylvania, several regiments of veterans arrived from the Army of the Potomac, and the peace of the city was once more secured. The rioters had kept the city in terror for four days and had destroyed two millions of property. For several days afterwards arrests went on, and many of the wounded law-breakers died in their retreats, afraid to call for assistance.

There were unimportant disturbances in other places which were speedily put down by the local authorities, but, as Mr. Greeley says: "in no single instance was there a riot incited by drafting wherein Americans by birth bore any considerable part, nor in which the great body of the actors were not born Europeans, and generally of recent importation." The part taken by Archbishop Hughes in this occurrence gave rise to various comments. He placarded about the city on the 16th of July an address "to the men of New York who are now called in many papers rioters," inviting them to come to his house and let him talk to them, assuring them of immunity from the police in going and coming. "You who are Catholics," the address concluded, "or as many of you as are, have a right to visit your bishop without molestation." On the 17th, at 2 o'clock, a crowd of four or five thousand persons assembled in front of the Archbishop's residence,[3] and the venerable prelate, clad in his purple robes and full canonical attire, appeared at the window and made a strange speech to the mob, half jocular and half earnest, alternately pleading, cajoling, and warning them. He told them that he "did not see a riotous face among them." He did not accuse them of having done anything wrong. He said that every man had the right to defend his house or his shanty at the risk of his life; that they had no cause to complain, "as Irishmen and Catholics," against the Government; and affectionately suggested whether it might not be better for them to retire to their homes and keep out of danger. He begged them to be quiet in the name of Ireland—"Ireland, that never committed a single act of cruelty until she was oppressed; Ireland, that has been the mother of heroes and of poets, but never the mother of cowards." The crowd greeted his speech with uproarious applause and quietly dispersed.

The number of those who lost their lives during the riots has never been ascertained. The mortality statistics for that week and the week succeeding show an increase of five or six hundred over the average. Governor Seymour estimated the number of killed and wounded at one thousand.

Naturally, in such days of terror and anger, there were not wanting those who asserted that the riots were the result and the manifestation of a widespread treasonable conspiracy involving leading Democrats at the North. The President received many letters to this effect, one relating the alleged confession of a well-known politician, who, overcome with agitation and remorse, had in the presence of the editors of the "Tribune" divulged the complicity of Seymour and others in the preparation of the émeute.[4] But he placed no reliance upon the story, and there was in fact no foundation for it. With all his desire to injure the Administration, Governor Seymour had not the material of an insurrectionist in his composi-

[1] While the riot was going on, Governor Seymour had an interview with Colonel Nugent, the acting Provost-Marshal General of New York City, and insisted on the colonel's announcing a suspension of the draft. The draft had already been stopped by violence. The announcement was urged by the governor no doubt because he thought it would allay the excitement; but this was, under the circumstances, making a concession to the mob, and endangering the successful enforcement of the law of the land. [General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863."]

[2] Of the 12th Regulars, under Captain Putman.

[3] Corner of Madison Avenue and Thirty-sixth street.

[4] J. R. Gilmore to Lincoln, July 17, 1863. MS.

tion, and when the riot came his excitement and horror was the best proof that he had not expected it.

The scenes of violence in New York were not repeated anywhere else, if we except a slight disturbance in Boston, but the ferment of opposition was so general as to give great disquietude to many friends of the Government throughout the country. Leading Unionists in Philadelphia, fearing a riot there, besought the President by mail and telegraph to stop the draft. In Chicago a similar appeal was made, and by recruitment and volunteering the necessity for a draft was avoided in Illinois until the next year.

No provision of the enrollment law excited such ardent opposition as that which was introduced for the purpose of mitigating its rigors — the provision exempting drafted men from service upon payment of three hundred dollars. "The rich man's money against the poor man's blood" was a cry from which no demagogue could refrain, and it was this which contributed most powerfully to rouse the unthinking masses against the draft. The money paid for exemptions was used, under the direction of the Provost-Marshal General, for the raising of recruits and the payment of the expenses of the draft. It amounted to a very large sum — twenty-six millions of dollars. After all expenses were paid there was a balance of nine millions left to the credit of the Bureau in the Treasury of the United States. The exemption fund was swelled by the action of county and municipal authorities, especially by those of New York, who in the flurry succeeding the riots passed in great haste an ordinance to pay the commutation for drafted men of the poorer class. A certain impetus was given to volunteering also, but the money came in faster than the men; and in June, 1864, the Provost-Marshal General reported that out of some 14,000 drafted men 7000 were exempted for various reasons and 5000 paid money commutation. This statement was sent to Congress by the President with the recommendation that the commutation clause be repealed. This was done[1] after a hot discussion which exhibited a curious change of front on the question, Messrs. Saulsbury, Richardson, and other Democrats energetically opposing the repeal, and making it the occasion for as bitter attacks on the Administration as those which had been for a year directed against the law.[2]

It may not be without interest to look for a moment at the measures pursued by the Confederate authorities to raise and maintain their army. There is a striking contrast between methods and results on either side of the line. The methods of the Confederates were far more prompt and more rigorous than those of the National Government, while the results attained were so much less satisfactory that their failure in this respect brought about the final catastrophe of their enterprise. They began the war with forces greatly superior in numbers to those of the Nation. Before the attack on Fort Sumter their Congress had authorized the raising of an army of 100,000 men and Mr. Davis had called into service 36,900 men, more than twice the army of the United States; and immediately after beginning hostilities he called for 32,000 more. On the 8th of May the Confederate Congress gave Mr. Davis almost unlimited power to accept the services of volunteers without regard to place of enlistment, and a few days later he was relieved by statute of the delays and limitations of formal calls, and all power of appointments to commissions was placed in his hands. So that, while from the beginning to the end the most punctilious respect was paid by the National executive and legislature to the rights of the loyal States in the matter of recruitment, the States which had seceded, on the pretext of preserving their autonomy, speedily gave themselves into the hands of a military dictator. In December, 1861, the term of enlistment was changed from one to three years, the pitiful bounty of fifty dollars being given as compensation. During all that winter recruiting languished, and several statutes continually increasing in severity were passed with little effect; and on the 16th of April, 1862, the Confederate Congress passed a sweeping measure of universal conscription, authorizing the President to call and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should end sooner, "all white men who are residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 35 years," not legally exempt from service; and arbitrarily lengthening to three years the terms of those already enlisted. A law so stringent was of course impossible of perfect execution. Under the clamor and panic of their constituencies the Confederate Congress passed, repealed, and modified various schemes of exemption intended to permit the ordinary routine of civil life to pursue its course, but great confusion and heart-burnings arose from every effort which was made to ease the workings of the inexorable machine. The question of overseers of plantations was one especially difficult to treat. The law of the 11th of October, 1862, exempted one man for every plantation of twenty negroes. This system was further extended from time to time, but owners of slaves were obliged to pay five hundred dollars a year for each exemption. By one statute it was provided that on plantations where these exemptions were granted the exempt should pay two

1 Law approved July 4, 1864.
2 "Congressional Globe," June 23, 1864.

hundred pounds of meat for every able-bodied slave on the plantation. Gradually all exemptions as of right were legislated away and the whole subject left to the discretion of the executive, which vastly increased his power and his unpopularity. It finally rested upon him to say how many editors, ministers, railroad engineers, and expressmen were absolutely required to keep up the current of life in the business of the country.

The limit of age was constantly extended. In September, 1862, an act of the Confederate Congress authorized the President to call into service all white men resident in the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 45; and in February, 1864, another law included all between 17 and 50, which gave occasion to Grant for his celebrated *mot*—afterwards credited by him to General Butler—that the Confederates were robbing the cradle and the grave to fill their armies.

Severe and drastic as were these laws, and unrelenting as was the insurrectionary Government in their execution, they were not carried out with anything like the system and thoroughness which characterized the action of the National authorities. The Confederate generals were constantly complaining that they got no recruits, or not enough to supply the waste of campaigns. On the 30th of April, 1864, the chief of the Bureau of Conscription at Richmond made a report to the Secretary of War, painting in the darkest colors the difficulties encountered by him in getting soldiers into the ranks, though he had all the laws and regulations he needed and there were men enough in the country. He said, and in these words confessed that the system had failed and that the defeat of the revolt was now but a question of time:

> The results indicate this grave consideration for the Government, that fresh material for the armies can no longer be estimated as an element of future calculation for their increase, and that necessity demands the invention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men now borne on the rolls. The stern revocation of all details, an appeal to the patriotism of the State claiming large bodies of able-bodied men, and the accretions by age are now almost the only unexhausted sources of supply. For conscription from the general population the functions of this bureau may cease with the termination of the year 1864.

April 1889

A JEST OF FATE.



IT was eight o'clock on a clean-washed, clear-cut, sun-bathed October morning when my mother and I climbed into the second-best buggy behind old white Telly for a twenty-mile drive "up the country." The Judge waved us a courtly adieu; little Tom and his sister hooked themselves on behind to go with us to the big gate, the opening of which furnished them with a reason for being; Aunt Sally called out from the back gallery last messages to Cousin Nancy; the negroes collected at doors and windows to see us off, and we rolled gently away into the fairyland of unfamiliar roads.

Our route wound here and there past fodder-stacked corn-fields, brier-grown old pastures, irregular old farm-houses sleeping in the sunshine, populous negro cabins, and, last and best, through vine-tangled, enchanting, enchanted woods. The country we traversed had for our æsthetic interests the advantage of being poor and sparsely settled; as we went on it became still rougher and lonelier. When the sun set behind us we were at a fork in the road, in the fullest uncertainty as to our proper route, and with the last house three miles behind us.

Our last instruction had been to "Jes keep the plain, big road right on to Squire Claymore's."

One road, so far as we could see, was as big as the other. One led down into a swampy wood that looked in the failing light as if it might be all too fruitful of adventure. The other took its way over a high, open country and seemed safer and pleasanter, and on this ground we logically chose it. Soon the open country ended and we found ourselves in something worth calling a forest; it grew denser and darker as we advanced; the night was settling down upon us.

"There are immense tracts like this up here in the barrens," said my mother in a voice that assumed the tone of a philosophical statement, but which rebelliously vibrated with a growing uneasiness. "I thought back there when we first got into the woods that the road looked

1st May 1889

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE PRESIDENT AND THE DRAFT — VALLANDIGHAM — THE PEACE PARTY AT THE POLLS.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE DRAFT.

DURING the entire summer and autumn of 1863, Governor Seymour and his friends made the proceedings of the Government in relation to the enrollment law the object of special and vehement attack.[2] On the 17th of October the President made a call for 300,000 volunteers, and at the same time ordered that the draft should be made for all deficiencies which might exist on the 5th of January following, on the quotas assigned to districts by the War Department.[3] Shortly after this the Democratic State committee issued a circular making the military administration of the Government, and especially the law calling for troops, the object of violent attack, greatly exaggerating the demands of the Government, claiming that no credits would be allowed for those who had paid commutation, and basing these charges upon a pretended proclamation of the 27th of October which had never been issued. The President, with the painstaking care which distinguished him, prepared with his own hand the following contradiction of this misleading circular:[4]

> The Provost-Marshal General has issued no proclamation at all. He has, in no form, announced anything recently in regard to troops in New York, except in his letter to Governor Seymour of October 21, which has been published in the newspapers of that State. It has not been announced nor decided in any form by the Provost-Marshal General, or any one else in authority of the Government, that every citizen who has paid his three hundred dollars' commutation is liable to be immediately drafted again, or that towns that have just raised the money to pay their quotas will have again to be subject to similar taxation or suffer the operation of the new conscription, nor is it probable that the like of this ever will be announced or decided.

The circular we have referred to went on to claim that the State had been thoroughly canvassed, and that the victory of the Democratic ticket was assured. But the result showed that the Democratic leaders were as far wrong in their prophecy as in their history. The Republican State ticket was elected by a majority of 30,000 over the Democratic, and the principal State of the Union decided in favor of the President the vehement controversy which had raged all the year between Seymour and Lincoln — a verdict which was repeated in the following year when Governor Seymour was a candidate for reëlection.

In the early part of December the President, anxious in every way to do justice and to satisfy, if possible, the claims of Governor Seymour, consented to the appointment of a commission to inquire into the whole subject of the enrollment in New York. The principal member of the commission, chosen by Governor Seymour, was William F. Allen, his intimate friend and an ardent Democrat in politics; of the other members, General Love of Indiana was also a Democrat; Chauncey Smith of Massachusetts was a lawyer, not prominently identified with either political party. Judge Allen clearly dominated the commission, and they agreed with him in condemning the principle on which the enrollment and the draft were conducted. They reported that, instead of numbering the men of a given district capable of bearing arms and making that number the basis of the draft,— which was the course the enrolling officers, in direct obedience to the law of Congress, had pursued,— the quotas should be adjusted upon the basis of proportion to the entire population. They did not indorse the injurious attacks made by the governor upon the enrolling officers and agents, but distinctly stated that their fidelity and integrity were unimpeached. The essential point of their report was simply that the quota should be in proportion to the total population of the district, and not according to the number of valid men to be found in it. When the President required from the Provost-Marshal General his opinion upon the report, General Fry made this reasonable criticism:

> The commission has evidently been absorbed by the conviction that the raising of men is, and will necessarily continue to be, equivalent to levying special taxes and raising money, and they would therefore require the same proceeds, under the en-

[2] See also THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for last month.— EDITOR.

[3] General J. B. Fry, "New York and the Conscription of 1863," p. 49.

[4] Dated, Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 31, 1863. MS.

[1] Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

rollment act, from a district of rich women which they would from a district with the same number of men of equal means. I assume that we are looking for personal military service from those able to perform it, that we make no calls for volunteers in the sense in which the commission understand it, but that we assign to the districts under the enrollment act fair quotas of the men we have found them to contain.

The President entirely agreed with the Provost-Marshal General that it was manifestly unjust to require as many drafted men from a district that had been depleted of its young men by the patriotic impulse which filled the army at the beginning of the war as were justly called for from one that had contributed nothing to the field, a course which would have been the logical result of yielding to the demands of Governor Seymour and the recommendation of the commission. But, wishing to make all possible concessions to the State authorities, he resolved once more to reduce the quota of New York, and explained his action in a letter to the Secretary of War dated February 27, 1864.

So long as Governor Seymour remained in office he continued his warfare upon the enrollment act and the officers charged with its execution. On the 18th of July, 1864, the President made a third call for troops under the act, and the governor promptly renewed his charges and complaints. At this time, however, both he and Mr. Lincoln were candidates before the people — the one for the Presidency, and the other for the Governorship of New York; and it was probably for this reason that Mr. Seymour's correspondence was carried on at this time with the Secretary of War instead of Mr. Lincoln. But it afforded no new features; there were the same complaints of excessive quotas, of unfair, unequal, and oppressive action, as before. He said again that there had been no opportunity given to correct the enrollment, upon which the Provost-Marshal General reported that the governor had been duly informed of the opportunities to make corrections, and that an order had been issued from his own headquarters in reference to the matter. No efforts were spared by the Government to insure a rigid revision of the lists. The governor spoke with great vehemence of the disparity between the demand made upon New York and Boston, saying that in one of the cities 26 per cent. of the population was enrolled, and in the other only 12½ per cent. General Fry replied to this that the proportion of enrollment to population in Boston was not 12½ but 16.92 per cent.; that less than 17 per cent. in New York and Brooklyn were enrolled, and that, in fine, the enrollment was a mere question of fact — it was the ascertainment of the number of men of a certain description in defined areas; that the enrollments were continuously open to revision, and that any name erroneously on them would be stricken off as soon as the error was pointed out by anybody to the Board of Enrollment. He then showed that the quotas throughout New York were in fact smaller than in many other States where the proportion of men was large, and closed his report by saying that he "saw no reason why the law should not be applied to New York as well as to other States." This report Mr. Stanton[1] transmitted to the governor, expressing the somewhat sanguine trust that it would satisfy him that his objections against the quotas assigned to New York were not well founded. He recalled the fact that a commission had been appointed the year before with a view to ascertain whether any mistake or errors had been made by the enrolling officers, but that the commissioners bore their testimony to the fidelity with which the work was done; that with a view to harmony the President had directed a reduction in some districts, but without the increase of others recommended by the commissioners; and that a basis for the assignment being now absolutely fixed by act of Congress, the War Department had no power to change it.

The voters of New York in the autumn election decided to retire Governor Seymour to private life, and his successor, Governor Fenton, gave to the Government, during the rest of the war, a hearty and loyal support.

While the controversy between the Government and its opponents in regard to the enrollment and the draft was going on, the President, disappointed and grieved at the persistent misrepresentations of his views and his intentions by those of whom he had expected better things, and feeling that he was unable, by any power of logic or persuasion, to induce the leaders of the Democratic party to do him justice or to coöperate with him in the measures which he was convinced were for the public good, thought for a time of appealing directly to the people of the United States in defense of the conduct of the Government. He prepared a long and elaborate address, which he intended more especially for the consideration of the honest and patriotic Democrats of the North, setting forth, with his inimitable clearness of statement, the necessity for the draft, the substantial fairness of the provisions of the law, and the honesty and equity with which, as he claimed, the Government had attempted to carry it out. But, after he had finished it, doubts arose in his mind as to the propriety or the expediency of addressing the public directly in that manner, and it was never published. It is here, for the first time, printed, from Mr. Lincoln's own manuscript, and it is

[1] Aug. 11, 1864.

a question whether the reader will more admire the lucidity and the fairness with which the President sets forth his views, or the reserve and abnegation with which, after writing it, he resolved to suppress so admirable a paper:

"It is at all times proper that misunderstanding between the public and the public servant should be avoided; and this is far more important now than in times of peace and tranquillity. I therefore address you without searching for a precedent upon which to do so. Some of you are sincerely devoted to the republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country, and yet are opposed to what is called the draft, or conscription.

"At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing, some in one direction and some in the other, would be presented to the mind of each man physically fit for a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motives he would, or would not, voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives would be patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment, and convenience, or the opposite of some of these. We already have, and have had in the service, as appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing of motives. And yet we must somehow obtain more, or relinquish the original object of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure already expended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law for the draft has been enacted. You who do not wish to be soldiers do not like this law. This is natural; nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it is disagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments with which to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things. In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed, and others who seek reward in a different way, are very active in accommodating us with this class of argument. They tell us the law is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in which the power of Congress to do a thing has ever been questioned in a case when the power is given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a power can be implied, when it is not expressed, has often been the subject of controversy; but this is the first case in which the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon, of denying a power which is plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution. The Constitution declares that 'the Congress shall have power . . . to raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.' The whole scope of the conscription act is 'to raise and support armies.' There is nothing else in it. It makes no appropriation of money, and hence the money clause just quoted is not touched by it. The case simply is, the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies; and by this act the Congress has exercised the power to raise and support armies. This is the whole of it. It is a law made in literal pursuance of this part of the United States Constitution; and another part of the same Constitution declares that 'this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' Do you admit that the power is given to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional mode? — has not done the thing in the right way? Who is to judge of this? The Constitution gives Congress the power, but it does not prescribe the mode, or expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case Congress must prescribe the mode, or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. Congress could not exercise the power to do the thing if it had not the power of providing a way to do it, when no way is provided by the Constitution for doing it. In fact, Congress would not have the power to raise and support armies, if even by the Constitution it were left to the option of any other, or others, to give or withhold the only mode of doing it. If the Constitution has prescribed a mode, Congress could and must follow that mode; but, as it is, the mode necessarily goes to Congress, with the power expressly given. The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an if.

"It is clear that a constitutional law may not be expedient or proper. Such would be a law to raise armies when no armies were needed. But this is not such. The republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country cannot be maintained without the further raising and supporting of armies. There can be no army without men. Men can be had only voluntarily or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft — the conscription. If you dispute the fact, and declare that men can still be had voluntarily in sufficient numbers, prove the assertion by yourselves volunteering in such numbers, and I shall gladly give up the draft. Or if not a sufficient number, but

any one of you will volunteer, he for his single self will escape all the horrors of the draft, and will thereby do only what each one of at least a million of his manly brethren have already done. Their toil and blood have been given as much for you as for themselves. Shall it all be lost rather than that you, too, will bear your part?

"I do not say that all who would avoid serving in the war are unpatriotic; but I do think every patriot should willingly take his chance under a law, made with great care, in order to secure entire fairness. This law was considered, discussed, modified, and amended by Congress at great length, and with much labor; and was finally passed, by both branches, with a near approach to unanimity. At last, it may not be exactly such as any one man out of Congress, or even in Congress, would have made it. It has been said, and I believe truly, that the Constitution itself is not altogether such as any one of its framers would have preferred. It was the joint work of all, and certainly the better that it was so.

"Much complaint is made of that provision of the conscription law which allows a drafted man to substitute three hundred dollars for himself; while, as I believe, none is made of that provision which allows him to substitute another man for himself. Nor is the three hundred dollar provision objected to for unconstitutionality; but for inequality, for favoring the rich against the poor. The substitution of men is the provision, if any, which favors the rich to the exclusion of the poor. But this being a provision in accordance with an old and well-known practice, in the raising of armies, is not objected to. There would have been great objection if that provision had been omitted. And yet being in, the money provision really modifies the inequality which the other introduces. It allows men to escape the service who are too poor to escape but for it. Without the money provision, competition among the more wealthy might, and probably would, raise the price of substitutes above three hundred dollars, thus leaving the man who could raise only three hundred dollars no escape from personal service. True, by the law as it is, the man who cannot raise so much as three hundred dollars, nor obtain a personal substitute for less, cannot escape; but he can come quite as near escaping as he could if the money provision were not in the law. To put it another way: is an unobjectionable law which allows only the man to escape who can pay a thousand dollars, made objectionable by adding a provision that any one may escape who can pay the smaller sum of three hundred dollars? This is the exact difference at this point between the present law and all former draft laws. It is true that by this law a somewhat larger number will escape than could under the law allowing personal substitutes only; but each additional man thus escaping will be a poorer man than could have escaped by the law in the other form. The money provision enlarges the class of exempts from actual service simply by admitting poorer men into it. How then can the money provision be a wrong to the poor man? The inequality complained of pertains in greater degree to the substitution of men, and is really modified and lessened by the money provision. The inequality could only be perfectly cured by sweeping both provisions away. This, being a great innovation, would probably leave the law more distasteful than it now is.

"The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.' It had been used just before, in establishing our independence, and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerated? Has the manhood of our race run out?

"Again, a law may be both constitutional and expedient, and yet may be administered in an unjust and unfair way. This law belongs to a class, which class is composed of those laws whose object is to distribute burthens or benefits on the principle of equality. No one of these laws can ever be practically administered with that exactness which can be conceived of in the mind. A tax law, the principle of which is that each owner shall pay in proportion to the value of his property, will be a dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it can be shown that every other man will pay in precisely the same proportion, according to value; nay, even, it will be a dead letter, if no one can be compelled to pay until it is certain that every other one will pay at all — even in unequal proportion. Again, the United States House of Representatives is constituted on the principle that each member is sent by the same number of people that each other one is sent by; and yet, in practice, no two of the whole number, much less the whole number, are ever sent by precisely the same number of constituents. The districts cannot be made precisely equal in population at first, and if they could, they would become unequal in a single day, and much more so in

the ten years, which the districts, once made, are to continue. They cannot be remodeled every day; nor, without too much expense and labor, even every year.

"This sort of difficulty applies in full force to the practical administration of the draft law. In fact, the difficulty is greater in the case of the draft law. First, it starts with all the inequality of the congressional districts; but these are based on entire population, while the draft is based on those only who are fit for soldiers, and such may not bear the same proportion to the whole in one district that they do in another. Again, the facts must be ascertained, and credit given, for the unequal numbers of soldiers which have already gone from the several districts. In all these points errors will occur in spite of the utmost fidelity. The Government is bound to administer the law with such an approach to exactness as is usual in analogous cases, and as entire good faith and fidelity will reach. If so great departures as to be inconsistent with such good faith and fidelity, or great departures occurring in any way, be pointed out they shall be corrected; and any agent shown to have caused such departures intentionally shall be dismissed.

"With these views, and on these principles, I feel bound to tell you it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed."

VALLANDIGHAM.

General Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio (March 26, 1863) with a zeal against the insurgents only heightened by his defeat at Fredericksburg. He found his department infested with a peculiarly bitter opposition to the Government and to the prosecution of the war, amounting, in his opinion, to positive aid and comfort to the enemy, and he determined to use all the powers confided to him to put an end to these manifestations, which he considered treasonable; and in the execution of this purpose he gave great latitude to the exercise of his authority. He was of a zealous and impulsive character, and weighed too little the consequences of his acts where his feelings were strongly enlisted. He issued, on the 13th of April, an order which obtained wide celebrity under the name of General Order No. 38, announcing that "all persons found within our lines, who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies and traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death." He enumerated, as among the acts which came within the view of this order, the writing and carrying of secret letters; passing the lines for treasonable purposes; recruiting for the Confederate service; harboring, concealing, or feeding public enemies within our lines; and passing beyond this reasonable category of offenses, he declared that "the habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department, and persons committing such offenses will at once be arrested, with a view to being tried, as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends." And in conclusion he added a clause which may be made to embrace, in its ample sweep, any demonstration not to the taste of the general in command: "It must be distinctly understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department."

This order at once excited a most furious denunciation on the part of those who, either on account of their acts, or their secret sympathies, felt themselves threatened by it, and many even of those opponents of the Administration who were entirely loyal to the Union[1] criticised the order as illegal in itself and liable to lead to dangerous abuses. The most energetic and eloquent of General Burnside's assailants was Clement L. Vallandigham, who had been for several years a member of Congress from Ohio, whose intemperate denunciation of the Government had caused him the loss of his seat,[2] and whose defeat had only heightened the acerb-

1 One of Burnside's own staff-officers, Colonel J. M. Cutts, wrote to the President July 30: "Order 38 has kindled the fires of hatred and contention. Burnside is foolishly and unwisely excited, and if continued in command will disgrace himself, you, and the country, as he did at Fredericksburg."

2 At the first threat of civil war Vallandigham made haste to declare himself opposed to any forcible execution of the laws. He declared the States of the Union the only judges of the sufficiency and justice of secession, and declared he would never vote one dollar of money whereby one drop of American blood should be shed in civil war; and in February preceding the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln he proposed to amend the Constitution by dividing the Union into four sections, giving each section a veto on the passage of any law or the election of Presidents or Vice-Presidents, and allowing to each State the right of secession on certain specified terms. Having thus early taken his stand, he retained his position with more consistency than was shown by any other member of his party. After his defeat by General R. C. Schenck, in his canvass for reëlection to Congress, he renewed his attacks upon the Government and its war policy with exaggerated vehemence.

In a speech delivered in the House of Representatives on the 14th of January, 1863, he boasted that he was of that number who had opposed abolitionism or the political development of the antislavery sentiment of the North and West from the beginning. He called it the development of the spirit of intermeddling, whose children are strife and murder. He said: "On the 14th of April I believed that coercion would bring on war, and war disunion. More than that, I believed, what you all in your hearts believe to-day, that the South could never be conquered — never. And not that only, but I was satisfied . . . that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States,

ity of his opposition to the war. General Order No. 38 furnished him a most inspiring text for assailing the Government, and he availed himself of it in Democratic meetings throughout the State. A rumor of his violent speeches came to the ears of the military authorities in Cincinnati, and an officer was sent, in citizen's clothes, to attend a meeting which was held at Mount Vernon, Ohio, where Mr. Vallandigham and other prominent Democrats were the orators of the day. The meeting was an enthusiastic one, full of zeal against the Government and of sympathy with the South. Mr. Vallandigham, feeling his audience thoroughly in harmony with him, spoke with unusual fluency and bitterness, greatly enjoying the applause of his hearers, and unconscious of the presence of the unsympathizing recorder, who leaned against the platform a few feet away and took down some of his most malignant periods. He said it was the design of those in power to usurp a despotism; that it was not their intention to effect a restoration of the Union; that the Government had rejected every overture of peace from the South and every proposition of mediation from Europe; that the war was for the liberation of the blacks and the enslavement of the whites; that General Order No. 38 was a base usurpation of arbitrary power; that he despised it and spat upon it and trampled it under his feet. Speaking of the conscription act, he said the people were not deserving to be free men who would submit to such encroachment on their liberties. He called the President "King Lincoln," and advised the people to come up together at the ballot box and hurl the tyrant from his throne. The audience and the speaker were evidently in entire agreement. The crowd wore in great numbers the distinctive badges of "Copperheads" and "Butternuts," and amid cheers which Vallandigham's speech elicited the witness heard a shout that "Jeff Davis was a gentleman, which was more than Lincoln was."

The officer returned to Cincinnati and made his report. Three days later, on the evening of the 4th of May, a special train went up to Dayton, with a company of the 115th Ohio, to arrest Mr. Vallandigham. Reaching Dayton they went at once to his house, where they arrived shortly before daylight, and demanded admittance. The orator appeared at an upper window and, being informed of their business, refused to allow them to enter. He began shouting in a loud voice; pistols were fired from the house; the signals were taken up in the town, and, according to some preconcerted arrangement, the fire bells began to toll. There was evidently no time to be lost. The soldiers forced their way into the house; Vallandigham was compelled to make a hasty toilet, and was hurried to the cars, and the special train pulled out of the station before any considerable crowd could assemble. Arriving at Cincinnati, Vallandigham was consigned to the military prison and kept in close confinement. During the day he contrived, however, to issue an address to the Democracy of Ohio, saying:

> I am here in a military bastile for no other offense than my political opinions, and the defense of them, and of the rights of the people, and of your constitutional liberties. . . . I am a Democrat — for the Constitution, for law, for the Union, for liberty — this is my only crime. . . . Meanwhile, Democrats of Ohio, of the North-west, of the United States, be firm, be true to your principles, to the Constitution, to the Union, and all will yet be well. . . . To you, to the whole people, to Time, I appeal.

While he was issuing these fervid words his friends in Dayton were making their demonstration in another fashion. The town was filled with excitement all day. Crowds gathered on the streets discussing and denouncing the arrest. Great numbers of wagons loaded with rural friends and adherents of the agitator came in from the country and, the excitement increasing as night came on, a crowd of several hundred men moved, hooting and yelling, to the office of the Republican newspaper. Some one threw a brick at the building, then a volley of pistol shots was fired, and the excitement of the crowd wreaked itself on the unoffending building, which was first sacked, and then destroyed by fire. Later in the night a company of troops arrived from Cincinnati, and before midnight the crowd was dispersed and order was restored.

Mr. Vallandigham was promptly tried by a military commission, convened May 6 by General Burnside, consisting of officers of his staff and of the Ohio and Kentucky volunteers. Mr. Vallandigham made no individual objection to the court, but protested that they had no authority to try him; that he was in neither the land nor naval forces of the United States, nor in the militia, and was therefore amenable only to the

. . . and with it . . . the change of our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism. . . . I do not support the war; and to-day I bless God that not the smell of so much as one drop of its blood is upon my garments. . . . Our Southern brethren were to be whipped back into love and fellowship at the point of the bayonet. Oh, monstrous delusion! . . . Sir, history will record that after nearly six thousand years of folly and wickedness in every form and administration of government, theocratic, democratic, monarchic, oligarchic, despotic, and mixed, it was reserved to American statesmanship, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, to try the grand experiment, on a scale the most costly and gigantic in its proportions, of creating love by force and developing fraternal affection by war, and history will record, too, on the same page, the utter disastrous and most bloody failure of the experiment."

civil courts. This protest was, of course, disregarded, and his trial went on. It was proved that he made the speech of which we have already given an abstract. He called as witness in his defense Mr. S. S. Cox, who was also one of the orators of the occasion, and who testified that the speech of Mr. Vallandigham, though couched in strong language, was in no respect treasonable. When the evidence was all in, the accused entered a protest against the entire proceeding, repeating the terms of his original protest, and adding that his alleged offense itself was not known to the Constitution nor to any law thereof. "It is," he said, "words spoken to the people of Ohio, in an open and public political meeting, lawfully and peaceably assembled under the Constitution and upon full notice. It is words of criticism of the public policy of the public servants of the people, by which policy it was alleged that the welfare of the country was not promoted. It was an appeal to the people to change that policy, not by force, but by free elections and the ballot box. It is not pretended that I counseled disobedience to the Constitution or resistance to laws and lawful authority. I never have. Beyond this protest, I have nothing further to submit." There were no speeches either in prosecution or in defense. When the court was cleared it remained in deliberation for three hours and returned a decision that the accused was guilty of the charge of "publicly expressing, in violation of General Order No. 38, from Headquarters Department of the Ohio, his sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." They therefore sentenced him to be placed in close confinement in some fortress of the United States, to be designated by the commanding officer of the department, there to be kept during the continuance of the war. General Burnside approved the finding and the sentence, and designated Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, as the place of confinement in accordance with the sentence.

But before the finding of the commission was made public, Mr. George E. Pugh, as counsel for Vallandigham, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court, sitting in Cincinnati, for a writ of habeas corpus. On the 11th of May the case was heard, and extended arguments were made by Mr. Pugh in favor of the motion, and by Mr. Perry, who appeared on behalf of General Burnside, against it. But the most noticeable feature of the trial was a written address from General Burnside himself, presented to the district attorney, in which he explained and defended his action. He began by saying that he was prohibited by law and by his duty from criticising the policy of the Government; that such abstention from injurious criticism was binding on every one in the service. He then went on to say:

> If it is my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying anything that would weaken the army by preventing a single recruit from joining the ranks, by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the department to avoid the same evil. . . . If I were to find a man from the enemy's country distributing in my camp speeches of their public men that tended to demoralize the troops, or to destroy their confidence in the constituted authorities of the Government, I would have him tried and hung, if found guilty, and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should such speeches from our own public men be allowed?

He even went so far as to disapprove the use of party names and party epithets, saying, "The simple names of patriot and traitor are comprehensive enough."

> If the people [he said] do not approve the policy of the Government they can change the constitutional authorities at the proper time and by the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone; but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which tend to weaken the authority of the Government and army: whilst the latter is in the presence of the enemy it is cowardly so to weaken it. . . . There is no fear of the people losing their liberties; we all know that to be the cry of demagogues, and none but the ignorant will listen to it.

Judge Leavitt denied the motion for habeas corpus in a long decision, in which he thoroughly reviewed the legal points involved in the case. The essential point of his decision was this: General Burnside, by order of the President, had been appointed to the military supervision of the Department of the Ohio, including, among other States, the State of Ohio. The precise extent of his authority was not known to the court, but it might properly be assumed that the President had clothed him with all the powers necessary to the efficient discharge of his duties. It is not claimed that in time of war the President is above the Constitution. He derives his power, on the contrary, expressly from the provision of that instrument that he shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy. The Constitution does not specify the powers he may rightfully exercise in this character, nor are they defined by legislation. No one denies, however, that the President, in this character, is invested with very high powers, which he has exercised, as commander-in-chief, from time to time during the present rebellion.

His acts in this capacity must be limited to such as are deemed essential to the protection and preservation of the Government and the Constitution. And in deciding what he may rightfully do under this power, where there is no express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely by his own judgment, and is amenable only for an abuse of his authority by impeachment. The occasion which calls for the exercise of this power exists only from the necessity of the case; and when the necessity exists there is a clear justification of the act. The judge concludes that if this view of the power of the President is correct, it implies the right to arrest persons who, by their mischievous acts of disloyalty, impede or endanger the military operations of the Government.

> And if the necessity exists, I see no reason [he said] why the power does not attach to the officer in command of a military department. The President cannot discharge the duties in person; he, therefore, constitutes an agent to represent him, clothed with the necessary power for the efficient supervision of the military interests of the Government throughout the department. . . . In the exercise of his discretion General Burnside issued the order (No. 38) which has been brought to the notice of the court.

Judge Leavitt would not comment on that order, but only referred to it because General Burnside had stated his motives for issuing it, and also because it was for its supposed violation that he ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. He had done this under his responsibility as the commanding general of the department, and in accordance with what he supposed to be the power vested in him by the appointment of the President. It was virtually an act of the Executive Department under the power vested in the President by the Constitution, and the court therefore refused to annul or reverse it.

The arrest, trial, and sentence of Vallandigham took the President somewhat by surprise, and it was only after these proceedings were consummated that he had an opportunity seriously to consider the case. If he had been consulted before any proceedings were initiated there is reason to believe he would not have permitted them;[1] but finding himself in presence of an accomplished fact, the question now given him to consider was, whether he should approve the sentence of the court, or, by annulling it, weaken the authority of the general commanding the district, and greatly encourage the active and dangerous secession element in the West. He concluded to accept the act of Burnside as within his discretion as military commander; but as the imprisonment of Vallandigham in the North would have been a constant source of irritation and political discussion, the President concluded to modify his sentence to one which could be immediately and finally executed, and the execution of which would excite far less sympathy with the prisoner, and, in fact, seriously damage his prestige and authority among his followers. The method of punishment which he chose was doubtless suggested by a paragraph in Burnside's Order No. 38, which had mentioned, as a form of punishment for the declaration of sympathies with the enemy, deportation "beyond our lines into those of their friends." He therefore commuted the sentence of Vallandigham, and directed that he be sent within the Confederate lines.[2] This was done about a fortnight after the court-martial. Mr. Vallandigham was sent to Tennessee, and, on the 25th of May, was escorted by a small cavalry force to the Confederate lines near Murfreesboro'. After a short parley with the rebel videttes, who made no objection to receiving the prisoner, he was delivered into the hands of a single private soldier of an Alabama regiment, Mr. Vallandigham making a formal protest to the effect that he was within the Confederate lines by force and against his will, and that he surrendered as a prisoner of war.

The arrest and sentence of this distinguished Democrat produced a profound sensation throughout the country. It occasioned general rejoicing in the South. The Government in Richmond saw in it a promise of counter-revolution in the North, and some of the Confederate generals built upon it the rosiest hopes for future campaigns. General Beauregard, writing to a friend in Mobile,[3] said the Yankees, by sending Vallandigham into Bragg's lines, had indicated a point of attack. He suggested that, Hooker being disposed of for the next six months at least, Lee should act on the

[1] General Burnside, feeling, after the trial, that his act had subjected the Administration to violent attack, thought proper to signify to the President that his resignation was at his service if desired, to which the President answered: "When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it." [Lincoln to Burnside, May 29, 1863. MS.]

[2] The order under which Vallandigham was sent South was dated the 19th of May and transmitted by telegraph from Washington to General Burnside: "The President directs that, without delay, you send C. L. Vallandigham, under secure guard, to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, to be put by him beyond our military lines, and in case of his return within our lines, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the term specified in his sentence." [McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 162.]

[3] May 26, 1863. War Records, Vol. XIV., p. 955.

defensive, and send Bragg 30,000 men to take the offensive at once. Let Bragg — or some better soldier who is sufficiently shadowed forth in parenthesis — "destroy or capture (as it is done in Europe) Rosecrans's army; then march into Kentucky; raise 30,000 more men there and in Tennessee; then get into Ohio and call upon the friends of Vallandigham to rise for his defense and support; then call upon Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri to throw off the yoke of the accursed Yankee nation; then" — his plan growing more and more magnificent as it took grandeur and color under his pen — "call upon the whole North-west to join in the movement, form a Confederacy of their own, and join us by a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive. What would then become of the North-east?" demanded the doughty creole. "How long would it take us to bring it back to its senses?" The feeling in the North, if less exuberant in its expression, was equally serious. No act of the Government has been so strongly criticised, and none having relation to the rights of an individual created a feeling so deep and so widespread. No further legal steps were taken in the case, except an application which was made by Vallandigham's counsel for a writ of certiorari to bring up the proceedings of the military commission for review in the Supreme Court of the United States. This motion was denied, on the evident ground that no such writ could be issued by the Supreme Court to any such military commission, as the court had no jurisdiction over the proceedings of such a tribunal. But in the Democratic newspapers, in public meetings, in a multitude of leading articles and pamphlets, the question was discussed with the greatest earnestness and even violence, the orators and politicians of the Democratic party regarding the incident as the most valuable bit of political capital which had fallen to them during the year. Even some of the most loyal newspapers of the North joined in the general attack, saying that by the statutes Vallandigham was a prisoner of state, and that the Secretary of War was bound to report him as such to the circuit judge of the district in which his supposed offenses were committed, to be regularly tried by the civil tribunal. But the principal criticism was, of course, confined to the ranks of the opposition. Their newspapers and public men vied with one another in a chorus of condemnation. To a meeting, held in Albany on the 16th of May, Governor Seymour wrote:

> It is an act which has brought dishonor upon our country; it is full of danger to our persons and our homes; it bears upon its front a conscious violation of law and justice. . . . The transaction involved a series of offenses against our most sacred rights. It interfered with the freedom of speech; it violated our rights to be secure in our homes against unreasonable searches and seizures; it pronounced sentence without trial, save one which was a mockery — which insulted as well as wronged. . . . If this proceeding is approved by the Government, and sanctioned by the people, it is not merely a step towards revolution — it is revolution; it will not only lead to military despotism, it establishes military despotism. . . . If it is upheld, our liberties are overthrown. . . . The action of the Administration will determine, in the minds of more than one-half of the people of the loyal States, whether the war is waged to put down rebellion at the South, or destroy free institutions at the North. We look for its decision with most solemn solicitude.

The meeting to which Governor Seymour sent this passionate address passed a series of resolutions insisting upon their loyalty and the services they had rendered the country, but demanding that the "Administration shall be true to the Constitution, shall recognize and maintain the rights of the States and the liberties of the citizen, shall everywhere outside the lines of military occupation and the scenes of insurrection exert all its powers to maintain the supremacy of the civil over military law"; and in view of these principles they denounced "the recent assumption of a military commander to seize and try a citizen of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the military orders of that general." The resolutions further set forth that such an assumption of military power strikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law. They enumerated the provisions of the Constitution defining the crime of treason and the defenses to which those accused of that crime are entitled, and said "that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his protection in times of civil commotion." They further resolved:

> That in the election of Governor Seymour the people of this State, by an emphatic majority, declared their condemnation of the system of arbitrary arrests, and their determination to stand by the Constitution. And that, regarding the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio as aimed at the rights of every citizen of the North, they denounce it as against the spirit of our laws and Constitution, and most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a cruel and unusual punishment upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution, and to restore him to the liberty of which he has been deprived.

A copy of these resolutions was sent to the President and received his most careful consideration. He answered on the 12th of June, in a letter which demands the close perusal of every student of our history. He accepted in

the beginning, and thanked the meeting for, the resolutions expressing the purpose of sustaining the cause of the Union despite the folly and wickedness of any administration. He referred to the safeguards of the Constitution for the defense of persons accused of treason, and contended that these provisions of the Constitution had no application to the case in hand. The arrests complained of were not made for the technical crime of treason. He then proceeded, in language so terse and vigorous that it is difficult to abridge a paragraph without positive mutilation, to describe the circumstances under which this rebellion began, and the hopes of the insurgents, which were founded upon the inveterate respect of the American people for the forms of law.

Prior to my installation here [he said] it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the National Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and, accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The rebellion thus begun soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it for more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law all together the Government would, in a great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus," they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the "habeas corpus" might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases, and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover that part of the enemy's programme, so soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in quiet times and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison in numbers have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers, even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

He then applied to the case in hand the clear provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," and went on to say:

This is precisely our present case — a case of rebellion wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are made, not so much for what has been done as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously — talks for his country with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably, if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on habeas corpus were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not

unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

Referring to the charge made in the resolutions that Mr. Vallandigham was arrested for no other reason than words addressed to public meetings in criticism of the course of the Administration, Mr. Lincoln said:

If this assertion is the truth and the whole truth,— if there was no other reason for the arrest,— then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But [he went on] Mr. Vallandigham was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him.

If it could be shown that his arrest was made on mistake of fact, the President would be glad to correct it. But, he said:

Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings until he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and to save the boy is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.

He then stated clearly his belief that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them.

The Constitution itself [he said] makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measure in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics, during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

The President parried the political thrust in the resolutions by reminding the gentlemen of Albany that although they addressed him as "Democrats," not all Democrats were of their way of thinking.

He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me; and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battlefield, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it.

The President fortified his argument by an incident of pertinent history especially adapted to touch the sympathies of Democrats — the arbitrary arrests made by General Jackson at New Orleans; his defiance of the writ of habeas corpus, and his imprisonment of the judge who had issued it. Near the close of this strong and adroit defense of the action of Burnside the President made a remarkable admission in these words:

And yet let me say that in my own discretion I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular case. . . . It gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested,— that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him,— and it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by it. I further say that as the war progresses it appears to me, opinion and action, which were in great confusion at first, take shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the necessity for strong dealing with them gradually decreases. I have every reason to desire that it should cease altogether, and far from the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who, like the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion. Still I must continue to do so much as may seem to be required by the public safety.

There are few of the President's state papers which produced a stronger impression upon the public mind than this. Its tone of candor and courtesy, which did not conceal his stern and resolute purpose; his clear statement of the needs of the country; his terse argument of his authority under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when, in case of rebellion, the public safety required it; his contrast of the venial crime of the simple-minded soldier boy, which was punished by

death, with the deeper guilt of the wily agitator, who claimed immunity through the Constitution he was endeavoring to destroy; the strong, yet humorous, common sense of his doubt whether a permanent taste for emetics could be contracted during a fit of sickness— met with an immediate and eager appreciation among the citizens of the country, and rendered this letter remarkable in the long series of Mr Lincoln's political writings. It is needless to say that it did not meet with equal approbation in all quarters. It was received by the politicians of New York, to whom it was addressed, with the gravest displeasure. They answered in an angry yet forcible paper, claiming that the original act of tyranny by which Mr. Vallandigham was arrested had been aggravated by the claim of despotic power which they assumed to find in the President's letter. They wrote with so much heat and feeling that they hardly paused to measure their epithets; otherwise they would scarcely have been guilty of the impertinence of speaking to the President of his "pretensions to more than legal authority," and of criticising his crystal-clear statement as the "misty and cloudy forms of expression" in which these pretensions are set forth. But it is not worth while to rescue either of these letters from the oblivion which soon overtook them. In the words of Mr. Lincoln on another occasion, "the world little noted nor long remembered them." Their first letter had no function nor result but to call into being the President's admirable reply, and the second was little more than a cry under punishment.

In the State of Ohio the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham had precipitated an issue which was in its solution greatly to the advantage of the cause of the Union. When, on the 11th of June, the Democratic convention of the State met at Columbus, it was found to be completely under the control of those opposed to the war, and the excitement consequent upon Vallandigham's arrest and banishment designated him as the only serious candidate for the office of governor. Nominating him by acclamation was the readiest and most practical way of signifying their disapproval of the proceedings of the Government. They passed a series of resolutions affirming their devotion to the Union, denouncing the arrest and banishment of Vallandigham as a forcible violation of the Constitution and a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the people of Ohio, saying that the Democratic party was fully competent to decide whether Mr. Vallandigham was a fit man to be nominated for governor, and that the attempt to deprive them of that right by his arrest and banishment was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty. They therefore called upon the President to restore Mr. Vallandigham to his home in Ohio. The committee appointed to present these resolutions accompanied them with a long letter signed by the most prominent Democrats of Ohio, arguing, upon lines similar to those followed in the Albany letter, that the action of the Government towards Vallandigham was illegal and unconstitutional; that it had created widespread and alarming disaffection among the people of the State; that it was not an offense against any law to contend that the war could not be used as a means of restoring the Union, or that a war directed against slavery would inevitably result in the final destruction of both the Constitution and the Union. They took up the President's letter to the Albany committee and insisted that Mr. Vallandigham was not warring upon the military; they disagreed entirely with the President on the subject of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; they represented the President as claiming that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace or public security, and that he had the right to engraft limitations or exceptions upon these constitutional guarantees whenever, in his judgment, the public safety required it. Having attributed to him these absurd pretensions, they proceeded solemnly to deny them, and ask:

> If an indefinable kind of constructive treason is to be introduced and engrafted upon the Constitution unknown to the laws of the land and subject to the will of the President whenever an insurrection or invasion shall occur in any part of this vast country, what safety or security will be left for the liberties of the people?

The President sent a reply to this letter, briefer than the one he had devoted to Albany, and not so full in its discussion of the constitutional question at issue. For his views in this regard he referred the Ohio committee to his Albany letter. He simply repudiated the opinions and intentions which the Ohio committee had gratuitously imputed to him. But he assumed the full responsibility for the exercise of the enormous powers which he believed the Constitution, under the circumstances, conferred upon him.

> You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals on the plea of conserving the public safety — when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision,

but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made, from time to time, and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made the commander-in-chief of their army and navy, is the man who holds the power, and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.

He disclaimed, in courteous language, any purpose of insult to Ohio in Mr. Vallandigham's case; and referring to the peremptory request of the committee that Vallandigham should be released from his sentence, and to the further claim of the committee that the Democracy of Ohio are loyal to the Union, he proposed, on what he considered very easy conditions, to comply with their request. He offered them the following propositions:

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union, and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

If the committee, or a majority of them, would write their names upon the back of the President's letter, thus committing themselves to these propositions and to nothing else, he would then publish the letter and the names, which publication would be, within itself, a revocation of Vallandigham's sentence. This would leave Mr. Vallandigham himself absolutely unpledged; the President's object being to gain for the cause of the Union so large a moral reënforcement from this clear definition of the attitude of the other gentlemen as to compensate for any damage that Mr. Vallandigham could possibly do on his return. The President concluded this letter with the same frankness that he used in that to Albany. "Still," he said, "in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem to require." This overture of the President was promptly rejected by the committee. They treated it as an evasion on his part of the questions involved in the case, and as implying not only an imputation upon their own sincerity and fidelity as citizens of the United States, but also a concession of the legality of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest and banishment.

Evidently nothing could come from negotiations with parties whose points of view were so far apart as those of the President and the Democratic leaders in New York and Ohio. The case must be resolved by the people of the State whose sovereignty it was said had been violated, and the issue was made in the clearest possible manner by the nomination of Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio. The convention which nominated him determined to leave no doubt of their position, not only denouncing the action of General Burnside and the President, but expressing their deep humiliation and regret at the failure of Governor Tod of Ohio to protect the citizens of the State in the enjoyment and exercise of their constitutional rights. The Union party, meeting at Columbus, nominated for governor John Brough, a war Democrat, and adopted a brief platform of unqualified devotion to the Union, in favor of a most vigorous prosecution of the war, and the laying aside of personal preferences and prejudices, and pledging hearty support to the President. Upon this issue the canvass proceeded to its close. Before it ended, Mr. Vallandigham himself intervened once more — not in person, indeed, but by letters from Canada. On entering the rebel lines he had gone at once to Richmond, where he was kindly and courteously received by the Confederate authorities, although both on his side and on theirs the forms appropriate to the fiction that he was a prisoner of war were carefully observed.[1] After a conference with the leading men of the Confederate Government, he went southward and arrived on the 22d of June at Bermuda in a vessel called the *Lady Davis*, which had run the blockade at Wilmington. He made only a brief stay in Bermuda and then took

[1] John B. Jones, a clerk in the rebel war office, made on the 22d of June, 1863, the following entry in his diary: "To-day I saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with Mr. Vallandigham, for file in the archives. He says if we can only hold out this year that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence. He seems to have thought that our cause was sinking, and feared we would submit, which would, of course, be ruinous to his party. But he advises strongly against any invasion of Pennsylvania, for that would unite all parties at the North, and so strengthen Lincoln's hands that he would be able to crush all opposition and trample upon the constitutional rights of the people. Mr. V. said nothing to indicate that either he or the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under Democratic rule. The President [Davis] indorsed with his own pen on this document that in regard to invasion of the North experience proved the contrary of what Mr. V. asserted." [Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., pp. 357, 358.]

passage for Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he arrived on the 5th of July. From the Canadian side of Niagara Falls he issued an address to the people of Ohio,[1] which began with this clever and striking exordium:

> Arrested and confined for three weeks in the United States a prisoner of state, banished thence to the Confederate States, and there held as an alien enemy and prisoner of war, though on parole, fairly and honorably dealt with, and given leave to depart, an act possible only by running the blockade at the hazard of being fired upon by ships flying the flag of my own country, I found myself first a free man when on British soil. And to-day, under protection of the British flag, I am here to enjoy and, in part, to exercise the privileges and rights which usurpers insolently deny me at home. . . . Six weeks ago, when just going into banishment because an audacious but most cowardly despotism caused it, I addressed you as a fellow-citizen. To-day, and from the very place then selected by me, but after wearisome and most perilous journeyings for more than four thousand miles by land and upon sea, still in exile, though almost within sight of my native State, I greet you as your representative.

He thanked and congratulated the Democrats of Ohio upon the nominations they had made. He indorsed their platform, which he called "elegant in style, admirable in sentiment." He claimed that his arrest was the issue before the country. "The President," he said, "accepts the issue. . . . In time of war there is but one will supreme — his will; but one law — military necessity, and he the sole judge." He was convinced that the war could never be prosecuted to a successful termination.

> If this civil war [he said] is to terminate only by the subjugation or submission of the Southern force in arms, the infant of to-day will not see the end of it. . . . Traveling a thousand miles or more, through nearly one-half of the Confederate States, and sojourning for a time at widely different points, I met not one man, woman, or child who was not resolved to perish rather than to yield to the pressure of arms, even in the most desperate extremity.

He announced, therefore, that he returned with his opinion in favor of peace not only unchanged, but confirmed and strengthened.

But nothing availed. Mr. Vallandigham was defeated by the unprecedented majority of 101,000 votes, 62,000 of which were cast in the State and 39,000 by the soldiers in the field, to whom a State statute had given the privilege of voting.

In view of this overwhelming defeat, Mr. Vallandigham thought it prudent to remain during the winter beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. He was in constant correspondence, however, with his associates and adherents,[2] and demonstrations were made from time to time against the Government for its treatment of him. On the 29th of February, 1864, Mr. Pendleton of Ohio offered a resolution in the House of Representatives that the arrest and banishment of Mr. Vallandigham were "acts of mere arbitrary power in palpable violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States," which was rejected by a strict party vote, 47 Democrats voting in favor of it, and 77 Union members voting against it, only two Democrats voting with the majority. Vallandigham's course in opposition to the war had been so exasperating to the Union sentiment of the country, his speeches had been so full of vehement malice, that even those who thought his original arrest an unjustifiable stretch of military power felt no sympathy with the object of it and were inclined to acquiesce in the President's disposition of the case. The situation was not without a humorous element also, to which the American mind is always hospitable. The spectacle of this furious agitator, condemned by court-martial to a long imprisonment and then handed over by the contemptuous mercy of the President to the care and keeping of his friends beyond the Union lines; his frantic protests that the Confederates were not his friends, but that he was their most formidable and dreaded enemy; the friendly receptions and attentions he met with in the South and among the sympathizing British officials in the West Indies and the Northern provinces; his nomination by the Democratic convention of his State, which was forced immediately to apply to the President to give them back their candidate — affected the popular mind as an event rather ridiculous than

1 "Rebellion Records," Vol. VII. Documents, pp. 438, 439.

2 While sojourning at Niagara Falls, Mr. Vallandigham had come into communication with a person who called himself William Cornell Jewett of Colorado, who passed his time writing letters to the newspapers and to public men in favor of putting an end to the war by foreign mediation. After the result of the Ohio election had convinced Vallandigham that little was to be expected in the way of peace from the efforts of the Democratic party, he wrote Jewett a letter strongly favoring an immediate acceptance of the mediation of France in the controversy between the States. He said: "The South and the North are both indebted to the great powers of Europe for having so long withheld recognition from the Confederate States. The South has proved her ability to maintain herself by her own strength and resources, without foreign aid, moral or material; and the North and West — the whole country, indeed — these great powers have served incalculably, by holding back a solemn proclamation to the world that the Union of these States was finally and formally dissolved. They have left to us every motive and every chance for reunion. . . . Foreign recognition now of the Confederate States could avail little to delay or prevent final reunion." (W. C. Jewett, Letter to "Liverpool Mercury," November 4.)

serious, and the constitutional question involved received probably less attention than it deserved. His letters from Canada aroused little or no sympathy, and when, in June, 1864, he returned to the United States, the President declined to take any notice of his presence.[1]

Emboldened by impunity, Vallandigham began at political meetings a new series of speeches more violent in tone than those which had caused his arrest. But as the effect of them was clearly beneficial to the Union cause, no means were taken to silence him. He defied the Government and the army; he made vague threats that in case he was arrested the persons and property of those instigating such a proceeding should be held as hostages.[2] He was not molested, and in August was allowed to take a prominent part in the National Democratic Convention at Chicago, where he rendered valuable service to the Union party[3] as chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and offered the motion that the nomination of General McClellan should be made unanimous.

THE DEFEAT OF THE PEACE PARTY AT THE POLLS.

THE reverses sustained by the Union arms during the summer and autumn of 1862 had their direct effect in the field of politics. Every unsuccessful movement, and especially every defeat of the National forces, increased the strength and the audacity of the opposition to the Government and the war. There were, it is true, hundreds of thousands of Democratic soldiers in the ranks fighting to uphold the Union; and as a result of this — because men's sentiments are far more influenced by their actions than their actions are inspired by their sentiments — they were generally induced to take the Republican view of public affairs, and by degrees to unite themselves with the Republican party. But they seemed to exert no influence whatever upon their friends and relations at home. The Democratic party remained as solid in its organization, as powerful in its resistance to the Government, as ever. The great liberating measure of the President, the proclamation of September, had its influence also in exasperating and consolidating the opposition. This act, which not only renders his name immortal, but glorifies the age in which he lived, contributed to the defeat of his party in some of the most important States of the Union. In the autumn of 1862 the Democrats carried New York, electing Horatio Seymour governor over that patriotic and accomplished gentleman, General James S. Wadsworth; the adjoining State of New Jersey was also carried by them. There were heavy losses of congressmen in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana; and even in the President's own State of Illinois the opposition inflicted upon him a peculiarly painful defeat, electing nine of his opponents and only four of his friends.

The Union sentiment was still sufficiently powerful throughout the North to elect an easy working majority in the House of Representatives, and the Republican predominance in the Senate was, of course, untouched; so that so far as legislation was concerned there was no danger that the Government would be embarrassed by an opposition majority. But the losses it met with in the elections were none the less serious and discouraging. A war disapproved by a free people cannot long be carried on by the will of the Government, and if the ratio of losses indicated by the elections of 1862 had continued another year the permanency of the Republic would have been gravely compromised. But the intelligence of the American people gradually acknowledged the wisdom and accepted the leadership of the President, and moved forward to the advanced platform upon which Mr. Lincoln had placed himself. The right of suffrage given by the State legislatures to the soldiers in the field reenforced the voting strength of the Republicans

[1] When Mr. Lincoln first heard of Vallandigham's return he wrote a joint letter to Governor Brough and General Heintzelman, who had succeeded Burnside in command of the department, directing them to "consult together freely; watch Vallandigham and others closely, and upon discovering any palpable injury or imminent danger to the military proceeding from him, them, or any of them, arrest all implicated; otherwise do not arrest without further order. Meanwhile report the signs to me from time to time." But, after writing the letter, he concluded not to send it. [Unpublished MS., June 20, 1864.]

He was, in fact, a little nonplused by Vallandigham's return. He had seriously thought of annulling the sentence of exile, but had been too much occupied with other matters to do it. After he had returned, the President said: "The only question to decide was whether he could afford to disregard the contempt of authority and breach of discipline displayed in Vallandigham's action; otherwise, it could not but result in benefit to the Union cause to have so violent and indiscreet a man go to Chicago as a firebrand to his own party." Fernando Wood had told him that he could do nothing more politic than to bring Vallandigham back. "In that case," he said, "he could promise him two Democratic candidates for the Presidency this year. These war Democrats," said Mr. Wood, "are scoundrelly hypocrites; they want to oppose you and favor the war at once, which is nonsense. There are but two sides in this fight — yours and mine; war and peace. You will succeed while the war lasts, I expect, but we shall succeed when the war is over. I intend to keep my record clear for the future."

[2] McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 176.

[3] The Illinois Democrats were greatly troubled by Vallandigham's apparition. W. R. Morrison said to J. H., June 18, "How much did you fellows give Fernandy Wood for importing him?" [J. H., Diary.]

at home, and the ballot and the bullet worked harmoniously together. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1862 Mr. Lincoln was exposed to the bitterest assaults and criticisms from every faction in the country. His conservative supporters reproached him with having yielded to the wishes of the radicals; the radicals denounced him for being hampered, if not corrupted, by the influence of the conservatives. On one side he was assailed by a clamor for peace, on the other by vehement and injurious demands for a more vigorous prosecution of the war. He stood unmoved by these attacks, converging upon him from every quarter, and rarely took the trouble to defend himself against them. Coming from every side, the pressure neutralized itself, like that of the atmosphere. To one friend who assailed him with peculiar candor, he made a reply which may answer as a sufficient defense to all the radical attacks which were so rife at the time.

I have just received and read your letter of the 20th. The purport of it is that we lost the late elections, and the Administration is failing because the war is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And I ought to be blamed, if I could do better. You think I could do better; therefore you blame me already. I think I could not do better; therefore I blame you for blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to accept the help of men who are not Republicans, provided they have "heart in it." — Agreed. I want no others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of "heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment, and take yours, I must also take that of others; and by the time I should reject all I should be advised to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or others — not even yourself. For be assured, my dear sir, there are men who have "heart in it" that think you are performing your part as poorly as you think I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add, that I have seen little since to relieve those fears. I do not clearly see the prospect of any more rapid movements. I fear we shall at last find out the difficulty is in our case rather than in particular generals. I wish to disparage no one — certainly not those who sympathize with me; but I must say I need success more than I need sympathy, and that I have not seen the so much greater evidence of getting success from my sympathizers than from those who are denounced as the contrary. It does seem to me that in the field the two classes have been very much alike in what they have done and what they have failed to do. In sealing their faith with their blood, Baker, and Lyon, and Bohlen, and Richardson, Republicans, did all that men could do; but did they any more than Kearney, Stevens, and Reno, and Mansfield, none of whom were Republicans, and some at least of whom have been bitterly and repeatedly denounced to me as secession sympathizers? I will not perform the ungrateful task of comparing cases of failure. In answer to your question, Has it not been publicly stated in the newspapers, and apparently proved as a fact, that from the commencement of the war the enemy was continually supplied with information by some of the confidential subordinates of as important an officer as Adjutant-General Thomas? I must say "No," as far as my knowledge extends. And I add that if you can give any tangible evidence upon the subject, I will thank you to come to this city and do so.[1]

The movements for peace which were made at this period on both sides of the line were feeble and without result. Mr. Foote of Tennessee introduced a resolution in the Confederate House of Representatives to the effect "that the signal success with which Divine Providence has so continually blessed our arms for several months past would fully justify the Confederate Government in dispatching a commissioner or commissioners to the Government at Washington City, empowered to propose the terms of a just and honorable peace." Mr. Holt of Georgia offered as a substitute a resolution setting forth that the people of the Confederate States have been always anxious for peace, and that "whenever the Government of the United States shall manifest a like anxiety it should be the duty of the President of the Confederate States to appoint commissioners to treat upon the subject." But both resolution and substitute were laid on the table by a large majority. In the Senate of the United States Mr. Garrett Davis offered a resolution[2] recommending to the States to choose delegates to a convention to be held at Louisville, Kentucky, to take into consideration the condition of the United States and the proper means for a restoration of the Union; this was laid upon the table. Mr. Vallandigham also offered resolutions for peace in the House of Representatives; but neither in the North nor in the South was there at that time a party sufficiently powerful to bring any measures for peace to the point of legislation, though on both sides there was a strong current of agitation for the termination of the war, which, being regarded and treated as treasonable, was easily held in check.

From time to time there were unauthorized attempts of individuals, inspired by restlessness or a love of notoriety, to set on foot amateur negotiations for peace. One of the most active and persistent of the peace politicians of the North was Fernando Wood of New York. He held a unique position in his party. While strongly sympathizing with the secessionists, and openly affiliating with them in public, he

1 Lincoln to Schurz, Nov. 24, 1862. MS.

2 "Congressional Globe," third session Thirty-seventh Congress, Part I., p. 4, Dec. 2, 1862.

nevertheless tried to keep up a sort of furtive confidential relation with the leading members of the Government. He frequently visited the White House, the State Department, and the Treasury Department, but emulated the discretion of Nicodemus as to the hour of his visits. No rebuffs daunted him; he apparently cared nothing for the evident distrust with which his overtures were received. He kept them up as long as the war lasted, probably in the hope that the time might come for him to play a conspicuous and important part in the final negotiations for peace. He used every occasion to ingratiate himself with the President. He wrote, congratulating him on the change in the War Department in the beginning of 1862, as indicating the President's "ability to govern, and also his executive power and will."[1] Later in the same year he wrote complaining that the radical abolitionists of New York represented him as hostile to the Administration and as in sympathy with the States in rebellion against the Government. He denied these charges, and begged the President to "rely upon his support in his efforts to maintain the integrity of the Union."[1] In September, after making a speech furiously denouncing the Government for its arbitrary arrests, he wrote a confidential note to the President, making the usual explanation that he had been incorrectly reported: "All I said applied to those arrests that had been made through error or misrepresentation, and exclusively as to the truly loyal." In November, after a similar tirade, he wrote to Mr. Seward, with a striking lack of originality, making the same plea of an incorrect report. "I did not," he said, "utter the treasonable sentiments reported." Having in this way, as he thought, established himself in the confidence of the President, he wrote him a letter on the 8th of December, 1862, pretending that he had "reliable and truthful authority" to say that the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress provided that a full and general amnesty should permit them to do so, no guaranty or terms being asked for other than the amnesty referred to.

> As an humble but loyal citizen [he said], deeply impressed with the great necessity of restoring the Union of these States, I ask your immediate attention to this subject. The magnitude of the interests at stake warrant some executive action predicated upon this information, if it be only to ascertain if it be grounded upon even probable foundation. If it shall prove groundless no harm shall have been done, provided the inquiry be made, as it can be, without compromising the Government or injury to the cause in which it is now engaged. If, however, it shall prove well founded, there is no estimate too high to place upon its national value.

1 MS.

2 McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 296.

The immediate object of his letter became evident in the following paragraph:

> Now, therefore, Mr. President, I suggest that gentlemen whose former political and social relations with the leaders of the Southern revolt [*sic*] may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence with them on this subject — the correspondence to be submitted to you. It may be thus ascertained what, if any, credence may be given to these statements, and also whether a peaceful solution of the present struggle may not be attainable.[2]

The President answered on the 12th of December. Referring to the first paragraph above quoted, he said:

> I strongly suspect your information will prove to be groundless; nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me. Understanding the phrase in the paragraph above quoted, "the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress," to be substantially the same as that the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, under the Constitution of the United States, I say that in such case the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if, within a reasonable time, "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld. I do not think it would be proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of the Southern States. My belief is that they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, they can communicate with me unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation. I should nevertheless receive with great pleasure the exact information you now have, and also such other as you may in any way obtain. Such information might be more valuable before the 1st of January than afterwards.

These last words refer, of course, to the impending proclamation of emancipation.

Between the date of Mr. Lincoln's letter and Mr. Wood's reply came the frightful carnage at Fredericksburg, which emboldened Mr. Wood to say that the President's reply had filled him with profound regret.

> It declines [he said] what I had conceived to be an innocent effort to ascertain the foundation for information in my possession of a desire in the South to return to the Union. It thus appears to be an indication on your part [*sic*] to continue a policy which, in my judgment, is not only unwise, but, in the opinion of many, is in conflict with the constitutional authority vested in the Federal Government.

He protested earnestly against this policy, and felt encouraged to renew the suggestions of his letter of the 8th.

> I feel [he said] that military operations so bloody and exhausting as ours must sooner or later be suspended. The day of suspension must come. The

only question is whether it shall be before the whole American people, North and South, shall be involved in general ruin, or whether it shall be whilst there is remaining sufficient of the recuperative element of life by which to restore our once happy, prosperous, and peaceful American Union.

To this letter the President made no reply.

Other volunteers from time to time tendered their services in the same field. Mr. Duff Green, a Virginia politician, wrote to the President from Richmond as early as the 20th of January, asking permission to visit Washington. He said that if he could see Mr. Lincoln and converse with him on the subject he could do much to pave the way for an early termination of the war. Receiving no encouragement from Washington, he asked the same permission from Richmond, but this request came to nothing. In the summer of 1863, however, an effort for peace negotiations was made, which came with such high sanction and involved personages of such individual and political importance that it requires particular mention.

About the middle of June, Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, became convinced that the time was auspicious for initiating negotiations for peace. He thought he saw reasons for great encouragement in the attitude of the North; the great gains of the Democratic party in the last autumnal elections, the pamphlet of Mr. George Ticknor Curtis attacking the measures of the Administration, a public meeting in favor of peace held without disturbance in the city of New York in which violent speeches were made by Mr. Fernando Wood and others, and the nomination for governor of Ohio of Vallandigham are all mentioned by him[1] as facts going to show that the people of the North were wearying of the war. On this insufficient evidence he wrote to Mr. Davis proposing that he should go to Washington, ostensibly to negotiate some questions involving the exchange of prisoners, but saying that he "was not without hopes that indirectly he could now turn attention to a general adjustment, upon such basis as might ultimately be acceptable to both parties, and stop the further effusion of blood in a contest so irrational, unchristian, and so inconsistent with all recognized American principles." He assured Mr. Davis that he entertained but one idea of the basis of final adjustment — the recognition of the sovereignty of the States, and the right of each in its sovereign capacity to determine its own destiny. He did not believe the Federal Government was yet ripe for such acknowledgment, but he did believe that the time had come for a proper presentation of the question to the authorities at Washington. "While, therefore," he says, "a mission might be dispatched on a minor point, the greater one could possibly, with prudence, discretion, and skill, be opened to view and brought in discussion, in a way that would lead eventually to successful results. This would depend upon many circumstances," he adds complacently, "but no little upon the character and efficiency of the agent. . . . So feeling, I have been prompted to address you these lines." Upon the receipt of this letter Mr. Davis sent a telegram requesting his Vice-President to go immediately to Richmond. He arrived there on the 22d of June; but in the ten days which had elapsed since his letter was written he found that changes of the utmost importance had taken place in the military situation. On the one hand the Confederate authorities had despaired of the condition of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and expected that any day might bring them tidings of his surrender, but on the other hand they were anticipating with sanguine enthusiasm the most magnificent results from Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. Mr. Stephens, in the work which he wrote at his leisure after the war was ended, represents that in these changed conditions he was inclined to give up his mission, thinking that no good could result from it, as the movement of Lee into Pennsylvania would greatly excite the war spirit and strengthen the war party — a view of the case in which Mr. Davis positively declined to agree. He thought Mr. Lincoln would be more likely to receive a commissioner for peace if General Lee's army was actually threatening Washington than if it was lying quietly south of the Rappahannock. The Confederate Cabinet being called together, they agreed with Mr. Davis; they thought the Federal Government might be best approached while under the threat of the guns of Lee, and before they should receive fresh hope and encouragement from the surrender of Pemberton, which was now considered inevitable. An arrangement was made for Stephens to proceed by land on the route taken by Lee's army, and to communicate with the Washington authorities from his headquarters;[2] but excessive rains and the badness of the roads caused a change of route, and the invalid Vice-President was therefore saved a most distressing journey, from which he would have come "bootless home and weather-beaten back." Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Confederate Navy, gave him a small steamer, and accompanied by Mr. Robert Ould as his secretary, he steamed away to Fort Monroe. In any case his mission

[1] Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 558.

[2] Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 566.

would probably have been fruitless, but he states only the truth when he claims that he arrived at an unlucky moment. He communicated with Admiral Lee in Hampton Roads on the Fourth of July, just after Lee's march to the North had ended in disastrous failure at Gettysburg. He sent the admiral a letter stating that he was "bearer of a communication in writing from Jefferson Davis, Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate land and naval forces, to Abraham Lincoln, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," and that he desired to proceed directly to Washington in his own steamer, the *Torpedo*. The titles by which Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Davis were designated in this note had been the subject of anxious consultation in Richmond. Stephens's commission from the Confederate President gave Mr. Lincoln the title above quoted to avoid the necessity of claiming the style of President for Mr. Davis; but in case Mr. Lincoln should stand upon his dignity and refuse the letter addressed to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Mr. Davis had prepared for Mr. Stephens a duplicate letter addressed to Mr. Lincoln as President and signed by Mr. Davis in the same style; if to this letter objections were made, on the ground that Mr. Davis was not recognized to be President of the Confederacy, Mr. Stephens's mission was then to be at an end, "as such conference," Mr. Davis said, "is admissible only on a footing of perfect equality." But all this care, foresight, and punctilio went for nothing. As soon as Mr. Lincoln received the telegram in which Admiral Lee announced to the Secretary of the Navy the arrival of Mr. Stephens, he immediately wrote on the back of the dispatch a note to be sent by Mr. Welles to Admiral Lee, in which, without paying any attention whatever to the style of Mr. Stephens's application, he went directly to the heart of the matter. This draft of an order ran:

> You will not permit Mr. Stephens to proceed to Washington or to pass the blockade. He does not make known the subjects to which the communication in writing from Mr. Davis relates, which he bears and seeks to deliver in person to the President, and upon which he desires to confer. Those subjects can only be military, or not military, or partly both. Whatever may be military will be readily received if offered through the well understood military channel. Of course nothing else will be received by the President when offered, as in this case, in terms assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States, and anything will be received and carefully considered by him when offered by any influential person, or persons, in terms not assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States.[1]

This note he afterwards evidently considered as entering too much into detail, and he therefore caused the Secretary of the Navy to send this brief reply to Admiral Lee:

> The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and conferences between the United States forces and the insurgents.

Mr. Stephens, when he came afterwards to relate the history of this abortive mission,[2] frankly admitted that his ulterior purpose was not so much to act upon Mr. Lincoln and the then ruling authorities at Washington as through them, when the correspondence should be published, upon the great mass of the people in the Northern States, who were becoming, he thought, so sensitively alive to the great danger of their own liberties. He wanted, he said, "to deeply impress the growing constitutional party at the North with a full realization of the true nature and ultimate tendencies of the war"; to show them "that the surest way to maintain their liberties was to allow us the separate enjoyment of ours."

Though this hope was baffled by the rebuff which Mr. Stephens received at Fort Monroe, which prevented him from laying before his sympathizing friends of the North his view of their endangered liberties and the best means of preserving them, it may be doubted whether the partisans of peace at the North lost anything by this incident. Certainly, throughout the whole summer of 1863, they fought their losing battle with a courage and a determination equal to that which their sympathizers were displaying in the South. But the very energy and malice with which they carried on the contest roused the loyal people of the North to still greater efforts and increased the dimensions of their ultimate triumph. The election in New Hampshire, the first which took place in the spring of 1863, while it brought victory to the Republicans, still gave painful evidence of the bitter hostility of the Democratic party to the prosecution of the war. Senator Daniel Clark, writing to Mr. Lincoln,[3] said:

> Scarcely a Democrat supported the Administration. Almost every one who had heretofore avowed himself for the Union and the country turned in for peace and party. Yet we have beaten them. They have retired from the field. The two houses in convention will choose a Republican governor, and Frank Pierce in retirement will not have beaten Abraham Lincoln in office.

There were after this, during the summer and early autumn, moments of depression and discouragement in which it seemed that the malignant energy displayed by the opposition

[1] Lincoln, autograph MS.

[2] Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 561.

[3] March 13. MS.

could not be without disastrous effect, and as the day of election drew near in the "October States" both sides felt justified in renewing their utmost efforts. In Pennsylvania the contest presented features of special interest. Andrew G. Curtin,[1] who, as governor of the State, had given not only efficient but enthusiastic support to the war, was opposed by Judge George W. Woodward, who, as one of the Democratic justices of the Supreme Court of the State, had just aimed a blow at the prosecution of the war which would have been fatal if followed up and sustained by other courts. He had declared the enrollment law unconstitutional, and upon the record thus made had been nominated for governor. The friends of Mr. Curtin relied on the war spirit to carry their candidate through, and towards the close of the campaign they claimed, most unjudiciously, that General McClellan, whose popularity was still great among the Democrats of Pennsylvania, was in favor of the election of Curtin, with whom he had always sustained friendly personal relations. Just on the eve of election this matter came to the attention of McClellan. Desiring to keep his political standing with his party intact, he sought an interview with Judge Woodward and published a letter declaring that, "having had a full conversation with the judge, he found that their views agreed, and that he regarded his election as governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of the nation."[2] But even this dilatory reënforcement of the peace party was not enough to save their canvass; the Republicans of the State were as thoroughly alive to the emergency as their opponents, and the vote polled was greater by many thousands than had ever been cast before. Governor Curtin was reëlected by a majority of over fifteen thousand, and Chief-Justice Lowrie, who with Woodward had aimed from the bench the most mischievous blow ever dealt at the enrollment bill, was defeated for reëlection by Daniel Agnew, and the court, thus reconstituted, reversed its previous judgment.

In Ohio the contest was marked with equal bitterness and enthusiasm. The Democrats, working against hope, but with undaunted persistency for their banished candidate, Vallandigham, were buried under the portentous majority of one hundred thousand votes. This overwhelming triumph of the Union party in the October States made success certain in the general election of the next month. The tide had turned, and the current now swept steadily onward in one way. The great State of New York, which had been shaken to its center by the frightful crimes and excitement incident to the draft riots, now witnessed a great popular political reaction; and reversing the majority of ten thousand given to Seymour in 1862, the Republican State ticket was elected by thirty thousand, and the legislature also passed into the hands of the Unionists. The success of the year which was dearest to the heart of the President was that attained in Maryland. The second passage of rebel armies over her territory seemed at last to have purged the secession sentiment from that State, and four Unionists out of her five districts were elected to Congress, and an emancipation State ticket was carried by twenty thousand majority.

Throughout the West the Union sentiment asserted itself with irresistible strength. An attempt marked with singular boldness and energy had been made during the year by the leaders of the peace party to gain control of the great States of the North-west, which for a time seemed to them so promising that the rebel emissaries in Canada, being informed of it, gave encouragement to their principals in Richmond to hope for the formation of a North-western Confederacy in opposition to the National Government. Meetings were continually held, secret societies were everywhere active, and every effort was made in public and in private to form a basis of organized hostility against the Government. The culmination of this important and dangerous movement may be regarded as having taken place at Springfield, Illinois, on the 17th of June. A great mass meeting, enormous in numbers and wild with enthusiasm, under the presidency of Senator Richardson, listened during all a summer's day to the most furious and vehement oratory, and at last passed resolutions demanding nothing less than submission to the South. They resolved "that a further offensive prosecution of this war tends to subvert the Constitution and the Government, and entails upon this nation all the disastrous conse-

[1] To show how the political emergency overcame the most inveterate personal hostilities, we give a characteristic letter which Simon Cameron wrote to Lincoln September 18, 1863. He said that Curtin would be reëlected, and that all his friends would support him, but that "if the result were to operate simply on his own private fortunes, there are many good Republicans and pious Christians who would see him in —— first. He will cheat us when it is over, and, if he can, sell us to our enemies. But he is now, by one of those accidents which sometimes control great events, the representative of the loyalty of this State, and his defeat might be disastrous to the country. My heart is too much engaged in the struggle for ending the rebellion to allow me to hesitate at even the support of Mr. Curtin."

[2] This letter of McClellan was a severe disappointment to Curtin, who had regarded him as his friend. A friend (now Sir John Puleston, M. P.) who was with him when the newspaper containing McClellan's letter was received said, "'*Et tu, Brute!*' was not a circumstance to it." [J. H., Diary.]

quences of misrule and anarchy"; that they were "in favor of peace upon a basis of restoration of the Union"; for the accomplishment of which they proposed "a national convention to settle upon terms of peace, which should have in view the restoration of the Union as it was, and the securing by constitutional amendment of such rights of the several States and people thereof as honor and justice demand."

This bold challenge was accepted by the Republicans with equal determination and superior means. The guns of Vicksburg and of Gettysburg might have been regarded as sufficient answer to the resolutions of the Springfield mass meeting, but the Copperheads[1] of that State only clamored the louder for peace after these great victories, and the political canvass went on with tenfold vehemence in the tacit truce of arms that followed the battles of July. The Republicans prepared for the beginning of September the greatest mass meeting of the campaign; and to give especial significance to the occasion, it was to take place at the home of Lincoln, on the very spot where defiant treason had trumpeted to the world its challenge in June.

It was the ardent wish of the Illinois Republicans that Mr. Lincoln might be with them on this important day. Mr. James C. Conkling, chairman of the committee of arrangements, wrote urging him to come in person.

> There is a bad element [he said] in this State, as well as others, and every public demonstration in favor of law and order and constitutional government will have a favorable influence. The importance of our meeting, therefore, at the capital of a State which has sent so many soldiers into the army, and which exercises such a controlling power in the West, cannot be overestimated.[2]

For a moment the President cherished the hope of going to Springfield and once more in his life renewing the sensation, so dear to politicians, of personal contact with great and enthusiastic masses, and of making one more speech to shouting thousands of his fellow-citizens. The temptation, however, only lasted for a moment, and instead of going he wrote a letter which was read amid the hushed attention of an immense auditory, and passed in a moment into the small number of American political classics. The meeting was an enormous one in numbers and in hot, tumultuous feeling; it was addressed by the greatest orators of the Republican party; speaking went on continuously at many stands from morning until twilight. The speeches were marked by the most advanced and unflinching Republican doctrine; the proclamation of emancipation, the arming of negroes, received universal adhesion, and of course every reference to Mr. Lincoln's name was received with thunders of applause; but with all these features of the highest interest and importance, the meeting can only live in the memories of men as the occasion of the letter which Mr. Lincoln wrote to its chairman:

> Your letter, inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me to thus meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require.
>
> The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union, and I am sure my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.
>
> There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.
>
> I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military — its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise if one were made with them.
>
> To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace-men of the North get together in convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union; in what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all.

[1] The "peace Democrats" of the North were variously nicknamed "Butternuts" and "Copperheads." The former name referred to the domestic dye which gave color to the uniforms of the Confederate soldiers, and the latter was the name of the most venomous snake in the West. In each case the nickname was assumed and borne with bravado by the younger Democrats, who in some instances wore butternuts as breastpins, and in others, with a clever return upon their opponents, cut the copper head of the Goddess of Liberty from the old-fashioned red cent and bore it as their cognizance.

[2] Conkling to Lincoln, Aug. 21. MS.

A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the successes of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people according to the bond of service,—the United States Constitution,—and that as such I am responsible to them.

But, to be plain, you are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said—if so much—is that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.

But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before.

I know, as fully as one can know the opinion of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important successes, believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called "Abolitionism" or with "Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit these opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you—but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North-west for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic—for the principle it lives by and keeps alive—for man's vast future—thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it.

Still let us not be over sanguine of a speedy, final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently

apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.[1]

Among all the state papers of Mr. Lincoln from his nomination to his death this letter is unique. It may be called his last stump speech, the only one made during his Presidency. We find in it all the qualities that made him in Illinois the incomparable political leader of his party for a generation. There is the same close, unerring logic, the same innate perception of political conduct, the same wit and sarcasm, the same touch of picturesque eloquence, which abounded in his earlier and more careless oratory, but all wonderfully heightened, strengthened, and chastened by a sense of immense responsibility. In this letter, which the chairman took only ten minutes to read, he said more than all the orators at all the stands. It was, like most of his speeches, addressed principally to his opponents, and in this short space he appealed successively to their reason, to their sympathies, and to their fears. By a succession of unanswerable syllogisms he showed them how untenable was their position. He appealed to their generosity, to their sense of duty, to their patriotism, even to their love of glory, and in the end he held out to them with dignified austerity the prospect of shame and self-reproach which lay before them if they continued their hostility to the sacred cause of humanity and nationality. The style of this letter is as remarkable as its matter; each sentence, like a trained athlete, is divested of every superfluous word and syllable, yet nowhere is there a word lacking, any more than a word too much. Modest as he was, he knew the value of his own work, and when a friend called to ask him if he was going to Springfield he replied, "No, I shall send them a letter instead; and it will be a rather good letter."[2]

The Springfield convention, taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the disloyal mass-meeting of June, resolved "that we will lay aside all party questions and forget all party prejudices and devote ourselves unreservedly to the support of our Government, until the rebellion shall be finally and forever crushed": they resolved that "whatever else may die, the Union shall live to perpetuate civil liberty; whatever else may perish, the Government shall survive in all its constitutional integrity; whatever else may be destroyed, the nation shall be preserved in its territorial unity; and to this end we pledge anew our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."[3]

In this spirit the campaign was fought through to its victorious close, and on the night of the 3d of November the President, sitting in the War Department, had the pleasure of learning from all the clicking wires about him that the cause of nationality and freedom was triumphant from one end of the Union to the other; that the people had come up fully abreast of him on the question of emancipation, and that the nation was now substantially united in the resolute purpose to prosecute the war to its legitimate conclusion. These victories at the polls made sure the good results of this summer of battles; the Administration felt itself confirmed anew and strengthened for the work before it. To those members of the Administration who had formerly acted with the Democratic party there was a certain sense of humiliation and disappointment. Mr. Stanton said, "The disheartening thing in the affair was that there seemed to be no patriotic principle left in the Democratic party, the whole organization voting solidly against the country."[4] Mr. Seward, on the contrary, came back from Auburn, where he had gone home to vote, in the highest spirits. He considered the political attitude of New York absolutely safe in the present and future. He thought "the crowd that follows power had come over to the Republicans; the Democrats had lost their leaders when Toombs and Davis and Breckinridge forsook them and went South; the inferior Northern Democrats who succeeded to the leadership had proved their incompetency; the best and most energetic portion of the rank and file of the party were now voting shoulder to shoulder with the Republicans.[5]

1 Lincoln to James C. Conkling, Aug. 26, 1863.

2 Nothing he ever uttered had a more instantaneous success. Mr. Sumner immediately wrote to him: "Thanks for your true and noble letter. It is a historical document. The case is admirably stated, so that all but the wicked must confess its force. It cannot be answered." Henry Wilson wrote him: "God Almighty bless you for your noble, patriotic, and Christian letter. It will be on the lips and in the hearts of hundreds of thousands this day." Among the letters which the President most appreciated was one from the venerable Josiah Quincy, then ninety-one years of age, who wrote: "Old age has its privileges, which I hope this letter will not exceed; but I cannot refrain from expressing to you my gratification and my gratitude for your letter to the Illinois convention — happy, timely, conclusive, and effective. What you say concerning emancipation, your proclamation, and your course of proceeding in relation to it was due to truth and to your own character, shamefully assailed as it has been. The development is an imperishable monument of wisdom and virtue." After discussing the question of emancipation, he continued: "I write under the impression that the victory of the United States in this war is inevitable; compromise is impossible. Peace on any other basis would be the establishment of two nations, each hating the other, both military, both necessarily warlike, their territories interlocked with a tendency of never-ceasing hostility. Can we leave to posterity a more cruel inheritance, or one more hopeless of happiness and prosperity?" Mr. Lincoln answered this letter in a tone expressive of his reverence for the age and illustrious character of the writer.

3 "History of Sangamon County," p. 315.

4 J. H., Diary, Nov. 3. MS.

5 Ibid., Nov. 8. MS.

No party," he said, "can survive an opposition to a war. The Revolutionary heroes were political oracles till 1812, and afterwards the 'soldiers of the late war' succeeded to their honors. But we are hereafter a nation of soldiers. These people will be trying to forget years hence that they ever opposed this war. I had to carry affidavits to prove I had nothing to do with the Hartford Convention. Now the party that gained eminence by the folly of the Federalists in opposing the war have the chalice commended to their own lips. I told the Democratic leaders," he said, with his habitual subacid good nature, "how they might have saved themselves and carried the next Presidential election, by being more loyal and earnest in support of the Administration than the Republican party. The Lord knows that would not have been hard."

Although in this memorable contest the Republicans presented a united front to the common enemy, within their own organization there were those bitter differences of opinion which always arise among men of strong convictions. The President's anteroom was thronged with earnest men who desired to warn him in person against the machinations of other men equally earnest, and his mail was encumbered by letters from every part of the country, and every shade of faction, filled with similar denunciations and warnings. The pure and able Senator Dixon of Connecticut wrote: "The heresies of Sumner are doing immense harm in a variety of ways. If his doctrine prevails, this country will be ruined. I do hope you and Mr. Seward will stand firm." From the other wing of the party came the most passionate denunciations of Seward and those who were associated with him in the popular mind; and after the election Senator Chandler of Michigan, one of the most powerful of the Republicans who had by this time assumed to themselves the title of Radicals, having seen in the newspapers a paragraph that Mr. Thurlow Weed and Governor Morgan had been in consultation with the President in regard to his message, wrote a vehement letter to the President, telling him there was a "patriotic organization in all the free and border States, containing over one million voters, every man of whom is your friend upon the Radical measures of your Administration; but there is not a Seward, Weed, or Blair man among them. How are these men," he asked, "to be of service to you in any way? They are a millstone about your neck. You drop them and they are politically ended forever. Conservatives and traitors are buried together. For God's sake do not exhume their remains in your message. They will smell worse than Lazarus after he had been buried three days."[1] There was no man slower than Mr. Lincoln to take personal offense at even the most indiscreet advice or censure; but he answered this letter of Mr. Chandler in a tone of unusual dignity and severity. "I have seen," he said, "Governor Morgan and Thurlow Weed separately, but not together, within the last ten days; but neither of them mentioned the forthcoming message, or said anything, so far as I can remember, which brought the thought of the message to my mind. I am very glad the elections this autumn have gone favorably and that I have not by native depravity, or under evil influences, done anything bad enough to prevent the good result. I hope to 'stand firm' enough to not go backward, and yet not go forward fast enough to wreck the country's cause."[2]

In the month of October Mr. Hood, the postmaster at Chattanooga, wrote to the President a letter setting forth the particulars of a scheme which Emerson Etheridge, Clerk of the House of Representatives, had entered into to give control of the next House to the opposition. Etheridge was a member of Congress from Tennessee before the war, and his sincere attachment to the Union in the face of much obloquy and persecution at home had endeared him to the Republicans in Congress and caused him to be given the post of Clerk of the House; but in the course of two years of war he had become separated from his former political affiliations and now sympathized with the opposition. Mr. Hood, who wrote apparently with great regret as a personal friend of Etheridge, claimed to have become aware of Etheridge's intention to leave off the rolls of the House the names of all members whose certificates did not bear on their face the statement that they had been elected "according to the laws of the State or of the United States." He based this action upon the provisions of a law which had been hurriedly passed during the last day of the Thirty-seventh Congress. At the same time it was understood that he had intimated to the Democratic members what his action would be, so as to allow them to provide themselves with certificates in the form required. The President, on the receipt of this news, put himself confidentially in communication with leading Republicans in all the loyal States, requesting them, without publicity, to have prepared duplicate certificates meeting the objection which it was thought that Etheridge would raise to the ordinary ones. This was in most cases attended to, but not in all, so that when the members began to arrive in Washington a few days before the day fixed for the opening of Congress, a general impression of the contemplated action of Etheridge

[1] Chandler to Lincoln, Nov. 15, 1863. MS.
[2] Lincoln to Chandler, Nov. 20, 1863. MS.

had transpired and there was some uneasiness in regard to the issue. The President had done what he could to meet the legal requirements of the case; but, that having been done, he was not inclined to rely exclusively upon moral force. In view of the threatened outrage he sent for some of the leading members of Congress and told them the main thing was to be sure that all the Union members should be present. "Then," he said, "if Mr. Etheridge undertakes revolutionary proceedings, let him be carried out on a chip, and let our men organize the House."[1] This practical solution of the trouble had occurred to others, and the Rev. Owen Lovejoy, disregarding for a moment the etiquette of his sacred calling, announced that he was quite ready himself to take charge of Etheridge, and was confident of his muscular superiority to the Tennesseean.

There was not so much uncertainty in regard to the issue as to prevent an animated contest among the Republicans for the caucus nomination for the speakership. The prominent candidates were Mr. Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and Mr. Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois. Mr. Cox of Ohio was the principal candidate for the barren honor of the caucus nomination among the Democrats; though for some time before the meeting of Congress there was a good deal of not very practical talk in regard to the nomination of General Frank P. Blair of Missouri as a compromise candidate to be supported by the Democrats and by a few of the so-called Conservative Republicans. General Blair, while one of the earliest and ablest Republicans of the border States, one who had distinguished himself equally in politics and in the field in the cause of freedom and of progress, had, through the vehemence of the factional fight which had so long been raging in Missouri, been gradually forced, partly by the denunciations of his enemies, and partly by his own combative instincts, into an attitude almost of hostility to the Republican party of the nation. Mr. Lincoln saw this with great regret. He had a high personal regard for Blair, and deplored the predicament into which his passionate temper and the assaults of his enemies were gradually crowding him. In the autumn of 1863 the Postmaster-General, in conversation with the President, said that his brother Frank would be guided by the President's wishes as to whether he should continue with his command in the field or take the seat in Congress to which he had been elected from Missouri. The President answered in a letter, dated 2d of November, saying:

> Some days ago I understood you to say that your brother, General Frank Blair, desired to be guided by my wishes as to whether he will occupy his seat in Congress or remain in the field. My wish, then, is compounded of what I believe will be best for the country and best for him; and it is that he will come here, put his military commission in my hands, take his seat, go into caucus with our friends, abide the nominations, help elect the nominees, and thus aid to organize a House of Representatives which will really support the Government in the war. If the result shall be the election of himself as Speaker, let him serve in that position. If not, let him retake his commission and return to the army. For the country this will heal a dangerous schism; for him it will relieve from a dangerous position. By a misunderstanding, as I think, he is in danger of being permanently separated from those with whom only he can ever have a real sympathy — the sincere opponents of slavery. It will be a mistake if he shall allow the provocations offered him by insincere time-servers to drive him from the house of his own building. He is young yet. He has abundant talent — quite enough to occupy all his time without devoting any to temper. He is rising in military skill and usefulness. His recent appointment to the command of a corps, by one so competent to judge as General Sherman, proves this. In that line he can serve both the country and himself more profitably than he could as a member of Congress upon the floor. The foregoing is what I would say if Frank Blair were my brother instead of yours.[2]

In pursuance of this letter Blair came to Washington, though before Congress assembled his candidacy for the speakership had passed out of sight. He took his seat, served for some months, and went back to the army in command of a corps, as the President had promised. This relinquishment of and restoration to a high command in the army occasioned much feeling and a violent attack upon the President on the part of the Radical Republicans, which continued even after he had submitted in a message to Congress the entire correspondence, which reflected nothing but credit upon all parties.

The canvass for Speaker closed on Saturday night, the 5th of December, Washburne withdrawing from the field, and Colfax being nominated by acclamation. All the next day there was great excitement at the hotels frequented by politicians in regard to Etheridge's proposed course of action, which was now no longer a secret to any one. The comments he everywhere heard upon his conduct had its effect upon his nerves, and he began to talk in a complaining and apologetic tone, saying he was simply obeying the law and there was no reason why Republicans should regard him vindictively. The next day, when the House opened, while he did not flinch from the position he had occupied, he did nothing arbitrary or revolutionary. He left off the roll the names of all those members whose certificates were not, in his opinion, in due form, but readily

[1] J. G. N., MS. Memoranda. [2] MS.

entertained a motion to restore them. This met with a hot protest from some of the pro-slavery members, but a vote was taken showing a majority of twenty for the Government. Mr. Washburne nominated Mr. Colfax, and he was elected by the same majority in a total vote of 181, the Democratic vote being scattered among many members, Mr. Cox receiving more than any other.

As soon as Congress came together Mr. Fernando Wood renewed his furtive overtures with the Government for the appointment of peace commissioners from what he called his wing of the Democratic party, making no secret of his belief that he himself was the most appropriate choice which could be made for such a function. He urged the President to publish some sort of amnesty for the Northern sympathizers with the rebellion which would include Mr. Vallandigham and permit him to return to the country. He promised that in that case there should be two Democratic candidates in the field at the next Presidential election. The President declined his proposition, but he would not take no for an answer. He called again on the morning of the 14th of December and the President refused to see him, merely sending word by a servant that he had nothing further to say to him.[1] Later in the day Mr. Wood offered, in the House of Representatives, a resolution "that the President be requested to appoint three commissioners, who shall be empowered to open negotiations with the authorities at Richmond to the end that this bloody, destructive, and inhuman war shall cease, and the Union be restored upon terms of equity, fraternity, and equality under the Constitution." This resolution was laid upon the table by a party vote, and Mr. Green Clay Smith of Kentucky offered resolutions opposing "any armistice, or intervention, or mediation, or proposition for peace from any quarter so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the Government; and we ignore," the resolutions continued, "all party names, lines, and issues, and recognize but two parties in this war—patriots and traitors." Second: "That we hold it to be the duty of Congress to pass all necessary bills to supply men and money, and the duty of the people to render every aid in their power to the constituted authorities of the Government in the crushing out of the rebellion and in bringing the leaders thereof to condign punishment." The third resolution tendered the thanks of Congress to the soldiers in the field. The first resolution was passed by a party vote of ninety-three to sixty-five; the second and third were passed unanimously, with the exception of Mr. B. G. Harris of Maryland. Several times during the session this battle of resolutions was renewed, but always with the same result; the Democratic party constantly favoring negotiations for peace while as constantly declaring their devotion to the Union, and the Republicans repudiating every suggestion of negotiation or compromise so long as the enemies of the Republic bore arms against it.

[1] J. G. N.. MS. Memoranda.

May 1889

THE WESTERN SOLDIER.

WHEN General Sherman said to General Grant, "Your belief in victory I can compare to nothing but the faith of the Christian in the Saviour," he specified one of the leading characteristics of the typical Western soldier. At no time, from Sumter to Appomattox, did that devoted servant of the demands of courage and fortitude doubt the success of the Union cause. It was a part of his temperament, of his philosophy, to look for triumph. Not that he was simply a good-humored optimist, unregardful of adverse conditions, nor yet a victim of blind superstition, political or theological, but that heredity and experience had equipped him with a sense of confidence in himself, in his country, and in the force called fortune that was alike heroic and logical. He came of a stock that had conquered the frontier wilderness through a long and hard discipline of toil, vigilance, and sacrifice, and in so doing had exalted self-reliance as the first of virtues. His idea of duty had its root in a deep growth of previous endurance, which was also a present possession of honor and practical advantage. The past appealed to him at a short distance and in voices that were personally familiar; the Union meant to him a tangible daily blessing, purchased for him by the direct efforts of his father and grandfather in the founding of new States; and he scorned to think for a moment that he could not repeat such service with similar results upon the field of battle.

In the beginning, to be sure, he misjudged the proportions of the undertaking; but when the whole truth was made plain to him it only served to emphasize his loyalty and confirm

CAN THE EMPEROR FORGET?

RUMBLE of drums in the flashing and crashing of battle,
Rushing of horses, with foam upon nostrils and flanks;
Clashing of bayonets, striking of swords, and the rattle
Of wrath in the standing, of death in the fast-falling ranks.

Trample the blood in the turf till the earth is afire,
Burning in gore: be it English or French, it is blood.
Profligate waste of it, spendthrift contempt of it! Dire
The flow of it, thus making crimson the Waterloo mud!

"Death to the enemy!" Children may suffer and languish;
Wives may speak softly of one who is baring his heart.
"Death to the enemy! Forward!" No thought of the anguish
Of wounds, with the cannon-wheels pressing their red sides apart.

What of the Emperor? Austerlitz, Jena, Marengo?
Can he foresee that the conquering eagle must fall,
Beating his wings on the traitor wind? Forward the men go —
"Viva Napoleon! Death to the enemy, all!"

Falling like rain come the bullets, and falling like flowers
Drop the French musketry, rising no more from the plain.
See the firm brow of Napoleon: massive it lowers.
Shout for his victory! Never, ah, never again!

Back from the mud that is crimson, and back from the corses
That lie by the cannon with eyes that can stare at the sun
Without shrinking. "Awake! They are leaving you, dumb-gazing forces!"
Aye, shout in their ears, but they move not. Their battle is done.

Done. And the Emperor? Exiled. Napoleon defeated?
He who has conquered the world? Say that rather the sun
Fell from his course and was chained by the earth. Fate has meted
His portion. March back what is left of you, soldiers! 'T is done.
. . . . . .

Far in that isle he is ceaselessly walking his prison,
As a lion his cage, who is thinking of night-dews that wet
His mane, and the servient sun that to dry it had risen.
Monarch then, prisoner now. Can the lion forget?
. . . . . .

Hark to the guns, that are greeting with long detonation
Him who is back from the stranger; is home again — home!
"Vive l'Empereur!" Hush! What mean you, fool? This coronation
Is dust crowned with dust, and the sky is the Invalides' dome.

"Vive l'Empereur!" Will they cease in their idiot babble?
Never more "Vive l'Empereur!" Men, he lies on his shield,
Broad-browed and yellow. Those hands are so white; did they dabble
In men's blood? And hold,— did those thin lips cry "Fire!" on the field?

Hark to the resonant guns! Remember, my brothers,
Thundering Waterloo's cannon and bright bayonets!
Oh, how they rattled! To him they were once as a mother's
Lullaby. "Vive l'Empereur!" Silence. Ah, he forgets!

Louise Morgan Smith.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR — THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION — THE RESIGNATION OF CHASE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR.

BEFORE the close of the year 1863 the public mind became greatly preoccupied with the subject of the next presidential election. Though the general drift of opinion was altogether in favor of intrusting to Mr. Lincoln the continuation of the work which he had thus far so well conducted, this feeling was by no means unanimous. It will seem strange to future students of the events of this time that the opposition in the Republican party to Mr. Lincoln, whose name will stand in history as the liberator of the slaves, came almost entirely from the radical antislavery element. The origins of this opposition have been so fully stated in other portions of this work, that it is not worth while to set them forth at any length in this place. They were principally the action of the President in regard to the administration of affairs in Missouri; the conflict between General Frémont and the Missouri conservatives, and between General Schofield and the Missouri radicals; the retention in command of various generals, who, from the radical point of view, had "no heart in the cause"; the deliberation with which the great antislavery acts of the President were performed; and, in general, the dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the war, of eager and ardent spirits imperfectly informed as to the processes of the Government and the facts of the situation. At the end of the year 1863 and the beginning of the following year all these elements of discord were seeking a rallying-point. This it was not easy to find. Every one sufficiently acquainted with practical politics to note the drift of public opinion saw the hopelessness of contending against the popularity of the President. There was not a Republican general in the field, of sufficient prominence to be thought of, who would give the least encouragement for the use of his name against Mr. Lincoln. In neither House of Congress was there a statesman who for a moment would enter into such a contest; and in the higher circles of the Administration there was only one man so short-sighted as not to perceive the expediency of the President's renomination and the impossibility of preventing it. Mr. Chase alone had the indiscretion to encourage the overtures of the malcontents, and the folly to imagine that he could lead them to success. Pure and disinterested as he was, and devoted with all his energies and powers to the cause of the country, he was always singularly ignorant of the current of public thought and absolutely incapable of judging men in their true relations. He was surrounded by sycophants who constantly assured him of his own strength with the people, and who convinced him at last that all manifestations to the contrary were the result of mystifications set on foot by his enemies. He regarded himself as the friend of Mr. Lincoln; to him and to others he made strong protestations of friendly feeling, which he undoubtedly thought were sincere; but he held so poor an opinion of the President's intellect and character in comparison with his own, that he could not believe the people so blind as deliberately to prefer the President to himself. In November, 1863, he wrote to his son-in-law, Governor Sprague: "If I were controlled by merely personal sentiments, I should prefer the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man; but I doubt the expediency of reëlecting anybody, and I think a man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years." Of course, he adds, "I am not anxious to be regarded as that man; and I am quite willing to leave that question to the decision of those who agree in thinking that some such man should be chosen." To another he wrote early in December: "I have not the slightest wish to press any claims upon the consideration of friends or the public. There is certainly a purpose, however, to use my name, and I do not feel bound to object to it."[2] He never admitted to himself that he had any personal desire for the place, and in this letter he continued: "Were the post in which these friends desire to place me as low as it is high, I should feel bound to render in it all the service possible to our common country." Yet he always felt that he could render better service in the higher places than in the lower, and when it was once in contemplation

[2] Chase to Spencer, Dec. 4, 1863.

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to offer him a seat on the Supreme Bench he distinctly intimated he would accept no place there but that of Chief-Justice. There never was a man who found it so easy to delude himself. He believed that he was indifferent to advancement and anxious only for the public good; yet in the midst of his enormous labors he found time to write interminable letters to every part of the country, all protesting his indifference to the Presidency but indicating his willingness to accept it, and painting pictures so dark of the chaotic state of affairs among his colleagues that the irresistible inference was that only he could save the country. For instance, he wrote to the editor of a religious newspaper, saying:

Had there been here an Administration in the true sense of the word — a President conferring with his Cabinet and taking their united judgments, and with their aid enforcing activity, economy, and energy in all departments of public service — we could have spoken boldly and defied the world. But our condition here has always been very different. I preside over the funnel; everybody else, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, over the spigots — and keep them well open, too. Mr. Seward conducts the foreign relations with very little let or help from anybody. There is no unity and no system, except so far as it is departmental. There is progress, but it is slow and involuntary; just what is coerced by the irresistible pressure of the vast force of the people. How, under such circumstances, can anybody announce a policy which can only be made respectable by union, wisdom, and courage?[1]

A few days later he wrote to another:

The Administration cannot be continued as it is. There is, in fact, no Administration, properly speaking. There are departments and there is a President. The latter leaves administration substantially to the heads of the former, deciding himself comparatively few questions. These heads act with almost absolute independence of each other.[2]

He could not bring himself to feel that the universal demonstrations in favor of the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln were genuine. He regarded himself all the while as the serious candidate, and the opposition to him as knavish and insincere. To one of his adherents he wrote:

It is impossible to reform and investigate without stirring up slanderers and revilers, both among those whose wrong-doings are exposed and unrighteous profits taken away, and among those, too, who think they see a good chance to take advantage of clamor to the injury of a public man, who, they fear, stands too well with the people.[3]

To another adherent in Ohio he wrote:

I cannot help being gratified by the preference expressed for me in some quarters, for those who express it are generally men of great weight, and high character, and independent judgment. . . . They think there will be a change in the current, which, so far as it is not spontaneous, is chiefly managed by the Blairs.[4]

He said that he should be glad to have Ohio decidedly on his side, and that if Ohio should express a preference for any other person he would not allow his name to be used. This was quite an unnecessary engagement, as no candidate could possibly be nominated without the support of his own State.

Indifferent as he claimed to be in regard to his personal prospects, he yet wrote on the 6th of February[5] promising to try to find a place for a man recommended by the editor of the "Evening Post," and complaining with some bitterness that that paper had not uttered a kind word in reference to him for some months past. There was, in fact, no limit to these overtures of the Secretary in every direction which he thought might be serviceable to him. A few days after the death of Archbishop Hughes, we find him writing to Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati, reporting the efforts which he is making in every quarter to have the Western prelate appointed the successor of the dead archbishop.[6] On the 18th of January he wrote to a friend of his in Toledo, Ohio, Mr. James C. Hall, formally announcing his candidacy for the Presidency. He told him that a committee of prominent senators, representatives, and citizens had been organized to promote his election; that a sub-committee had conferred with him, and he had consented to their wishes. He then went on to say:

If I know my own heart, I desire nothing so much as the suppression of this rebellion and the establishment of union, order, and prosperity on sure and safe foundations; and I should despise myself if I felt capable of allowing any personal objects to influence me to any action which would affect, by one jot or tittle, injuriously, the accomplishment of those objects. And it is a source of real gratification to believe that those who desire my nomination desire it on public grounds alone, and will not hesitate in any matter which may concern me to act upon such grounds and on such grounds only.

He added that he desired the support of Ohio, and that if he did not receive it he would cheerfully acquiesce.

All through the winter this quasi-candidacy continued. It seemed of the utmost importance to the Secretary and his few adherents, though

1 Chase to the Rev. J. Leavitt, Jan. 24, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 562.
2 Chase to Dickson, Jan. 27, 1864. Ibid., p. 564.
3 Chase to Gilbert, Jan. 30, 1864. Ibid., p. 567.
4 Chase to Flamen Ball, Feb. 2, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 570.
5 Chase to Bailey. Ibid., p. 571.
6 Chase to Purcell, Feb. 1, 1864. Ibid., p. 568.

it really formed an imperceptible eddy beside the vast current in which the will of the people was sweeping forward to its purpose. Being confined exclusively to politicians, it had, of course, its principal manifestation in the city of Washington. It played its little part in the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives. An attempt was made to identify Mr. Colfax, the most popular candidate for that office, with the adherents of Mr. Chase; but upon hearing of this he at once sought an audience with the President and positively repudiated any such connection. When Congress had organized, the message of the President was received with an enthusiasm which for the moment swept out of sight every trace of opposing opinion. From that moment there was no further question in regard to the Republican nomination.

There was at one time an effort on the part of some of the leading spirits in the Union League, a secret Republican organization which had been very zealous and effective in political work throughout the Union, to commit it to some measure hostile to Mr. Lincoln. This had alarmed even so experienced and astute an observer as Thurlow Weed, who sent to Mr. Seward in the autumn of 1863 a warning that "loyal leagues, into which Odd Fellows and Know Nothings rush, are fixing to control delegate appointments for Mr. Chase."[1] Mr. Seward accepted this warning somewhat too readily, induced by his inveterate anti-masonic prejudices; these fears had no substantial foundation. Some of the leaders of the League, sympathizing strongly with the radicals of Missouri, had indeed from time to time made efforts to commit the order against the President; but such attempts failed there, as elsewhere, on account of the overwhelming tide of contrary opinion, and when the principal chapter of the order met in Washington on the 10th of December, they elected a list of officers who were almost all either friends of Mr. Lincoln or men of sufficient sagacity not to oppose him.

From the beginning Mr. Lincoln had been fully aware of Mr. Chase's candidacy and of everything that was done for its promotion. It was impossible for him to remain unconscious of it; and although he discouraged all conversation on the subject and refused to read letters relating to it, he could not entirely shut the matter out from his cognizance. He had his own opinion of the taste and judgment displayed by Mr. Chase in his criticisms of himself and of his colleagues in the Cabinet; but he took no notice of them.

> I have determined [he said] to shut my eyes, so far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offense to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt with, and that he would have arranged it very differently. It was so with General Frémont, with General Hunter when I annulled his hasty proclamation, with General Butler when he was recalled from New Orleans, with these Missouri people when they called the other day. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes so long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department.[2]

When Rosecrans was removed from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, Mr. Chase pursued the same course. His spiteful comments on that act were reported to the President, who simply laughed at the zealous friend who brought him the news. When told that such tactics might give Mr. Chase the nomination, he said he hoped the country would never do worse. He regretted, however, that the thing had begun, because although it did not annoy him, his friends thought it ought to. He went on appointing by the dozen Mr. Chase's partisans and adherents to places in the Government. He knew perfectly what he was doing, and allowed himself the luxury of a quiet smile as he signed their commissions. He heard more of such gossip than was amusing or agreeable to him. He said on one occasion, "I wish they would stop thrusting that subject of the Presidency into my face. I do not want to hear anything about it."

Of course one reason for the magnanimity with which Mr. Lincoln endured this rivalry of his able and ambitious minister of finance was his consciousness of the inequality of the match between them. Although his renomination was a matter in regard to which he refused to converse much, even with intimate friends, he was perfectly aware of the drift of things. In capacity of appreciating popular currents and in judgment of individual character Mr. Chase was as a child beside him; and he allowed the opposition to himself in his own Cabinet to continue, without question or remark, with all the more patience and forbearance because he knew how feeble it was.

The movement in favor of Mr. Chase culminated in the month of February in a secret circular signed by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, and widely circulated through the Union. It is admitted by Mr. Chase's sincerest admirers that the weak point of his character was the incapacity shown in his judgment of men and

[1] MS.

[2] J. H., Diary, Oct. 16, 1863.

his choice of intimates; and in no instance was this defect more glaringly exhibited than in the selection of such a man as Senator Pomeroy to conduct his canvass for the Presidency. The two Kansas senators, Lane and Pomeroy, hated each other intensely, and as long as they were in office together wrangled persistently over the patronage of their State. The President once wrote to Pomeroy, after declining an interview with him:

> I wish you and Lane would make a sincere effort to get out of the mood you are in. It does neither of you any good; it gives you the means of tormenting my life out of me, and nothing else.[1]

Each thought the other got the advantage of him, each abused the President roundly behind his back; but Lane, being the more subtle and adroit politician of the two, never allowed himself to be put in an attitude of open hostility to the Administration. Pomeroy's resentment drove him at last into a mood of sullen animosity towards the President, and it was under his weak leadership that the elements of opposition to Mr. Lincoln at last came together. As the confidential circular issued by the committee of which Pomeroy was the head was the most considerable effort made within the Republican party to defeat the renomination of Mr. Lincoln, we give the document, to show upon how slender a foundation this opposition was based.

> The movements recently made throughout the country to secure the renomination of President Lincoln render necessary counter-action on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union who differ from the policy of the Administration.
>
> So long as no efforts were made to forestall the political action of the people, it was both wise and patriotic for all true friends of the Government to devote their influence to the suppression of the rebellion; but when it becomes evident that party and the machinery of official influence are being used to secure the perpetuation of the present Administration, those who conscientiously believe that the interests of the country and of freedom demand a change in favor of vigor and purity and nationality, have no choice but to appeal at once to the people before it is too late to secure a fair discussion of principles.
>
> Those in behalf of whom this appeal is made have thoughtfully surveyed the political field, and have arrived at the following conclusions: *First*, that even were the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln desirable, it is practically impossible against the union of influences which will oppose him. *Second*, that should he be reëlected, his manifest tendency towards compromises and temporary expedients of policy will become stronger during a second term than it has been in the first, and the cause of human liberty, and the dignity of the nation, suffer proportionately, while the war may continue to languish during his whole Administration, till the public debt shall become a burden too great to be borne. *Third*, that the patronage of the Government through the necessities of the war has been so rapidly increased, and to such an enormous extent, and so loosely placed, as to render the application of the one-term principle absolutely essential to the certain safety of our republican institutions. *Fourth*, that we find united in Hon. Salmon P. Chase more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years than are combined in any other available candidate. His record is clear and unimpeachable, showing him to be a statesman of rare ability and an administrator of the highest order, while his private character furnishes the surest available guarantee of economy and purity in the management of public affairs. *Fifth*, that the discussion of the Presidential question, already commenced by the friends of Mr. Lincoln, has developed a popularity and strength in Mr. Chase unexpected even to his warmest admirers; and while we are aware that its strength is at present unorganized, and in no condition to manifest its real magnitude, we are satisfied that it only needs a systematic and faithful effort to develop it to an extent sufficient to overcome all opposing obstacles. For these reasons the friends of Mr. Chase have determined on measures which shall present his claims fairly and at once to the country. A central organization has been effected, which already has its connections in all the States, and the object of which is to enable his friends everywhere most effectually to promote his elevation to the Presidency. We wish the hearty coöperation of all those who are in favor of the speedy restoration of the Union on the basis of universal freedom, and who desire an administration of the Government during the first period of its new life which shall to the fullest extent develop the capacity of free institutions, enlarge the resources of the country, diminish the burdens of taxation, elevate the standard of public and private morality, vindicate the honor of the Republic before the world, and in all things make our American nationality the fairest example for imitation which human progress has ever achieved. If these objects meet your approval, you can render efficient aid by exerting yourself at once to organize your section of the country, and by corresponding with the chairman of the National Executive Committee for the purpose either of receiving or imparting information.

Of this circular, sent broadcast over the country, many copies of course fell into the hands of the President's friends, and they soon began to come to the Executive Mansion. The President, who was absolutely without curiosity in regard to attacks upon himself, refused to look at them, and they accumulated unread in the desk of his secretary. At last, however, the circular got into print, and it appeared in the "National Intelligencer" of Washington on the morning of the 22d of February. Mr. Chase at once wrote to the President to assure him that he had no knowledge of the existence of the letter before seeing it in print. He gave a brief account of the solicitations of his friends, in compliance with which he had

[1] Lincoln to Pomeroy, May 12, 1864. MS.

consented to be a candidate for the Presidency, adding, with his usual nobility of phrase:

I have never wished that my name should have a moment's thought in comparison with the common cause of enfranchisement and restoration, or be continued before the public a moment after the indication of a preference by the friends of that cause for another. I have thought this explanation due to you as well as to myself. If there is anything in my action or position which in your judgment will prejudice the public interests under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem, and, permit me to add, affection. Differences of opinion as to administrative action have not changed these sentiments, nor have they been changed by assaults upon me by persons who profess themselves the special representatives of your views and policy. You are not responsible for acts not your own; nor will you hold me responsible except for what I do or say myself. Great numbers now desire your reëlection. Should their wishes be fulfilled by the suffrage of the people, I hope to carry with me into private life the sentiments I now cherish, whole and unimpaired.

The President next day acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and promised to answer it more fully when he could find time to do so. The next week he wrote at greater length:[1]

I would have taken time to answer yours of the 22d sooner, only that I did not suppose any evil could result from the delay, especially as, by a note, I promptly acknowledged the receipt of yours, and promised a fuller answer. Now, on consideration I find there is really very little to say. My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote, but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee and of secret issues which, I supposed, came from it and of secret agents who, I supposed, were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more. I fully concur with you that neither of us can be justly held responsible for what our respective friends may do without our instigation or countenance; and I assure you, as you have assured me, that no assault has been made upon you by my instigation or with my countenance. Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I do not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change.[2]

Before the President wrote this letter the candidacy of Mr. Chase had already passed completely out of sight. In fact, it never could have been said to exist except in the imagination of Mr. Chase and a narrow circle of adherents. He was by no means the choice even of the great body of the radicals who were discontented with Mr. Lincoln. So early as the 17th of December, 1863, Mr. Medill, the editor of the "Chicago Tribune," who represented the most vehement Republican sentiment of the North-west, wrote:

I presume it is true that Mr. Chase's friends are working for his nomination, but it is all lost labor; Old Abe has the inside track so completely that he will be nominated by acclamation when the convention meets. . . . The people will say to Chase: "You stick to finance and be content until after 1868"; and to Grant, "Give the rebels no rest; put them through; your reward will come in due time"; but Uncle Abe must be allowed to boss the reconstruction of the Union.

And from the opening of the year 1864 the feeling in favor of the renomination of Lincoln grew so ardent and so restless that it was almost impossible for the most discreet of the Republican leaders to hold the manifestations of the popular preference in check. An attempt was made by the Treasury officials in Indiana to prevent the State convention which met in February from declaring for Lincoln, but it was all in vain. Wherever any assembly of Republicans came together fresh from the people the only struggle was as to who should get first on the floor to demand the President's renomination. Mr. Chase's principal hope was, of course, founded upon the adhesion of his friends in Ohio; but the result there, as elsewhere, proved how blind he was to the course of politics. The governor of the State wrote to the President[3] that he was mortified to hear that he had been set down as a Chase man.

The fact that Mr. Chase has been laboring, for the past year at least, with an eye single to promoting his own selfish purposes, totally regardless of the consequences to the Government, as I believe has been the case, is alone sufficient to induce me to oppose him; but aside from this, the policy inaugurated under your lead must be maintained, and it would be suicidal to change leaders in the midst of the contest.

This is only a specimen of dozens of letters which came from the leading men of the State, who had been relied upon by Mr. Chase to promote his canvass; and finally the feeling grew so strong in Ohio that although no au-

1 Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 29, 1864. MS.

2 After this correspondence had passed, Mr. Pomeroy, who, whatever his defects of character, did not lack courage, rose in his place in the Senate (March 10), reiterated with added energy his criticisms of the President and his eulogy of Mr. Chase, and claimed that the latter had nothing to do with the circular, but had been "drafted into the service" without his consent.

3 Tod to Lincoln, Feb. 24, 1864.

thorized convention of Republicans was to meet at that time, the Union members of the legislature took the matter in hand and gave, on the 25th of February, the *coup de grâce* to the Secretary's candidacy. They held a full caucus, and nominated Mr. Lincoln for reëlection, at the demand, as they said, of the people and the soldiers of Ohio. The State of Rhode Island, which Mr. Chase had expected the personal influence of his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, to secure for him, also made haste to range itself with the other States of the North; and as more than a month before the great State of Pennsylvania had by the unanimous expression of the Union members of its legislature declared for Lincoln, the Secretary at last concluded that the contest was hopeless, and wrote another letter to Mr. Hall, referring to his former statement that should his friends in Ohio manifest a preference for another he would acquiesce in that decision, and adding:

> The recent action of the Union members of our legislature indicates such a preference. It becomes my duty, therefore,—and I count it more a privilege than a duty,—to ask that no further consideration be given to my name. It was never more important than now that all our efforts and all our energies should be devoted to the suppression of the rebellion, and to the restoration of order and prosperity, on solid and sure foundations of union, freedom, and impartial justice; and I earnestly urge all with whom my counsels may have weight to allow nothing to divide them while this great work, in comparison with which persons and even parties are nothing, remains unaccomplished.

In the closing line of this letter occurs the first intimation of that feeling of revolt against the Republican party which afterwards led Mr. Chase to seek the nomination of the Democrats. In numerous letters written during the spring he reiterated his absolute withdrawal from the contest, but indulged in sneers and insinuations against the President, which show how deeply he was wounded by his discomfiture.[1]

THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION.

BEFORE the snows melted, it had become evident to the most narrow and malignant of Mr. Lincoln's opponents that nothing could prevent his renomination by the Republican convention which was to meet at Baltimore in June. There was no voice of opposition to him in any organized Republican assembly, except in Missouri, and even there the large majority of radical Republicans were willing to accept the universal verdict of their party; but there were a few earnest spirits scattered throughout the country to whom opposition to the Administration had become the habit of a lifetime. There were others not so honest, who had personal reasons for disliking the President. To these it was impossible to stand quietly by and see Mr. Lincoln made his own successor without one last effort to prevent it. The result of informal consultations among them was the publication of a number of independent calls for a mass convention of the people to meet at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May, a week before the assembling of the Republican convention at Baltimore.

The two centers of this disaffection were in St. Louis and New York. In the former city it was composed of a small fraction of a faction. The large majority of those radical politicians who had been for two years engaged in the bitter struggle with Blair and his associates still retained their connection with the Republican party, and had no intention of breaking off their relations with the Union party of the nation. It was a small fraction of their number which issued its call to the disaffected throughout the nation. Harking back to the original cause of quarrel, they had attached themselves blindly to the personal fortunes of General Frémont; they now put themselves in communication with a small club of like-minded enthusiasts in New York called the "Central Frémont Club," and invited their radical fellow-citizens to meet them in convention at Cleveland. They made no pretense of any purpose of consultation or of independent individual action. The object stated in their call was "in order then and there to recommend the nomination of John C. Frémont for the Presidency of the United States, and to assist in organizing for his election." They denounced "the imbecile and vacillating policy of the present Administration in the con-

[1] In an article published in "The Galaxy," July, 1873, by Mr. J. M. Winchell, whom Mr. Schuckers in his "Life of Chase" calls the author of the Pomeroy circular (see Schuckers' "Life of Chase," p. 500), occurs this singular passage: "The movement in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, had culminated in disaster; that gentleman's chief supporters, including his senatorial son-in-law, having manifested a plentiful lack of nerve or zeal, when the critical question became public, of arraying him against his official chief, and made haste to *take him at his word of declination, diplomatically spoken, in order to rouse their flagging spirits.*" In a letter of the 7th of May (Chase to Riddle, Warden, p. 576) Mr. Chase said: "I am trying to keep all Presidential aspiration out of my head. I fancy that as President I could take care of the Treasury better with the help of a Secretary than I can as Secretary without the help of a President. But our Ohio folks don't want me enough, if they want me at all, to make it proper for me to allow my name to be used. I hope the time is not distant when I can honorably separate myself from political affairs altogether, leaving the new era to the new men whom God may raise up for it."

duct of the war, . . . its treachery to justice, freedom, and genuine democratic principles in its plan of reconstruction, whereby the honor and dignity of the nation have been sacrificed to conciliate the still existing and arrogant slave power and to further the ends of an unscrupulous partisan ambition"; they demanded the immediate extinction of slavery throughout the whole United States by congressional action, the absolute equality of all men before the law, and a vigorous execution of the laws confiscating the property of the rebels. This circular was stronger in its epithets than in its signatures; the names of the signers were, as a rule, unknown to fame. One column was headed by the name of the Rev. George B. Cheever, another by the apparently farcical signature of "Pantaleon Candidus." Perhaps the most important name affixed to this document was that of Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who wrote desiring to sign her name to the call, "taking it for granted," she said, "that you use 'men' in its largest sense." She informed the committee that they had "lifted politics into the sphere of morals and religion, and made it the duty of all true men and women to unite with them in building up the New Nation." She spelled "new nation" with capital letters, and gave occasion for a malicious accusation that her letter was merely an advertisement of a radical Frémont paper of that name which was then leading a precarious existence in New York. Mr. Samuel Bowles inferred from her letter that the convention was to be composed of "the gentler sex of both genders."

Another call was issued by the People's Committee of St. Louis, though signed by individuals from several other States. These gentlemen felt themselves

> impelled on their own responsibility to declare to the people that the time had come for all independent men, jealous of their liberties and of the national greatness, to confer together and unite to resist the swelling invasion of an open, shameless, and unrestrained patronage which threatens to engulf under its destructive wave the rights of the people, the liberty and dignity of the nation;

declaring that they did not recognize in the Baltimore convention the essential conditions of a truly national convention: it was to be held, they thought, too near Washington and too far from the center of the country, its mode of convocation giving no guarantee of wise or honest deliberation. This circular was signed by B. Gratz Brown of Missouri and by a number of old-time abolitionists in the East, though its principal signers were from the ranks of the most vehement German radicals of St. Louis. Still another call was drawn up and issued by Lucius Robinson, Controller of the State of New York. The terms of this address were properly applicable to all the Administration Republicans. It called upon the

> citizens of the United States who mean to uphold the Union, who believe that the rebellion can be suppressed without infringing the rights of individuals or of States, who regard the extinction of slavery as among the practical effects of the war for the Union, and favor an amendment of the Federal Constitution for the exclusion of slavery, and who demand integrity and economy in the administration of government.

The signers of this call approached the question from an entirely different point of view from that of the radical Germans of St. Louis. In their view Mr. Lincoln, instead of being a craven and a laggard, was going entirely too fast and too far. Their favorite candidate was General Grant. Mr. Wendell Phillips, the stormy petrel of all our political disturbances, found enjoyment even in this teapot tempest. He strongly approved the convention at Cleveland, and constructed beforehand a brief platform for it.

> Subdue the South as rapidly as possible. The moment territory comes under our flag reconstruct States thus: confiscate and divide the lands of rebels; extend the right of suffrage broadly as possible to whites and blacks; let the Federal Constitution prohibit slavery throughout the Union, and forbid the States to make any distinction among their citizens on account of color or race.[1]

He also advised the nomination "for the Presidency of a statesman and a patriot"; by which terms he intended to exclude Mr. Lincoln.

The convention might have met, deliberated, and adjourned for all the people of the United States cared about it, had it not been for the violent and enthusiastic admiration it excited in Democratic newspapers and the wide publicity they gave to its proceedings. They described it as a gathering of the utmost dignity and importance; they pretended to discern in it a distinct line of cleavage through the middle of the Republican party. For several days before it assembled they published imaginary dispatches from Cleveland representing the streets and hotels as crowded with a throng of earnest patriots determined on the destruction of the tyrant Lincoln. The papers of Cleveland tell another story. There was no sign of political upheaval in the streets or hotels of that beautiful and thriving city. Up to the very day of the meeting of the convention there was no place provided for it, and when the first stragglers began to arrive they found no preparation made to receive them. All the public halls of any consequence were

[1] Phillips to Stallo, April 21.

engaged, and the convention at last took shelter in a small room called "Chapin's Hall." Its utmost capacity was five or six hundred persons, and it was much too large for the convention; delegates and spectators together were never numerous enough to fill it. The delegates were for the most part Germans from St. Louis. They held a preliminary meeting the night before the convention opened, and passed vigorous and loyal resolutions of the usual character. To the resolution that the rebellion must be put down, some one moved to amend by adding the words, "with God's assistance," which was voted down with boisterous demonstrations. *Non tali auxilio* was the sentiment of these materialist Missourians.

The convention met at 10 o'clock in a hall only half filled. Hoping for later arrivals, they delayed organization until nearly noon. The leaders who had been expected to give character and direction to the movement did not appear. It was hoped until the last moment that Mr. Greeley would be present, though he had never given any authority for such an expectation. He said, in answer to an inquiry, that "the only convention he took any interest in was that one Grant was holding before Richmond." Mr. Gratz Brown, the real head of the movement, was also absent. Emil Pretorius and Mr. Cheever, who, from the two extremities of the country, had talked most loudly in favor of the convention, staid away. The only persons present whose names were at all known were General John Cochrane of New York; Colonel Moss, a noisy politician from Missouri; Caspar Butz of Illinois; two or three of the old-school abolitionists; and several (not the weightiest) members of the staff of General Frémont. The delegates from the German Workingmen's Union of Chicago were discredited in advance by the publication of a card from the majority of the association they pretended to represent, declaring their intention to support the nominees of the Baltimore convention. Some one moved, as usual, the appointment of a committee on credentials; but as no one had any valid credentials, it was resolved instead to appoint a committee to enroll the names of the delegates. No action was taken even upon this proposition, because the act of enrollment would have been too fatal a confession of weakness. The committee on organization reported the name of General Cochrane for president of the convention, who made a discreet and moderate speech. He was a man of too much native amiability of character to feel personal bitterness towards any one, and too adroit and experienced a politician to commit himself irrevocably against any contingency. He had, in fact, thrown an anchor to windward by visiting the President before the convention met and assuring him of his continued friendship. A delegate from Iowa, who seemed to have taken the convention seriously, then offered a resolution that no member of it should hold, or apply for, office under the next Administration — a proposition which was incontinently smothered. While waiting for the report of the committee on the platform, speeches were made by several delegates. Mr. Plumb attacked Mr. Lincoln as a pro-slavery politician. Colonel Moss of Missouri denounced him as the principal obstacle to freedom in America. A debate now arose on the proposition of the committee on rules that in voting for President the vote should be by States according to their representation in Congress. This was in the interest of the Grant delegates and was violently opposed by the Missourians, who formed a large majority of the convention, and had come for no purpose but to nominate Frémont. In the course of this debate the somewhat dreary proceedings were enlivened by a comic incident. A middle-aged man, who gave his name as Carr, addressed the chair, saying that he had come from Illinois as a delegate under the last call and did not want to be favored "a single mite." His ideas not flowing readily, he repeated this declaration three times in a voice continually rising in shrillness with his excitement. Something in his tone stirred the risibles of the convention, and loud laughter saluted the Illinoisan. As soon as he could make himself heard he cried out, "These are solemn times." This statement was greeted with another laugh, and the delegate now shouted at the top of his voice, "I believe there is a God who holds the universe in his hands as you would hold an egg." This comprehensive scheme of theocracy was too much for the Missouri agnostics, and the convention broke out in a tumult of jeers and roars. The rural delegate, amazed at the reception of his confession of faith, and apparently in doubt whether he had not stumbled by accident into a lunatic asylum, paused, and asked the chairman in a tone of great seriousness whether he believed in a God. The wildest merriment now took possession of the assembly, in the midst of which the Illinois theist solemnly marched down the aisle and out of the house, shaking from his feet the dust of that unbelieving convention. As soon as the laughing died away the committee on resolutions reported a set of judicious and, on the whole, undeniable propositions, such as, the Union must and shall be preserved, the constitutional laws of the United States must be obeyed, the rebellion must be suppressed by force of arms and without compromise. The platform did not greatly differ from that of Baltimore, except that it spoke in favor of one

Presidential term, declared that to Congress instead of the President belonged the question of reconstruction, and advocated the confiscation of the property of the rebels and its distribution among the soldiers.

The platform was adopted after brief debate, and a letter from Mr. Wendell Phillips was read to the convention, full of the vehement unreason which distinguished all the attempts of this matchless orator to apply his mind to the practical affairs of life. He predicted the direst results from four more years of Lincoln's administration.

> Unless the South is recognized [which he apparently thought not improbable under Lincoln's nerveless policy], the war will continue; the taxation needed to sustain our immense debt, doubled by that time, will grind the laboring man of the North down to the level of the pauper labor of Europe; and we shall have a government accustomed to despotic power for eight years — a fearful peril to democratic institutions.

He denounced Mr. Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and drew this comical parallel between him and Frémont:

> The Administration, therefore, I regard as a civil and military failure, and its avowed policy ruinous to the North in every point of view. Mr. Lincoln may wish the end peace and freedom, but he is wholly unwilling to use the means which can secure that end. If Mr. Lincoln is reëlected I do not expect to see the Union reconstructed in my day, unless on terms more disastrous to liberty than even disunion would be. If I turn to General Frémont, I see a man whose first act was to use the freedom of the negro as his weapon; I see one whose thorough loyalty to democratic institutions, without regard to race, whose earnest and decisive character, whose clear-sighted statesmanship and rare military ability, justify my confidence that in his hands all will be done to save the state that foresight, skill, decision, and statesmanship can do.

With characteristic reliance on his own freedom from prejudice, he continued:

> This is an hour of such peril to the Republic that I think men should surrender all party and personal partiality, and support any man able and willing to save the state.

This was, in fact, the attitude of mind of the vast majority of the people of the country; but all it meant in Mr. Phillips's case was that he was willing to vote for either Frémont or Butler to defeat Lincoln.

A feeble attempt was now made by the delegates from New York, who called themselves "War Democrats," to induce the convention to nominate General Grant. Mr. Colvin read a letter from Mr. Lucius Robinson of New York — afterwards governor of that State — attacking the errors and blunders "of the weak Executive and Cabinet," and claiming that the hope of the people throughout the country rested upon General Grant as a candidate. Although Mr. Colvin supplemented the reading of this letter by promising a majority of one hundred thousand for Grant in the State of New York, the Missourians cheered only the louder for Frémont; and when a last effort was made by Mr. Demers of Albany to nominate Grant, he was promptly denounced as a Lincoln hireling. Colonel Moss, in the uniform of a general of the Missouri militia, arose and put a stop to the profitless discussion by moving in a stentorian voice the nomination of General Frémont by acclamation, which was at once done; and the assembly completed its work by placing John Cochrane on the ticket as its candidate for Vice-President. No one present seemed to have any recollection of the provision of the Constitution which forbids both of these officers being taken from the same State.

The convention met again in the evening and listened to dispirited and discouraging speeches of ratification. The committee appointed in the afternoon to give a name to the new party brought in that of the "Radical Democracy," and in this style it was formally christened. An executive committee was appointed, of men destitute of executive capacity, and the convention adjourned.

Its work met with no response from the country. On the day of its meeting the German press of Cleveland expressed its profound disappointment at the smallness and insignificance of the gathering, and with a few unimportant exceptions the newspapers of the country greeted the work of the convention with an unbroken chorus of ridicule. Its absurdities and inconsistencies were indeed too glaring for serious consideration. Its movers had denounced the Baltimore convention as being held too early for an expression of the deliberate judgment of the people, and now they had made their own nominations a week earlier; they had claimed that Baltimore was not sufficiently central in situation, and they had held their convention on the northern frontier of the country; they had claimed that the Baltimore delegates were not properly elected, and they had assumed to make nominations by delegates not elected at all; they had denounced the Baltimore convention as a close corporation and invited the people to assemble in mass, and when they came together they were so few they never dared to count themselves; they had pretended to desire a stronger candidate than Mr. Lincoln, and had selected the most conspicuous failure of the war; they clamored loudly against corruption in office, and one of the leading personages in the convention was a member of Frémont's staff who had been

dismissed the service for dishonesty in Government contracts.

The whole proceeding, though it excited some indignation among the friends of Mr. Lincoln, was regarded by the President himself only with amusement. On the morning after the convention a friend, giving him an account of it, said that, instead of the many thousands who had been expected, there were present at no time more than four hundred men. The President, struck by the number mentioned, reached for the Bible which commonly lay on his desk, and after a moment's search, read these words:

> And every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them: and there were with him about four hundred men.[1]

It was only among the Democratic papers that the Cleveland convention met with any support or applause. They gave it solemn and unmeasured eulogies for its independence, its patriotism, its sagacity, and even its numbers. The Copperhead papers in New York urged the radicals not to give up their attitude of uncompromising hostility to Lincoln, and predicted a formidable schism in the Republican party as a consequence of their action. But the motive of this support was so evident that it deceived nobody; and it was compared by a sarcastic observer to the conduct of the Spanish urchins accompanying a condemned Jew to an *auto-da-fé*, and shouting, in the fear that he might recant and rob them of their holiday, "Stand fast, Moses." The ticket of the two New Yorkers met with a gust of ridicule which would have destroyed more robust chances than theirs. "The New York Major-General John C. and the New York Brigadier-General John C." formed a matched ticket fated to laughter.

But if no one else took them seriously, the two generals at least saw in the circumstances no occasion for smiling. General Frémont promptly accepted his nomination.[2] He said:

> This is not an ordinary election. It is a contest for the right even to have candidates, and not merely, as usual, for the choice among them. . . . The ordinary rights secured under the Constitution and the laws of the country have been violated, and extraordinary powers have been usurped by the Executive. It is directly before the people now to say whether or not the principles established by the Revolution are worth maintaining. . . . To-day we have in the country the abuses of a military dictation without its unity of action and vigor of execution — an Administration marked at home by disregard of constitutional rights, by its violation of personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, as a crowning shame, by its abandonment of the right of asylum.

The feebleness and want of principle of the Administration, its incapacity and selfishness, were roundly denounced by General Frémont, but he repudiated the cry of the Cleveland convention for confiscating the property of rebels. In conclusion he said:

> If the convention at Baltimore will nominate any man whose past life justifies a well-grounded confidence in his fidelity to our cardinal principles, there is no reason why there should be any division among the really patriotic men of the country. To any such I shall be most happy to give a cordial and active support. . . . But if Mr. Lincoln should be nominated — as I believe it would be fatal to the country to indorse a policy and renew a power which has cost us the lives of thousands of men, and needlessly put the country on the road to bankruptcy — there will remain no other alternative but to organize against him every element of conscientious opposition with the view to prevent the misfortune of his reëlection.

He therefore accepted the nomination, and informed the committee that he had resigned his commission in the army. General Cochrane accepted in briefer and more judicious language, holding the same views as his chief on the subject of confiscation. Later in the summer some of the partisans of Frémont, seeing that there was positively no response in the country to his candidacy, wrote to him suggesting that the candidates nominated at Cleveland and Baltimore should withdraw, and leave the field entirely free for a united effort for "a new convention which should represent the patriotism of all parties." They asked him whether in case Mr. Lincoln would withdraw he would do so.[3] Although the contingency referred to was more than sufficiently remote, General Frémont with unbroken dignity refused to accede to this proposition.

> Having now definitely accepted the Cleveland nomination [he said], I have not the right to act independently of the truly patriotic and earnest party who conferred that honor upon me. . . . It might, beside, have only the effect still further to unsettle the public mind and defeat the object you have in view if we should disorganize before first proceeding to organize something better.[4]

But a month later[5] he seemed to have regarded the public mind as beyond the risk of unsettling, and he then wrote to his committee, withdrawing his name from the list of candidates. He could not, however, withhold a parting demonstration against the President.

[1] This, it will be remembered, was several years in advance of the famous reference to the Cave of Adullam in the British Parliament.

[2] June 4, 1864. [3] August 20. [4] August 25. [5] September 21.

In respect to Mr. Lincoln [he said] I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of acceptance. I consider that his administration has been politically, militarily, and financially a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret for the country. There never was a greater unanimity in a country than was exhibited here at the fall of Sumter, and the South was powerless in the face of it; but Mr. Lincoln completely paralyzed this generous feeling. He destroyed the strength of the position and divided the North when he declared to the South that slavery should be protected. He has built up for the South a strength which otherwise they could have never attained, and this has given them an advocate on the Chicago platform.

With a final denunciation of the leading men whose reticence had "established for Mr. Lincoln a character among the people which leaves now no choice," General Frémont at last subsided into silence. General Cochrane on the same day withdrew his name from the Cleveland ticket, which had already passed into swift oblivion. His letter had none of the asperity which characterized that of his chief. He genially attacked the Chicago resolutions, and, while regretting the omissions of the Baltimore platform, he approved it in substance.

We stand within view [he said] of a rebellion suppressed, within hail of a country reunited and saved. War lifts the curtain and discloses the prospect. War has given to us Atlanta, and war offers to us Richmond. . . . Peace and division, or war and the Union. Other alternative there is none.

Two incidents which occurred in the spring of 1864 caused unusual excitement among both wings of the opposition to Mr. Lincoln. The one was the delivery of Arguelles to the Spanish authorities; the other was the seizure of two New York newspapers for publishing a forged proclamation. It was altogether natural that the pro-slavery Democrats and peace men should have objected to these acts, as one of the injured parties was a slave trader, and the others opponents of the war; but it was not the least of the absurdities of the Cleveland protestants that they also, in their anxiety to find a weapon against the President, at the very moment that they were assailing him for not overriding all law and precedent in obedience to their demand, still belabored him for these instances of energetic action in the very direction in which they demanded that he should proceed.

The case of Arguelles was a perfectly clear one; and if the surrender of a criminal is ever justified as an exercise of international comity in the absence of treaty stipulations, no objections could reasonably be made in this instance. He was a colonel in the Spanish army and lieutenant-governor of the district of Colon in Cuba. He had captured a cargo of African slaves in his official capacity, and had received much credit for his efficiency and a considerable sum of money as his share of the prize. He went to New York immediately afterwards and purchased a Spanish newspaper which was published there; but after his departure from Cuba it was ascertained that in beginning so expensive a business in New York he did not rely exclusively upon the money he had received from the Government, but that in concert with a curate of Colon he had sold one hundred and forty-one of the recaptured Africans, had put the money in his own pocket, and had officially reported them as having died of smallpox. The Cuban Government laid these facts before the State Department at Washington, and represented that the return of this miscreant to Cuba was necessary to secure the liberation of the unfortunate victims of his cruelty and greed. It was impossible to bring the matter before the courts, as no extradition treaty existed at that period between Spain and the United States, and the American authorities could not by any legal procedure take cognizance of the crime. The President and Mr. Seward at once assumed the responsibility of acting in the only way indicated by the laws of common humanity and international courtesy. Arguelles was arrested in New York by the United States marshal, put in charge of a Spanish officer commissioned for the purpose, and by him taken to Havana. The action of the Government was furiously attacked by all the pro-slavery organs. A resolution was introduced by Mr. Johnson in the Senate demanding an explanation of the circumstances.[1] Mr. Seward answered,[2] basing the action of the Government upon the stipulations of the ninth article of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, by which the two countries agreed to use all the measures in their power to close the market for slaves throughout the world, and added:

Although there is a conflict of authorities concerning the expediency of exercising comity towards a foreign government by surrendering, at its request, one of its own subjects charged with the commission of crime within its territory, and although it may be conceded that there is no obligation to make such a surrender upon a demand therefor, unless it is acknowledged by treaty or by statute law, yet a nation is never bound to furnish asylum to dangerous criminals who are offenders against the human race; and it is believed that if in any case the comity could with propriety be practiced, the one which is understood to have called forth the resolution furnished a just occasion for its exercise.

The Captain-General of Cuba, on the arrival of Arguelles, sent his thanks to Mr. Seward[3]

1 "Congressional Globe," May 26, 1864.
2 May 30, 1864.
3 McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 355.

for the service which he had rendered to humanity by furnishing the medium through which a great number of human beings will obtain their freedom whom the desertion of the person referred to would have reduced to slavery. His presence alone in this island a very few hours has given liberty to eighty-six.

The grand jury of New York nevertheless indicted Marshal Murray for the arrest of Arguelles on the charge of kidnapping. The marshal pleaded the orders of the President as the authority for his action, and based upon this a petition that the case be transferred to the United States court; and although the judges before whom he was taken, who happened to be Democrats, denied this petition, the indictment was finally quashed, and the only result of the President's action was the denunciation which he received in the Democratic newspapers, combined with the shrill treble of the clamor from the Cleveland convention.

The momentary suppression of the two New York newspapers, of which mention has been made, was a less defensible act, and arose from an error which was, after all, sufficiently natural on the part of the Secretary of War. On the 19th of May the "Journal of Commerce" and the "World," two newspapers which had especially distinguished themselves by the violence of their opposition to the Administration, published a forged proclamation signed with the President's name calling in terms of exaggerated depression not far from desperation for four hundred thousand troops. It was a scheme devised by two young Bohemians of the press, probably with no other purpose than that of making money by stock-jobbing. In the tremulous state of the public mind which then prevailed, in the midst of the terrible slaughter of Grant's opening campaign, the country was painfully sensitive to such news, and the forged proclamation, telegraphed far and wide, accomplished for the moment the purpose for which it was doubtless intended. It excited everywhere a feeling of consternation; the price of gold rose rapidly during the morning hours, and the Stock Exchange was thrown into violent fever. The details of the mystification were managed with some skill, the paper on which the document was written being that employed by the Associated Press in delivering its news to the journals, and it was left at all the newspaper offices in New York just before the moment of going to press. If all the newspapers had printed it the guiltlessness of each would have been equally evident; but unfortunately for the victims of the trick, the only two papers which published the forgery were those whose previous conduct had rendered them liable to the suspicion of bad faith. The fiery Secretary of War immediately issued orders for the suppression of the "World" and "Journal of Commerce," and the arrest of their editors. The editors were never incarcerated; after a short detention, they were released. The publication of the papers was resumed after two days of interruption. These prompt measures and the announcement of the imposture sent over the country by telegraph soon quieted the excitement, and the quick detection of the guilty persons reduced the incident to its true rank in the annals of vulgar misdemeanors.

But in the memories of the Democrats of New York the incident survived, and was vigorously employed during the summer months as a means of attack upon the Administration. Governor Seymour interested himself in the matter and wrote a long and vehement letter to the district attorney of New York, denouncing the action of the Government. "These things," he said in his exclamatory style, "are more hurtful to the national honor and strength than the loss of battles. The world will confound such acts with the principles of our Government, and the folly and crimes of officials will be looked upon as the natural results of the spirit of our institutions. Our State and local authorities must repel this ruinous inference." He predicted the most dreadful consequences to the city of New York if this were not done. The harbor would be sealed up, the commerce of New York paralyzed, the world would withdraw from the keeping of New York merchants its treasures and its commerce if they did not unite in this demand for the security of persons and of property. In obedience to these frantic orders Mr. Oakey Hall, the district attorney, did his best, and was energetically seconded by Judge Russell, who charged the grand jury that the officers who took possession of these newspaper establishments were "liable as for riot"; but the grand jury, who seem to have kept their heads more successfully than either the governor or the judge, resolved that it was "inexpedient to examine into the subject." The governor could not rest quiet under this contemptuous refusal of the grand jury to do his bidding. He wrote again to the district attorney, saying, "As the grand jury have refused to do their duty, the subject of the seizure of these journals should at once be brought before some proper magistrate." He promised him all the assistance he required in the prosecution of the investigations. Thus egged on by the chief executive of the State, Mr. Hall proceeded to do the work required of him. Upon warrants issued at his instance by City Judge Russell, General Dix and several officers of his staff were arrested.[1] They

[1] July 1.

submitted with perfect courtesy to the behest of the civil authorities, and appeared before Judge Russell to answer for their acts. The judge held them over on their own recognizance to await the action of another grand jury, which, it was hoped, might be more subservient to the wishes of the governor than the last; but no further action was ever taken in the matter.

During the same week which witnessed the radical fiasco at Cleveland, an attempt was made in New York to put General Grant before the country as a Presidential candidate. The committee having the matter in charge made no public avowal of their intentions; they merely called a meeting to express the gratitude of the country to the general for his signal services. They even invited the President to take part in the proceedings, an invitation which he said it was impossible for him to accept.

> I approve [he wrote], nevertheless, whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain General Grant and the noble armies now under his direction. My previous high estimate of General Grant has been maintained and heightened by what has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting, while the magnitude and difficulty of the task before him do not prove less than I expected. He and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of their great trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will so shape your good words that they may turn to men and guns, moving to his and their support.[1]

With such a gracious approval of the movement, the meeting naturally fell into the hands of the Lincoln men. General Grant, neither at this time nor at any other, gave the least countenance to the efforts which were made to array him in political opposition to the President.

THE RESIGNATION OF MR. CHASE.

After Mr. Chase's withdrawal from his hopeless contest for the Presidency, his sentiments toward Mr. Lincoln, as exhibited in his letters and his diary, took on a tinge of bitterness which gradually increased until their friendly association in the public service became no longer possible. There was something almost comic in the sudden collapse of his candidacy; and the American people, who are quick to detect the ludicrous in any event, could not help smiling when the States of Rhode Island and Ohio ranged themselves among the first on the side of the President. This was intolerable to Mr. Chase, who, with all his great and noble qualities, was deficient in humor. His wounded self-love could find no balm in these circumstances except in the preposterous fiction which he constructed for himself, that through "the systematic operations of the Postmaster-General and those holding office under him a preference for the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln was created."[2] Absurd as this fancy was, he appears firmly to have believed it; and the Blairs, whom he never liked, now appeared to him in the light of powerful enemies. An incident which occurred in Congress in April increased this impression to a degree which was almost maddening to the Secretary. The quarrel between General Frank Blair and the radicals in Missouri had been transferred to Washington; and one of the Missouri members having made charges against him of corrupt operations in trade permits, he demanded an investigation, which resulted, of course, in his complete exoneration from such imputations. It was a striking instance of the bewildering power of factious hatred that such charges should ever have been brought. Any one who knew Blair, however slightly, should have known that personal dishonesty could never have offered him the least temptation. In defending himself on the floor of Congress the natural pugnacity of his disposition led him to what soldiers call an offensive return,— in fact, Frank Blair always preferred to do his fighting within the enemy's lines,— and believing the Secretary of the Treasury to be in sympathy, at least, with the assault which had been made upon his character, he attacked him with equal vigor and injustice by way of retaliation. As we have seen in another chapter, before this investigation was begun the President had promised when Blair should resign his seat in the House to restore him to the command in the Western army which he had relinquished on coming to Washington. Although he greatly disapproved of General Blair's attack upon Mr. Chase, the President did not think that he was justified on this account in breaking his word; and doubtless reasoned that sending Blair back to the army would not only enable him to do good service in the field, but would quiet an element of discord in Congress. The result, however, was most unfortunate in its effect on the feelings of Mr. Chase. He was stung to the bitterest resentment by the attack of Blair; and he held that restoring Blair to his command made the President an accomplice in his offense. From that time he took a continually darkened view both of the President's character and of his chances for reëlection. "No good could come," he said, "of the probable identification of the next Administration with the Blair family." His first thought was to resign his place in the Cabinet; but on consulting his friends and finding them unani-

1 Lincoln to F. A. Conkling, June 3, 1864.

2 Chase to General Blunt, May 4, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 583.

mous against such a course, he gave it up.[1] But his letters during this month are full of ill-will to the President. To his niece he wrote: "If Congress gives me the measures I want, and Uncle Abe will stop spending so fast," he, Chase, would bring about resumption within a year. To another, he blamed the President for the slaughter at Fort Pillow.[2] To Governor Buckingham, who had written him a sympathetic note, he said:[3] "My chief concern in the attacks made on me springs from the conviction that the influence of the men who make them must necessarily divide the friends of the Union and freedom, unless the President shall cast it off, of which I have little hope. I am willing to be myself its victim, but grieve to think our country may be also"; and adds this compliment to his correspondent at the expense of his colleagues in the Government: "How strikingly the economy and prudence shown by the narration of your excellent message contrasts with the extravagance and recklessness which mark the disbursement of national treasure." Writing to another friend, he indulges in this lumbering pleasantry: "It seems as if there were no limit to expense. . . The spigot in Uncle Abe's barrel is made twice as big as the bung-hole. He may have been a good flatboatman and rail-splitter, but he certainly never learned the true science of coopering." This was a dark month to him; his only fortress of refuge was his self-esteem: secure in this, he lavished on every side his criticisms and his animadversions upon his associates. "Congress," he said,[4] "is unwilling to take the decisive steps which are indispensable to the highest degree of public credit; and the Executive does not, I fear, sufficiently realize the importance of an energetic and comprehensive policy in all departments of administration." Smarting as he did under the attack of the Blairs, he pretended to treat them with contempt. "Do not trouble yourself about the Blairs," he wrote to an adherent. "Dogs will bark at the moon, but I have never heard that the moon stopped on that account." By constantly dwelling on the imaginary coalition of Lincoln with the Blairs against him, he began at last to take heart again and to think that against adversaries so weak and so wicked there might still be a chance of victory. Only a fortnight before the gathering of the Republican convention at Baltimore he began to look beyond the already certain event of that convention, and to contemplate the possibility of defeating Mr. Lincoln after he should be nominated.

> It has become quite apparent now [he said] that the importunity of Mr. Lincoln's special friends for an early convention, in order to make his nomination sure, was a mistake both for him and for the country. The convention will not be regarded as a Union convention, but simply as a Blair-Lincoln convention, by a great body of citizens whose support is essential to success. Few except those already committed to Mr. Lincoln will consider themselves bound by a predetermined nomination. Very many who may ultimately vote for Mr. Lincoln will wait the course of events hoping that some popular movement for Grant, or some other successful general, will offer a better hope of saving the country. Others, and the number seems to be increasing, will not support his nomination in any event; believing that our ill-success thus far in the suppression of the rebellion is due mainly to his course of action and inaction, and that no change can be for the worse. But these are speculations merely from my standpoint.[5]

The Secretary's relations with the President and his colleagues while he was in this frame of mind were naturally subject to much friction, and this frame of mind had lasted with little variation for more than a year. It was impossible to get on with him except by constant agreement to all his demands. He chose in his letters and his diaries to represent himself as the one just and patriotic man in the Government, who was striving with desperate energy, but with little hope, to preserve the Administration from corrupt influences. It cannot be doubted that his motives were pure, his ability and industry unusual, his integrity, of course, beyond question. He held, and justly held, that, being responsible for the proper conduct of affairs in his department, he should not be compelled to make appointments contrary to his convictions of duty. He was unquestionably right in insisting that appointments should be made on public grounds, and that only men of ability and character should be chosen to fill them; but he had an exasperating habit of assuming that nobody agreed with him in this view, and that all differences of opinion in regard to persons necessarily sprung from corrupt or improper motives on the part of those who differed with him. At the slightest word of disagreement he immediately put on his full armor of noble sentiments and phrases, appealed to Heaven for the rectitude of his intentions, and threatened to resign his commission if thwarted in his purpose. When he was not opposed he made his recommendations, as his colleagues did, on grounds of political expediency as well as of personal fitness. One day, for instance, he recommended the appointment of Rheinhold Solger as Assistant Register of

[1] Chase to Jay Cooke, May 5, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 584.

[2] Chase to D. T. Smith, May 9, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 587.

[3] May 9, 1864. Ibid.

[4] Chase to Hamilton, May 15, 1864. Ibid., p. 590.

[5] Chase to Brough, May 19, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 593.

the Treasury on the ground that "the German supporters of the Administration have had no considerable appointment in the department." He frequently gave in support of his nominees the recommendation of senators and representatives of the States where the appointments were to be made. But he always sturdily resented any suggestions from the President that an appointment proposed by him would have a bad effect politically. He had the faculty of making himself believe that his obstinacy in such matters arose purely from devotion to principle. He would not only weary the President with unending oral discussions, but, returning to the department, would write him letters filled with high and irrelevant morality, and at evening would enter in his diary meditations upon his own purity and the perversity of those he chose to call his enemies. It would hardly be wise for the ablest man of affairs to assume such an attitude. To justify it at all one should be infallible in his judgment of men. With the Secretary of the Treasury this was far from being the case. He was not a good judge of character; he gave his confidence freely to any one who came flattering him and criticizing the President, and after having given it, it was almost impossible to make him believe that the man who talked so judiciously could be a knave. His chosen biographer, Judge Warden, says: "He was indeed sought less by strong men and by good men than by weak men and by bad men."[1] A much better authority, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, while giving him unmeasured praise for other qualities calls him "profoundly ignorant of men," and says, "The baldest charlatan might deceive him into trusting his personal worth."[2]

Early in the year 1864 the Federal appointments in New York City began to be the subject of frequent conversation between the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. So many complaints of irregularity and inefficiency in the conduct of affairs in the New York custom house had reached Mr. Lincoln that he began to think a change in the officers there would be of advantage to the public service. Every suggestion of this sort, however, was met by Mr. Chase with passionate opposition. Mr. Lincoln had not lost confidence in the integrity or the high character of Mr. Barney, the collector of customs; he was even willing to give him an important appointment abroad in testimony of his continued esteem; but he was not satisfied with what he heard of the conduct of his office. Several of his subordinates had been detected in improper and corrupt practices, and after being defended by Mr. Chase until defense was impossible, they had been dismissed, and in some cases punished. In the month of February, while the conduct of the custom house was under investigation in Congress, a special agent of the Treasury Department named Joshua F. Bailey came to Washington, having been summoned as a witness to testify before the committee of the House of Representatives in charge of the matter. He called on the chairman in advance, and endeavored to smother the investigation by saying, among other things, that, whatever might be developed, the President would in no case take any action. The chairman of the committee reported this impudent statement to the President, who at once communicated the fact to the Secretary of the Treasury, saying, "The public interest cannot fail to suffer in the hands of this irresponsible and unscrupulous man"; and he proposed at the same time to send Mr. Barney as minister to Portugal.[3] Mr. Chase defended Bailey, and resisted with such energy the displacement of Mr. Barney that midsummer came with matters in the custom house unchanged. Mr. Chase, in his diary, gives a full account of a conversation between himself and the President[4] in regard to this matter, in which the Secretary reiterates his assurances of confidence in the conduct of the custom house, and gives especially warm expression to his regard for Bailey, meeting the positive assertion of the chairman of the committee of the House of Representatives by saying, "I think Mr. Bailey is not the fool to have made such a suggestion." So long as he remained in office he gave this blind confidence to Bailey, who finally showed how ill he deserved it by the embezzlement of a large sum of public money, and by his flight in ruin and disgrace from the country.

In February, 1863, the Senate rejected the nomination of Mr. Mark Howard as collector of internal revenue for the district of Connecticut. Mr. Chase, hearing that this rejection was made at the instance of Senator Dixon, immediately wrote a letter demanding the renomination of Howard; or, if the President should not agree with him in this, of some one not recommended by Senator Dixon. A few days later the President wrote to Mr. Chase that after much reflection and with a great deal of pain that it was adverse to his wish, he had concluded that it was not best to renominate Mr. Howard. He recognized the constitutional right of the Senate to reject his nominations without being called to account; and to take the ground in advance that he would nominate no one for the vacant place who was favored by a senator so eminent in character and ability as Mr. Dixon seemed to him pre-

1 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 530.
2 Reid, "Ohio in the War," Vol. I., p. 18.
3 Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 12, 1864.
4 June 6.

posterous. The only person from Connecticut recommended for the vacancy was Mr. Goodman, in favor of whom Senator Dixon and Mr. Loomis, the Representative in the House, cordially united. The President therefore asked Mr. Chase to send him a nomination for Goodman.[1] Immediately on the receipt of this letter Mr. Chase wrote out his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury in these words:

> Finding myself unable to approve the manner in which selections for appointment to important trusts in this department have been recently made, and being unwilling to remain responsible for its administration, under existing circumstances, I respectfully resign the office of Secretary of the Treasury.[2]

This letter, however, never reached the President, as Senator Dixon came in before it was dispatched and discussed the matter in a spirit so entirely different from that of the Secretary that no quarrel was possible with him; and after he left, Mr. Chase wrote a letter to the President, in which he said:

> I do not insist on the renomination of Mr. Howard; and Mr. Dixon and Mr. Loomis, as I understand, do not claim the nomination of his successor. . . . My only object — and I think you so understand it — is to secure fit men for responsible places, without admitting the rights of senators or representatives to control appointments, for which the President, and the Secretary, as his presumed adviser, must be responsible. Unless this principle can be practically established, I feel that I cannot be useful to you or the country in my present position.[3]

It is possible that the Secretary may have thought that this implied threat to resign brought both the President and the senator to reason, for the matter ended at this time by their allowing him to have absolutely his own way. Mr. Dixon wrote to the President,[4] saying that he "preferred to leave the whole matter to the Secretary of the Treasury, believing his choice would be such as to advance the interests of the country and the Administration"; and the President, who heartily detested these squabbles over office, was glad of this arrangement. There was not a shade of difference between him and Mr. Chase as to the duty of the Administration to appoint only fit men to office, but the President always preferred to effect this object without needlessly offending the men upon whom the Government depended for its support in the war.

A few months later Mr. Lincoln was subjected to great trouble and inconvenience by the constant complaints which came to him by every mail from Puget Sound against the collector for that district, one Victor Smith, from Ohio, a friend and appointee of Mr. Chase. This Smith is described by Schuckers[5] as

> a man not very likely to become popular on the Pacific coast — or anywhere else. He believed in spirit rappings and was an avowed abolitionist; he whined a great deal about "progress"; was somewhat arrogant in manner and intolerant in speech, and speedily made himself thoroughly unpopular in his office.

No attention was paid by the Secretary to these complaints, which were from time to time referred to him by the President; but at last the clamor by letter and by deputations from across the continent became intolerable, and the President, during a somewhat protracted absence of the Secretary from Washington, ordered a change to be made in the office. In a private note to Mr. Chase, wishing to avoid giving him personal offense, he said:

> My mind is made up to remove Victor Smith as collector of the customs at the Puget Sound district. Yet in doing this I do not decide that the charges against him are true. I only decide that the degree of dissatisfaction with him there is too great for him to be retained. But I believe he is your personal acquaintance and friend, and if you desire it, I will try to find some other place for him.[6]

Three days later the Secretary, having returned to Washington, answered in his usual manner, protesting once more his ardent desire to serve the country faithfully, and claiming that he had a right to be consulted in matters of appointment. He sent a blank commission for the person whom the President had concluded to appoint, but protested against the precedent, and tendered his resignation. This time again the President gave way. He drove to the Secretary's house, handed his petulant letter back to him, and begged him to think no more of the matter.[7] Two days afterward, in a letter assenting to other recommendations for office which had come to him from the Treasury Department, he said, "Please send me over the commission for Louis C. Gunn, as you recommend, for collector of customs at Puget Sound."[8]

Any statesman possessing a sense of humor

1 March 2, 1863. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 524.

2 Ibid., pp. 524, 525.

3 March 3, 1863. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 525.

4 Dixon to Lincoln, March 5, 1863. MS.

5 Mr. Schuckers was private secretary to Mr. Chase and author of a biography of him, q. v., p. 423.

6 Lincoln to Chase, May 8, 1863; MS. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 527.

7 Mr. Maunsell B. Field, in his "Memories of Many Men and Some Women," p. 303, quotes Mr. Lincoln as saying: "I went directly up to him with the resignation in my hand, and, putting my arm around his neck, said to him, 'Chase, here is a paper with which I wish to have nothing to do; take it back and be reasonable.' It was difficult to bring him to terms. I had to plead with him a long time; but I finally succeeded, and heard nothing more of that resignation."

8 Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 528.

would have hesitated before repeating this identical proceeding; but, as we have said, Mr. Chase was deficient in this saving sense, and he apparently saw no reason why it should not be repeated indefinitely.

Mr. John J. Cisco, the assistant treasurer at New York, who had served the Government with remarkable ability and efficiency through three administrations, resigned his commission in May, to take effect at the close of the fiscal year, the 30th of June, 1864. It was a post of great importance in a financial point of view, and not insignificant in the way of political influence. Up to this time, Mr. Chase had made all the important appointments in New York from his own wing of the supporters of the Union — the men who had formerly been connected with the Democratic party, and who now belonged to what was called the radical wing of the Republican. This matter was the source of constant complaint from those who were sometimes called the Conservative Republicans of New York, or those who had in great part formerly belonged to the Whig party, and who in later years acknowledged the leadership of Mr. Seward. The President was anxious that in an appointment so important as that which was now about to be made both sections of the party in New York should, if possible, be satisfied; and especially that no nominations should be made which should be positively objectionable to Senator Morgan, who was considered to represent more especially the city of New York and its great commercial interests. To this Mr. Chase at first interposed no objection; and it was upon full and friendly consultation and conference between him and Senator Morgan that the appointment was offered successively to Mr. Denning Duer and to Mr. John A. Stewart, both of them gentlemen of the highest standing. But both declined the office tendered them; upon which Mr. Chase suddenly resolved to appoint Mr. Maunsell B. Field, who was at that time an assistant secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Field was a gentleman of excellent social position, of fine literary culture, to whom the Secretary was sincerely attached, but who was entirely destitute of such standing in either the political or the financial circles of New York as was required by so important a place. Senator Morgan at once protested vigorously against such an appointment, which only served to confirm the Secretary in his insistence upon it. Besides his objections to Mr. Field, whom he thought in no way competent to hold such a place, Mr. Morgan urged that the political result of his appointment would be extremely unfavorable to the Union party in New York. He became thoroughly alarmed, and begged the Secretary and the President successively to make their choice among three of the most eminent citizens of New York whose names he presented; but the Secretary's mind was made up. Without further consultation with the President, he sent him the nomination for Mr. Field on the 27th of June. The next day the President replied:

> I cannot, without much embarrassment, make this appointment; principally, because of Senator Morgan's very firm opposition to it. Senator Harris has not yet spoken to me on the subject, though I understand he is not averse to the appointment of Mr. Field, nor yet to any one of the three named by Senator Morgan. . . . Governor Morgan tells me he has mentioned three names to you, to wit: R. M. Blatchford, Dudley S. Gregory, and Thomas Hillhouse. It will really oblige me if you will make choice among those three, or any other man that Senators Morgan and Harris will be satisfied with, and send me a nomination for him.[1]

There have been few ministers who would have refused so reasonable and considerate a request as this, but it did not for a moment shake Mr. Chase's determination to have his own way in the matter. He sent a note to the President asking for an interview, and telegraphed to Mr. Cisco,[2] begging him most earnestly to withdraw his resignation and give the country the benefit of his services at least one quarter longer. He was determined, in one way or another, that neither the President nor the senators of New York should have anything to say in regard to this appointment; and conscious of his own blamelessness in all the controversy, he went home and wrote in his diary: "Oh, for more faith and clearer sight! How stable is the city of God! How disordered is the city of man!" Later in the day the President wrote him:

> When I received your note this forenoon suggesting a conversation — a verbal conversation — in relation to the appointment of a successor to Mr. Cisco, I hesitated, because the difference does not, in the main part, lie within the range of a conversation between you and me. As the proverb goes, no man knows so well where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. I do not think Mr. Field a very proper man for the place, but I would trust your judgment and forego this were the greater difficulty out of the way. Much as I personally like Mr. Barney, it has been a great burden to me to retain him in his place when nearly all our friends in New York were directly or indirectly urging his removal. Then the appointment of Hogeboom to be general appraiser brought me to, and has ever since kept me at, the verge of open revolt. Now the appointment of Mr. Field would precipitate it, unless Senator Morgan, and those feeling as he does, could be brought to concur in it. Strained as I

[1] Lincoln to Chase, June 28, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 611.

[2] Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 506.

already am at this point, I do not think that I can make this appointment in the direction of still greater strain.[1]

In the evening the extremely tense situation was relieved by a telegram from Mr. Cisco complying with the request of the Secretary to remain another quarter. But it was not in the nature of Mr. Chase to accept this simple dénouement. He felt that the President had acted badly, and must be subjected to some discipline; and he naturally resorted to those measures which had hitherto proved so effective. He wrote to him:

The withdrawal of Mr. Cisco's resignation, which I inclose, relieves the present difficulty; but I cannot help feeling that my position here is not altogether agreeable to you, and it is certainly too full of embarrassment and difficulty and painful responsibility to allow in me the least desire to retain it. I think it my duty, therefore, to inclose to you my resignation. I shall regard it as a real relief if you think proper to accept it, and will most cheerfully render to my successor any aid he may find useful in entering upon his duties.[2]

In this letter Mr. Chase inclosed his formal resignation. The President received this note while very much occupied with other affairs. The first paper which met his eye was the telegram from Mr. Cisco withdrawing his resignation. Glad that the affair was so happily terminated, he laid the packet aside for some hours, without looking at the other papers contained in it. The next morning, wishing to write a congratulatory note to Mr. Chase upon this welcome termination of the crisis, he found, to his bitter chagrin and disappointment, that the Secretary had once more tendered his resignation. He took it to mean precisely what the Secretary had intended — that if he were to retain Mr. Chase as Secretary of the Treasury, it should not be hereafter as a subordinate; to refuse this resignation, to go once more to the Secretary and urge him to remain, would amount to an abdication of his constitutional powers. He therefore, without hesitation, sent him this letter:

Your resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury, sent me yesterday, is accepted. Of all I have said in commendation of your ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service.[3]

At the same time he sent to the Senate the nomination of David Tod of Ohio as Secretary of the Treasury. Most people have chosen to consider this a singular selection. Yet David Tod was by no means an unknown man. He had gained an honorable position at the bar; had been the Democratic candidate for governor in 1843; had served with credit as minister to Brazil; was first vice-president of the Charleston convention and became its president at Baltimore on the secession of Caleb Cushing; was one of the most prominent men in Ohio in railroad and mining enterprises; had been the most eminent and efficient of the war Democrats of the State; and as governor had shown executive capacity of high order.[4] There were some superficial points of resemblance between Mr. Chase and Governor Tod that doubtless caught the attention of the President in choosing a successor to the former in such haste. Tod was a citizen of the same State with Chase, of which both had been governor; he had come into the Union party from the Democrats; he was a man of unusually dignified and impressive presence; but it is safe to say that no one had ever thought of him for the place now vacant. The nomination was presented to the Senate at its opening and was received with amazement. Not the least surprised of the statesmen in the Capitol was Mr. Chase himself, who was busy at the moment in one of the committee rooms of the Senate arranging some legislation which he needed for his department. There are many indications which go to show that his resignation of the evening before was intended, like those which had preceded it, as a means of discipline for the President. After sending it he wrote to Mr. Cisco expressing his thanks for the withdrawal of his resignation, and saying:

It relieves me from a very painful embarrassment. . . . I could not remain here and see your office made parcel of the machinery of party, or even feel serious apprehension that it might be.

Even on the morning of the 30th of June, Mr. Chase wrote to the President recommending a considerable increase of taxation, saying that there would be a deficit by existing laws of about eighty millions.

On the other hand, there is nothing to show, up to the instant that he was informed of the nomination of Tod, that he expected his official career to end on that day. The news for that moment created something like consternation in political circles at the capital. Mr. Washburne hurried to the White House, saying the change was disastrous; that at this time of military unsuccess, financial weakness, congressional hesitation on questions of conscription, and imminent famine in the West, it was

[1] Lincoln to Chase, June 28, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 613.
[2] Chase to Lincoln, June 29, 1864.
[3] Lincoln to Chase, June 30, 1864. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 614.
[4] Reid, "Ohio in the War."

ruinous. The Senate Committee on Finance, to which the nomination of Tod had been referred, came down in a body to talk with the President about it. The President gave this account of the interview: "Fessenden was frightened, Conness was angry, Sherman thought we could not have gotten on together much longer anyhow, Cowan and Van Winkle were indifferent."[1] They not only objected to any change, but specially protested against the nomination of Tod as too little known and too inexperienced for the place. The President replied that he had little personal acquaintance with Tod, that he had nominated him on account of the high opinion he had formed of him as governor of Ohio; but that the Senate had the duty and responsibility of passing upon the question of fitness, in which it must be entirely untrammeled; he could not, in justice to himself or to Tod, withdraw the nomination. The impression of the undesirability of the change rather deepened during the day. Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts, an intimate friend of both the President and Mr. Chase, and the man upon whom both principally relied for the conduct of financial legislation in the House, spoke of the crisis in deep depression. He said he had been for some time of the opinion that Mr. Chase did not see his way entirely clear to raising the funds which were necessary; that his supplementary demand for money sent in at the close of the session after everything had been granted which he asked, looked like an intention to throw an anchor to windward in case he was refused. Mr. Hooper said he had waked this morning feeling a little vexed that Chase had done this, that he thought it was an attempt to throw an unfair responsibility upon Congress; but now this resignation came to relieve him of all responsibility; his successor would have an enormous work to do; the future was troubled; there remained the great practical problem, regularly recurring, to raise one hundred millions a month.

> I do not clearly see [he said] how it is to be done; the talent of finance in its national aspect is something entirely different from banking. Most bankers criticize Mr. Chase, but he has a faculty of using the knowledge and experience of others to the best advantage; that has sufficed him hitherto; a point has been reached where he does not clearly see what comes next, and at this point the President allows him to step from under his load.[1]

This view of the case has a color of confirmation in a passage of the diary of Mr. Chase of the 30th of June, which goes to show at least a mixed motive in his resignation. After his resignation had been accepted, Mr. Hooper had called upon him and, evidently hoping that some reconciliation was still possible, told him that, several days before, the President had spoken to him in terms of high esteem, indicating his purpose of making him Chief-Justice in the event of a vacancy, a post which Mr. Chase had long before told the President was the one he most desired. Mr. Chase answered that had such expression of good-will reached him in time it might have prevented the present misunderstanding, but that now he could not change his position. "Besides," he adds, "I did not see how I could carry on the department without more means than Congress was likely to supply, and amid the embarrassment created by factious hostility within, and both factious and party hostility without the department."[2]

At night the President received a dispatch from Mr. Tod declining the appointment on the ground of ill-health. The President's secretary went immediately to the Capitol to communicate this information to the senators, so that no vote might be taken on the nomination. Early the next morning the President sent to the Senate the nomination of William Pitt Fessenden, senator from Maine. When he gave the nomination to his secretary, the latter informed him that Mr. Fessenden was then in the ante-room waiting to see him. He answered, "Start at once for the Senate, and then let Fessenden come in." The senator, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, began immediately to discuss the question of the vacant place in the Treasury, suggesting the name of Mr. McCulloch. The President listened to him for a moment with a smile of amusement, and then told him that he had already sent *his* nomination to the Senate. Fessenden leaped to his feet, exclaiming, "You must withdraw it. I cannot accept." "If you decline," said the President, "you must do it in open day, for I shall not recall the nomination." "We talked about it for some time," said the President, "and he went away less decided in his refusal."

The nomination was instantly confirmed, the executive session lasting no more than a minute. It gave immediate and widespread satisfaction. There seemed to be no difference of opinion in regard to Mr. Fessenden; the only fear was that he would not accept. His first impulse was to decline; but being besieged all day by the flattering solicitations of his friends, it was impossible for him to persist in refusing. The President was equally surprised and gratified at the enthusiastic and general approval the nomination had met with. He said:[1]

> It is very singular, considering that this appointment is so popular when made, that no one ever

[1] J. H., Diary.

[2] Chase, Diary. Warden, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 618.

WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

mentioned his name to me for that place. Thinking over the matter, two or three points occurred to me: first, his thorough acquaintance with the business; as chairman of the Senate Committee of Finance he knows as much of this special subject as Mr. Chase; he possesses a national reputation and the confidence of the country; he is a radical without the petulant and vicious fretfulness of many radicals. There are reasons why this appointment ought to be very agreeable to him. For some time past he has been running in rather a pocket of bad luck; the failure to renominate Mr. Hamlin makes possible a contest between him and the Vice-President, the most popular man in Maine, for the election which is now imminent. A little while ago in the Senate you know Trumbull told him his ill-temper had left him no friends, but this sudden and most gratifying manifestation of good feeling over his appointment, his instantaneous confirmation, the earnest entreaties of everybody that he should accept, cannot but be very grateful to his feelings.

Mr. Chase left a full record in his diaries and letters of the sense of injury and wrong done him by the President. He especially resented the President's reference to the "embarrassment in our official relations." "I had found a good deal of embarrassment from him," he said; "but what he had found from me I could not imagine, unless it has been caused by my unwillingness to have offices distributed as spoils or benefits. . . . He has never given me the active and earnest support I was entitled to." After Mr. Fessenden was appointed, the ex-Secretary entered in his diary his approval of the selection:

He has the confidence of the country, and many who have become inimical to me will give their confidence to him and their support. Perhaps they will do more than they otherwise would to sustain him, in order to show how much better a Secretary he is than I was.

Before Mr. Fessenden accepted his appointment he called on Mr. Chase and conversed fully with him on the subject. Mr. Chase frankly and cordially advised him to accept, telling him that all the great work of the Department was now fairly blocked out and in progress, that the organization was all planned and in many ways complete, and all in a state which admitted of completion. His most difficult task would be to provide money. "But he would have advantages," said Mr. Chase, "which I had not. Those to whom I had given offense would have no cause of ill-will against my successor, and would very probably come to his support with zeal increased by their ill-will to me; so that my damage would be to his advantage, especially with a certain class of capitalists and bankers."

The entries in Mr. Chase's diary continue for several days in the same strain. He congratulates himself on his own integrity; he speaks with severity of the machinations of imaginary enemies. On the 2d of July he remarks the passage of the bill giving the Secretary of the Treasury control over trade in the rebel States and authority to lease abandoned property and to care for the freedmen, and adds: "How much good I expected to accomplish under this bill! Will my successor do this work? I fear not. He had not the same heart for this measure that I had." On the Fourth of July the ringing of bells, the firing of cannon, and the snapping of crackers awoke him to the reflection that "if the Government had been willing to do justice, and had used its vast powers with equal energy and wisdom, the struggle might have been happily terminated long ago." Later in the same day Mr. Fessenden came to see him, and informed him that he had been discussing with the President the subject of appointments in the Treasury Department, and that Mr. Lincoln had requested him not to remove any friends of Governor Chase unless there should be a real necessity for it. Mr. Chase persuaded himself that if the President had spoken to him in that tone he would have withdrawn his resignation.

Why did he not? [he mused.] I can see but one reason—that I am too earnest, too antislavery, and say too radical, to make him willing to have me connected with the Administration: just as my opinion that he is not earnest enough, not antislavery enough, not radical enough, but goes naturally with those hostile to me, rather than with me, makes me willing and glad to be disconnected from it.

How far his animosity against the President had misled this able, honest, pure, and otherwise sagacious man may be seen in one single phrase. Referring to the President's refusal to sign the reconstruction bill, he put down his deliberate opinion that neither the President nor his chief advisers had abandoned the idea of possible reconstruction with slavery; and this in spite of the President's categorical statement, "While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation or by any of the acts of Congress," and of his declaration that such action would be "a cruel and an astounding breach of faith." But after all these expressions of that petulant injustice which was only a foible in a noble character, the greatest financial Secretary which the country had known since Hamilton had a perfect right, in laying down the high office he had borne with such integrity and such signal success, to indulge in the meditation which we find in his diary of June 30:

> So my official life closes. I have laid broad foundations. Nothing but wise legislation and especially bold yet judicious provision of taxes, with fair economy in administration, and energetic yet prudent military action, . . . seems necessary to insure complete success.

June 1889

THE WATER-SEEKER.

WHO makes a road through regions rough and lone,
Who plants and rears a tree where shade is none,
Who scores the furrow in a soil untamed,
Is fit in song heroic to be named.

Nor scanter praise be his whose patient force
Gives to an arid land a water-course,
Gradual, but grateful as the jet that broke
From forth the ledge that felt the prophet's stroke.

Behold a toiler in far Idaho,
'Mid foothills where, in summer's steady glow,
The slender-shafted cottonwood looks dim,
The swarthy dust-cloud veils the horizon's rim.

As day by day his toil the stream extends,
Sometimes the grasses harsh a footfall bends—
His wife and child, the genii of the stream,
Before him rise as in a lovely dream!

Edith M. Thomas.

THE IRRIGATING DITCH.

PICTURES OF THE FAR WEST.—VII.

THE word "desert" is used, in the West, to describe alike lands in which the principle of life, if it ever existed, is totally extinct, and those other lands which are merely "thirsty."

West of the Missouri there are immense, sad provinces devoted to drought. They lie beneath skies that are pitilessly clear. The great snow-fields, the treasury of waters, are far away, and the streams which should convey the treasure are often many days' journeys apart. These wild water-courses are Nature's commissaries sent from the mountains to the relief of the plains; but they scamper like pickpockets. They make away with the stores they were charged to distribute. They hurry along, making the only sound to be heard for miles in those vacant lands which they have defrauded. Year by year, or century by century, they plow out their barren channels: gradually they sink, beyond any possibility of fulfilling their mission. Now and then one will dig for itself a grave in the desert, bury its mouth in the sand, and be known as a "lost" river.

"pulled out" for Anadarko on the Washita, where the head agency of the Comanches, Kiowas, and Wichitas is located. The little ponies made bad work of the sandy roads. Kiowa houses became more numerous along the road, and there is evidence that they farm more than the brother tribe, but they are not so attractive a people. Of course the tepee is pitched in the front yard and the house is used as a kind of out-building. The medicine-bags were hanging from the tripod of poles near by, and an occasional buck was lying on his back "smoking his medicine"—a very comfortable form of devotion.

We saw the grass houses of the Wichitas, which might be taken for ordinary haystacks. As they stand out on the prairie surrounded by wagons, agricultural implements, and cattle, one is caught wondering where is the remainder of the farm which goes with this farm-yard.

These Territory Apaches are very different from their brothers of the mountains. They are good-looking, but are regarded contemptuously by other Indians and also by the traders. They are treacherous, violent, and most cunning liars and thieves. I spent an evening in one of their tepees watching a game of monte, and the gambling passion was developed almost to insanity. They sat and glared at the cards, their dark faces gleaming with avarice, cunning, and excitement. I thought then that the good white men who would undertake to make Christian gentlemen and honest tillers of the soil out of this material would contract for a job to subvert the process of nature.

Our little ponies, recuperated by some grain and rest, were once more hooked up, and the cowboy and I started for Fort Reno to see the Arrapahoes and the Cheyennes, hoping to meet them far along on "the white man's road."[1]

Frederic Remington.

CASCO BAY.

IF e'er you sail on Casco Bay
When fields are green and skies are sweet,
And watch the foam-capped waves at play
Where land and sea touch hands and greet,
As friend with friend, in rude delight,
Your soul, like birds at break of day,
Will rise for many a joyous flight
Midst summer isles of Casco Bay:
Of Casco Bay! Sweet Casco Bay!
Where life is joy and love at play
Midst summer isles of Casco Bay.

Oh, wild and glad and circling far,
The ripples sparkle from your prow
As silvery laughter from a star
When Venus decks the evening's brow;
And where the islands stand apart
The ocean waves roll in to pay
Some tribute from the sea's great heart
To gentle, queenly Casco Bay:
To Casco Bay! Dear Casco Bay!
Your soul imbibes the salt-sea spray
And sings with lovely Casco Bay.

Down smiling channels shadows run
And shimmer on the green-blue tides;
And, booming like a far-off gun,
Where Harpswell sea from sea divides,
You hear the breakers' sullen roar
And watch the waves ascend in spray
While all around, behind, before,
The white sails swell on Casco Bay:
On Casco Bay! Fair Casco Bay!
The white sails fill and bear away
The happy ships on Casco Bay.

Benjamin S. Parker.

1 See "Open Letter" by Hamilton W. Mabie in this number of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.—EDITOR.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

LINCOLN RENOMINATED—THE WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO—HORACE GREELEY'S PEACE MISSION.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

LINCOLN RENOMINATED.

IN other chapters we have mentioned the unavailing efforts made by a few politicians to defeat the will of the people which everywhere demanded the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. These efforts were worth studying as manifestations of eccentric human nature, but they never had the least effect upon the great currents of public opinion. Death alone could have prevented the choice of Mr. Lincoln by the Union convention. So absolute and universal was this tendency that most of the politicians made no effort to direct or guide it; they simply exerted themselves to keep in the van and not be overwhelmed. The convention was to meet on the 7th of June, but the irregular nominations of the President began at the feast of the Epiphany. The first convention of the year was held in New Hampshire on the 6th of January—for the nomination of State officers. It had properly no concern with the National nominations. The convention consisted in great part of the friends of Mr. Chase, and those employees of the Treasury Department whose homes were in New Hampshire had come together determined to smother any mistimed demonstration for the President; but the first mention of his name set the assembly on fire, and before the chairman knew what he was doing the convention had declared in favor of the renomination of Lincoln. The same day a far more important demonstration came to the surface in Pennsylvania. The State legislature met on the 5th of January, and the following day a paper, prepared in advance, addressed to the President, requesting him to accept a second term of the Presidency, began to be circulated among the Union members. Not one to whom it was presented declined to sign it. Within a day or two it received the signature of every Union member of the Senate and the House of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Simon Cameron, transmitting it to the President on the 14th of January, could say:

> You are now fairly launched on your second voyage, and of its success I am as confident as ever I was of anything in my life. Providence has decreed your reëlection, and no combination of the wicked can prevent it.[2]

This remarkable address began by congratulating the President upon the successes of the recent election, which were generously ascribed to the policy of his Administration. Referring to the Republican victory in their own State, the members of the legislature said:

> If the voice of Pennsylvania became thus potential in indorsing the policy of your Administration, we consider that, as the representatives of those who have so completely indorsed your official course, we are only responding to their demands when we thus publicly announce our unshaken preference for your reëlection to the Presidency in 1864.

This preference is justified by them purely on public grounds.

> To make a change in the Administration until its authority has been fully reëstablished in the revolted States would be to give the enemies of the Government abroad a pretext for asserting that the Government had failed at home. To change the policy in operation to crush rebellion and restore the land to peace would be to afford the traitors in arms time to gather new strength—if not for immediate victory, at least for ultimate success in their efforts permanently to dissolve the Union. . . . We do not make this communication at this time to elicit from you any expression of opinion on this subject. Having confidence in your patriotism, we believe that you will abide the decision of the friends of the Union, and yield consent to any honorable use which they may deem proper to make of your name in order to secure the greatest good to the country and the speediest success to our arms. . . . Expressing what we feel to be the language not only of our own constituents, but also of the people of all the loyal States, we claim to indulge the expectation that you will yield to the preference which has already made you the people's candidate for the Presidency in 1864.

In every gathering of the supporters of the Union the same irrepressible sentiment broke forth. The "New York Times" on the 15th of January clearly expressed the general feeling:

> The same wise policy which would forbid a man of business in troublous times to change his agent of proved efficiency, impels the loyal people of our

[2] Cameron to Lincoln, Jan. 14, 1864. MS.

[1] Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

country to continue President Lincoln in his responsible position; and against the confirmed will of the people politicians are powerless.

The sentiment was so potent in its pressure upon the politicians that they everywhere gave way and broke into premature indorsement of the nomination. The Union Central Committee of New York held a special meeting and unanimously recommended the renomination of the President. Senator Morgan, sending this news to Mr. Lincoln, added:

> It is going to be difficult to restrain the boys, and there is not much use in trying to do so.[1]

At a local election some of the ward tickets were headed, with an irrelevancy which showed the spirit of the hour, "For President of the United States in 1864, Abraham Lincoln." From one end to the other of the country these spontaneous nominations joyously echoed one another. Towards the close of January the radical legislature of Kansas, with but one dissenting voice, passed through both its Houses a resolution renominating Lincoln. All through the next month these demonstrations continued. The Union members of the New Jersey legislature united in an address to the President, saying:

> Without any disparagement of the true men who surround you, and whose counsels you have shared, believing that you are the choice of the people, whose servants we are, and firmly satisfied that they desire and intend to give you four years for a policy of peace, we present your name as the candidate for President of the American people in 1864.[2]

Connecticut instructed her delegates by resolutions on the 17th of February; Maryland, Minnesota, and Colorado expressed in the same way the sentiment of their people. Wisconsin and Indiana made haste to range themselves with the other Northern States; and Ohio seized the opportunity to put a stop to the restless ambition of her favorite son by a resolution of the Republican members of the legislature declaring that "the people of Ohio, and her soldiers in the army, demand the renomination of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency" — the members rising to their feet and cheering with uncontrollable clamor when the resolution passed. The State of Maine, on the extreme eastern border, spoke next: early in March, the President received this dispatch, signed by a name afterwards illustrious in our political annals:

> Both branches of the Maine legislature have this day adopted resolutions cordially recommending your renomination. Every Union member voted in favor of them. Maine is a unit for you.
>
> JAMES G. BLAINE.

[1] Jan. 4, 1864. MS.
[2] Feb. 18, 1864.

Nowhere except in the State of Missouri was the name of Mr. Lincoln mentioned without overwhelming adhesion, and even in the Missouri Assembly the resolution in favor of his renomination was laid upon the table by a majority of only eight. There had been some anxiety on the part of Mr. Lincoln's friends lest the powerful secret organization called the Union League, which represented the most ardent and vehement Republican sentiment of the country, should fall into the hands of his opponents; but it was speedily seen that out of Missouri these apprehensions were groundless. The Union Leagues of New York, Illinois, and even Vicksburg, where the victory of Grant had allowed the development of a robust Union sentiment, were among the first to declare for the President. The organization in Philadelphia, powerful in wealth, intelligence, and personal influence, so early as the 11th of January had resolved that to the "prudence, sagacity, comprehension, and perseverance of Mr. Lincoln, under the guidance of a benign Providence, the nation is more indebted for the grand results of the war, which Southern rebels have wickedly waged against liberty and the Union, than to any other single instrumentality, and that he is justly entitled to whatever reward it is in the power of the nation to bestow." They declared also:

> That as Mr. Lincoln has had to endure the largest share of the labor required to suppress the rebellion, now rapidly verging to its close, he should also enjoy the largest share of the honors which await those who have contended for the right. They therefore recognize with pleasure the unmistakable indications of the popular will in all the loyal States, and heartily join with their fellow-citizens, without any distinction of party, here and elsewhere, in presenting him as the people's candidate for the Presidency.

The current swept on irresistibly throughout the months of spring. A few opponents of Mr. Lincoln, seeing that he was already nominated the moment the convention should meet, made one last effort to postpone the meeting of the convention until September, knowing that their only reliance was in some possible accident of the summer. So earnest and important a Republican as William Cullen Bryant united with a self-constituted committee of others equally earnest, but not so important, to induce the National Committee to postpone the convention. In their opinion "the country was not now in a position to enter into a Presidential contest; it was clear to them that no nomination could be made with any unanimity so early as June. They thought it best to see what the result of the summer campaign would be, as the wish of the people to continue their present leaders in power would depend very much upon this." The committee, of

course, took no notice of this appeal, though it was favored by so strong a Republican authority as the "New York Tribune."[1] The National Committee wisely thought that they might with as much reason take into consideration the request of a committee of prominent citizens to check an impending thunderstorm. All the movements in opposition to Mr. Lincoln were marked with the same naïveté and futility. The secret circular of Senator Pomeroy, the farcical Cleveland convention, the attempt of Mr. Bryant's committee to postpone the convention, were all equally feeble and nugatory in their effect.

Mr. Lincoln took no measures whatever to promote his candidacy. It is true he did not, like other candidates, assume airs of reluctance or bashfulness. While he discouraged on the part of strangers any suggestions as to his re-election, among his friends he made no secret of his readiness to continue the work he was engaged in, if such should seem to be the general wish. In a private letter to Mr. E. B. Washburne he said: "A second term would be a great honor and a great labor, which together perhaps I would not decline if tendered."[2] To another congressman he is reported to have said: "I do not desire a renomination except for the reason that such action on the part of the Republican party would be the most emphatic indorsement which could be given to the policy of my Administration." We have already mentioned the equanimity with which he treated the efforts of a leading member of his Cabinet to supplant him, and he received in the same manner the frequent suggestions of apprehensive friends that he would do well to beware of Grant. His usual reply was, "If he takes Richmond, let him have it." In reality General Grant was never at any time a competitor for the nomination. Of course, after the battle of Missionary Ridge there was no lack of such suggestions on the part of those who surrounded the victorious general; but he positively refused to put himself in the lists or to give any sanction to the use of his name. The President constantly discouraged on the part of office-holders of the Government, civil or military, any especial eagerness in his behalf. General Schurz wrote, late in February, asking permission to take an active part in the Presidential canvass, to which Mr. Lincoln replied:

> Allow me to suggest that if you wish to remain in the military service, it is very dangerous for you to get temporarily out of it; because, with a major-general once out, it is next to impossible for even the President to get him in again. With my appreciation of your ability and correct principle, of course I would be very glad to have your service for the country in the approaching political canvass; but I fear we cannot properly have it without separating you from the military.[3]

And in a subsequent letter addressed to the same general he said:[4]

> I perceive no objection to your making a political speech when you are where one is to be made; but quite surely speaking in the North and fighting in the South at the same time are not possible; nor could I be justified to detail any officer to the political campaign during its continuance and then return him to the army.[5]

The experience of a hundred years of our politics has shown what perils environ a Presidential candidate who makes speeches. The temptation to flatter the immediate audience, without regard to the ultimate effect of the words spoken, has often proved too strong for the wariest politician to resist. Especially is a candidate in danger when confronting an audience belonging to a special race or class. Mr. Lincoln made no mistake either in 1860 or in 1864. Even when exposed to the strongest possible temptation, the reception of an address from a deputation of a workingmen's association, he preserved his mental balance undisturbed. To such a committee, who approached him on the 21st of March, 1864, he replied by repeating to them the passage from his message of December, 1861, in which the relations of labor and capital are set down with mathematical and logical precision, illuminated by the light of a broad humanity; and he only added to the views thus expressed the following words, than which nothing wiser or more humane has ever been said by social economists:

> None are so deeply interested to resist the present rebellion as the working people. Let them beware of prejudices working division and hostility among themselves. The most notable feature of a disturbance in your city last summer was the hanging of some working people by other working people. It should never be so. The strongest bond of human sympathy, outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all working people, of all nations and

1 April 26, 1864.

2 Oct. 26, 1863. MS.

3 Lincoln to Schurz, March 13, 1864. MS.

4 Lincoln to Schurz, March 23, 1864. Autograph MS.

5 General John A. Logan, in a letter addressed to General W. T. Sherman and published after General Logan's death, said that when he left the army to make speeches in Illinois he did this at the request of the President. We have been unable to find any communication in this sense among Mr. Lincoln's papers. We applied to General Logan's family for the evidence on which the assertion was founded, but received no answer. There is no question that General Logan's statement was made in good faith, and that he believed that in taking a leave and assisting in the political canvass he was acting in accordance with the President's wishes. But Mr. Lincoln's action in other cases was so consistently opposed to this hypothesis, that we can only conclude that General Logan got his impression of what the President desired from some other person than the President himself.

tongues and kindreds. Nor should this lead to a war upon property or the owners of property. Property is the fruit of labor, property is desirable, is a positive good in the world. That some should be rich shows that others may become rich, and, hence, is just encouragement to industry and enterprise. Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another, but let him labor diligently and build one for himself, thus by example asserting that his own shall be safe from violence when built.

The politicians who opposed Mr. Lincoln, whether from pure motives or from motives not so pure, met with one common fate: they were almost universally beaten in their own districts by men who, whatever their other incentives, were sufficiently adroit to perceive the sign in which they should conquer. It gave a man all this year a quite unfair advantage in his district to be known as a friend of the President, when his opponent was not equally outspoken; and many of the most radical politicians, seeing in which direction their advantage lay, suddenly turned upon their opponents and vanquished them in the President's name. General Lane, for example, who had been engaged in a bitter controversy with Pomeroy in regard to local interests in Kansas, saw his opportunity in the anti-Lincoln circular of his colleague; and although before this it would have been hard to say which of the two had been most free in his criticisms of the President, General Lane instantly trimmed his sails to catch the favoring breeze and elected himself and a full list of delegates to the Baltimore convention, whom he called, in his characteristic language, "all vindictive friends of the President." Other members of Congress, equally radical and more sincere and honest, made haste to range themselves on the side of the President against those with whom they had been more intimately associated. William D. Kelley of Philadelphia publicly proclaimed him "the wisest radical of us all"; Mr. Ashley of Ohio, to whom one of his abolitionist constituents had objected that he wanted no more of a President who had not crushed a rebellion in four years, replied that this was unreasonable, as the Lord had not crushed the devil in a much longer time.

As the day for the meeting at Baltimore drew near, and its unanimous verdict became more and more evident, the President was besieged from every quarter of the Union with solicitations to make known his wishes in regard to the work of the convention. To all such inquiries he returned an energetic refusal to give any word of counsel or to express any personal desire. During a few days preceding the convention a great many delegates took the road to Washington, either to get some intimation of the President's wishes or to impress their own faces and names on his expectant mind. They were all welcomed with genial and cordial courtesy, but received not the slightest intimation of what would be agreeable to him. The most powerful politicians from New York and Pennsylvania were listened to with no more confidential consideration than the shy and awkward representatives of the rebellious States, who had elected themselves in sutlers' tents and in the shadow of department headquarters. "What is that crowd of people in the hall?" he said one day to his secretary. "It is a delegation from South Carolina. They are a swindle." "Let them in," said Lincoln; "they will not swindle me."

When at last the convention came together, on the 7th of June, 1864, it had less to do than any other convention in our political history. The delegates were bound by a peremptory mandate. Mr. Forney, in an article printed the day before the meeting,[1] put forth with unusual candor the attitude of the convention towards its constituents. The permanent policy of the Republican party of the nation was already absolutely established by the acts of the President and accepted and ratified by Congress and the people.

> For this reason [said Mr. Forney] it is less important as a political body, as it cannot originate but will simply republish a policy. Yet for this reason it is transcendently the more imposing in its expression of the national will. Nor has the convention a candidate to choose. Choice is forbidden it by the previous action of the people. It is a body which almost beyond parallel is directly responsible to the people, and little more than the instrument of their will. Mr. Lincoln is already renominated, and the convention will but formally announce the decision of the people. If this absence of independence lessens the mere political interest of the convention in one respect, the fact that it will thoroughly and unquestionably obey national instructions gives it higher importance.

These words represented the well-nigh universal sentiment among Republicans. There were, of course, those to whom such a sentiment was not agreeable. Horace Greeley found it hard to accept an opinion which ran counter to his personal views. In an article of the same date as that last quoted, although he admitted the predestined action of the convention, he still protested vehemently against the impolicy of such action. He quoted the message sent by Mr. Lincoln to Governor Seymour in the dark winter of 1862–63, "that if he wants to be President of the United States, he must take care that there shall be a United States."

> We could wish [said Greeley] the Presidency utterly forgotten or ignored for the next two months,

[1] Philadelphia "Press," June 6.

while every impulse, every effort of the loyal millions should be directed towards the overthrow of the armed hosts of the rebellion. That effected, or its speedy accomplishment proved impossible, we should be ready to enter clear-sightedly on the Presidential canvass. Now we are not. We feel that the expected nomination, if made at this time, exposes the Union party to a dangerous "flank movement" — possibly a successful one.

Among the Democratic newspapers a still more blind and obstinate disinclination to accept the existing facts is seen up to the hour of the meeting of the convention. They still insisted that the nomination of Lincoln was in the highest degree doubtful; some pretended that the delegates were equally divided between Lincoln and Grant; others insisted that the nomination of Frémont at Cleveland had electrified the country and would probably carry the convention by storm.

The convention was opened by a brief speech from Senator Morgan of New York, who was chairman of the executive committee. It contained one significant sentence. He said the party of which they were the delegates and honored representatives would fall short of accomplishing its great mission unless among its other resolves it should declare for such amendment of the Constitution as would positively prohibit African slavery in the United States. The sentence was greeted with prolonged applause, which burst at last into three cheers, in the midst of which Governor Morgan announced the choice by the National Committee of Robert J. Breckinridge of Kentucky as temporary chairman of the convention. The venerable Kentuckian on taking the chair made a speech which, though entirely extemporaneous, was delivered with great ease and dignity, and profoundly impressed his auditors.

Disregarding the etiquette which assumes that a convention is a deliberative assembly and that its choice cannot be foretold until it is made, he calmly took it for granted at the very beginning of his remarks that the Union candidate for the Presidency was already nominated, and as soon as the tumultuous cheers which greeted his mention of the name of Abraham Lincoln had died away he turned at once to the discussion of what he considered the real business of the day — the declaration of principles. Coming from a section of the country where the Constitution had been especially reverenced in words and vehemently assailed in action, he declared that with all the outcry about our violations of the Constitution this present living generation and this present Union party are more thoroughly devoted to that Constitution than any generation that ever lived under it; but he contended also that sacred as was the Constitution the nation was not its slave.

We ought to have it distinctly understood by friends and enemies that while we love that instrument, while we will maintain it, and will with undoubted certainty put to death friend or foe who undertakes to trample it under foot; yet, beyond a doubt, we will reserve the right to alter it to suit ourselves from time to time and from generation to generation.

This speech was full of brief and powerful apothegms, some of which were startling as coming from an aged theologian of an aspect equally strong and benignant.

The only enduring, the only imperishable cement of all free institutions [he said], has been the blood of traitors. . . . It is a fearful truth, but we had as well avow it at once; and every blow you strike, and every rebel you kill, every battle you win, dreadful as it is to do it, you are adding, it may be a year, it may be ten years, it may be a century, it may be ten centuries, to the life of the Government and the freedom of your children.[1]

Though presiding over a political convention, he declared himself absolutely detached from politics. "As an Abolition party, as a Republican party, as a Whig party, as a Democratic party, as an American party, I will not follow you one foot. As a Union party I will follow you to the ends of the earth, and to the gates of death." He echoed the brief speech in which Governor Morgan had struck the keynote. He said:

I unite myself with those who believe that slavery is contrary to the brightest interests of all men and of all governments, contrary to the spirit of the Christian religion, and incompatible with the natural rights of man. I join myself with those who say, Away with it forever; and I fervently pray God that the day may come when throughout the whole land every man may be as free as you are, and as capable of enjoying regulated liberty. . . . I know very well that the sentiments which I am uttering will cause me great odium in the State in which I was born, which I love, where the bones of two generations of my ancestors and some of my children are, and where very soon I shall lay my own. . . . But we have put our faces towards the way in which we intend to go, and we will go in it to the end.

In the evening the permanent organization of the convention was effected, William Dennison of Ohio being made chairman. He, also, in a brief and eloquent speech took for granted the unanimous nomination for the Presidency of the United States "of the wise and good man whose unselfish devotion to the country, in the administration of the Government, has secured to him not only the admiration but the warmest affection of every friend of constitutional liberty"; and

[1] McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 404.

also, in the tone of both the speakers who had preceded him, said that the loyal people of the country expected the convention

> to declare the cause and the support of the rebellion to be slavery, which, as well for its treasonable offenses against the Government as for its incompatibility with the rights of humanity and the permanent peace of the country, must, with the termination of the war, and as much speedier as possible, be made to cease forever in every State and Territory of the Union.

There were in fact but three tasks before the convention. The first was to settle the status of contesting delegations from the States and Territories; the second, to agree upon the usual platform; and the third, to nominate a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. All of these questions were handled skillfully, and with a spirit of moderation which led to the most successful result in the canvass.

There were no questions of consequence in regard to the delegations of any of the Northern States, nor did any questions arise in regard to those from Kentucky and West Virginia, Delaware and Maryland. There were two delegations from Missouri, both making special claims of loyalty and of regularity of election. The committee on credentials decided that those styling themselves the "Radical Union" delegates should be awarded the seats. As this was the only delegation which had presented itself opposed to the nomination of Lincoln, and as a large majority, not only of the convention, but of the committee on credentials, were of the contrary opinion, their action in admitting the recalcitrant Missourians was sagacious. It quieted at once the beginnings of what might have been a dangerous schism. The question as to admitting the delegates from Tennessee also raised some discussion, but was decided in their favor by more than a two-thirds vote. The delegates from Louisiana and Arkansas were also admitted by a vote nearly as large. The delegates from Nevada, Colorado, and Nebraska were admitted with the right to vote; those from the States of Virginia and Florida, and the remaining Territories, were admitted to the privileges of the floor without the right to vote; and those from South Carolina were rejected altogether.

The same wise spirit of compromise was shown in the platform, reported by Henry J. Raymond of New York. The first resolution declared it the highest duty of every citizen to maintain the integrity of the Union and to quell the rebellion by force of arms; the second approved the determination of the Government to enter into no compromise with the rebels; the third, while approving all the acts hitherto done against slavery, declared in favor of an amendment to the Constitution terminating and forever prohibiting the existence of slavery in the United States. This resolution was received with an outburst of spontaneous and thunderous applause. The fourth resolution gave thanks to the soldiers and sailors; the fifth applauded the practical wisdom, unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity with which Abraham Lincoln had discharged, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, the great duties and responsibilities of the Presidential office, and it enumerated and approved the acts of his Administration. The sixth resolution was of sufficient significance to be given entire:

> *Resolved*, That we deem it essential to the general welfare that harmony should prevail in the national councils, and we regard as worthy of public confidence and official trust those only who cordially indorse the principles proclaimed in these resolutions and which should characterize the administration of the Government.

This resolution, like the admission of the Missouri radicals, was intended in general to win the support and heal the dissatisfaction of the so-called radicals throughout the Union. Its specific meaning, however, was not entirely clear. There were not many of the delegates who voted for it who would have agreed upon all the details of a scheme for reorganizing the Cabinet. If measures for ostracizing all the objectionable members of the Government had been set on foot in the hall of the convention, it is probable that the name of every member of the Cabinet would have been found on some of the shells. It is altogether likely, however, that the name of the Postmaster-General would have occurred more frequently than that of any other minister. The controversy between his brother and the radicals of Missouri, in which he had, in accordance with his habit and temperament, taken an energetic part, had embittered against him the feelings of the radical Republicans, not only in the West but throughout the North, and his habit of candid and trenchant criticism had raised for him enemies in all political circles.

The seventh resolution claimed for the colored troops the full protection of the laws of war. The eighth declared that foreign emigration should be fostered and encouraged. The ninth spoke in favor of the speedy construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast. The tenth declared that the national faith pledged for the redemption of the public debt must be kept inviolate; and the eleventh declared against the efforts of any European power to establish monarchical governments sustained by foreign military forces in near proximity to the United States.

This last resolution showed the result of an adroit and sagacious compromise. The radicals in the convention desired to make it a censure upon the action of the President and the Secretary of State; but the friends of the Administration, while accepting to its utmost results the declaration in favor of the Monroe doctrine, assumed that the President and his Cabinet were of the same mind, and therefore headed the resolution with the declaration:

> That we approve the decision taken by the Government that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the Western continent.

There was nothing more before the convention but the nominations, and one of those was in fact already made. The only delay in registering the will of the convention occurred as a consequence of the impatience of members to do it by irregular and summary methods. Mr. Delano of Ohio made the customary motion to proceed to the nomination; Simon Cameron moved as a substitute the renomination of Lincoln and Hamlin by acclamation. A long wrangle ensued on the motion to lay this substitute on the table, which was brought to a close by a brief speech from Henry J. Raymond, representing the cooler heads, who were determined that whatever opposition there might be should have the fullest opportunity of expression; and by a motion, which was adopted, to nominate in the usual way, by the call of States. The interminable nominating speeches of recent years had not come into fashion: Mr. Cook, the chairman of the Illinois delegation, merely said, "The State of Illinois again presents to the loyal people of this nation, for President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln—God bless him!" and those who seconded the nomination were equally brief. Every State gave its undivided voice for Lincoln, with the exception of Missouri, which cast its vote, as the chairman stated, under positive instructions, for Grant. But before the result was announced Mr. Hume of Missouri moved that the nomination of Lincoln be declared unanimous. This could not be done until the result of the balloting was made known—484 for Lincoln, 22 for Grant. Missouri then changed its vote, and the secretary read the grand total of 506 for Lincoln. This announcement was greeted with a storm of cheering, which during many minutes as often as it died away burst out anew.

The principal names mentioned for the Vice-Presidency were, besides Mr. Hamlin, the actual incumbent, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York; besides these General Rousseau had the vote of his own State, Kentucky. The radicals of Missouri favored General B. F. Butler, who had a few scattered votes also from New England. But among the three principal candidates the voters were equally enough divided to make the contest exceedingly spirited and interesting. For several days before the convention the President had been besieged by inquiries as to his personal wishes in regard to his associate on the ticket. He had persistently refused to give the slightest intimation of such wish. His private secretary, Mr. Nicolay, was at Baltimore in attendance at the convention; and although he was acquainted with this attitude of the President, at last, overborne by the solicitations of the chairman of the Illinois delegation, who had been perplexed at the advocacy of Joseph Holt by Mr. Swett, one of the President's most intimate friends, Mr. Nicolay wrote a letter to Mr. Hay, who had been left in charge of the Executive office in his absence, containing among other matters this passage:

> Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett is all right; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes; whether the President has any preference, either personal or on the score of policy; or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confidential intimation. . . . Please get this information for me if possible.

The letter was shown to the President, who indorsed upon it this memorandum:

> Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him for V. P. Wish not to interfere about V. P. Cannot interfere about platform. Convention must judge for itself.

This positive and final instruction was sent at once to Mr. Nicolay, and by him communicated to the President's most intimate friends in the convention. It was therefore with minds absolutely untrammeled by even any knowledge of the President's wishes that the convention went about its work of selecting his associate on the ticket.

It is altogether probable that the ticket of 1864 would have been nominated without a contest had it not been for the general impression, in and out of the convention, that it would be advisable to select as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency a war Democrat. Mr. Dickinson, while not putting himself forward as a candidate, had sanctioned the use of his name by his friends on the especial ground that his candidacy might attract to the support of the Union party many Democrats who would have been unwilling to support a ticket avowedly Republican; but these considerations weighed with still greater force in favor of Mr. Johnson, who was not only a Democrat, but

also a citizen of a border slaveholding State, and had rendered distinguished services to the Union cause. At the first show of hands it was at once evident that the Tennesseean was stronger than the New Yorker, receiving four more votes than Mr. Dickinson even in the New York delegation. When the votes on the first ballot were counted it was found that Mr. Johnson had received 200, Mr. Hamlin 150, Mr. Dickinson 108; but before the result was announced almost the whole convention turned their votes to Johnson, and on motion of Mr. Tremain of New York his nomination was declared unanimous. The work was quickly done. Mr. Lincoln, walking over to the War Department in the afternoon as usual for military news, received the dispatch announcing the nomination of Andrew Johnson before he was informed of his own. The telegram containing the news of his own nomination had gone to the White House a few minutes before.

In the evening the National Grand Council of the Union League came together. A large proportion of the members had participated in the National Convention, and their action was therefore a foregone conclusion. They adopted a platform similar to that of the convention, with the exception that they declared, as the Cleveland people had done, in favor of the confiscation of the property of rebels. They heartily approved and indorsed the nominations already made, and passed a resolution to the effect that as Lincoln and Johnson were the only candidates who could hope to be elected as loyal men, they regarded it as the imperative duty of the Union League to do all that lay in its power to secure their election. They also earnestly approved and indorsed the platform and principles adopted by the convention, and pledged themselves, as individuals and as members of the League, to do all in their power to elect the candidates. The seal of secrecy was removed from this action and a copy of the resolution transmitted to the President by W. R. Erwin, the Grand Recording Secretary.[1]

A committee, headed by Governor Dennison, came on the next day [2] to notify the President of his nomination.

> I need not say to you, sir [said Mr. Dennison], that the convention, in thus unanimously nominating you for reëlection, but gives utterance to the almost universal voice of the loyal people of the country. To doubt of your triumphant election would be little short of abandoning the hope of the final suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of the authority of the Government over the insurgent States.

The President answered:

> I will neither conceal my gratification nor restrain the expression of my gratitude that the Union people, through their convention, in the continued effort to save and advance the nation, have deemed me not unworthy to remain in my present position. I know no reason to doubt that I shall accept the nomination tendered; and yet perhaps I should not declare definitely before reading and considering what is called the platform. I will say now, however, I approve the declaration in favor of so amending the Constitution as to prohibit slavery throughout the nation. When the people in revolt, with a hundred days of explicit notice that they could within those days resume their allegiance without the overthrow of their institutions and that they could not so resume it afterwards, elected to stand out, such amendment to the Constitution as is now proposed became a fitting and necessary conclusion to the final success of the Union cause. Such alone can meet and cover all cavils. Now the unconditional Union men, North and South, perceive its importance and embrace it. In the joint names of Liberty and Union, let us labor to give it legal form and practical effect.

On the same day a committee of the Union League presented themselves to inform him of the action taken the night before. The President answered them more informally, saying that he did not allow himself to suppose that either the convention or the League had concluded that he was either the greatest or the best man in America, but rather that they had decided that it was not best "to swap horses while swimming the stream." All day the throngs of shouting and congratulating delegates filled all the approaches to the Executive Mansion. In a brief speech at night, in answer to a serenade from citizens of Ohio, the President said:

> What we want, more than Baltimore conventions or Presidential elections, is success under General Grant. I propose that you constantly bear in mind that the support you owe to the brave officers and soldiers in the field is of the very first importance, and we should therefore bend all our energies to that point.

He then proposed three cheers for General Grant and the officers and soldiers with him, and, swinging his own hat, led off in the cheering.

The more formal notification of the convention was made in a letter written by George William Curtis of New York, in which he paraphrased the platform and expressed the sentiment of the convention and of the people of the country with his usual elegance and force.

> They have watched your official course, therefore, with unflagging attention; and amid the bitter taunts of eager friends and the fierce denunciation of enemies, now moving too fast for some, now too slowly for others, they have seen you throughout this tremendous contest patient, sagacious, faithful, just; leaning upon the heart of the great mass of the people, and satisfied to be moved by

[1] MS. [2] Thursday, June 9.

its mighty pulsations. It is for this reason that, long before the convention met, the popular instinct had plainly indicated you as its candidate, and the convention therefore merely recorded the popular will. Your character and career prove your unswerving fidelity to the cardinal principles of American liberty and of the American Constitution. In the name of that liberty and Constitution, sir, we earnestly request your acceptance of this nomination, reverently commending our beloved country and you, its Chief Magistrate, with all its brave sons who, on sea and land, are faithfully defending the good old American cause of equal rights, to the blessing of Almighty God.

In accepting the nomination the President observed the same wise rule of brevity which he had followed four years before. He made but one specific reference to any subject of discussion. While he accepted the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the Western continent, he gave the convention and the country distinctly to understand that he stood by the action already adopted by himself and the Secretary of State.

There might be misunderstanding [he said] were I not to say that the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department and indorsed by the convention among the measures and acts of the Executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable.

THE WADE-DAVIS MANIFESTO.

In his message to Congress of the 8th of December, 1863, Mr. Lincoln gave expression to his ideas on the subject of reconstruction more fully and clearly than ever before. He appended to that message a proclamation of the same date guaranteeing a full pardon to all who had been implicated in the rebellion, with certain specified exceptions, on the condition of taking and maintaining an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder; to abide by and support all acts of Congress and proclamations of the President made during the rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress or by decision of the Supreme Court. The exceptions to this general amnesty were of those who, having held places of honor and trust under the Government of the United States, had betrayed this trust and entered the service of the Confederacy, and of those who had been guilty of treatment of colored troops not justified by the laws of war. The proclamation further promised that when in any of the States in rebellion a number of citizens equal to one-tenth of the voters in the year 1860 should



HENRY WINTER DAVIS.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY POLLOCK.)

reëstablish a State government republican in form, and not contravening the oath above mentioned, that such should be recognized as the true government of the State, and should receive the benefits of the constitutional provision that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence." The President also engaged by this proclamation not to object to any provision which might be adopted by such State governments in relation to the freed people of the States which should recognize and declare their permanent freedom and provide for their education, "and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class." He suggested that in reconstructing the loyal State governments, the names, the boundaries, the subdivisions, the constitutions, and the general codes of laws of the States should be preserved. He stated distinctly that his proclamation had no reference to States where the loyal State governments had all the while been maintained; he took care to make it clear that the respective Houses, and not the Executive, had the constitutional power to decide whether members sent to Congress from any State should be admitted to seats; and he concluded by saying:

This proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be reëstablished within said States, or in any of them. And while the mode presented is the

best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.[1]

The message contained an unusually forcible and luminous expression of the principles embraced in the proclamation. The President referred to the dark and doubtful days which followed the announcement of the policy of emancipation and of the employment of black soldiers; the gradual justification of those acts by the successes which the national arms had since achieved; of the change of the public spirit of the border States in favor of emancipation; the enlistment of black soldiers, and their efficient and creditable behavior in arms; the absence of any tendency to servile insurrection or to violence and cruelty among the negroes; the sensible improvement in the public opinion of Europe and of America. He then explained the purpose and spirit of his proclamation. Nothing had been attempted beyond what was amply justified by the Constitution; the form of an oath had been given, but no man was coerced to take it; the Constitution authorized the Executive to grant or withhold a pardon at his own absolute discretion, and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial authority. He therefore referred to the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing to the States a republican form of government as providing precisely for the case now under treatment; where the element within a State favorable to republican government in the Union might "be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State."

> An attempt [said the President] to guaranty and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole or in preponderating part from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements, so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness.

In justification of his requiring in the oath of amnesty a submission to and support of the antislavery laws and proclamations, he said:

> Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their fullest effects, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided and will further aid the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may add, at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.

The President called attention to the fact that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision; that the whole purpose and spirit of the proclamation is permissive and not mandatory.

> The proposed acquiescence [he said] of the National Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves, while no power of the National Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition.

He had taken the utmost pains to avoid the danger of committal on points which could be more safely left to further developments. "Saying that on certain terms certain classes will be pardoned with rights restored, it is not said that other classes or other terms will never be included; saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way." The President expressed his profound congratulation at the movement towards emancipation by the several States, and urged once more upon Congress the importance of aiding these steps to the great consummation.

It is rare that so important a state paper has been received with such unanimous tokens of enthusiastic adhesion. However the leading Republicans in Congress may have been led later in the session to differ with the President, there was apparently no voice of discord raised on the day the message was read to both Houses. For a moment all factions in Congress seemed to be of one mind. One who spent the morning on the floor of Congress wrote on the same day: "Men acted as though the millennium had come. Chandler

[1] In some instances this proclamation was misunderstood by generals and commanders of departments, so that prisoners of war were allowed on their voluntary application to take the amnesty oath. This was not the President's intention, and would have led to serious embarrassment in the matter of the exchange of prisoners.

He therefore, on the 26th of March, 1864, issued a supplementary proclamation declaring that the proclamation applied only to those persons who, being yet at large and free from any arrest, confinement, or duress, should voluntarily come forward and take the said oath with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority; and that persons excluded from the amnesty offered in the proclamation might apply to the President for clemency, like all other offenders, and that their application would receive due consideration.

was delighted, Sumner was joyous, apparently forgetting for the moment his doctrine of State suicide,[1] while at the other political pole Dixon and Reverdy Johnson said the message was highly satisfactory."[2] Henry Wilson said to the President's secretary: "He has struck another great blow. Tell him for me, God bless him." The effect was similar in the House of Representatives. Mr. Boutwell, who represented the extreme antislavery element of New England, said: "It is a very able and shrewd paper. It has great points of popularity, and it is right." Lovejoy, the leading abolitionist of the West, seemed to see on the mountain the feet of one bringing good tidings. "I shall live," he said, "to see slavery ended in America." Garfield gave his unreserved approval; Kellogg of Michigan went shouting about the lobby: "The President is the only man. There is none like him in the world. He sees more widely and more clearly than any of us." Mr. Henry T. Blow, the radical member from St. Louis (who six months later was denouncing Mr. Lincoln as a traitor to freedom), said: "God bless old Abe! I am one of the radicals who have always believed in him." Mr. Greeley, who was on the floor of the House, went so far as to say the message was "devilish good." The Executive Mansion was filled all day by a rush of congressmen, congratulating the President and assuring him of their support in his wise and humane policy. The conservatives and radicals vied with each other in claiming that the message represented their own views of the crisis. Mr. Judd of Illinois said to the President: "The opinion of people who read your message to-day is, that on that platform two of your ministers must walk the plank — Blair and Bates." To which the President answered: "Both of these men acquiesced in it without objection; the only member of the Cabinet who objected was Mr. Chase." For a moment the most prejudiced Democrats found little to say against the message; they called it "very ingenious and cunning, admirably calculated to deceive." This reception of the message was extremely pleasing to the President. A solution of the most important problem of the time which conservatives like Dixon and Reverdy Johnson thoroughly approved, and to which Mr. Sumner made no objection, was of course a source of profound gratification. He took it as a proof of what he had often said, that there was no essential contest between loyal men on this subject if they would consider it reasonably. He said in conversation on the 10th of December: "The only question is, Who constitute the State? When that is decided, the solution of subsequent questions is easy."[3] He wrote in his original draft of the message that he considered "the discussion as to whether a State had been at any time out of the Union as vain and profitless. We know they were, we trust they shall be, in the Union. It does not greatly matter whether in the meantime they shall be considered to have been in or out." But afterwards, considering that the Constitution empowered him to grant protection to States "in the Union," he saw that it would not answer to admit that the States had at any time been out of it; he erased that sentence as possibly suggestive of evil. He preferred, he said, "to stand firmly based on the Constitution rather than to work in the air." He was specially gratified by reports which came to him of the adhesion of the Missourians in Congress to his view.

BENJAMIN F. WADE.
(FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE.)

I know [he said] these radical men have in them the stuff which must save the state and on which we must mainly rely. They are absolutely incorrosive by the virus of secession. It cannot touch or taint them; while the conservatives, in casting about for votes to carry through their plans, are attempting to affiliate with those whose record is not clear. If one side must be crushed out and the other cherished, there cannot be any doubt which side we must choose as fuller of hope for the future; but just there [he continued] is where their wrong begins. They insist that I shall hold and treat Governor Gamble and his supporters, men appointed by the loyal people of Missouri as representatives of Missouri loyalty, and who have done their whole duty in the war faithfully and promptly, who when they have disagreed with me have been silent and

1 See resolutions introduced in Senate Feb. 11, 1862.
2 J. H., Diary.
3 J. H., Diary.

kept about the good work — that I shall treat these men as copperheads and enemies of the Government. This is simply monstrous.

For the first few days there was no hint of any hostile feeling in Congress. There was, in fact, no just reason why the legislative body should regard its prerogative as invaded. The President had not only kept clearly within his constitutional powers, but his action had been expressly authorized by Congress. The act of July 17, 1862, had provided that the President might thereafter at any time, by proclamation, extend pardon and amnesty to persons participating in the rebellion, "with such exceptions and on such conditions as he might deem expedient for the public welfare." Of course a general amnesty required general conditions; and the most important of these was one which should provide for the protection of the freedmen who had been liberated by the war.

It soon enough appeared, however, that the millennium had not arrived; that in a Congress composed of men of such positive convictions and vehement character there were many who would not submit permanently to the leadership of any man, least of all to that of one so gentle, so reasonable, so devoid of malice as the President. Mr. Henry Winter Davis at once moved that that part of the message relating to reconstruction should be referred to a special committee, of which he was made chairman, and on the 15th of February he reported "a bill to guarantee to certain States whose governments have been usurped or overthrown a republican form of government." Mr. Davis was a man of too much integrity and elevation of character to allow the imputation that his action on public matters was dictated entirely by personal feeling or prejudice; but at the same time it cannot be denied that he maintained towards the President from beginning to end of his administration an attitude of consistent hostility. This was a source of chagrin and disappointment to Mr. Lincoln. He came to Washington with a high opinion of the ability and the character of Mr. Davis, and expected to maintain with him relations of intimate friendship. He was cousin to one of the President's closest friends in Illinois, Judge David Davis, and his attitude in the Congress which preceded the rebellion was such as to arouse in the mind of Mr. Lincoln the highest admiration and regard. But the selection of Mr. Blair of Maryland as a member of the Cabinet estranged the sympathies of Mr. Davis and his friends, and the breach thus made between him and the Administration was never healed, though the President did all in his power to heal it. In the spring of 1863 Mr. Davis, assuming that the President might be inclined to favor unduly the conservative candidate in the election for the next Congress, sought an interview with him, the result of which the President placed in writing in a letter dated March 18:

> There will be in the new House of Representatives, as there were in the old, some members openly opposing the war, some supporting it unconditionally, and some supporting it with "buts" and "ifs" and "ands." They will divide on the organization of the House — on the election of a speaker. As you ask my opinion, I give it, that the supporters of the war should send no man to Congress who will not pledge himself to go into caucus with the unconditional supporters of the war, and to abide the action of such caucus and vote for the person therein nominated for speaker. Let the friends of the Government first save the Government, and then administer it to their own liking.

Mr. Davis answered:

> Your favor of the 18th is all that could be desired, and will greatly aid us in bringing our friends to a conclusion such as the interests of the country require.

In spite of all the efforts which the President made to be on friendly terms with Mr. Davis, the difference between them constantly widened. Mr. Davis grew continually more confirmed in his attitude of hostility to every proposition of the President. He became one of the most severe and least generous critics of the Administration in Congress. He came at last to consider the President as unworthy of even respectful treatment; and Mr. Seward, in the midst of his energetic and aggressive campaign against European unfriendliness, was continually attacked by him as a truckler to foreign powers and little less than a traitor to his country. The President, however, was a man so persistently and incorrigibly just, that even in the face of this provocation he never lost his high opinion of Mr. Davis's ability nor his confidence in his inherent good intentions. He refused, in spite of the solicitations of most of his personal friends in Maryland, to discriminate against the faction headed by Mr. Davis in making appointments to office in that State; and when, during an important campaign, a deputation of prominent supporters of the Administration in Maryland came to Washington to denounce Mr. Davis for his outspoken hostility to the President, saying that such a course, if it continued unchecked, would lose Mr. Lincoln the electoral vote of the State, he replied:

> I understood that Mr. Davis is doing all in his power to secure the success of the emancipation ticket in Maryland. If he does this, I care nothing about the electoral vote.

In the preamble to his bill Mr. Davis expressed, with his habitual boldness and lucidity, his fundamental thesis that the rebellious States were out of the Union.

Whereas [he said], the so-called Confederate States are a public enemy, waging an unjust war, whose injustice is so glaring that they have no right to claim the mitigation of the extreme rights of war which are accorded by modern usage to an enemy who has the right to consider the war a just one; and,

Whereas, none of the States which, by a regularly recorded majority of its citizens, have joined the so-called Southern Confederacy can be considered and treated as entitled to be represented in Congress or to take any part in the political government of the Union.

This seemed to Congress too trenchant a solution of a constitutional knot which was puzzling the best minds of the commonwealth, and the preamble was rejected; but the spirit of it breathed in every section of the bill. Mr. Davis's design was to put a stop to the work which the President had already begun in Tennessee and Louisiana, and to prevent the extension of that policy to other Southern States. The bill authorized the appointment of a provisional governor in each of the States in rebellion, and provided that, after the military resistance to the United States should have been suppressed and the people sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and laws, the white male citizens of the State should be enrolled, and when a majority of them should have taken the oath of allegiance the loyal people of the State should be entitled to elect delegates to a convention to reëstablish a State government. The convention was required to insert in the constitution three provisions: First, to prevent prominent civil or military officers of the Confederates to vote for or to be members of the legislature or governor; second, that involuntary servitude is forever prohibited, and the freedom of all persons guaranteed in said States; third, no debt, State or Confederate, created by or under the sanction of the usurping power shall be recognized or paid by the State. Upon the adoption of the constitution by the convention, and its ratification by the electors of the State, the provisional government shall so certify to the President, who, after obtaining the assent of Congress, shall by proclamation recognize the government so established, and none other, as the constitutional government of the State; and from the date of such recognition, and not before, congressmen and Presidential electors may be elected in such State. Pending the reorganization, the provisional governor shall enforce the laws of the Union and of the State before rebellion. Another section of the bill emancipated all slaves in those States, with their posterity, and made it the duty of the United States courts to discharge them on habeas corpus if restrained of their liberty on pretense of any claim to service or labor as slaves, and to inflict a penalty of fine or imprisonment upon the persons claiming them. Another section declared any person hereafter holding any important office, civil or military, in the rebel service not to be a citizen of the United States.

This bill was supported by Mr. Davis in a speech of extraordinary energy. Without hesitation he declared it a test and standard of antislavery orthodoxy; he asserted boldly that Congress, and Congress alone, had the power to revive the reign of law in all that territory which through rebellion had put itself outside of the law. "Until," he said, "Congress recognizes a State government organized under its auspices, there is no government in the rebel States except the authority of Congress." The duty is imposed on Congress to administer civil government until the people shall, under its guidance, submit to the Constitution of the United States, and, under the laws which it shall impose and on the conditions Congress may require, reorganize a republican government for themselves and Congress shall recognize that government. He declared there was no indication which came from the South, from the darkness of that bottomless pit, that there was a willingness to accept any terms that even the Democrats were willing to offer; he believed that no beginning of legal and orderly government could be made till military opposition was absolutely annihilated; that there were only three ways of bringing about a reorganization of civil governments. One was to remove the cause of the war by an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting slavery everywhere within its limits: that, he said, "goes to the root of the matter, and should consecrate the nation's triumph"; but this measure he thought involved infinite difficulty and delay. Though it met his hearty approval, it was not a remedy for the evils to be dealt with. The next plan he considered was that of the President's amnesty proclamation. This he denounced as utterly lacking in all the guarantees required:

If, in any manner [he said], by the toleration of martial law, lately proclaimed the fundamental law, under the dictation of any military authority, or under the prescriptions of a provost-marshal, something in the form of a government shall be presented, represented to rest on the votes of one-tenth of the population, the President will recognize that, provided it does not contravene the proclamation of freedom and the laws of Congress.

Having dismissed both of these plans with brief censure, he then made a powerful plea for the bill he had reported. He called upon Congress to take the responsibility of saying:

In the face of those who clamor for speedy recognition of governments tolerating slavery, that the

safety of the people of the United States is the supreme law; that their will is the supreme rule of law, and that we are authorized to pronounce their will on this subject; take the responsibility to say that we will revise the judgments of our ancestors; that we have experience written in blood which they had not; that we find now, what they darkly doubted, that slavery is really, radically inconsistent with the permanence of republican governments, and that being charged by the supreme law of the land on our conscience and judgment to guarantee, that is, to continue, maintain, and enforce, if it exists, to institute and restore when overthrown, republican governments throughout the broad limits of the Republic, we will weed out every element of their policy which we think incompatible with its permanence and endurance.

The bill was extensively debated. It was not opposed to any extent by the Republicans of the House; the Democrats were left to make a purely partisan opposition to it. The President declined to exercise any influence on the debate, and the bill was passed by a vote of seventy-four to sixty-six. It was called up in the Senate by Mr. Wade of Ohio, who, in supporting it, followed very much the same line of argument as that adopted by Mr. Davis in the House. Mr. B. Gratz Brown of Missouri, believing that as the session was drawing near its close there was no time to discuss a measure of such transcendent importance, offered an amendment simply forbidding the States in insurrection to cast any vote for electors of President or Vice-President of the United States, or to elect members of Congress until the insurrection in such State was suppressed or abandoned, and its inhabitants had returned to their obedience to the Government of the United States; such returning to obedience being declared by proclamation of the President, issued by virtue of an act of Congress hereafter to be passed authorizing the same. The amendment of Mr. Brown was adopted by a bare majority, seventeen voting in favor of it and sixteen against it. Mr. Sumner tried to have the Proclamation of Emancipation adopted and enacted as a statute of the United States, but this proposition was lost by a considerable majority. The House declined to concur in the amendment of the Senate and asked for a committee of conference, in which the Senate receded from its amendment and the bill went to the President for his approval in the closing moments of the session.

Congress was to adjourn at noon on the Fourth of July; the President was in his room at the Capitol signing bills, which were laid before him as they were brought from the two Houses. When this important bill was placed before him he laid it aside and went on with the other work of the moment. Several prominent members entered in a state of intense anxiety over the fate of the bill. Mr. Sumner and Mr. Boutwell, while their nervousness was evident, refrained from any comment. Mr. Chandler, who was unabashed in any mortal presence, roundly asked the President if he intended to sign the bill.[1] The President replied: "This bill has been placed before me a few moments before Congress adjourns. It is a matter of too much importance to be swallowed in that way." "If it is vetoed," cried Mr. Chandler, "it will damage us fearfully in the North-west. The important point is that one prohibiting slavery in the reconstructed States." Mr. Lincoln said: "That is the point on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act." "It is no more than you have done yourself," said the senator. The President answered: "I conceive that I may in an emergency do things on military grounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress." Mr. Chandler, expressing his deep chagrin, went out, and the President, addressing the members of the Cabinet who were seated with him, said: "I do not see how any of us now can deny and contradict what we have always said, that Congress has no constitutional power over slavery in the States." Mr. Fessenden expressed his entire agreement with this view.

> I have even had my doubts [he said] as to the constitutional efficacy of your own decree of emancipation, in such cases where it has not been carried into effect by the actual advance of the army.

The President said:

> This bill and the position of these gentlemen seem to me, in asserting that the insurrectionary States are no longer in the Union, to make the fatal admission that States, whenever they please, may of their own motion dissolve their connection with the Union. Now we cannot survive that admission, I am convinced. If that be true, I am not President; these gentlemen are not Congress. I have laboriously endeavored to avoid that question ever since it first began to be mooted, and thus to avoid confusion and disturbance in our own councils. It was to obviate this question that I earnestly favored the movement for an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery, which passed the Senate and failed in the House. I thought it much better, if it were possible, to restore the Union without the necessity of a violent quarrel among its friends as to whether certain States have been in or out of the Union during the war — a merely metaphysical question, and one unnecessary to be forced into discussion.

Although every member of the Cabinet agreed with the President, when, a few minutes later, he entered his carriage to go home, he foresaw the importance of the step he had resolved to take and its possibly disastrous consequences to himself. When some one said to him that the threats made by the extreme radicals had no foundation, and that people

[1] J. H., Diary.

would not bolt their ticket on a question of metaphysics, he answered: "If they choose to make a point upon this, I do not doubt that they can do harm. They have never been friendly to me. At all events, I must keep some consciousness of being somewhere near right. I must keep some standard or principle fixed within myself."

After the fullest deliberation the President remained by his first impression that the bill was too rigid and too restrictive in its provisions to accomplish the work desired. He had all his life hated formulas in government, and he believed that the will of an intelligent people, acting freely under democratic institutions, could best give shape to the special machinery under which it was to be governed; and, in the wide variety of circumstances and conditions prevailing throughout the South, he held it unwise for either Congress or himself to prescribe any fixed and formal method by which the several States should resume their practical legal relations with the Union. Thinking in this way, and feeling himself unable to accept the bill of Congress as the last word of reconstruction, and yet unwilling to reject whatever of practical good might be accomplished by it, he resolved, a few days after Congress had adjourned, to remit the matter to the people themselves and to allow them their choice of all the methods proposed of returning to their allegiance. He issued, on the 8th of July, a proclamation giving a copy of the bill of Congress, reciting the circumstances under which it was passed, and going on to say:

> Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known that while I am — as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan of restoration — unprepared by a formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration, and while I am also unprepared to declare that the free State constitutions and governments, already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana, shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it; and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.

The refusal of the President to sign the reconstruction bill caused a great effervescence at the adjournment of Congress. Mr. Chase, who had resigned from the Cabinet, made this entry in his diary:

> The President pocketed the great bill providing for the reorganization of the rebel States as loyal States. He did not venture to veto, and so put it in his pocket. It was a condemnation of his amnesty proclamation and of his general policy of reconstruction, rejecting the idea of possible reconstruction with slavery, which neither the President nor his chief advisers have, in my opinion, abandoned.

This entry, made by Mr. Chase in the bitterness of his anger, places the basest construction upon the President's action; but this sentiment was shared by not a few of those who claimed the title of extreme radicals in Congress. Mr. Sumner reported a feeling of intense indignation against the President. Two days later the ex-Secretary gleefully reported, on the authority of Senator Pomeroy, that there was great dissatisfaction with Mr. Lincoln, which had been much exasperated by the pocketing of the reconstruction bill.

When Mr. Lincoln, disregarding precedents, and acting on his lifelong rule of taking the people into his confidence, issued his proclamation of the 8th of July, it was received by each division of the loyal people of the country as might have been expected. The great mass of Republican voters, who cared little for the metaphysics of the case, accepted his proclamation, as they had accepted that issued six months before, as the wisest and most practicable method of handling the question; but among those already hostile to the President, and those whose devotion to the cause of freedom was so ardent as to make them look upon him as lukewarm, the exasperation which was already excited increased. The indignation of Mr. Davis and Mr. Wade at seeing their work of the last session thus brought to nothing could not be restrained. Mr. Davis prepared, and both of them signed and published on the 5th of August, a manifesto, the most vigorous in attack that was ever directed against the President from his own party during his term. The grim beginning of this document, which is addressed "To the Supporters of the Government," is in these terms:

> We have read without surprise, but not without indignation, the proclamation of the President of the 8th of July, 1864. The supporters of the Administration are responsible to the country for its conduct; and it is their right and duty to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.

The paper went on to narrate the history of the reconstruction bill, and to claim that its treatment indicated a persistent though un-

avowed purpose of the President to defeat the will of the people by the Executive perversion of the Constitution. They insinuated that only the lowest personal motives could have dictated this action:

> The President [they said], by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. . . . If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President to "hold for naught" the will of Congress rather than his governments in Louisiana and Arkansas.

They ridiculed the President's earnestly expressed hope that the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery might be adopted:

> We curiously inquire on what his expectation rests, after the vote of the House of Representatives at the recent session and in the face of the political complexion of more than enough of the States to prevent the possibility of its adoption within any reasonable time; and why he did not indulge his sincere hopes with so large an installment of the blessing as his approval of the bill would have secured?

When we consider that only a few months elapsed before this beneficent amendment was adopted, we can form some idea of the comparative political sagacity of Mr. Lincoln and his critics. The fact that the President gave the bill of Congress his approval as a very proper plan for the loyal people of any States choosing to adopt it seemed to infuriate the authors of the bill: they say, "A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated." At the close of a long review of the President's proclamation, in which every sentence came in for its share of censure or of ridicule, this manifesto concluded:

> Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President—a blow at the friends of his Administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government. The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his Administration have so long practiced, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes our support he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and to execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress. If the supporters of the Government fail to insist on this they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and security, committed to their keeping, they sacrifice. Let them consider the remedy of these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it.

HORACE GREELEY'S PEACE MISSION.

NOT least among the troubles and the vexations of the summer of 1864 was the constant criticism of sincere Republicans who were impatient at what they considered the slow progress of the war, and irritated at the deliberation with which Mr. Lincoln weighed every important act before decision. Besides this, a feeling of discouragement had taken possession of some of the more excitable spirits, which induced them to give ready hospitality to any suggestions of peace. Foremost among these was Horace Greeley, who in personal interviews, in private letters, and in the columns of the "Tribune" repeatedly placed before the President, with that vigor of expression in which he was unrivaled, the complaints and the discontents of a considerable body of devoted, if not altogether reasonable, Union men. The attitude of benevolent criticism which he was known to sustain towards the Administration naturally drew around him a certain number of adventurers and busybodies, who fluttered between the two great parties, and were glad to occupy the attention of prominent men on either side with schemes whose only real object was some slight gain or questionable notoriety for themselves. A person who called himself "William Cornell Jewett of Colorado" had gained some sort of intimacy with Mr. Greeley by alleging relations with eminent Northern and Southern statesmen. He was one of those newspaper laughing-stocks who come gradually to be known and talked about. He wrote interminable letters of advice to Mr. Lincoln and to Jefferson Davis, which were never read nor answered, but which, printed with humorous comment in the "New York Herald," were taken seriously by the undiscriminating, and even quoted and discussed in the London papers. He wrote to Mr. Greeley in the early part of July from Niagara Falls, and appears to have convinced the latter that he was an authorized intermediary from the Confederate authorities to make propositions for peace. He wrote that he had just left George N. Sanders of Kentucky on the Canada side.

> I am authorized to state to you [he continued], for our use only, not the public, that two ambassadors of Davis & Co. are now in Canada with full and complete powers for a peace, and Mr. Sanders requests that you come on immediately to me at Cataract House to have a private interview; or, if you will send the President's protection for him and two friends, they will come and meet you. He says the

whole matter can be consummated by me, you, them, and President Lincoln.

This letter was followed the next day by a telegram saying:

Will you come here? Parties have full power.

Mr. Greeley was greatly impressed by this communication. The inherent improbabilities of it did not seem to strike him, though the antecedents of Sanders were scarcely more reputable than those of Jewett. He sent the letter and the telegram to the President, inclosed in a letter of his own, the perfervid vehemence of which shows the state of excitement he was laboring under. He refers to his correspondent as "our irrepressible friend Colorado Jewett." He admits some doubt as to the "full powers," but insists upon the Confederate desire for peace.

And therefore [he says] I venture to remind you that our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country also longs for peace; shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood. And a widespread conviction that the Government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace, and do not improve proffered opportunities to achieve it, is doing great harm now, and is morally certain, unless removed, to do far greater in the approaching elections.

He then rebukes Mr. Lincoln for not having received the Stephens embassy, disapproves the warlike tone of the Baltimore platform, urges the President to make overtures for peace in time to affect the North Carolina elections, and suggests the following plan of adjustment: 1. The Union is restored and declared perpetual. 2. Slavery is utterly and forever abolished throughout the same. 3. A complete amnesty for all political offenses. 4. Payment of $400,000,000 to the slave States pro rata for their slaves. 5. The slave States to be represented in proportion to their total population. 6. A National convention to be called at once.

The letter closes with this impassioned appeal:

Mr. President, I fear you do not realize how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor, and how joyously they would hail its achievement and bless its authors. With United States stocks worth but forty cents in gold per dollar, and drafting about to commence on the third million of Union soldiers, can this be wondered at? I do not say that a just peace is now attainable, though I believe it to be so. But I do say that a frank offer by you to the insurgents of terms which the impartial will say ought to be accepted will, at the worst, prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause; it may save us from a Northern insurrection.

In a postscript Mr. Greeley again urges the President to invite "those at Niagara to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum."

Mr. Lincoln determined at once to take action upon this letter. He had no faith in Jewett's story. He doubted whether the embassy had any existence except in the imagination of Sanders and Jewett. But he felt the unreasonableness and injustice of Mr. Greeley's letter, while he did not doubt his good faith; and he resolved to convince him at least, and perhaps others of his way of thinking, that there was no foundation for the reproaches they were casting upon the Government for refusing to treat with the rebels. That there might be no opportunity for dispute in relation to the facts of the case, he arranged that the witness of his willingness to listen to any overtures which might come from the South should be Mr. Greeley himself. He answered his letter at once, on the 9th of July, saying:

If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition from Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that if he really brings such proposition he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met with him. The same if there be two or more persons.

Mr. Greeley answered this letter the next day in evident embarrassment. The President had surprised him by his frank and prompt acquiescence in his suggestions. He had accepted the first two points of Mr. Greeley's plan of adjustment — the restoration of the Union, and the abandonment of slavery — as the only preliminary conditions of negotiations upon which he would insist, and requested this vehement advocate of peace to bring forward his ambassadors. Mr. Greeley's reply of the 10th seems somewhat lacking both in temper and in candor. He thought the negotiators would not "open their budget" to him; repeated his reproaches at the "rude repulse" of Stephens; referred again to the importance of doing something in time for the North Carolina elections; and said at least he would try to get a look into the hand of the men at Niagara, though he had "little heart for it." But on the 13th he wrote in a much more positive manner. He said:

I have now information, on which I can rely, that two persons, duly commissioned and empowered to negotiate for peace, are at this moment not far from Niagara Falls in Canada, and are desirous of conferring with yourself, or with such persons as you may appoint and empower to treat with them. Their names (only given in confidence) are Hon. Clement C. Clay of Alabama, and Hon. Jacob Thompson of Mississippi.

He added that he knew nothing and had proposed nothing as to terms; that it seemed to him high time an effort should be made to terminate the wholesale slaughter. He hoped to hear that the President had concluded to act in the premises, and to act so promptly as to do some good in the North Carolina elections.

On the receipt of this letter, which was written four days after Mr. Greeley had been fully authorized to bring to Washington any one he could find empowered to treat for peace, and which yet was based on the assumption of the President's unwillingness to do the very thing he had already done, Mr. Lincoln resolved to put an end to a correspondence which promised to be indefinitely prolonged, by sending an aide-de-camp to New York to arrange in a personal interview what it seemed impossible to conclude by mail. On the 15th he sent Mr. Greeley a brief telegram expressing his disappointment, saying, "I was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man or men," and announced the departure of a messenger with a letter. The letter was of the briefest. It merely said:

> Yours of the 13th is just received, and I am disappointed that you have not already reached here with those commissioners, if they would consent to come, on being shown my letter to you of the 9th inst. Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the terms stated in former, bring them. I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made.

This curt and peremptory missive was delivered to Mr. Greeley by Major John Hay early on the morning of the 16th. He was still somewhat reluctant to go; he thought some one not so well known would be less embarrassed by public curiosity; but said finally that he would start at once if he could be given a safe conduct for four persons, to be named by him. Major Hay communicated this to the President and received the required order in reply. "If there is or is not anything in the affair," he said, "I wish to know it without unnecessary delay."

The safe conduct was immediately written and given to Mr. Greeley, who started at once for Niagara. It provided that Clement C. Clay, Jacob Thompson, James P. Holcombe, and George N. Sanders should have safe conduct to Washington in company with Horace Greeley, and should be exempt from arrest or annoyance of any kind from any officer of the United States during their journey. Nothing was said by Mr. Greeley or by Major Hay to the effect that this safe conduct modified in any respect the conditions imposed by the President's letter of the 9th. It merely carried into effect the proposition made in that letter. On arriving at Niagara, Mr. Greeley placed himself at once in the hands of Jewett, who was waiting to receive him, and sent by him a letter addressed to Clay, Thompson, and Holcombe, in which he said:

> I am informed that you are duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace; that you desire to visit Washington in the fulfillment of your mission; and that you further desire that Mr. George N. Sanders shall accompany you. If my information be thus far substantially correct, I am authorized by the President of the United States to tender you his safe conduct on the journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time that will be agreeable to you.

No clearer proof can be given than is afforded in this letter that Mr. Greeley was absolutely ignorant of all the essential facts appertaining to the negotiation in which he was engaged. As it turned out, he had been misinformed even as to the personnel of the embassy, Jacob Thompson not being, and not having been, in company with the others; none of them had any authority to act in the capacity attributed to them; and, worse than all this, Mr. Greeley kept out of view, in his missive thus shot at a venture, the very conditions which Mr. Lincoln had imposed in his letter of the 9th and repeated in that of the 15th. Yet, with all the advantages thus afforded them, Clay and Holcombe felt themselves too bare and naked of credentials to accept Mr. Greeley's offer, and were therefore compelled to answer that they had not been accredited from Richmond, as assumed in his note. They made haste to say, however, that they were acquainted with the views of their Government, and could easily get credentials, or other agents could be accredited in their place, if they could be sent to Richmond armed with "the circumstances disclosed in this correspondence." It is incomprehensible that a man of Mr. Greeley's experience should not have recognized at once the purport of this proposal. It simply meant that Mr. Lincoln should take the initiative in suing the Richmond authorities for peace, on terms to be proposed by them. The essential impossibility of these terms was not apparent to Mr. Greeley; he merely saw that the situation was somewhat different from what he had expected, and therefore acknowledged the receipt of the letter, promised to report to Washington and solicit fresh instructions, and then telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln the substance of what Clay and Holcombe had written. The President, with unwearied patience, drew up a final paper, which he sent by Major Hay to Niagara, informing Mr. Greeley by telegraph that it was on the way. This information Mr. Greeley at once sent over the border, with many apologies for the delay.

Major Hay arrived at Niagara on the 20th

of July with a paper in the President's own handwriting, expressed in these words:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

To whom it may concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Mr. Greeley had already begun to have some impression of the unfortunate position in which he had placed himself, and the reading of this straightforward document still further nettled and perplexed him. He proposed to bring Jewett into conference; this Major Hay declined. He then refused to cross the river to Clifton unless Major Hay would accompany him, and himself deliver the paper to the Confederate emissaries. They therefore went together and met Mr. Holcombe in a private room of the Clifton House (Mr. Clay being absent for a day), and handed him the President's letter. After a few moments' conversation they separated, Mr. Greeley returning to New York and Major Hay remaining at Niagara to receive any answer that might be given to the letter. Before taking the train Mr. Greeley had an interview with Jewett, unknown to Major Hay, in which he seems to have authorized Jewett to continue to act as his representative. Jewett lost no time in acquainting the emissaries with this fact, informing them of the departure of Mr. Greeley, of "his regret at the sad termination of the initiatory steps taken for peace, in consequence of the change made by the President in his instructions to convey commissioners to Washington for negotiations, unconditionally, and that Mr. Greeley would be pleased to receive their answer" through him (Jewett). They replied to Jewett with mutual compliments, inclosing a long letter to Mr. Greeley, arraigning the President for his alleged breach of faith, which Jewett promptly communicated to the newspapers of the country without notice to Major Hay, informing him afterwards in a note that he did this by way of revenging the slight of the preceding day.

In giving the letter of the rebel emissaries to the press instead of sending it to its proper destination, Jewett accomplished the purpose for which it was written. It formed a not ineffective document in a heated political campaign. It would be difficult to ascertain, at this day, whether Mr. Greeley ever communicated to Jewett or Sanders, and whether they, in their constant flittings to and fro over the Suspension Bridge, ever made known to Clay and Holcombe the conditions of negotiation laid down by Mr. Lincoln in his letters of the 9th and 15th of July. At all events they pretended to be ignorant of any such conditions, and assumed that the President had sent Mr. Greeley to invite them to Washington without credentials and without conditions, to convey to Richmond his overtures of peace. They did not say with any certainty that even in that event his overtures would have been accepted, but expressed the hope that in case the war must continue there might "have been infused into its conduct something more of the spirit which softens and partially redeems its brutalities." They then went on to accuse the President of a "sudden and entire change of views," of a "rude withdrawal of a courteous overture," of "fresh blasts of war to the bitter end"; attributing this supposed change to some "mysteries of his cabinet" or some "caprice of his imperial will." They plainly intimated that while the South desired peace, it would not accept any arrangement which bartered away its self-government; and in conclusion they called upon their fellow-Confederates to strip from their "eyes the last film of delusion" that peace is possible, and "if there were any patriots or Christians" in the North, they implored them "to recall the abused authority and vindicate the outraged civilization of their country."

Even this impudent and uncandid manifesto did not convince Mr. Greeley that he had committed an error. On the contrary, he adopted the point of view of the rebel emissaries, and contended after his return to New York that he regarded the safe conduct given him on the 16th of July as a waiver by the President of all the conditions of his former letters. Being attacked by his colleagues of the press for his action at Niagara, he could only defend himself by implied censure of the President, and the discussion grew so warm that both he and his assailants at last joined in a request to Mr. Lincoln to permit the publication of the correspondence between them. This was an excellent opportunity for Mr. Lincoln to vindicate his own proceeding. But he rarely looked at such matters from the point of view of personal advantage, and he feared that the passionate, almost despairing appeals of the most prominent Republican editor in the North for peace at any cost would deepen the gloom in the public mind and have an injurious effect upon the Union cause. He therefore proposed to Mr. Greeley, in case the correspondence should be published, to omit some of the most vehement

phrases of his letters and those in which he advocated peace negotiations solely for political effect; at the same time he invited him to come to Washington and talk with him freely. Mr. Greeley, writing on the 8th of August, accepted both suggestions in principle, but he querulously declined going to Washington at that time, on the ground that the President was surrounded by his "bitterest personal enemies," and that his going would only result in further mischief, as at Niagara. "I will gladly go," he continued, "whenever I feel a hope that their influence has waned." Then, unable to restrain himself, he broke out in new and severe reproaches against the President for not having received Mr. Stephens, for not having sent a deputation to Richmond to ask for peace after Vicksburg, for not having taken the Democrats in Congress at their word, and sent "three of the biggest of them as commissioners to see what kind of a peace they could get." He referred once more to Niagara, and said magnanimously, "Let the past go"; but added the stern admonition, "Do not let this month pass without an earnest effort for peace." He held out a hope that if the President would turn from the error of his ways he would still help him make peace; but for the time being, "knowing who are nearest you," he gave him up. The only meaning this can have is simply, Dismiss Seward from your Cabinet and do as I tell you, and then perhaps I can save your Administration.

The next day, having received another telegram from the President, who, regardless of his own dignity, was still endeavoring to conciliate and convince him, Mr. Greeley wrote another letter, which we shall give more fully than the rest, to show in what a dangerous frame of mind was the editor of the most important organ of public opinion in the North. He begins by refusing to telegraph, "since I learned by sad experience at Niagara that my dispatches go to the War Department before reaching you."

> I fear that my chance for usefulness has passed. I know that nine-tenths of the whole American people, North and South, are anxious for peace — peace on almost any terms — and utterly sick of human slaughter and devastation. I know that, to the general eye, it now seems that the rebels are anxious to negotiate and that we refuse their advances. I know that if this impression be not removed we shall be beaten out of sight next November. I firmly believe that, were the election to take place to-morrow, the Democratic majority in this State and Pennsylvania would amount to 100,000, and that we should lose Connecticut also. Now if the rebellion can be crushed before November it will do to go on; if not, we are rushing to certain ruin.
>
> What, then, can I do in Washington? Your trusted advisers nearly all think I ought to go to Fort Lafayette for what I have done already. Seward wanted me sent there for my brief conference with M. Mercier. The cry has steadily been, No truce! No armistice! No negotiation! No mediation! Nothing but surrender at discretion! I never heard of such fatuity before. There is nothing like it in history. It *must* result in disaster, or all experience is delusive.
>
> Now I do not know that a tolerable peace could be had, but I believe it might have been last month; and, at all events, I know that an honest, sincere effort for it would have done us immense good. And I think no Government fighting a rebellion should ever close its ears to any proposition the rebels may make.
>
> I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for peace forthwith. And in case peace cannot now be made consent to an *armistice for one year*, each party to retain unmolested all it now holds, but the rebel ports to be opened. Meantime let a national convention be held, and there will surely be no more war at all events.

In a letter of the 11th of August, Mr. Greeley closed this extraordinary correspondence by insisting that if his letters were published they should be printed entire. This was accepted by Mr. Lincoln as a veto upon their publication. He could not afford, for the sake of vindicating his own action, to reveal to the country the despondency — one might almost say the desperation — of one so prominent in Republican councils as the editor of the "Tribune." The spectacle of this veteran journalist, who was justly regarded as the leading controversial writer on the antislavery side, ready to sacrifice everything for peace, and frantically denouncing the Government for refusing to surrender the contest, would have been, in its effect upon public opinion, a disaster equal to the loss of a great battle. The President had a sincere regard for Mr. Greeley also, and was unwilling to injure him and his great capacities for usefulness by publishing these ill-considered and discouraging utterances. His magnanimity was hardly appreciated. Mr. Greeley, in this letter of the 11th of August, and afterwards, insisted that the President had in his letter and his dispatch of the 15th of July changed his ground from that held in his letter of the 9th, which ground, he asserted, was again shifted in his paper "To whom it may concern." This was of course wholly without foundation. The letter of the 9th authorized Mr. Greeley to bring to Washington any one "professing to have any proposition from Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery"; the letter of the 15th repeats the offer contained in that of the 9th, saying, "Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the terms

stated in former, bring them." The next day Major Hay gave Mr. Greeley a formal safe conduct for himself and party, and neither of them thought of it as nullifying the President's letters. Indeed, Mr. Greeley's sole preposterous justification for his claim that his safe conduct superseded the President's instructions was that Major Hay did not say that it did not.

It was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln that, seeing the temper in which Mr. Greeley regarded the transaction, he dropped the matter and submitted in silence to the misrepresentations to which he was subjected by reason of it. The correspondence preceding the Niagara conference was not published until after the President's death; that subsequent to it sees the light for the first time in these pages. The public, having nothing of the record except the impudent manifesto of Clay and Holcombe, the foolish chatter of Jewett, and such half-statements as Mr. Greeley chose to make in answer to the assaults of his confrères of the press, judged Mr. Lincoln unjustly. Some thought he erred in giving any hearing to the rebels; some criticized his choice of a commissioner; and the opposition naturally made the most of his conditions of negotiation, and accused him of embarking in a war of extermination in the interest of the negro.[1] So that this well-meant effort of the President to ascertain what were the possibilities of peace through negotiation, or, failing that, to convince the representative of a large body of Republicans of his willingness to do all he could in that direction, resulted only in putting a keener edge upon the criticisms of his supporters, and in arming his adversaries with a weapon which they used, after their manner, among the rebels of the border States and their sympathizers in the North. Nevertheless, surveying the whole transaction after the lapse of twenty-five years, it is not easy to see how any act of his in relation to it was lacking in wisdom, or how it could have been changed for the better. Certainly every step of the proceeding was marked with his usual unselfish sincerity and magnanimity to friend and to foe.

Century July 1889

NILS'S GARDEN.



AMONG a thousand students in a university town there will always be two or three in whom science and poetry hold each other at a deadlock. The headquarters for these few was, in my time, the delightful room of Edward Tenniman on the spot where the new Law School now stands. He himself was the high priest of this double altar, the professor of these incompatible elective studies. The room was in an old colonial house of the humbler description, the ceiling was low with a cross-timber, the walls were wainscoted, and there was a large, open fireplace. The arrangements of the room followed half unconsciously the double bent of the owner's mind. All one side was devoted to serve botanical science: tin boxes, specimens, herbaria, microscopes, and a recess filled with Latin and German botanical works. The middle of the room was, as it were, transitional: there was a desk with an Æschylus forever open, and a great copy of Liddell and Scott's lexicon, then a novelty. On the other side one passed into high philosophy and dreamland: a portrait of Coleridge, his framed autograph, a picture of his study, and a whole library of mystical philosophy, including, I remember, the folio edition of Jacob Behmen in five volumes, over whose symbolic plates we used to pore. With what delight after a rather stiff lesson in botany — for he took a few of us as private pupils — did we turn to the other side of the room, when Tenniman would unfold for us Behmen's "Aurora, or Day-Spring," and, better yet, the "Signatura Rerum, or the signature of all things, showing the Sign and Signification of the several Forms and Shapes in the Creation; and what the Beginning, Ruin, and Cure of every Thing is, it proceeds out of Eternity into Time, and again out of time into Eternity, and comprehends all Mysteries. Written in High Dutch, 1622, by Jacob Behmen, alias Teutonicus Phylosophus." No doubt this side of the room was very unscientific, in the modern sense, but it was certainly refreshing after an hour or two at the microscope. It

[1] On the morning that the letter of the rebel emissaries was printed Major Hay, returning to Washington, heard this colloquy between two draymen on a Jersey City ferry-boat: "Have you heard the news?" "No; what is it?" "Old Abe and Jeff. Davis have been trying to make peace." "How did they make out?" "Old Abe, he says, 'Let the niggers go free, and we 'll stop fighting.' Jeff., he says, 'I 'll let them be free that 's free now, and the rest stay as they are.' Old Abe, he says, 'No, they got to be all free'; and so they broke up on that." These draymen were not the only citizens who gave this brief and dramatic form to the negotiations.

diers; but at some of the irksome tasks, like standing sentry, they do not come out strong. They are not often used for that purpose, however, it being found that Indians do not appreciate military forms and ceremonies.

Having seen all that I desired, I procured passage in the stage to a station on the Santa Fe Railroad. In the far distance the train came rushing up the track, and as it stopped I boarded it. As I settled back in the soft cushions of the sleeping-car I looked at my dirty clothes and did not blame the negro porter for regarding me with the haughty spirit of his class.

Frederic Remington.

SOMETHING WRONG.

OLD, old Earth! what have *you* to do
With a June in your heart ever fresh and new?
The poets sing, as of very truth,
That June dwells alone in the heart of youth,
And here you are in your eons, Earth,
With as sweet a June as you had at birth.

And God! He is ages and ages older!
And the love of age is paler, colder —
The poets sing, as of very truth —
Than the love that springs in the heart of youth;
So he cannot love, if the songs run true,
As he did when he shaped and fashioned you,
Yet here you are, with your June as fair
As the first that gladdened our parent pair!

Ah! there 's something wrong with the poets' song,
Or the hearts that to God and his earth belong.

Julia G. Skinner.

ACROSS THE FIELDS TO ANNE.

From Stratford-on-Avon a lane runs westward through the fields a mile to the little village of Shottery, in which is the cottage of Anne Hathaway, Shakspere's sweetheart and wife.

HOW often in the summer-tide,
His graver business set aside,
Has stripling Will, the thoughtful-eyed,
As to the pipe of Pan
Stepped blithesomely with lover's pride
Across the fields to Anne!

It must have been a merry mile,
This summer stroll by hedge and stile,
With sweet foreknowledge all the while
How sure the pathway ran
To dear delights of kiss and smile,
Across the fields to Anne.

The silly sheep that graze to-day,
I wot, they let him go his way,
Nor once looked up, as who should say:
"It is a seemly man."
For many lads went wooing aye
Across the fields to Anne.

The oaks, they have a wiser look;
Mayhap they whispered to the brook:
"The world by him shall yet be shook,
It is in nature's plan;
Though now he fleets like any rook
Across the fields to Anne."

And I am sure, that on some hour
Coquetting soft 'twixt sun and shower,
He stooped and broke a daisy-flower
With heart of tiny span,
And bore it as a lover's dower
Across the fields to Anne.

While from her cottage garden-bed
She plucked a jasmine's goodlihede,
To scent his jerkin's brown instead;
Now since that love began,
What luckier swain than he who sped
Across the fields to Anne?

The winding path whereon I pace,
The hedgerows green, the summer's grace,
Are still before me face to face;
Methinks I almost can
Turn poet and join the singing race
Across the fields to Anne!

Richard E. Burton.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE CHICAGO SURRENDER—CONSPIRACIES IN THE NORTH—LINCOLN AND THE CHURCHES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE CHICAGO SURRENDER.

THE Democratic managers had called the National Convention of their party to meet on the Fourth of July, 1864, but after the nomination of Frémont at Cleveland and of Lincoln at Baltimore it was thought prudent to postpone it to a later date, in the hope that something in the chapter of accidents might arise to the advantage of the opposition. It appeared for awhile as if this manœuvre were to be successful. As a vessel shows its finest sailing qualities against a head wind, so the best political work is always done in the face of severe opposition; and as the Republican party had as yet no enemy before it, the canvass, during its first months, seemed stricken with languor and apathy. The military situation was far from satisfactory. The terrible fighting in the Wilderness, succeeded by Grant's flank movement to the left, and the culmination of the campaign in the horrible slaughter at Cold Harbor, had profoundly shocked and depressed the country. The movement upon Petersburg, so far without decisive results, had contributed little of hope or encouragement; the campaign of Sherman in Georgia gave as yet no positive assurance of the brilliant result it afterwards attained; the Confederate raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, in July, was the cause of great annoyance and exasperation.

This untoward state of things in the field of military operations found its exact counterpart in the political campaign. Several circumstances contributed to divide and discourage the Administration party. The resignation of Mr. Chase, on the last day of June, had seemed, to not a few leading Republicans at the North, as a presage of disintegration in the Government; Mr. Greeley's mission to Niagara Falls, in spite of the wise and resolute attitude taken by the President in relation to peace negotiations, had unsettled and troubled the minds of many. The Democratic party, not having as yet appointed a candidate nor formulated a platform, were free to devote all their leisure to attacks upon the Administration; and the political fusillade continued with great energy through the summer months. The Republicans were everywhere on the defensive, having no objective point of attack in the opposite lines. The rebel emissaries in Canada, being in thorough concert with the leading peace men of the North, redoubled their efforts to disturb the public tranquillity, and not without success. Mr. Davis says of this period:

> Political developments at the North favored the adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile section. The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it seemed that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election in that year was the continuance or cessation of the war.[2]

There is a remarkable concurrence between this view of Mr. Davis and that of Mr. Lincoln in a letter to a friend which we have quoted in another place. Referring to the emissaries at Niagara Falls and their interest in the Chicago convention, and also to the expressions used by the Confederate authorities in their conversation with Jaquess, Mr. Lincoln said, "The Presidential contest is between a Union and a Disunion candidate, disunion certainly following the success of the latter!"[3]

Mr. Thompson, in his report of the operations of the rebel commission in Canada, claims that the results of the Niagara Falls conference were the source of such encouragement to the peace party as to lead them to give up their half-formed project of insurrection in the North-west in the hope of defeating Lincoln at the polls. In the midst of these discouraging circumstances the manifesto of Wade and Davis came to add its depressing influence to the general gloom. It seemed for a time as if this action of two of the most prominent Republicans in either house of Congress would result in a serious defection from the Republican party, though in the end the effect of the demonstration proved inconsiderable.

General McClellan had before this time become the acknowledged leader of the Democratic party in the North. It is true he was

2 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate States," Vol. II., p. 611.

3 Lincoln to Wakeman, July 25, 1864. Unpublished MS.

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not the favorite candidate of the Democracy in most of the Western States, but in the powerful States of the seaboard, and especially in the large cities, he was the only person indicated by popular consent among the opposition as the antagonist of Lincoln in the Presidential canvass. His attitude was therefore a matter of grave preoccupation, not only to most of the leading Republicans, but even to the President himself. There have been, in the last twenty years, many conflicting stories in regard to the overtures made to him during this summer; but, so far as can be ascertained, they were all the voluntary acts of over-anxious friends of the President, and made without his knowledge or consent. As early as the month of June, 1863, Mr. Thurlow Weed conceived the idea that it would be of great advantage to the Union cause if General McClellan would take a prominent part in a great war meeting to be held in New York. With the knowledge and approval of the President he approached the general with this purpose; he even suggested to him that the result might be the organization of a movement to make him the Union candidate for the Presidency. We learn from Mr. Weed that General McClellan at first gave a favorable hearing to the proposition, but at the last moment withdrew his consent to preside at the meeting in a letter in which he said: "I am clear in the conviction that the policy governing the conduct of the war should be one looking not only to military success, but also to ultimate reunion, and that it should consequently be such as to preserve the rights of all Union-loving citizens, wherever they may be, as far as compatible with military necessity."[1] The chance of identifying himself with the Union party thus passed away; later in the season he came out in favor of the candidates of the peace faction in Pennsylvania.

An attempt made in July, 1864, by Mr. Francis P. Blair, the elder, to induce McClellan to withdraw from the canvass caused a great deal of gossip at the time, and led to such misstatements and exaggerations that Mr. Blair afterwards published a full and detailed account of his action.[2] This venerable gentleman, sharing in the apprehension entertained by many as to the divisions and consequent weakness of the Union party, went to New York in the latter part of July "to make an effort at conciliation." "I went on this errand," said Mr. Blair, "without consulting the President, without giving him, directly or indirectly, the slightest intimation of my object, and, of course, without his authority. I apprised no one but my son." He first called upon the leading editors of the city. Mr. Bryant, though discontented with the Administration, considered Mr. Lincoln, with all his abatements, the only man who could be relied upon for the defense of the Union. Mr. Greeley assured Mr. Blair that "his best efforts would not be wanting to secure the peace of the country through the reëlection of the President"; Mr. Bennett of the "Herald" gave his ultimatum in a "raucle Scotch accent" — "Tell him to restore McClellan to the army and he will carry the election by default." Through Mr. S. L. M. Barlow, Mr. Blair had a long and intimate conversation with General McClellan. He began by stating distinctly to him that he had not come from Mr. Lincoln; that he had no authority or even consent from him to make representations or overtures of any sort. He then urged him, with the privilege of age and long friendship, to have nothing to do with the Chicago convention, saying that if he accepted their nomination he would be defeated. He pictured to him the dismal fate that awaits defeated candidates; he urged him to make himself the inspiring center and representative of the loyal Democrats of the North by writing a letter to Lincoln asking to be restored to service in the army, declaring at the same time that he did not seek it with a view to recommend himself to the Presidential nomination. "In case the President should refuse this request," said Mr. Blair, "he would then be responsible for the consequences." General McClellan received this well-meant advice in his customary manner. It is altogether probable that he did not believe a word of Mr. Blair's opening statement that this overture was without the approval or privity of the President. It no doubt seemed to him a political trick to induce him to decline the nomination of which he was already certain. He listened with his habitual courtesy and answered with his habitual indecision. He disclaimed any desire for the Presidential candidacy; he thanked Mr. Blair for his friendly suggestions; he said he would give them deep consideration; that he was called to the country to see a sick child and regretted that he could not talk with him again. Mr. Blair came back from his useless mission and repeated to Mr. Lincoln what he had done, adding that he thought it probable that General McClellan would write to him. The President "neither expressed approval nor disapprobation," says Mr. Blair in his letter, "but his manner was as courteous and kind as General McClellan's had been."

The political situation grew darker throughout the summer. At last, towards the end of August, the general gloom and depression

[1] T. W. Barnes, "The Life of Thurlow Weed," Vol. II., p. 429.

[2] Letter of F. P. Blair, dated Oct. 5, 1864, in the "National Intelligencer."

enveloped the President himself. The Democrats had not yet selected their candidate nor opened their campaign. As in the field of theology there is no militant virtue unless there is an active evil to oppose, so in that of politics a party without an organized opposition appears to drop to pieces by its own weight. To use Mr. Lincoln's words: "At this period we had no adversary and seemed to have no friends." For a moment he despaired of the success of the Union party in the coming election. He was not alone in this impression. It was shared by his leading friends and counselors. So experienced and astute a politician as Mr. Thurlow Weed wrote on the 22d of August:

> When, ten days since, I told Mr. Lincoln that his re-election was an impossibility, I also told him that the information would soon come to him through other channels. It has doubtless ere this reached him. At any rate nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States who authorizes the slightest hope of success. Mr. Raymond, who has just left me, says that unless some prompt and bold step be taken all is lost. The people are wild for peace. They are told that the President will only listen to terms of peace on condition that slavery be abandoned. . . . Mr. Raymond thinks that commissioners should be immediately sent to Richmond offering to treat for peace on the basis of Union. That something should be done and promptly done to give the Administration a chance for its life is certain.[1]

Mr. Lincoln's action in this conjuncture was most original and characteristic. Feeling that the campaign was going against him, he made up his mind deliberately as to the course he should pursue, and unwilling to leave his resolution to the chances of the changed mood which might follow in the natural exasperation of defeat, he resolved to lay down for himself the course of action demanded by his present conviction of duty. He wrote on the 23d of August the following memorandum:

> This morning, as for several days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to so coöperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.[2]

He then folded and pasted the sheet in such manner that its contents could not be read, and as the Cabinet came together he handed this paper to each member successively, requesting them to write their names across the back of it. In this peculiar fashion he pledged himself and the Administration to accept loyally the anticipated verdict of the people against him, and to do the utmost to save the Union in the brief remainder of his term of office. He gave no intimation to any member of the Cabinet of the nature of the paper they had signed until after his triumphant reëlection.[3]

The Democratic convention was finally called to meet in Chicago on the 29th of August. Much was expected from the strength and the audacity which the peace party in the North-west had recently displayed, and the day of the meeting of the convention was actually chosen by rebel emissaries in Canada and their agents in the Western States for an outbreak which should effect that revolution in the North-west which was the vague and chimerical dream that had been so long cherished and caressed in Richmond and Toronto.

About the time of the adjournment of Congress the Democratic members of that body issued an address to their party, which, when read after twenty-five years, shows how blinded by partisan passion these intelligent and well-meaning gentlemen, neither better nor worse in most respects than the rest of their fellow-citizens, had become. They charged in effect that there were only two classes of people supporting the Government—those who were making money out of the war, and the Radical abolitionists; and they called upon the indefinite abstraction which they named "the country" to throw out of office the administration of a Government under favor of which these two classes of men "nestle in power and gratify their unholy greed and their detestable passions." The party of the Union—that is to say, the majority of the people of the country—is

1 Weed to Seward, August 22. MS.

2 Copied from the MS.

3 We copy from the MS. diary of one of the President's secretaries under date of November 11, 1864, the following passage relating to this incident: "At the meeting of the Cabinet to-day the President took out a paper from his desk and said: 'Gentlemen, do you remember last summer I asked you all to sign your names to the back of a paper of which I did not show you the inside? This is it. Now, Mr. Hay, see if you can open this without tearing it.' He had pasted it up in so singular a style that it required some cutting to get it open. He then read this memorandum [given in the text above]. The President said: 'You will remember that this was written at the time, six days before the Chicago nominating convention, when as yet we had no adversary and seemed to have no friends. I then solemnly resolved on the course of action indicated in this paper. I resolved in case of the election of General McClellan, being certain that he would be the candidate, that I would see him and talk matters over with him. I would say, "General, the election has demonstrated that you are stronger, have more influence with the American people, than I. Now let us together, you with your influence and I with all the executive power of the Government, try to save the country. You raise as many troops as you possibly can for this final trial, and I will devote all my energies to assist and finish the war."'

"Seward said, 'And the general would have answered you, "Yes, yes"; and the next day when you saw him again and pressed these views upon him he would have said, "Yes, yes," and so on forever, and would have done nothing at all.'

"'At least,' said Lincoln, 'I should have done my duty and have stood clear before my own conscience.'"

called in this address "a nightmare of corruption and fanaticism which is pressing out its very existence." The most remarkable feature of this singular document is its assumption that the people who were trying to save the Union and to reëstablish its authority were influenced only by sentimental doctrines and the wild passions of fury and vengeance. "We do not decry theory," these congressmen gravely said; "but we assert that statesmanship is concerned mainly in the domain of the practical, and that in the present imperfect condition of human affairs it is obliged to modify general ideas and adapt them to existing conditions." They called upon the country to sustain this calm and philosophic view of the functions of statesmanship, "to bring the sound elements of society to the surface," to "purge the body politic of its unhealthy elements," and to substitute in places of public trust "just and broad-minded, pure and liberal men, in the place of radicals and corruptionists." This being done, they promised the millennium.

The Democratic National Convention came together at the time appointed, but it is by no means sure that any real and permanent advantage had been gained by the delay. The scheme of the American Knights to inaugurate on that day their counter-revolution had, by the usual treachery of some of its members, been discovered and guarded against by a strong show of force in the city of Chicago, and its execution was postponed until the day of the November election. No great approach to harmony, on the subject of peace or war, had been made in the two months of observation and skirmishing which the managers had allowed themselves. The only manner in which the peace men and the war Democrats could arrive at an agreement was by mutual deception. The war Democrats, led by the delegation from New York, were working for a military candidate; and the peace Democrats, under the redoubtable leadership of Mr. Vallandigham, who had returned from Canada and was allowed to remain at large by the half-contemptuous and half-calculated lenity of the Government he defied, bent all their energies to a clear statement of their principles in the platform.

Mr. August Belmont, a German by birth and the representative of the Rothschilds' banking-house, called the delegates to order, informing them that the future of the Republic rested in their hands. "Four years of misrule," he said, "by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party have brought our country to the very verge of ruin." He gravely stated, expecting it to be believed, and apparently believing it himself, that the "results of such a calamity as the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln must be the utter disintegration of our whole political and social system amidst bloodshed and anarchy." This German banker promised the convention that the American people would rush to the support of their candidate and platform, "provided you will offer to their suffrage a tried patriot." This vague reference to McClellan was greeted with applause from the Eastern delegates. Mr. Belmont said: "We are here, not as war Democrats nor as peace Democrats, but as citizens of the great Republic"; and he named as temporary chairman Mr. William Bigler, formerly governor of Pennsylvania. Mr. Bigler made a brief speech charging upon the Republicans all the woes of the country, and saying that "the men now in authority, because of the feud which they have so long maintained with violent and unwise men of the South, and because of a blind fanaticism about an institution of some of the States in relation to which they have no duties to perform and no responsibilities to bear, are rendered incapable of adopting the proper means to rescue our country from its present lamentable condition."

The usual committees were appointed, and Mr. Vallandigham was presented by his State delegation as a member of the committee on platform. Several resolutions were offered in open convention — one by Washington Hunt of New York suggesting a convention of the States; one by Mr. Price of Missouri for a demonstration in favor of the freedom and purity of the elective franchise; and one by Mr. Long of Ohio, a furious advocate of peace, who had attained the honor of censure by the Congress of the United States, suggested that a committee proceed forthwith to Washington to demand of Mr. Lincoln the suspension of the draft until after the election.

Governor Seymour of New York was chosen permanent chairman of the convention. He made a long and eloquent speech full of abstract devotion to the Union and of denunciation of all the measures that had hitherto been taken to save it. "This Administration," he said, "cannot save this Union if it would. It has, by its proclamations, by vindictive legislation, by displays of hate and passion, placed obstacles in its own pathway which it cannot overcome, and has hampered its own freedom of action by unconstitutional acts." But Mr. Seymour did not mourn as one without hope. He continued: "If the Administration cannot save this Union, we can. Mr. Lincoln values many things above the Union; we put it first of all. He thinks a proclamation worth more than peace; we think the blood of our people more precious than the edicts of the President. . . . We demand no conditions for the restoration of our Union. We are shackled

with no hates, no prejudices, no passions." And so,— as he imagined,— without prejudices, without hatred, and without passion, he went on denouncing his Government and the majority of his fellow-citizens with eloquent fury to the end of his speech. His address was greeted at its close with loud applause, not unmingled with calls on the part of the peace men for Vallandigham. He did not respond at that moment, but the most weighty utterance of the convention was his, nevertheless — the second resolution of the platform, reported by the chairman, Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky. There had been on the organization of the committee a contest between Guthrie and Vallandigham for the chairmanship. "Through the artifices of Cassidy, Tilden, and other New York politicians,"[1] Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky received twelve votes to eight for Vallandigham; but whatever managers may accomplish, the strongest man with the strongest force behind him generally has his way, and when the committee got to work Vallandigham carried too many guns for Guthrie. He wrote, to use his own words,

> the material resolution of the Chicago platform, and carried it through the sub-committee and the general committee in spite of the most desperate and persistent opposition on the part of Cassidy and his friends, Mr. Cassidy himself in an adjoining room laboring to defeat it.

This Vallandigham resolution is the only one in the platform worth quoting. All the rest was a string of mere commonplaces declaring devotion to the Union, denouncing interference of the military in elections, enumerating the illegal and arbitrary acts of the Government, expressing the sympathy of the convention with soldiers and sailors and prisoners of war. But the resolution written by Mr. Vallandigham and by him forced upon his party —

> *Resolved*, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

It is altogether probable that this distinct proposition of surrender to the Confederates might have been modified or defeated in full convention if the war Democrats had had the courage of their convictions; but they were so intent upon the nomination of McClellan that they considered the question of platform as of secondary importance, and these fatal resolutions were therefore adopted without debate, and the convention passed to the nomination of candidates. General McClellan was nominated by Mr. Stockton of New Jersey, followed by S. S. Cox of Ohio; Mr. Saulsbury of Delaware nominated Mr. Powell of Kentucky, who with compliments declined; Mr. Stuart, in behalf of the peace faction from Ohio, nominated Mr. Seymour of Connecticut; and Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky raised the specter of the old-fashioned Democracy in the convention by nominating ex-President Pierce in a speech more amusing than effective. McClellan received 174 votes, but before the result was declared the vote was raised upon revision to 202; Seymour received a little more than one-tenth of that number. Mr. Vallandigham, who had taken possession of the convention through his platform, now adopted the candidate also, and put the seal of his sinister approval upon General McClellan by moving that his nomination be made unanimous, which was done with great cheering. Mr. Wickliffe, the comic old man of the convention, then offered a resolution that General McClellan, immediately after his inauguration in March next, should "open Abraham Lincoln's prison doors and let the captives free." Mr. Guthrie and Mr. Pendleton were the principal names mentioned in the first ballot for Vice-President, but on the second New York changed from Guthrie to Pendleton, and, all the other candidates being withdrawn, he was nominated, unanimously. Pendleton came to the stand and briefly addressed the convention, accepting the nomination and promising to continue "faithful to those principles which lay at the very bottom of the organization of the Democratic party." The convention did not adjourn as usual *sine die*. On the motion of Mr. Wickliffe, who said that "the delegates from the West were of the opinion that circumstances might occur between now and the 4th of March next which would make it proper for the Democracy of the country to meet in convention again," the convention resolved to "remain as organized, subject to be called at any time and place that the Executive National Committee shall designate." The motives of this action were not avowed. It was taken as a significant warning that the leaders of the Democratic party held themselves ready for any extraordinary measures which the exigencies of the time might provoke or invite.

The New Yorkers had, however, the last

[1] Letter of Vallandigham to the New York "News," Oct. 22, 1864.

word. Mr. Seymour, as Chairman of the Convention, was chairman of the committee to inform McClellan of his nomination, and before he wrote the letter Atlanta had fallen, the tide had turned, and the winds of popular opinion, which had seemed stagnant throughout the midsummer, now began to blow favorably to the national cause. The committee, in their letter dated a week after the convention adjourned, said:

Be assured that those for whom we speak were animated with the most earnest, devoted, prayerful desire for the salvation of the American Union, and preservation of the Constitution of the United States, and that the accomplishment of these objects was the guiding and impelling motive in every mind; and we may be permitted to add that their purpose to maintain the Union is manifested in their selection, as their candidate, of one whose life has been devoted to its cause, while it is their earnest hope and confident belief that your election will restore to our country Union, Peace, and Constitutional Liberty.

The general answered on the same date.[1] He also felt with the New York politicians that the poison of death was in the platform of the convention; that if he accepted it pure and simple the campaign was hopeless; his only possible chance for success was in his war record; his position as a candidate on a platform of dishonorable peace was no less desperate than ridiculous. He, therefore, in his letter of acceptance renewed his assurances of devotion to the Union, the Constitution, the laws, and the flag of his country.

The reëstablishment of the Union [he said] in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more. Let me add, what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights. . . . But the Union must be preserved at all hazards. I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain, that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives. A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without union.

Having thus absolutely repudiated the platform upon which he was nominated, he coolly concluded, "Believing that the views here expressed are those of the convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination."

Upon this contradictory body of doctrine McClellan began his campaign. The platform of the convention was the law, his letter was the gospel, and the orators of the party might reconcile the two according to their sympathies or their ingenuity. The Ohio wing had no hesitation in taking its stand. "The Chicago platform," said Mr. Vallandigham, speaking from the same platform with Mr. Pendleton on the 17th of September, "enunciated its policy and principles by authority and was binding upon every Democrat, and by them the Democratic Administration must and should be governed. It was the only authorized exposition of the Democratic creed, and he repudiated all others." And a week afterwards[2] he went still further and specifically contradicted General McClellan.

The two principal points in his letter of acceptance to which I object were brought before the committee. The one containing the threat of future war was unanimously rejected. The other, to the effect that until the States and people of the South had returned to the Union we would not exhaust these arts of statesmanship, as they are called, received but three votes in that committee, though presented almost in the very words of the letter itself.

CONSPIRACIES IN THE NORTH.

Opposition to the Government by constitutional means was not enough to gratify the vehement and resentful feelings of those Democrats in the North whose zeal for slavery seemed completely to have destroyed in their hearts every impulse of patriotism. They were ready to do the work of the Southern Confederacy in the North, and were alone prevented by their fear of the law. To evade the restraints of justice and the sharp measures of the military administration, they formed throughout the country secret associations for the purpose of resisting the laws, of embarrassing in every way the action of the Government, of communicating information to the rebels in arms, and in many cases of inflicting serious damage on the lives and property of the Unionists. They adopted various names in different parts of the country, but the designation adopted by the society having the largest number of lodges in the different States was the "Knights of the Golden Circle." As fast as one name was discovered and pub-

[1] Sept. 8, 1864.
[2] At Sidney, Ohio, Sept. 24.

lished it was cast aside and another adopted, and the same organization with the same membership appeared successively under the name we have mentioned and that of "The Order of American Knights," "The Order of the Star," and the "Sons of Liberty." These secret organizations possessed a singular charm to uneducated men, independent of their political sympathies; and this attraction, combined with the fact that they could not in plain daylight inflict any injury upon the Government, drove many thousands of the lower class of Democrats into these furtive lodges. It is impossible to ascertain, with any degree of exactness, the numbers of those who became affiliated with the orders. The numbers claimed by the adepts vary widely. A million was not infrequently the membership of which they boasted. Mr. Vallandigham asserted, in a public speech, that the organized body numbered half a million. Judge Holt, in his official report, accepted this aggregate as being something near the truth. The heaviest force was in Illinois and in Indiana; in Ohio they were also very numerous, and in the border States of Kentucky and Missouri. Their organization was entirely military; the State lodges were commanded by major-generals, the congressional districts by brigadiers, the counties by colonels, and the townships by captains. They drilled as much as was possible under the limitations of secrecy; they made large purchases of arms. General Carrington estimated that 30,000 guns and revolvers were brought into Indiana alone, and the adherents of the order in the State of Illinois were also fully armed. In the month of March, 1864, it was estimated that the entire armed force of the order capable of being mobilized for active service was 340,000 men.[1] It is altogether probable that this estimate was greatly exaggerated; and even if so large a number had been initiated into the order, their lack of drill, discipline, and moral character rendered them incapable at any time of acting as an army. The order was large enough at least to offer the fullest hospitality to detectives and to Union men who volunteered to join with the purpose of reporting what they could to the authorities; so that the Government was speedily put in possession of the entire scheme of organization, with the names of the prominent officers of the order and written copies of their constitutions, oaths, and books of ritual. The constitutions of secret societies are generally valuable only as illustrations of human stupidity, and these were no exception to the rule. Their declaration of principles begins with this lucid proposition: "All men are endowed by the Creator with certain rights; equal as far as there is equality in the capacity for the appreciation, enjoyment, and exercise of those rights." The institution of slavery receives the approval of this band of midnight traitors in the following muddled and brutal sentences:

> In the divine economy no individual of the human race must be permitted to encumber the earth, to mar its aspects of transcendent beauty, nor to impede the progress of the physical or intellectual man, neither in himself nor in the race to which he belongs. Hence a people . . . whom neither the divinity within them nor the inspirations of divine and beautiful nature around them can impel to virtuous action and progress onward and upward, should be subjected to a just and humane servitude and tutelage to the superior race until they shall be able to appreciate the benefits and advantages of civilization.

They also declare in favor of something they imagine to be the theory of State rights, and also the duty of the people to expel their rulers from the Government by force of arms when they see good reason. "This is not revolution," they say, "but solely the assertion of State rights." Had they been content to meet in their lodges at stated times and bewilder themselves by such rhetoric as this there would have been no harm done; but there is plenty of evidence that the measures they adopted to bring what they called their principles into action were of positive injury to the national welfare. One of their chief objects was the exciting of discontent in the army and the encouraging of desertion; members of the order enlisted with the express purpose of inciting soldiers to desert with them; money and citizens' clothing were furnished them for this purpose; lawyers were hired to advise soldiers on leave not to go back and to promise them the requisite defense in the courts if they got into trouble by desertion. The adjutant-general of Indiana, in his report for 1863, says that the number of deserters and absentees returned to the army through the post of Indianapolis alone, during the last month of 1862, was about 2600. The squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters were frequently attacked in rural districts by these organized bodies; the most violent resistance was made to the enrollment and the draft. Several enrolling officers were shot in Indiana and in Illinois; about sixty persons were tried and convicted in Indiana for conspiracy to resist the draft.[2] A constant system of communication with the rebels in arms was kept up across the border; arms, ammunition, and, in some instances, recruits, were sent to aid the Confederates; secret murders and assassinations were not unknown; the plan of establishing a North-western Confederacy in hostility to the East and in alliance with the Southern Confederacy was the favor-

1 Report of Judge-Advocate General Holt.
2 Ibid.

ite dream of the malignant and narrow minds controlling the order. The Government wisely took little notice of the proceedings of this organization. It was constantly informed of its general plans and purposes; the Grand Secretary of the order in Missouri made a full confession of his connection with it. In August a large number of copies of the ritual of the order of American Knights were seized in the office of D. W. Voorhees, a prominent Democratic member of Congress at Terre Haute.[1] A private soldier in the Union army, named Stidger, had himself initiated into the order, and with infinite skill and success rose to a high position in it, becoming Grand Secretary for the State of Kentucky. Thus thoroughly informed of the composition and the purposes of the society, the Government was constantly able to guard against any serious disturbances of the public peace; and whenever the arrest of any of the ringleaders was determined upon, the evidence for their conviction was always overwhelming.

The fullest light was thrown upon the organization and plans of these treasonable orders by the trials of certain conspirators in Indiana in the autumn of 1864. We will make no reference to the testimony of Government detectives who joined the conspiracy with the purpose of revealing its secrets. It is sufficient to quote the unwilling and unquestionably truthful statements of members of the order, brought into court by subpœna. William Clayton,[2] a farmer of Warren County, Illinois, testified that he was initiated a member of the order of American Knights "at a congregation formed in the timber"; he took a long and bombastic oath, the only significant part of which was the pledge to take up arms if required, in the cause of the oppressed against usurpers waging war against a people endeavoring to establish a government for themselves in accordance with the eternal principles of truth; this, he testified, bound him to assist the South in its struggle for independence. He said he understood the purpose of the order was primarily to beat the Republicans at the polls, and that force of arms was to be resorted to in case of necessity; that they contemplated a rebel invasion in support of these objects; that the understanding was that in case the rebels came into Illinois, they and the brethren of this organization were to shake hands and be friends; that they were to give aid and assistance to the invaders; that death was the penalty for divulging the secrets of the order. Other members testified that they took an oath providing that in case of treachery they were to be drawn and quartered, their mangled remains to be cast out at the four gates. When these dwellers in prairie villages were asked what they meant by "the four gates," they said they did not know. Clayton further said their objects were "to resist the conscription or anything else that pushed them too hard."[3] Another farmer said he joined "because he had been a Democrat all his life"; another, that he "went in out of curiosity"—and this was doubtless a motive with many. In communities where there is little to interest an idle mind these secret mummeries possess a singular attraction. The grips, the passwords, the emblems, formed a great part of whatever temptation the order offered to the rural conspirators. Their favorite cognizance was the oak; not on account of any civic association, but because the word was formed of the initials of the name, "Order of American Knights." Their grand hailing cry of distress was "Oak-houn," the last syllable taken from the name of the South Carolina statesman whose principles they imagined they were putting in operation.

By far the most important witness for the Government was Horace Heffren, a lawyer of Salem, Indiana, a man high in the councils of the order. He was indicted for treasonable practices, and concluded to make a clean breast of it.[4] He gave an apparently truthful account; detailed the scheme for forming a North-western Confederacy, or, if that failed, for joining the Southern army; the State Government of Indiana was to be seized, Governor Morton was to be held for a hostage or killed. He confirmed the story of the general uprising which was to have taken place on the 16th of August in conjunction with a rebel raid from Cumberland Gap, the great feature of which was the liberation of the Confederate prisoners in Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. But when the time came the rebels did not, and the conspirators lacked heart for the fight. Vallandigham, the supreme head of the order, was too far away for intelligent and efficient direction. The whole conspiracy was shabby and puerile, although it included many editors and politicians of local standing. They were not all cravens; some of them stood up stoutly before the military commission and defended the cause of the South. "I assert," said one, "that the South has been fighting for their rights as defined in the Dred Scott decision."[5] But there was very little display of heroism when the time of trial arrived. There was much that was ignoble and sordid; a scramble for the salaried places, a rush to handle the money provided for arms; one man intriguing for a place on the staff "because he had a sore leg"; a cloud of small politicians, who hardly knew whether

1 Report of Judge-Advocate General.
2 Treason trials at Indianapolis, p. 39.
3 Ibid., p. 45. 4 Ibid., p. 125. 5 Ibid., p. 174.

they were members or not; "they had heard a ritual read, but paid little attention to it"; they were anxious to be members if the scheme succeeded, and to avoid the law if it failed.

The President's attitude in regard to this organization was one of good-humored contempt rather than anything else. Most of the officers commanding departments, however, regarded the machinations of these dark-lantern knights as a matter of the deepest import. Governor Morton was greatly disquieted by their work in his State, and sent a telegram to the President in January, 1863,[1] expressing his fear that the legislature, when it met, would pass a joint resolution to acknowledge the Southern Confederacy and urge the North-west to dissolve all constitutional relation with the New England States. But when the legislature came together, although it evinced a hearty good-will in giving the governor all the worry and annoyance possible, it took no such overt step of treason as he feared.

Their action was, indeed, sufficiently violent and contumacious. The House of Representatives insolently returned his message to him and passed a resolution accepting in its stead that of the Democratic governor of New York. Measures were introduced to take the military power of the State away from the governor and to confer it upon the Democratic State officers. To defeat these unconstitutional proceedings the Republicans adopted the equally irregular course of abandoning the legislature and leaving it without a quorum; in consequence of which no appropriation bills were passed, and the governor had to appeal to the people of the State for means to carry on the government. These were furnished in part by the voluntary offerings of banks, private corporations, and individuals; but needing a quarter of a million dollars for an emergency, he came to Washington and obtained it from the General Government, by virtue of a statute of July 31, 1861, which set aside two millions for the purchase of munitions of war to be used in States in rebellion or "in which rebellion is or may be threatened." In view of the revolutionary attitude of the legislature, and the known treasonable organization and purposes of the Sons of Liberty, the Secretary of War decided that Indiana was so "threatened," and made Governor Morton a disbursing officer to the amount of 250,000 dollars. It is related that Morton remarked, as he took the warrant, "If the cause failed, they would be called heavily to account for this"; to which Stanton replied, "If the cause fails, I do not wish to live."[2]

1 Morton to Stanton, Jan. 3, 1863.

2 Henry Wilson. Article E. M. Stanton, "Atlantic Monthly," February, 1870.

3 Rosecrans to Lincoln, June 22, 1864. MS.

General Rosecrans, commanding in Missouri, was thrown into something like panic by the doings of the Knights, and Governor Yates of Illinois shared fully in his trepidation. In June, 1864, the governor and the general joined in an earnest demand that the President should order Colonel Sanderson, of Rosecrans's staff, to Washington for a personal interview upon matters of overwhelming importance. The President was unwilling that either Rosecrans or his subordinate should come to Washington upon this errand, under the temptation to magnify his office by alarming reports. He therefore concluded to send one of his own private secretaries to St. Louis to see precisely what were the facts which had thrown the general commanding into such a state of consternation. Rosecrans then repeated the entire story of the organization of the order of American Knights and the Golden Circle, facts which were already well known to the President and the Secretary of War; but the immediate cause of his excitement was the expected return of Vallandigham, which, he said, was in accordance with the resolution adopted by the order at the convocation held in Windsor, Canada. General Rosecrans thought that his return would be the signal for the rising of the Knights throughout the North-west, and for serious public disorders.

The President, on receiving his secretary's report, declined to order Sanderson to Washington; and in reference to Rosecrans's strict injunctions of secrecy he said that a secret confided on the one side to half a million Democrats, and on the other to five governors and their staffs, was hardly worth keeping. He said the Northern section of the conspiracy merited no special attention, being about an equal mixture of puerility and malice.

General Rosecrans, after he was convinced that the President would not overrule the Secretary of War by ordering Colonel Sanderson to Washington, concluded at last to send his voluminous report in manuscript, accompanying it with the following letter, which we copy as giving in few words the results of his researches:[3]

> Since Major Hay's departure, bearing my letter about the secret conspiracy we have been tracing out, we have added much information of its Southern connexions, operations, uses, and intentions.
>
> We have also found a new element in its workings under the name of McClellan minute men.
>
> The evident extent and anti-national purposes of this great conspiracy compel me to urge the consideration of what ought to be done to anticipate its workings and prevent the mischief it is capable of producing again upon your attention.
>
> Therefore, I have sent the report of Colonel Sanderson with the details of evidence covering a thousand pages of foolscap, by himself, to be carried or forwarded to you by safe hands.

That report and its accompanying papers show,

1. That there exists an oath-bound secret society, under various names but forming one brotherhood both in the rebel and loyal States, the objects of which are the overthrow of the existing national Government and the dismemberment of this nation.

2. That the secret oaths bind these conspirators to revolution and all its consequences of murder, arson, pillage, and an untold train of crimes, including assassination and perjury, under the penalty of death to the disobedient or recusant.

3. That they intend to operate in conjunction with rebel movements this summer to revolutionize the loyal States, if they can.

4. That Vallandigham is the Supreme Commander of the Northern wing of this society, and General Price, of the rebel army, the Supreme Commander of the Southern wing of the organization. And that Vallandigham's return was a part of the programme well understood both North and South, by which the revolution they propose was to be inaugurated.

5. That this association is now and has been the principal agency by which spying and supplying rebels with means of war are carried on, between the loyal and rebel States, and that even some of our officers are engaged in it.

6. That they claim to have 25,000 members in Missouri, 140,000 in Illinois, 100,000 in Indiana, 80,000 in Ohio, 70,000 in Kentucky, and that they are extending through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland.

Besides which prominent and general facts, the names of members, mode of operating, and other details appear fully, showing what a formidable power and what agencies for mischief we have to deal with.

With this synopsis of the report it is respectfully submitted with the single remark — that whatever orders you may deem best to give, it must be obvious to your Excellency that leading conspirators like Chas. L. Hunt and Dr. Shore of St. Louis, arrested for being implicated in the association, cannot be released without serious hazard to the public welfare and safety.

From first to last these organizations were singularly lacking in energy and initiative. The only substantial harm they did was in encouraging desertions and embarrassing and resisting the officers concerned in the enrollment and the draft. The toleration with which the President regarded them, and the immunity which he allowed them in their passive treason, arose from the fact that he never could be made to believe that there was as much crime as folly in their acts and purposes. Senator McDonald reports that the President once said to him when he was asking the pardon of some of these conspirators condemned by military commission, "Nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democrats are disloyal." They were sufficiently disloyal to take all manner of oaths against the Government; to be ready in their secret councils to declare they were ready to shed the last drop of their blood to abolish it; to express their ardent sympathy with its enemies and their detestation of its officers and supporters. But this was the limit of their criminal courage. Shedding the last drop of one's blood is a comparatively easy sacrifice — it is shedding the first drop that costs; and these rural Catalines were never quite ready to risk their skins for their so-called principles. All the attempts against the public peace in the free States and on the Northern border proceeded not from the resident conspirators, but from desperate Southern emissaries and their aiders and abettors in the British provinces, and even these rarely rose above the level of ordinary arson and highway robbery.

The case of the *Chesapeake* was one of the most noteworthy of these incidents. Two Canadians named Braine and Parr resolved, in the latter part of 1863, to start on a privateering enterprise on their own account. Parr, though born in Canada, had lived for several years in Tennessee; and Braine, who had been arrested and confined in Fort Warren, had been released from that prison on his claim, presented by the British minister, that he was a British subject. Their sole pretension to Confederate nationality was the possession of commissions in the Confederate navy prepared *ad hoc*. They enlisted a dozen men, all British subjects, and purchased in New York the arms and equipment they required for their enterprise, and took passage on board the United States merchant steamer *Chesapeake*, which left New York on the 5th of December, bound for Portland, Maine. On the morning of the 8th they assaulted the officers and crew of the *Chesapeake*, capturing her after a struggle of only a few minutes' duration, killing one and wounding two of her officers.[1] They took the *Chesapeake* into the Bay of Fundy and there delivered her into the hands of a man calling himself Captain Parker of the Confederate navy, who afterwards turned out to be an Englishman whose name was Vernon Locke, and who had come out in a pilot boat to meet her. Feeling now secure in the possession of her new nationality, she went to Sambro Harbor, Nova Scotia, to receive the fuel and supplies necessary to enable her to prosecute her voyage to the Confederate States. While she lay there, the United States gun-boat *Ella and Annie* entered the harbor; and, says Mr. Benjamin, whose righteous indignation was evidently aroused by the proceedings, "with that habitual contempt of the territorial sovereignty of Great Britain and of her neutral rights which characterizes our enemies," recaptured the prize and left the British port with the

1 Benjamin to Holcombe, Feb. 15, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

purpose of taking the *Chesapeake* to the United States; but meeting on the way a superior officer of the United States navy, the captain of the *Ella and Annie* was ordered by him to return to Halifax to restore the *Chesapeake* to the jurisdiction of Great Britain. This was done, and the few pirates who had been captured in the *Chesapeake* were delivered up. The case was taken at once into the courts and was promptly and properly decided, so far as the vessel was concerned, by her delivery to her rightful owners; but before this decision was made known at Richmond, the Confederate Government, seeing in the case a possibility of profit to their cause, dispatched to Halifax Professor J. P. Holcombe, said to be the most accomplished international lawyer in the Confederacy, to take charge of the case. During the professor's transit, however, by way of Wilmington and Bermuda, the case had come to its natural close, and on arriving at Halifax he found his occupation gone. He was compelled to report to the department that every man concerned in the capture of the *Chesapeake*, with the single exception of the Canadian-Tennesseean just mentioned, was a British subject.[1] He also found that the captors had been guilty of stealing and peddling the cargo and pocketing the proceeds, and that the antecedents of the so-called Confederate officers involved were most disreputable. He seemed greatly disappointed to find that this gang of murderers and thieves were not high-minded and honorable gentlemen, and therefore concluded to make no demand upon the British authorities for the restitution of the stolen ship. He remained for some time in Halifax enjoying the hospitality of the colonial sympathizers with the South, and then proceeded to join the other secession emissaries in Canada who were engaged in equally congenial enterprises.

The principal agent of the Confederates in Canada was Jacob Thompson, late Secretary of the Interior in the administration of Buchanan, whose dishonorable administration of that important office has already been mentioned. He had sunk into appropriate insignificance, even among his own associates, after the war began; had been captured by General Grant on the Mississippi River in a ridiculous attempt at playing the spy under a flag of truce,[2] and, after being released with contemptuous forbearance, had gone to Canada, under instructions from the rebel Government, to do what damage he could in connection with the refugees and escaped prisoners who fringed the Northern frontier during the last two years of the war. He immediately placed himself in communication with the disloyal Democrats of the Northern States, and through them and a band of refugees who at once gathered about him in Canada for employment began a series of operations which, for their folly no less than their malignity, would be incredible if they were not recorded in the report which Thompson himself, with amazing moral obtuseness, wrote of his mission on the 3d of December, 1864.[3] He states that immediately on his arrival in Canada he put himself in communication with the leading spirits of the Sons of Liberty. He was received among them with cordiality, and the greatest confidence was extended to him. They became convinced, during the summer of 1864, that their efforts to defeat the election of Mr. Lincoln were hopeless. "Lincoln had the power," he said, "and would certainly reëlect himself," and there was no hope but in force. The belief was entertained and freely expressed that by a bold, vigorous, and concerted movement the three great North-western States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio could be seized and held. This would naturally involve the accession of Missouri and Kentucky to the Confederacy, and this, in sixty days, would end the war. It was resolved to hold a series of peace meetings in Illinois for the purpose of preparing the public mind for such a revolt. The first of these meetings was to be held at Peoria, and "to make it a success," says Thompson, "I agreed that so much money as was necessary would be furnished by me." It was held, and was decidedly successful. But he pretends that the Niagara Falls conference and Lincoln's letter, "To whom it may concern," shook the country to such an extent that the leading politicians conceived the idea that Lincoln might be beaten at the ballot box on such an issue. "The nerves of the leaders," he says, "thereupon began to relax." The seizure of arms at Indianapolis, the arrests of leading supporters at Louisville, the unsympathetic attitude of Mr. McDonald, the Democratic candidate for governor of Indiana, all tended to discourage the ringleaders; and the day fixed for the revolt, which was to have been the 16th of August, passed by with no demonstration. "The necessity of pandering to the military feeling which resulted in the nomination of McClellan totally demoralized," says Thompson, "the Sons of Liberty."

Convinced that there was nothing to be expected from the coöperation of Northern Democrats, Thompson fell back once more upon his gang of escaped prisoners and other loose fish in Canada. The next scheme adopted by him was ingenious and audacious and not without possibilities of success. He determined to cap-

1 Holcombe to Benjamin, April 1, 1864.

2 "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," I., p. 462.

3 Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

ture the war steamer *Michigan*, plying on Lake Erie, and with her to liberate the rebel prisoners on Johnson's Island; the prisoners were then to march upon Cleveland, attacking that town by land and by water, and thence march through Ohio to gain Virginia. A man named Cole, formerly one of Forrest's troopers, was sent round the lakes as a deck passenger to inform himself thoroughly of the approaches to the harbors, the depositories of coal, the stations and habits of the *Michigan*. He performed his duty with energy and efficiency and with great satisfaction and amusement to himself. He invented an oil corporation of which he was president and board of directors, opened an office in Buffalo, and used a good deal of Thompson's money in making the acquaintance of the officers of the *Michigan*. The 19th of September was the day fixed for the attempt upon the *Michigan*, Cole having contrived to have himself invited to dine with the officers of the vessel on that day. A Virginian named John Yates Beall was assigned the more difficult and dangerous part of the enterprise. He, with twenty-five Confederates, took passage from Sandwich, in Canada, on board the *Philo Parsons*, an unarmed merchant vessel plying between Detroit and Sandusky; they were all armed with revolvers, and had no trouble in taking possession of the steamer and robbing the clerk of what money he had. They soon afterwards fell in with another unarmed steamer, the *Island Queen*, scuttled her, and then steered for Sandusky Bay to join Cole and the boats he had prepared in an attack upon the *Michigan*. But the plan miscarried. The military, aware of Cole's intentions, had captured him; and Beall, missing the signals which had been agreed upon, did not dare to proceed in the enterprise alone. He therefore returned to Sandwich, and his crew scattered through Canada. Beall was not content with the failure of this enterprise, and later in the season, in the middle of December, he was caught in the State of New York near the Suspension Bridge in an attempt to throw a passenger train from the West off the railroad track for the purpose of robbing the express company.[1] This was the third attempt which he had made to accomplish this purpose. He was in citizen's dress, engaged in an act of simple murder and robbery, yet he imagined that the fact that he had a Confederate commission in his pocket would secure him against punishment in case of capture. He was tried by court martial and sentenced to death. Mr. Jefferson Davis took the same view of the talismanic character of the Confederate commission upon which Beall had relied, and issued a manifesto assuming the responsibility of the act and declaring that it was done by his authority. There was great clamor in regard to the case, and many people of all parties pleaded with Mr. Lincoln to commute the sentence of Beall. A petition in this cause was signed by most of the Democratic members of the House of Representatives and by many Republicans. But the Judge-Advocate General reported that "Beall, convicted upon indubitable proof as a spy, guerrillero, outlaw, and would-be murderer of hundreds of innocent persons traveling in supposed security upon one of our great thoroughfares, fully deserved to die a felon's death, and the summary enforcement of that penalty was a duty which government owed to society."

Loath as Mr. Lincoln was at all times to approve a capital sentence, he felt that in this case he could not permit himself to yield to the promptings of his kindly heart. He sent a private message to General Dix, saying he would be glad if he would allow Beall a respite of a few days to prepare himself for death, but positively declined to interfere with the sentence, and Beall was hung in the latter part of February. The Virginia Senate made his case their own, and recommended, by resolutions of the 3d of March, the adoption of such steps as might be necessary in retaliation for the offense committed by the authorities of the United States.

Under Thompson's orders the large prison camps in the North had been thoroughly examined with a view of effecting the release of the Confederate prisoners confined in them. But the attempts at different places were given up for one reason or another, and it was resolved to concentrate all the efforts of the conspirators upon Camp Douglas at Chicago. A large number of rebels and their sympathizers were gathered together in that city, and the plan for taking the prison camp with its ten thousand Confederate prisoners was matured, and was to have been put into execution on the night of election day, taking advantage of the excitement and the crowds of people in the streets to surprise the camp, release and arm the prisoners of war, cut the telegraph wires, burn the railway stations, and seize the banks and stores containing arms and ammunition. It was hoped that this would excite a simultaneous rising of the Sons of Liberty throughout the State, and result in the release of the Confederate prisoners in other camps. But the plot, as usual, was betrayed by repentant rebels who were in the most secret councils of the conspirators. Shortly after midnight on the 7th of November, Colonel Sweet, commanding Camp Douglas, trapped in their various hiding-places and took prisoners all the leaders of the contemplated attack, among them Morgan's ad-

[1] General Orders No. 17, Feb. 21, 1865. Case of J. Y. Beall.

jutant-general, St. Leger Grenfell, Colonel Marmaduke, a brother of the rebel general, the commanding officer of the Sons of Liberty in the State, and several other officers of the rebel army who were escaped prisoners. In one house they found two cartloads of revolvers loaded and capped, two hundred stands of muskets loaded, and a large amount of ammunition.[1]

Mr. Thompson hesitated at nothing which he thought might injure the people of the United States. Any villain who approached him with a project of murder and arson was sure of a kindly reception. "Soon after I reached Canada," he says, "a Mr. Minor Major visited me and represented himself as an accredited agent from the Confederate States to destroy steamboats on the Mississippi River, and that his operations were suspended for want of means. I advanced to him $2000 in Federal currency, and soon afterwards several boats were burned at St. Louis, involving an immense loss of property to the enemy. . . . Money has been advanced to a Mr. Churchill of Cincinnati to organize a corps for the purpose of incendiarism in that city. I consider him a true man; and although as yet he has effected but little, I am in constant expectation of hearing of effective work in that quarter." Another miscreant of the same type, named Colonel Martin, who brought an unsigned letter from Jefferson Davis to Thompson, expressed a wish to organize a corps to burn New York City. "He was allowed to do so," says Mr. Thompson, "and a most daring attempt has been made to fire that city, but their reliance on the Greek fire has proved a misfortune. It cannot be depended on as an agent in such work. I have no faith whatever in it, and no attempt shall hereafter be made under my general directions with any such material." A party of eight persons, mostly escaped prisoners, were sent to New York to destroy that city by fire. One of them named Kennedy was captured, tried, and hung. Before his execution he confessed that he had set fire to four places: Barnum's Museum, Lovejoy's Hotel, Tammany Hotel, and the New England House; "the others," he said, with a certain sense of wrong, "only started fires where each was lodging, and then ran off. Had they all done as I did, we would have had thirty-two fires and played a huge joke on the fire department." This stupid tool of baser men escaped to Canada; but relying, as Beall did, on his commission as a captain in the Confederate army, he started once more for the Confederacy by way of Detroit, and was arrested by detectives in the railway station. He had taken on a new name and a new character; and in his trial, among the evidence he brought forward which he thought would insure his immunity, was a pledge given to the transportation agent in Canada to return with all due diligence to the Confederacy. Even after his sentence he had no realization of the crime he had committed. He wrote to the President arguing, as a matter of law, that death was too severe a penalty for arson, and suggesting that there was no need of punishing him as an example, since the execution of Beall had already served that purpose.

If Mr. Thompson is to be believed it would appear that his adherents in Canada were not altogether under discipline, and that they sometimes took the opportunity to indulge in occasional burglaries and murders on their own account. He said in his official report that he knew nothing of the St. Albans affair until after it was over. This was a crime of unusual atrocity, and bade fair, for the moment, to involve the most serious consequences. A party of Confederate thieves, some twenty or thirty strong, came over the border from Canada on the 19th of October, and entering the village of St. Albans in Vermont, they robbed the banks of some fifty thousand dollars, accompanying this crime with entirely uncalled for cruelty, firing upon the unarmed citizens, killing one man and wounding three; they also burned one of the hotels in the place. The *razzia* was over in less than an hour, and the band, who had stolen horses enough in the vicinity to mount them all, immediately returned to Canada. It seemed at first as if the Canadian authorities intended to arrest the criminals and hold them for punishment, and Mr. Seward, two days afterwards, expressed his gratification to the British legation at Washington for this prompt and apparently satisfactory proceeding. As it turned out, however, he spoke too quickly, for Judge Coursol discharged the criminals from custody and restored to them the money they had stolen. As soon as this intelligence reached New York, General Dix, outraged beyond endurance by the iniquity of the act, without consultation with the Government issued an order directing all military commanders on the frontier in case of further acts of depredation and murder to shoot down the murderers, or the persons acting under commissions from the rebel authorities at Richmond; and further instructing them that if it should be necessary, with a view to their capture, to cross the border between the United States and Canada, to pursue them wherever they might take refuge, and on no account to surrender them to the local authorities, but to send them to the headquarters of the Department of the East for trial and punishment by martial law. The

[1] Colonel Sweet's report to General Cook, Nov. 7, 1864.

President, who felt no less keenly than General Dix the wrong and outrage committed by these rebel murderers and the Canadian authorities who seemed to be protecting them, nevertheless declined to allow any subordinate to embroil the country with a foreign nation in this way;[1] and in spite of General Dix's vehement defense of what he called "the right of hot pursuit," the President required him to revoke the instructions quoted. The British Government directed Lord Monck, the Governor-General of Canada, to be guided by the decision of the proper legal authorities in the provinces whether persons in custody ought or ought not to be delivered up under the treaty of extradition, saying that in case the decision should have been that they ought to be delivered, the Government would approve Lord Monck's acting on this decision; and in case of the contrary decision, the Government suggested that they should be put upon trial on the charge of misprision and violation of the royal prerogative by levying war from her Majesty's dominions against a friendly power. The criminals whom Judge Coursol had released were again captured; the Canadian Parliament reproved the action of Coursol and suspended him from office. The prisoners having been again arrested, the matter was heard before Mr. Justice Smith of Montreal, who again discharged them, on the ground that Young, the ringleader of the party, bore a commission in the Confederate army;[2] that Mr. Clement C. Clay, an associate of Thompson's as Confederate commissioner, was aware of Young's purpose and gave him a check for four hundred dollars for his expenses. "The attack on St. Albans," he said, "must therefore be regarded as a hostile expedition, undertaken and carried out under the authority of the so-called Confederate States by one of the officers of their army." The prisoners, he held, had not acquired any domicile in Canada nor lost their national character by their residence there. The Government of Canada was not satisfied with this pettifogging plea and again arrested the prisoners; but the war having now come to an end, the case was languidly prosecuted and the criminals received no punishment. The Canadian authorities, however, desiring to maintain amicable relations with the United States and to do substantial justice in the case in spite of the courts, refunded the fifty thousand dollars stolen by the raiders, and an attempt was made in the provincial legislature to pass a law which should prevent the setting on foot of such unlawful expeditions from Canadian soil in the future.

1 This order of General Dix gave great satisfaction at Richmond. An official of the Confederate War Department entered in his diary December 19: "General Dix orders his military subordinates to pursue any rebel raiders even into Canada and bring them over. So light may come from that quarter. A war with England would be our peace."

2 There is an entry in "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," December 15, which would indicate that Young's commission was spurious or prepared after the fact: "A letter from G. N. Sanders . . . asks copies of orders, to be certified by Secretary of War, commanding the raid into Vermont, the burning, pillaging, etc., *to save Lieutenant Young's life.* I doubt if such written orders are in existence — but no matter."

LINCOLN AND THE CHURCHES.

In a conflict which was founded upon the quickened moral sense of the people it was not strange that the Government received the most earnest support from the churches. From one end of the loyal States to the other all the religious organizations, with few exceptions, moved by the double forces of patriotism and religion, ranged themselves upon the side of the Government against the rebellion. A large number of pulpits in the North had already taken their places as tribunes for the defense of popular freedom, and it was from them that, at the menace of war, the first cry of danger and of defiance rang out. Those ministers who had for years been denouncing the encroachments of slavery did not wait for any organized action on the part of their colleagues, but proclaimed at once in a thousand varying tones that peace was "a blessing worth fighting for." The more conservative churches were but little in the rear of the more advanced. Those who had counseled moderation and patience with the South on account of the divided responsibility for slavery which rested on both halves of the nation speedily felt the sense of release from the obligations of brotherhood when the South had repudiated and renounced them, and rallied to the support of the insulted flag with an earnestness not less ardent, and more steadily trustworthy, than that of the original antislavery clergy. As the war went on, and as every stage of it gave a clearer presage of the coming destruction of slavery, the deliverances of the churches became every day more and more decided in favor of the national cause and the downfall of human bondage. To detail the thousand ways in which the churches testified their support of the national cause, to give even an abstract of the countless expressions of loyalty which came from the different religious bodies of the country, would occupy many volumes; we can only refer briefly to a few of the more important utterances of some of the great religious societies.

In all the church conventions which met after the President's preliminary proclamation of the 22d of September, 1862, that act of liber-

ation was greeted with the heartiest expressions of approval and support. The Baptist Convention of New York declared that "While we see with the profoundest sorrow thousands of husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons falling on the battlefield, considering the interests to be preserved and transmitted to future generations we cannot regard the sacrifice of treasure and of life too much for the object to be secured." They denounced "human slavery as the procuring cause of the rebellion now raging among us"; they declared that "the spirit of the age, the safety of the country, and the laws of God require its entire removal." The American Baptist Missionary Union had, in the spring of 1862, adopted with unanimity resolutions characterizing "the war now waged by the National Government to put down the unprovoked and wicked rebellion that has risen against us, and to establish anew the reign of order and of law, as a most righteous and holy one, sanctioned alike by God and all right-thinking men"; expressing their opinion that "the principal cause and origin of this attempt to destroy the Government has been the institution of slavery," and that a safe, solid, and lasting peace could not be expected short of its complete overthrow. The next year they declared that the developments of the past year had only tended to deepen their conviction of these truths, which they solemnly reiterated and affirmed. They referred to the "fatal and suicidal blows" inflicted upon slavery by the slaveholders' rebellion, and said that "for thus overruling what appeared at first to be a terrible national calamity, to the production of results so unexpected and glorious, their gratitude and adoration are due to that wonder-working God who still maketh the wrath of men to praise him, while the remainder of wrath he restrains." They approved the President's proclamation and the acts of Congress abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories, and hailed the dawn of that glorious day when "liberty shall be proclaimed throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." In severe and dignified language they expressed their gratitude for whatever measure of sympathy they had received from abroad, but at the same time declared that the United States asked no assistance from other nations, and would brook no intervention or interference. In October, 1864, at a meeting of the American Board of Foreign Missions, in Worcester, Massachusetts, the venerable Albert Barnes was granted leave to introduce, without reference to a committee, a series of resolutions expressing the hearty sympathy of the Board in the efforts to suppress the rebellion; hoping for the deliverance of the world from the oppression of slavery; and gratefully acknowledging "the divine interposition in the success which has attended the arms of the nation as an indication that we shall again be one people, united under one glorious Constitution, united in our efforts to spread the Gospel around the world." These resolutions were adopted unanimously with great enthusiasm, the audience rising to their feet and singing the national anthem.

The State conferences of the Congregational churches passed similar resolutions from time to time. As a specimen of all we give an abstract of the resolutions of the Conference of Massachusetts in 1864. "The chief hope of rebellion is in the sympathy and distraction of a divided North, and the surest and shortest way to peace is not to recall our armies and to relax our grasp upon the enemy, but to present a united and loyal front and an unconquerable determination to prosecute the war till the power of the Government meets no longer armed resistance." They disclaim any feeling of despondency or of impatience, "believing that God is on our side," and interpret hopefully the divine delays which have "led to more and more radical and precious resolutions and deliverances," and assert roundly and with undaunted courage that "there can be no effectual reëstablishment of the national authority by any negotiation which confesses the inability of the Government to subdue rebellion by force of arms and proposes terms of peace to rebels still flying the flag of defiance."

It was not only in New England that the Congregational churches maintained this stern and patriotic attitude. The General Association of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania came boldly forward in the autumn of 1864, and, discarding all pretenses of non-partisanship or neutrality, declared for the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln in these unqualified words:

> As the momentous issues of this long and deadly contest are approaching their solution in a combined struggle in the field and at the polls, we will sustain with our votes the brave and noble men who are defending our liberties with their lives, and will animate our fellow-citizens by every consideration of religious hope and duty, of devotion to country and to liberty, to make the decision of the people on the 8th of November final and fatal to the hopes of traitors in arms and conspirators in political councils. Our hopes for the preservation of our liberties as a nation, and for the complete emancipation of the African race in the South, depend, under God, upon sustaining the Government in upholding the integrity of the Union throughout all the trials and doubts of the war, and in that policy which looks to the abandonment of slavery as the condition of permanent union and peace.

The German Reformed Synod passed ear-

nest resolutions urging upon their clergy and laity to continue to labor and pray for the success of the Government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion, and to restore peace and union. These resolutions were reiterated from year to year in every State where this church had an organization in existence. The Lutheran General Synod which met at York in 1864 passed resolutions denouncing slavery, setting forth "the necessity of its forcible suppression, the righteousness of the war which is waged by the Government of the United States for the maintenance of the national life, and the duty of every Christian to support it by the whole weight of his influence, his prayers, and his efforts." The Moravian Synod also denounced slavery and considered an earnest support of the Constitution and the laws a religious duty, and expressed its willingness "to render all the aid in its power to subdue unrighteous rebellion, and extend the rightful authority of the Government over every portion of our country."

One of the most weighty utterances of any religious organization during the war was that of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, which met at Columbus, Ohio, in the spring of 1862. Important as was this deliverance from the sanction which it carried, as the utterance of one of the most considerable religious organizations in the country, it was no less significant as the work of the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge of Kentucky, who held a position second to none in the border States in character, in political influence, and in social connections. This remarkable paper began with the praise of peace, but, in striking contrast to the many craven pleas based upon this theme during the war, it threw the blame of the violation of peace upon the disloyal and traitorous attempt to overthrow the National Government by military force.

> This whole treason [the report continues], rebellion, anarchy, fraud, and violence, is utterly contrary to the dictates of natural religion and morality, and is plainly condemned by the revealed will of God. It is the clear and solemn duty of the National Government to preserve, at whatever cost, the National Union and Constitution, to maintain the laws in their supremacy, to crush force by force, and to restore the reign of public order and peace to the entire nation by whatever lawful means are necessary thereunto. And it is the bounden duty of the people who compose this great nation, each one in his several place and degree, to uphold the Federal Government and every State Government and all persons in authority, whether civil or military, in all their lawful and proper acts, unto the end hereinbefore set forth.

The report denounces treason, rebellion, and anarchy as sinful, and gravely deprecates the conduct of the Southern synods in encouraging them. The concluding section says:

> We record our gratitude to God for the prevailing unity of sentiment and general internal peace which have characterized the Church in the States that have not revolted, embracing a great majority of ministers, congregations, and people under our care. It may still be called with emphasis a loyal, orthodox, and pious church, and all its acts and works indicate its right to a title so noble. Let a spirit of quietness, of mutual forbearance, and of ready obedience to authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, illustrate the loyalty, the orthodoxy, and the piety of the Church. . . . In the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus we earnestly exhort all who love God or fear his wrath to turn a deaf ear to all counsels and suggestions that lead toward a reaction favorable to disloyalty, schism, or disturbance, either in the Church or in the country. In all these respects we must give account to God in that great day, and it is in view of our own dread responsibility to the Judge of quick and dead that we now make this deliverance.

This austere and unqualified declaration of loyalty, this denunciation of a treason which was at that hour lifting a defiant and almost triumphant head through a great part of the Union, was adopted by a majority which, under the circumstances, is surprising. Two hundred and six ministers and ruling elders voted for it; only twenty voted against it; less than one in ten failed to rise to that height of moral and political duty. The keynote thus early set governed this powerful Church throughout the war. Its General Assembly, meeting at Newark, New Jersey, in 1864, adopted a long and most energetic report, declaring that

> the time has at length come, in the providence of God, when it is his will that every vestige of human slavery among us should be effaced, and that every Christian man should address himself with industry and earnestness to his appropriate part in the performance of this great duty. . . . Under the influence of the most incomprehensible infatuation of wickedness, those who are most deeply interested in the perpetuation of slavery have taken away every motive for its further toleration.

An attempt was made at the meeting of the Synod of New York to censure this action of the General Assembly of the Church, but it was voted down by a majority of six to one. The General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church passed equally strong and uncompromising resolutions:

> Believing it to be a duty especially incumbent on the Church to let her light shine, we trust that all the preachers of the Gospel, of every denomination, will hear and obey God's voice, now calling upon them louder than ever before to open their mouth in behalf of the dumb.

The Reformed Presbyterian Church, commonly called the "Scotch Covenanters," a[d]

dressed the President by committee in 1862, beginning with the proud boast that "this Church, true to its high lineage and ancient spirit, does not hold within its pale a single secessionist or sympathizer with rebellion in these United States." They congratulated him upon the antislavery measures of the Government and urged him,

> by every consideration drawn from the Word of God and the present condition of our bleeding country, not to be moved from the path of duty on which he has so auspiciously entered, either by the threats or blandishments of the enemies of human progress, nor the fears of timid friends.

Two years later they met and declared that —

> It is the duty of the Church of Christ to encourage and sustain the Government of the country in all that they do for the honor of God, the freedom of the enslaved, the mitigation of the inevitable evils of war, and the preservation, at all hazards, of the national life, integrity, and power.

The New School Presbyterians also lifted their voice with equal energy and clearness against the rebellion and in favor of the Government. At their General Assembly each year during the war they adopted resolutions of the most uncompromising loyalty, and on several occasions addressed the President personally with messages full of ardent devotion and high encouragement. They said:

> Since the day of your inauguration, the thousands of our membership have followed you with unceasing prayer, besieging the throne of grace in your behalf. . . . When we look at the history of your administration hitherto, and at the wonderful way in which the people have been led under your guidance, we glorify God in you.[1]

A year later[2] they embodied their sentiments of loyalty to the Union and opposition to slavery in a forcible series of resolutions, which were brought to Washington and presented to the President by a committee of which Mr. John A. Foote, a brother of the admiral, was chairman. The President replied:

> It has been my happiness to receive testimonies of a similar nature from, I believe, all denominations of Christians. . . . This to me is most gratifying, because from the beginning I saw that the issues of our great struggle depended on the divine interposition and favor. . . . As a pilot, I have used my best exertions to keep afloat our Ship of State, and shall be glad to resign my trust at the appointed time to another pilot more skillful and successful than I may prove. In every case and at all hazards, the Government must be perpetuated. Relying as I do upon the Almighty Power, and encouraged as I am by these resolutions which you have just read, with the support which I receive from Christian men, I shall not hesitate to use all the means at my control to secure the termination of this rebellion, and will hope for success.

Of the firm and loyal attitude of the Protestant Episcopal Church this resolution of the Convention of the Diocese of Pennsylvania may serve as an example:

> We hereby declare our unfaltering allegiance to the Government of the United States, and we pledge it our willing devotion and service; and as a body of Christians we will pray that, in God's own time and way, this rebellion may be put down; that oppression and slavery in all its forms may be done away; that freedom of body and mind, political and religious, may everywhere prevail; that the emancipated negroes, whom God in his providence is committing to our care, may be the objects of our liberal and Christian regard and instruction; that war may soon cease throughout all our borders, and that our now lacerated country may again be so united that from the lakes on the North to the gulf on the South, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, there shall be one Union, one Government, one flag, one Constitution, the whole culminating in that higher glory which shall make this nation Emmanuel's land — a mountain of holiness and a dwelling-place of righteousness.

No church was more ready or powerful in its support of the Government than the widespread Methodist Episcopal Church. From the beginning it took ground firmly and unanimously for the national cause; the Western armies especially were filled with the young and vigorous fighting men of that connection. To a committee of the General Conference of 1864, the President said:

> Nobly sustained as the Government has been by all the churches, I would utter nothing which might in the least appear invidious against any. Yet, without this, it may fairly be said that the Methodist Episcopal Church, not less devoted than the best, is, by its greatest numbers, the most important of all. It is no fault in others that the Methodist Church sends more soldiers to the field, more nurses to the hospitals, and more prayers to heaven than any other. God bless the Methodist Church. Bless all the churches, and blessed be God, who in this our great trial giveth us the churches.[3]

[1] Cincinnati, May 22, 1862. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 469.

[2] Philadelphia, May 27, 1863.

[3] In an address delivered by Dr. J. P. Newman in New Orleans, March 23, 1864, he makes this well-founded claim: "The Methodist Church has been unanimous and zealous in the defense of the Union. Her bishops, her ministers, and her laity have nobly responded to the call of their country in this hour of her peril. The voice of Simpson has been heard pleading eloquently for the union of the country. Ames, as patriotic as wise, has not hesitated to lend his aid to our unfortunate prisoners in Richmond and to give his sons to the army. Janes has found no narrow field for his philanthropic heart in the labors of the Christian Commission. All our church papers and periodicals have given an uncompromising, zealous, persistent support to the Government, and have thrown the whole weight of their influence, intelligent as it was potent, on the side of the Union."

These energetic expressions of loyalty were not confined to the Protestant churches alone. Archbishop Hughes in New York gave his great personal and ecclesiastical influence to the support of the Government, and Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati took occasion, in recommending the observance of Thanksgiving Day, 1864, to his people, to urge upon them the cause of the country.

> We confess [he says] that it has greatly pained us to hear that certain rash, irreverent, and thoughtless men of our communion have denounced and abused the Government, the Administration, and their abettors. Now God commands us to bless, and curse not. And when bad men cursed the supporters of the Government, did they not reflect that they cursed the more than hundreds of thousands of Catholic voters and Catholic soldiers of our army who defend that Government in the field? Did they not reflect that its downfall would be hailed with acclamation by our own hereditary oppressors across the ocean? Did they reflect that if political salvation is ever to reach a far-distant and beloved island, it must come to it from these United States which they would sever?

"The Administration did not commence this war," the archbishop said, and went on in his address to contrast the conduct of the National Government with that of the rebellion.

> It is time [he said, in conclusion] that all should rally around the powers which the Apostle commanded us to obey, and thus, presenting an undivided front to the enemy, reëstablish the Union, without which there can be no panacea, present or prospective, for the ills we suffer.

The Society of Friends occupied a peculiar relation to the war. By the two leading tenets of their religion they were drawn in different ways; they were intensely opposed both to slavery and to war. While, therefore, they were ready to favor every act of Mr. Lincoln's administration which promised to abridge the power and shorten the duration of slavery, they were placed in a cruel dilemma when called upon to take part in the only measures by which the country could be preserved, and the predominance of a government based upon slavery prevented. The result was as might readily be imagined. Human nature asserted itself in the midst of that serious and tranquil communion as everywhere else, and the Friends acted each according to his individual bent. In the words of the address of the Yearly Meeting of 1864:

> Many of our young men, overcome by the spirit of war, rushed into the conflict where some of them found an early death, some purchased their release from the draft by the payment of money; others remained steadfast to their faith in the hour of trial, thereby subjecting themselves to the penalty for desertion.

Those who entered the army illustrated in their plain speech and quiet courage the virtues of their lineage no less than those who, refusing to bear arms, bore uncomplainingly all that the law could inflict upon them by way of punishment for their contumacy. But the Society, as a body, remained outwardly true to both articles of its creed and protested constantly against both slavery and the war which it caused. The Yearly Meeting of 1862 greeted with hearty approval the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, while praying that the effusion of blood might be stayed; and that of 1864, while "appreciating the difficulties that surround those upon whom rests the responsibility of guiding the nation through the awful perils of civil war," and declining to "enter into judgment with those who differed" from them, still persisted in their dignified petition to the President and to Congress that they might not be compelled to offend their own consciences by complying with the law requiring military service.

Mr. Lincoln's attitude in relation to this question was especially delicate. Himself of Quaker ancestry, he felt a peculiar sympathy with their scruples, and yet he could not legally relieve them from their liabilities, and he clearly perceived the impolicy of recommending to Congress any specific measure of relief. He heard and answered their addresses with the greatest patience and respect, and intervened with his prerogative on occasions of peculiar hardship. We owe to these complications two or three letters, which strikingly exhibit his quick sympathies, his keen sense of justice, and his profound religious feeling. To the Quakers of Iowa, who had sent him an address through Senator Harlan, he wrote:

> It is most cheering and encouraging for me to know that in the efforts which I have made, and am making, for the restoration of a righteous peace to our country, I am upheld and sustained by the good wishes and prayers of God's people. No one is more deeply than myself aware that without his favor our highest wisdom is but as foolishness, and that our most strenuous efforts would avail nothing in the shadow of his displeasure. It seems to me that if there be one subject upon which all good men may entirely agree, it is in imploring the gracious favor of the God of nations upon the struggle our people are making for the preservation of their precious birthright of civil and religious liberty.[1]

To the Quakers of Rhode Island, in answer to a letter, he said:

> Engaged as I am, in a great war, I fear it will be difficult for the world to understand how fully I appreciate the principles of peace inculcated in this letter and everywhere by the Society of Friends.[2]

[1] Lincoln to Iowa Quakers, Jan. 5, 1862. Unpub. MS.

[2] Letter to Dr. S. B. Toby, March 19, 1862. Lincoln, Unpublished MS.

But one of the most significant of the President's letters, in which he expresses with less than his usual reserve his idea of the moral and religious bearings of the great conflict, was written to Mrs. Gurney, the wife of the eminent English preacher of the Society of Friends, in the autumn of 1864. It shows in a singularly touching and instructive way how the ancestral faith of the Quaker survived in this son of a pioneer, commander-in-chief of a million of men engaged in one of the most destructive wars of modern times:

MY ESTEEMED FRIEND: I have not forgotten — probably never shall forget — the very impressive occasion when yourself and friends visited me on a Sabbath forenoon, two years ago; nor has your kind letter, written nearly a year later, ever been forgotten. In all, it has been your purpose to strengthen my reliance on God. I am much indebted to the good Christian people of this country for their constant prayers and consolations, and to no one of them more than to yourself. The purposes of the Almighty are perfect, and must prevail, though we erring mortals may fail to accurately perceive them in advance. We hoped for a happy termination of this terrible war long before this; but God knows best, and has ruled otherwise. We shall yet acknowledge his wisdom, and our own error therein. Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best lights he gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends he ordains. Surely he intends some great good to follow this mighty convulsion, which no mortal could make, and no mortal could stay. Your people, the Friends, have had, and are having, a very great trial. On principle and faith, opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war. In this hard dilemma, some have chosen one horn, and some the other. For those appealing to me on conscientious grounds, I have done, and shall do, the best I could and can, in my own conscience, under my oath to the law. That you believe this I doubt not, and believing it I shall still receive for our country and myself your earnest prayers to our Father in heaven. Your sincere friend,

A. LINCOLN.

The most important agencies through which the mingled patriotism and religion of the country lent their assistance to the armies of the Union were the Sanitary Commissions and the Christian Commission. The former collected and disbursed not less than $5,000,000 in cash and $9,000,000 in supplies for the benefit of the armies in the field and the sick and wounded in the hospitals, while the Christian Commission raised some $4,500,000, not only for this purpose, but also to extend to the soldiers the benefits and consolations of religion in cases where the overworked army chaplains found the complete fulfillment of these offices beyond their powers. The Sanitary Fairs throughout the country were remarkable exhibitions of the patriotism and philanthropy of the people. They were carried on to a great extent by the women of the country, and the quickening of the national spirit by these concerted efforts was of more importance to the Union cause than even the vast sums of money which were produced; though these were unprecedented in the annals of charity. The fair at New York realized $1,300,000, nearly all of which was clear profit. On every great battlefield of the war, even before the thunder of the artillery was silenced, the trains of these great organizations were upon the field and their members were engaged caring for the wounded, bearing away the sick, praying with the dying, and receiving their last messages; while in every village of the North gentle and patriotic women were constantly employed making ready the stores of luxuries and delicacies dispensed by charitable agents at the front.

In the work of these beneficent agencies the President took a profound interest. He frequently consulted with Dr. Bellows and Mr. Stuart as to the best means of carrying on their work. Being requested to preside at a meeting of the Christian Commission held in Washington on the 22d of February, 1863, he wrote:

While for reasons that I deem sufficient I must decline to preside, I cannot withhold my approval of the meeting and its worthy objects. Whatever shall be, sincerely and in God's name, devised for the good of the soldiers and seamen in their hard spheres of duty can hardly fail to be blessed. And whatever shall tend to turn our thoughts from the unreasoning and uncharitable passions, prejudices, and jealousies incident to a great national trouble such as ours, and to fix them on the vast and long-enduring consequences, for weal or for woe, which are to result from the struggle, and especially to strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being for the final triumph of the right, cannot but be well for us all. The birthday of Washington and the Christian Sabbath coinciding this year, and suggesting together the highest interests of this life and of that to come, is most propitious for the meeting proposed.

The cause of the rebellion was adopted and carried on by the churches in the South, if not with more zeal and determination, at least with greater vehemence at the beginning than was shown by the religious organizations of the North. Even before the war began the State Convention of Baptists in Alabama[1] made haste to rush into secession, saying that "the Union had failed in important particulars to answer the purpose for which it was created," and that they held themselves "subject to the call of proper authority in defense of the sovereignty of Alabama, and of her right as a sovereignty to withdraw from the Union." Several of the Presbyterian Synods of the South went headlong into the rebellion before the close of the

[1] November, 1860.

year 1860, and others followed their example in the autumn meeting of 1861. They formed their General Assembly of the Southern Confederacy on the 4th of December of that year. Even before the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln the Protestant Episcopal Convention of several States formally withdrew from the Union, and that fiery soldier-priest Leonidas Polk, Bishop of Louisiana, commanded the clergy to shift their public prayers from the President of the United States to that of the Confederate States, and announced in a pastoral letter that "Our separation from our brethren of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States has been effected because we must follow our nationality. . . . Our relations to each other hereafter will be the relations we now both hold to the men of our mother church in England." Unable to restrain his ardor within the limits of the church militant, he exchanged his crozier for a sword and died by a cannon shot on the Georgia hills.

At the session of the first General Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church at Augusta an address was adopted congratulating the Church in the Confederate States upon the unity which existed in its councils, upon its promise of growth and expansion, and upon the fact that the leading minds of the new republic were of their own communion; they called upon the Church to make strenuous efforts in behalf of the slaves of the South, and gently advocated such an arrangement of their peculiar institution as not to violate the right of marriage among the blacks. "Hitherto," they say, "we have been hindered by the pressure of Abolitionists; now that we have thrown off from us that hateful and infidel pestilence, we should prove to the world that we are faithful to our trust, and the Church should lead the hosts of the Lord in this work of justice and mercy." Feeble efforts in this direction were made by churches in other communions in the South, but strong opposition was at once developed. In the Transylvania Presbytery it was argued that "Though the matter presented was one of undoubted grievance, involving a sin which ought to be purged away, yet, to prevent agitation in the Church at such a time of intense political strife, there must be no intermeddling," and a resolution in favor of the solemnization of matrimony among slaves was laid upon the table, nearly every member of the Presbytery voting against it.[1]

The Methodist Church in the South had separated from their brethren in the North fifteen years before the war on the question of slavery, and a portion of their clergy and laity when the war broke out naturally engaged in it with their accustomed zeal; but they were by no means unanimous, even within the seceding States, and the organization was virtually wrecked by the war.[2]

As the national authority began to be reëstablished throughout the States in rebellion, not the least embarrassing of the questions which generals in command were called upon to decide was that of the treatment of churches whose pastors were openly or covertly disloyal to the Union. There was no general plan adopted by the Government for such cases; in fact, it was impossible to formulate a policy which should meet so vast a variety of circumstances as presented themselves in the different regions of the South. The Board of Missions of the Methodist Church sent down some of their ablest ministers, with general authority to take charge of abandoned churches, and to establish in them their interrupted worship. The mission boards of other denominations took similar action, and the Secretary of War[3] gave general orders to the officers commanding the different departments to permit ministers of the gospel bearing the commission of these mission boards to exercise the functions of their office and to give them all the aid, countenance, and support which might be practicable. But before and after these orders there was much clashing between the military and the ecclesiastical authorities, which had its rise generally in the individual temperaments of the respective generals and priests. There was an instance in one place where a young officer rose in his pew and requested an Episcopal minister to read the prayer for the President of the United States, which he had omitted. Upon the minister's refusal the soldier advanced to the pulpit and led the preacher, loudly protesting, to the door, and then quietly returning to the altar himself read the prayer—not much, it is to be feared, to the edification of the congregation. General Butler arrested a clergyman in Norfolk, and placed him at hard labor on the public works for disloyalty

1 McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 548.

2 At a convention of loyal ministers and laymen of the Methodist Episcopal Church held at Knoxville, August, 1864, it was resolved that the loyal members of the conference have a just claim to all the church property; that they really constitute the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church, within the bounds of the Holston Conference; that they propose, at the earliest day practicable, to transfer the same to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States; and that the ministers be instructed to propose to their congregations to unite *en masse* with that church. Their report states "that there are in the bounds of the Holston Conference 120 preachers known to be loyal, and 40 others supposed to be true to the Union; and it is thought, therefore, that the work of reconstruction will be easily accomplished." [McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 546.]

3 March 10, 1864. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 522.

in belief and action; but the President reversed this sentence and changed it to one of exclusion from the Union lines.[1] The Catholic Bishop of Natchez having refused to read the prescribed form of prayer for the President, and having protested in an able and temperate paper against the orders of the commanding general in this regard, the latter ordered him to be expelled from the Union lines, although the order was almost immediately rescinded. General Rosecrans issued an order[2] in Missouri requiring the members of religious convocations to give satisfactory evidence of their loyalty to the Government of the United States as a condition precedent to their assemblage and protection. In answer to the protestations which naturally resulted from this mandate he replied that it was given at the request of many loyal church members, both lay and clerical; that if he should permit all bodies claiming to be religious to meet without question, a convocation of Price's army, under the garb of religion, might assemble with impunity and plot treason. He claimed that there was no hardship in compelling the members of such assemblages to establish their loyalty by oath and certificate, and insisted that his order, while providing against public danger, really protected the purity and the freedom of religion.

In the course of these controversies between secessionist ministers and commanding generals an incident occurred which deserves a moment's notice, as it led to a clear and vigorous statement from Mr. Lincoln of his attitude in regard to these matters. During the year 1862 a somewhat bitter discussion arose between the Rev. Dr. McPheeters of the Vine Street Church in St. Louis and some of his congregation in regard to his supposed sympathies with the rebellion. Looking back upon the controversy from this distance of time it seems that rather hard measure was dealt to the parson; for although, from all the circumstances of the case, there appears little doubt that his feelings were strongly enlisted in the cause of the rebellion, he behaved with so much discretion that the principal offenses charged against him by his zealous parishioners were that he once baptized a small rebel by the name of Sterling Price, and that he would not declare himself in favor of the Union. The difference in his church grew continually more flagrant and was entertained by interminable letters and statements on both sides, until at last the provost-marshal intervened, ordering the arrest of Dr. McPheeters, excluding him from his pulpit, and taking the control of his church out of the hands of its trustees. This action gave rise to extended comment, not only in Missouri, but throughout the Union. The President, being informed of it, wrote[3] to General Curtis disapproving the act of the provost-marshal, saying, in a terse and vigorous phrase, which immediately obtained wide currency, "The United States Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the churches. When an individual in a church, or out of it, becomes dangerous to the public interest he must be checked; but let the churches, as such, take care of themselves." But even this peremptory and unmistakable command did not put an end to the discussion. Taking the hands of the government away from the preacher did not quench the dissensions in the church, nor restore the pastor to the position which he occupied before the war; and almost a year later some of the friends of Dr. McPheeters considered it necessary and proper to ask the intervention of the President to restore to him all his ecclesiastical privileges in addition to the civil rights which they admitted he already enjoyed. This the President, in a letter[4] of equal clearness and vigor, refused to do. "I have never interfered," he said, "nor thought of interfering, as to who shall, or shall not, preach in any church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority"; but he continues, "If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. McPheeters back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that too will be declined. I will not have control of any church on any side." The case finally ended by the exclusion of Dr. McPheeters from his pulpit by the order of the presbytery having ecclesiastical authority in the case.

In this wise and salutary abstention from any interference with the churches, which was dictated by his own convictions as well as enjoined by the Constitution, the President did not always have the support of his subordinates. He had not only, as we have seen, to administer occasional rebukes to his over-zealous generals, but even in his own Cabinet he was sometimes compelled to overrule a disposition to abuse of authority in things spiritual. Several weeks after he had so clearly expressed himself in the McPheeters case, he found, to his amazement, that the Secretary of War had been giving orders virtually placing the army in certain places at the disposition of a Methodist bishop for the enforcement of his ecclesiastical decrees. He addressed to Mr. Stanton a note of measured censure,[5] which was followed by an order from the War Department explaining and modifying the more objectionable features of the

[1] Report of Judge-Advocate General, April 30, 1864.
[2] March 7, 1864. [3] Jan. 2, 1863. [4] Dec. 22, 1863.

[5] "After having made these declarations in good faith and in writing, you can conceive of my embar-

former document. The Secretary explained that his action had no other intention than to furnish "a means of rallying the Methodist people in favor of the Union, in localities where the rebellion had disorganized and scattered them."[1] This explanation was not entirely satisfactory to the President, but he thought best to make no further public reference to the matter. Scarcely was this affair disposed of when a complaint was received from Memphis of some interference by the military with a church edifice there. Mr. Lincoln made upon the paper this peremptory indorsement: "If the military have military need of the church building, let them keep it; otherwise, let them get out of it, and leave it and its owners alone, except for the causes that justify the arrest of any one."[2] Two months later the President, hearing of further complications in the case, made still another order, which even at the risk of wearying the reader we will give, from his own manuscript, as illustrating not only his conscientious desire that justice should be done, but also the exasperating obstacles he was continually compelled to surmount, in those troubled times, to accomplish, with all the vast powers at his disposition, this reasonable desire.

> I am now told that the military were not in possession of the building; and yet that in pretended execution of the above they, the military, put one set of men out of and another set into the building. This, if true, is most extraordinary. I say again, if there be no military need for the building, leave it alone, neither putting any one in or out of it, except on finding some one preaching or practicing treason, in which case lay hands upon him, just as if he were doing the same thing in any other building, or in the streets or highways.[3]

He at last made himself understood and his orders respected; yet so widespread was the tendency of generals to meddle with matters beyond their jurisdiction, that it took three years of such vehement injunctions as these to teach them to keep their hands away from the clergy and the churches.

Lincoln had a profound respect for every form of sincere religious belief. He steadily refused to show favor to any particular denomination of Christians; and when General Grant issued an unjust and injurious order against the Jews, expelling them from his department, the President ordered it to be revoked the moment it was brought to his notice.[4]

He was a man of profound and intense religious feeling. We have no purpose of attempting to formulate his creed; we question if he himself ever did so. There have been swift witnesses who, judging from expressions uttered in his callow youth, have called him an atheist, and others who, with the most laudable intentions, have remembered improbable conversations which they bring forward to prove at once his orthodoxy and their own intimacy with him. But leaving aside these apocryphal evidences, we have only to look at his authentic public and private utterances to see how deep and strong in all the latter part of his life was the current of his religious thought and emotion. He continually invited and appreciated, at their highest value, the prayers of good people. The pressure of the tremendous problems by which he was surrounded; the awful moral significance of the conflict in which he was the chief combatant; the overwhelming sense of personal responsibility, which never left him for an hour—all contributed to produce, in a temperament naturally serious and predisposed to a spiritual view of life and conduct, a sense of reverent acceptance of the guidance of a Superior Power. From that morning when, standing amid the falling snowflakes on the railway car at Springfield, he asked the prayers of his neighbors in those touching phrases whose echo rose that night in invocations from thousands of family altars, to that memorable hour when on the steps of the Capitol he humbled himself before his Creator in the sublime words of the second inaugural, there is not an expression known to have come from his lips or his pen but proves that he held himself answerable in every act of his career to a more august tribunal than any on earth. The fact that he was not a communicant of any church, and that he was singularly reserved in regard to his personal religious life, gives only the greater force to these striking proofs of his profound reverence and faith.

In final substantiation of this assertion, we subjoin two papers from the hand of the President, one official and the other private, which bear within themselves the imprint of a sincere devotion and a steadfast reliance upon the power and benignity of an overruling Providence. The first is an order which he issued on the 16th of November, 1864, on the observance of Sunday:

> The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observ-

rassment at now having brought to me what purported to be a formal order of the War Department, bearing date November 30, 1863, giving Bishop Ames control and possession of all the Methodist churches in certain Southern military departments whose pastors have not been appointed by a loyal bishop or bishops, and ordering the military to aid him against any resistance which may be made to his taking such possession and control. What is to be done about it?" [Lincoln to Stanton, MS., Feb. 11, 1864.]

1 Lincoln to Hogan, Feb. 13, 1864.
2 Lincoln MS., March 4, 1864.
3 Lincoln MS., May 13, 1864.
4 War Records, Vol. XVII., pp. 424, 530.

ance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service. The importance for man and beast of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the Army and Navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity. The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. "At this time of public distress [adopting the words of Washington in 1776] men may find enough to do in the service of their God and their country without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality." The first General Order issued by the Father of his Country after the Declaration of Independence indicated the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended. "The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier, defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country."[1]

The date of this remarkable order leaves no possibility for the insinuation that it sprung from any political purpose or intention. Mr. Lincoln had just been reëlected by an overwhelming majority; his party was everywhere triumphant; his own personal popularity was unbounded; there was no temptation to hypocrisy or deceit. There is no explanation of the order except that it was the offspring of sincere conviction. But if it may be said that this was, after all, an exoteric utterance, springing from those relations of religion and good government which the wisest rulers have always recognized in their intercourse with the people, we will give one other document, of which nothing of the sort can be said. It is a paper which Mr. Lincoln wrote in September, 1862, while his mind was burdened with the weightiest question of his life, the weightiest with which this century has had to grapple. Wearied with all the considerations of law and of expediency with which he had been struggling for two years, he retired within himself and tried to bring some order into his thoughts by rising above the wrangling of men and of parties, and pondering the relations of human government to the Divine. In this frame of mind, absolutely detached from any earthly considerations, he wrote this meditation. It has never been published. It was not written to be seen of men. It was penned in the awful sincerity of a perfectly honest soul trying to bring itself into closer communion with its Maker.

The will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both *may* be and one *must* be wrong. God cannot be *for* and *against* the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect his purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is probably true; that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By his mere great power on the minds of the now contestants, he could have either *saved* or *destroyed* the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began. And having begun, he could give the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds.

[1] General McDowell used to tell a story which illustrates Mr. Lincoln's Sabbatarian feeling. The President had ordered a movement which required dispatch, and in his anxiety rode to McDowell's headquarters to inquire how soon he could start. "On Monday morning," said McDowell; "or, by pushing things, perhaps Sunday afternoon." Lincoln, after a moment's thought, said, "McDowell, get a good ready and start Monday." [Herman Haupt, MS. Memoirs.]

Aug 1889

TO A PAINTER. (J. A. B.)

POET, whose golden songs in silence sung
Thrill from the canvas to the hearts of men,—
Sweet harmonies that speak without a tongue,
Melodious numbers writ without a pen,—
The great gods gifted thee and hold thee dear;
Placed in thy hand the torch which genius lit,
Touched thee with genial sunshine, and good cheer,
And swift heat lightnings of a charming wit
Whose shafts are ever harmless, though so bright;
Gave thee of all life's blessings this, the best,—
The true love of thy kind,— for thy delight.
So be thou happy, poet-painter blest,
Whose gentle eyes look out, all unaware,
Beneath the brow of Keats, soft-crowned with shadowy hair.

Celia Thaxter.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

CABINET CHANGES—LINCOLN REËLECTED—CHASE AS CHIEF-JUSTICE.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

CABINET CHANGES.

THE principal concession in the Baltimore platform made by the friends of the Administration to its opponents was the resolution which called for harmony in the Cabinet; and although no method was specified by which such harmony could be attained, it was no secret that the convention requested, and, so far as its authority went, required, that the Cabinet should be rendered homogeneous by the dismissal of those members who were stigmatized as conservatives. The President at first took no notice, either publicly or privately, of this resolution, and it was with something akin to consternation that the radical body of his supporters heard of the first change which occurred in his Cabinet after the convention adjourned. The resignation of Mr. Chase, whom the extreme radicals regarded as in some sort their special representative in the Government, took them entirely by surprise. The demonstration made by Mr. Wade and Mr. Davis some weeks later increased the feeling of restlessness among them, and brought upon the President a powerful pressure from every quarter to induce him to give satisfaction to the radical demand by the dismissal from the Cabinet of Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster-General, who had gradually attracted to himself the hostility of all the radical Republicans in the country. The unpopularity into which Mr. Blair had fallen among the radicals was one of those incidents that recall the oft-repeated simile that compares political revolutions to Saturn devouring his offspring. Mr. Blair was one of the founders of the Republican party. After graduating at West Point and serving for a year in the Seminole war, he resigned his commission in the army and began to practice law in St. Louis. He immediately gained high distinction in his profession, and became, while yet a young man, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. He returned to Maryland, and in 1855 was appointed solicitor of the United States in the Court of Claims. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise made a Republican of him. President Buchanan removed him from office in 1858 on account of his zealous antislavery attitude. He was counsel for the plaintiff in the famous Dred Scott case, and presided over the Republican convention of Maryland in 1860. With the exception of his brother Frank in Missouri, and Cassius M. Clay in Kentucky, he was beyond question the most prominent opponent of the extension of slavery in all the Southern States. The immediate cause which occasioned his loss of caste among the radical antislavery men was the quarrel which sprung up between his family and General Frémont in Missouri. In this also he had the mortification of feeling that he had nursed the pinion that impelled the steel. The reputation of General Frémont was the creation of the Blairs. It was at their solicitation that the President appointed the Pathfinder a major-general in the regular army, and gave him command of the important department of Missouri. So late as the 24th of August, 1861, General Frémont relied upon Montgomery Blair for all the support and assistance he required in Washington. The Postmaster-General, writing to him on that date, spoke of the President and his colleagues with the indiscreet frankness of confidential friendship. "Chase," he said, "has more horror of seeing treasury notes below par than of seeing soldiers killed, and therefore has held back too much, I think. I do not believe at all in that style of managing the Treasury." He goes on lamenting his lack of influence in the Government in a style which reminds us of Mr. Chase himself.

> This, I can see [he says], is partly my own fault. I have been too obstreperous, perhaps, in my position, and men do not like those who have exposed their mistakes beforehand and dun them with them afterwards. The main difficulty is, however, with Lincoln himself. He is of the Whig school, and that brings him naturally not only to incline to the feeble policy of the Whigs, but to give his confidence to such advisers. It costs me a great deal of labor to get anything done, because of this inclination in the mind of the President, or leading members of the Cabinet, including Chase, who never voted a Democratic ticket in his life. But you have got the people at your back, and I am doing all I

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can to cut red tape and get things done. I will be more civil and patient than heretofore, and see if that will work.

No man can be sufficiently sure of friends to write them such letters as this. A few months later Frémont was Blair's deadliest enemy, and these letters, being printed, came up like impertinent ghosts between the Postmaster-General and his colleagues at the Cabinet table.

In the beginning of this quarrel the Blairs were unquestionably right; but being unjustly assailed by the radicals, the natural pugnacity of their dispositions would not permit them to rest firmly planted on their own ground. They entered upon a course of hostility that was at first confined to their factious enemies, but which gradually broadened and extended till it landed them both in the Democratic party. Montgomery Blair was doubtless unconscious of his progress in that direction. He thought himself the most zealous of Republicans until the moment that he declared himself the most zealous of Democrats. Every admonition he received but increased the heat and energy with which he defended himself. The Union League of Philadelphia, towards the close of 1863, left out his name in the resolutions by which they elected all the rest of the Cabinet honorary members of the League. He chose to consider Mr. Winter Davis responsible for some attacks made upon him, and desired to defeat him in Maryland. The President, who had certainly no cause to show personal favor to Mr. Davis, said that as he was the choice of the Union men of Maryland he merited and should receive what friendly support the Administration could give him. Mr. Blair made a speech in Rockville touching upon the subject of reconstruction, and indulged in vigorous and somewhat acrid allusions to some of his leading Republican assailants. This brought upon him, and upon Mr. Lincoln, over his shoulders, much vehement criticism. It was in relation to this speech that the President said:

> The controversy between the two sets of men represented by Blair and by Sumner is one of mere form and little else. I do not think Mr. Blair would agree that the States in rebellion are to be permitted to come at once into the political family and renew their performances, which have already so bedeviled us, and I do not think Mr. Sumner would insist that when the loyal people of a State obtain supremacy in their councils and are ready to assume the direction of their own affairs they should be excluded. I do not understand Mr. Blair to admit that Jefferson Davis may take his seat in Congress again as a representative of his people. I do not understand Mr. Sumner to assert that John Minor Botts may not. So far as I understand Mr. Sumner, he seems in favor of Congress taking from the Executive the power it at present exercises over insurrectionary districts and assuming it to itself; but when the vital question arises as to the right and privilege of the people of these States to govern themselves, I apprehend there will be little difference among loyal men. The question at once is presented, in whom is this power vested? and the practical matter for discussion is how to keep the rebellious population from overwhelming and outvoting the loyal minority.[1]

It was about this time that the President wrote the letter of kindly and sensible advice to General Frank Blair which we have given in another place; a letter which, when published many months afterwards, gave great and lasting offense to the enemies of Blair in Congress and in the country. Although General Blair at this time retired from the contest for the speakership, the Postmaster-General continued, with equally bad taste and judgment, to oppose the nomination of Mr. Colfax for that place. Upon Colfax going to him in person and demanding the motive of his hostility, Mr. Blair was so indiscreet as to give as a reason for his opposition that Colfax was running as a Chase candidate.[2]

The opposition to Blair was not confined to the radical demonstrations in the Baltimore convention and out of it. Some of the most judicious Republicans in the country, who were not personally unfriendly to Blair, urged upon the President the necessity of freeing himself from such a source of weakness and discord. Even in the bosom of the Government itself a strong hostility to Mr. Blair made itself felt. While Mr. Chase remained in the Cabinet there was always a condition of smoldering hostility between the two men. Mr. Blair's enmity to Mr. Seward also became more and more violent in its expression, and his relations with Mr. Stanton were subject to a strain which was hardly endurable. There was still, however, so much in his character and antecedents that was estimable, the President had so deep a regard for both the Blairs, and especially for their father, that he had great reluctance to take any action against the Postmaster-General. In the middle of July, after the termination of Early's raid upon Washington, General Halleck, exasperated by the report of stringent and sarcastic remarks which Mr. Blair, under the provocation of the destruction by rebels of his property in the suburbs of Washington, had made, in reference to the laxity or poltroonery of the defenders of the capital, addressed an angry note to the Secretary of War, saying that he wished to know "whether such wholesale denouncement and accusation by a member of the Cabinet receives the sanction and approbation of the President of the United States.

[1] J. H., Diary, Nov. 1.
[2] J. H., Diary, Nov. 21.

If so," said General Halleck, "the names of the officers accused should be stricken from the rolls of the army; if not, it is due to the honor of the accused that the slanderer should be dismissed from the Cabinet." Mr. Stanton sent this letter of Halleck's to the President without comment. The President, on the same day, replied in his most masterful manner. After summarizing Halleck's letter, he said:

> Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I suppose such knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, I do not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would not dismiss a member of the Cabinet therefor. I do not consider what may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss is sufficient ground for so grave a step. Besides this, truth is generally the best vindication against slander. I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the Cabinet shall be dismissed.[1]

Not satisfied with this, the President, when the Cabinet came together, made them this impressive and oracular little speech:

> I must myself be the judge how long to retain in and when to remove any of you from his position. It would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure another's removal, or in any way to prejudice him before the public. Such endeavor would be a wrong to me, and, much worse, a wrong to the country. My wish is that on this subject no remark be made nor question asked by any of you, here or elsewhere, now or hereafter.[2]

This, we are inclined to think, is one of the most remarkable speeches ever made by a President. The tone of authority is unmistakable. Washington was never more dignified; Jackson was never more peremptory.

The feeling against Mr. Blair and the pressure upon the President to remove him increased throughout the summer. Henry Wilson wrote on the 5th of September, "Blair every one hates. Tens of thousands of men will be lost to you or will give a reluctant vote on account of the Blairs." The President's mail was filled with such appeals as this; but through the gloom and discouragement of midsummer he declined to act. There was a moment, as we have seen, when he lost heart in the campaign, and believed that the verdict of the country would be against him. Yet even then he refused to make the concession to the radical spirit which he was assured from every quarter would result so greatly to his advantage; but with the victories which came later in the season, and with the response of the country to the infamy of the surrender of the Chicago convention, there came a great and inspiring change of public opinion, and before the month of September ended the assured triumph of the Union cause became evident to one so capable as was Mr. Lincoln to discern and appreciate the signs of the times. He felt that it was his duty no longer to retain in his Cabinet a member who, whatever his personal merits, had lost the confidence of the great body of Republicans. He had learned also during the long controversy more than he had ever known before of the violent and unruly candor of the Postmaster-General. Exasperated by the attacks made upon him, there were no limits to Mr. Blair's jealousy and suspicion. He wearied the President by insisting upon it that all the leading Republicans were Lincoln's enemies. After Chase left the Cabinet he insisted that Seward and Stanton were in league against Lincoln; that Stanton went into the Cabinet to break down the Administration by thwarting McClellan, and that Seward was coquetting with the Copperheads. Mr. Lincoln listened to these denunciations with growing fatigue and impatience. He protested against them. He said once to Mr. Blair, in the presence of another, "It is much better not to be led from the region of reason into that of hot blood by imputing to public men motives which they do not avow."[3] Towards the end of September the President, reasonably sure of his reëlection, and feeling that he ought not any longer to delay complying with the demand of a party which was giving him so earnest and loyal a support, wrote this letter to the Postmaster-General:

> You have generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me it was at my disposal. The time is come. You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any other friend; and while it is true that the war does not so greatly add to the difficulties of your department as to those of some others, it is yet much to say, as I most truly can, that in the three years and a half during which you have administered the General Post-office, I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith.[4]

Mr. Blair accepted his dismissal in a manner which was to have been expected from his manly and generous character. He called upon the President at once, not pretending to be pleased at what had happened, but assuming that the President had good reasons for his action, and refraining from any demand for explanation. He went immediately to Maryland and busied himself in speaking and working for the Union cause, and for the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln. He made a

1 Lincoln to Stanton, July 14, 1864. MS.
2 Lincoln. MS.
3 J. H., Diary.
4 Lincoln to Blair, September 23, 1864.

speech a few days later in New York, at a great war meeting, in which he said that the action of the President in asking his resignation was suggested by his own father. All the family received this serious reverse in the temper of fighting men ready for all the chances of battle, and of bold players whose traditional rule of conduct when the cards go against them is, "Pay and look pleasant." General Blair wrote to his father that he was sure in advance that his brother had acted for the good of the country, and in the interest of the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln, in which he says "the safety of the country is involved."

> I believe [he continued] that the failure to elect Mr. Lincoln would be the greatest disaster that could befall the country, and the sacrifice made by the judge to prevent this is so incomparably small that I feel it would not cost him a pang to make. . . . He leaves the Cabinet with an untarnished name, and a reputation of having administered the department with the greatest ability and success; and so far as worldly considerations go, it is better for him to go out than to remain in the Cabinet. As to the future I have no fear. If Mr. Lincoln's reëlection is secured, no matter what his personal disposition may be towards us, or what his political necessities may compel him to do, if the country is saved and restored, those who have served it in its trials will some day be rewarded for the patriotism they have shown by a higher power than that of the President.

After the death of Judge Taney, Mr. Blair for a while indulged the hope that he might be appointed Chief-Justice, a position for which his natural abilities, his legal learning, his former judicial service, and his large acquaintance with the more important matters which would come before the court eminently fitted him; but the competition of Mr. Chase was too strong for any rival, however worthy, and he was chosen, to the bitter disappointment of the Blairs. Even this did not shake their steadfast loyalty to the Union cause, nor their personal fidelity and friendship to the President. Immediately after his second inauguration Mr. Lincoln offered Montgomery Blair his choice of the Spanish or the Austrian mission, an offer which was peremptorily though respectfully declined.[1]

Mr. Blair's successor in the Cabinet, ex-Governor William Dennison of Ohio, had been selected beforehand. The President informed him of his appointment in a curt telegram, and directed him to proceed to Washington as soon as possible. Mr. Dennison had rendered admirable service to the Government as governor of Ohio at the outbreak of the war. He was a gentleman of the highest character, of great ability and perfect integrity, and of peculiarly winning and gracious manners. We find among the President's papers a letter written by his intimate friend, David Davis, on the 2d of June, suggesting Governor Dennison as a proper person to preside over the Baltimore convention. Judge Davis says: "He is a pure, upright man, one of your most devoted friends. If, during this or your subsequent administration, you think it your duty to modify your Cabinet, in my judgment you could not get a wiser counselor than Governor Dennison." This, so far as we know, was the first, perhaps the only, suggestion made to the President in favor of Mr. Dennison for a place in the Cabinet. The claim of localities always had a disproportionate weight in his mind. When Mr. Chase resigned Mr. Lincoln appointed Governor Tod in his place, and after Tod had declined he was glad to find an opportunity to call another Ohio statesman into his Cabinet.

The reconstruction of the Cabinet went on by gradual disintegration rather than by any brusque or even voluntary action of the President. Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General, before the end of the year 1864 grew weary, not only of the labors of his official position, but also of the rapid progress of the revolution of which he had been one of the earliest advocates. Although heartily devoted to the cause of freedom and emancipation, he was wedded, by constitutional temperament and lifelong habit, to the strictest rules of law and precedent. Every deviation from tradition pained him inexpressibly. The natural and unavoidable triumph of the radical party in St. Louis politics, and to a certain extent in those of the nation, seemed to him the herald of the trump of doom. He grew tired of it all, and expressed to the President his desire for retirement. If he had not himself wished to retire, the President would probably not have suggested it; he was greatly displeased at an announcement made by Simon Cameron, as if upon his authority, that in the event of reëlection he would call around him fresh and earnest antislavery men. Mr. Lincoln, on hearing of this indiscreet and injurious statement, said, "They need not be so savage about a change in the Government. There are now only three left of the original Cabinet." He put a vacant judgeship at the disposition of the Attorney-General; but Mr. Bates declined it, not without some petulant remarks about the "uselessness of a legal system in a State dominated by the revolutionary spirit which then ruled in Missouri." He said he could not work in harmony with the radicals, whom he regarded as enemies of law and order; there was no such thing as a patriotic and honest American radical; some of the transcendental Republican Germans were honest enough in their moon-struck theorizing, but the

[1] Seward to Lincoln, March 9, 1865. MS.

Americans impudently and dishonestly arrogated to themselves the title of unconditional loyalty, when the whole spirit of their faction was contempt of and opposition to the law. "While the present state of things continues in Missouri there is no need of a court; so says Judge Treat, and I agree with him." Considering the subject of a successor to Mr. Bates, the President, his mind still hampered by the consideration of locality, weighed for several days the names of all the leading men of Missouri who were in any way fitted for the place, but found good reasons for rejecting them all. One of his secretaries said to him, "Why confine yourself to Missouri? Why not go to the adjoining State and take Judge Holt?" The President looked up with some surprise and said: "Why, that would be an excellent appointment. I question if I could do better. I had always intended, though I had never mentioned it to any one, that if a vacancy should occur on the Supreme Bench in any Southern district I would appoint him; but giving him a place in the Cabinet would not hinder that."

Mr. Bates tendered his resignation at last on the 24th of November.

> Heretofore [he said], it has not been compatible with my ideas of duty to the public and fidelity to you to leave my post of service for any private considerations, however urgent. Then the fate of the nation hung in doubt and gloom; even your own fate, as identified with that of the nation, was a source of much anxiety. Now, on the contrary, the affairs of the Government display a brighter aspect; and to you, as head and leader of the Government, all the honor and good fortune that we hoped for has come. And it seems to me, under these altered circumstances, that the time has come when I may, without dereliction of duty, ask leave to retire to private life. In tendering the resignation of my office of Attorney-General of the United States (which I now do) I gladly seize the occasion to repeat the expression of my gratitude, not only for your good opinion which led to my appointment, but also for your uniform and unvarying courtesy and kindness during the whole time in which we have been associated in the public service. The memory of that kindness and personal favor I shall bear with me into private life, and hope to retain it in my heart as long as I live. Pray let my resignation take effect on the last day of November.

A few days before the end of November the President offered the place of Attorney-General to Joseph Holt; but Mr. Holt, with that modesty and conscientiousness which formed the most striking trait of his noble character, believed that the length of time which had elapsed since he had retired from active service at the bar had rendered him unfit for the preparation and presentation of cases in an adequate manner before the Supreme Court, and therefore declined the appointment. The President was not at first inclined to accept this as a sufficient reason for declination; but on the 30th of November Mr. Holt wrote a letter formally reiterating his refusal to accept the appointment.

> After the most careful reflection [he said] I have not been able to overcome the embarrassments referred to at our last interview, and which then disinclined me to accept, as they must now determine me respectfully to decline, the appointment tendered in terms at once so generous and so full of encouragement. In view of all the circumstances, I am satisfied that I can serve you better in the position which I now hold at your hands than in the more elevated one to which I have been invited. I have reached this conclusion with extreme reluctance and regret; but having reached it, and with decided convictions, no other course is open to me than that which has been taken. I beg you will be assured that I am and shall ever be most grateful for this distinguished token of your confidence and good-will. In it I cannot fail to find renewed incentives to the faithful and zealous performance of the public duties with which you have already charged me.

Failing to secure Mr. Holt, the mind of the President turned naturally enough to another Kentuckian, Mr. James Speed, an able and accomplished lawyer, a man of high professional and social standing in his State, and the brother of the most intimate friend of the President's youth, Joshua F. Speed. Mr. Holt warmly recommended Mr. Speed. He said:

> I can recall no public man in the State, of uncompromising loyalty, who unites in the same degree the qualifications of professional attainments, fervent devotion to the Union and to the principles of your administration, and spotless purity of personal character. To these he adds — what I should deem indispensable — a warm and hearty friendship for yourself, personally and officially.

Soon after the opening of the new year Mr. Fessenden was again elected to the Senate from Maine, and resigned his office as Secretary of the Treasury. In his letter of resignation he said:

> I carry with me great and increased respect for your personal character and for the policy which has marked your administration of the Government at a period requiring the most devoted patriotism and the highest intellectual and moral qualities for a place so exalted as yours. Allow me also to congratulate you upon the greatly improved aspect of our national affairs, to which, and to the auspicious result of our prolonged struggle for national life, now, as I sincerely believe, so near at hand, no one can claim to have so largely contributed as the chosen Chief Magistrate of this great people.

The place thus vacated instantly excited a wide and spirited competition of recommendations. The principal bankers of Chicago joined in recommending Hugh McCulloch of Indiana, who had made a remarkably favorable official record as Comptroller of the Currency

in the supervision of the national banks; Governor Morgan was strongly presented by nearly the entire State of New York, though a few of the so-called radicals of that State joined with the great mass of the people of New England in recommending Governor Andrew, whose splendid executive qualities no less than his fiery zeal and patriotism had endeared him to the earnest antislavery people throughout the country. Both branches of the Maine legislature recommended ex-Vice-President Hamlin to take the place vacated by his distinguished colleague. Mr. Jay Cooke, who was carrying on with such remarkable success at that time the great funding operations of the Treasury Department, reënforced with his recommendation the demand of the Western politicians and bankers for Mr. McCulloch. Mr. Montgomery Blair, who still retained his friendly and confidential relations with the President, wrote to him on the 22d of February, saying that Mr. Hamlin did not wish his claim to be appointed Secretary of the Treasury urged upon the President; that Mr. Morgan positively refused the appointment. He supplemented these two important bits of information with the characteristic and irrelevant suggestion that Mr. Seward should leave the Cabinet, that Sumner should take his place, and that Governor Andrew might then succeed Sumner in the Senate. He also added that it would be a good thing to encourage Garibaldi to drive the French from Mexico. The President concluded to nominate Governor Morgan, who declined the honor. Mr. McCulloch was then appointed; upon which Mr. Usher, on the 8th of March, desiring, as he said, to relieve the President from any possible embarrassment which might arise from the fact that two members of the Cabinet were from the same State, resigned his place as Secretary of the Interior. The President indorsed the resignation, "Accepted, to take effect May 15, 1865." Before that date should arrive tremendous changes were to take place in the Government of the United States.

LINCOLN REËLECTED.

FROM the moment the Democratic convention named its candidates the stars in their courses seemed to fight against them. During the very hours when the streets of Chicago were blazing with torches, and the air was filled with the perfervid rhetoric of the peace men rejoicing over their work, Hood was preparing for the evacuation of Atlanta; and the same newspapers which laid before their readers the craven utterances of the Vallandigham platform announced the entry of Sherman into the great manufacturing metropolis of Georgia — so close together came bane and antidote. The convention had declared the war was a failure, and demanded that the Government should sue for terms of peace. Lincoln's reply three days afterwards was a proclamation announcing to the country "the signal successes that Divine Providence has recently vouchsafed" the people at Mobile and Atlanta, and calling for "devout acknowledgment to the Supreme Being in whose hands are the destinies of nations." He also tendered, by proclamation, the national thanks to Farragut, Canby, and Granger, and to General Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of their respective commands, and ordered that national salutes of one hundred guns should be fired on successive days from all the arsenals and navy yards in the United States in honor of these glorious victories. Thus, amid the prayers and thanksgivings of a grateful people, and the thunder and smoke of great guns uttering from their iron throats the general joy, the presidential campaign began. The darkest hour had come just before the dawn, and the light broadened on the political campaign from beginning to end.[1]

One of the earliest speeches of the autumn was made by Mr. Seward at his home in Auburn, New York.[2] He spoke avowedly without authority from the President, yet, as well from his intimacy with Mr. Lincoln as from his commanding place in the Administration, his speech demanded and received great attention. He said:

> While the rebels continue to wage war against the Government of the United States, the military measures affecting slavery, which have been adopted from necessity to bring the war to a speedy and successful end, will be continued, except so far as practical experience shall show that they can be modified advantageously, with a view to the same end. When the insurgents shall have disbanded their armies and laid down their arms the war will instantly cease; and all the war measures then existing, including those which affect slavery, will cease also; and all the moral, economical, and political questions, as well questions affecting slavery as others, which shall then be existing between individuals and States and the Federal Government, whether they arose before the civil war began, or whether they grew out it, will, by force of the Constitution, pass over to the arbitrament of courts of law and to the councils of legislation.

Referring to the Chicago declaration in favor of the immediate cessation of hostilities, and

[1] The Rev. Dr. Thompson, calling on the President soon after this, congratulated him on the improved aspect of politics, and asked him whether he attributed it in greater part to the Chicago platform or to the victory at Atlanta. "I should say the victory," Mr. Lincoln answered; "at least, I should prefer to have that repeated."

[2] September 3, 1864.

the paralyzing effect on the action of the Government which would follow the success of the Democrats upon such a platform, he asked, in that contingency, "Who can vouch for the safety of the country against the rebels during the interval which must elapse before the new Administration can constitutionally come into power?"[1] The opposition journalists immediately seized upon this as a threat that the Administration was determined to keep itself in power whatever might be the verdict of the people, and this clamor went on until the President, as we shall show, put an effectual quietus upon it.

Mr. Lincoln himself took little part in the contest. He was forced, from time to time, to assist with his presence charitable demonstrations in favor of the sick and wounded soldiers; and being always obliged on these occasions to say a few words, he acquitted himself of these necessary tasks with dignity and discretion. He made no personal reference to his opponents, and spoke of his enemies North and South with unfailing charity and moderation. Regiments of soldiers returning to their homes after their term of service was over sometimes called upon him, and in brief and pithy speeches he thanked them for calling, and always added a word or two of wise or witty political thought. Speaking to an Ohio regiment, he defined in one phrase the essential character of our republican government with more accuracy and clearness than ever Jefferson had done:

I wish it might be more generally and universally understood what the country is now engaged in. We have, as all will agree, a free government, where every man has a right to be equal with every other man. In this great struggle this form of government, and every form of human rights, is endangered if our enemies succeed. . . . There is involved in this struggle the question whether your children and my children shall enjoy the privileges we have enjoyed. . . . When you return to your homes, rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free government, and we will carry out the great work we have commenced.

To another regiment he said:

I happen, temporarily, to occupy this house. I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has done. It is in order that each one of you may have, through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and intelligence — that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life with all its desirable human aspirations — it is for this that the struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright. . . . The nation is worth fighting for to secure such an inestimable jewel.

Being invited to attend a Union mass meeting at Buffalo, the President at first thought of writing a letter, and we find among his papers the following fragment in his own manuscript:

Yours inviting me to attend a Union mass meeting at Buffalo is received. Much is being said about peace, and no man desires peace more ardently than I. Still I am yet unprepared to give up the Union for a peace which, so achieved, could not be of much duration. The preservation of our Union was *not* the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It was commenced for precisely the reverse object — *to destroy our Union*. The insurgents commenced it by firing upon the *Star of the West* and on Fort Sumter, and by other similar acts. It is true, however, that the Administration accepted the war thus commenced for the sole avowed object of preserving our Union; and it is not true that it has since been, or will be, prosecuted by this Administration for any other object. In declaring this I only declare what I can know, and do know, to be true, and what no other man can know to be false.

In taking the various steps which have led to my present position in relation to the war, the public interest and my private interest have been perfectly parallel, because in no other way could I serve myself so well as by truly serving the Union. The whole field has been open to me where to choose. No place-hunting necessity has been upon me urging me to seek a position of antagonism to some other man, irrespective of whether such position might be favorable or unfavorable to the Union.

Of course, I may err in judgment; but my present position in reference to the rebellion is the result of my best judgment, and, according to that best judgment, it is the only position upon which any executive can or could save the Union. Any substantial departure from it insures the success of the rebellion. An armistice — a cessation of hostilities — is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for. Any different policy in regard to the colored man deprives us of his help, and this is more than we can bear. We cannot spare the hundred and forty or fifty thousand now serving us as soldiers, seamen, and laborers. This is not a question of sentiment or taste, but one of physical force, which may be measured and estimated as horse-power and steam-power are measured and estimated. Keep it, and you can save the Union. Throw it away, and the Union goes with it. Nor is it possible for any administration to retain the services of these

[1] Ten days later, when Mr. Seward had returned to Washington, he said, in answer to a serenade: "The Democracy of Chicago, after waiting six weeks to see whether this war for the Union is to succeed or fail, finally concluded that it would fail, and therefore went in for a nomination and platform to make it a sure thing by a cessation of hostilities and an abandonment of the contest. At Baltimore, on the contrary, we determined that there should be no such thing as failure, and therefore we went in to save the Union by battle to the last. Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations, and the elections in Vermont and Maine prove the Baltimore nominations stanch and sound. The issue is thus squarely made up — McClellan and disunion, or Lincoln and Union."

people with the express or implied understanding that upon the first convenient occasion they are to be reënslaved. It cannot be, and it ought not to be.

After he had written thus far he seems to have changed his mind as to the good taste or the expediency of aiding even thus far in his own canvass. He therefore laid his letter aside and wrote a brief note[1] declining to address the meeting, on the ground, first, that it would be a breach of precedent, and, secondly, that if he once began to write letters it would be difficult to discriminate between meetings having equal claims.

Although the dignity and self-control with which Mr. Lincoln held himself aloof from the work of the canvass has been generally acknowledged, there is one incident of the campaign which was the object of severe criticism at the time. Governor Johnson, in accordance with the request of the State convention of Tennessee, had issued a proclamation[2] specifying the manner in which the vote for presidential electors should be taken, the qualification of voters, and the oath which they should be required to take. The Democratic candidates on the electoral ticket of that State, regarding themselves aggrieved by these requirements of the convention and the governor, united in a protest against this proceeding, and one of their number, a Mr. Lellyet, was sent to present the protest in person.[3] In the account of his interview with the President, which he published in the newspapers, Mr. Lellyet said that the President told him "he would manage his side of this contest in his own way, and the friends of General McClellan could manage their side in theirs." It is not impossible that, in a moment of irritation at the presentation of a petition which was in itself an insinuation that he was making a selfish and corrupt use of his power, the President may have treated Mr. Lellyet with scant courtesy; but he took the protest, nevertheless, and told him he would answer it at his convenience. There is certainly nothing of malice or of petulance in the grave and serious tone of the reply which the President sent a few days later to the McClellan electors of Tennessee. He informed them that he had had no communication whatever with Governor Johnson on the subject of his proclamation; that he had given to the subject such consideration as was in his power in the midst of so many pressing public duties.

> My conclusion is [he said] that I can have nothing to do with the matter, either to sustain the plan as the convention and Governor Johnson have initia ed it, or to revoke or modify it as you demand. By the Constitution and laws the President is charged with no duty in the conduct of a presidential election in any State; nor do I, in this case, perceive any military reason for his interference in the matter.
>
> The movement set on foot by the convention and Governor Johnson does not, as seems to be assumed by you, emanate from the National Executive. In no proper sense can it be considered other than as an independent movement of at least a portion of the loyal people of Tennessee.
>
> I do not perceive in the plan any menace of violence or coercion towards any one. Governor Johnson, like any other loyal citizen of Tennessee, has the right to favor any political plan he chooses, and, as military governor, it is his duty to keep the peace among and for the loyal people of the State. I cannot discern that by this plan he purposes any more.
>
> But you object to the plan. Leaving it alone will be your perfect security against it. Do as you please on your own account, peacefully and loyally, and Governor Johnson will not molest you, but will protect you against violence so far as in his power.
>
> I presume the conducting of a presidential election in Tennessee in strict accordance with the old code of the State is not now a possibility.
>
> It is scarcely necessary to add that if any election shall be held, and any vote shall be cast in the State of Tennessee for President and Vice-President of the United States, it will belong not to the military agents, nor yet to the Executive Department, but exclusively to another department of the Government, to determine whether they are entitled to be counted in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Except it be to give protection against violence, I decline to interfere in any way with any presidential election.[4]

The McClellan electors thereupon withdrew from the contest; Lincoln and Johnson electors were chosen, but their votes were not counted by Congress.

The most important utterance of the President during the campaign was a speech which he made on the evening of the 19th of October, in which he referred to the construction which had been placed on the remarks of the Secretary of State at Auburn, already quoted. He thought the distorted and unjust conclusions which had been drawn from Seward's remarks had gone far enough and that the time had come to put an end to them, and he seized, for that purpose, the occasion of a serenade from a party of loyal Marylanders who were celebrating in Washington the victory which the party of emancipation had gained in the elections in their State. He said a few words of congratulation upon that auspicious event, and then added:

> A word upon another subject. Something said by the Secretary of State, in his recent speech at Auburn, has been construed by some into a threat that if I shall be beaten at the election I will, between then and the end of my constitutional term, do what I may be able to ruin the Government. Others regard the fact that the Chicago convention

[1] Lincoln to Schermerhorn, Sept. 12, 1864. MS.
[2] Sept. 30, 1864. [3] Oct. 16, 1864.
[4] Lincoln to William B. Campbell *et al.*, Oct. 22, 1864.

adjourned, not *sine die*, but to meet again, if called to do so by a particular individual, as the intimation of a purpose that if their nominee shall be elected he will at once seize control of the Government. I hope the good people will permit themselves to suffer no uneasiness on either point.

I am struggling to maintain government, not to overthrow it. I am struggling especially to prevent others from overthrowing it. I therefore say that if I shall live I shall remain President until the 4th of next March; and that whoever shall be constitutionally elected therefor, in November, shall be duly installed as President on the 4th of March; and that, in the interval, I shall do my utmost that whoever is to hold the helm for the next voyage shall start with the best possible chance to save the ship.

This is due to the people both on principle and under the Constitution. Their will, constitutionally expressed, is the ultimate law for all. If they should deliberately resolve to have immediate peace, even at the loss of their country and their liberty, I know not the power or the right to resist them. It is their own business, and they must do as they please with their own. I believe, however, they are still resolved to preserve their country and their liberty; and in this, in office or out of it, I am resolved to stand by them.[1]

During the progress of the campaign Mr. Lincoln was frequently called upon to assist his friends, to oppose his enemies, and to exercise his powerful influence in appeasing discords in different States and districts. He interfered as little as possible, and always in the interests of the party at large, rather than in those of individuals. He took no account of the personal attitude of candidates towards himself. In the case of those who were among his intimate friends he would go no further than to demand that Government officers should not work against them. When Mr. Arnold of Chicago, who had incurred the hostility of Mr. Scripps, the postmaster at that place, complained of the opposition of that official and called upon the President to put a stop to it, the President would do nothing more than to order the offending postmaster to content himself with the exercise of his own rights as a citizen and a voter and to allow his subordinates to do the same. The postmaster answered, as was natural, that this was precisely what he had been doing, and that this was the source of Mr. Arnold's complaint; that the congressman wanted his active official assistance, and would be satisfied with nothing less. Although Arnold was an intimate and valued friend of the President, he declined to exercise any further pressure upon the postmaster, and Mr. Arnold soon afterwards withdrew from the contest. After candidates had been regularly and fairly nominated, the President had no hesitation in doing all in his power to conciliate hostilities and to unite the party in support of them. He tolerated in these cases no factious or malicious opposition on the part of his office-holders, and he laid his hands most heavily upon those injudicious friends of his own who attempted to defeat the reëlection of Republican congressmen who had not been especially friendly to him. A large number of the leading Republicans in Roscoe Conkling's district had declared their intention to oppose him. Mr. Conkling's friends appealed to the President, claiming that the Republican opposition to him had its rise and origin among friends of the Secretary of State. The President commended their complaint to the attention of Mr. Seward, and answered for himself: "I am for the regular nominee in all cases, and no one could be more satisfactory to me as the nominee in that district than Mr. [Roscoe] Conkling. I do not mean to say there are not others as good as he in the district, but I think I know him to be at least good enough."[2] Being informed of some hostility on the part of the custom-house officials in New York against Frederick A. Conkling, he wrote similar admonitions to them. The postmaster of Philadelphia being accused of interference against William D. Kelley, the President sent for him, and following his custom in grave matters, he read to him a reprimand which he had committed to paper in the following words:

> Complaint is made to me that you are using your official power to defeat Judge Kelley's renomination to Congress. I am well satisfied with Judge Kelley as a member of Congress, and I do not know that the man who might supplant him would be as satisfactory; but the correct principle, I think, is that all our friends should have absolute freedom of choice among our friends. My wish, therefore, is that you will do just as you think fit with your own suffrage in the case, and not constrain any of your subordinates to do other than as he thinks fit with his. This is precisely the rule I inculcated and adhered to on my part when a certain other nomination now recently made was being canvassed for.[3]

The reform of the civil service had not at that time been formulated by its friends, nor even adopted in principle by the country at large, yet it would be difficult even in the light of this day to improve upon this statement of its essential principle as applied to the conduct of office-holders. The postmaster, of course, promised exact obedience; but later in the summer the President was informed, on authority that he credited, that of the two or three hundred employees in the post-office not one of them was openly in favor of the renomination of Judge Kelley. Upon learning

[1] Autograph MS.
[2] Lincoln to Ward Hunt, Aug. 16, 1864. MS.
[3] June 20, 1864. MS.

this, Mr. Lincoln wrote to an influential friend in Philadelphia, stating these facts and adding:

> This, if true, is not accidental.. Left to their free choice, there can be no doubt that a large number of them, probably as much or more than half, would be for Kelley. And if they are for him and are not restrained they can put it beyond question by publicly saying so. Please tell the postmaster he must find a way to relieve me from the suspicion that he is not keeping his promise to me in good faith.[1]

The postmaster felt at last the hand of iron under the velvet glove, and Kelley was renominated and reëlected, as he has been ever since — to the honor and advantage of his district and State.

The summer was full of brief panics and flurries among the politicians, and they were continually rushing to Mr. Lincoln to urge him to action or inaction in the interests of the canvass. We believe there is no instance in which he yielded to these solicitations. A matter of especial difficulty was the draft for half a million of men which had been issued on the 18th of July. Leading Republicans all over the country, fearing the effect of the draft upon the elections, begged the President to withdraw the call or suspend operations under it. Mr. Cameron, so late as the 19th of October, after the State elections had been secured, advised against the draft in Philadelphia. Mr. Chase on the same day telegraphed from Ohio, which had been carried triumphantly by the Republicans a few days before, recommending the suspension of the draft for three weeks — Chief-Justice Taney having died a week before. Judge Johnston of Ohio reports that he was with the President when a committee came from Ohio to request him to suspend the draft until after the elections, and that Mr. Lincoln quietly answered, "What is the Presidency worth to me if I have no country?" But these solicitations were not all in the same direction. General Sherman telegraphed from the field, "If the President modifies the draft to the extent of one man, or wavers in its execution, he is gone forever; the army would vote against him." The politicians and the general probably exaggerated in equal measure; the army would not have rejected him if he had seen fit to suspend the draft; and the people stood by him in his refusal to do it. He went so far in compliance with the earnest request of the Union people in Indiana as to write to Sherman expressing his sense of the importance of allowing as many of the Indiana soldiers as possible to go home to vote. Most of the other States which voted in October allowed their soldiers to vote in the field. Indiana had not passed the necessary legislation for this purpose. The draft was steadily proceeding in that State, and, in the opinion of the leading men there, was endangering the success of the Union party in the elections. "Anything you can safely do," Mr. Lincoln wrote, "to let her soldiers, or any part of them, go home and vote at the State election will be greatly in point. They need not remain for the presidential elections, but may return to you at once."[2] He was careful, however, not to urge General Sherman to any course of action which he might consider injurious. "This is," he added, "in no sense an order, but is merely intended to impress you with the importance, to the army itself, of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the judge of what you can safely do." There were also reports from Missouri that Rosecrans was inclined to deny the soldiers the right of attending the elections, on the assumed ground that they would get drunk and make disturbance. The President, on being informed of this, quoted to Rosecrans the following words from the letter which he had written to Schofield: "'At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restrictions laid by the Missouri convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion.' This," said Lincoln, "I thought right then and think right now, and I may add I do not remember that either party complained after the election of General Schofield's action under it. Wherever the law allows soldiers to vote, their officers must also allow it."[3]

The opposition to Mr. Lincoln within the ranks of his own party did not entirely die away, even after the Chicago nomination and the changed political prospect which immediately followed it. So late as the 20th of September Thurlow Weed wrote to Mr. Seward that

> The conspiracy against Mr. Lincoln collapsed on Monday last. It was equally formidable and vicious, embracing a larger number of leading men than I had supposed possible. Knowing that I was not satisfied with the President, they came to me for coöperation; but my objection to Mr. Lincoln is that he has done too much for those who now seek to drive him out of the field. Their last meeting was early last week at the house of Dudley Field, which was attended by Greeley, George Wilkes, Tilton, Opdyke, Noyes, and twenty-five others of the same stripe.

He also stated that a circular had been sent to leading Republicans in other States inquiring as to the feasibility of making another nomination for President at that time; that the malcontents, finding themselves in solitude, had concluded to break up operations and try to control the regular State convention.

[1] Lincoln to McMichael, Aug. 5, 1864. MS.
[2] Lincoln to Sherman, Sept. 19, 1864. MS.
[3] Lincoln to Rosecrans, Sept. 26, 1864. MS.

After every semblance of open hostility had disappeared everywhere else in the country the fire of faction still kept it alive in Missouri. A singular state of things existed there. The radical party had almost entirely absorbed the Union sentiment of the State; the conservative party, the President's friends, had almost ceased to exist. The incumbents of the Government offices, a few of the intimate personal friends of Blair, still stood out against the radicals; and so long as this attitude was maintained the radicals, while working vigorously for their State and local tickets, refused to avow themselves in favor of Lincoln. So far as can be ascertained the only reason for this absurd position was that the "Clay Banks," as the conservatives were called, wished the radicals to declare for Lincoln as a pretext by which they could join the vast majority of their party, and the radicals spitefully refused to allow them this accommodation. Mr. Fletcher, the radical candidate for governor, refused during the greater part of the campaign to make any public statement that he would vote for Lincoln. His reason for this, privately given, was that he feared such an announcement would alienate from his support a large number of the more furious anti-Lincoln Germans. At last, however, he concluded to declare for the regular Republican presidential ticket, and a meeting was appointed for the purpose; but, to the astonishment of the moderate Union men, he went no further at this meeting than to say he would not vote for McClellan, and in explanation of this singular performance he told the President's private secretary [1] that he had found at the hotel where his speech was made a letter of the "Clay Bank" committee offering their support on condition of his declaring for Lincoln, and that he would not be coerced into it. The President sent messages to the moderate Unionists expressing his desire that the absurd and futile quarrel should come to an end, and they, to do them justice, desired nothing more. The only condition of their support which they made was that candidates should declare themselves for Lincoln, which they in turn would have been willing to do if it were not that the "Clay Banks" requested it.

> So far as practical results went the party was united enough [Mr. Nicolay reported]; it seems to be well understood that, with the exception of very few impracticables, the Union men will cast their votes for you, for the radical congressmen, for the emancipation candidates, for the State legislature and the State convention, so that in practice nearly everybody is right and united, while in profession everybody is wrong or at cross purposes.

This was surmised while the clatter of factious fighting was going on, and was abundantly proved by the result. While the radical candidate for governor only claimed that he would be elected by a majority of ten thousand, which claim by many of his party was considered sanguine, when the votes were counted it was found that Lincoln had carried the State by the immense majority of forty thousand.

The electoral contest began with the picket firing in Vermont and Maine in September, was continued in what might be called the grand guard fighting in October, in the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, and the final battle all along the line took place in November. Vermont and Maine were carried by good Republican majorities, the canvass in the latter State having been managed by James G. Blaine with a dash and energy which gave a presage of his future career. Before the October elections came on, auguries of Republican success had become so significant and universal that there was little doubt in the best-informed political circles of the result. The President, however, was too old a politician to be sure of anything until the votes were counted, and it was not without some natural trepidation that on the evening of the 11th of October he walked over to the War Department to get from the telegraphic instruments the earliest intimations of the course of the contest. The first dispatch he received contained the welcome intelligence of the election of Rutherford B. Hayes and his Republican colleague from the hard-fought Cincinnati districts. Next came dispatches announcing a Republican majority in Philadelphia and indicating a similar result in the State of Pennsylvania. The news continued very much in the same strain during the evening, and the President in the lull of dispatches read aloud to Stanton and Dana selected chapters of the Nasby papers. As the votes of the soldiers in the different camps in the vicinity of Washington began to be reported they were found to be nearly unanimous in favor of the Republican candidate, the proportion among Western troops being generally that of ten to one: among the Eastern troops, although there was everywhere a majority, it was not so large. Carver Hospital, by which Lincoln and Stanton passed every day on their way to the country, gave the heaviest opposition vote reported — about one out of three. Lincoln turned to the Secretary and said, "That 's hard on us, Stanton! They know us better than the others." The sum of the day's work was of enormous importance. Indiana indicated a gain of thirty thousand in two years. Governor Morton and the entire Republican ticket were elected by twenty thousand majority, with the gain of four congressmen. Pennsylvania, whose representatives in

[1] Nicolay to Lincoln, Oct. 18, 1864. MS.

Congress had been equally divided, now changed their proportion to fifteen against nine, and made her legislature strongly Republican in both branches, with popular majorities ranging from ten to fifteen thousand. The Unionists carried Ohio by a majority of over fifty-four thousand and effected a complete revolution in her representation in Congress; for while in 1862 she had elected fourteen Democrats and five Republicans, she now sent to Washington seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. But the success of the day which lay nearest to the heart of the President was the adoption in Maryland of the new State constitution abolishing slavery forever on her soil. The majority was a very slender one, the vote of the soldiers in the field being necessary to save emancipation; but it served, and the next month the Union majority was greatly increased.

It would seem strange that after this decisive victory there should have been any room left for hope or confidence on the side of the opposition or for anxiety and panic among Republican politicians; but alternating fits of confidence and despondency are inseparable from all long-continued political campaigns, and even after these overwhelming successes we find the Democratic speeches and papers full of boasting, and the private correspondence of the most experienced Republican leaders full of tremor and apprehension. The President, however, had passed through his moment of despondency, and from this time to the end entertained no shadow of doubt of the result. Mr. Washburne wrote to him on the 17th of October from Galena: "It is no use to deceive ourselves about this State. Everything is at sixes and sevens; no head or tail to anything. There is imminent danger of our losing the State"; and more in the same strain. The President laid away the letter, writing on the envelope the single word, "Stampeded." Ten days later Washburne had recovered his spirits, and wrote, "John Logan is carrying everything before him in Egypt." Earlier in the campaign Mr. Washburne, desiring to do all in his power to forward the Union cause, had written to Grant asking permission to print a letter from him in favor of Lincoln. Grant replied that he had no objection to this, but he thought that "for the President to answer all the charges the opposition would bring against him would be like setting a maiden to work to prove her chastity." A friend of Mr. Seward communicated to him about the same time an astonishing mare's nest, in which he claimed to have discovered that the opposition policy for the presidential campaign would be to abstain from voting. The Secretary submitted this letter to the President. To Mr. Lincoln, with his life-long observation of politics, this idea of abstention from voting seemed more amusing than threatening. He returned the letter to the Secretary with this indorsement: "More likely to abstain from stopping when once they get at it."

As the time drew near for the election in November a flight of rumors of intended secessionist demonstrations in the principal States of the North covered the land. The points of danger which were most clearly indicated were the cities of Chicago and New York. We have related in another place the efficient measures taken to prevent any outbreak in Chicago, with the arrest and punishment of the conspirators. The precautionary measures in other States prevented any attempt at disorder. To preserve the public peace in the city of New York and to secure the guarantee of a fair and orderly election there, General Butler was sent with a considerable force of troops to that city. He issued an order on the 5th of November declaring that troops had been detailed for duty in that district sufficient to preserve the peace of the United States, to protect public property, to prevent disorder, and to insure calm and quiet. He referred to the charge made by the opposition that the presence of Union troops might possibly have an effect upon the free exercise of the duty of voting at the ensuing election. He hotly repudiated this accusation.

> The armies of the United States [he said] are ministers of good and not of evil. . . . Those who fear them are accused by their own consciences. Let every citizen having the right to vote act according to the inspiration of his own judgment freely. He will be protected in that right by the whole power of the Government if it shall become necessary.

He denounced energetically the crime of fraudulent voting, but did not assume to himself the duty of separating the tares from the wheat. He simply warned the evil-intentioned that fraudulent voting would be detected and punished after the election was over. Governor Seymour had been, as usual, much exercised for fear of executive usurpation at the polls, and had issued a proclamation on the 2d of November urging the avoidance of all measures which would tend to strife or disorder. He called upon sheriffs of counties to take care that every voter should have a free ballot in the manner secured to him by the constitutional laws, and to exercise the full force of the law and call forth, if need be, the power of their districts against the interference of the military in the vicinity of the polling-places.

There was by no means a unanimous agreement among even the supporters of the Administration as to the expediency of sending

General Butler to New York at this time. The action was taken by Mr. Stanton on his own responsibility. Thurlow Weed disapproved of it, and up to the day of election thought, on the whole, the proceeding was injurious, in spite of Butler's admirable general order; but Butler acted under the circumstances with remarkable judgment and discretion. He devoted the days which elapsed between his arrival and the election to making himself thoroughly acquainted with the city, with its police arrangements, and the means at his disposal to preserve order. Every hour was occupied with a careful study of maps, of police arrangements, of telegraphic communication between his headquarters and every region of the city, and in consultations with general officers, the creation of an improvised engineer department, and the planning of a system of barricades in case of a widespread insurrection. But the object to which he gave special attention, and in which he most thoroughly succeeded, was the avoidance of any pretext for any charge of interference with the rights of citizens at the polls. On the morning of the 8th of November, although the city was absolutely in the hands of the disciplined military force which had been sent to guard it, not a soldier was visible to the thousands of voters who thronged the streets; but everybody knew that they were there, and the result was, as Butler telegraphed to Lincoln at noon on election day, "the quietest city ever seen."

To Mr. Lincoln this was one of the most solemn days of his life. Assured of his personal success, and devoutly confident that the day of peace and the reëstablishment of the Union was not far off, he felt no elation and no sense of triumph over his opponents. His mind seemed filled with mingled feelings of deep and humble gratitude to the vast majority of his fellow-citizens who were this day testifying to him their heartfelt confidence and affection, and of a keen and somewhat surprised regret that he should be an object in so many quarters of so bitter and vindictive an opposition. He said to one of his secretaries: "It is singular that I, who am not a vindictive man, should always, except once, have been before the people for election in canvasses marked for their bitterness. When I came to Congress it was a quiet time; but always, except that, the contests in which I have been prominent have been marked with great rancor."[1]

In the evening he went over, as was his custom, to the War Department. The night was rainy and dark. As he entered the telegraph room he was handed a dispatch from Mr. Forney claiming 10,000 Union majority in Philadelphia. The figures were so far above his estimate that he said, "Forney is a little excitable." A moment after a dispatch came from Mr. Felton in Baltimore, "15,000 in the city, 5000 in the State. All hail, free Maryland!" A moment after there came messages from Boston announcing majorities for Mr. Hooper and Mr. Rice of something like 4000 each. The President, astonished, asked if this was not a clerical error for 400, but the larger figures were soon confirmed. Mr. Rice afterwards, in speaking of these astounding majorities in districts where there was never the least charge made of irregularity at the polls, quoted an explanation made by a constituent of his, with no irreverent intention, "The Almighty must have stuffed the ballot boxes."

The entrance of General Eckert, who came in covered with mud from a fall in crossing the street, reminded the President of an incident of his defeat by Douglas. He said: "For such an awkward fellow, I am pretty sure-footed. It used to take a rather dexterous man to throw me. I remember the evening of the day in 1858 that decided the contest for the Senate between Mr. Douglas and myself was something like this — dark, raining, and gloomy. I had been reading the returns and had ascertained that we had lost the legislature, and started to go home. The path had been worn hog-backed and was slippery. Both my feet slipped from under me, but I recovered myself and lit clear; and I said to myself, 'It is a slip, and not a fall.'"

Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, indulged in some not unnatural exultation over the complete effacement of Henry Winter Davis from Maryland politics. Mr. Davis had assailed the navy with a peculiarly malicious opposition for two years for no cause that Mr. Fox could assign except that he was a brother-in-law of Montgomery Blair. The President would not agree with him. "You have more of that feeling of personal resentment than I," he said. "Perhaps I have too little of it; but I never thought it paid. A man has no time to spend half his life in quarrels. If any man ceases to attack me I never remember the past against him." All the evening the dispatches kept the same tenor of widespread success — in almost all cases above the estimates. The October States showed increased majorities, and long before midnight the indications were that the State of New York had cast her ponderous vote for Lincoln, and made the verdict of the North almost unanimous in his favor, leaving General McClellan but 21 electoral votes, derived from New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky, 212 being cast for Lincoln and Johnson.

It was two o'clock in the morning before the President left the War Department. At the

[1] J. H., Diary.

door he met a party of serenaders with a brass band who saluted him with music and cheers, and, in the American fashion, demanded a speech. He made a brief response, saying that he did not pretend that those who had thought the best interests of the nation were to be subserved by the support of the present Administration embraced all the patriotism and loyalty of the country. He continued:

I do believe, and I trust without personal interest, that the welfare of the country does require that such support and indorsement be given.

I earnestly believe that the consequence of this day's work (if it be as you assume, and as now seems probable) will be to the lasting advantage, if not to the very salvation, of the country. I cannot at this hour say what has been the result of the election. But, whatever it may be, I have no desire to modify this opinion, that all who have labored to-day in behalf of the Union organization have wrought for the best interest of their country and the world, not only for the present, but for all future ages.

I am thankful to God for this approval of the people; but, while deeply grateful for this mark of their confidence in me, if I know my heart, my gratitude is free from any taint of personal triumph. I do not impugn the motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me to triumph over any one; but I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of the people's resolution to stand by free government and the rights of humanity.

For several days the torrent of congratulations came pouring in. Frank Blair wrote from Georgia, where he was leading an army corps under Sherman to the sea: "The vote in this army to-day is almost unanimous for Lincoln. Give Uncle Abe my compliments and congratulations." Grant paused for a moment in his labors in the investment of Richmond to express his sense of the vast importance and significance of the election. He thought a tremendous crisis in the history of the country had been met and triumphantly passed by the quiet and orderly conduct of the American people on the 8th of November.

The manner in which the President received these tumultuous demonstrations of good-will was so characteristic that it seems to us worthy of special attention. He was absolutely free from elation or self-congratulation. He seemed to deprecate his own triumph and to sympathize rather with the beaten than the victorious party. He received notice that on the night of the 10th of November the various Republican clubs in the District of Columbia would serenade him. Not wishing to speak extempore on an occasion where his words would receive so wide a publication, he sat down and hastily wrote a speech which, while it has not received the world-wide fame of certain other of his utterances, is one of the weightiest and wisest of all his discourses. He read it at the window which opens on the north portico of the Executive Mansion, a secretary standing beside him lighting the page with a candle. "Not very graceful," he said, "but I am growing old enough not to care much for the manner of doing things."[1] There was certainly never an equal compliment paid to a serenading crowd. The inmost philosophy of republican government was in the President's little speech.

It has long been a grave question [he said] whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies. On this point the present rebellion has brought our republic to a severe test, and a presidential election occurring in regular course during the rebellion has added not a little to the strain. If the loyal people united were put to the utmost of their strength by the rebellion, must they not fail when divided and partially paralyzed by a political war among themselves? But the election was a necessity. We cannot have a free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men who have passed through this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged. But the election, along with its incidental and undesired strife, has done good, too. It has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound and how strong we still are. It shows that, even among candidates of the same party, he who is most devoted to the Union and most opposed to treason can receive most of the people's vote. It shows, also, to an extent yet unknown, that we have more men now than we had when the war began. Gold is good in its place; but living, brave, patriotic men are better than gold.

But the rebellion continues; and, now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven and shall strive to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am duly sensible to the high compliment of a re-election, and duly grateful, as I trust, to Almighty God for having directed my countrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result.

May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in this same spirit towards those who have? And now let me close by asking three

[1] J. H., Diary.

hearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallant and skillful commanders.[1]

In this lofty and magnanimous spirit he received all the addresses of congratulation that came in upon him in these days. To a delegation from Maryland who ascribed it to his rare discretion that Maryland was then a free State he replied with deep appreciation of their courtesy, and he added: "Those who differ from and oppose us will yet see that defeat was better for their own good than if they had been successful." He not only had no feeling of malicious triumph himself, he had no patience with it in others. When Mr. Raymond, who represented his special friends in New York, wrote a letter breathing fire and vengeance against the officials of the custom-house, who, he said, had come near defeating him in the race for Congress, the President merely observed that it was "the spirit of such letters as that which created the factious malignity of which Mr. Raymond complained." To all those who begged for a rigorous and exemplary course of punishment for political derelictions in the late canvass his favorite expression was, "I am in favor of short statutes of limitation in politics." He rejected peremptorily some suggestions of General Butler and the War Department having in view the punishment of flagrant offenders in New York: "We must not sully victory with harshness." His thoughtful and chivalrous consideration for the beaten party did not, however, prevent him from feeling the deepest gratitude for those who had labored on his side. He felt that the humblest citizen who had done his duty had claims upon him. Hearing that Deacon John Phillips of Sturbridge, Massachusetts, a man who had already completed his 104th year, and had voted at every presidential election since the foundation of the Government, had taken the pains to go to the polls to vote for him, the President wrote him a grateful letter of thanks.

> The example [he said] of such devotion to civic duties in one whose days have already been extended an average life-time beyond the Psalmist's limit cannot but be valuable and fruitful. It is not for myself only, but for the country which you have in your sphere served so long and so well, that I thank you.

The venerable man, who had attained his majority in the midst of the war of the Revolution, and who had arrived at middle age before this century opened, answered in a note which greatly pleased and moved the President, as coming from one of the oldest men living on the earth.

> I feel that I have no desire to live [he said] but to see the conclusion of this wicked rebellion and the power of God displayed in the conversion of the nations. I believe, by the help of God, you will finish the first, and also be the means of establishing universal freedom and restoring peace to the Union. That the God of mercy will bless you in this great work, and through life, is the prayer of your unworthy servant, JOHN PHILLIPS.

There is one phrase of the President's speech of the 10th of November which we have quoted which is singularly illustrative, not only of the quick apprehension with which he seized upon facts of importance, but also of the accuracy and method with which he ascertained and established them. Within a few hours after the voting had closed he was able to say that the election had shown that "we have more men now than we had when the war began." A great bundle of papers which lies before us as we write, filled with telegrams from every quarter annotated in his own neat handwriting, with a mass of figures which would have dismayed an ordinary accountant, shows the importance which he attached to this fact and the industry with which he investigated it. In his message to Congress a few weeks later he elaborated this statement with the utmost care. He showed from the comparative votes in 1860 and in 1864 a net increase of votes during the three years and a half of war of 145,551. The accomplished statisticians of "The Tribune" almanac in the following month, after the closest study of the official returns, expressed their surprise "at the singular accuracy of the President's figures."

An extract from his annual message to Congress gives the best summing up of the results of the election that has ever been written.

> The purpose of the people within the loyal States to maintain the integrity of the Union was never more firm nor more nearly unanimous than now. The extraordinary calmness and good order with which the millions of voters met and mingled at the polls give strong assurance of this. Not only all those who supported the Union ticket so called, but a great majority of the opposing party also, may be fairly claimed to entertain and to be actuated by the same purpose. It is an unanswerable argument to this effect, that no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union. There have been much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Union cause; but on the distinct issue of Union or no Union the politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. In affording the people the fair opportunity of showing one to another and to the world this firmness and unanimity of purpose, the election has been of vast value to the national cause.

On the day of election General McClellan

[1] Autograph MS.

resigned his commission in the army, and the place thus made vacant was filled by the appointment of General Philip H. Sheridan, a fit type and illustration of the turn in the tide of affairs, which was to sweep from that time rapidly onward to the great and decisive national triumph.

CHASE AS CHIEF-JUSTICE.

CHIEF-JUSTICE TANEY died on the 12th day of October, 1864, during the public rejoicings that hailed the success of the Union party at the autumnal elections. He was a man of amiable character, of blameless life, of great learning, of stainless integrity; yet such is the undiscriminating cruelty with which public opinion executes its decrees, that this aged and upright judge was borne to his grave with few expressions of regret, and even with a feeling not wholly suppressed that his removal formed a part of the good news which the autumn had brought to the upholders of the Union. Toilsome and irreproachable as his life had been, so far as purity of intentions were concerned, it was marked by one of those mistakes which are never forgiven. In a critical hour of history he had made a decision contrary to the spirit of the age, contrary to the best hopes and aspirations of the nation at large. Before he had assumed the grave responsibilities of Chief-Justice he had not been insensible to those emotions and sympathies which animated the majority of his countrymen in later years. So early as 1818 he had spoken of slavery as a blot on our national character, and expressed the confident hope that it would effectually though gradually be wiped away. "Until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall come when we can point without a blush to the language held in the Declaration of Independence," he said, "every friend of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery and better to the utmost of his power the wretched condition of the slave." But when he assumed public office he became a part of the machinery of his party. He accepted its tenets and carried them unflinchingly to their logical result, so that to a mind so upright and straightforward in its operations there seemed nothing revolting in the enunciation of the dismal and inhuman propositions of the Dred Scott decision. His whole life was therefore read in the light of that one act, and when he died, the nation he had so faithfully served according to his lights looked upon his death as the removal of a barrier to human progress. The general feeling found expression in the grim and profane witticism of Senator Wade, uttered some months before, when it seemed likely that the Chief-Justice would survive the administration of Mr. Lincoln: "No man ever prayed as I did that Taney might outlive James Buchanan's term, and now I am afraid I have overdone it."

The friends of Mr. Chase immediately claimed that the place thus vacated belonged to him. They not only insisted that he was best fitted of all the public men in the country for the duties of that high office; that the great issues of the war would be safest in his hands; that the rights of the freedmen would be most secure with an ardent and consistent abolitionist; that the national currency would be best cared for by its parent; they also claimed that the place had been promised him by the President, and this claim, though not wholly true, was not without foundation. Several times during the last year or two the President had intimated in conversation with various friends of Mr. Chase that he thought favorably of appointing him Chief-Justice if a vacancy should occur. These expressions had been faithfully reported to the Secretary, and promptly entered by him in his diary at the time.[1] When Mr. Curtin was a candidate for reëlection as governor of Pennsylvania, John Covode came to Mr. Chase and told him if Curtin was elected governor he would shape matters in Pennsylvania so as to secure its delegates in the presidential convention, but that the majority of the loyal men in Pennsylvania preferred Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase replied that no speculations as to Governor Curtin's future course could excuse the loyal men from supporting him now; that the future must take care of itself; that he, Mr. Chase, was not anxious for the Presidency; that there was but one position in the Government which he would really like to have, if it were possible to have it without any sacrifice of principle or public interest, and that was the chief-justiceship. At this Mr. Covode expressed himself satisfied, and went away resolved to permit the renomination of Curtin, which, it may be said in passing, he could have done nothing to prevent. Mr. Chase's eyes seemed pretty constantly fixed upon the bench in the intervals of his presidential aspirations. For a few days after his resignation his feelings against the President were of such bitterness that he seems to have given up that prospect. He was on the verge of open revolt from the party with which he had been so long associated. In his diary of the 6th of July he says:

> Pomeroy says he means to go on a buffalo hunt and then to Europe. He cannot support Lincoln, but won't desert his principles. I am much of the same sentiments, though not willing now to decide what duty may demand next fall. Pomeroy remarked that on the news of my resignation reaching

[1] August 30, 1863.

the Senate, several of the Democratic senators came to him and said, "We 'll go with you now for Chase." This meant nothing but a vehement desire to overthrow the existing Administration, but might mean much if the Democrats would only cut loose from slavery, and go for freedom and the protection of labor by a national currency. If they would do that I would cheerfully go for any man they might nominate.

A few days later he wrote recounting his efforts for the public good, and added:

My efforts were stoutly resisted outside, and had not earnest sympathy inside of the Administration. They were steadily prevailing, however, when a sense of duty to myself and the country also compelled me to resign.

A few malignant opponents of Mr. Lincoln still continued to write to Mr. Chase and keep alive in his mind the fancy of a possible nomination to the Presidency. His weakness before the people had been signally shown by an ill-judged attempt to secure him the nomination for Congress in Cincinnati, but in spite of this he still responded readily to suggestions from factious partisans. To one writing from Michigan he replied that he was now a private citizen and expected to remain such.

No one [he said] has been authorized to use my name in any political connection, except that I said I should not feel at liberty to refuse my services to the citizens of my congressional district if spontaneously and unanimously demanded. I think now that I erred in saying this; but it seemed right at the time. No such movement as the one you suggest seems to me expedient so far as I am concerned. Whether it would be expedient or patriotic in reference to some other name, I am not able to judge. I see only, as all see, that there is a deplorable lack of harmony, caused chiefly, in my judgment, by the injudicious course of some of Mr. Lincoln's chief advisers, and his own action on their advice.[1]

Even to comparative strangers he could not write without speaking slightingly of the President. To one he said: "I fear our good President is so anxious for the restoration of the Union that he will not care sufficiently about the basis of representation." To another, with a singular and unusual lack of dignity, he said: "Some seem to think that a man who has handled millions must be rich, and so I should be if I could have retained for myself even one per cent. of what I saved to the people; but I would not exchange the consciousness of having kept my hands free from the touch of one cent of public treasure for all the riches in the world." Mr. Chase was, of course, absolutely and unquestionably honest, but that virtue is not so rare in public men that one should celebrate it in himself. He passed the heat of the midsummer in the White Mountains. During his absence his tone of bitter and sullen comment towards the President and his associates in the Cabinet continued,[2] but after the fall of Atlanta, and the evident response of the country to the Chicago nominations, his tone underwent a sudden change. He announced himself at last in favor of the election of Mr. Lincoln. In his diary of the 17th of September, after he had returned to Washington, he said:

I have seen the President twice. . . . His manner was cordial and so were his words; and I hear of nothing but good-will from him. But he is not at all demonstrative, either in speech or manner. I feel that I do not know him, and I found no action on what he says or does. . . . It is my conviction that the cause I love and the general interests of the country will be best promoted by his reëlection, and I have resolved to join my efforts to those of almost the whole body of my friends in securing it.

He continues in his usual tone of self-portraiture:

I have been told that the President said he and I could not get along together in the Cabinet. Doubtless there was a difference of temperament, and on some points of judgment I may have been too earnest and eager, while I thought him not earnest enough and too slow. On some occasions, indeed, I found that it was so. But I never desired anything else than his complete success, and never indulged a personal feeling incompatible with absolute fidelity to his administration.

He repeats over and again in his letters and diaries that he never really desired the Presidency; that he seized the first opportunity of withdrawing from the canvass. From Washington he went to Ohio, where he brought himself at last to make an open declaration of his preference for Mr. Lincoln as against McClellan; he voted for the Republican ticket at the election in October, and sent a telegram to the President that the result was "all right in Ohio and Indiana."

The death of Chief-Justice Taney occurred immediately afterwards, and the canvass for a successor on the part of the friends of Mr. Chase began without a moment's delay. Mr. Sumner was particularly ardent and pressing. "A Chief-Justice is needed," he wrote to the President, "whose position on the slavery question is already fixed and will not need argument of counsel to convert him." A mass

1 Chase to Charles S. May, August 31, 1864.

2 Samuel Bowles wrote September 4, 1864: "Do you notice that the 'Antislavery Standard' and the 'Liberator,' the representatives of the old abolitionists, are both earnest for Lincoln? Yet a new crop of radicals have sprung up, who are resisting the President and making mischief. Chase is going around, peddling his griefs in private ears and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln. Oh, how little great men can be!" ["Life and Times of Samuel Bowles," Vol. I., p. 413.]

of solicitations of the same character came in upon the President, and they were reënforced inside the Cabinet by the earnest influence of Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Stanton; and although these and other friends of Mr. Chase were so strongly encouraged by Mr. Lincoln's response that they had no hesitation in assuring him that he would without doubt be made Chief-Justice, the President gave no decided intimation of his purpose. It is altogether probable that he intended from the first to appoint him, but he resolved at the same time to say nothing about it until he was ready to act. He said to his secretary, "I shall be very 'shut pan' about this matter." When one day his secretary brought him a letter from Mr. Chase in Ohio, he said, "What is it about?" "Simply a kind and friendly letter," the secretary answered. Mr. Lincoln, without reading it, replied, with his shrewd smile, "File it with his other recommendations."

So reticent was Mr. Lincoln in regard to his purpose that the enemies of Mr. Chase, who were especially abundant and active in Ohio, endeavored to prevent his nomination by the presentation of strong and numerously signed protests against it. The President received them not too affably, and while he listened respectfully to all they had to say in regard to the merits of the case, he sternly checked them when they began to repeat instances of Mr. Chase's personal hostility to himself. He treated with the same contempt a more serious statement which he received from New York that Mr. Cisco, who had personally declared for McClellan, gave as his reason for such a course that Secretary Chase had told him that Mr. Lincoln was incompetent and unfit for the position he held, though he added that Mr. Chase on his return to Washington had informed him that he then considered it his public duty to support Mr. Lincoln for the Presidency. Strangely enough from the Treasury Department itself came an earnest protest against the late Secretary. The venerable Judge Lewis, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, protested that he was not a man of large legal or financial knowledge; that his selfishness had gradually narrowed and contracted his views of things in general; that he was amazingly ignorant of men; that it was the opinion in the department that he really desired towards the end of his term of office to injure and as far as possible to destroy the influence and popularity of the Administration. By his constant denunciation of the extravagance of disbursements, and his tone of malevolent comment against every act of the President, he clearly indicated his desire to excite popular discontent and grumbling against the Government. Judge Lewis said that with the exception of a few sycophants the entire department was relieved by the change. Even Mr. Field, for whose sake he gave up his place, expressed himself as gratified by it. To all these representations Mr. Lincoln made no reply. He was equally silent as to the merits of other distinguished jurists whose names were mentioned to him. He had the highest esteem and regard for Mr. Evarts; he had great confidence in the legal learning and weight of character of Judge Swayne; he had a feeling of hearty friendship for Mr. Montgomery Blair, and although he had thought proper in the preceding autumn to ask for his resignation, the intimate and even affectionate relations which he maintained towards the ex-Postmaster-General encouraged him and his friends to believe that he would receive the appointment. The late Vice-President Wilson, shortly before his death,[1] said that Blair met him one day near the War Department and solicited his good word, saying that Chase would certainly not be nominated. Wilson was startled by Blair's confident tone and went at once to the President, to whom he reiterated the arguments already used in favor of Mr. Chase's nomination, saying that the President could well afford to overlook the harsh and indecorous things which Chase had said of him during the summer. "Oh! as to that," replied Lincoln, "I care nothing. Of Mr. Chase's ability and of his soundness on the general issues of the war there is, of course, no question. I have only one doubt about his appointment. He is a man of unbounded ambition, and has been working all his life to become President. That he can never be; and I fear that if I make him Chief-Justice he will simply become more restless and uneasy and neglect the place in his strife and intrigue to make himself President. If I were sure that he would go on the bench and give up his aspirations and do nothing but make himself a great judge, I would not hesitate a moment."

So strong was this impression upon Mr. Lincoln's mind that he half formed the intention of sending for Mr. Chase and saying frankly to him that the way was open to him to become the greatest Chief-Justice the Supreme Court had ever had if he would dismiss at once and forever the subject of the Presidency from his mind. But speaking on the subject with Senator Sumner, he saw in a moment's conversation how liable to misconstruction and misapprehension such action would be. In his eagerness to do what he thought best for the interests of both Mr. Chase and the country, he lost sight for an instant of the construction which Mr. Chase would inevitably place upon such a proposition coming from his twice-successful rival. Convinced as he was of Chase's

[1] April, 1874. Conversation with J. G. N.

great powers, and hoping rather against his own convictions that once upon the bench he would see in what direction his best prospects of usefulness and fame rested, he concluded to take all risks, and on the 6th of December nominated him to the Senate for Chief-Justice. He communicated his intention to no one, and wrote out the nomination in full with his own hand. It was confirmed at once without reference to a committee. Mr. Chase on reaching home the night of the same day was saluted at his door under his new title by his daughter, Mrs. Sprague. He at once sent the President a note, saying:

> Before I sleep I must thank you for this mark of your confidence, and especially for the manner in which the nomination was made. I will never forget either, and trust you will never regret either. Be assured that I prize your confidence and goodwill more than any nomination to office.

The appointment was received with the greatest satisfaction throughout the Union. Although the name of Mr. Chase had been especially pressed upon the President by the public men who represented the most advanced antislavery sentiment of the North, the appointment when once made met with little opposition from any quarter. Mr. Chase, in a long life of political prominence and constant controversy, had won the universal respect of the country, not only for his abilities, but also for his courage, his integrity, and a certain solid weight of character of which his great head and massive person seemed a fitting embodiment. He had placed his portrait on the lower denominations of the legal-tender notes, saying with his customary heavy pleasantry, "I had put the President's head on the higher priced notes, and my own, as was becoming, on the smaller ones." His handsome face and features had thus become more familiar in the eyes of the people than those of any other man in America; and though neither then nor at any other period of his life did he become what could be called universally popular, the image of him became fixed in the general instinct as a person of serious importance in the national life. The people who gave themselves the trouble to reason about the matter said it was impossible that an original abolitionist should be untrue to the principles of freedom, or that the father of the national currency should ever disown his own offspring; while those who thought and spoke on impulse took it for granted that such a man as Mr. Chase should never for any length of time be out of the highest employment.

After all, the fears of the President in regard to the Chief-Justice were better founded than his hopes. Mr. Chase took his place on the bench with a conscientious desire to do his whole duty in his great office, to devote his undoubted powers and his prodigious industry to making himself a worthy successor of the great jurists who before him had illustrated the bench, but he could not discharge the political affairs of the country from his mind. He still considered himself called upon to counteract the mischievous tendencies of the President towards conciliation and hasty reconstruction. His slighting references to him in his letters and diaries continued from the hour he took his place on the bench. When the fighting had ended around Richmond, and on the capitulation of Lee the fabric of the Southern Confederacy had fallen about the ears of its framers like a house of cards, the Chief-Justice felt himself called on to come at once to the front, and he wrote from Baltimore to the President:

> I am very anxious about the future, and most about the principles which are to govern reconstruction, for as these principles are sound or unsound so will be the work and its results. You have no time to read a long letter nor have I time to write one, so I will be brief. And first as to Virginia. [1]

He advised the President to stand by the Peirpoint government. As to the other rebel States, he suggested the enrollment of the loyal citizens without regard to complexion.

> This, you know [he said], has long been my opinion. . . . The application of this principle to Louisiana is made somewhat difficult by the organization which has already taken place, but happily the Constitution authorizes the legislature to extend the right of suffrage. . . . What reaches me of the condition of things in Louisiana impresses me strongly with the belief that this extension will be of the greatest benefit to the whole population.

He advised, as to Arkansas, an amendment of the Constitution, or a new convention, the members to be elected by the loyal citizens, without distinction of color. "To all the other States," he said, "the general principle may be easily applied." He closed by saying: "I most respectfully, but most earnestly, commend these matters to your attention. God gives you a great place and a great opportunity. May he guide you in the use of them." But the same day the President delivered from a window of the White House that final speech to the people which he had prepared without waiting for the instructions of the Chief-Justice, and the day after Mr. Chase wrote again from Baltimore reviewing the record of both, reminding the President of his former errors from which Mr. Chase had tried to save him, discussing

[1] Chase to Lincoln, April 11, 1865.

in full the Louisiana case, of which the President had made so masterly and luminous a presentation in his speech, insinuating that if the President were only as well informed as he was he would see things very differently.[1] Almost before the ink was dry on this unasked and superfluous sermon the President was dead. The Chief-Justice, writing to a friend in Ohio, said: "The schemes of politicians will now adjust themselves to the new conditions. I want no part in them."[2] He retained his attitude at the head of the extreme Republicans until about the time of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Over this famous trial he presided with the greatest dignity and impartiality; with a knowledge of law which was never at fault, and with a courage which rose superior to all the threats and all the entreaties of his friends. But his action during the trial and its result alienated him at once from the great body of those who had been his strongest supporters, while it created a momentary appearance of popularity among his life-long opponents. His friends began to persuade him, and he began to think, that he might be the candidate of the Democratic party for the Presidency. He commenced writing voluminous letters to leading Democrats expressing his indifference to the nomination, but at the same time saying he had always been a Democrat, was a Democrat still, and that the course which the Democracy ought to adopt would be to embrace true Democratic principles and declare for universal suffrage in the reconstruction of the Union. He did not flinch for an instant from his position on this important question. He said: "I believe I could refuse the throne of the world if it were offered me at the price of abandoning the cause of equal rights and exact justice to all men."[3] Following his inveterate habit of taking a subjective view of the world of politics, he thought it possible that the Democratic party might be converted in the twinkling of an eye by virtue of his broad and liberal views. He cherished this pleasant delusion for several months. Whenever an obscure politician called upon him or wrote to him from some remote corner of the country, expressing a desire that he should be the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, he would say, "Such indications . . . afford ground for hope that a change is going on in the views and policy of the Democratic party which warrants good hopes for the future."[4] There was for a moment a vague impression among the leading Democrats that as it was hopeless to make a campaign with one of their own party against the overwhelming popularity of General Grant, it might be worth while to try the experiment of nominating the Chief-Justice with the hope of diverting a portion of the Republican vote, and a correspondence took place between August Belmont and Mr. Chase in relation to that subject. Mr. Chase wrote:

> For more than a quarter of a century I have been, in my political views and sentiments, a Democrat, and I still think that upon questions of finance, commerce, and administration generally, the old Democratic principles afford the best guidance.[5]

But he stoutly asserted, even in the face of this temptation, his belief in universal suffrage, though he coupled it with universal amnesty, and said:

> If the white citizens hitherto prominent in affairs will simply recognize their [the negroes'] right of suffrage, and assure them against future attempts to take it from them, I am sure that those citizens will be welcomed back to their old lead with joy and acclamation, . . . and a majority, if not all, the Southern States may be carried for the Democratic candidates at the next election.

He repeated this sanguine statement in his correspondence with other leading Democrats, but the negotiation came to nothing; the Democratic convention met in New York, and Mr. Chase's name, mentioned by accident, gained a roar of cheers from the assembly and one-half of one vote from a California delegate. He professed his entire indifference to the result, and took no further interest in the canvass. An injudicious Republican politician in New York asked him to address a Grant meeting. He declined, of course, stating that he could not unreservedly support the Republican ticket, and that this was not the time for discrimination in a public address. "The action of the two parties has obliged me to resume with my old faith my old position, . . . that of Democrat, by the grace of God, free and independent." When his old enemy, General Blair, came to the front in the progress of the canvass and rather overshadowed the more conservative Seymour, the Chief-Justice intimated[6] that men of his way of thinking would be constrained to the support of General Grant.

But if the political attitude of Mr. Chase in his later years was a subject of amazement

[1] "I most earnestly wish you could have read the New Orleans papers for the past few months. Your duties have not allowed it. I have read them a good deal; quite enough to be certain that if you had read what I have your feelings of humanity and justice would not let you rest till all loyalists are made equal in the right of self-protection by suffrage." [Chase to Lincoln, April 12, 1865.]

[2] Chase to Ashley, April 16, 1865.

[3] Chase to Barney, May 29, 1868.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Chase to Belmont, May 30, 1868.

[6] In a letter to Col. Brown of Kentucky, Sept. 29, 1868.

and sorrow to his ardent supporters, his decisions upon the bench were a no less startling surprise to those who had insisted upon his appointment as the surest means of conserving all the victories of the war. He who had sustained Mr. Stanton in his most energetic and daring acts during the war now declared such acts illegal; he who had continually criticized, not always loyally, the conduct of the President for what he considered his weak reverence for the rights of States, now became the earnest champion of State rights; and finally the man to whose personal solicitations a majority of Congress had yielded in passing the legal-tender act, without which he said that the war could not have been successfully carried on, from his place on the bench declared the act unconstitutional. But so firm was the impression in the minds of the people of the United States of the great powers and perfect integrity, the high courage, the exalted patriotism of this man, that when he died, worn out by his tireless devotion to the public welfare, he was mourned and praised as, in spite of all errors and infirmities, he deserved to be. Although his appointment had not accomplished all the good which Mr. Lincoln hoped for when he made it, it cannot be called a mistake. Mr. Chase had deserved well of the Republic. He was entitled to any reward the Republic could give him; and the President, in giving to his most powerful and most distinguished rival the greatest place which a President ever has it in his power to bestow, gave an exemplary proof of the magnanimity and generosity of his own spirit.

Sep 1889

LIFE.

I AM o'er-weary picturing the strife;
This is a solemn fate — to ride to death
Lashed through the hurrying fatal lists of life,
Strengthless to cease, begging for one short breath,
Yet spurned for answer by a Power that thrusts
Its spurs into the soul. Upon the brow
Stand beads of blood; the very javelin rusts
From tears; the drooping form can scarce but bow
To earth. "One moment, Power, one resting-space,
Have mercy!" "On, on, on!" the stern reply.
I urge, "I once have triumphed, is not grace
For victory?" "Have on! Thy grace am I!"
"Is there no pause, no rest, however brief?"
"On to the fight! Thy death is thy relief."

Louise Morgan-Smith.

TO GEORGE KENNAN.

UNFLINCHING Dante of a later day,
Thou who hast wandered through the realms of pain
And seen with aching breast and whirling brain
Woes which thou wert unable to allay,
What frightful visions hast thou brought away:
Of torments, passions, agonies, struggles vain
To break the prison walls, to rend the chain—
Of hopeless hearts too desperate to pray!
Men are the devils of that pitiless hell!
Men guard the labyrinth of that ninefold curse!
Marvel of marvels! Thou hast lived to tell,
In prose more sorrowful than Dante's verse,
Of pangs more grievous, sufferings more fell,
Than Dante or his master dared rehearse!

Nathan Haskell Dole.

THE PHARAOH OF THE EXODUS, AND HIS SON,

IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR MONUMENTS.



8. PRINCE KHAMUS, DECEASED.
(FROM LEPSIUS'S "DENKMÄLER.")

ONLY in its later books does the Bible distinguish the different rulers of Egypt by their proper names. The word "Pharaoh" was a title rather than a personal appellation, and was borne by the reigning king, each one in turn down the long line of sovereigns.

A change of Pharaohs silently occurs in the biblical story between the second and the third chapters of the Book of Exodus. In Chapter II. we read:

> Now when Pharaoh heard this thing, he sought to slay Moses. (Ver. 15.)
>
> And it came to pass in the course of those many days, that the king of Egypt died: and the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage. (Ver. 23.)

From which it is clear that one Pharaoh had passed off the stage — the one who is commonly known as the "Pharaoh of the Oppression." But in Chapter III. we read how God called unto Moses out of the midst of the burning bush, and said:

> Come now, therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people the children of Israel out of Egypt. (Ver. 10.)

From this it is equally clear that another Pharaoh had entered upon the scene — the one who is commonly known as the "Pharaoh of the Exodus." Everybody being acquainted with the peculiar names of such great personages, the writer of the Book of Exodus phrased his recital after the manner of that modern monarchic formula, "The King is dead! Long live the King!"

Not long ago we were astounded to see the tomb open and give up, among its treasures, the first of these two sovereigns, the person, carefully embalmed, of the Pharaoh of the Oppression — to behold his imperishable features after so long a time restored to view, and to find how remarkably faithful those portrait-statues were which his artists had carved when he was in the bloom of youth or in the prime of manhood. Nor, perhaps, have we forgotten how the monuments stand ready to unlock the mystery in regard to that daughter of his who saved the life of the foundling Moses.

And still, if we were to choose between the Pharaoh of the Oppression and the Pharaoh of the Exodus, or were asked, "Out of the several Pharaohs mentioned in the Bible, which one above all others would you most wish to learn more about, in fact, whatever the archæology of Egypt can teach us?" with scarcely a moment's hesitation we would answer, "The Pharaoh of the Exodus." That one who replied, "Who is the Lord, that I should hearken unto his voice to let Israel go?"; that one who required straw as well as bricks of the already burdened and groaning Hebrews; that one before whom the contest by enchantments took place, until the magicians gave up, exclaiming, "This is the finger of God"; that one who recalled his consent the instant the evils were removed; that one who, under all the signs and wonders and plagues of Jehovah, hardened his heart up to the very entrance of death into his dwelling to lay low his cherished first-born son, the heir to the throne; that one who repented having thrust out the bondsmen, and pursued after them, and overtook them encamping by the sea; that one, in fine, upon whose hosts the sea returned to its flow, till there remained not so much as one of them.

Do, then, the antiquities of Egypt really and in like manner illustrate the Pharaoh of the Exodus? Did he cause statues to be made of himself which show just how he looked? Have the inscriptions anything to tell us about his history also? Do his monuments bear out the many particulars of the biblical relation concerning his resistance to the God of Israel, and his disastrous defeat? Do they clear up the mystery of his first-born son, who was smitten on that fatal midnight when the Lord passed through the land and entered at every door whose posts were not sprinkled with blood?

These are natural questions, which we are eager to have answered in detail. Why not make a second search among the monuments?

Many households among us are accustomed to go to a painter or a photographer once in a while, or even every year, to put on record both faces and numbers of the family group. This custom, however, prevailed in the days of Rameses as well as in our own. He intended

verse of this. The "rise" and "drop," which had probably existed for some time previous, then took on definite names and became combined with the other curves. The most logical explanation of the curvature of a ball depends upon the supposition of the compression of the air just in front of the ball and a corresponding rarefaction immediately behind it, so that the ball by its friction is deflected from its true course. When the curves were mastered, the tendency of the pitchers was to bring the hand up above the hip in order to get more of a twist to the ball and thereby assist the curve. The difficulty experienced by umpires in controlling this tendency led to the adoption of a rule allowing the pitcher to deliver the ball from any point below the shoulder. This rule prevailed for a time, but no sooner were the pitchers allowed this leeway than they began to make the umpire's task equally difficult again by getting their delivery just a trifle higher than the law allowed. In order to put an end to the eternal field discussions upon this point a rule was passed permitting the pitcher to throw the ball in any way he saw fit, and this rule has met with comparatively good success. The pitcher, who had formerly been placed forty-five feet from the batsman, was relegated to a fifty-foot distance. Even then, by taking advantage of a step or two behind his line, he acquired so much speed that it became necessary to fix his position more definitely, and to-day he is even bound to the extent of the exact position of his feet when delivering the ball. In spite of all these restrictions, such is the growing skill of pitchers that the problem is constantly under discussion how to legislate in favor of the batsman.

The rest of the fielding has kept some measure of progress with the pitching, the catcher's position exhibiting the highest development. This development is fortunately accompanied by numerous safeguards against the shocks of the increased speed of the ball. The first catchers who came up under the bat were wont to wear a small piece of rubber in the mouth as a protection to the teeth from foul tips. It was not long before an inventive genius designed a wire mask which buckled about the head, and, while allowing perfect freedom and sight, rendered the catcher safe from any chance ball striking his face. The next step was the use of a large breastplate extending quite to the legs. This is made of rubber, and inflated so as to make a yielding cushion. The gloves which the catchers have worn ever since the days of the rubber mouthpiece have also undergone radical changes, and are to-day so heavily made as thoroughly to protect both hands, leaving free only the fingers of the right hand.



FIELDER CATCHING A FLY.

Outside the battery, in these days of almost perfect fielding, the strongest factor is team play. Plenty of men can be found who can perform the ordinary duties of basemen and fielders, but the problem is to secure men for these positions who are strong batsmen and who harmonize well with one another. The usual merits for the individual positions are: in a first baseman, ability to catch bad throwing; in a second baseman, an especial capacity for covering a large amount of ground; in a third baseman, rapidity in fielding ground balls over to first. A third baseman must recover himself quickly and have a strong throw. A short-stop should be an accurate thrower, and a man of brains sufficient to take advantage of opportunities for double plays and fielding out advanced runners. The outfielders must be fast, not only in covering ground, but also in returning balls to the diamond.

Base-ball is a game for the people. The materials are inexpensive, and all that is wanted is a field. If one may judge from what one sees by the way, it is more difficult to say what will not answer for a ball-field than what will; for in spite of carts, cabs, and police, no street is too small or too crowded for Young America to make a ball-field of it. With its eager young followers everywhere and with many men now growing into the prime of life who have enjoyed it most heartily in their younger days, it is safe to say that as a sport, and as, par excellence, the American sport, it is sure of a long life.

Walter Camp.

STOPPING A GROUNDER.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

BLAIR'S MEXICAN PROJECT — THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE — THE XIIITH AMENDMENT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

BLAIR'S MEXICAN PROJECT.

THE triumphant reëlection of Mr. Lincoln in November, 1864, greatly simplified the political conditions as well as the military prospects of the country. Decisive popular majorities had pointedly rebuked the individuals who proclaimed, and the party which had resolved, that the war was a failure. The verdict of the ballot-box not only decided the continuance of a war administration and a war policy, but renewed the assurance of a public sentiment to sustain its prosecution. When Congress convened on the 6th of December, and the President transmitted to that body his annual message, he included in his comprehensive review of public affairs a temperate but strong and terse statement of this fact and its potent significance. Inspired by this majestic manifestation of the popular will to preserve the Union and maintain the Constitution, he was able to speak of the future with hope and confidence. But, with characteristic prudence and good taste, he uttered no word of boasting and indulged in no syllable of acrimony; on the contrary, in terms of fatherly kindness, he again offered the rebellious States the generous conditions he had previously tendered them by various acts and declarations, and specifically in his amnesty proclamation of December 8, 1863. The statement of the whole situation with its alternative issues was so admirably compressed into the closing paragraphs of his message as to leave no room for ignorance or misunderstanding.

> The national resources, then [he said], are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible. The public purpose to reëstablish and maintain the national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union — precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten. Either way, it would be the victory and defeat following war. What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept the Union, they can. Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The number of such may increase. They can, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their arms, and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. After so much, the Government could not, if it would, maintain war against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in constitutional and lawful channels. Some certain, and other possible, questions are, and would be, beyond the Executive power to adjust; as, for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever might require the appropriation of money. The Executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation of actual war. Pardons and remissions of forfeitures, however, would still be within Executive control. In what spirit and temper this control would be exercised can be fairly judged of by the past. A year ago general pardon and amnesty, upon specified terms, were offered to all, except certain designated classes; and it was, at the same time, made known that the excepted classes were still within contemplation of special clemency. . . . In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority, on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that "While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress." If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument

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to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.[1]

The country was about to enter upon the fifth year of actual war; but at length all the indications were pointing unmistakably to a speedy collapse of the rebellion. This foreshadowed disaster to the Confederate armies gave rise to another volunteer peace project and negotiation, which, from the boldness of its animating thought and the official prominence of its actors, assumes a special historical importance.

The veteran politician Francis P. Blair, senior, who as a young journalist, thirty-five years before, had helped President Jackson throttle the South Carolina nullification; who, from his long political and personal experience at Washington, perhaps knew better than almost any one else the individual characters and tempers of Southern leaders; and who, moreover, was ambitious to crown his remarkable career with another dazzling chapter of political intrigue, conceived that the time had arrived when he might perhaps take up the rôle of a successful mediator between the North and the South. He gave various hints of his desire to President Lincoln, but received neither encouragement nor opportunity to unfold his plans. "Come to me after Savannah falls," was Lincoln's evasive reply; and when, on the 22d of December, Sherman announced the surrender of that city as a national Christmas gift, Mr. Blair hastened to put his design into execution. Three days after Christmas the President gave him a simple card bearing the words:

Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go south, and return.
December 28, 1864.[2] A. LINCOLN.

With this single credential he went to the camp of General Grant, from which he forwarded, by the usual flags of truce, the following letters to Jefferson Davis at Richmond:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
December 30, 1864.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President, etc., etc.

MY DEAR SIR: The loss of some papers of importance (title papers), which I suppose may have been taken by some persons who had access to my house when Genl. Early's army were in possession of my place, induces me to ask the privilege of visiting Richmond and beg the favor of you to facilitate my inquiries in regard to them.

Your mo. ob. st.
F. P. BLAIR.[3]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Dec'r 30, 1864.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President, etc., etc.

MY DEAR SIR: The fact stated in the inclosed note may serve to answer inquiries as to the object of my visit, which, if allowed by you, I would not communicate fully to any one but yourself. The main purpose I have in seeing you is to explain the views I entertain in reference to the state of the affairs of our country, and to submit to your consideration ideas which in my opinion you may turn to good and possibly bring to practical results — that may not only repair all the ruin the war has brought upon the nation, but contribute to promote the welfare of other nations that have suffered from it. In candor I must say to you in advance that I come to you wholly unaccredited except in so far as I may be by having permission to pass our lines and to offer to you my own suggestions — suggestions which I have submitted to no one in authority on this side the lines, and will not, without my conversation with you may lead me to suppose they may lead to something practicable. With the hope of such result, if allowed, I will confidentially unbosom my heart frankly and without reserve. You will of course hold in reserve all that is not proper to be said to one coming, as I do, merely as a private citizen and addressing one clothed with the highest responsibilities. Unless the great interests now at stake induce you to attribute more importance to my application than it would otherwise command I could not expect that you would invite the intrusion. I venture however to submit the matter to your judgment.

Your most obedient servant,
F. P. BLAIR.[4]

Mr. Davis returned a reply with permission to make the visit; but by some mischance it did not reach Mr. Blair till after his patience had become exhausted by waiting and he had returned to Washington. Proceeding then to Richmond he was received by Jefferson Davis in a confidential interview on the 12th of January, 1865,[5] which he so thoroughly described in a written report that it is quoted in full:

"I introduced the subject to Mr. Davis by giving him an account of the mode in which I obtained leave to go through the lines, telling him that the President stopped me when I told him 'I had kindly relations with Mr. Davis, and at the proper time I might do something towards peace,' and said, 'Come to me when Savannah falls' — how after that event he shunned an interview with me, until I perceived he did not wish to hear me, but desired I should go without explanation of my object. I then told Mr. Davis that I wanted to know, if he thought fit to communicate it, whether he had any commitments with European powers which would control his conduct in making arrangements with the Government of the United States. He said in the most de-

1 Message, Dec. 6, 1864.
2 MS.
3 Unpublished MS.
4 Unpublished MS.
5 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 612.

cisive manner that there were none, that he had no commitments; and expressed himself with some vehemence that he was absolutely free and would die a freeman in all respects. This is pretty much his language; it was his sentiment and manner certainly. I told him that that was an all-important point, for if it were otherwise I would not have another word to say. I then prefaced the reading of the paper — which I had intended to embody in a letter to him, or present in some form if I could not reach him, or if I were prevented from seeing him personally — by saying that it was somewhat after the manner of an editorial and was not of a diplomatic character, and that I was like a shoemaker who sticks to his last, and could not change my mode of expressing my thoughts; moreover, I had become an old man, and what I was about to submit to him might be the dreams of an old man, but that I depended upon his practical good sense to assure me whether they were dreams that could be realized or not; that I had no doubt that he would deal with me with the utmost frankness, and give me credit for the like candor; that he knew that every drop of my blood and that of my children flowed from a Southern source; that I loved my whole country, but could not help feeling the force of the affections which my native instincts, enforced by habit, had attached me to the South. He replied that he gave me his full confidence, knew that I was an earnest man, and believed I was an honest man, and said he reciprocated the attachment which I had expressed for him and his family; that he was under great obligations to my family for kindnesses rendered to his, that he would never forget them, and that even when dying they would be remembered in his prayers. I then read the paper to him.[1]

"'*Suggestions submitted to Jefferson Davis, President, etc., etc.*

"'The amnesty proclamation of President Lincoln in connection with his last message to Congress, referring to the termination of the rebellion, presents a basis on which I think permanent peace and union between the warring sections of our country may be reëstablished. The amnesty offered would doubtless be enlarged to secure these objects and made to embrace all who sincerely desired to renew and confirm their allegiance to the Government of the United States by the extinction of the institution which originated the war against the National Republic. The proposition of the message is, that the war should be no longer waged by the United States against those who began it, after it had been relinquished by them, with the designs it was meant to accomplish. This, simply as the first step to peace, is a proposal of an armistice, that, with proper conditions arranged to accommodate it to the feelings, the wishes, the interests of all concerned, might facilitate a restoration of perfect harmony among the parties to the war and lead on again the prosperity which has been so unhappily interrupted.

"'Slavery no longer remains an insurmountable obstruction to pacification. You propose to use the slaves in some mode to conquer a peace for the South. If this race be employed to secure the independence of the Southern States by risking their lives in the service, the achievement is certainly to be crowned with their deliverance from bondage. But why should blacks or whites, the slaves or the free, be offered as victims to slaughter to acquire freedom and independence, when both objects are now attainable without such sacrifice? The white race of the South for almost a century have justly considered themselves, both as individuals and States, free and independent. If that proud eminence can again be reached, with the addition of all the material prosperity which has distinguished the free States, without making hecatombs of either whites or blacks, merely by the manumission of the latter, why should the atonement by blood be further insisted on? Slavery, "the cause of all our woes," is admitted now on all sides to be doomed. As an institution all the world condemns it.

"'This expiation made, what remains to distract our country? It now seems a free-will offering on the part of the South as essential to its own safety. Being made, nothing but military force can keep the North and South asunder. The people are one people, speak a common language, are educated in the same common law, are brought up in one common habitude,— the growth of republican representative institutions,— all fixed in freeholds rooted in the soil of a great luxuriant continent bound as one body by backbone mountains, pervaded in every member with gigantic streams running in every direction to give animation and strength like arteries and veins in the human system. Such an embodiment, in such a country, cannot be divided. The instruction of all ages appealing to the intelligence of the race brings conviction that union is strength — strength to build up the grandeur of the Republic; strength essential to secure the peace, the safety, the prosperity and glory of a great Republic. At the birth of the Government the necessities of commerce and the influence of social relations among a people of the same origin overcame the repugnance generated between the Northern and Southern States by the presence of negro slavery in the latter, and

[1] Unpublished MS.

brought them together as one people under a general government in spite of the revolting principle of slavery incorporated into the free system, which made liberty its essential element. Now that the ingredient, adverse to union, which produced disruption is removed, there is nothing left to counteract the powerful attraction that even as colonies brought our people together as a nation and which still resists victoriously the frenzy of revolution. The instincts of kindred, the bonds of commerce delineated on our maps, rivers, railroads, canals, which mark its transit, are circulating the life's blood of a gigantic race which claims the continent for its pedestal. The love of liberty nurtured by popular institutions, so dear to the Anglo-Saxon race, makes its attachments indestructible on this continent. We see them coming together again, after momentary rupture, along the Ohio, the Mississippi, upon the Gulf, the Potomac, and gradually in the interior wherever defense is assured from the military power that at first overthrew the Government. It is now plain to every sense that nothing but the interposition of the soldiery of foreign tyrannies can prevent all the States from resuming their places in the Union, casting from them the demon of discord. The few States remaining in arms that made the war for slavery as the *sine qua non* now propose to surrender it, and even the independence which was coveted to support it, as a price for foreign aid.

"'Slavery abandoned, the issue is changed, and war against the Union becomes a war for monarchy; and the cry for independence of a government that assured the independence of the Southern States of all foreign powers and their equality in the Union, is converted into an appeal for succor to European potentates, to whom they offer, in return, homage as dependencies! And this is the price they propose to pay for success in breaking up the National Government! But will the people who have consented to wage this war for an institution once considered a property, now that they have abandoned it, continue the war to enslave themselves? Would they abandon slavery to commend themselves to the protection of European monarchies, and thus escape the embrace of that national Republic as a part of which they have enjoyed almost a century of prosperity and renown? The whole aspect of the controversy upon this view is changed. The patriarchal domestic institution given up and the idea of independence and 'being let alone' in happy isolation surrendered to obtain the boon of foreign protection under the rule of monarchy! The most modern exemplification of this programme for discontented republican States defeating their popular institution by intestine hostilities is found in the French emperor's Austrian deputy, Maximilian, sent to prescribe for their disorders. Certainly a better choice for a vice-royalty under the auspices of France and Germany could not have been made. This scion of the house of Hapsburg must have inherited from a line of ancestors extending to the Dark Ages the very innate instincts of that despotism which has manacled the little republics of Italy and the little principalities of Germany, and subjected them to the will of the Kaiser for more than a thousand years. With the blessing of Heaven, the great American Republic will foil this design of the central despotism of Europe to destroy all that remains of liberty on the civilized continents of the earth. Great Britain's jealousy and apprehension of her ancient enemy, and the ambition of Russia, looking to the South for aggrandizement, will unite in arresting the strides to power of this new Holy Alliance in the heart of Europe. England, for her wars in Europe, draws her armies from India and America. She will never consent to see France, which is a laboratory of soldiers, add to her means of creating armies by making military colonies of Mexico and the Southern States of this Union for the purpose.

"'The design of Louis Napoleon in reference to conquest on this continent is not left to conjecture. With extraordinary frankness he made a public declaration that his object was to make the Latin race supreme in the southern section of the North American continent. This is a Napoleonic idea. The great Napoleon, in a letter or one of his dictations at St. Helena, states that it had been his purpose to embody an army of negroes in San Domingo, to be landed in the slave States with French support to instigate the blacks there to insurrection, and through revolution effect conquest. Louis Napoleon saw revolution involving the struggle of races and sections on the question of slavery made to his hand, when he instantly recurred to his uncle's ideas of establishing colonies to create commerce and a navy for France and to breed the material for armies to maintain his European empire. The moment he perceived our frenzied people engaged in perpetrating a national suicide he invaded Mexico to take up a position on the southern flank of this Republic, to avail himself of its distractions as well as those of Mexico, to give effect to the darling scheme of the Bonapartist dynasty to make for the Latin race in all our regions on the Gulf a seat of power under the auspices of France. His phrase "Supremacy of the Latin race" was to conciliate to his object the whole Spanish as well as the French and the mixed populations which originally founded and built up the colonies that introduced civ-

ilization around the Gulf of Mexico and on the streams of its wilderness interior. Jefferson Davis is the fortunate man who now holds the commanding position to encounter this formidable scheme of conquest, and whose fiat can at the same time deliver his country from the bloody agony now covering it in mourning. He can drive Maximilian from his American throne, and baffle the designs of Napoleon to subject our Southern people to the "Latin race." With a breath he can blow away all pretense for proscription, conscription, or confiscation in the Southern States, restore their fields to luxuriant cultivation, their ports to the commerce of the world, their constitutions and their rights under them as essentially a part of the Constitution of the United States to that strong guaranty under which they flourished for nearly a century not only as equals, but down to the hour of conflict the prevalent power on the continent. All this may be achieved by means which, so far from subjecting the weaker section of our Republic to humiliation or those asserting its cause by secession to dishonor, will add to the glory of both.

"'To accomplish this great good for our common country President Lincoln has opened the way in his amnesty proclamation and the message which looks to armistice. Suppose the first enlarged to embrace all engaged in the war; suppose secret preliminaries to armistice enable President Davis to transfer such portions of his army as he may deem proper for his purpose to Texas, held out to it as the land of promise; suppose this force on the banks of the Rio Grande, armed, equipped, and provided, and Juarez propitiated and rallying the Liberals of Mexico to give it welcome and support — could it not enter Mexico in full confidence of expelling the invaders, who, taking advantage of the distractions of our own Republic, have overthrown that of Mexico and established a foreign despotism to rule that land and spread its power over ours? I know Romero, the able, patriotic minister who represents the Republic of Mexico near our Government. He is intimate with my son Montgomery, who is persuaded that he could induce Juarez to devolve all the power he can command on President Davis — a dictatorship, if necessary — to restore the rights of Mexico and her people and provide for the stability of its government. With such hopes inspiring and a veteran army of invincibles to rally on, such a force of Mexicans might be embodied as would make the conquest of the country the work of its own people under able leading. But if more force were wanted than these Mexican recruits and the army of the South would supply, would not multitudes of the army of the North, officers and men, be found ready to embark in an enterprise vital to the interests of our whole Republic? The Republican party has staked itself on the assertion of the Monroe doctrine proposed by Canning and sanctioned by a British cabinet. The Democrats of the North have proclaimed their adhesion to it, and I doubt not from the spirit exhibited by the Congress now in session, however unwilling to declare war, it would countenance all legitimate efforts short of such result to restore the Mexican Republic. I think I could venture to pledge my son General Blair, now commanding a corps against the Confederacy, to resign his commission, expatriate himself, and join all the force he could draw to the standard borne on a crusade for the expulsion of the European despotism now threatening our confines. There is no cause so dear to the soul of American patriotism as that which embodies resistance to the intrusion of a foreign tyranny. Its infancy, nurtured in the sternest trials of a war against dictation from potentates of another hemisphere, has grown to a manhood that will never permit its approaches. He who expels the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty from our southern flank, which General Jackson in one of his letters warned me was the vulnerable point through which foreign invasion would come, will ally his name with those of Washington and Jackson as a defender of the liberty of the country. If in delivering Mexico he should model its States in form and principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new Southern constellation to its benignant sky while rounding off our possession on the continent at the Isthmus, and opening the way to blending the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific, thus embracing our Republic in the arms of the ocean, he would complete the work of Jefferson, who first set one foot of our colossal government on the Pacific by a stride from the Gulf of Mexico. Such achievement would be more highly appreciated in the South, inasmuch as it would restore the equipoise between the Northern and Southern States — if indeed such sectional distinctions could be recognized after the peculiar institution which created them had ceased to exist.'"

It is of course possible that the hard mental processes in political metaphysics through which Jefferson Davis had forced his intellect in pursuing the ambitious hallucinations which led him from loyalty to treason, had blighted all generous sentiment and healthy imagination. But if his heart was yet capable of a single patriotic memory and impulse, strange emotions must have troubled him as he sat listening to the reading of this paper by the man who had been the familiar friend, the trusted adviser, it might almost be said the confidential voice, of Andrew Jackson. It was as

though the ghost of the great President had come from his grave in Tennessee to draw him a sad and solemn picture of the ruin and shame to which he was bringing, and had almost brought, the American Republic, especially "his people" of the Southern States—nationality squandered, slavery doomed, and his Confederacy a supplicant for life at the hands of European despotisms. If he did not correctly realize the scene and hour in all its impressiveness, he seems at least to have tacitly acknowledged that his sanguinary adventure in statesmanship was moribund, and that it was high time to listen earnestly to any scheme which might give hope of averting from himself and his adherents the catastrophe to whose near approach he could no longer shut his eyes. Mr. Blair's report thus narrates the remainder of the interview:

"I then said to him, 'There is my problem, Mr. Davis; do you think it possible to be solved?' After consideration he said, 'I think so.' I then said, 'You see that I make the great point of this matter that the war is no longer made for slavery, but monarchy. You know that if the war is kept up and the Union divided, armies must be kept afoot on both sides, and this state of things has never continued long without resulting in monarchy on one side or the other, and on both generally.' He assented to this, and with great emphasis remarked that he was like Lucius Junius Brutus, and uttered the sentiment ascribed to him in Shakspere, without exactly quoting it:

> There was a Brutus once that would have brooked
> The eternal devil to keep his state in Rome
> As easily as a king.

Then he said that he was thoroughly for popular government, that this feeling had been born and bred in him. Touching the project, he said, of bringing the sections together again, the great difficulty was the excessive vindictiveness produced by outrages perpetrated in the invaded States during the war. He said reconcilement must depend, he thought, upon time and events, which he hoped would restore better feelings, but that he was certain that no circumstance would have a greater effect than to see the arms of our countrymen from the North and the South united in a war upon a foreign power assailing principles of government common to both sections and threatening their destruction. And he said he was convinced that all the powers of Europe felt it their interest that our people in this quarrel should exhaust all their energies in destroying each other, and thus make them a prey to the potentates of Europe, who felt that the destruction of our Government was necessary to the maintenance of the monarchical principles on which their own were founded. I told him that I was encouraged by finding him holding these views, and believed that our country, if impressed with them, as I thought it might be universally, would soon resume its happy unity. He said I ought to know with what reluctance he had been drawn out of the Union; that he labored to the last moment to avoid it; that he had followed the old flag longer and with more devotion than anything else on earth; that at Bull Run when he saw the flag he supposed it was his own hanging on the staff,—they were more alike then than now,—and when the flag of the United States unfurled itself in the breeze he saw it with a sigh, but he had to choose between it and his own, and he had to look to it as that of an enemy. He felt now that it was laid up, but the circumstances to which he had adverted might restore it and reconcilement be easier. With regard to Mexico, if the foreign power was driven out, it would have to depend on the events there to make it possible to connect that country with this and restore the equipoise to which I looked; nobody could foresee how things would shape themselves.

"In relation to the vindictiveness produced by the war, I said I thought he was mistaken in supposing it would be attended with great difficulty in producing reconcilement between the States and people; I told him I had spent four hours on the picket line and perceived that kind feeling existed, instead of estrangement, between the men on both sides who stood armed to shoot each other. There was nothing to prevent the immediate indulgence of hostile feelings if they felt them. But they manifested a friendly feeling. A Boston Captain Deacon, who carried me through the lines to deliver me over to Captain Davis of South Carolina, drew his bottle from his bag and proposed to drink his health. They drank together with mutual good-will and gave each other their hands. This spirit of magnanimity exists in the soldiery on both sides. It is only the politicians and those who profit, or hope to profit, by the disasters of the war who indulge in acrimony. Mr. Davis said that what I remarked was very just in the main. He admitted that it was for the most part the people at home, who brooded over the disasters of the war, who indulged in bitterness.

"Touching the matter of arrangement for reconcilement proposed by me, he remarked that all depended upon well-founded confidence, and, looking at me with very significant expression, he said, 'What, Mr. Blair, do you think of Mr. Seward?' I replied: 'Mr. Seward is a very pleasant companion; he has good social feelings, but I have no doubt that where his ambition is concerned his selfish

feelings prevail over all principle. I have no doubt he would betray any man, no matter what his obligations to him, if he stood in the way of his selfish and ambitious schemes. But,' I said, 'this matter, if entered upon at all, must be with Mr. Lincoln himself. The transaction is a military transaction, and depends entirely upon the Commander-in-Chief of our armies. If he goes into it he will certainly consider it as the affair of the military head of the Government. Now I know that Mr. Lincoln is capable of great personal sacrifices — of sacrificing the strongest feelings of his heart, of sacrificing a friend when he thinks it necessary for the good of the country; and you may rely upon it, if he plights his faith to any man in a transaction for which he is responsible as an officer or a man, he will maintain his word inviolably.' Mr. Davis said he was glad to hear me say so. He did not know Mr. Lincoln; but he was sure I did, and therefore my declaration gave him the highest satisfaction. As to Mr. Seward, he had no confidence in him himself, and he did not know any man or party in the South that had any.

"In relation to the mode of effecting the object about which we had been talking, he said we ought soon to have some understanding, because things to be done or omitted will depend upon it; that he was willing to appoint persons to have conferences, without regard to forms; that there must be some medium of communication; that he would appoint a person or persons who could be implicitly relied on by Mr. Lincoln; that he had on a former occasion indicated Judge Campbell, of the Supreme Court, as a person who could be relied on. I told him he was a person in whom I had unbounded confidence, both as regarded talents and fidelity.

"In reply to some remarks that I made as to the fame he would acquire in relieving the country from all its disasters, restoring its harmony, and extending its dominion to the Isthmus, he said what his name might be in history he cared not. If he could restore the prosperity and happiness of his country, that was the end and aim of his being. For himself, death would end his cares, and that was very easy to be accomplished.

"The next day after my first interview he sent me a note, saying he thought I might desire to have something in writing in regard to his conclusion, and therefore he made a brief statement which I brought away."[1]

The substantial accuracy of Mr. Blair's report is confirmed by the memorandum of the same interview which Jefferson Davis wrote at the time and has since printed.[2] In this conversation the rebel leader took little pains to disguise his entire willingness to enter upon the wild scheme of military conquest and annexation which could easily be read between the lines of a political crusade to rescue the Monroe doctrine from its present peril. If Mr. Blair felt elated at having so quickly made a convert of the Confederate President, he was still further gratified at discovering yet more favorable symptoms in his official surrounding at Richmond. In the three or four days he spent at the rebel capital he found nearly every prominent personage convinced of the hopeless condition of the rebellion, and even eager to seize upon any contrivance to help them out of their direful prospects. The letter which he bore from Jefferson Davis to be shown to President Lincoln was in the following language:

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, January 12, 1865.

F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

SIR: I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to give you, in this form, the substance of remarks made by me, to be repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc. I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace; and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission, if the United States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference, with a view to secure peace to the two countries. Yours, etc.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.[3]

But the Government councils at Washington were not ruled by the spirit of political adventure. Abraham Lincoln had a loftier conception of patriotic duty and a higher ideal of national ethics. The proposal to divert his nation, "conceived in Liberty," from its grand task of preserving for humanity "government of the people, by the people, for the people," and degrade its heroic struggle and sacrifice to the low level of a joint filibustering foray, which, instead of crowning his work of emancipation, might perhaps eventuate in a renewal, extension, and perpetuation of slavery, did not receive from him an instant's consideration. His whole interest in Mr. Blair's mission was in the despondency of the rebel leaders which it disclosed, and the possibility of bringing them to an acknowledgment of their despair and the abandonment of their resistance. His only response to the overture thus half officially brought to his notice was to open the door of negotiation a little wider than he had done

1 Unpublished MS.

2 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 612 et seq.

3 "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.

before, but for the specific and exclusive objects of union and peace. As an answer to Jefferson Davis's note he therefore wrote Mr. Blair the following:

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1865.

F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN.[1]

With this note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond, giving Mr. Davis such feeble excuses as he could hastily frame why Mr. Lincoln had rejected his overture for a joint invasion of Mexico,[2] alleging that Mr. Lincoln was embarrassed by radical politicians and could not use "political agencies." Mr. Blair then, but again without authority, proposed a new project, namely, that Grant and Lee should enter into negotiations, the scope and object of which, however, he seems to have left altogether vague. The simple truth is evident that Mr. Blair was, as best he might, covering his retreat from an abortive intrigue. He soon reported to Davis that military negotiation was out of the question.

Jefferson Davis therefore had only two alternatives before him — either to repeat his stubborn ultimatum of separation and independence, or frankly to accept Lincoln's ultimatum of reunion. The principal Richmond authorities knew, and some of them had tacitly admitted, that their Confederacy was nearly in collapse. Vice-President Stephens, in a secret speech to the rebel Senate, had pointed out that "we could not match our opponents in numbers, and should not attempt to cope with them in direct physical power," and advocated a Fabian policy which involved the abandonment of Richmond.[3] Judge Campbell, rebel Assistant Secretary of War, had collected facts and figures, which a few weeks later he embodied in a formal report, showing the South to be in practical exhaustion.[4] Lee sent a dispatch saying he had not two days' rations for his army.[5] Richmond was already in a panic at rumors of evacuation. Flour was selling at a thousand dollars a barrel in Confederate currency. The recent fall of Fort Fisher had closed the last avenue through which blockade runners could bring them foreign supplies. Governor Brown of Georgia was refusing to obey orders from Richmond and characterizing them as "usurping" and "despotic."[6] Under such circumstances a defiant cry of independence would not reassure anybody; nor, on the other hand, was it longer possible to remain silent. Mr. Blair's first visit to Richmond had created general interest. Old friends plied him with eager questions and laid his truthful answers concerning their gloomy prospects solemnly to heart. The fact of his secret consultation with Davis transpired. When Mr. Blair came a second time and held a second secret consultation with the rebel President wonder and rumor rose to fever heat.

Impelled to take action, Mr. Davis had not the courage to be frank. He called, first, Vice-President Stephens, and afterward his cabinet, to a discussion of the project. A peace commission of three was appointed, consisting of Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President; R. M. T. Hunter, senator and ex-Secretary of State; and John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War — all of them convinced that the rebellion was hopeless, and yet unwilling to admit the logical consequences and necessities. The drafting of instructions for the guidance of the commissioners was a difficult problem, since the explicit condition prescribed by Mr. Lincoln's note was that he would only receive an agent sent him "with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country." The astute Mr. Benjamin, rebel Secretary of State, in order to make the instructions "as vague and general as possible," proposed the simple direction to confer "upon the subject to which it relates."[7] His action and language were broad enough to carry the inference that in his secret heart he too was sick of rebellion and ready to make terms. Whether it was so meant or not, his chief refused to receive the delicate suggestion.

1 "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.

2 "He [Blair] then unfolded to me [writes Davis] the embarrassment of Mr. Lincoln on account of the extreme men, in Congress and elsewhere, who wished to drive him into harsher measures than he was inclined to adopt; whence it would not be feasible for him to enter into any arrangement with us by the use of political agencies; that if anything beneficial could be effected it must be done without the intervention of the politicians. He therefore suggested that Generals Lee and Grant might enter into an arrangement by which hostilities would be suspended, and a way paved for the restoration of peace. I responded that I would willingly intrust to General Lee such negotiation as was indicated." [Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., pp. 616, 617.]

3 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 587–589.

4 See "Open Letters" of this number of the magazine, for a letter from Judge Campbell to Judge Curtis entitled, "A View of the Confederacy from the Inside."—EDITOR.

5 J. B. Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 384.

6 Ibid., p. 395.

7 Benjamin to Davis, May 17, 1877. "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., pp. 212–214.

With the ruin and defeat of the Confederate cause staring him full in the face Davis could bring himself neither to a dignified refusal nor to a resigned acceptance of the form of negotiation as Mr. Lincoln had tendered it. Even in this gulf of war and destitution into which he had led his people he could not forego the vanity of masquerading as a champion. He was unwilling, says Mr. Benjamin, to appear to betray his trust as Confederate President. "You thought, from regard to your personal honor, that your language ought to be such as to render impossible any malignant comment on your actions."[1] But if so, why not adopt the heroic alternative and refuse to negotiate? Why resort to the yet more humiliating absurdity of sending a commission on terms which he knew Mr. Lincoln had pointedly rejected?[2] With greater sacrifice of personal dignity the Confederate President adopted the devious alternative — a continuation of the narrow, unmanly, pettifogging misrepresentation with which Southern leaders had deluded the Southern people. Instead of Mr. Benjamin's phraseology, Jefferson Davis wrote the following instruction to the commissioners, which carried a palpable contradiction on its face:

RICHMOND, January 28, 1865.

In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries. Your obedient servant,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.[3]

THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE.

WITH this double-meaning credential the commissioners presented themselves at the Union lines near Richmond on the evening of January 29, 1865, and, instead of frankly showing their authority, asked admission "in accordance with an understanding claimed to exist with Lieutenant-General Grant, on their way to Washington as peace commissioners."[4] The application being telegraphed to Washington, Mr. Stanton answered that no one should be admitted under such character or profession until the President's instructions were received.[5] Mr. Lincoln, being apprised of the application, promptly dispatched a special messenger with written directions to admit the commissioners under safe conduct if they would say in writing that they came for the purpose of an informal conference on the basis of his note of January 18 to Mr. Blair, "with a view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."[6] Before this messenger arrived, however, the commissioners reconsidered the form of their application and addressed a new one to General Grant, asking permission "to proceed to Washington to hold a conference with President Lincoln upon the subject of the existing war, and with a view of ascertaining upon what terms it may be terminated, in pursuance of the course indicated by him in his letter to Mr. Blair of January 18, 1865."[7]

Pursuant to this request, they were provisionally conveyed to Grant's headquarters. One of them records with evident surprise the unostentatious surroundings of the General-in-Chief.

> I was instantly struck with the great simplicity and perfect naturalness of his manners, and the entire absence of everything like affectation, show, or even the usual military air or *mien* of men in his position. He was plainly attired, sitting in a log-cabin, busily writing on a small table, by a kerosene lamp. It was night when we arrived. There was nothing in his appearance or surroundings which indicated his official rank. There were neither guards nor aids about him. . . . He furnished us with comfortable quarters on board one of his dispatch boats. The more I became acquainted with him, the more I became thoroughly impressed with the very extraordinary combination of rare elements of character which he exhibited. During the time he met us frequently and conversed freely upon various subjects, not much upon our mission. I saw, however, very clearly that he was very anxious for the proposed conference to take place.[8]

The commissioners' note to Grant had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of President Lincoln; and so accepting it, he, on the 31st of January, sent Secretary Seward to meet them, giving him for this purpose the following written instructions:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, January 31, 1865.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State:

You will proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, there to meet and informally confer with Messrs.

1 Benjamin to Davis, May 17, 1877. "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., p. 213.

2 [INDORSEMENT BY MR. LINCOLN.]

"To-day [January 28] Mr. Blair tells me that on the 21st instant he delivered to Mr. Davis the original, of which the within is a copy, and left it with him; that at the time of delivering it Mr. Davis read it over twice in Mr. Blair's presence, at the close of which he (Mr. Blair) remarked that the part about 'our one common country' related to the part of Mr. Davis's letter about 'the two countries,' to which Mr. Davis replied that he so understood it. A. LINCOLN."

["House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 229.]

3 "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. IV., p. 214.

4 Wilcox to Parke, Jan. 29, 1865. "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 230.

5 Stanton to Ord, Jan. 29, 1865, 10 P. M. Ibid., p. 230.

6 Lincoln to Eckert, Jan. 30, 1865. Ibid., p. 231.

7 Ibid., p. 232.

8 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 597.

Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, on the basis of my letter to F. P. Blair, Esq., of January 18, 1865, a copy of which you have. You will make known to them that three things are indispensable, to wit: *First*, the restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. *Second*, no receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding documents. *Third*, no cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. You will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may choose to say, and report to me. You will not assume to definitely consummate anything.

Yours, etc.,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.[1]

Mr. Seward started on the morning of February 1, and simultaneously with his departure the President repeated to General Grant the monition which the Secretary of War had already sent him two days before through the special messenger, "Let nothing which is transpiring change, hinder, or delay your military movements or plans."[2] Grant responded to the order, promising that no armistice should ensue, adding, "The troops are kept in readiness to move at the shortest notice, if occasion should justify it."[3] The special messenger, Major Thomas J. Eckert, arrived while Mr. Seward was yet on his way. On informing the commissioners of the President's exact requirement, they replied by presenting Jefferson Davis's instruction. This was receding from the terms contained in their note to Grant, and Major Eckert promptly notified them that they could not proceed further unless they complied strictly with President Lincoln's terms. Thus at half-past nine on the night of February 1 the mission of Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell was practically at an end. It was never explained why they took this course, for the next day they again changed their minds. The only conjecture which seems plausible is that they hoped to persuade General Grant to take some extraordinary and dictatorial step. One of them hints as much in a newspaper article written long after the war. "We had tried," he wrote, "to intimate to General Grant, before we reached Old Point, that a settlement generally satisfactory to both sides could be more easily effected through him and General Lee by an armistice than in any other way. The attempt was in vain."[4] The general had indeed listened to them, with great interest; and in their eagerness to convert him they had probably indulged in stronger phrases of repentance than they felt. About an hour after the commissioners refused Major Eckert's ultimatum General Grant telegraphed the following to Secretary Stanton, from which it will be seen that at least two of the commissioners had declared to him their personal willingness "to restore peace and union."

February 1, 10.30 P. M., 1865.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state confidentially, but not officially, to become a matter of record, that I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter, that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my own, or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an awkward position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence. At the same time I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recommend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instructions contemplated to secure their safe conduct, if they had used the same language to Major Eckert.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.[5]

On the morning of February 2, President Lincoln went to the War Department, and, reading Major Eckert's report, was about to recall Mr. Seward by telegraph, when Grant's dispatch was placed in his hands. The communication served to change his purpose. Resolving not to neglect the indications of sincerity here described, he immediately telegraphed in reply, "Say to the gentlemen I will meet them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there."[6] The commissioners by this time had decided to accept Mr. Lincoln's terms, which they did in writing to both Major Eckert and General Grant, and thereupon were at once conveyed from General Grant's headquarters at City Point to Fort Monroe, where Mr. Lincoln joined Secretary Seward on the same night.

On the morning of February 3, 1865, the rebel commissioners were conducted on board the *River Queen*, lying at anchor near Fort Monroe, where President Lincoln and Secretary Seward awaited them; and in the saloon of that steamer an informal conference of four hours' duration ensued. It was agreed beforehand that no writing or memorandum should be made at the time, so that the record of the interview remains only in the separate accounts

1 "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 233.
2 Ibid., p. 233.
3 Ibid., p. 234.
4 "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. III., p. 175 (April, 1877).
5 "House Journal," 2d Session 38th Congress, p. 235.
6 Ibid., p. 235.

which each of the rebel commissioners afterward wrote out from memory, neither Mr. Seward nor President Lincoln ever having made any report in detail. Former personal acquaintance made the beginning easy and cordial, through pleasant reminiscences of the past and mutual inquiries after friends. In a careful analysis of these reports, thus furnished by the Confederates themselves, the first striking feature is the difference of intention between the parties. It is apparent that Mr. Lincoln went, honestly and frankly in all friendliness, to offer them the best terms he could to secure peace and reunion, but to abate no jot of official duty and personal dignity; while the main thought of the commissioners was to evade the express condition on which they had been admitted to conference; to seek to postpone the vital issue; and to propose an armistice, by debating a mere juggling expedient, against which they had in a private agreement with one another already committed themselves.

Mr. Stephens began the discussion by asking whether there was no way of restoring the harmony and happiness of former days; to which Mr. Lincoln replied, "There was but one way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting the laws of the Union to cease that resistance." Mr. Stephens rejoined that they had been induced to believe that both parties might for a while leave their present strife in abeyance and occupy themselves with some continental question till their anger should cool and accommodation become possible.

Here Mr. Lincoln interposed promptly and frankly: "I suppose you refer to something that Mr. Blair has said. Now it is proper to state at the beginning that whatever he said was of his own accord, and without the least authority from me. When he applied for a passport to go to Richmond, with certain ideas which he wished to make known to me, I told him flatly that I did not want to hear them. If he desired to go to Richmond of his own accord, I would give him a passport; but he had no authority to speak for me in any way whatever. When he returned and brought me Mr. Davis's letter, I gave him the one to which you alluded in your application for leave to cross the lines. I was always willing to hear propositions for peace on the conditions of this letter, and on no other. The restoration of the Union is a *sine qua non* with me, and hence my instructions that no conference was to be held except upon that basis."

Despite this express disavowal Mr. Stephens persisted in believing that Mr. Lincoln had come with ulterior designs, and went on at considerable length to elaborate his idea of a joint Mexican expedition, to be undertaken during an armistice and without a prior pledge of ultimate reunion. Such an expedition, he argued, would establish the "right of self-government to all peoples on this continent against the dominion or control of any European power." Establishing this principle of the right of peoples to self-government would necessarily also establish, by logical sequence, the right of States to self-government; and, present passions being cooled, there would ensue "an Ocean-bound Federal Republic, under the operation of this *Continental Regulator* — the ultimate absolute sovereignty of each State." His idea was that "All the States might reasonably be expected, very soon, to return, of their own accord, to their former relations to the Union, just as they came together at first by their own consent, and for their mutual interests. Others, too, would continue to join it in the future, as they had in the past. This great law of the system would effect the same certain results in its organization as the law of gravitation in the material world."[1]

Mr. Stephens does not seem to have realized how comically absurd was his effort to convert President Lincoln to the doctrine of secession by this very transparent bit of cunning, and the others listened with considerate and patient gravity. Mr. Seward at length punctured the bubble with a few well-directed sentences, when Mr. Hunter also intervened to express his entire dissent from Mr. Stephens's proposal. "In this view," reports Mr. Stephens naïvely, "he expressed the joint opinion of the commissioners; indeed, we had determined not to enter into any agreement that would require the Confederate arms to join in any invasion of Mexico."[2] But the rebel Vice-President fails to record why, under these circumstances, he had opened this useless branch of the discussion.

At this stage President Lincoln brought back the conversation pointedly to the original object of the conference:

> He repeated that he could not entertain a proposition for an armistice on any terms while the great and vital question of reunion was undisposed of. That was the first question to be settled. He could enter into no treaty, convention, or stipulation, or agreement with the Confederate States, jointly or separately, upon that or any other subject, but upon the basis first settled that the Union was to be restored. Any such agreement, or stipulation, would be a *quasi* recognition of the States then in arms against the National Government, as a separate power. That he never could do.[3]

1 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 600–604.
2 Ibid., p. 608.
3 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., p. 608.

This branch of the discussion [also reports Judge Campbell] was closed by Mr. Lincoln, who answered that it could not be entertained; that there could be no war without the consent of Congress, and no treaty without the consent of the Senate of the United States; that he could make no treaty with the Confederate States, because that would be a recognition of those States, and that this could not be done under any circumstances; that unless a settlement were made there would be danger that the quarrel would break out in the midst of the joint operations; that one party might unite with the common enemy to destroy the other; that he was determined to do nothing to suspend the operations for bringing the existing struggle to a close to attain any collateral end. Mr. Lincoln in this part of the conversation admitted that he had power to make a military convention, and that his arrangements under that might extend to settle several of the points mentioned, but others it could not.[1]

The sophistical theory of secession as a conservative principle, and the filibustering bait of a joint expedition to steal Mexico under guise of enforcing the Monroe doctrine, being thus effectually cleared away, the discussion at length turned to the only reasonable inquiry which remained. Judge Campbell asked how restoration could be brought about if the Confederate States would consent, mentioning important questions, such as the disbandment of the army, confiscation acts on both sides, the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation, representation in Congress, the division of Virginia, and so on, which would inevitably arise and require immediate adjustment. On these various topics much conversation ensued, which, even as briefly reported, is too long to be quoted entire. It will be more useful to condense, under specific headings, the substantial declarations and offers which the commissioners report Mr. Lincoln to have made.

I. Reconstruction.—The shortest way the insurgents could effect this, he said, was "by disbanding their armies and permitting the national authorities to resume their functions." Mr. Seward called attention to that phrase of his annual message where he had declared, "In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it." As to the rebel States being admitted to representation in Congress, "Mr. Lincoln very promptly replied that his own individual opinion was they ought to be. He also thought they would be; but he could not enter into any stipulation upon the subject. His own opinion was that when the resistance ceased and the national authority was recognized the States would be immediately restored to their practical relations to the Union."

II. Confiscation Acts.—"Mr. Lincoln said that so far as the confiscation acts and other penal acts were concerned, their enforcement was left entirely with him, and on that point he was perfectly willing to be full and explicit, and on his assurance perfect reliance might be placed. He should exercise the power of the Executive with the utmost liberality."[2] "As to all questions," says Judge Campbell's report, "involving rights of property, the courts could determine them, and that Congress would no doubt be liberal in making restitution of confiscated property, or by indemnity, after the passions that had been excited by the war had been composed."[3]

III. The Emancipation Proclamation. —"Mr. Lincoln said that was a judicial question. How the courts would decide it he did not know, and could give no answer. His own opinion was, that as the proclamation was a war measure, and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war power, as soon as the war ceased it would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation while it was in active exercise. This was his individual opinion, but the courts might decide the other way, and hold that it effectually emancipated all the slaves in the States to which it applied at the time. So far as he was concerned, he should leave it to the courts to decide. He never would change or modify the terms of the proclamation in the slightest particular."

At another point in the conversation "He said it was not his intention in the beginning to interfere with slavery in the States; that he never would have done it if he had not been compelled by necessity to do it to maintain the Union; that the subject presented many difficult and perplexing questions to him; that he had hesitated for some time, and had resorted to this measure only when driven to it by public necessity; that he had been in favor of the General Government prohibiting the extension of slavery into the Territories, but did not think that that Government possessed power over the subject in the States, except as a war measure; and that he had always himself been in favor of emancipation, but not immediate emancipation, even by the States. Many evils attending this appeared to him."

Recurring once more to the subject of emancipation, "He went on to say that he would be willing to be taxed to remunerate the South-

1 Campbell in "Southern Magazine," December, 1874, p. 191.

2 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 609, 612, and 617.

3 Campbell in "Southern Magazine," December, 1874, p. 192.

ern people for their slaves. He believed the people of the North were as responsible for slavery as the people of the South; and if the war should then cease, with the voluntary abolition of slavery by the States, he should be in favor, individually, of the Government paying a fair indemnity for the loss to the owners. He said he believed this feeling had an extensive existence at the North. He knew some who were in favor of an appropriation as high as four hundred millions of dollars for this purpose. I could mention persons, said he, whose names would astonish you, who are willing to do this if the war shall now cease without further expense, and with the abolition of slavery as stated. But on this subject, he said, he could give no assurance — enter into no stipulation. He barely expressed his own feelings and views, and what he believed to be the views of others upon the subject."

IV. THE DIVISION OF VIRGINIA.— "Mr. Lincoln said he could only give an individual opinion, which was, that Western Virginia would be continued to be recognized as a separate State in the Union."

V. THE XIIITH AMENDMENT.— Mr. Seward brought to the notice of the commissioners one topic which to them was new; namely, that only a few days before, on the 31st of January, Congress had passed the XIIIth Amendment to the Constitution, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, would effect an immediate abolition of slavery throughout the entire Union. The reports of the commissioners represent Mr. Seward as saying that if the South would submit and agree to immediate restoration, the restored States might yet defeat the ratification of this amendment, intimating that Congress had passed it "under the predominance of revolutionary passion," which would abate on the cessation of the war. It may well be doubted whether Mr. Seward stated the case as strongly as the commissioners intimate, since he himself, like Mr. Lincoln and his entire cabinet, had favored the measure. It is probable that the commissioners allowed their own feelings and wishes to color too strongly the hypothesis he stated, and to interpret as a probability what he mentioned as only among the possible events of the future.

It will be seen that in what he said upon these various propositions Mr. Lincoln was always extremely careful to discriminate between what he was under the Constitution authorized to do as Executive, and what would devolve upon coördinate branches of the Government under their own powers and limitations. With the utmost circumspection he pointed out the distinctions between his personal opinions and wishes and his official authority. More especially, however, did he repeat and emphasize the declaration that he would do none of the things mentioned or promised without a previous pledge of reunion and cessation of resistance. "Even in case the Confederate States should entertain the proposition of a return to the Union," says Mr. Stephens's narrative, "he persisted in asserting that he could not enter into any agreement upon this subject [reconstruction], or upon any other matters of that sort, with parties in arms against the Government." Mr. Hunter interposed, and in illustration of the propriety of the Executive entering into agreements with persons in arms against the acknowledged rightful public authority referred to repeated instances of this character between Charles I. of England and the people in arms against him. Mr. Lincoln in reply to this said: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head." The pertinent retort reduced Mr. Hunter to his last rhetorical resource — a wail of protest, in the very worst tone of sectional egotism, that the Confederate States and their people were by these terms forced to unconditional surrender and submission. To this Mr. Seward replied with patience and dignity "That no words like unconditional submission had been used, or any importing or justly implying degradation, or humiliation even, to the people of the Confederate States. . . . Nor did he think that in yielding to the execution of the laws under the Constitution of the United States, with all its guarantees and securities for personal and political rights, as they might be declared to be by the courts, could be properly considered as unconditional submission to conquerors, or as having anything humiliating in it. The Southern people and the Southern States would be under the Constitution of the United States, with all their rights secured thereby, in the same way, and through the same instrumentalities, as the similar rights of the people of the other States were."

The reader will recall that in his last annual message President Lincoln declared his belief, based "on careful consideration of all the evidence accessible," that it was useless to attempt to negotiate with Jefferson Davis, but that the prospect would be better with his followers. Mr. Lincoln had evidently gone to Fort Monroe in hope of making some direct impression upon Stephens and Hunter, whom Grant represented as having such good intentions "to restore peace and union." He did not neglect to try this joint of the rebel commissioners' armor. Seizing the proper opportunity, he pressed upon Stephens the suggestion of separate State action to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Addressing him, he said:

If I resided in Georgia, with my present sentiments, I 'll tell you what I would do if I were in your place. I would go home and get the governor of the State to call the legislature together, and get them to recall all the State troops from the war; elect senators and members to Congress, and ratify this constitutional amendment prospectively, so as to take effect — say in five years. Such a ratification would be valid, in my opinion. I have looked into the subject, and think such a prospective ratification would be valid. Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced now that slavery is doomed. It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men to pursue would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. This would be my course, if I were in your place.

The salutary advice was wasted. Mr. Stephens was a very incarnation of political paradoxes. Perhaps in all the South there was not another man whose personal desires were so moderate and correct, and whose political theories were so radical and wrong. At the beginning he had opposed secession as premature and foolish, war as desperate and ruinous; yet, against his better judgment, he had followed his "corner-stone" theory of slavery and his "supremacy" theory of States rights to the war and the ruin he foretold. Now, at the end of four years' experiment, he still clung obstinately to his new theory of secession as a "continental regulator," and the vain hope that Mr. Lincoln would yet adopt it. When at last the parties were separating, with friendly handshakings, he asked Mr. Lincoln to reconsider the plan of an armistice on the basis of a Mexican expedition. "Well, Stephens," replied Mr. Lincoln, "I will reconsider it; but I do not think my mind will change." And so ended the Hampton Roads conference.[1]

The commissioners returned to Richmond in great disappointment, and communicated the failure of their efforts to Jefferson Davis, whose chagrin was as great as their own. They had all caught eagerly at the hope that this negotiation would somehow extricate them from the dilemmas and dangers whose crushing portent they realized, but had no power to avert except by surrender; and now, when this last hope failed them, they were doubly cast down. Campbell says he "favored negotiations for peace"[2] — doubtless meaning by this language that he advocated the acceptance of the proffered terms. Stephens yet believed that Mr. Lincoln would be tempted by the Mexican scheme and would reconsider his decision. He therefore advised that the results of the meeting should be kept secret; and when the other commissioners and Davis refused to follow this advice, he gave up the Confederate cause as hopeless, withdrew from Richmond, abandoned the rebellion, and went into retirement.[3] His signature to the brief public report of the commissioners stating the result of the Hampton Roads conference was his last participation in the ill-starred enterprise.

Davis took the only course open to him after refusing the honorable peace which Mr. Lincoln had tendered. He transmitted the commissioners' report to the rebel Congress with a brief and dry message, stating that the enemy refused any terms except those the conqueror may grant; and then arranged as vigorous an effort as the circumstances permitted, once more to "fire the Southern heart." A public meeting was called, and on the evening of February 6 Jefferson Davis and others made speeches at the African Church,[4] which, judging from the meager reports that were printed, were as denunciatory and bellicose as the bitterest Confederate could have wished. Davis, particularly, is represented to have excelled himself in that lurid flow of partisan passion and vaunting prophecy which he so effectively used upon Southern listeners for many years. "Sooner than we should ever be united again," he said, "he would be willing to yield up everything he had on earth — if it were possible he would sacrifice a thousand lives"; and further announced his confidence that they would yet "compel the Yankees, in less than twelve months, to petition us for peace on our own terms."[5] He denounced President Lincoln as "His Majesty Abraham the First," and said "before the campaign was over he

1 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 610–618.

2 Campbell, "Recollections," etc. Pamphlet.

3 Stephens, "War between the States," Vol. II., pp. 224–226.

4 This meeting at the African Church was supplemented, a few days later, by a grand concerted effort at public speech-making at different places in Richmond, intended to electrify the South. Pollard, the Southern historian, thus describes it: "All business was suspended in Richmond; at high noon processions were formed to the different places of meeting; and no less than twenty different orators, composed of the most effective speakers in Congress and the cabinet, and the most eloquent divines of Richmond, took their stands in the halls of legislation, in the churches and the theaters, and swelled the eloquence of this last grand appeal to the people and armies of the South. . . . It was an extraordinary day in Richmond; vast crowds huddled around the stands of the speakers or lined the streets; and the air was vocal with the efforts of the orator and the responses of his audience. It appeared indeed that the blood of the people had again been kindled. But it was only the sickly glare of an expiring flame; there was no steadiness in the excitement; there was no virtue in the huzzas; the inspiration ended with the voices and ceremonies that invoked it; and it was found that the spirit of the people of the Confederacy was too weak, too much broken, to react with effect or assume the position of erect and desperate defiance." [Pollard, "The Lost Cause," pp. 684, 685.]

5 "Richmond Dispatch," Feb. 7, 1865.

and Seward might find 'they had been speaking to their masters.' "[1]

This extravagance of impotent anger, this rage of baffled ambition, would seem merely pitiably grotesque were it not rendered ghastly by the reflection that it was the signal which carried many additional thousands of brave soldiers to bloody graves in continuing a palpably hopeless military struggle.

THE XIIITH AMENDMENT.

We have enumerated with some detail the series of radical antislavery measures enacted at the second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, which ended July 17, 1862 — the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; the prohibition of slavery in the national Territories; the practical repeal of the fugitive slave law; and the sweeping measures of confiscation which in different forms decreed forfeiture of slave property for the crimes of treason and rebellion. When this wholesale legislation was supplemented by the President's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of September 22, 1862, and his final edict of freedom of January 1, 1863, the institution had clearly received its *coup de grâce* in all except the loyal border States. Consequently the third session of the Thirty-seventh Congress ending March 4, 1863, occupied itself with this phase of the slavery question only to the extent of an effort to put into operation the President's plan of compensated abolishment. That effort took practical shape in a bill to give the State of Missouri fifteen millions on condition that she would emancipate her slaves; but the proposition failed, largely through the opposition of a few conservative members from Missouri, and the session adjourned without having by its legislation advanced the destruction of slavery.

When Congress met again in December, 1863, and organized by the election of Schuyler Colfax of Indiana as Speaker, the whole situation had undergone further change. The Union arms had been triumphant — Gettysburg had been won and Vicksburg had capitulated; Lincoln's edict of freedom had become an accepted fact; fifty regiments of negro soldiers carried bayonets in the Union armies; Vallandigham had been beaten for governor in Ohio by a hundred thousand majority; the draft had been successfully enforced in every district of every loyal State in the Union. Under these brightening prospects, military and political, the more progressive spirits in Congress took up anew the suspended battle with slavery which the institution had itself invited by its unprovoked assault on the life of the Government.

The President's reference to the subject in his annual message was very brief:

> The movements [said he] by State action for emancipation in several of the States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation.[2]

His language had reference to Maryland, where during the autumn of 1863 the question of emancipation had been actively discussed by political parties, and where at the election of November 4, 1863, a legislature had been chosen containing a considerable majority pledged to emancipation.

More especially did it refer to Missouri, where, notwithstanding the failure of the fifteen-million compensation bill at the previous session, a State convention had actually passed an ordinance of emancipation, though with such limitations as rendered it unacceptable to the more advanced public opinion of the State. Prudence was the very essence of Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship, and he doubtless felt it was not safe for the Executive to venture farther at that time. "We are like whalers," he said to Governor Morgan one day, "who have been on a long chase: we have at last got the harpoon into the monster, but we must now look how we steer, or with one 'flop' of his tail he will yet send us all into eternity."[3]

Senators and members of the House, especially those representing antislavery States or districts, did not need to be so circumspect. It was doubtless with this consciousness that J. M. Ashley, a Republican representative from Ohio, and James F. Wilson, a Republican representative from Iowa, on the 14th of December, 1863, — that being the earliest opportunity after the House was organized, — introduced, the former a bill and the latter a joint resolution to propose to the several States an amendment of the Constitution prohibiting slavery throughout the United States. Both the propositions were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Wilson was chairman; but before he made any report on the subject it had been brought before the Senate, where its discussion attracted marked public attention.

Senator John B. Henderson, who with rare courage and skill had, as a progressive conservative, made himself one of the leading champions of Missouri emancipation, on the 11th of January, 1864, introduced into the

[1] Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 411.

[2] Message, Dec. 8, 1863.

[3] Carpenter in Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 752.

Senate a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution that slavery shall not exist in the United States.[1] It is not probable that either he or the Senate saw any near hope of success in such a measure. The resolution went to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where it caused some discussion, but apparently without being treated as a matter of pressing importance. Nearly a month had elapsed when Mr. Sumner also introduced a joint resolution, proposing an amendment that "Everywhere within the limits of the United States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave."[2] He asked its reference to the select committee on slavery, of which he was chairman; but several senators argued that such an amendment properly belonged to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in this reference Mr. Sumner finally acquiesced. It is possible that this slight and courteously worded rivalry between the two committees induced earlier action than would otherwise have happened, for two days later — February 10 — Mr. Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, reported back a substitute in the following language, differing from the phraseology of both Mr. Sumner and Mr. Henderson :

ARTICLE XIII.

SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

SECT. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.[3]

Even after the Committee on the Judiciary by this report had adopted the measure, it was evidently thought to be merely in an experimental or trial stage, for more than six weeks elapsed before the Senate again took it up for action. On the 28th of March, however, Mr. Trumbull formally opened debate upon it in an elaborate speech. The discussion was continued from time to time until April 8. As the Republicans had almost unanimous control of the Senate, their speeches, though able and eloquent, seemed perfunctory and devoted to a foregone conclusion. Those which attracted most attention were the arguments of Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and Mr. Henderson of Missouri,— senators representing slave States,— advocating the amendment. Senator Sumner, whose pride of erudition amounted almost to vanity, pleaded earnestly for his phrase, "All persons are equal before the law," copied from the Constitution of revolutionary France. But Mr. Howard of Michigan, one of the soundest lawyers and clearest thinkers of the Senate, pointed out the inapplicability of the words, and declared it safer to follow the Ordinance of 1787, with its historical associations and its well-adjudicated meaning.

There was, of course, from the first no doubt whatever that the Senate would pass the constitutional amendment, the political classification of that body being thirty-six Republicans, five Conditional Unionists, and nine Democrats. Not only was the whole Republican strength, thirty-six votes, cast in its favor, but two Democrats,— Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and James W. Nesmith of Oregon,— with a political wisdom far in advance of their party, also voted for it, giving more than the two-thirds required by the Constitution.

When, however, the joint resolution went to the House of Representatives there was such a formidable party strength arrayed against it as to foreshadow its failure. The party classification of the House stood one hundred and two Republicans, seventy-five Democrats, and nine from the border States, leaving but little chance of obtaining the required two-thirds in favor of the measure. Nevertheless there was sufficient Republican strength to secure its discussion; and when it came up on the 31st of May the first vote showed seventy-six to fifty-five against rejecting the joint resolution.

We may infer that the conviction of the present hopelessness of the measure greatly shortened the debate upon it. The question occupied the House only on three different days — the 31st of May, when it was taken up, and the 14th and 15th of June. The speeches in opposition all came from Democrats; the speeches in its favor all came from Republicans, except one. From its adoption the former predicted the direst evils to the Constitution and the Republic; the latter the most beneficial results in the restoration of the country to peace and the fulfillment of the high destiny intended for it by its founders. Upon the final question of its passage the vote stood: yeas, ninety-three; nays, sixty-five; absent or not voting, twenty-three. Of those voting in favor of the resolution eighty-seven were Republicans and four were Democrats.[4] Those voting against it were all Democrats. The resolution, not having secured a two-thirds vote, was

1 Henry Wilson, "Antislavery Measures in Congress," p. 251.

2 "Globe," Feb. 8, 1864, p. 521.

3 "Globe," March 28, 1864, p. 1313.

4 The Democrats voting for the joint resolution were Moses F. Odell and John A. Griswold of New York, Joseph Baily of Pennsylvania, and Ezra Wheeler of Wisconsin, the latter having also made the only speech in its favor from the Democratic side.

thus lost; seeing which Mr. Ashley, Republican, who had the measure in charge, changed his vote so that he might, if occasion arose, move its reconsideration.

The ever-vigilant public opinion of the loyal States, intensified by the burdens and anxieties of the war, took up this far-reaching question of abolishing slavery by constitutional amendment with an interest fully as deep as that manifested by Congress. Before the joint resolution had failed in the House of Representatives the issue was already transferred to discussion and prospective decision in a new forum.

When on the 7th of June, 1864, the National Republican Convention met in Baltimore, the two most vital thoughts which animated its members were the renomination of Mr. Lincoln and the success of the constitutional amendment. The first was recognized as a popular decision needing only the formality of an announcement by the convention; and the full emphasis of speech and resolution was therefore centered on the latter, as the dominant and aggressive reform upon which the party would stake its political fortunes in the coming campaign.

It is not among the least of the evidences of President Lincoln's political sagacity and political courage that it was he himself who supplied the spark that fired this train of popular action. The editor of the "New York Independent," who attended the convention, and who with others visited Mr. Lincoln immediately after the nomination, printed the following in his paper of June 16, 1864: "When one of us mentioned the great enthusiasm at the convention, after Senator E. D. Morgan's proposition to amend the Constitution, abolishing slavery, Mr. Lincoln instantly said, 'It was I who suggested to Mr. Morgan that he should put that idea into his opening speech.'" The declaration of Morgan, who was chairman of the National Republican Committee, and as such called the convention to order, immediately found an echo in the speech of the temporary chairman, the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. The indorsement of the principle by the eminent Kentucky divine, not on the ground of party, but on the high philosophy of true universal government and of genuine Christian religion, gave the announcement an interest and significance accorded to few planks in party platforms. Permanent chairman Dennison reaffirmed the doctrine of Morgan and Breckinridge, and the thunderous applause of the whole convention greeted the formal proclamation of the new dogma of political faith in the third resolution of the platform:

Resolved, That as slavery was the cause and now constitutes the strength of this rebellion, and as it must be always and everywhere hostile to the principles of republican government, justice and the national safety demand its utter and complete extirpation from the soil of the Republic; and that while we uphold and maintain the acts and proclamations by which the Government in its own defense has aimed a death blow at this gigantic evil, we are in favor, furthermore, of such an amendment to the Constitution, to be made by the people, in conformity with its provisions, as shall terminate and forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of the United States.

We have related elsewhere how upon this and the other declarations of the platform the Republican party went to battle and gained an overwhelming victory — a popular majority of 411,281, an electoral majority of 191, and a House of Representatives of 138 Unionists to 35 Democrats. In view of this result the President was able to take up the question with confidence among his official recommendations; and in the annual message which he transmitted to Congress on the 6th of December, 1864, he urged upon the members whose terms were about to expire the propriety of at once carrying into effect the clearly expressed popular will. Said he:

At the last session of Congress a proposed amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the United States, passed the Senate, but failed, for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote, in the House of Representatives. Although the present is the same Congress, and nearly the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of the measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question is not changed; but an intervening election shows, almost certainly, that the next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence there is only a question of *time* as to when the proposed amendment will go to the States for their action. And as it is to so go at all events, may we not agree that the sooner the better? It is not claimed that the election has imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes any further than, as an additional element to be considered, their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people, now for the first time heard upon the question. In a great national crisis like ours unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is very desirable — almost indispensable. And yet no approach to unanimity is attainable unless some deference shall be paid to the will of the majority, simply because it is the will of the majority. In this case the common end is the maintenance of the Union; and, among the means to secure that end, such will, through the election, is most clearly declared in favor of such constitutional amendment.[1]

On the 15th of December Mr. Ashley gave notice that he would on the 6th of January, 1865, call up the constitutional amendment for reconsideration;[2] and accordingly on the

1 Lincoln, Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1864.
2 "Globe, Dec. 15, 1864, p. 53.

day appointed he opened the new debate upon it in an earnest speech. General discussion followed from time to time, occupying perhaps half the days of the month of January. As at the previous session, the Republicans all favored, while the Democrats mainly opposed it, but the important exceptions among the latter showed what immense gains the proposition had made in popular opinion and in congressional willingness to recognize and embody it. The logic of events had become more powerful than party creed or strategy. For fifteen years the Democratic party had stood as sentinel and bulwark to slavery; and yet, despite its alliance and championship, the peculiar institution was being consumed like dry leaves in the fire of war. For a whole decade it had been defeated in every great contest of congressional debate and legislation. It had withered in popular elections, been paralyzed by confiscation laws, crushed by Executive decrees, trampled upon by marching Union armies. More notable than all, the agony of dissolution had come upon it in its final stronghold — the constitutions of the slave States. Local public opinion had throttled it in West Virginia, in Missouri, in Arkansas, in Louisiana, in Maryland; and the same spirit of change was upon Tennessee, and even showing itself in Kentucky. Here was a great revolution of ideas, a mighty sweep of sentiment, which could not be explained away by the stale charge of sectional fanaticism, or by alleging technical irregularities of political procedure. Here was a mighty flood of public opinion, overleaping old barriers and rushing into new channels. The Democratic party did not and could not shut its eyes to the accomplished facts. "In my judgment," said Mr. Holman of Indiana, "the fate of slavery is sealed. It dies by the rebellious hand of its votaries, untouched by the law. Its fate is determined by the war; by the measures of the war; by the results of the war. These, sir, must determine it, even if the Constitution were amended."[1] He opposed the amendment, he declared, simply because it was unnecessary. Though few other Democrats were so frank, all their speeches were weighed down by the same consciousness of a losing fight, a hopeless cause. The Democratic leader of the House, and lately defeated Democratic candidate for Vice-President, Mr. Pendleton, opposed the amendment, as he had done at the previous session, by asserting that three-fourths of the States did not possess constitutional power to pass it, this being — if the paradox be excused — at the same time the weakest and the strongest argument: weakest, because the Constitution in terms contradicted the assertion; strongest, because under the circumstances nothing less than unconstitutionality could justify opposition. But while the Democrats as a party thus persisted in a false attitude, more progressive members had the courage to take independent and wiser action. Not only did the four Democrats — Moses F. Odell and John A. Griswold, of New York; Joseph Baily, of Pennsylvania; and Ezra Wheeler, of Wisconsin — who supported the amendment at the first session again record their votes in its favor, but they were now joined by thirteen others of their party associates, namely: Augustus C. Baldwin, of Michigan; Alexander H. Coffroth and Archibald McAllister, of Pennsylvania; James E. English, of Connecticut; John Ganson, Anson Herrick, Homer A. Nelson, William Radford, and John B. Steele, of New York; Wells A. Hutchins, of Ohio; Austin A. King and James S. Rollins, of Missouri; and George H. Yeaman, of Kentucky; and by their help the favorable two-thirds vote was secured. But special credit for the result must not be accorded to these alone. Even more than of Northern Democrats must be recognized the courage and progressive liberality of members from the border slave States — one from Delaware, four from Maryland, three from West Virginia, four from Kentucky, and seven from Missouri, whose speeches and votes aided the consummation of the great act; and, finally, something is due to those Democrats, eight in number, who were absent without pairs, and thus, perhaps not altogether by accident, reduced somewhat the two-thirds vote necessary to the passage of the joint resolution.

Mingled with these influences of a public and moral nature it is not unlikely that others of more selfish interest, operating both for and against the amendment, were not entirely wanting. One, who was a member of the House, writes:

> The success of the measure had been considered very doubtful, and depended upon certain negotiations the result of which was not fully assured, and the particulars of which never reached the public.[2]

So also one of the President's secretaries wrote on the 18th of January:

> I went to the President this afternoon at the request of Mr. Ashley, on a matter connecting itself with the pending amendment of the Constitution. The Camden and Amboy railroad interest promised Mr. Ashley that if he would help postpone the Raritan railroad bill over this session they would in return make the New Jersey Democrats help about the amendment, either by their votes or absence. Sumner being the Senate champion of the Raritan bill, Ashley went to him to ask him to drop it for this session. Sumner, however, showed reluctance to adopt Mr. Ashley's suggestion, saying that he hoped the amendment would pass anyhow,

1 "Globe," Jan. 11, 1865, p. 219.

2 George W. Julian, "Political Recollections," p. 250.

etc. Ashley thought he discerned in Sumner's manner two reasons: (1) That if the present Senate resolution were not adopted by the House, the Senate would send them another in which they would most likely adopt Sumner's own phraseology and thereby gratify his ambition; and (2) that Sumner thinks the defeat of the Camden and Amboy monopoly would establish a principle by legislative enactment which would effectually crush out the last lingering relics of the States rights dogma. Ashley therefore desired the President to send for Sumner, and urge him to be practical and secure the passage of the amendment in the manner suggested by Mr. Ashley. I stated these points to the President, who replied at once: "I can do nothing with Mr. Sumner in these matters. While Mr. Sumner is very cordial with me, he is making his history in an issue with me on this very point. He hopes to succeed in beating the President so as to change this Government from its original form and make it a strong centralized power." Then calling Mr. Ashley into the room, the President said to him, "I think I understand Mr. Sumner; and I think he would be all the more resolute in his persistence on the points which Mr. Nicolay has mentioned to me if he supposed I were at all watching his course on this matter."[1]

The issue was decided in the afternoon of the 31st of January, 1865. The scene was one of unusual interest. The galleries were filled to overflowing; the members watched the proceedings with unconcealed solicitude. "Up to noon," said a contemporaneous formal report, "the pro-slavery party are said to have been confident of defeating the amendment, and after that time had passed, one of the most earnest advocates of the measure said, 'T is the toss of a copper.'"[2] There were the usual pleas for postponement and for permission to offer amendments or substitutes, but at four o'clock the House came to a final vote, and the roll-call showed, yeas, 119; nays, 56; not voting, 8. Scattering murmurs of applause had followed the announcement of affirmative votes from several of the Democratic members. This was renewed when by direction of the Speaker the clerk called his name and he voted aye. But when the Speaker finally announced, "The constitutional majority of two-thirds having voted in the affirmative, the joint resolution is passed," "the announcement" — so continues the official report printed in the "Globe" —"was received by the House and by the spectators with an outburst of enthusiasm. The members on the Republican side of the House instantly sprung to their feet, and, regardless of parliamentary rules, applauded with cheers and clapping of hands. The example was followed by the male spectators in the galleries, which were crowded to excess, who waved their hats and cheered loud and long, while the ladies, hundreds of whom were present, rose in their seats and waved their handkerchiefs, participating in and adding to the general excitement and intense interest of the scene. This lasted for several minutes."[3] "In honor of this immortal and sublime event," cried Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois, "I move that the House do now adjourn," and against the objection of a Maryland Democrat the motion was carried by a yea and nay vote. A salute of one hundred guns soon made the occasion the subject of comment and congratulation throughout the city. On the following night a considerable procession marched with music to the Executive Mansion to carry popular greetings to the President. In response to their calls, Mr. Lincoln appeared at a window and made a brief speech, of which only an abstract report was preserved, but which is nevertheless important as showing the searching analysis of cause and effect which this question had undergone in his mind, the deep interest he felt, and the far-reaching consequences he attached to the measure and its success.

He supposed [he said] the passage through Congress of the constitutional amendment for the abolishment of slavery throughout the United States was the occasion to which he was indebted for the honor of this call. The occasion was one of congratulation to the country and to the whole world. But there is a task yet before us — to go forward and have consummated by the votes of the States that which Congress had so nobly begun yesterday. He had the honor to inform those present that Illinois had to-day already done the work. Maryland was about half through, but he felt proud that Illinois was a little ahead. He thought this measure was a very fitting if not an indispensable adjunct to the winding up of the great difficulty. He wished the reunion of all the States perfected, and so effected as to remove all causes of disturbance in the future; and to attain this end, it was necessary that the original disturbing cause should, if possible, be rooted out. He thought all would bear him witness that he had never shrunk from doing all that he could to eradicate slavery, by issuing an Emancipation Proclamation. But that proclamation falls far short of what the amendment will be when fully consummated. A question might be raised whether the proclamation was legally valid. It might be urged, that it only aided those that came into our lines, and that it was inoperative as to those who did not give themselves up; or that it would have no effect upon the children of slaves born hereafter; in fact, it would be urged that it did not meet the evil. But this amendment is a king's cure-all for all the evils. It winds the whole thing up. He would repeat, that it was the fitting if not the indispensable adjunct to the consummation of the great game we are playing. He could not but congratulate all present — himself, the country, and the whole world — upon this great moral victory. / Oct 1889

1 J. G. N., "Personal Memoranda." MS.

2 Report of Special Committee of the Union League Club of New York. Pamphlet.

3 "Globe," Jan. 31, 1865, p. 531.

father's house, instead of taking his place at the table, he insisted upon acting as waiter. This led to an explosion, and to his expulsion from home. For the last two years he had been wandering among the various communities, and during that winter had been living in Boston, in the houses of various gentlemen on whom he had intruded himself without invitation, taking care, with commendable good taste, to select the best houses in the city. In pursuance of his system, he had now come to spend a few days with Mrs. Sturgis. When dinner was served he went with me to the table, but declined to eat anything except apples, of which, fortunately, we had a good store in the house. A plate of these was set before him, which he peeled and ate very contentedly, refusing to partake of anything else, but lecturing us earnestly on the atrocity of our habits in eating beef, salt, and butter, and drinking wine and coffee. He himself did not drink at all, not even water. He staid with us a few days, during which I found him a very agreeable companion; and when he went away I accompanied him to Boston to attend an Abolition convention which was then in session in the city, at which he was desirous of speaking. When the convention adjourned for dinner he asked me to go with him to the house of Francis Jackson, one of the leading Abolitionists of Boston. As I had no acquaintance with Mr. Jackson, I declined to intrude myself upon his hospitality, and was about to set out upon my return to Brookline, which I could reach in time for dinner, when Larned insisted that if I would not go to Jackson's to dinner I must at least go and dine with him at an eating-house. We went accordingly to a place near by, where I got a dinner of the usual kind, while my companion, in default of apples, ate an apple-pie, which he said came within the limits of his dietetic system. After dinner, it suddenly occurred to me to inquire if he had any means of paying. "Not a cent." I was nearly in the same condition, having only just money enough to pay my fare out in the omnibus to Brookline. I told him he must get out of the scrape without involving me. To this he assented, saying that he was used to such things and had great confidence in human nature. I accordingly walked directly out, leaving him to settle at the counter. He came out presently, triumphant. The restaurant keeper was indeed human, and had agreed to give him credit till that indefinite period, "the next time he came."

I then parted with him in the street, with my friendship for him a little cooled by this untoward incident, and did not see him again for about three years, when he suddenly called at my lodgings one day, fashionably dressed, and acting and talking like other people. I soon learned that he had renounced all his vagaries, was settled in the South as a Unitarian minister, and had married a lady who owned a number of slaves, whom he did not think it necessary to emancipate.

The "Newness" with him was completely "played out," and after Brook Farm exploded in 1847 and Margaret Fuller went to Europe, I think it had very little distinctive existence in New England. The aspiring youth of New England seem now to be contented with making their way in the world very much as other people make it, without seeking for any fundamental change in the established order of society.

Robert Carter.

THE PEONY.

A STURDY maid—
Plump hands upon her hips,
White throat flung back,
And laughing scarlet lips—
Full bodice laced
With kerchief well tucked in—
Smile for each lad,
A kiss, perhaps, no sin!
Plain speech or rough,
No empty flattery—
But wholesome heart—
That is the Peony!

Margaret Deland.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE SECOND INAUGURAL — FIVE FORKS — APPOMATTOX.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE SECOND INAUGURAL.

WE have seen what effect the Hampton Roads conference produced upon Jefferson Davis, and to what intemperate and wrathful utterance it provoked him. Its effect upon President Lincoln was almost directly the reverse. His interview with the rebel commissioners doubtless strengthened his former convictions that the rebellion was waning in enthusiasm and resources, and that the Union cause must triumph at no distant day. Secure in his renewal of four years' personal leadership, and hopefully inspirited by every sign of early victory in the war, his only thought was to shorten, by generous conciliation, the period of the dreadful conflict. His temper was not one of exultation, but of broad patriotic charity, and of keen, sensitive personal sympathy for the whole country and all its people, South as well as North. His conversation with Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell had probably revealed to him glimpses of the undercurrent of their anxiety that fraternal bloodshed and the destructive ravages of war might somehow come to an end. To every word or tone freighted with this feeling, the sincere, magnanimous, and tender heart of President Lincoln responded with bounding impulses. As a ruler and a statesman, he was clear in his judgment and inflexible in his will to reëstablish union and maintain freedom for all who had gained it by the chances of war; but also as a statesman and a ruler, he was ready to lend his individual influence and his official discretion to any measure of mitigation and manifestation of good-will that, without imperiling the union of the States, or the liberty of the citizen, might promote acquiescence in impending political changes, and abatement and reconcilement of hostile sectional feelings. Filled with such thoughts and purposes, he spent the day after his return from Hampton Roads in considering and perfecting a new proposal, designed as a peace-offering to the States in rebellion. On the evening of February 5, 1865, he called his Cabinet together and read to them the following draft of a message and proclamation, which he had written during the day, and upon which he invited their opinion and advice:

Fellow-citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives: I respectfully recommend that a joint resolution, substantially as follows, be adopted, so soon as practicable, by your honorable bodies: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby empowered, in his discretion, to pay four hundred millions of dollars to the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, in the manner and on the conditions following, to wit: The payment to be made in six per cent. Government bonds, and to be distributed among said States *pro rata* on their respective slave populations as shown by the census of 1860, and no part of said sum to be paid unless all resistance to the national authority shall be abandoned and cease, on or before the first day of April next; and upon such abandonment and ceasing of resistance one-half of said sum to be paid, in manner aforesaid, and the remaining half to be paid only upon the amendment of the national Constitution recently proposed by Congress becoming valid law, on or before the first day of July next, by the action thereon of the requisite number of States."

The adoption of such resolution is sought with a view to embody it, with other propositions, in a proclamation looking to peace and reunion.

Whereas, a joint resolution has been adopted by Congress, in the words following, to wit:

Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that on the conditions therein stated, the power conferred on the Executive in and by said joint resolution will be fully exercised; that war will cease and armies be reduced to a basis of peace; that all political offenses will be pardoned; that all property, except slaves, liable to confiscation or forfeiture, will be released therefrom, except in cases of intervening interests of third parties; and that liberality will be recommended to Congress upon all points not lying within Executive control.[2]

It may be said with truth that this was going to the verge of magnanimity towards a foe already in the throes and helplessness of overwhelming defeat — a foe that had rebelled without adequate cause and maintained the contest without reasonable hope. But Mr. Lincoln remembered that the rebels, notwithstanding all their offenses and errors, were yet American citizens, members of the same

[2] Unpublished MS.

[1] Copyright by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 1886. All rights reserved.

nation, brothers of the same blood. He remembered, too, that the object of the war, equally with peace and freedom, was the maintenance of one government and the perpetuation of one Union. Not only must hostilities cease, but dissension, suspicion, and estrangement be eradicated. As it had been in the past, so it must again become in the future—not merely a nation with the same Constitution and laws, but a people united in feeling, in hope, in aspiration. In his judgment, the liberality that would work reconciliation would be well employed. Whether their complaints for the past were well or ill founded, he would remove even the temptation to complain in the future. He would give them peace, reunion, political pardon, remission of confiscation wherever it was in his power, and securing unquestioned and universal freedom through the constitutional amendment, he would at the same time compensate their loss of slavery by a direct money equivalent.

It turned out that he was more humane than his constitutional advisers. The indorsement of his own handwriting on the manuscript draft of his proposed message records the result of his appeal and suggestion:

"FEBRUARY 5, 1865. To-day these papers, which explain themselves, were drawn up and submitted to the Cabinet and unanimously disapproved by them.—A. LINCOLN."[1]

It would appear that there was but little discussion of the proposition. The President's evident earnestness on the one side, and the unanimous dissent of the Cabinet on the other, probably created an awkward situation which could be best relieved by silence on each hand. The diary of Secretary Welles gives only a brief mention of the important incident, but it reflects the feeling which pervaded the Cabinet chamber:

MONDAY, February 6, 1865.

There was a Cabinet meeting last evening. The President had matured a scheme which he hoped would be successful in promoting peace. It was a proposition for paying the expense of the war for two hundred days, or four hundred millions to the rebel States, to be for the extinguishment of slavery or for such purpose as the States were disposed. This, in few words, was the scheme. It did not meet with favor, but was dropped. The earnest desire of the President to conciliate and effect peace was manifest, but there may be such a thing as so overdoing as to cause a distrust or adverse feeling. In the present temper of Congress the proposed measure, if a wise one, could not be carried through successfully; I do not think the scheme could accomplish any good results. The rebels would misconstrue it if the offer were made. If attempted and defeated it would do harm.[2]

The statement of Secretary Usher, written many years afterwards from memory, also records the deep feeling with which the President received the non-concurrence of his Executive Council:

The members of the Cabinet were all opposed. He seemed somewhat surprised at that and asked, "How long will the war last?" No one answered, but he soon said: "A hundred days. We are spending now in carrying on the war three millions a day, which will amount to all this money, besides all the lives." With a deep sigh he added, "But you are all opposed to me, and I will not send the message."[3]

The entry made by Secretary Welles in his diary on the morning after the Cabinet meeting, as to the amount and time, is undoubtedly the correct one, coinciding as it does with the President's manuscript. But the discrepancy in the figures of the two witnesses is of little moment. Both accounts show us that the proposal was not based on sentiment alone, but upon a practical arithmetical calculation. An expenditure of three or four hundred millions was inevitable; but his plan would save many precious lives, would shield homes and hearths from further sorrow and desolation, would dissolve sectional hatred, and plant fraternal goodwill. Though overborne in opinion, clearly he was not convinced. With the words, "You are all opposed to me," sadly uttered, Mr. Lincoln folded up the paper and ceased the further discussion of what was doubtless the project then nearest his heart. We may surmise, however, that, as he wrote upon it the indorsement we have quoted and laid it away, he looked forward to a not distant day when, in the new term of the Presidency to which he was already elected, the Cabinet, with new and more liberal views, would respond more charitably to his own generous impulses.

Few Cabinet secrets were better kept than this proposal of the President and its discussion. Since the subject was indefinitely postponed, it was, of course, desirable that it should not come to the knowledge of the public. Silence was rendered easier by the fact that popular attention in the North busied itself with rumors concerning the Hampton Roads conference. To satisfy this curiosity, a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed on February 8, requested the President to communicate such information respecting it as he might deem not incompatible with the public interest.[4] With this request Mr. Lincoln complied on the 10th, by a message in which all the correspondence was printed, followed by a brief report touching the points of conference:

On the morning of the 3d [wrote Mr. Lincoln] the three gentlemen, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and

[1] Unpublished MS. [2] Unpublished MS.
[3] "New York Tribune," Sept. 13, 1885.
[4] "Globe," Feb. 8, 1865, p. 665.

Campbell, came aboard of our steamer, and had an interview with the Secretary of State and myself of several hours' duration. No question of preliminaries to the meeting was then and there made or mentioned. No other person was present; no papers were exchanged or produced; and it was, in advance, agreed that the conversation was to be informal and verbal merely. On our part, the whole substance of the instructions to the Secretary of State, hereinbefore recited, was stated and insisted upon, and nothing was said inconsistent therewith; while, by the other party, it was not said that in any event or on any condition they ever would consent to reunion; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they never would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first, which, as some of them seem to argue, might or might not lead to reunion; but which course, we thought, would amount to an indefinite postponement. The conference ended without result.[1]

A short discussion occurred in the House on the motion to print this message, but it did not rise above the ordinary level of a party wrangle. The few Democrats who took part in it complained of the President for refusing an armistice, while the Republicans retorted with Jefferson Davis's condition about the "two countries" and the more recent declarations of his Richmond harangue, announcing his readiness to perish for independence. On the whole, both Congress and the country were gratified that the incident had called out Mr. Lincoln's renewed declaration of an unalterable resolve to maintain the Union. Patriotic hope was quickened and public confidence strengthened by noting once more his singleness of purpose and steadfastness of faith. No act of his could have formed a more fitting prelude to his second inauguration, which was now rapidly approaching, and the preliminary steps of which were at this time being consummated.

A new phase of the reconstruction question was developed in the usual congressional routine of counting the electoral votes of the late presidential election. Former chapters have set forth the President's general views on reconstruction, and shown that though the executive and legislative branches of the Government differed as to the theory and policy of restoring insurrectionary States to their normal federal functions, such difference had not reached the point of troublesome or dangerous antagonism. Over the new question also dissension and conflict were happily avoided. By instruction to his military commanders and in private letters to prominent citizens Mr. Lincoln had strongly advised and actively promoted the formation of loyal State governments in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and had maintained the restored government of Virginia after the division of that State and the admission of West Virginia into the Union, and had officially given them the recognition of the Executive Department of the Government. The Legislative Department, however, had latterly withheld its recognition, and refused them representation in Congress. The query now arose whether the popular and electoral votes of some of those States for President should be allowed and counted.

The subject was taken up by the House, which on January 30 passed a joint resolution naming the insurrectionary States, declaring them to have been "in armed rebellion" on the 8th of November, 1864, and not entitled to representation in the electoral college. A searching debate on this resolution arose in the Senate, which called out the best legal talent of that body. It could not very consistently be affirmed that Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, held by Federal troops and controlled by Federal commanders in part at least, were "in armed rebellion" on election day, under whatever constitutional theory of reconstruction. The phraseology was finally amended to read that the rebel States "were in such condition on the 8th day of November, 1864, that no valid election for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws thereof, was held therein on said day," and in this form the joint resolution was passed by both houses. Joint resolutions of Congress have all the force and effect of laws, and custom requires the President to approve them in the same manner as regular acts. His signature in this case might therefore be alleged to imply that he consented to or adopted a theory of reconstruction at variance with his former recommendation and action. To avoid the possibility of such misconstruction, Mr. Lincoln sent Congress a short message, in which he said:

The joint resolution, entitled "Joint resolution declaring certain States not entitled to representation in the electoral college," has been signed by the Executive, in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation to him. In his own view, however, the two houses of Congress, convened under the twelfth article of the Constitution, have complete power to exclude from counting all electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal; and it is not competent for the Executive to defeat or obstruct that power by a veto, as would be the case if his action were at all essential in the matter. He disclaims all right of the Executive to interfere in any way in the matter of canvassing or counting electoral votes; and he also disclaims that, by signing said resolution, he has expressed any opinion on the recitals of the preamble, or any judgment of his own upon the subject of the resolution.[2]

1 "House Journal," Feb. 10, 1865, p. 237.

2 Lincoln, Message, Feb. 8, 1865. "House Journal," p. 213.

In anticipation of possible debate and contention on the subject of counting the electoral votes of reconstructed States, Congress had, on February 6, adopted what afterwards became famous as the Twenty-second Joint Rule, which directed in substance that all such questions should be decided, not by the joint convention of the two houses, but by each house for itself without debate, the two houses having temporarily separated for that purpose; and requiring the concurrence of both for any affirmative action, or to count a vote objected to. When the two houses met in joint convention on the eighth day of February, mention was made by the Vice-President, presiding, that "The Chair has in his possession returns from the States of Louisiana and Tennessee; but in obedience to the law of the land, the Chair holds it to be his duty not to present them to the convention."[1] No member insisted on having these returns opened, since they could not possibly change the result. Only the returns therefore from the loyal States, including West Virginia, were counted, showing two hundred and twelve electoral votes for Lincoln, and twenty-one for McClellan. The Vice-President thereupon announced "that Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, having received a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, is duly elected President of the United States for four years, commencing on the fourth day of March, 1865."[2]

The usual committee was appointed to wait upon Mr. Lincoln and notify him of his second election; and in response to their announcement, he read the following brief address:

With deep gratitude to my countrymen for this mark of their confidence; with a distrust of my own ability to perform the duty required, under the most favorable circumstances, and now rendered doubly difficult by existing national perils; yet with a firm reliance on the strength of our free Government and the eventual loyalty of the people to the just principles upon which it is founded, and, above all, with an unshaken faith in the Supreme Ruler of Nations, I accept this trust. Be pleased to signify this to the respective houses of Congress.[3]

In the informal friendly conversation which followed, the President said to the committee, in substance:

Having served four years in the depths of a great and yet unended national peril, I can view this call to a second term in nowise more flatteringly to myself than as an expression of the public judgment that I may better finish a difficult work in which I have labored from the first than could any one less severely schooled to the task.[4]

The formal inauguration of Mr. Lincoln for his second presidential term took place at the appointed time, March 4, 1865. There is little variation in the simple but impressive pageantry with which this official ceremony is celebrated. The principal novelty commented upon by the newspapers was the share which the hitherto enslaved race had, for the first time, in this public and political drama. Civic associations of negro citizens joined in the procession, and a battalion of negro soldiers formed part of the military escort. The weather was sufficiently favorable to allow the ceremonies to take place on the eastern portico, in view of a vast throng of spectators. Imaginative beholders, who were prone to draw augury and comfort from symbols, could rejoice that the great bronze statue of Freedom now crowned the dome of the Capitol, and that her guardianship was justified by the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment virtually blotted slavery from the Constitution. The central act of the occasion was President Lincoln's second inaugural address, which enriched the political literature of the Union with another masterpiece, and which deserves to be quoted in full. He said:

Fellow-Countrymen: At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then, a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it — all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agen s were in the city seeking to destroy it without war — seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came.

One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend

1 "Globe," Feb. 8, 1865, p. 668.
2 Ibid., p. 669.
3 Unpublished MS. The reply reported by the notification committee is incorrect, having apparently been written out from memory, intermingling an abstract of the formal paper which the President read with the informal conversation that succeeded.
4 "Globe," March 1, 1865, pp. 1236 and 1263.

this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered — that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope — fervently do we pray — that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan — to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.[1]

The address being concluded, Chief-Justice Chase administered the oath of office; and listeners who heard Abraham Lincoln for the second time repeat, "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," went from the impressive scene to their several homes with thankfulness and with confidence that the destiny of the country and the liberty of the citizen were in safe keeping. "The fiery trial" through which he had hitherto walked showed him possessed of the capacity, the courage, and the will to keep the promise of his oath.

Among the many criticisms passed by writers and thinkers upon the language of the second inaugural, none will so interest the reader as that of Mr. Lincoln himself, written about ten days after its delivery, in the following letter to a friend:

DEAR MR. WEED: Every one likes a compliment. Thank you for yours on my little notification speech and on the recent inaugural address. I expect the latter to wear as well as, perhaps better than, anything I have produced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case, is to deny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told, and, as whatever of humiliation there is in it falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to tell it.[2]

A careful student of Mr. Lincoln's character will also find this inaugural address instinct with another meaning, which, very naturally, the President's own comment did not touch. The eternal law of compensation, which it declares and applies to the sin and fall of American slavery, in a diction rivaling the fire and the dignity of the old Hebrew prophecies,[3] may, without violent inference, be interpreted to foreshadow an intention to renew at a fitting moment the brotherly good-will gift to the South which has been treated of in the first part of this chapter. Such an inference finds strong corroboration in the phrases which closed the last public address he ever made. On Tuesday evening, April 11, a considerable assemblage of citizens of Washington gathered at the Executive Mansion to celebrate the victory of Grant over Lee. The rather long and careful speech which Mr. Lincoln made on that occasion was, however, less about the past than the future. It discussed the subject of reconstruction, as illustrated in the case of Louisiana, showing also how that issue was related to the questions of emancipation, the condition of the freedmen, the welfare of the South, and the ratification of the constitutional amendment. "So new and unprecedented is the whole case," he concluded, "that no ex-

1 "Globe," March 4, 1865, pp. 1424, 1425.

2 Weed, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 449.

3 Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orléans, in a letter, 2d April, 1865, to Mr. Auguste Cochin, acknowledging the receipt of Lincoln's second inaugural, said:

"J'ai lu ce document avec la plus religieuse émotion, avec l'admiration la plus sympathique. . . . M. Lincoln exprime, avec une solennelle et touchante gravité, les sentiments qui, j'en suis sûr, envahissent les âmes d'élite, au Nord comme au Sud. Quel beau jour lorsque l'union des âmes se fera là, dans la vraie et parfaite lumière de l'Evangile. Mais quel beau jour déjà lorsque le chef deux fois élu d'un grand peuple tient un langage chrétien, trop absent, dans notre Europe, du langage officiel des grandes affaires, annonce la fin de l'esclavage, et prepare les embrassements de la justice et de la miséricorde dont l'Ecriture Sainte a parlé. Je vous remercie de m'avoir fait lire cette belle page de l'histoire des grands hommes." . . .

clusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper."[1] Can any one doubt that this "new announcement" which was taking shape in his mind would again have embraced and combined justice to the blacks and generosity to the whites of the South, with union and liberty for the whole country? It will remain a perpetual sorrow to the nation, and especially to the South, that the lingering madness of rebellion tragically thwarted the possibility of such a consummation.

FIVE FORKS.

From the hour of Mr. Lincoln's reëlection the Confederate cause was doomed. The cheering of the troops which greeted the news from the North was heard within the lines at Richmond and at Petersburg, and although the leaders maintained to the end their attitude of defiance, the impression rapidly gained ground among the people that the end was not far off. The stimulus of hope being gone, they began to feel the pinch of increasing want. Their currency had become almost worthless. In October a dollar in gold was worth thirty-five dollars in Confederate money; a month later it brought fifty dollars; with the opening of the new year the price rose to sixty dollars, and soon after to seventy; and despite the efforts of the Confederate treasury, which would occasionally rush into the market and beat down the price of gold ten or twenty per cent. in a day, the currency gradually depreciated until a hundred for one was offered and not taken. As a result of this vanishing value of their money a portentous rise took place in the prices of all the necessaries of life. It is hard for a people to recognize that their money is good for nothing; to do this is to confess that their Government has failed: it was natural, therefore, for the unhappy citizens of Richmond to think that monstrous prices were being extorted for food, clothing, and fuel, when, in fact, they were paying no more than was reasonable. The journals and diaries of the time are filled with bitter execrations against the extortioners and forestallers; but when we translate their prices into the gold standard, we wonder how the grocers and clothiers lived. To pay a thousand dollars for a barrel of flour was enough to strike a householder with horror; but ten dollars is not a famine price. A suit of clothes costs from one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars; but if you divide this sum by seventy-five, there is very little profit left for the tailor. High prices, however, even if paid in dry leaves, are a hardship when dry leaves are not plentiful; and there was scarcity, even of Confederate money, in the South. In Richmond, which lived upon the war, the dearth was especially evident. The clerks in the departments received say four thousand dollars a year, hardly enough for a month's provisions. Skilled mechanics fared somewhat better. They could earn, so long as they kept out of the army, something like six thousand dollars a year. Statesmanship was cheap. A congressman's pay was five thousand five hundred dollars; but most of the civil officers of the Government managed to get their supplies at cost prices from the military stores. It was illegal; but they could not have lived otherwise, and they doubtless considered their lives necessary to their country.

The depreciation of the Confederate currency was an unmistakable symptom of a lack of confidence in the course of affairs, since it did not arise from inflation. On the contrary, Mr. Trenholm, the Secretary of the Treasury, did all he could to check this dangerous tendency, going so far as to incur the reproaches of many who imagined his action enhanced prices. All dealers instinctively felt the money was worthless, and their only object was to get it out of their hands as soon as possible, at whatever prices, in exchange for objects of real value. One Confederate diarist[2] records with indignation that he saw a Jew buy at auction an old set of table-spoons for five hundred and seventy-five dollars, and makes this a cause of complaint against the Government, which permits men to acquire in this way the means of running away. Anybody who was able to leave the country became the object of the envy and hatred of those who remained behind. They began to treat their own financial system with contempt. When the officer in charge of the Treasury Note Bureau at Columbia, alarmed at the approach of Sherman, asked where he was to go, he could get no attention to his inquiries; one high functionary advising that he go to the devil.[3]

At every advance of General Grant's lines a new disturbance and alarm was manifested in Richmond, the first proof of which was always a fresh rigor in the enforcement, not only of existing conscription laws, but of the arbitrary orders of the frightened authorities. After the capture of Fort Harrison, on the north side of the James, squads of guards were sent into

1 Raymond, "Life of Lincoln," p. 687.
2 Jones, Vol. II., p. 361.
3 "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 384.

the streets with directions to arrest every able-bodied man they met. They paid no regard to passes or to certificates of exemption or detail, but hurried the unhappy civilians off to the field, or herded them, pending their assignment to companies, within the railings of the public square. Two members of the Cabinet, Reagan and George Davis, were thus arrested on the streets by the zealous guards in spite of their protestations, though they were, of course, soon recognized and released. The pavements were swept of every class of loiterers; the clerks in the departments with their exemptions in their pockets were carried off, whether able to do duty or not. It is said by one Confederate writer[1] that the medical boards were ordered to exempt no one who seemed capable of bearing arms for ten days, and he mentions an instance where a man died, on the eleventh day of his service, of consumption. Human nature will not endure such a strain as this: a week after this sweeping of Richmond for recruits, General Gardner reported that more than half the men thus dragged to the trenches had deserted. Of those who remained, the members of influential families came, one by one, back to the town on various pretexts, increasing the bitterness of feeling among those too poor or too obscure to rescue their sons and brothers.

Desertion grew too common to punish. Almost every man in the Confederacy was, by statute or decree, liable to military service, and yet hundreds of thousands of them were not in the army. If men were to be shot for deserting, it would have been a question whether there were soldiers enough to shoot them. Mr. Davis acted prudently in remitting the death sentences laid before him, although this occasioned great dissatisfaction in the army. Near the end of the year 1864 Longstreet reported one hundred men of Pickett's division as in the guard-house for desertion, attributing the blame for it to the numerous reprieves which had been granted, no one having been executed for two months. General Lee sent this report to Richmond with his approval, which gave great offense to the Confederate President. He returned the paper, with an indorsement to the effect that the remission of sentences was not a proper subject for the criticism of a military commander.[2]

As disaster increased, as each day brought its catastrophe, the Confederate Government steadily lost ground in the confidence and respect of the Southern people. It is characteristic of every failing revolt that in the hour of ruin the participators turn upon one another with reproaches, often as causeless and unjust as those they cast upon their legitimate government. Mr. Davis and his councilors now underwent this natural retribution. They were doing their best, but they no longer got any credit for it. From every part of the Confederacy came complaints for what was done, demands for what it was impossible to do. Some of the States were in a condition near to counter-revolution. Governor Brown of Georgia made no pretense of concealing his contumacy. The march of Sherman across his State seemed to have emancipated him from any obligations to the Confederacy. His letters to Richmond from that moment lost all color of allegiance. The feeling in North Carolina was little better. A slow paralysis was benumbing the limbs of the insurrection, and even at the heart its vitality was plainly declining. The Confederate Congress, which had hitherto been the mere register of the President's will, now turned upon him and gave him wormwood to drink. On the 19th of January they passed a resolution making Lee general-in-chief of the army. This Mr. Davis might have borne with patience, although it was intended as a notification to him that his meddling with military affairs must come to an end. But far worse was the necessity put upon him, as a sequel to this act,— and in conformity with a resolution of the Virginia legislature,— of reappointing General Joseph E. Johnston to the command of the army which was to resist Sherman's victorious march to the North. After this he might say that the bitterness of death was past. The Virginia delegation in Congress passed a vote of want of confidence in the Government's conduct of the war. Mr. Seddon, considering his honor impugned, and not unwilling to lay down a thankless task, resigned his post of Secretary of War. Mr. Davis at first wished him to reconsider his action, claiming that such a declaration from congressmen was beyond their functions and subversive of the President's constitutional jurisdiction; but Mr. Seddon insisted, and General John C. Breckinridge was appointed in his place in February, for the few weeks that remained before the final crash.[3] Warnings of serious demoralization came daily from the army; even that firm support to the revolt seemed crumbling. Disaffection was so rife in official circles in Richmond that it was not thought politic to call public attention to it by repression. A detective reported a member of Congress as uttering treasonable language, and for his pains was told at the War Department that matters of that sort were none of his business.[4]

It is a curious and instructive thing to note how the act of emancipation had by this time

[1] Jones, Vol. II., p. 305.
[2] Ibid., p. 343.
[3] Pollard, p. 441.
[4] "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 390.

virtually enforced itself in Richmond. The value of slave property was gone. It is true that a slave was still occasionally sold, at a price less than one-tenth of what he would have brought before the war. But servants could be hired of their nominal owners at a barley-corn rate; six dollars in gold would pay the hire of a good cook for a year — merely enough to keep up the show of vassalage. In effect any one could hire a negro for his keeping, which was all that anybody in Richmond got for his work. Even Mr. Davis had at last become docile to the stern teachings of events. In his message of November he had recommended the employment of 40,000 slaves in the army,— not as soldiers it is true, save in the last extremity,— with emancipation to come later.

Lee assumed command of all the Confederate forces on the ninth day of February. His situation was one of unprecedented gloom. The day before, he had reported to Richmond that his troops, who had been in line of battle for two days at Hatcher's Run, exposed to the bitter winter weather, had been without meat for three days. "If some change is not made," he said, "and the commissary department organized, I apprehend dire results; . . . you must not be surprised if calamity befalls us." Mr. Davis indorsed this discouraging dispatch with words of anger and command easy to write: "This is too sad to be patiently considered; . . . criminal neglect or gross incapacity. . . . Let supplies be had by purchase or borrowing." A prodigious effort was made, and the danger of starvation for the moment averted, but no permanent improvement resulted in the situation of affairs. The armies of the Union were closing in from every point of the compass. Grant was every day pushing his formidable left wing nearer the only roads by which Lee could escape; Thomas was threatening the Confederate communications from Tennessee; Sheridan was moving for the last time up the Valley of the Shenandoah to abolish Early; while from the south the redoubtable columns of Sherman — the men who had taken Vicksburg, who had scaled the heights of Chattanooga, and having marched through Georgia had left Savannah loyal and Charleston evacuated — were moving northward with the steady pace and irresistible progress of a tragic fate. It was the approach of this portent which shook the nerves of the Confederate leaders more than the familiar proximity of Grant. Beauregard, and afterwards Johnston, were ordered to "destroy Sherman."[1] Beauregard, after his kind, showed his Government its duty in loud and valiant words. He advised Mr. Davis to send him at once heavy reënforcements "to give the enemy battle and crush him"; "then to concentrate all forces against Grant, march to Washington and dictate a peace"— a plan of limpid simplicity, which was not adopted. Johnston superseded the brilliant Louisianian the next day, and thereafter did what he could — with the scraps and remnants of an army allowed him — to resist the irresistible.

A singular and significant attempt at negotiations was made at this time by General Lee. He was now so strong in the confidence of the people of the South, and the Government at Richmond was so rapidly becoming discredited, that he could doubtless have obtained the popular support, and compelled the assent of the Executive to any measures he thought proper for the attainment of peace. From this it was easy for him and for others to come to the wholly erroneous conclusion that General Grant held a similar relation to the Government and people of the United States. General Lee seized upon the pretext of a conversation reported to him by General Longstreet, as having been held with General Ord under an ordinary flag of truce for exchange of prisoners, to address a letter to Grant, sanctioned by Mr. Davis, saying he had been informed that General Ord had said that General Grant would not decline an interview with a view "to a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention," providing Lee had authority to act. He therefore proposed to meet General Grant, "with the hope that upon an interchange of views it might be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a military convention." In such event he said he was "authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed conference may render necessary or advisable." Grant at once telegraphed these overtures to Washington. Stanton received his dispatch at the Capitol, where the President was, according to his custom, passing the last night of the session for the convenience of signing bills. The Secretary handed the telegram to Mr. Lincoln, who read it in silence. He asked no advice or suggestion from any one about him, but, taking a pen, wrote with his usual slowness and precision a dispatch in Stanton's name, which he showed to Seward and then handed to Stanton to be signed, dated, and sent. The language is that of an experienced ruler, perfectly sure of himself and of his duty:

> The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matters. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the

[1] Breckinridge to Lee, Feb. 21.

President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

General Grant, on the receipt of this instruction, wrote, in answer to General Lee, that he had no authority to accede to his proposition — such authority being vested in the President of the United States alone; he further explained that General Ord's language must have been misunderstood. Grant reported to Washington what he had done, adding that he would in no case exceed his authority, or omit to press all advantages to the utmost of his ability. This closed the last avenue of hope to the Confederate authorities of any compromise by which the dread alternative of utter defeat or unconditional surrender might be avoided.[1]

Early in March, General Lee came to Richmond and had a conference with Mr. Davis on the measures to be adopted in the crisis which he saw was imminent. The General-in-Chief had not taken his advancement seriously. He had not sympathized in the slight which it involved towards the civil government; he had positively refused to assume the dictatorial powers with which the Richmond Congress had clearly intended to invest him; he had ostentatiously thanked "the President alone" for a promotion which in reality came from the President's enemies and critics. He continued to the end, in accordance with the Constitution of the Confederate States, to treat Mr. Davis as the Commander-in-Chief of the forces. He now laid before him the terrible facts by which the army was environed: Richmond and Petersburg must be evacuated before many days; a new seat for the Confederate Government, a new base of defense for the armies, must be taken up farther south and west. There is a direct contradiction between Mr. Davis and the friends of General Lee as to the manner in which the former received this communication. Mr. Davis says[2] he suggested an immediate withdrawal, but that General Lee said his horses were too weak for the roads, in their present state, and that he must wait till the ground became firmer. But General Long, who gives General Lee as his authority,[3] says that the President overruled the general; that Lee wanted then to withdraw his forces and take up a line behind the Staunton River, from which point he might have indefinitely protracted the war. However this may be, they were both agreed that sooner or later the Richmond lines

1 Jefferson Davis refers to this incident in his message of March 13 to the Confederate Congress, and says: "It thus appears that neither with the Confederate authorities, nor the authorities of any State, nor through the commanding generals, will the Government of the United States treat or make any terms or agreement whatever for the cessation of hostilities. There

A-BRAC.

Praise I gave only to the tuneful Nine,
And took no heed of other Pens than thine.

But, much it is that thus in soft retreat,
The cushioned ambush of a window-seat,
Reflected halos wreathed about thy head
Of chromoed gymnasts, green, and blue, and red;
Thy *rus in urbe* no contracted field,
But all of Afric's burning heart revealed;
Far from the madding crowd, compelled to pay,
Thou calm mayst sit and free the Show survey:
See the lithe leopard axioms confound,
Changing his spots at every agile bound;
The zebra, bearing with a martyr's zeal
The stripes that only those about him feel;
The tall giraffe a shapely neck display,
Where long, long woe might well be wept away;
While for communion if the giant cries,
Lo! the Fat Woman gives back size for sighs!

Here under thine own vine and fig tree's shade,
And the sweet influence of the Bearded Maid;
Nature anigh — not rocks, nor streams, nor dells,
But herds, heard often, and wild woodsy smells
(But a bare pole's length from the canvas where
The sleek seal scuds before the Polar bear);
Here thou mayst sit and thy light zithern play,
The ostrich rival with thine easier lay;
Soft sonnets warble to the timid deer,
Troll bolder ballads to the buck-a-near.
Tiring of concourse that thy pace confines,
Of quadrupeds — and quadrupedal lines,
With longer stride let Pegasus then lope —
Pentameter — loved and approved of Pope;
That all who visit the Great Show may see
Thou 'rt not outfooted by thy *vis-à-vis;*
And own, though Barnum permeates the street,
Thy airs, O Singer! all are strangely sweet.

Indeed, when I reflect on all thou hast,
And with thine own my lowlier lot contrast,—
No circus near, no beasts about my door,
Save the one wolf that sits there evermore,—
I ask why Fate does thus deny to me
The beasts and blessings she bestows on thee.

be made public. This put all persons at their ease and the promise of privacy was well kept. It was a time of great anxiety and of long suspense; one of those critical periods when decisive battles were expected, and when news from the front was scanty, and slow in coming.

At the appointed hour the delegates were ushered into the President's office. Soon afterwards Mr. Lincoln came in slowly and looking careworn, sad, and anxious. In brief remarks by men representing the various work of the Christian Commission, he was told that we had no requests to make, no favors to ask, no offices to seek; that we were there only to assure him of our profoundest respect, sympathy, and loyalty to the Government and to himself as its head, and of our intention to carry on the philanthropic and spiritual ministrations of the Commission in the army and navy, with the continued sanction and help of himself and of the military and naval authorities. It was also said that "behind all the political and patriotic forces of the Union there was a vast Christian constituency in the homes and churches of loyal States which would never fail him with their prayers and consecration to

The assault was made with great spirit at half-past four on the morning of the 25th of March. Its initial success was due to a singular cause. The opposing lines at the point chosen were only 150 yards apart; the pickets were only 50 yards from each other; it was therefore a favorite point of departure for those Confederates who were tired of the war. Desertions had of late become very numerous and had naturally been encouraged in every way; orders had been issued allowing deserters to bring their arms with them. When Gordon's skirmishers came stealing through the darkness they were at first mistaken for an unusually large batch of deserters, and they overpowered several picket posts without a shot being fired. The storming party at once followed, took the trenches with a rush, and in a few minutes had possession of the main line on the right of Stedman. Turning on the fort, they soon drove out or made prisoners the garrison. It was the dark hour before dawn, and the defense could not distinguish friends from foes; and for a little while General Parke, who acted with his usual vigor and intelligence, was unable to make headway against the invisible enemy who swarmed on both sides of the breach in the lines. General N. B. McLaughlen, who was posted to the left of Fort Stedman, at once got to work and recaptured an outlying battery with the bayonet, and then hurrying into the fort, in ignorance of its capture, was made prisoner. As soon as it was light, Parke's troops advanced from every direction to mend the breach; Potter on the left, Wilcox on the right, and Hartranft, who had been held in reserve, attacking directly from the high ground in the rear. The last two, between them, first made short work of the Confederate detachments that were moving on the City Point road and telegraph and searching in vain for three forts in the rear of Stedman which they had been ordered to take, and which in reality did not exist. By half-past seven Parke had his task well in hand. He had repulsed the Confederate attack to the right and left of Fort Stedman, recaptured two of the detached batteries, forced the enemy with heavy loss back into the fort, and concentrated upon them a heavy artillery fire from three sides. A few minutes later Hartranft's division carried Fort Stedman by assault, and Gordon withdrew to the Confederate lines what he was able to save of his attacking force. The cross fire of artillery was now so withering that few of the Confederates could get back, and none could come to their assistance. General Parke captured 2000 prisoners, including 71 officers and 9 stands of colors; his own total loss was about 1000.

But this heavy loss was not the only damage the Confederates suffered. Humphreys and Wright, in command of the troops on the Union left, who were to be routed and dispersed according to General Lee's plan, on being informed of the racket in the center, correctly assuming that Parke could take care of himself, instantly searched the lines in their front to see if they had been essentially weakened to support Gordon's attack. They found they had not; but in the process of gaining this information they captured the enemy's intrenched picket lines in front of them, which, in spite of repeated attempts to regain them, were firmly held, and gave inestimable advantage to the Union army in the struggle of the next week. The net results therefore to General Lee of the day's work were a bitter disappointment, a squandering of four thousand of his best troops against half that number on the other side, and the loss of his intrenched picket line, which brought such dangerous neighbors as Wright and Humphreys within arm's-length of him.

For several weeks General Grant's chief anxiety had been lest Lee should abandon his lines. At first he feared a concentration of Lee and Johnston against Sherman; but when the victorious army of the West had arrived at Goldsboro' and formed connection with Schofield his anxiety on that score was at rest, and there only remained a keen eagerness to make an end of the Army of Northern Virginia. "I was afraid," he says, "every morning that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line."[1] Still — just as Lee, though feeling every hour of waiting was fraught with danger, was prevented from moving by the bad roads and the Richmond complications — Grant, although burning to attack, was delayed by the same cause of bad roads, and by another. He did not wish to move until Sheridan had completed the work assigned him in the Valley and joined either Sherman or the army at Petersburg. But at last, satisfied with Sheridan's progress and with Sherman's condition, he resolved to wait no longer, and on the 24th of March, at the very moment when Gordon was making his arrangements for the next day's sortie, Grant issued his orders for the great movement to the left which was to finish the war. He intended to begin on the 29th, but Lee's desperate dash of the 25th appeared to the Union commander to indicate an intention to secure a wider opening to the Danville road to facilitate an immediate move of the Confederates westward, and he felt more than ever that not a moment was to be lost. Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th, and Sherman came up from

[1] Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 424.

North Carolina for a brief visit the next day. He said he would be ready to move on the 10th of April, and laid before Grant a plan for a coöperative campaign, which was of course satisfactory, as was always everything that Sherman proposed, but which the swift rush of events soon rendered superfluous. The President was also there, and an interesting conversation took place between these famous brothers-in-arms and Mr. Lincoln, after which Sherman went back to Goldsboro' and Grant began pushing his army to the left with even more than his usual iron energy.

It was a great army; it was the result of all the power and wisdom of the Government, all the devotion of the people, all the intelligence and teachableness of the soldiers themselves, and all the ability and character which the experience of a mighty war had developed in the officers. Few nations have produced better corps commanders than Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, and Parke, taking their names as they come in the vast sweep of the Union lines from Dinwiddie Court House to the James in the last days of March; north of the James was Weitzel, vigilant and capable. Between Grant and the Army of the Potomac was Meade, the incarnation of industry, zeal, and talent; and in command of all was Grant, then in his best days, the most extraordinary military temperament this country has ever seen. When unfriendly criticism has exhausted itself, the fact remains, not to be explained away by any reasoning, subtle or gross, that in this tremendous war he accomplished more with the means given him than any other two, on either side. The means given him were enormous, the support of the Government was intelligent and untiring; but others had received the same means and the same support — and he alone captured three armies. The popular instinct which hails him as our greatest general is correct; and the dilettante critics who write ingenious arguments to prove that one or another of his subordinates or his adversaries was his superior will please for a time their diminishing coteries, and then pass into silence without damaging his robust fame.

The numbers of the respective armies in this last grapple have been the occasion of endless controversy. We take the figures given by General Humphreys — not merely on account of his profound study of the subject and personal acquaintance with it, but because we consider him the most thoroughly candid and impartial man who has written the history of this army. The effective force of infantry of the Army of the Potomac was 69,000; of field artillery, 6000, with 243 guns. The effective force of infantry of the Army of the James was 32,000; of field artillery, 3000, with 126 guns and 1700 cavalry, though General Ord took with him only about one-half his infantry; Sheridan's cavalrymen, present for duty, 13,000; the grand total of all arms was 124,700. Lee's infantry numbered 46,000; his field artillery, 5000; his cavalry, 6000; in all, 57,000.

Grant's plan, as announced in his instructions of March 24,[1] was at first to dispatch Sheridan to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads, at the same time moving a heavy force to the left, primarily to insure the success of Sheridan's raid,[2] and then to turn Lee's position. But his purpose grew and developed every hour, and before he had been a day away from his winter headquarters he had given up the comparatively narrow scheme with which he started and had adopted the far bolder and more comprehensive plan, which he carried out to his immortal honor. It is probable that to General Sheridan belongs a part of the credit of this change of plan. He informs us that when discretion was given him, in the Valley, either to go south, past Lee's right flank, and join Sherman, or to turn east and unite with the Army of the Potomac, he chose the latter course, because he thought it best that the Eastern army, which had thus far won scanty laurels when compared with the Western, should have the glory of this final victory; and that when he arrived at City Point and found General Grant's plans once more contemplated the possibility of sending his cavalry to Sherman and bringing that commander, after disposing of Johnston, to share in the destruction of Lee, Sheridan urged the General-in-Chief to finish the work immediately with the Army of the Potomac, that had so richly merited the glory which would come of the fruition of their long years of blood and toil. Both commanders were full of the spirit of victory. On the evening of the 29th of March, Sheridan's cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of the moving force of infantry extended to the Quaker road — almost to Lee's right flank on the White Oak Ridge. Grant's purpose had now taken complete shape in his mind. From his tent on Gravelly Creek he wrote to Sheridan, telling him the position of all his corps, and adding in simple words, which will stir the blood of every reader for ages to come, "I now feel like ending the matter . . . before we go back." He ordered Sheridan not to cut loose and go after the railroads, but to push for the

1 Grant, Report.

2 Grant wrote to Sherman on the 22d of March: "I shall start with no distinct view further than holding Lee's forces from following Sheridan. But I will be along myself, and will take advantage of anything that turns up." [Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 323.]

enemy's right rear. "We will all act together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."

The next day Sheridan advanced to Five Forks, where he found a heavy force of the enemy. Lee, justly alarmed by Grant's movements, had drawn all his available troops out of the trenches, dispatched a sufficient force under Fitzhugh Lee to Five Forks to hold that important cross-roads, and had taken personal command of the rest on the White Oak Ridge. A heavy storm of rain began the night of the 29th, continuing more than twenty-four hours, and greatly impeded the march of the troops. Warren, on the morning of the 21st, worked his way towards the White Oak road; but before he reached it Lee came out of his lines and attacked Warren's advanced division (Ayers's) with such impetus that it was driven back on the main line at Gravelly Run. There, gallantly supported by General Miles of Humphreys's corps, who made a spirited attack on Lee's left flank, Warren held his own, and in the afternoon moved forward and drove the enemy into his works.

Lee, not satisfied with opposing Sheridan at Five Forks with cavalry, had on the 30th sent Pickett there with some 7000 infantry, which, with nearly an equal force of cavalry, was too much for the Union horse to handle. Sheridan was therefore, on the 31st, forced back to Dinwiddie Court House. "Here," says Grant, "Sheridan displayed great generalship." He fought with obstinate tenacity, disputing every inch of ground, deploying his cavalry on foot, leaving only men enough with his horses to guard them. He gave Pickett and Lee a hard day's work on the way to Dinwiddie, and at night reported his situation to Grant in his usual tone of valorous confidence. Grant, indeed, was far more disturbed than Sheridan. He rained orders and suggestions all night upon Meade, Warren, and Sheridan, the purpose of which was to effect a concentration at daylight on that portion of the enemy in front of Sheridan. Warren, giving his troops, who had been marching and fighting for three days, a few hours' needed rest, came in on Sheridan's right about dawn. But Pickett, seeing that he was out of position, did not wait to be caught between the two Union columns; he withdrew noiselessly during the night [1] and resumed his strongly intrenched post at Five Forks. Grant, in ignorance of this timely flight of Pickett, was greatly incensed at Warren for not having done what is now seen to have been impossible to do, since Pickett was gone before the hour when Grant wished Warren to attack him. The long-smoldering dislike of Warren, which had been for months increasing in Grant's mind, now blazed out into active hostility, and he sent an aide-de-camp to Sheridan, suggesting that Warren be relieved from his command.[2]

Sheridan hurried up to Five Forks with his cavalry, leaving Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps. Filled, as Sheridan was all this day, with the most intense martial ardor, his judgment and control of his troops were never more powerful and comprehensive. He pressed with his cavalry the retreating Confederates until they came to Five Forks, and then assigned to Merritt the duty of demonstrating strongly on Pickett's right, while with the infantry of the Fifth Corps he was to strike the left flank, which ran along the White Oak road about three-quarters of a mile east from Five Forks and then made a return of a hundred yards to the north, perpendicular to the road. It was the old tactics of the Valley repeated, with the additional advantage in this case that, if successful, he would drive Pickett westward and cut him off from Lee. To guard against any interruption from the east, Mackenzie had been sent to take possession of the White Oak road, some three miles east of the Forks, a task which he promptly performed, and then came back to take his position on the right of the Fifth Corps.

The battle was fought almost as it was planned: the only difference between conception and execution arose from the fact that it had not been practicable to ascertain the precise position of the enemy's left flank, lest the attempt might put them on their guard. Ayers's division was on the left, Crawford on the right, Griffin behind Crawford, and in this way they moved to the attack about four o'clock. Warren, understanding that the enemy's lines reached farther down the road than was the case, sent Ayers, his smallest division, in a direction which brought it against the angle, and Crawford and Griffin were moving across the road and altogether past the left of the enemy into the woods, when the heavy firing in front

[1] The testimony of the Confederate generals in the Warren court of inquiry shows that Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee, anticipating Warren's arrival at daybreak, resolved to retire at ten o'clock on the night of the 31st of March, and that the movement began at once. "Nearly everything on wheels," Fitzhugh Lee said, "was away by midnight." At daylight the cavalry moved, covering the rear of the infantry. (Warren Court of Inquiry, p. 469.) General W. H. F. Lee's testimony is to the same effect, p. 536.

[2] Thorough inquiry among the friends of both generals seems to establish the fact that Grant's animosity towards Warren arose from the habit Warren had of discussing his orders, suggesting changes in plans of battle, and movements in support of his own. Grant regarded this habit as lacking in respect to himself, and although Warren was looked upon as one of the ablest and most devoted officers in the army, it was evident that sooner or later Grant's irritation would come to a point which would prove ruinous to Warren.

of Ayers warned Warren of his error, and he immediately bestirred himself to rectify it, sending his aides in every direction, and finally riding off into the woods to bring back Crawford and Griffin to the point where they were so greatly needed. All this occupied considerable time, and in the mean while the brunt of the battle fell upon Ayers's division. They were hardly strong enough for the work thus accidentally assigned them, and there might have been a serious check at that moment but for the providential presence of Sheridan himself, who, with a fury and vehemence founded on the soundest judgment, personally led the troops in their attack on the intrenchments. Those who saw him that day will tell the story to their latest breath, how, holding the colors in his hand, with a face darkened with smoke and anger, and with sharp exhortations that rang like pistol-shots, he gathered up the faltering battalions of Ayers and swept like a spring gust over Pickett's breastworks. Meanwhile Warren was doing similar work on the right. He had at last succeeded in giving his other two divisions the right direction, and came in on the reverse of the enemy's lines. At one moment, finding some hesitation in a part of Crawford's force, "Warren, riding forward," says Humphreys, "with the corps flag in his hand, led his troops across the field." His horse was shot dead in the final charge. The dusk of evening came down on one of the most complete and momentous victories of the war. Pickett was absolutely routed; every man was driven from the field except the killed and wounded, and the prisoners, who were gathered in to the number of some five thousand, with a great quantity of guns and colors. As the battle was ending, Sheridan sent an order to Warren relieving him of his command and directing him to report to General Grant for orders.

It does not come within the compass of this work to review all the circumstances which led General Grant to entertain so rooted a dislike to Warren, and General Sheridan, who had but a slight acquaintance with him,[1] to adopt his chief's opinions. In removing him from command they were perfectly justified. Honestly holding the opinion they held of him, it was their duty to prevent the evils they thought might result from his retention in so important a trust. But it is not improper here to say that a court of inquiry, which General Warren succeeded in obtaining after General Grant had for twelve years denied it to him, decided that the opinions under which Grant and Sheridan acted were erroneous, and that Warren did his whole duty at Five Forks. Grant never changed his opinion of him. It is true he offered him another command the next day, and soon afterwards he was given an important department to administer; but the General-in-Chief was always implacable towards him. Even on his death-bed, when he forgave all his enemies, and sent forth that touching appeal for human kindliness, not only to his friends, but to those who had not hitherto been friends, he kept his feeling of keen dislike for Warren — then sleeping in his honored grave — and wrote it down for future ages in his "Memoirs." A curious instance of his increasing bitterness is seen in one phrase. In his report of 1865 he says Warren was relieved "about the close of this battle"; in his "Memoirs" he says "the troops were brought up and an assault successfully made" — *after* Warren was relieved.

1 "As we had never been thrown much together, I knew but little of him." [Sheridan, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 168.]

APPOMATTOX.

THE battle of Five Forks ought to have ended the war: Lee's right had been shattered and routed; his line, as he had long predicted, had been stretched westward until it broke; there was no longer any hope of saving Richmond, or even of materially delaying its fall. But General Lee apparently thought that even the gain of a day was of value to the Richmond Government, and what was left of the Army of Northern Virginia was still so perfect in discipline and obedience that it answered with unabated spirit and courage every demand made upon it. It is painful to record or to read the story of the hard fighting of the 2d of April; every drop of blood spent on the lines of Petersburg that day seems to have been shed in vain.

Parke and Wright had been ordered on the 30th of March to examine the enemy's works in their respective fronts with a view to determine whether it was practicable to carry them by assault; they had both reported favorably. After the great victory of Five Forks, Grant, whose anxiety for Sheridan seems excessive, thought that Lee would reënforce against him heavily,[2] when, in fact, Lee had already sent to his right all the troops that could be spared, and Sheridan had routed them. To relieve Sheridan, and to take advantage of any weakness in Lee's extended front, Grant now ordered an assault all along the lines. The answers came in with electric swiftness and confidence: Wright said he would "make the fur fly"; Ord promised to go into the Confederate lines "like a hot knife into butter." The ground,

2 Grant to Ord: "I have just heard from Sheridan. . . . Everything the enemy has will probably be pushed against him."

however, in front of Ord was so difficult that Grant gave him no positive orders to assault, but, on the contrary, enjoined upon him great vigilance and caution. Similar instructions were given to Humphreys; Miles, of his corps, was ordered westward on the White Oak road to help Sheridan, and Wright and Parke were directed to attack at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. Grant's principal anxiety was lest Lee should get away from Petersburg and overwhelm Sheridan on the White Oak road. Lee was thinking of nothing of the kind. The terrible blow his right had received seemed to have stunned him. He waited, with a fortitude not far from despair, for the attack which the morning was sure to bring, making what hasty preparations were in his power for the coming storm. It came with the first glimmer of dawn. Wright, who had carefully studied the ground in his front, from the safe point of vantage he had gained the day of Gordon's ill-fated sortie, had selected the open space in front of Forts Fisher and Walsh as the weak point in the Confederate harness. Not that it was really weak, except in comparison with the almost impregnable works to right and left: the enemy's front was intersected by marshy rivulets; a heavy abatis had to be cut away under musketry fire from the parapets and a rain of artillery from the batteries. It was a quarter to five before there was light enough to guide the storming columns; but at that instant they swarmed forward, rushing over the Confederate pickets with too much momentum to be delayed a minute, and, gaining the main works, made them their own after a brief but murderous conflict. In fifteen minutes Wright lost eleven hundred men. They wasted not an instant after this immense success. Some pushed on in the ardor of the assault across the Boydtown road as far as the South Side Railroad;[1] the gallant Confederate General A. P. Hill rode unawares upon a squad of these skirmishers, and, refusing to surrender, lost his life at their hands. But the main body of the troops wisely improved their victory. A portion of them worked resolutely to the right, meeting strong resistance from the Confederates under Wilcox; the larger part re-formed with the celerity that comes from discipline and experience, and moved down the reverse of the captured lines to Hatcher's Run, where, about seven o'clock, having swept everything before them and made large captures of men and guns, they met their comrades of the Twenty-fourth Corps, whom they joined, facing about and marching over ground cleared of the enemy till the left closed in on the Appomattox River.

Parke also assaulted at the earliest light, meeting with a success on the outer line equally brilliant and important, capturing four hundred yards of intrenchments with many guns, colors, and prisoners. But there was in front of him an interior line, heavily fortified, and here the enemy, under General Gordon, not only made a stand, but resumed the offensive and assaulted several times during the day, without success, the lines which Parke had seized in the morning and hastily reversed. On the left Humphreys displayed his usual intelligent energy; as soon as he heard of the success of Wright and Parke, on his right, he attacked with Hays's division the Confederate redoubt at Crow's House, capturing the works, the guns, and most of the garrison, while upon his left Mott's division drove the enemy out of their works at Burgess's Mill. Humphreys wanted to concentrate his whole corps against the scattered enemy by the Claibourne road; but General Meade countermanded the movement. Mott and Hays were ordered towards Petersburg, and Miles, who had been holding the White Oak road for Sheridan, was therefore left alone to deal with Heth's division, which had hastily intrenched itself near Sutherland's Station, and here a sharp fight took place. Miles, twice repulsed, stuck obstinately to his task, and about three o'clock whipped and dislodged the enemy, making large captures, and driving him off towards the Appomattox and Amelia Court House.

Two forts — Gregg and Whitworth — on the main line of the Confederate intrenchments west of Petersburg made a stout resistance to the National troops. The former was a very strong work, surrounded by a deep and wide wet ditch, flanked by fire to the right and left. It was an ugly thing to handle, but Foster's and Turner's divisions of Gibbon's corps assaulted with unflinching valor, meeting a desperate resistance. Every advantage, except that of numbers, was on the side of its brave defenders, and they put twice their own number *hors du combat* before they surrendered. Gibbon reports a loss of 714 killed and wounded; 55 Confederate dead were found in the work. After Gregg had fallen, Turner's men made short work of Whitworth, and the Confederates, from the Appomattox to the Weldon road, fell slowly back to their inner line of works near Petersburg, now garrisoned by Longstreet's troops, who had come in from the north side of the James.

The attack of Wright, though it must have been anticipated, came upon General Lee with the stunning effect of lightning. Before the advance of the National army had been reported to Lee or Hill, they saw squads of men in blue scattered about the Boydtown road,[2] and it was in riding forward to ascer-

[1] Humphreys, p. 365.
[2] W. H. Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee."

tain what the strange apparition meant that General Hill lost his life. General Lee, in full uniform, with his dress sword, which he seldom wore, but which he had put on that morning in honor of the momentous day he saw coming,[1]—being determined, with that chivalrous spirit of his, to receive adversity splendidly,—watched from the lawn in front of his headquarters the formidable advance of the National troops before whom his weakened lines were breaking into spray, and then, mounting his iron-gray charger, slowly rode back to his inner line. There his ragged troops received him with shouts and cheers which showed there was plenty of fight left in them; and there he spent the day in making preparations for the evacuation which was now the only resort left him. He sent a dispatch to Richmond, carrying in brief and simple words the message of doom to the Confederate authorities: "I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till night. I am not certain I can do that." He succinctly stated the disaster that had befallen him, announced his purpose of concentrating on the Danville road, and advised that all preparations be made for leaving Richmond that night.

Some Confederate writers express surprise that General Grant did not attack and destroy Lee's army on the afternoon of the 2d of April; but this is a view, after the fact, easy to express. Wright's and Humphreys's troops on the Union left had been on foot for eighteen hours; they had fought an important battle, marched and countermarched many miles, and were now confronted by Longstreet's fresh corps, behind formidable works, led by the best of Lee's generals; while the attitude of the force under Gordon, on the south side of the town, was such as to require the close attention of Parke. Grant, anticipating an early retirement of Lee from his citadel, wisely resolved to avoid the waste and bloodshed of an immediate assault on the inner lines at Petersburg. He ordered Sheridan to get upon Lee's line of retreat, sent Humphreys to strengthen him; then, directing a general bombardment for five o'clock the next morning, and an assault at six, he gave himself and his soldiers a little of the rest they had so richly earned, and which they so seriously needed, as a restorative after the labors past and a preparation for the labors to come.

He had telegraphed during the day to President Lincoln, who was at City Point, the great day's news as it developed hour by hour. He was particularly happy at the large captures. "How many prisoners?" was always the first question as an aide-de-camp came galloping in with news of success. Prisoners he regarded as so much net gain: he was weary of slaughter; he wanted the war ended with the least bloodshed possible. It was with the greatest delight that he was able to telegraph on this Sunday afternoon, "The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men and probably fifty pieces of artillery."

General Lee, after the first shock of the breaking of his lines, soon recovered his usual *sang-froid*, and bent all his energies to saving his army and leading it out of its untenable position on the James to a point from which he could effect a junction with Johnston in North Carolina. The place selected for this purpose was Burkeville, at the crossing of the South Side and Danville roads, fifty miles from Richmond, whence a short distance would bring him to Danville, where the desired junction might be made. Even in this ruin of the Confederacy, when the organized revolt which he had sustained so long with the bayonets of his soldiers was crashing about his ears, he was able still to cradle himself in the illusion that it was only a campaign that had failed; that he might withdraw his troops, form a junction with Johnston, and continue the war indefinitely in another field. Whatever we may think of his judgment, it is impossible not to admire the coolness of a general who, in the midst of irremediable disaster such as encompassed Lee on the afternoon of the 2d of April, could write such a letter as he wrote to Jefferson Davis under date of three o'clock.[2] He began it by a quiet and calm discussion of the question of negro recruitment; promised to give his attention to the business of finding suitable officers for the black regiments; hoped the appeal Mr. Davis had made to the governors would have a good effect; and, altogether, wrote as if years of struggle and effort were before him and his chief. He then went on to narrate the story of the day's catastrophe and to give his plans for the future. He closed by apologizing for "writing such a hurried letter to your Excellency," on the ground that he was "in the presence of the enemy, endeavoring to resist his advance."

At nightfall all his preparations were completed. He mounted his horse, and riding out of the town dismounted at the mouth of the road leading to Amelia Court House, the first point of rendezvous, where he had directed supplies to be sent, and standing beside his horse, the bridle reins in his hand, he watched his troops file noiselessly by in the darkness. At three o'clock the town, which had been so long and so stoutly defended, was abandoned; only a thin line of skirmishers was left in front of Parke, and before daybreak he pierced the

1 J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee."
2 Davis, "Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 660.

line in several places, gathering in the few pickets that were left. The town was formally surrendered to Colonel Ely at half-past four, anticipating the capitulation which some one else offered to General Wright a few minutes later. Meade reported the news to Grant and instantly received the order to march his army immediately up the Appomattox by the river road; and Grant, divining the intentions of Lee, dispatched an officer to Sheridan, directing him to push with all speed to the Danville road with Humphreys and Griffin and all the cavalry.

Thus the flight and the pursuit began almost at the same moment. The swift-footed Army of Northern Virginia was now racing for its life; and Grant, inspired with more than his native tenacity and energy, and thoroughly aroused to the tremendous task of ending the war at once, not only pressed his enemy in the rear, but hung upon his flank, and strained every nerve to get in his front. It is characteristic of him that he did not even allow himself the pleasure of entering Richmond, which, deserted by those who had so often promised to protect it, and wrapped in flames lighted by the reckless hands of Confederate officials, surrendered to Weitzel early on the morning of the 3d.

All that day Lee pushed forward towards Amelia Court House. He seemed in higher spirits than usual. As one who has long been dreading bankruptcy feels a great load taken from his mind when his assignment is made, so the Virginian chief, when he drew out from the ruin and conflagration in which the Confederate dream of independent power was passing away, and marched with his men into the vernal fields and woods of his native State, was filled with a new sense of encouragement and cheer. "I have got my army safe out of its breastworks," he said, "and in order to follow me the enemy must abandon his lines, and can derive no further benefit from his railroads or James River."[1] But he was now dealing with the man who, in Mississippi, had boldly swung loose from his base of supplies in an enemy's country, in face of an army equal to his own, and had won a victory a day without a wagon train.

There was little fighting the first day except among the cavalry. Custer attacked the Confederates at Namozine Church, and later in the day Merritt's cavalry had a sharp contest with Fitzhugh Lee at Deep Creek. On the 4th, Sheridan, who was aware of Lee's intention to concentrate at Amelia Court House, brought his cavalry with great speed to Jetersville, about eight miles southwest of the Court House, where Lee's army was resting. Sheridan intrenched, and sent tidings of his own and the enemy's position to Grant, and on the afternoon of the next day[2] the Second and Sixth corps came up. A terrible disappointment awaited General Lee on his arrival at Amelia Court House. He had ordered, he says, supplies to be sent there; but when his half-starved troops arrived on the 4th of April they found that no food had been sent to meet them, and nearly twenty-four hours were lost in collecting subsistence for men and horses. "This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved."[3] The whole pursuing force was south and stretching out to the west of him, when he started on the night of the 5th of April to make one more effort to reach a place of temporary safety. Burkeville, the junction of the Lynchburg and Danville roads, was in Grant's possession; the way to Danville was barred, and the supply of provisions from the south cut off. Lee was compelled to change his route to the west; and he now started for Lynchburg, which he was destined never to reach.

It had been Meade's intention to attack Lee at Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th of April, but before he reached that place he discovered that Lee's westward march had already begun, and that the Confederates were well beyond the Union left. Meade quickly faced his army about and started in pursuit. A running fight ensued for fourteen miles; the enemy, with remarkable quickness and dexterity, halting and partially intrenching themselves from time to time, and the National forces driving them out of every position, moving so swiftly that lines of battle followed closely on the skirmish line. At several points the cavalry, on this and the preceding day, harassed the moving left flank of the Confederates and worked havoc on the trains, on one occasion causing a grievous loss to history by burning Lee's headquarters baggage with all its wealth of returns and reports. Sheridan and Meade pressed so closely at last that Ewell's corps was brought to bay at Sailor's Creek, a rivulet running northward into the Appomattox. Here an important battle, or rather series of battles, took place, with fatal results to Lee's fast vanishing army. The Fifth Corps held the extreme

1 J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee," p. 451.

2 April 5.

3 Lee's report of the surrender. Other Confederate writers insist that the train which should have borne these supplies to Lee was directed to Richmond to assist the flight of the Confederate authorities. (Pollard, "Lost Cause," p. 703.) Jefferson Davis ("Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 668) denounces the whole story as a malignant calumny, and gives voluminous statements from Confederate officers to confute it. But there seems no reason to doubt General Lee's statement, made to Mr. Davis in his report at the time.

right and was not engaged. Humphreys, coming to where the roads divided, took the right fork and drove Gordon down towards the mouth of the creek. A sharp battle was fought about dark, which resulted in the total defeat of the Confederates, Humphreys capturing 1700 prisoners, 13 flags, 4 guns, and a large part of the main trains; Gordon making his escape in the night to High Bridge with what was left of his command. Wright, on the left-hand road, had also a keen fight, and won a most valuable victory. With Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions he attacked Ewell's corps, in position on the banks of the creek, enveloping him with the utmost swiftness and vehemence; Sheridan, whose cavalry had intercepted the Confederates, ordered Cook and Merritt to attack on the left, which was done with such vigor — Davies's horsemen riding over the enemy's breastworks at a single rush — that, smitten in front and flank, unable either to stand or to get away, Ewell's whole force was captured on the field. The day's loss was deadly to Lee, not less than eight thousand in all; among them such famous generals as Ewell, Kershaw, Custis Lee, Corse, and others were prisoners.

In the mean time Ord, under Sheridan's orders, had moved rapidly along the Lynchburg road to Rice's Station, where he found Longstreet's corps intrenched, and night came on before he could get into position to attack. General Read, Ord's chief-of-staff, had gone still farther forward with eighty horsemen and five hundred infantry to burn High Bridge, if possible. He passed through Farmville, and was within two miles of the bridge, when he fell in with two divisions of Confederate cavalry under Rosser and Munford. One of the most gallant and pathetic battles of the war took place. General Read, Colonel Washburn, and all the cavalry officers with Read were killed, and the rest captured; the Confederate loss was also heavy. Read's generous self-sacrifice halted the Confederate army for several hours. Longstreet lost the day at Rice's Station waiting for Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon to unite with him. They were engaged in a fruitless attempt to save their trains,[1] which resulted, as we have seen, in the almost total loss of the trains, in the capture of Ewell's entire force, and in the routing and shattering of the other commands. The day's work was of incalculable value to the National arms. Sheridan's unerring eye appreciated the full importance of it; his hasty report ended with the words, "If the thing is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender." Grant sent the dispatch to President Lincoln, who instantly replied, "Let the thing be pressed." [2]

In fact, after nightfall of the 6th Lee's army could only flutter like a wounded bird with one wing shattered; there was no longer any possibility of escape. Yet General Lee found it hard to relinquish the illusions of years, and his valiant heart still dreamed of evading the gathering toils and forming somewhere a junction with Johnston and indefinitely prolonging the war. As soon as night had come down on the disastrous field of Sailor's Creek, he again took up his weary march westward. Longstreet marched for Farmville, crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox, and on the 7th moved out on the road which ran through Appomattox Court House to Lynchburg. His famishing troops had found provisions at Farmville, and with this refreshment marched with such celerity that Grant and Sheridan, with all the energy they could breathe into their subordinates, could not head them off, or bring them to decisive battle that day. Nevertheless the advance of the Union army hung close upon the heels of the Confederates. The rear corps under Gordon had burned the railroad bridge, near Farmville, behind them; but General Barlow, sending his men forward at double-quick, saved the wagon bridge, and the Second Corps crossed over without delay and continued the chase, Humphreys taking the northern road, and sending Barlow by the railroad bed along the river. Barlow overtook Gordon's rear, working great destruction among his trains. Humphreys came up with the main body shortly after noon, and pressing them closely held them till evening, expecting Barlow to join him, and Wright and Crook to cross the river and attack from the south, a movement which the swollen water and the destruction of the bridge prevented. General Irwin Gregg's brigade had indeed succeeded in getting over, but was attacked by an overwhelming force of Confederate cavalry,— three divisions,— Gregg being captured, and his brigade driven back. This trivial success in the midst of unspeakable disaster delighted General Lee. He said to his son, W. H. F. Lee, "Keep your command together, General; do not let it think of surrender. I will get you out of this." [3]

But his inveterate optimism was not shared by his subordinates. A number of his principal officers, selecting General Pendleton as their spokesman, made known to him on the 7th their belief that further resistance was useless, and advised surrender. General Lee replied: "'I trust it has not come to that. . . . We have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms.' . . . Besides, he feared that if he made the first overtures for capitulation Grant would regard it as a confession of weakness, and demand unconditional sur-

1 Humphreys, p. 385.
2 Badeau, Vol. III., p. 581.
3 J. E. Cooke, "Life of R. E. Lee," p. 455.

render."[1] But General Grant did not wish to drive a gallant antagonist to such extremes. On this same day, seeing how desperate was Lee's condition, and anxious to have an end of the now useless strife, he sent him this courteous and generous summons:[2]

> The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance, on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

This letter was sent at night through Humphreys's lines to Lee, who at once answered: "Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender." The forlorn remnant of the Confederate army stole away in the night, on the desperate chance of finding food at Appomattox and a way of escape to Lynchburg, and at daybreak the hot pursuit was resumed by the Second and Sixth corps. All this day the flight and chase continued, through a portion of Virginia never as yet wasted by the passage of hostile armies. The air was sweet and pure, scented by opening buds and the breath of spring; the early peach trees were in flower; the sylvan by-paths were slightly shaded by the pale-green foliage of leafing trees. Through these quiet solitudes the fast-diminishing army of Lee plodded on, in the apathetic obedience which is all there is left to brave men when hope is gone, and behind them came the victorious legions of Grant, inspired to the forgetfulness of pain and fatigue by the stimulus of a prodigious success. Sheridan on the extreme left, by unheard-of exertions at last accomplished the important task of placing himself squarely on Lee's line of retreat. His advance, under Custer, captured, about sunset on the evening of the 8th, Appomattox Station with four trains of provisions, then attacked the rebel force advancing from Farmville, and drove it towards the Court House, taking twenty-five guns and many prisoners. A reconnaissance revealed the startling fact that Lee's whole army was coming up the road. Though he had nothing but cavalry, Sheridan with undaunted courage resolved to hold the inestimable advantage he had gained, sending a request to Grant to hurry up the required infantry support, saying that if Gibbon and Griffin could get to him that night "the job might be finished in the morning." He added, with singular prescience, referring to the negotiations which had been opened, "I do not think Lee means to surrender until compelled to do so."

This was strictly true. When Grant received Lee's first letter he replied on the morning of the 8th, saying: "Peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon; namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified from taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received." But in the course of the day a last hope seemed to have come to Lee that he might yet reach Appomattox in safety and thence make his way to Lynchburg — a hope utterly fallacious, for Stoneman was now on the railroad near Lynchburg. He therefore, while giving orders to his subordinates to press with the utmost energy westward, answered General Grant's letter in a tone more ingenious than candid, reserving, while negotiations were going on, the chance of breaking away.

> In my note of yesterday [he said] I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot therefore meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A. M., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond between the picket lines of the two armies.

Grant was not to be entrapped into a futile negotiation for the restoration of peace. He doubtless had in view the President's peremptory instructions of the 3d of March, forbidding him to entertain any proposition except for the surrender of armies, or to engage in any political discussion or conference. He therefore answered General Lee on the morning of the 9th of April with perfect courtesy, but with unmistakable frankness, saying: "I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 A. M., to-day, could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally desirous for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that

[1] Long, p. 417.
[2] April 7.

most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself," etc. He dispatched this letter to Lee and then set off to the left, where Sheridan was barring Lee's last avenue of escape.

It appears from General Lee's report, made four days after the surrender, that he had no intention on the night of the 8th of giving up the fight. He ordered Fitz Lee, supported by Gordon, in the morning "to drive the enemy from his front, wheel to the left and cover the passage of the trains, while Longstreet . . . should close up and hold the position." He expected to find only cavalry on the ground, and thought even his remnant of infantry could break through Sheridan's horse while he himself was amusing Grant with platonic discussions in the rear. But he received, on arriving at the rendezvous he had suggested, not only Grant's stern refusal to enter into a political negotiation, but other intelligence which was to him the trump of doom. Ord and Griffin had made an almost incredible march of some thirty miles during the preceding day and night, and had come up at daylight to the post assigned them in support of Sheridan; and when Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon made their advance in the morning and the National cavalry fell slowly back, in obedience to their orders, there suddenly appeared before the amazed Confederates a formidable force of infantry filling the road, covering the adjacent hills and valley, and barring as with an adamantine wall the further progress of the army of the revolt. The marching of the Confederate army was over forever. The appalling tidings were instantly carried to Lee. He at once sent orders to cease hostilities, and, suddenly brought to a sense of his real situation, sent a note to Grant, asking an interview in accordance with the offer contained "in Grant's letter of the 8th for the surrender of his army." Grant had created the emergency calling for such action. As Sheridan was about to charge on the huddled mass of astonished horse and foot in front of him a flag of truce was displayed, and the war was at an end. The Army of Northern Virginia was already captured. "I 've got 'em, like that!" cried Sheridan, doubling up his fist, fearful of some ruse or evasion in the white flag. The Army of the Potomac on the north and east, Sheridan and Ord on the south and west, completely encircled the demoralized and crumbled army of Lee. There was not another day's fighting in them. That morning at three o'clock Gordon had sent word to Lee that he "had fought his corps to a frazzle, and could do nothing more unless heavily supported by Longstreet." Lee and his army were prisoners of war before he and Grant met at Appomattox.

The meeting took place at the house of Mr. McLean, in the edge of the village. Lee met Grant at the threshold, and ushered him into a small and barely furnished parlor where were soon assembled the leading officers of the National army. General Lee was accompanied only by his secretary, Colonel Charles Marshall. A short conversation led up to a request from Lee for the terms on which the surrender of his army would be received. Grant briefly stated the terms which would be accorded. Lee acceded to them, and Grant wrote the following letter:

> In accordance with the substance of my letter to you on the 8th inst. I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authorities so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

General Grant says in his "Memoirs" that up to the moment when he put pen to paper he had not thought of a word that he should write. The terms he had verbally proposed, and which Lee had accepted, were soon put in writing, and there he might have stopped. But as he wrote, a feeling of sympathy for his gallant antagonist gradually came over him, and he added the extremely liberal terms with which his letter closed. The sight of Lee's sword, an especially fine one, suggested the paragraph allowing officers to retain their side-arms; and he ended with a phrase which he had evidently not thought of and for which he had no authority, which practically pardoned and amnestied every man in Lee's army — a thing he had refused to consider the day before, and which had been expressly forbidden him in President Lincoln's order of the 3d of March.[1] Yet so great was the joy over the crowning victory, so

[1] The President in his Amnesty Proclamation of December 8, 1863, expressly excepted officers above the rank of colonel, all who left seats in Congress to aid the rebellion, and all who resigned commissions in the army or navy of the United States and afterwards participated in the rebellion. The terms granted at Appomattox practically extended amnesty to many persons in these classes.

deep was the gratitude of the Government and the people to Grant and his heroic army, that his terms were accepted as he wrote them, and his exercise of the Executive prerogative of pardon entirely overlooked. It must be noticed here, however, as a few days later it led the greatest of Grant's generals into serious error.

Lee must have read the memorandum of terms with as much surprise as gratification. He said the permission for officers to retain their side-arms would have a happy effect. He then suggested and gained another important concession — that those of the cavalry and artillery who owned their own horses should be allowed to take them home to put in their crops. Lee wrote a brief reply accepting the terms. He then remarked that his army was in a starving condition, and asked Grant to provide them with subsistence and forage, to which he at once assented, and asked for how many men the rations would be wanted. Lee answered, "About twenty-five thousand," and orders were at once given to issue them. The number surrendered turned out to be even larger than this. The paroles signed amounted to 28,231. If we add to this the captures at Five Forks, Petersburg, and Sailor's Creek, the thousands who deserted the failing cause at every by-road leading to their homes, and filled every wood and thicket between Richmond and Lynchburg, we can see how considerable an army Lee commanded when Grant "started out gunning." Yet every Confederate writer, speaker, and singer who refers to the surrender says, and will say forever, that Lee surrendered only seven thousand muskets.

With these brief and simple formalities one of the most momentous transactions of modern times was concluded. The news soon transpired, and the Union gunners prepared to fire a national salute; but Grant would not permit it. He forbade any rejoicing over a fallen enemy, who he hoped would hereafter be an enemy no longer. The next day he rode to the Confederate lines to make a visit of farewell to General Lee. Sitting on horseback between the lines, the two heroes of the war held a friendly conversation. Lee considered the war at an end, slavery dead, the national authority restored; Johnston must now surrender — the sooner the better. Grant urged him to make a public appeal to hasten the return of peace; but Lee, true to his ideas of subordination to a government which had ceased to exist, said he could not do this without consulting the Confederate President. They parted with courteous good wishes, and Grant, without pausing to look at the city he had taken or the enormous system of works which had so long held him at bay, intent only upon reaping the peaceful results of his colossal victory, and putting an end to the waste and the burden of war, hurried away to Washington to do what he could for this practical and beneficent purpose. He had done an inestimable service to the Republic: he had won immortal honor for himself; but neither then nor at any subsequent period of his life was there any sign in his words or his bearing of the least touch of vainglory. The day after Appomattox he was as simple, modest, and unassuming a citizen as he was the day before Sumter.

Nov 1889

TELLUS.

WHY here on this third planet from the sun
Fret we, and smite against our prison-bars?
Why not in Saturn, Mercury, or Mars
Mourn we our sins, the things undone and done?
Where was the soul's bewildering course begun?
In what sad land among the scattered stars
Wrought she the ill which now for ever scars
By bitter consequence each victory won?
I know not, dearest friend; yet this I see,
That thou for holier fellowships wast meant;
Through some strange blunder thou art here; and we,
Who on the convict-ship were hither sent
By judgment just, must not be named with thee
Whose tranquil presence shames our discontent.

William R. Huntington.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Southern Cadets in Action.

IN his sketch of "The West Point of the Confederacy," published in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for January, 1889, Mr. John S. Wise says: "At a later period of the war it [the Virginia Military Institute] had, I believe, the exceptional honor of having sent its corps of cadets, as a body, into battle." The cadets of the University of Alabama share with the Virginia Military Institute corps the honor of having received "a baptism of fire" in the closing days of the war.[1] In fact, from the thoroughness of its military organization and equipment, and from the number and quality of the officers it furnished the Southern army, the University of Alabama may fairly contest with the Virginia Institute the honor of having been the "West Point of the Confederacy."

Unlike the Virginia Military Institute, the University of Alabama was not founded as a military school; but the legislature of the State, at its session of 1859–60, probably in anticipation of the "irrepressible conflict" between the sections, took steps towards grafting a military department on the classical and scientific courses of the institution, and in September, 1860, its students for the first time went into camp on the college grounds as a military body under the name of the Alabama Corps of Cadets. Colonel Caleb Huse, now in charge of a training school for West Point at Highland Falls, N. Y., who was then a young army officer, was detailed as commandant of cadets, and under his direction the corps soon reached a high degree of excellence in drill and discipline. At the outbreak of the war Colonel Huse resigned his commission in the army and accepted an important post under the Confederate Government. Colonel J. T. Murfee, an accomplished officer and a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, succeeded Colonel Huse as commandant, and he was aided in perfecting the organization of the military department of the institution by a complement of young officers known as "State Captains," most of whom were also Virginia Military Institute graduates.

As the war became more and more an earnest reality the University of Alabama assumed more and more the aspects of a second West Point. The president, Dr. L. C. Garland, now the venerable chancellor of the Vanderbilt University, donned the regulation gray of a Confederate colonel, and held reviews, inspections, etc., with the soldierly precision of a West Point superintendent. From time to time the young men whom the University had trained to the profession of arms were commissioned as officers in the Southern army, and of these quite a number rose rapidly in rank; one of them, the lamented General John C. Saunders, having won the stars of a brigadier before he had reached his majority.

The university, being located at Tuscaloosa, in the interior of the State, was for a long time exempt from danger from the raiders who ravaged the northern borders of Alabama; but as the crisis drew on in the spring of 1865 the Federal troops came nearer and nearer. On the 30th of March, General E. M. McCook, then at Elyton (at present a suburb of the new city of Birmingham), fifty miles northeast of Tuscaloosa, acting under orders from General J. H. Wilson, detached Brigadier-General John T. Croxton and his brigade of fifteen hundred veteran cavalry with orders "to proceed rapidly by the most direct route to Tuscaloosa, to destroy the bridge, factories, mills, university (military school), and whatever else might be of benefit to the rebel cause."

The opportunity was now at hand for the cadet corps to taste the realities of war that it had so often mimicked in the marching and countermarching of the battalion manœuvers. The corps was about three hundred strong and was in fine trim. On the night of the 3d of April "taps" was sounded as usual. The cadets went to bed with little thought that within three miles, just across the Black Warrior River, lay Croxton's raiders, ready to make a dash across the bridge into Tuscaloosa. The Federal general, by his capture of scouts and citizens, had prevented knowledge of his approach. The surprise was complete. For the sake of form, a few of the "home guard"—old men and boys—had been kept at the bridge that night; but no one had an idea that the Federals were near. When their approach was discovered, a courier was at once dispatched to the university. The long roll was sounded, and in a few moments the cadet battalion was formed and hurried away in the darkness to the brow of the hill overlooking the bridge. There a line of battle was formed.

It was too late. Croxton's men had already crossed the bridge and were formed on the river bank. The cadets, however, were eager for the fray, and the two or three volleys that they poured down the hill for a while disconcerted the Federals and checked their advance. There was rapid firing for a short time on both sides; but, owing probably to the darkness of the night, the casualties were few. The officer in charge of the cadets, seeing the hopelessness of an attempt to dislodge a force so superior in numbers, drew off his command, having sustained a loss of only three or four wounded.

General Croxton, in his official report, makes no mention of the losses sustained by the Federals. He says: "They [the militia and cadets] made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge us, but failed, and morning found us in peaceful possession of the premises, with sixty prisoners and three pieces of artillery." The prisoners referred to were members of the "home guard," and not cadets. The three pieces of artillery

[1] In a communication published in the "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Lieutenant James Oates, of the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry, writing of Sherman's march towards Atlanta, says: "It was during the advance that day [May 9, 1864] that we came in contact with the Georgia Cadets from the Military Institute at Marietta, who had come out from the woods at Resaca and formed their line behind a rail fence. After a volley from the Cadets, which killed several of our men, our regiment charged them. . . ."—EDITOR.

Dec. 1886

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE FALL OF THE REBEL CAPITAL—LINCOLN IN RICHMOND.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FALL OF THE REBEL CAPITAL.

SINCE the visit of Blair and the return of the rebel commissioners from the Hampton Roads conference, no event of special significance had excited the authorities or people of Richmond. February and March passed away in the routine of war and politics, which at the end of four years had become familiar and dull. To shrewd observers in that city things were going from bad to worse. Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President, had abandoned the capital and the cause and retired to Georgia to await the end. Judge John A. Campbell, though performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of War, made, among his intimate friends, no concealment of his opinion that the last days of the Confederacy had come.[2] The members of the rebel Congress, adjourning after their long and fruitless winter session, gave many indications that they never expected to reassemble. A large part of their winter's work had been to demonstrate without direct accusation that it was the Confederate mal-Administration which was wrecking the Southern cause. On his part Jefferson Davis prolonged their session a week to send them his last message—a dry lecture to prove that the blame rested entirely on their own shoulders. The last desperate measure of rebel statesmanship, the law to permit masters to put their slaves into the Southern armies to fight for the rebellion, was so palpably illogical and impracticable that both the rebel Congress and the rebel President appear to have treated it as the merest legislative rubbish; or else the latter would scarcely have written in the same message, after stating that "much benefit is anticipated from this measure," that

> The people of the Confederacy can be but little known to him who supposes it possible they would ever consent to purchase, at the cost of degradation and slavery, permission to live in a country garrisoned by their own negroes, and governed by officers sent by the conqueror to rule over them.[3]

Jefferson Davis was strongly addicted to political contradictions, but we must suppose even his cross-eyed philosophy capable of detecting that a negro willing to fight in slavery in preference to fighting in freedom was not a very safe reliance for Southern independence. The language as he employs it here fitly closes the continuous official Confederate wail about Northern subjugation, Northern despotism, Northern barbarity, Northern atrocity, and Northern inhumanity which rings through his letters, speeches, orders, messages, and proclamations with monotonous dissonance during his whole four years of authority.

Of all the Southern people none were quite so blinded as those of Richmond. Their little bubble of pride at being the Confederate capital was ever iridescent with the brightest hopes. They had no dream that the visible symbols of Confederate government and glory upon which their eyes had nourished their faith would disappear almost as suddenly as if an earthquake had swallowed them. Poverty, distress, and desolation had indeed crept into their homes, but the approach had been slow, and so mitigated by the exaltations of a heroic self-sacrifice that they welcomed the change rather than suffered by it. For the moment nature was their helper. The cheering, healing, revivifying influences of the spring-time were at hand. The warm sunshine lay on the hills, the songs of birds were in the air, buds and blossoms filled the gardens.

All accounts agree that when on Sunday morning, April 2, 1865, the people of Richmond went forth to their places of worship, they had no thought of impending change or public calamity. The ominous signs of such a possibility had escaped their attention. A few days before, Mrs. Jefferson Davis, with her children, had left Richmond for the South and sent some of her furniture to auction. So also some weeks before, the horses remaining in the city had been impressed to collect the tobacco into convenient warehouses where it

2 Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 450.

3 Davis, Message, March 13, 1865. "American Annual Cyclopædia," 1865, pp. 718, 719.

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could be readily burned to prevent its falling into Yankee hands.[1]

But the significance of these and perhaps other indications could not be measured by the general populace. In fact for some days a rather unusual quiet had prevailed. That morning Jefferson Davis was in his pew in St. Paul's Church when before the sermon was ended an officer walked up the aisle and handed him a telegram from General Lee at Petersburg, dated at half-past ten that morning, in which he read, "My lines are broken in three places; Richmond must be evacuated this evening." He rose and walked out of church; whereupon the officer handed the telegram to the rector, who as speedily as possible brought the services to a close, making the announcement that General Ewell, the commander at Richmond, desired the military forces to assemble at three o'clock in the afternoon. The news seems also to have reached in some form one or two of the other churches, so that though no announcement of the fact was made, the city little by little became aware of the harrowing necessity.

The fact of its being Sunday, with no business going on and rest pervading every household, doubtless served to moderate the shock to the public. Yet very soon the scene was greatly transformed. From the Sabbath stillness of the morning the streets became alive with bustle and activity. Jefferson Davis had called his Cabinet and officials together, and the hurried packing of the Confederate archives for shipment was soon in progress. Citizens who had the means made hasty preparations for flight; the far greater number who were compelled to stay were in a flutter to devise measures of protection or concealment. The banks were opened and depositors flocked thither to withdraw their money and valuables. A remnant of the Virginia legislature gathered in the Representatives' Hall at the Capitol to debate a question of greater urgency than had ever before taxed their wisdom or eloquence. In another room sat the municipal council, for once impressed with the full weight of its responsibility. Meanwhile the streets were full of hurrying people, of loaded wagons, of galloping military officers conveying orders. One striking sketch of that wild hurry-skurry deserves to be recorded.

Lumpkin, who for many years had kept a slave-trader's jail, also had a work of necessity on hand — fifty men, women, and children, who must be saved to the missionary institution for the future enlightenment of Africa. Although it was the Lord's day (perhaps he was comforted by the thought that "the better the day the better the deed") the coffle-gang was made up in the jail yard, within pistol shot of Davis's parlor window, within a stone's throw of the Monumental Church, and a sad and weeping throng, chained two and two, the last slave-coffle that shall ever tread the streets of Richmond, were hurried to the Danville depot.[2]

But the "institution," like the Confederacy, was already *in extremis*. The account adds that the departing trains could afford no transportation for this last slave cargo, and the gang probably went to pieces like every other Richmond organization, military and political.

Evening had come, and the confusion of the streets found its culmination at the railroad depots. Military authority made room for the fleeing President and his Cabinet, and department officials and their boxes of more important papers. The cars were overcrowded and overloaded long before the clamoring multitude and piles of miscellaneous baggage could be got aboard, and by the occasional light of lanterns flitting hither and thither the wheezing and coughing trains moved out into the darkness. The legislature of Virginia and the governor of the State departed in a canal boat towards Lynchburg. All available vehicles carrying fugitives were leaving the city by various country roads, but the great mass of the population, unable to get away, had to confront the dread certainty that only one night remained before the appearance of a hostile army with the power of death and destruction over them and their homes.

How this power might be exercised, present signs were none too reassuring. Since noon, when the fact of evacuation had become certain, the whole fabric of society seemed to be crumbling to pieces. Military authority was concentrating its energy on only two objects, destruction and departure. The civil authority was lending a hand, for the single hasty precaution which the city council could ordain was, that all the liquors in the city should be emptied out. To order this was one thing, to have it rigorously executed would be asking quite too much of the lower human appetites, and while some of the street gutters ran with alcohol, enough was surreptitiously consumed to produce a frightful state of excitement and drunkenness. No picture need be drawn of the possibilities of violence and crime which must have haunted the timid watchers in Richmond who listened all night to the shouts, the blasphemy, the disorder that rose and fell in the streets, or who furtively noted the signs of pillage already begun. And how shall we follow their imagination, passing from these visible acts of the friends of yesterday to what they might look for from the enemies expected to-morrow? For had not their President offi-

[1] Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 438.

[2] "Atlantic Monthly," June, 1865.

cially, their statesmen, and their newspapers with frantic rhetoric, warned them against the fanatical, penny-worshiping Yankee invader? And that final horror of horrors, the negro soldiers held up to their dread by the solemn presidential message of Jefferson Davis only two weeks before. What now of the fear of servile insurrection, the terrible specter they had secretly nursed from their very childhood? It is scarcely possible they can have escaped such meditations even though already weary and exhausted with the surprises and labors of the day, with the startling anxieties of the evening, with the absorbing care of burying their household silver and secreting their yet more precious personal ornaments and tokens of affection. In Europe, a thousand wars have rendered such experiences historically commonplace; in America, let us hope that a thousand years of peace may render their repetition impossible.

Full of dangerous portent as had been the night, the morning became yet more ominous. Long before day sleepers and watchers alike were startled by a succession of explosions which shook every building. The military authorities were blowing up the vessels in construction at the river. These were nine in number, three of them iron-clads of four guns each, the others small wooden ships.[1] Next, the arsenal was fired; and, as many thousands of loaded shells were stored here, there succeeded for a period the sounds of a continuous cannonade. Already fire had been set to the warehouses containing the collected tobacco and cotton, among which loaded shells had also been scattered to insure more complete destruction.

There is a conflict of testimony as to who is responsible for the deplorable public calamity which ensued. The rebel Congress had passed a law ordering the Government tobacco and other public property to be burned, and Jefferson Davis states that the general commanding had advised with the mayor and city authorities about precautions against a conflagration.[2] On the other hand, Lieutenant-General Ewell, the military commander, has authorized the statement that he not only earnestly warned the city authorities of the certain consequences of the measure, but that he took the responsibility of disobeying the law and military orders. "I left the city about seven o'clock in the morning," he writes, "and as yet nothing had been fired by my orders; yet the buildings and depot near the railway bridge were on fire, and the flames were so close as to be disagreeable as I rode by them."[3] By this time the spirit of lawlessness and hunger for pillage had gained full headway. The rearguard of the retreating Confederates set the three great bridges in flames, and while the fire started at the four immense warehouses and various points, and soon uniting in an uncontrollable conflagration was beginning to eat out the heart of the city, a miscellaneous mob went from store to store, and with a beam for a battering ram smashed in the doors so that the crowd might freely enter and plunder the contents. This rapacity, first directed towards bread and provision stores, gradually extended itself to all other objects until mere greed of booty rather than need or usefulness became the ruling instinct, and promoted the waste and destruction of that which had been stolen. Into this pandemonium of fire and license there came one additional terror to fill up its dramatic completeness.

> About ten o'clock [writes an eye-witness], just before the entrance of the Federal army, a cry of dismay rang all along the streets which were out of the track of the fire, and I saw a crowd of leaping, shouting demons, in parti-colored clothes, and with heads half shaven. It was the convicts from the penitentiary, who had overcome the guard, set fire to the prison, and were now at liberty. Many a heart which had kept its courage to this point quailed at the sight. Fortunately, they were too intent upon securing their freedom to do much damage.[4]

It is quite probable that the magnitude and

1 "The following is a list of the vessels destroyed: *Virginia*, flag-ship, four guns, iron-clad; *Richmond*, four guns, iron-clad; *Fredericksburg*, four guns, iron-clad; *Nansemond*, two guns, wooden; *Hampton*, two guns, wooden; *Roanoke*, one gun, wooden; *Torpedo*, tender; *Shrapnel; Patrick Henry*, school-ship." [Porter, Report, April 5, 1865. Report Sec. Navy, 1865–66.]

2 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 666.

3 Ewell to Lossing, November, 1866. "The Independent," March 11, 1886.

Lossing, writing from both the written statement and verbal explanations of General Ewell, says: "Now General Ewell earnestly warned the city authorities of the danger of acting according to the letter of that resolution; for a brisk wind was blowing from the south which would send the flames of the burning warehouses into the town and imperil the whole city. Early in the evening a deputation of citizens called upon President Davis and remonstrated against carrying out that order of Congress, because the safety of the city would be jeopardized. He was then in an unamiable state of mind, and curtly replied, 'Your statement that the burning of the warehouses will endanger the city is only a cowardly pretext to save your property for the Yankees!' After Davis's departure a committee of the city council, at the suggestion of General Ewell, went to the War Office to remonstrate with whomsoever might represent the department, against the execution of the perilous order. Major Melton rudely replied in language which was almost an echo of that of his superior, and General Ewell, in spite of his earnest remonstrances, was ordered to cause the four warehouses near the river to be set on fire at three o'clock in the morning." [Lossing, in "The Independent" (New York), March 11, 1886.]

4 Mary Tucker Magill, in "The Independent" (New York), Jan. 7, 1886.

rapidity of the disaster served in a measure to mitigate its evil results. The burning of seven hundred buildings comprising the entire business portion of Richmond, warehouses, manufactories, mills, depots, and stores, all within the brief space of a day, was a visitation so sudden, so unexpected, so stupefying as to overawe and terrorize even wrong-doers, and made the harvest of plunder so abundant as to serve to scatter the mob and satisfy its rapacity to quick repletion.

Before a new hunger could arise, assistance, protection, and relief were at hand. The citizens' committee which went forth to surrender Richmond met the vanguard of the Union army under General Weitzel outside the limits of the city in the early forenoon, and after a formal ceremony of submission, a small detachment of white Union cavalry galloped into the late rebel capital, and proceeding directly to the State House raised the national flag over it.[1] Soon afterward there occurred what was to the inhabitants the central incident of the day — the event which engrossed their solicitude even more than the vanished rebel Government, the destroyed city, or the lost cause. This was the arrival of the colored soldiers, the, to them, visible realization of the new political and social heavens and earth to which four years of rebellion and war had brought them. The prejudices of a lifetime cannot be instantly overcome, and the rebels of Richmond doubtless felt that this was the final drop in their cup of misery and that their "subjugation" was complete. General Weitzel had arrived with the first detachment of Union cavalry; and seeing the conflagration and disorder, he sent back an aide in haste to bring into the city the first brigade he could find, to act as a provost guard.

At length they came — a brigade of colored cavalry from the division of General Devens.[2] It is related that about this time, as by a common impulse, the white people of Richmond disappeared from the streets, and the black population streamed forth with an apparently instinctive recognition that their day of jubilee had at last arrived. To see this compact, organized body of men of their own color, on horseback, in neat uniforms, with flashing sabers, with the gleam of confidence and triumph in their eyes, was a palpable living reality to which their hope and pride, long repressed, gave instant response. They greeted them with expressions of welcome in every form — cheers, shouts, laughter, and a rattle of exclamations as they rushed along the sides of the street to keep pace with the advancing column and feast their eyes on the incredible sight; while the black Union soldiers rose high in their stirrups and with waving swords and deafening huzzas acknowledged the fraternal reception.

But there was little time for holiday enjoyment. The conflagration was roaring, destruction was advancing; fury of fire, blackness of smoke, crash of falling walls, obstruction of débris, confusion, helplessness, danger, seemed everywhere. The great Capitol Square on the hill had become the refuge of women and children and the temporary storing-place of the few household effects they had saved from the burning. From this center, where the Stars and Stripes were first hoisted, there now flowed back upon the stricken city, not the doom and devastation for which its people looked, but the friendly help and protection of a generous army bringing them peace, and the spirit of a benevolent Government tendering them forgiveness and reconciliation. Up to this time it would seem that not an organization had been proposed nor a hand raised to stay the ravages of the flames. The public spirit of Richmond was dead even to that commonest of human impulses, the willingness to help a neighbor in affliction. The advent of the Union army breathed a new life into this social paralysis. The first care of the officers was to organize resistance to fire; and instead of the blood and rapine which the deluded Virginians feared from the Yankee officers and "niggers" in Federal uniforms, they beheld them reëstablish order and personal security, and convert the unrestrained mob of whites and blacks into a regulated energy, to save what remained of their city from the needless fire and pillage to which their own friends had devoted it, against remonstrance and against humanity. And this was not all. Beginning that afternoon and continuing many days, these "Yankee invaders" fed the poor of Richmond, and saved them from the starvation to which the law of the Confederate Congress, relentlessly executed by the Confederate President and some of his subordinates, exposed them.

LINCOLN IN RICHMOND.

A LITTLE more than two months before these events, President Lincoln had written the following letter to General Grant:

Please read and answer this letter as though I was not President, but only a friend. My son, now in his twenty-second year, having graduated at Harvard, wishes to see something of the war before it ends. I do not wish to put him in the ranks,

[1] The flag was raised by a young officer named Johnston Livingston de Peyster, who had carried it at his saddle-bow for a week with this purpose.

[2] Weitzel, testimony; Report of Committee on Conduct of the War. Supplement, Part I., p. 523.

nor yet to give him a commission, to which those who have already served long are better entitled, and better qualified to hold. Could he, without embarrassment to you, or detriment to the service, go into your military family with some nominal rank, I, and not the public, furnishing his necessary means? If no, say so without the least hesitation, because I am as anxious and as deeply interested that you shall not be encumbered as you can be yourself.[1]

Grant replied as follows:

Your favor of this date in relation to your son serving in some military capacity is received. I will be most happy to have him in my military family in the manner you propose. The nominal rank given him is immaterial, but I would suggest that of captain, as I have three staff-officers now, of considerable service, in no higher grade. Indeed, I have one officer with only the rank of lieutenant who has been in the service from the beginning of the war. This, however, will make no difference, and I would still say give the rank of captain.—Please excuse my writing on a half-sheet. I have no resource but to take the blank half of your letter.[2]

The President's son therefore became a member of Grant's staff with the rank of captain, and acquitted himself of the duties of that station with fidelity and honor.

We may assume that it was the anticipated important military events rather than the presence of Captain Robert T. Lincoln at Grant's headquarters which induced the general on the 20th of March, 1865, to invite the President and Mrs. Lincoln to make a visit to his camp near Richmond; and on the 22d they and their younger son Thomas, nicknamed "Tad," proceeded in the steamer *River Queen* from Washington to City Point, where General Grant with his family and staff were "occupying a pretty group of huts on the bank of the James River, overlooking the harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war and merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale."[3] Here, making his home on the steamer which brought him, the President remained about ten days, enjoying what was probably the most satisfactory relaxation in which he had been able to indulge during his whole presidential service. It was springtime and the weather was moderately steady; his days were occupied visiting the various camps of the great army in company with the general. "He was a good horseman," records a member of the general's staff, "and made his way through swamps and over corduroy roads as well as the best trooper in the command. The soldiers invariably recognized him and greeted him, wherever he appeared amongst them, with cheers that were no lip service, but came from the depth of their hearts."[4] Many evening hours were passed with groups of officers before roaring camp-fires, where Mr. Lincoln was always the magnetic center of genial conversation and lively anecdote. The interest of the visit was further enhanced by the arrival at City Point, on the evening of March 27, of General Sherman, who, having left General Schofield to command in his absence, made a hasty trip to confer with Grant. He was able to gratify the President with a narrative of the leading incidents of his great march from Atlanta to Savannah and from Savannah to Goldsboro', North Carolina. In one or two informal interviews in the after cabin of the *River Queen*, Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Rear-Admiral Porter enjoyed a frank interchange of opinion about the favorable prospects of early and final victory, and of the speedy realization of the long-hoped-for peace. Sherman and Porter affirm that the President confided to them certain liberal views on the subject of reconstructing State governments in the conquered States which do not seem compatible with the very guarded language of Mr. Lincoln elsewhere used or recorded by him. It is fair to presume that their own enthusiasm colored their recollection of the President's expressions, though it is no doubt true that he spoke of his willingness to be liberal to the verge of prudence, and that he even gave them to understand that he would not be displeased at the escape from the country of Jefferson Davis and other principal rebel leaders.

On the 29th of March the party separated, Sherman returning to North Carolina, and Grant starting on his final campaign to Appomattox. Five days later Grant informed Mr. Lincoln of the fall of Petersburg, and the President made a flying visit to that town for another brief conference with the general. The capture of Richmond was hourly expected, and that welcome information reached Lincoln soon after his return to City Point.

Between the receipt of this news and the following forenoon, but before any information about the great fire had been received, a visit to Richmond was arranged between President Lincoln and Admiral Porter. Accounts differ as to who suggested it or extended the invitation, and there is great vagueness and even contradiction about the details of the trip. Admiral Porter states[5] that he carried the President in his flag-ship, the *Malvern*, until she grounded, when he transferred the party to his barge with a tugboat to tow it and a small detachment of marines on board. Another account states that the President proceeded in

1 Lincoln to Grant, Jan. 19, 1865. Unpublished MS.
2 Grant to Lincoln, Jan. 21, 1865. Unpublished MS.
3 Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 324.
4 Gen. Horace Porter, in THE CENTURY, Oct., 1885.
5 "New York Tribune."

the steamer *River Queen* until the transfer to the barge; also that another transport, having a four-horse field wagon and a squadron of cavalry, followed for the service of the President. Still a third account states[1] that the party went in the admiral's barge the whole distance, as affording greater safety against danger from any torpedoes which might not yet have been removed. The various accounts agree that obstructions, consisting of rows of piling, sunken hulks, and the débris of the destroyed Confederate vessels, were encountered, which only the tug and barge were able to pass.

The result therefore was that the party were compelled to make a landing at some distance below the proper place, at the suburb called Rockett's, and that there was neither sentry nor officer nor wagon nor escort to meet and receive them. One cannot help wondering at the manifest imprudence of both Mr. Lincoln and Admiral Porter in the whole proceeding.

Never in the history of the world did the ruler of a mighty nation and the conqueror of a great rebellion enter the captured chief city of the insurgents in such humbleness and simplicity. As they stepped from the barge the street along the river front seemed deserted, and they sent out to find some chance person of whom to inquire their way. The unusual group soon attracted the attention of idlers, and a crowd gathered. Admiral Porter ordered twelve of the marines to fix bayonets to their rifles and to form six in front and six behind the party, which consisted of President Lincoln, holding his son "Tad" by the hand, Admiral Porter, and three officers, all being on foot; and in this order they walked from the landing at Rockett's to the center of Richmond, a distance of nearly two miles. It was a long and fatiguing march, evidently not expected by the President, who during his ten-days' stay with the army had probably always had an officer at his elbow to anticipate his slightest wish for horses or vehicles. There remains no trustworthy account of this strange presidential entry; the printed narratives of it written from memory, after the lapse of years, are so evidently colored by fancy that they do not invite credence. Admiral Porter, writing on the following day, says:

> On the 4th of April I accompanied the President up to Richmond, where he was received with the strongest demonstrations of joy.[2]

This is perhaps the most perfect historical record we shall ever have of the event, and the imagination may easily fill up the picture of a gradually increasing crowd, principally of negroes, following the little group of marines and officers with the tall form of the President in its center; and, having learned that it was indeed Mr. Lincoln, giving expression to wonder, joy, and gratitude in a variety of picturesque emotional ejaculations peculiar to the colored race, and for which there was ample time while the little procession made its tiresome march, whose route cannot now be traced.

At length the party reached the headquarters of General Weitzel, established in the very house occupied by Jefferson Davis as the presidential mansion of the rebel Confederacy, and from which he had fled less than two days before. Here Mr. Lincoln was glad of a chance to sit down and rest, and a little later to partake of a lunch which the general provided. An informal reception, chiefly of Union officers, naturally followed, and later in the afternoon General Weitzel went with the President and Admiral Porter in a carriage, guarded by an escort of cavalry, to visit the Capitol, the burnt district, Libby Prison, Castle Thunder, and other points of interest about the city; and of this afternoon drive also no trustworthy narrative in detail by an eye-witness appears to have been written at the time.

It was probably before the President went on this drive that there occurred an interview on political topics which forms one of the chief points of interest connected with his visit. Judge John A. Campbell, rebel Assistant Secretary of War, remained in Richmond when on Sunday night the other members of the rebel Government fled, and on Tuesday morning he reported to the Union military governor, General G. F. Shepley, and informed him of his "submission to the military authorities."[3] Learning from General Shepley that Mr. Lincoln was at City Point, he asked permission to see him. This application was evidently communicated to Mr. Lincoln, for shortly after his arrival a staff-officer informed Campbell that the requested interview would be granted, and conducted him to the President at the general's headquarters, where it took place. The rebel General J. R. Anderson and others were present as friends of the judge, and General Weitzel as the witness of Mr. Lincoln. Campbell, as spokesman, "told the President that the war was over," and made inquiries about the measures and conditions necessary to secure peace. Speaking for Virginia, he "urged him to consult and counsel with her public men, and her citizens, as to the restoration of peace, civil order, and the renewal of her relations as a member of the Union."[4]

[1] Manuscript narrative of Colonel W. H. Crook.
[2] Porter, Report, April 5, 1865.
[3] Campbell, pamphlet.
[4] Ibid.

In his pamphlet, written from memory long afterwards, Campbell states that Mr. Lincoln replied "that my general principles were right, the trouble was how to apply them"; and no conclusion was reached except to appoint another interview for the following day on board the *Malvern*. This second interview was accordingly held on Wednesday, April 5, Campbell taking with him only a single citizen of Richmond, as the others to whom he sent invitations were either absent from the city or declined to accompany him. General Weitzel was again present as a witness. The conversation apparently took a wide range on the general topic of restoring local governments in the South, in the course of which the President gave Judge Campbell a written memorandum,[1] embracing an outline of conditions of peace which repeated in substance the terms he had proffered the rebel commissioners (of whom Campbell was one) at the Hampton Roads conference on the 3d of February, 1865. The only practical suggestion which was made has been summarized as follows by General Weitzel in a statement written from memory, as the result of the two interviews:

> Mr. Campbell and the other gentleman assured Mr. Lincoln that if he would allow the Virginia legislature to meet, it would at once repeal the ordinance of secession, and that then General Robert E. Lee and every other Virginian would submit; that this would amount to the virtual destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, and eventually to the surrender of all the other rebel armies, and would insure perfect peace in the shortest possible time.[2]

Out of this second conference, which also ended without result, President Lincoln thought he saw an opportunity to draw an immediate and substantial military benefit. On the next day (April 6) he wrote from City Point, where he had returned, the following letter to General Weitzel, which he immediately transmitted to the general by the hand of Senator Wilkinson, in whose presence he wrote it and who was on his way from City Point to Richmond:

> It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion may now desire to assemble at Richmond, and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public.[3]

This document bears upon its face the distinct military object which the President had in view in permitting the rebel legislature to assemble, namely, to withdraw immediately the Virginia troops from the army of Lee, then on his retreat towards Lynchburg. It could not be foreseen that Lee would surrender the whole of that army within the next three days, though it was evident that the withdrawal of the Virginia forces from it, under whatever pretended State authority, would contribute to the ending of the war quite as effectually as the reduction of that army to an equal number by battle or capture. The ground upon which Lincoln believed the rebel legislature might take this action is set forth in his dispatch to Grant of the same date, in which he wrote:

> Secretary Seward was thrown from his carriage yesterday and seriously injured. This with other matters will take me to Washington soon. I was at Richmond yesterday and the day before, when and where Judge Campbell, who was with Messrs. Hunter and Stephens in February, called on me, and made such representations as induced me to put in his hands an informal paper repeating the propositions in my letter of instructions to Mr. Seward, which you remember, and adding "that if the war be now further persisted in by the rebels, whatever, let them say so, and state their conditions, so that the conditions can be known and considered. It is further added, that the remission of confiscation being within the executive power, if the war be now further persisted in by those opposing the Government, the making of confiscated property at the least to bear the additional cost will be insisted on, but that confiscations (except in case of third party intervening interests) will be remitted to the people of any State which shall now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops from further resistance to the Government. What is now said as to remission of confiscation has no reference to supposed property in slaves." [President Lincoln's memorandum printed in Campbell, pamphlet, pp. 9, 10.]

1 "As to peace, I have said before, and now repeat, that three things are indispensable:

"1. The restoration of the national authority throughout the United States.

"2. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message, and in preceding documents.

"3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. That all propositions coming from those now in hostility to the Government, not inconsistent with the foregoing, will be respectfully considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality.

"I now add that it seems useless to me to be more specific with those who will not say that they are ready for the indispensable terms, even on conditions to be named by themselves. If there be any who are ready for these indispensable terms, on any conditions what-

2 Weitzel, in "Philadelphia Times."

3 Lincoln to Weitzel, April 6, 1865. Weitzel, testimony; Report of Committee on Conduct of the War. Supplement, Part I., p. 521.

confiscated property shall at the least bear the additional cost, and that confiscation shall be remitted to the people of any State which will now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops and other support from the resistance to the Government." Judge Campbell thought it not impossible that the rebel legislature of Virginia would do the latter, if permitted, and accordingly I addressed a private letter to General Weitzel, with permission for Judge Campbell to see it, telling him (General W.) that if they attempt this to permit and protect them, unless they attempt something hostile to the United States, in which case to give them notice and time to leave, and to arrest any remaining after such time. I do not think it very probable that anything will come of this, but I have thought best to notify you, so that if you should see signs you may understand them. From your recent dispatches, it seems that you are pretty effectually withdrawing the Virginia troops from opposition to the Government. Nothing that I have done, or probably shall do, is to delay, hinder, or interfere with your work.[1]

That Mr. Lincoln well understood the temper of leading Virginians when he wrote that he had little hope of any result from the permission he had given is shown by what followed. When, on the morning of April 7, General Weitzel received the President's letter of the 6th, he showed it confidentially to Judge Campbell, who thereupon called together a committee, apparently five in number, of the Virginia rebel legislature, and instead of informing them precisely what Lincoln had authorized, namely, a meeting to "take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," the judge in a letter to the committee (dated April 7) formulated quite a different line of action.

> I have had [he wrote], since the evacuation of Richmond, two conversations with Mr. Lincoln, President of the United States. . . . The conversations had relation to the establishment of a government for Virginia, the requirement of oaths of allegiance from the citizens, and the terms of settlement with the United States. With the concurrence and sanction of General Weitzel, he assented to the application not to require oaths of allegiance from the citizens. He stated that he would send to General Weitzel his decision upon the question of a government for Virginia. This letter was received on Thursday, and was read by me. . . . The object of the invitation is for the government of Virginia to determine whether they will administer the laws in connection with the authorities of the United States. I understand from Mr. Lincoln, if this condition be fulfilled, that no attempt would be made to establish or sustain any other authority.[2]

The rest of Campbell's long letter relates to safe-conducts, to transportation, and to the contents of the written memorandum handed by Lincoln to him at the interview on the *Malvern* about general conditions of peace. But this memorandum contained no syllable of reference to the "government of Virginia," and bore no relation of any kind to the President's permission to "take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops," except its promise "that confiscations (except in case of third party intervening interests) will be remitted to the people of any State which shall now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops from further resistance to the Government." Going a step further, the committee next prepared a call inviting a meeting of the General Assembly, announcing the consent of "the military authorities of the United States to the session of the legislature in Richmond," and stating that "The matters to be submitted to the legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of questions involving life, liberty, and property that have arisen in the States as a consequence of the war."[3] When General Weitzel indorsed his approval on the call "for publication in the 'Whig' and in hand-bill form," he does not seem to have read, or if he read to have realized, how completely President Lincoln's permission had been changed and his authority perverted. Instead of permitting them to recall Virginia soldiers, Weitzel was about to allow them authoritatively to sit in judgment on all the political consequences of the war "in the States."

General Weitzel's approval was signed to the call on April 11, and it was published in the "Richmond Whig" on the morning of the 12th. On that day the President, having returned to Washington, was at the War Department writing an answer to a dispatch from General Weitzel, in which the general defended himself against the Secretary's censure for having neglected to require from the churches in Richmond prayers for the President of the United States, similar to those which prior to the fall of the city had been offered up in their religious services in behalf of "the rebel chief, Jefferson Davis, before he was driven from the Capitol." Weitzel contended that the tone of President Lincoln's conversations with him justified the omission. Mr. Lincoln was never punctilious about social or official etiquette towards himself, and he doubtless felt in this instance that neither his moral nor political well-being was seriously dependent upon the prayers of the Richmond rebel churches. To this part of the general's dispatch he therefore answered:

> I have seen your dispatches to Colonel Hardie about the matter of prayers. I do not remember hearing prayer spoken of while I was in Richmond,

1 Lincoln to Grant, April 6, 1865.
2 Campbell, pamphlet.
3 Ibid.

but I have no doubt you acted in what appeared to you to be the spirit and temper manifested by me while there.[1]

Having thus generously assumed responsibility for Weitzel's alleged neglect, the President's next thought was about what the Virginia rebel legislature was doing, of which he had heard nothing since his return from City Point. He therefore included in this same telegram of April 12 the following inquiry and direction:

> Is there any sign of the rebel legislature coming together on the understanding of my letter to you? If there is any such sign, inform me what it is. If there is no sign, you may withdraw the offer.

To this question General Weitzel answered briefly, "The passports have gone out for the legislature, and it is common talk that they will come together." It is probable that Mr. Lincoln thought that if after the lapse of five days the proposed meeting had progressed no farther than "common talk," nothing could be expected from it. It would also seem that at this time he must have received, either by telegraph or by mail, copies of the correspondence and call which Weitzel had authorized, and which had been published that morning. The President therefore immediately wrote and sent to General Weitzel a long telegram, in which he explained his course with such clearness that its mere perusal sets at rest all controversy respecting either his original intention of policy or the legal effect of his action and orders, and by a final revocation of the permission he had given brought the incident to its natural and appropriate termination:

> I have just seen Judge Campbell's letter to you of the 7th. He assumes, it appears to me, that I have called the insurgent legislature of Virginia together, as the rightful legislature of the State, to settle all differences with the United States. I have done no such thing.[2] I spoke of them not as a legislature, but as "the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion." I did this on purpose to exclude the assumption that I was recognizing them as a rightful body. I dealt with them as men having power *de facto* to do a specific thing, to wit: "to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," for which, in the paper handed to Judge Campbell, I promised a special equivalent, to wit: a remission to the people of the State, except in certain cases, of the confiscation of their property. I meant this and no more. Inasmuch, however, as Judge Campbell misconstrues this, and is still pressing for an armistice, contrary to the explicit statement of the paper I gave him, and particularly as General Grant has since captured the Virginia troops, so that giving a consideration for their withdrawal is no longer applicable, let my letter to you and the paper to Judge Campbell both be withdrawn or countermanded, and he be notified of it. Do not now allow them to assemble, but if any have come allow them safe return to their homes.[3]

1 Lincoln to Weitzel, April 12, 1865.

2 The account given by Admiral Porter of this transaction, in his "Naval History," p. 799, is evidently written from memory, without consultation of dates or documents, and is wholly inaccurate.

3 Campbell, pamphlet.

June 1889

WITH A COPY OF SHELLEY.

BEHOLD I send thee to the heights of song,
My brother! Let thine eyes awake as clear
As morning dew, within whose glowing sphere
Is mirrored half a world; and listen long,
Till in thine ears, famished to keenness, throng
The bugles of the soul, till far and near
Silence grows populous, and wind and mere
Are phantom-choked with voices. Then be strong—
Then halt not till thou seest the beacons flare
Souls mad for truth have lit from peak to peak.
Haste on to breathe the intoxicating air—
Wine to the brave and poison to the weak—
Far in the blue where angels' feet have trod,
Where earth is one with heaven and man with God.

Harriet Monroe.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

The Foes of Civil Service Reform.

A DETERMINED attempt to overthrow the civil service rules and to restore the spoils system may now at any time be expected. Areas of low pressure are reported in the neighborhood of most of the State capitals; the storm-center, which is now hovering over Kansas, is rapidly moving eastward; high winds and local squalls prevail in portions of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland, and the cyclone may strike Washington about the first of December. Storm-signals should be displayed upon the Capitol, and over the front portico of the White House.

It may be well to notice that the storm is wholly an artificial product; the Æolus who carries these winds in his carpet-bag is always a local politician. The people at large are not worrying about "the injustice and oppression" of the civil service rules; so far as they know, these rules are working very well. It is the political machinists whose wrath is kindled. Nor is this any unexpected phenomenon. Nobody supposed that the professional politicians would gracefully submit to such a sharp restriction of their power. The distribution of the offices among their friends is the final cause of their existence as politicians; when they were stripped of that function, their occupation was gone. They did not willingly surrender it; when some of them voted to part with it, it was a mere political trick, and they meant to recover it at no distant day. At the time when the civil service measure became a law it was pointed out in these columns that the action of Congress was not sincere. There were a few men in both parties who believed in the reform; but the majority in favor of the bill was gained by the votes of a large number of Republicans who wished to prevent the Democrats, then apparently about to gain possession of the government, from turning out their friends. The civil service rules would be a bulwark against the removal of Republicans from office; as such they were zealously supported by a good many Republican politicians so long as the Democrats were in power, and fiercely opposed, for the same reason, by many Democratic politicians. But as soon as the administration changed the case was bravely altered. The Democrats are now doing most of the denouncing, as witness the Ohio resolutions, anathematizing "the Republican administration for its repeated violation of its pledges in behalf of civil service reform"; while the Republican bosses are cursing themselves for their folly in permitting their own hands to be tied by these measures, and threatening to erase them from the statute books. Not a few prominent Republican leaders are now characterizing civil service reform as a fraud and a sham. These gentlemen must be permitted to speak for themselves. What they have done to promote it was undoubtedly a fraud and a sham. That there has been considerable trickery and evasion in the administration of the law may be admitted. That the resolutions of the political conventions of both parties indorsing this reform have been, as a rule, fraudulent and hypocritical is also probable. If this is what these gentlemen mean, we must admit that they know what they are talking about. And there is no doubt that great efforts have been made, in various quarters, to make the civil service reform appear to be a fraud and a sham by getting men appointed as heads of departments and chiefs of bureaux and great offices who do not believe in the reform, and who are determined, if possible, to exhibit its methods as inefficient and odious. Much more of this kind of work is likely to be done. The more adroit opponents of civil service reform will refrain from attacking it openly; they will be well content if they can keep its administration in the hands of its foes, who will be sure to prove it a failure.

Against a conspiracy of this nature the public may well be warned. The determination to break down the civil service rules is by many politicians frankly avowed and by many others secretly cherished. The great majority of those persons who manage our politics and who manipulate the party organs may be counted as the open or insidious foes of the merit system. The establishment of this system was extorted from them by public opinion; it must be defended against them. There is need, just now, of a vigorous popular campaign against the spoilsmen. A thorough discussion of the system, its principles and its achievements, would be extremely useful at the present time. The stupid cant of the spoilsmen about the establishment of "an office-holding aristocracy" needs to be exposed, and the fact made plain that the merit system is the only method of distributing appointive offices upon purely democratic principles. The managers of the party machine constitute, in fact, an office-holding "trust" or "combine," which generally manages to monopolize the offices and to shut out all those who do not belong to their clique. No one can hope for an office who has not in some way proved himself subservient to them. The great majority of intelligent, capable, self-respecting young men have no more prospect of obtaining office under the spoils system than if they were inhabitants of some other planet. But the merit system opens the doors freely and equally to all. The applicant for office depends not upon the favor of the local boss or the member of Congress, but solely on his own character and ability. This is the system which the spoilsmen stigmatize as "a relic of European governments." It is easy to show the people the true inwardness of the spoilsman's objection and the hypocrisy of his plea. But it is only by thorough discussion and systematic agitation that the cause will prosper; public opinion must be aroused and invigorated; a powerful interest is arrayed against the reform, and can be baffled only by vigilant and resolute effort on the part of its friends.

The urgency of this reform was never more apparent than at the present time. Great questions of administration seem to be forcing themselves upon the American people. In spite of ourselves we have already been compelled to take hold of the railways. Precisely what shape the problem of supervision or regulation will assume we cannot tell; much depends upon the action of the railways themselves. But it is possible that the

"Aha!" said the little man. "That 's about right. Half the time I 'm a baker, and half the time a ghost. And now, then, if you folks care to hear all about it, I 'm ready to talk."

"Care to hear!" said Dolor Tripp. "I 'm on pins and needles to hear!"

The fire was now built up afresh, and again we placed ourselves on our chairs, stools, and boxes about the hearth, Griscom Brothers having a place in the middle, between Dolor Tripp and Doris. I happened to notice that in this arrangement the schoolmaster was left out, and was standing back of our half-circle. But as the schoolmaster was evidently a humble-minded person and did not appear to object to his position, I thought it wise not to disturb the company by interrupting the story which the baker had just begun.

(To be continued.)

Frank R. Stockton.

A GOD OF THE AZTECS.

[The Aztecs chose a youth without blemish, gave him a palace and household, and worshiped him as a god for a year, and then sacrificed him to the god he represented.]

MY fawn, my bride of an hour,
Dark as a dusky cloud,
Lithe-limbed, shadowy-browed,
Why do you droop and cower
As the languid lilies nod
With the weight of the sunset shower?
Is it sad, my fawn, my flower,
To be the bride of a god?

Have you left the garden gloom,
To be sad here for my sake—
To sit in the pillared room,
With your tender, tearful gaze;
Have you left the garden ways
And the women half awake—
My silent, statuesque women—
As cool and calm as the lake
That they lave the languid limb in?

Do you find me fair, my flower,
That you look with troubled eyes—
Fashioned without a flaw
For a god and a sacrifice?
I walk in the morning hour
And the people gather in awe,
The people gather and gaze
As I walk in the crowded ways;
The flowers are on my head,
The flowers are under my feet;
I touch my lute in the street,
And the throng with the lute are led.

Do you shrink from the scent of the flowers?
Do you start at the lute's soft sound?
Do you count the passing hours—
The hours of my pomp and pride—
Do you think of the day, my bride,
That the circling stars bring round,
The day when my feet shall ascend
Where the altar-stone is laid—
The day when my hand shall rend
The lute whereon I have played—
When I lay my godhood down
With the robes that the god arrayed,
And part my blossoming crown,
And fling the flowers to the gale
From the temple tops, for a token
That the pride of man shall be broken,
And the beauty of man shall fade,
And the life of man shall fail—
When we wind with steps unsteady
Up the sides of the pyramid,
When we wind, now seen, now hid
From the eyes of the gazing city—
While the black-robed priest stands ready
With the sullen fire in his eyes,
With the knife for the sacrifice—
The priest who has outlived pity?

Do you start, and tremble, and shiver
As you lie on my heart, my bride?
Do you fancy how it will quiver
As it quivers against your own,
Rent from the shuddering side,
Held up to the sun on high—
Cast on the altar-stone?
And is it so sad, my bride,
To have been a god—and to die?
I am fair, my flower, my fawn,
I am strong and supple and slim—
I must die in my perfect dawn,
With the bowl of life at the brim,
Ere the foot can gather a stain
From the earth it has scarcely trod,
Or the eye begin to dim,
Or the blood begin to wane
From body, and brow, and limb
That have borne the name of a god!

My heart shall break on the altar,
And yours shall break for this!
I will drain your love like wine,
At the single draught of a kiss,
And grow too strong to falter
For the thought of the things I miss;
And upon your lips resign
The less for the larger bliss—
The smiles that might have been mine
For one of your tender tears,
And a life of common years
For a year of the life divine!

Helen Thayer Hutcheson.



ANDREW JOHNSON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE FOURTEENTH OF APRIL—THE FATE OF THE ASSASSINS —THE MOURNING PAGEANT.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE FOURTEENTH OF APRIL.

THE 14th of April was a day of deep and tranquil happiness throughout the United States. It was Good Friday, observed by a portion of the people as an occasion of fasting and religious meditation; but even among the most devout the great tidings of the preceding week exerted their joyous influence, and changed this period of traditional mourning into an occasion of general and profound thanksgiving. Peace, so strenuously fought for, so long sought and prayed for, with prayers uttered and unutterable, was at last near at hand, its dawn visible on the reddening hills. The sermons all day were full of gladness; the Misereres turned of themselves to Te Deums. The country from morning till evening was filled with a solemn joy; but the date was not to lose its awful significance in the calendar: at night it was claimed once more, and forever, by a world-wide sorrow.

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The thanksgiving of the nation found its principal expression at Charleston harbor. A month before, when Sherman had "conquered Charleston by turning his back upon it," the Government resolved that the flag of the Union should receive a conspicuous reparation on the spot where it had first been outraged. It was ordered by the President that General Robert Anderson should, at the hour of noon on the 14th day of April, raise and plant on the ruins of Fort Sumter the identical flag lowered and saluted by him four years before. In the absence of General Sherman the ceremonies were in the charge of General Gillmore. Henry Ward Beecher, the most famous of the anti-slavery preachers of the North, was selected to deliver an oration. The surrender of Lee, the news of which arrived at Charleston on the eve of the ceremonies, gave a more transcendent importance to the celebration, which became at once the occasion of a national thanksgiving over the downfall of the rebellion. On the day fixed, Charleston was filled with a great concourse of distinguished officers and citizens. Its long-deserted streets were crowded with an eager multitude and gay with innumerable flags, while the air was thrilled from an early hour with patriotic strains from the many bands, and shaken with the thunder of Dahlgren's fleet, which opened the day by firing from every vessel a national salute of twenty-one guns. By eleven o'clock a brilliant gathering of boats, ships, and steamers of every sort had assembled around the battered ruin of the fort; the whole bay seemed covered with the vast flotilla, planted with a forest of masts, whose foliage was the triumphant banners of the nation. The same chaplain[1] who had officiated at the raising of the flag over Sumter, at the first scene of the war, now offered a prayer; Dr. Richard S. Storrs and the people read, in alternate verses, a selection of psalms of thanksgiving and victory, beginning with these marvelous words which have preserved for so many ages the very pulse and throb of the joy of redemption:

When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, we were like them that dream.

Then was our mouth filled with laughter, and our tongue with singing: then said they among the heathen, The Lord hath done great things for them.

The Lord hath done great things for us; whereof we are glad.

Turn again our captivity, O Lord, as the streams in the south.

They that sow in tears shall reap in joy.

He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him.

And at the close, before the Gloria, the people and the minister read all together, in a voice that seemed to catch the inspiration of the hour:

Some trust in chariots, and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the Lord our God.

We will rejoice in thy salvation, and in the name of our God we will set up our banners.

General Townsend[2] then read the original dispatch announcing the fall of Sumter, and precisely as the bells of the ships struck the hour of noon, General Anderson, with his own hands seizing the halyards, hoisted to its place the flag which he had seen lowered before the opening guns of rebellion. As the starry banner floated out upon the breeze, which freshened at the moment as if to embrace it, a storm of joyful acclamation burst forth from the vast assembly, mingled with the music of hundreds of instruments, the shouts of the people, and the full-throated roar of great guns from the Union and the captured rebel forts alike, on every side of the harbor, thundering their harmonious salute to the restored banner. General Anderson made a brief and touching speech, the people sang "The Star-Spangled Banner," Mr. Beecher delivered an address in his best and gravest manner, filled with an earnest, sincere, and unboastful spirit of nationality; with a feeling of brotherhood to the South, prophesying for that section the advantages which her defeat has in fact brought her; a speech as brave, as gentle, and as magnanimous as the occasion demanded. In concluding he said, and we quote his words, as they embodied the opinion of all men of good will on this last day of Abraham Lincoln's life:

We offer to the President of these United States our solemn congratulations that God has sustained his life and health under the unparalleled burdens and sufferings of four bloody years, and permitted him to behold this auspicious consummation of that national unity for which he has waited with so much patience and fortitude, and for which he has labored with such disinterested wisdom.

At sunset another national salute was fired; the evening was given up to social festivities; the most distinguished of the visitors were entertained at supper by General Gillmore; a brilliant show of fireworks by Admiral Dahlgren illuminated the bay and the circle of now friendly forts, at the very moment when at the capital of the nation a little group of conspirators were preparing the blackest crime which sullies the record of the century.

In Washington also it was a day, not of exultation, but of deep peace and thankfulness. It was the fifth day after the surrender of Lee; the first effervescence of that intoxicating success had passed away. The President had,

1 The Rev. Matthias Harris.

2 Gen. E. D. Townsend, afterwards Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

with that ever-present sense of responsibility which distinguished him, given his thoughts instantly to the momentous question of the restoration of the Union and harmony between the lately warring sections. He had, in defiance of precedent and even of his own habit, delivered to the people on the 11th, from the windows of the White House, his well-considered views as to the measures demanded by the times. His whole heart was now enlisted in the work of "binding up the nation's wounds," of doing all which might "achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace." Grant had arrived that morning in Washington and immediately proceeded to the Executive Mansion, where he met the Cabinet, Friday being their regular day of meeting. He expressed some anxiety as to the news from Sherman, which he was expecting hourly. The President answered him in that singular vein of poetic mysticism which, though constantly held in check by his strong common sense, formed a remarkable element in his character. He assured Grant that the news would come soon and come favorably, for he had last night had his usual dream which preceded great events. He seemed to be, he said, in a singular and indescribable vessel, but always the same, moving with great rapidity towards a dark and indefinite shore; he had had this dream before Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and Vicksburg. The Cabinet were greatly impressed by this story; but Grant, the most matter-of-fact of created beings, made the characteristic response that "Murfreesboro' was no victory, and had no important results." The President did not argue this point with him, but repeated that Sherman would beat or had beaten Johnston; that his dream must relate to that, as he knew of no other important event which was likely at present to occur.[1]

The subject of the discussion which took place in the Cabinet on that last day of Lincoln's firm and tolerant rule has been preserved for us in the notes of Mr. Welles. They were written out, it is true, seven years afterwards, at a time when Grant was President, seeking reëlection, and when Mr. Welles had followed Andrew Johnson into full fellowship with the Democratic party. Making whatever allowance is due for the changed environment of the writer, we still find his account[2] of the day's conversation candid and trustworthy. The subject of trade between the States was the first that engaged the attention of the Cabinet. Mr. Stanton wished it to be carried on under somewhat strict military supervision; Mr. Welles was in favor of a more liberal system; Mr. McCulloch, new to the Treasury, and embarrassed by his grave responsibilities, favored the abolition of the Treasury agencies, and above all desired a definite understanding of the purpose of the Government. The President, seeing that in this divergence of views among men equally able and honest there lay the best chance of a judicious arrangement, appointed the three Secretaries as a commission with plenary power to examine the whole subject, announcing himself as content in advance with their conclusions.

The great subject of the reëstablishment of civil government in the Southern States was then taken up. Mr. Stanton had, a few days before, drawn up a project for an executive ordinance for the preservation of order and the rehabilitation of legal processes in the States lately in rebellion. The President, using this sketch as his text, not adopting it as a whole, but saying that it was substantially the result of frequent discussions in the Cabinet, spoke at some length on the question of reconstruction, than which none more important could ever engage the attention of the Government. It was providential, he thought, that this matter should have arisen at a time when it could be considered, so far as the Executive was concerned, without interference by Congress. If they were wise and discreet, they should reanimate the States and get their governments in successful operation, with order prevailing and the Union reëstablished, before Congress came together in December. The President felt so kindly towards the South, he was so sure of the Cabinet under his guidance, that he was anxious to close the period of strife without overmuch discussion. He was particularly desirous to avoid the shedding of blood, or any vindictiveness of punishment. He gave plain notice that morning that he would have none of it. "No one need expect he would take any part in hanging or killing these men, even the worst of them.[3] Frighten them out of the country, open the gates, let down the bars, scare them off," said he, throwing up his hands as if scaring sheep. "Enough lives have been sacrificed; we must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union."[4] He depre-

1 This story is told by the Hon. Gideon Welles in an article printed in "The Galaxy" for April, 1872. It was frequently told by Charles Dickens with characteristic amplifications. See also "The Life of George Eliot."

2 "The Galaxy," April, 1872.

3 Welles, in "The Galaxy."

4 Near the close of the war his old friend, Joseph Gillespie, asked him what was to be done with the rebels. He answered, after referring to the vehement demand prevalent in certain quarters for exemplary punishment, by quoting the words of David to his nephews, who were asking for vengeance on Shimei because "he cursed the Lord's anointed": "What have I to do with you, ye sons of Zeruiah, that ye should this day be adversaries unto me? Shall there any man be put to death this day in Israel?"

cated the disposition he had seen in some quarters to hector and dictate to the people of the South, who were trying to right themselves. He regretted that suffrage, under proper arrangement, had not been given to negroes in Louisiana, but he held that their constitution was in the main a good one. He was averse to the exercise of arbitrary powers by the Executive or by Congress. Congress had the undoubted right to receive or reject members; the Executive had no control in this; but the Executive could do very much to restore order in the States, and their practical relations with the Government, before Congress came together.

Mr. Stanton then read his plan for the temporary military government of the States of Virginia and North Carolina, which for this purpose were combined in one department. This gave rise at once to extended discussion, Mr. Welles and Mr. Dennison opposing the scheme of uniting two States under one government. The President closed the session by saying the same objection had occurred to him, and by directing Mr. Stanton to revise the document and report separate plans for the government of the two States. He did not wish the autonomy nor the individuality of the States destroyed. He commended the whole subject to the most earnest and careful consideration of the Cabinet; it was to be resumed on the following Tuesday; it was, he said, the great question pending — they must now begin to act in the interest of peace.

These were the last words that Lincoln spoke to his Cabinet. They dispersed with these words of clemency and good-will in their ears, never again to meet under his wise and benignant chairmanship. He had told them that morning a strange story, which made some demand upon their faith, but the circumstances under which they were next to come together were beyond the scope of the wildest fancy. The day was one of unusual enjoyment to Mr. Lincoln. His son Robert had returned from the field with General Grant, and the President spent an hour with the young soldier in delighted conversation over the campaign. He denied himself generally to the throng of visitors, admitting only a few friends.

Schuyler Colfax, who was contemplating a visit overland to the Pacific, came to ask whether the President would probably call an extra session of Congress during the summer. Mr. Lincoln assured him that he had no such intention, and gave him a verbal message to the mining population of Colorado and the western slope of the mountains concerning the part they were to take in the great conquests of peace which were coming. In the afternoon he went for a long drive with Mrs. Lincoln. His mood, as it had been all day, was singularly happy and tender. He talked much of the past and the future; after four years of trouble and tumult he looked forward to four years of comparative quiet and normal work; after that he expected to go back to Illinois and practice law again. He was never simpler or gentler than on this day of unprecedented triumph; his heart overflowed with sentiments of gratitude to Heaven, which took the shape usual to generous natures, of love and kindness to all men.

From the very beginning of his Presidency Mr. Lincoln had been constantly subject to the threats of his enemies and the warnings of his friends. The threats came in every form; his mail was infested with brutal and vulgar menace, mostly anonymous, the proper expression of vile and cowardly minds. The warnings were not less numerous; the vaporings of village bullies, the extravagances of excited secessionist politicians, even the drolling of practical jokers, were faithfully reported to him by zealous or nervous friends. Most of these communications received no notice. In cases where there seemed a ground for inquiry it was made, as carefully as possible, by the President's private secretary and by the War Department, but always without substantial result. Warnings that appeared to be most definite, when they came to be examined proved too vague and confused for further attention. The President was too intelligent not to know he was in some danger. Madmen frequently made their way to the very door of the Executive offices and sometimes into Mr. Lincoln's presence.[1] He had himself so sane a mind, and a heart so kindly even to his enemies, that it was hard for him to believe in a political hatred so deadly as to lead to murder. He would sometimes laughingly say, "Our friends on the other side would make nothing by exchanging me for Hamlin," the Vice-President having the reputation of more radical views than his chief.

He knew indeed that incitements to murder him were not uncommon in the South. An advertisement had appeared in a paper of Selma, Alabama, in December, 1864, opening a subscription for funds to effect the assassination of Lincoln, Seward, and Johnson before the

[1] All Presidents receive the visits of persons more or less demented. Mr. Hayes, when about to retire one day from his working-room, asked his messenger if there was any one waiting to see him. "Only two," the attendant replied, "and one of them is crazy." "Send in the sane one," said the President. A grave-looking man was introduced, who announced himself as the emperor of the world. The President rang the bell, and told the messenger if that was his idea of sanity to send in the maniac.

inauguration.[1] There was more of this murderous spirit abroad than was suspected. A letter was found in the Confederate Archives[2] from one Lieutenant Alston, who wrote to Jefferson Davis immediately after Lincoln's reëlection offering to "rid his country of some of her deadliest enemies by striking at the very heart's blood of those who seek to enchain her in slavery." This shameless proposal was referred, by Mr. Davis's direction, to the Secretary of War; and by Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent to the Confederate Adjutant-General indorsed "for attention." We can readily imagine what reception an officer would have met with who should have laid before Mr. Lincoln a scheme to assassinate Jefferson Davis. It was the uprightness and the kindliness of his own heart that made him slow to believe that any such ignoble fury could find a place in the hearts of men in their right minds. Although he freely discussed with the officials about him the possibilities of danger, he always considered them remote, as is the habit of men constitutionally brave, and positively refused to torment himself with precautions for his own safety. He would sum the matter up by saying that both friends and strangers must have daily access to him in all manner of ways and places; his life was therefore in reach of any one, sane or mad, who was ready to murder and be hanged for it; that he could not possibly guard against all danger unless he were to shut himself up in an iron box, in which condition he could scarcely perform the duties of a President; by the hand of a murderer he could die only once; to go continually in fear would be to die over and over. He therefore went in and out before the people, always unarmed, generally unattended. He would receive hundreds of visitors in a day, his breast bare to pistol or knife. He would walk at midnight, with a single secretary or alone, from the Executive Mansion to the War Department, and back. He would ride through the lonely roads of an uninhabited suburb from the White House to the Soldiers' Home in the dusk of evening, and return to his work in the morning before the town was astir. He was greatly annoyed when, late in the war, it was decided that there must be a guard stationed at the Executive Mansion, and that a squad of cavalry must accompany him on his daily ride — but he was always reasonable and yielded to the best judgment of others.

Four years of threats and boastings, of alarms that were not founded, and of plots that came to nothing, thus passed away; but precisely at the time when the triumph of the nation over the long insurrection seemed assured, and a feeling of peace and security was diffused over the country, one of the conspiracies, not seemingly more important than the many abortive ones, ripened in the sudden heat of hatred and despair. A little band of malignant secessionists, consisting of John Wilkes Booth, an actor, of a famous family of players, Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a disbanded rebel soldier from Florida, George Atzerodt, formerly a coachmaker, but more recently a spy and blockade runner of the Potomac, David E. Herold, a young druggist's clerk, Samuel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, Maryland secessionists and Confederate soldiers, and John H. Surratt, had their ordinary rendezvous at the house of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt,[3] the widowed mother of the last named, formerly a woman of some property in Maryland, but reduced by reverses to keeping a small boarding-house in Washington. Booth was the leader of the little coterie. He was a young man of twenty-six, strikingly handsome, with a pale olive face, dark eyes, and that ease and grace of manner which came to him of right from his theatrical ancestors. He had played for several seasons with only indifferent success; his value as an actor lay rather in his romantic beauty of person than in any talent or industry he possessed. He was a fanatical secessionist; had assisted at the capture and execution of John Brown, and had imbibed, at Richmond and other Southern cities where he had played, a furious spirit of partisanship against Lincoln and the Union party. After the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln, which rang the knell of the insurrection, Booth, like many of the secessionists North and South, was stung to the quick by disappointment. He visited Canada, consorted with the rebel emissaries there, and at last — whether or not at their instigation cannot certainly be said — conceived a scheme to capture the President and take him to Richmond. He spent a great part of the autumn and winter inducing a small number of loose fish of secession sympathies to join him in this fantastic enterprise. He seemed always well supplied with money, and talked largely of his speculations in oil as a source of income; but his agent afterwards testified[4] that he never realized a dollar from that source; that his investments, which were inconsiderable, were a total loss. The winter passed away and nothing was accomplished. On the 4th of March, Booth was at the Capitol and created a disturbance by trying to force his way through the line of policemen who guarded the passage through which the President walked to the east front of the building.[5] His

1 Pitman, Conspiracy Trial, p. 51.
2 Ibid., p. 52.
3 541 H Street.
4 Pitman, p. 45.
5 He was seized and held back by John W. Westfall, of the Capitol Police.

intentions at this time are not known; he afterwards said[1] he lost an excellent chance of killing the President that day. There are indications in the evidence given on the trial of the conspirators that they suffered some great disappointment in their schemes in the latter part of March, and a letter from Arnold to Booth,[2] dated March 27, showed that some of them had grown timid of the consequences of their contemplated enterprise and were ready to give it up. He advised Booth, before going further, "to go and see how it will be taken in R—d." But timid as they might be by nature, the whole group was so completely under the ascendency of Booth that they did not dare disobey him when in his presence; and after the surrender of Lee, in an access of malice and rage which was akin to madness, he called them together and assigned each his part in the new crime, the purpose of which had arisen suddenly in his mind out of the ruins of the abandoned abduction scheme. This plan was as brief and simple as it was horrible. Powell, alias Payne, the stalwart, brutal, simple-minded boy from Florida, was to murder Seward; Atzerodt, the comic villain of the drama, was assigned to remove Andrew Johnson; Booth reserved for himself the most difficult and most conspicuous rôle of the tragedy; it was Herold's duty to attend him as a page and aid in his escape. Minor parts were assigned to stage carpenters and other hangers-on, who probably did not understand what it all meant. Herold, Atzerodt, and Surratt had previously deposited at a tavern at Surrattsville, Maryland, owned by Mrs. Surratt, but kept by a man named Lloyd, a quantity of ropes, carbines, ammunition, and whisky, which were to be used in the abduction scheme. On the 11th of April Mrs. Surratt, being at the tavern, told Lloyd to have the shooting irons in readiness, and on Friday, the 14th, again visited the place and told him they would probably be called for that night.

The preparations for the final blow were made with feverish haste; it was only about noon of the 14th that Booth learned the President was to go to Ford's Theater that night. It has always been a matter of surprise in Europe that he should have been at a place of amusement on Good Friday; but the day was not kept sacred in America, except by the members of certain churches. It was not, throughout the country, a day of religious observance. The President was fond of the theater; it was one of his few means of recreation. It was natural enough that, on this day of profound national thanksgiving, he should take advantage of a few hours' relaxation to see a comedy. Besides, the town was thronged with soldiers and officers, all eager to see him; it was represented to him that appearing occasionally in public would gratify many people whom he could not otherwise meet. Mrs. Lincoln had asked General and Mrs. Grant to accompany her; they had accepted, and the announcement that they would be present was made as an advertisement in the evening papers; but they changed their minds and went north by an afternoon train. Mrs. Lincoln then invited in their stead Miss Harris and Major Rathbone, the daughter and the stepson of Senator Harris. The President's carriage called for these young people, and the four went together to the theater. The President had been detained by visitors, and the play had made some progress when he arrived. When he appeared in his box the band struck up "Hail to the Chief," the actors ceased playing, and the audience rose, cheering tumultuously; the President bowed in acknowledgment of this greeting and the play went on.

From the moment Booth ascertained the President's intention to attend the theater in the evening his every action was alert and energetic. He and his confederates, Herold, Surratt, and Atzerodt, were seen on horseback in every part of the city. He had a hurried conference with Mrs. Surratt before she started for Lloyd's tavern. He intrusted to an actor named Matthews a carefully prepared statement of his reasons for committing the murder, which he charged him to give to the publisher of the "National Intelligencer," but which Matthews, in the terror and dismay of the night, burned without showing to any one.[3] Booth was perfectly at home in Ford's Theater, where he was greatly liked by all the employees, without other reason than the sufficient one of his youth and good looks. Either by himself or with the aid of his friends he arranged his whole plan of attack and escape during the afternoon. He counted upon address and audacity to gain access to the small passage behind the President's box; once there, he guarded against interference by an arrangement of a wooden bar to be fastened by a simple mortise in the angle of the wall and the door by which he entered, so that the door could not be opened from without. He even provided for the contingency of not gaining entrance to the box by boring a hole in its door, through which he might either observe the occupants or take aim and shoot. He hired at a livery stable a small, fleet horse, which he showed with pride during the day to barkeepers and loafers among his friends.

The moon rose that night at ten o'clock.

1 Pitman, p. 45.
2 Ibid., p. 236.
3 John F. Coyle, MS. Statement.



DIAGRAM OF THE BOX IN FORD'S THEATER.
(COPIED FROM THE DRAWING IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT.)

A few minutes before that hour he called one of the underlings of the theater to the back door and left him there holding his horse. He then went to a saloon near by, took a drink of brandy, and, entering the theater, passed rapidly through the crowd in rear of the dress circle and made his way to the passage leading to the President's box. He showed a card to a servant in attendance and was allowed to pass in. He entered noiselessly, and, turning, fastened the door with the bar he had previously made ready, without disturbing any of the occupants of the box, between whom and himself there yet remained the slight partition and the door through which he had bored the hole. Their eyes were fixed upon the stage; the play was "Our American Cousin," the original version by Tom Taylor, before Sothern had made a new work of it by his elaboration of the part of *Dundreary*. No one, not even the comedian on the stage, could ever remember the last words of the piece that were uttered that night — the last Abraham Lincoln heard upon earth. The whole performance remains in the memory of those who heard it a vague phantasmagoria, the actors the thinnest of specters. The awful tragedy in the box makes everything else seem pale and unreal. Here were five human beings in a narrow space — the greatest man of his time, in the glory of the most stupendous success in our history, the idolized chief of a nation already mighty, with illimitable vistas of grandeur to come; his beloved wife, proud and happy; a pair of betrothed lovers, with all the promise of felicity that youth, social position, and wealth could give them; and this young actor, handsome as Endymion upon Latmos, the pet of his little world. The glitter of fame, happiness, and ease was upon the entire group, but in an instant everything was to be changed with the blinding swiftness of enchantment. Quick death was to come on the central figure of that company — the central figure, we believe, of the great and good men of the century. Over all the rest the blackest fates hovered menacingly — fates from which a mother might pray that kindly death would save her children in their infancy. One was to wander with the stain of murder on his soul, with the curses of a world upon his name, with a price set upon his head, in frightful physical pain, till he died a dog's death in a burning barn; the stricken wife was to pass the rest of her days in melancholy and madness; of those two young lovers, one was to slay the other, and then end his life a raving maniac.

The murderer seemed to himself to be taking part in a play. The fumes of brandy and partisan hate had for weeks kept his brain in a morbid state. He felt as if he were playing Brutus off the boards; he posed, expecting applause. Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, he opened the box door, put the pistol to the President's head, and fired; dropping the weapon, he took the knife in his right hand, and when Major Rathbone sprang to seize him he struck savagely at him. Major Rathbone received the blow on his left arm, suffering a wide and deep wound. Booth, rushing forward, then placed his left hand on the railing of the box and vaulted lightly over to the stage. It was a high leap, but nothing to such a trained athlete. He was in the habit of introducing what actors call sensational leaps in his plays. In "Macbeth," where he met the weird sisters, he leaped from a rock twelve feet high. He would have got safely away but for his spur catching in the folds of the Union flag with which the front of the box was draped. He fell on the stage, the torn flag trailing on his spur, but instantly rose as if he had received no hurt, though in fact the fall had broken his leg, turned to the audience, brandishing his dripping knife and shouting the State motto of Virginia, "Sic Semper Tyrannis,"[1] and fled rapidly across the stage and out of sight. Major Rathbone had shouted, "Stop him!" The cry went out, "He has shot the President." From the audience, at first stupid with surprise

[1] Mr. Leopold de Gaillard, writing on the 29th of April, 1865, refers to these words of Booth, which he calls a "stupid phrase" and not American in character. "I remember," he adds, "but one assassination adorned with a Latin quotation, but it took place in Florence, and in the sixteenth century. Lorenzino

and afterwards wild with excitement and horror, two or three men jumped upon the stage in pursuit of the flying assassin; but he ran through the familiar passages, leaped upon his horse, which was in waiting in the alley behind, rewarded with a kick and a curse the call-boy who had held him, and rode rapidly away in the light of the just risen moon.

The President scarcely moved; his head drooped forward slightly, his eyes closed. Colonel Rathbone, at first not regarding his own grievous hurt, rushed to the door of the box to summon aid. He found it barred, and on the outside some one was beating and clamoring for entrance. He opened the door; a young officer named Crawford entered; one or two army surgeons soon followed, who hastily examined the wound. It was at once seen to be mortal. It was afterwards ascertained that a large derringer bullet had entered the back of the head on the left side, and, passing through the brain, had lodged just behind the left eye. By direction of Rathbone and Crawford, the President was carried to a house across the street and laid upon a bed in a small room at the rear of the hall, on the ground floor. Mrs. Lincoln followed, half distracted, tenderly cared for by Miss Harris. Rathbone, exhausted by loss of blood, fainted, and was carried home. Messengers were sent for the members of the Cabinet, for the Surgeon-General, for Dr. Stone, the President's family physician; a crowd of people rushed instinctively to the White House and, bursting through the doors, shouted the dreadful news to Robert Lincoln and Major Hay, who sat gossiping in an upper room. They ran downstairs. Finding a carriage at the door, they entered it to go to Tenth street. As they were driving away, a friend came up and told them that Mr. Seward and most of the Cabinet had been murdered. The news was all so improbable that they could not help hoping it was all untrue. But when they got to Tenth street and found every thoroughfare blocked by the swiftly gathering thousands, agitated by tumultuous excitement, they were prepared for the worst. In a few minutes all who had been sent for, and many others, were gathered in the little chamber where the Chief of the State lay in his agony. His son was met at the door by Dr. Stone, who with grave tenderness informed him that there was no hope. After a natural outburst of grief young Lincoln devoted himself the rest of the night to soothing and comforting his mother.

The President had been shot a few minutes past ten. The wound would have brought in-



FORD'S THEATRE

TENTH STREET, ABOVE E.

SEASON II ..... WEEK XXXI ..... NIGHT 196

WHOLE NUMBER OF NIGHTS, 496.

JOHN T. FORD ..... PROPRIETOR AND MANAGER
(Also of Holliday St. Theatre, Baltimore, and Academy of Music, Phila.)

Stage Manager ..... J. B. WRIGHT

Treasurer ..... E. CLAY FORD

Friday Evening, April 14th, 1865

BENEFIT!

—AND—

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LAURA KEENE

THE DISTINGUISHED MANAGERESS, AUTHORESS AND ACTRESS,

Supported by

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TOM TAYLOR'S CELEBRATED ECCENTRIC COMEDY,

As originally produced in America by Miss Keene, and performed by her upwards of

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Lieutenant Vernon, R. N.	W. J. FERGUSON
Captain De Boots	C. BYRNES
Binney	G. SPEAR
Buddicomb, a valet	J. H. EVANS
John Whicker, a gardener	J. L. DeBONAY
Rasper, a groom	
Bailiffs	G. A. PARKHURST and L. JOHNSON
Mary Trenchard	Miss J. GOURLAY
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SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 15,

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When will be presented BOUCICAULT'S Great Sensation Drama,

THE OCTOROON

Easter Monday, April 17, Engagement of the YOUNG AMERICAN TRAGEDIAN,

EDWIN ADAMS

FOR TWELVE NIGHTS ONLY.

FACSIMILE OF A PLAY-BILL FOUND IN PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S BOX AFTER THE ASSASSINATION. THE ORIGINAL IS OWNED BY E. A. EMERSON, OF LYNCHBURG, VA.

J. A. Case, of Brooklyn, also has a play-bill, given to A. K. Brown by John T. Ford, the proprietor of Ford's Opera House in Washington, who noted on it that it was found under President Lincoln's chair.—EDITOR.

treacherously killed his cousin, Alexander de Medicie, who was in reality a tyrant, and left in writing near the body the line of Virgil on Brutus: *Vincet Amor patriæ laudumque immensa Cupido.* It was the thirst of fame which was the real incentive to these savage deeds." [Gazette de France, April 30, 1865.]

stant death to most men, but his vital tenacity was extraordinary. He was, of course, unconscious from the first moment; but he breathed with slow and regular respiration throughout the night. As the dawn came, and the lamplight grew pale in the fresher beams, his pulse began to fail; but his face even then was scarcely more haggard than those of the sorrowing group of statesmen and generals around him. His automatic moaning, which had continued through the night, ceased; a look of unspeakable peace came upon his worn features. At twenty-two minutes after seven he died.[1] Stanton broke the silence by saying, "Now he belongs to the ages." Dr. Gurley kneeled by the bedside and prayed fervently. The widow came in from the adjoining room supported by her son and cast herself with loud outcry on the dead body.

THE FATE OF THE ASSASSINS.

BOOTH had done his work efficiently. His principal subordinate, the young Floridian called Payne, had acted with equal audacity and cruelty, but not with equally fatal results. He had made a shambles of the residence of the Secretary of State, but among all his mangled victims there was not one killed. At eight o'clock that night he received his final orders from Booth,[2] who placed in his hands a knife and revolver, and a little package like a prescription, and taught him his lesson. Payne[3] was a young man, hardly of age, of herculean strength, of very limited mental capacity, blindly devoted to Booth, who had selected him as the fitting instrument of his mad hatred. He obeyed the orders of his fascinating senior as exactly and remorselessly as a steel machine. At precisely the moment when Booth entered the theater, Payne came on horseback to the door of Mr. Seward's residence on Lafayette Square.[4] Dismounting, he pretended to be a messenger from the attending physician, with a package of medicine, and demanded immediate access to the sick-room of the Secretary. Mr. Seward had been thrown from his carriage a few days before and his right arm and jaw were fractured. The servant at the door tried to prevent Payne from going up the stairs, but he persisted, and the noise the two men made in mounting brought Frederick Seward out into the hall. The Secretary had been very restless and had with difficulty at last been composed to sleep. Fearing that this restorative slumber might be broken, Frederick Seward came out to check the intruders. He met Payne at the head of the stairs, and after hearing his story bade him go back, offering himself to take charge of the medicine. Payne seemed for an instant to give up his purpose in the face of this unexpected obstacle, but suddenly turned and rushed furiously upon Frederick Seward, putting a pistol to his head. It missed fire, and he then began beating him on the head with it, tearing his scalp and fracturing his skull. Still struggling, the two came to the Secretary's room and fell together through the door. Frederick Seward soon became unconscious and remained so for several weeks, being perhaps the last man in the civilized world who learned the strange story of the night. The Secretary lay on the farther side of the bed from the door; in the room was his daughter and a soldier-nurse named Robinson. They both sprang up at the noise of the disturbance; Payne struck them right and left out of his way, wounding Robinson with his knife; then rushed to the bed and began striking at the throat of the crippled statesman, inflicting three terrible wounds in cheek and neck; the Secretary rolled off between the bed and the wall. Robinson had by this time recovered himself and seized the assassin from behind, trying to pull him away from the bed. He fought with the quickness of a cat, stabbing Robinson twice severely over his shoulder, in spite of which the nurse still held on to him bravely. Colonel Augustus Seward, roused by his sister's screams, came in his nightdress into the room, and seeing the two forms in this deadly grapple thought at first his father was delirious and was struggling with the nurse; but noting in a moment the size and strength of the man, he changed his mind and thought that the nurse had gone mad and was murdering the Secretary. Nothing but madness was at first thought of anywhere to account for the night's work. He seized Payne, and after a struggle forced him out of the door—the assassin stabbing him repeatedly about the head and face. Payne broke away at last and ran rapidly downstairs, seriously wounding an attendant named Hansell on the way. He reached the door unhurt, leaped upon his horse, and rode leisurely away out Vermont Avenue to the eastern suburb. When surgical aid arrived, the quiet house, ordinarily so

[1] The persons about the deathbed of the President, besides his wife and son, were Vice-President Johnson, all the Cabinet with the exception of Mr. Seward, viz: Stanton, Welles, McCulloch, Usher, Dennison, and Speed; Generals Halleck, Meigs, Farnsworth, Augur, and Todd; Senator Sumner; Rev. Dr. Gurley; Schuyler Colfax; Governor Farwell; Judges Cartter and Otto; Surgeon-General Barnes; Drs. Stone, Crane, and Leale; Major John Hay, A. A. G.; and Maunsell B. Field. Mr. Nicolay was in Charleston at the flag-raising over Sumter.

[2] Doster's speech, Pitman, p. 314.

[3] His true name was Lewis Thornton Powell.

[4] Now the residence of James G. Blaine, Secretary of State.

decorous and well ordered, the scene of an affectionate home life and an unobtrusive hospitality, looked like a field hospital; five of its inmates were bleeding from ghastly wounds, and two of them — among the highest officials of the nation — it was thought might never see the light of another day; though all providentially recovered.

The assassin left behind him in his flight his bloodstained knife, his revolver, — or rather the fragments of it, for he had beaten it to pieces over the head of Frederick Seward, — and his hat. This last apparently trivial loss cost him and one of his fellow-conspirators their lives; for as soon as he had left the immediate scene of his crime, his perceptions being quickened by a murderer's avenging fears, it occurred to him that the lack of a hat would expose him to suspicion wherever he was seen; so instead of making good his escape, he abandoned his horse and hid himself for two days in the woods east of Washington. Driven by hunger he at last resolved to return to the city, to the house on H street which had been the headquarters of the conspiracy. He made himself a cap from the sleeve of his woolen shirt, threw over his shoulder a pickax he had found in a trench, and coming into town under cover of the darkness knocked about midnight at Mrs. Surratt's door. As his fate would have it, the house was full of officers who had that moment arrested all the inmates and were about to take them to the office of the provost-marshal. Payne thus fell into the hands of justice, and the utterance of half a dozen words by him and the unhappy woman whose shelter he had sought was the death warrant of both. Being asked by Major Smith to give an account of himself, he said he had been hired by Mrs. Surratt to dig a drain for her. She was called out and asked if she knew him. Not being aware of what he had said, she raised her right hand, with uncalled-for solemnity, and said, "Before God, I do not know him, never saw him, and never hired him." These words, the evidence of a guilty secret shared between them, started a train of evidence which led them both to the scaffold.

Booth was recognized by dozens of people as he stood before the footlights and brandished his dripping dagger in a Brutus attitude. His swift horse quickly carried him beyond the reach of any haphazard pursuit. He gained the navy-yard bridge in a few minutes, was hailed by a sentry, but persuaded the sergeant of the guard that he was returning to his home in Charles County and that he had waited in Washington till the moon should rise. He was allowed to pass, and shortly afterwards Herold came to the bridge and passed over with similar explanations. A moment later the owner of the horse which Herold rode came up in pursuit of his animal. He, the only honest man of the three, was turned back by the guard — the sergeant felt he must draw the line somewhere. The assassin and his wretched acolyte came at midnight to Mrs. Surratt's tavern. Booth, whose broken leg was by this time giving him excruciating torture, remained outside, on his horse, and Herold went in, shouting to the inn-keeper to give him "those things." Lloyd, knowing what was meant, without a word brought the whisky, carbines, and field-glass which the Surratts had deposited there. Booth refused his gun, being unable in his crippled condition to carry it. Herold told Lloyd they had killed the President, and they rode away, leaving Lloyd, who was a sodden drunkard and contrabandist, unnerved by the news and by his muddy perception of his own complicity in the crime. He held his tongue for a day or two; but at last, overcome by fear, told all that he knew to the authorities. Booth and Herold pushed on through the moonlight to the house of an acquaintance of Booth, a rebel sympathizer, a surgeon named Samuel Mudd. The pain of his broken bone had become intolerable and day was approaching; aid and shelter had become pressingly necessary. Mudd received them kindly, set Booth's leg, and gave him a room where he rested until the middle of the afternoon; Mudd had a crutch made for him, and in the evening sent them on their desolate way to the South.

If Booth had been in health there is no reason why he should not have remained at large a good while; he might even have made his escape to some foreign country, though, sooner or later, a crime so prodigious will generally find its perpetrator out. But it is easy to hide among a sympathizing people. Many a Union soldier, escaping from prison, has walked hundreds of miles through the enemy's country relying implicitly upon the friendship of the negroes. Booth, from the hour he crossed the navy-yard bridge, though he met with a considerable number of men, was given shelter and assistance by every one whose sympathies were with the South. After parting with Dr. Mudd, he and Herold went to the residence of Samuel Cox,[1] near Port Tobacco, and were by him given into the charge of Thomas Jones, a contraband trader between Maryland and Richmond, a man so devoted

1 What Booth and Herold were about during the week between the 15th and the 22d of April was not brought out upon the trial of the conspirators, but Mr. George Alfred Townsend, while making the extensive and careful studies for his historical novel, "Katy of Catoctin," reconstructed the entire itinerary of the assassin, and published an admirably clear account of it in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for April, 1884.

to the interests of the Confederacy that treason and murder seemed every-day incidents to be accepted as natural and necessary. He kept Booth and Herold in hiding, at the peril of his own life, for more than a week, feeding and caring for them in the woods near his house, watching for an opportunity to ferry them across the Potomac. He did this while every woodpath was haunted by Government detectives, while his own neighborhood was under strong suspicion, knowing that death would promptly follow his own detection, and that a reward was offered for the capture of his helpless charge which would make a rich man of any one who gave him up. So close was the search that Herold killed the horses on which they had ridden out of Washington for fear a neigh might betray them.

With such devoted aid Booth might have wandered a long way; but there is no final escape but suicide for an assassin with a broken leg. At each painful move the chances of discovery increased. Jones was indeed able, after repeated failures, to ferry his fated guests across the Potomac. Arriving on the Virginia side, they lived the lives of hunted animals for two or three days longer, finding to their horror that they were received by the strongest Confederates with more of annoyance than enthusiasm — though none indeed offered to betray them. At one house, while food was given him, hospitality was not offered.[1] Booth wrote the proprietor a note, pathetic in its attempted dignity, inclosing five dollars — "though hard to spare" — for his entertainment. He had by this time seen the comments of the newspapers on his work, and bitterer than death or wounds was the blow to his vanity.[2] He confided his feelings of wrong to his diary:

> I struck boldly, and not as the papers say; I walked with a firm step through thousands of his friends; was stopped, but pushed on. A colonel was at his side. I shouted *Sic Semper* before I fired. In jumping broke my leg. I passed all his pickets. Rode sixty miles that night, with the bone of my leg tearing the flesh at every jump.

On Friday the 21st he writes:

> After being hunted like a dog through swamps, woods, and last night chased by gun-boats till I was forced to return, wet, cold, and starving, with every man's hand against me, I am here in despair. And why? For doing what Brutus was honored for — what made Tell a hero.

He goes on comparing himself favorably with these stage heroes, and adds:

> I struck for my country and that alone — a country that groaned beneath his tyranny and prayed for this end; and yet now behold the cold hand they extend to me.

He was especially grieved that the grandiloquent letter he had intrusted to his fellow-actor Matthews — and which he in his terror had destroyed — had not been published. He thought the Government had wickedly suppressed it; he was tortured with doubts whether God would forgive him, whether it would not be better to go back to Washington and "clear his name." "I am abandoned, with the curse of Cain upon me, when, if the world knew my heart, that one blow would have made me great." With blessings on his mother, upon his wretched companion of crime and flight, upon the world which he thought was not worthy of him, he closed these strange outpourings, saying, "I do not wish to shed a drop of blood, but I must fight the course."

The course was soon ended. At Port Conway, on the Rappahannock, Booth and Herold met three young men in Confederate uniforms. They were disbanded soldiers; but Herold, imagining that they were recruiting for the Southern army, told them his story with perfect frankness and even pride, saying, "We are the assassinators of the President," and asked their company into the Confederate lines. He was disappointed at learning they were not going South, but his confidence was not misplaced. The soldiers took the fugitives to Port Royal, and tried to get shelter for them, representing Booth as a wounded Confederate soldier. After one or two failures they found refuge on the farm of a man named Garrett on the road to Bowling Green.

On the night of the 25th of April a party under Lieutenant E. P. Doherty arrested, in his bed at Bowling Green, William Jett, one of the Confederate soldiers mentioned above, and forced him to guide them to Garrett's farm. Booth and Herold were sleeping in the barn. When called upon to surrender, Booth refused, and threatened to shoot young Garrett, who had gone in to get his arms. A parley took place, lasting some minutes. Booth offered to fight the party at a hundred yards, and when this was refused cried out in a theatrical tone, "Well, my brave boys, prepare a stretcher for me." Doherty then told him he would fire the barn; upon this Herold came out and surrendered. The barn was fired, and while it was burning, Booth, who was clearly visible by the flames through the cracks in the building, was shot by Boston Corbett, a sergeant of cavalry, a soldier of a gloomy and fanatical disposition, which afterwards developed into insanity.[3] Booth was hit in the back of the neck, not far from the place where he had shot the President. He lingered about three hours in great pain, conscious but nearly inarticulate, and died at seven in the morning.

1 Trial of J. H. Surratt, p. 402. 2 Ibid., p. 310.
3 He is still living, 1889, in an insane asylum in Kansas.

The surviving conspirators, with the exception of John H. Surratt, were tried by a military commission[1] sitting in Washington in the months of May and June. The charges against them specified that they were "incited and encouraged" to treason and murder by Jefferson Davis and the Confederate emissaries in Canada. This was not proved on the trial: the evidence bearing on the case showed frequent communication between Canada and Richmond and the Booth coterie in Washington, and some transactions in drafts at the Montreal Bank, where Jacob Thompson and Booth both kept their accounts. It was shown by the sworn testimony of a reputable witness that Jefferson Davis at Greensboro', on hearing of the assassination, expressed his gratification at the news; but this, so far from proving any direct complicity in the crime, would rather prove the opposite, as a conscious murderer usually conceals his malice.[2] Against all the rest the facts we have briefly stated were abundantly proved, though in the case of Mrs. Surratt the repugnance which all men feel at the execution of a woman induced the commission to unite in a recommendation to mercy, which President Johnson, then in the first flush of his zeal against traitors, disregarded.[3] Habeas corpus proceedings were then resorted to, and failed in virtue of the President's orders to the military in charge of the prisoners. The sentences were accordingly executed: Mrs. Surratt, Payne, Herold, and Atzerodt were hanged on the 7th of July; Mudd, Arnold, and McLaughlin were imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, though the term was afterwards shortened, and Spangler, the scene shifter at the theater, was sentenced to six years of jail. John Surratt escaped to Canada, lay in hiding some months in a monastery, and in the autumn sailed for England under an assumed name. He wandered over Europe, enlisted in the Papal Zouaves, deserted and fled to Egypt, where he was detected and brought back to Washington in 1867. His trial lasted two months and ended in a disagreement of the jury.

THE MOURNING PAGEANT.

RECOUNTING the fate of these wretched malefactors has led us far afield. We will now return to the morning of the 15th of April and sketch, in brief and wholly inadequate words, the honors which the nation paid to its dead. The appalling news spread quickly over the country; millions of citizens learned at their breakfast tables that the President had been shot and was dying; and two hours after his death, when a squad of soldiers were escorting his mortal remains to the Executive Mansion, the dreadful fact was known at all the great centers of population. This was the first time the telegraph had been called upon to spread over the world tidings of such deep and mournful significance; it was therefore the first time the entire people of the United States had been called to deplore the passing away of an idolized leader even before his body was cold in death. The news fell with peculiar severity upon hearts which were glowing with the joy of a great victory. For the last four days, in every city and hamlet of the land, the people were breaking forth into unusual and fantastic expressions of gaiety and content; bonfires flamed through the nights; the days were uproarious with the firing of guns; the streets were hung with flags and wreaths, and whatever decorations could be on the instant improvised by a people not especially gifted with the scenic sense; and committees were everywhere forming to arrange for elaborate and official functions of joy. Upon this mirth and expansion the awful intelligence from Washington fell with the crushing and stunning effect of an unspeakable calamity. In the sudden rigor of this unexpected misfortune the country lost sight of the vast national success of the past week; and it thus came to pass that there was never any organized expression of the general exultation or rejoicing in the North over the downfall of the rebellion. It was unquestionably best that it should be so; and Lincoln himself would not have had it otherwise. He hated the arrogance of triumph; and even in his cruel death he would have been glad to know that his passage to eternity would prevent too loud an exultation over the vanquished. As it was, the South could take no umbrage at a grief so genuine and so legitimate; the people of that section even shared, to a certain degree, in the lamentations over the bier of one whom in their

[1] This commission was composed of officers not only of high rank and distinction, but of unusual weight of character. They were Generals David Hunter, Lew Wallace, August V. Kautz, A. P. Howe, R. S. Foster, J. A. Ekin, T. N. Harris, Colonels C. H. Tompkins and D. R. Clendenin. The Judge Advocate and Recorder was Joseph Holt, assisted by the Hon. John A. Bingham and Colonel H. L. Burnett.

[2] Mr. Davis, in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," contradicts this evidence of Mr. Lewis F. Bates. He admits, however, that the dispatch, being read in his presence to the troops with him, elicited cheers, "as was natural at news of the fall of one they considered their most powerful foe"; and he adds, "For an enemy so relentless, in the war for our subjugation, we could not be expected to mourn." When captured by General Wilson he affected to think he cleared himself of all suspicion in this regard by saying that Johnson was more objectionable to him than Lincoln — not noticing that the conspiracy contemplated the murder of both of them.

[3] See argument of Pierrepont on trial of John H. Surratt, p. 77.

inmost hearts they knew to have wished them well.

There was one exception to the general grief too remarkable to be passed over in silence. Among the extreme radicals in Congress Mr. Lincoln's determined clemency and liberality towards the Southern people had made an impression so unfavorable that, though they were naturally shocked at his murder, they did not among themselves conceal their gratification that he was no longer in their way. In a political caucus, held a few hours after the President's death, they resolved on an entire change of the Cabinet, and a "line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln; . . . the feeling was nearly universal"—we are using the language of one of their most prominent representatives[1]—"that the accession of Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country." The next day the Committee on the Conduct of the War called on the new President, and Senator Wade bluntly expressed to him the feeling of his associates: "Johnson, we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the Government."[2] Before many months passed away they had opportunity to learn that violence of speech was no guarantee of political consistency.

In Washington, with this singular exception, the manifestation of the public grief was immediate and demonstrative. The insignia of rejoicing at once disappeared, and within an hour after the body of the President was taken to the White House the town was shrouded in black. Not only the public buildings, the stores and shops, and the better class of residences were draped in funeral decorations, but a still more touching proof of the affection with which the dead man was regarded was seen in the poorest class of houses, where the laboring men of both colors found means in their penury to afford some scanty show of mourning. The interest and the veneration of the people still centered in the White House, where, under a tall catafalque in the east room, the late Chief of the State lay in the majesty of death, and not at the modest tavern on Pennsylvania Avenue where the new President had his lodging. At eleven o'clock Chief-Justice Chase administered the oath of office to Andrew Johnson in the presence of a few witnesses. He immediately summoned the Cabinet for a brief meeting. Mr. William Hunter was appointed Acting Secretary of State during the interim of the disability of Mr. Seward and his son, and directed to communicate to the country and the world the change in the head of the Government brought about by the last night's crime. It was determined that the funeral ceremonies in Washington should be celebrated on Wednesday, the 19th of April, and all the churches throughout the country were invited to join at the same time "in solemnizing the occasion" by appropriate observances. All of pomp and circumstance which the Government could command was employed to give a fitting escort from the White House to the Capitol, where the body of the President was to lie in state. A splendidly appointed force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry formed the greater part of the procession, which was completed by delegations from Illinois and Kentucky as mourners, the new President, the Cabinet, the ministers of foreign powers, and all the high officers of the nation, legislative, judicial, and executive. The pall-bearers comprised the leading members of both houses of Congress and the officers of the highest rank in the army and navy.

The ceremonies in the east room were brief and simple. The Rev. Dr. Hall of the Church of the Epiphany read the burial service. Bishop Simpson of the Methodist Church, distinguished equally for his eloquence and his patriotism, offered a prayer, and the Rev. Dr. P. D. Gurley, at whose church the President and his family habitually attended worship, delivered a short address, commemorating, in language notably free from courtly flattery, the qualities of courage, purity, and sublime faith which had made the dead man great and useful. The coffin was carried to the funeral car, and the vast procession moved to the Capitol amid the tolling of all the bells in Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria, and the booming of minute-guns at Lafayette Square, at the City Hall, and on the hill of the Capitol. To associate the pomp of the day with the greatest work of Lincoln's life, a detachment of colored troops marched at the head of the line. In the rotunda, under the soaring dome of the Capitol, the coffin rested during the day and night of the 19th and until the evening of the next day. The people passed by in thousands to gaze on the face of the liberator—which had taken on in death an expression of profound happiness and repose, like that so often seen on the features of soldiers shot dead in battle.

It had been decided from the first that the President was to be buried at Springfield. Whenever a President dies, whose personality, more than his office, has endeared him to the people, it is proposed that his body shall rest at Washington; but the better instinct of the country, no less than the natural feelings of the family, insist that his dust shall lie among his own neighbors and kin. It is fitting that Washington shall sleep at Mount Vernon, the Adamses at Quincy, that even Harrison and

[1] George W. Julian, "Political Recollections," p. 255.

[2] Ibid., p. 257.

Taylor and Garfield, though they died in office, should be conveyed to the bosom of the States which had cherished them and sent them to the service of the nation. So Illinois claimed her greatest citizen for final sepulture amid the scenes which witnessed the growth and development of his unique character. The town of Springfield set apart a lovely spot in its northern suburb for his grave and appropriated $20,000 — a large sum considering the size and wealth of the town — to defray the expenses of his funeral. As soon as it was announced that he was to be buried in Illinois every town and city on the route begged that the train might halt within its limits and give its people the opportunity of testifying their grief and their reverence. It was finally arranged that the funeral cortége should follow substantially the same route over which Lincoln had come in 1861 to take possession of the place to which he had given a new dignity and value for all time.

Governor Brough of Ohio and Mr. John W. Garrett of Baltimore were placed in general charge of the solemn journey. A guard of honor consisting of a dozen officers of high rank in the army and navy[1] was detailed by their respective departments, which received the remains of the President at the station in Washington at eight o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 21st of April, and the train, decked in somber trappings, moved out towards Baltimore. In this city, through which, four years before, it was a question whether the President-elect could pass with safety to his life, the train made a halt; the coffin was taken with sacred care to the great dome of the Exchange, and there, surrounded by evergreens and lilies, it lay for several hours, the people passing by in mournful throngs. Night was closing in, with rain and wind, when the train reached Harrisburg, and the coffin was carried through the muddy streets to the State Capitol, where the next morning the same scenes of grief and affection were seen. We need not enumerate the many stopping-places of this mournful pageant. The same demonstration was repeated, gaining continually in intensity of feeling and solemn splendor of display, in every city through which the procession passed. At Philadelphia a vast concourse accompanied the dead President to Independence Hall: he had shown himself worthy of the lofty fate he courted when, on that hallowed spot, on the birthday of Washington, 1861, he had said he would rather be assassinated than give up the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence.

[1] General E. D. Townsend represented the Secretary of War, Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis the Secretary of the Navy.



THE FUNERAL CAR. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY F. RELYEA.)

Here, as at many other places, the most touching manifestations of loving remembrance came from the poor, who brought flowers twined by themselves to lay upon the coffin. The reception at New York was worthy alike of the great city and of the memory of the man they honored. The body lay in state in the City Hall and a half-million of people passed in deep silence before it. Here General Scott came, pale and feeble, but resolute, to pay his tribute of respect to his departed friend and commander.

The train went up the Hudson River by night, and at every town and village on the way vast crowds were revealed in waiting by the fitful glare of torches; dirges and hymns were sung as the train moved by. Midnight had passed when the coffin was borne to the Capitol at Albany, yet the multitude rushed in as if it were day, and for twelve hours the long line of people from northern New York and the neighboring States poured through the room.

Over the broad spaces of New York the cortége made its way, through one continuous crowd of mourners. At Syracuse thirty thousand people came out in a storm at midnight to greet the passing train with fires and bells and cannons; at Rochester the same solemn observances made the night memorable; at Buffalo — it was now the morning of the 27th — the body lay in state at St. James's Hall, visited by a multitude from the western counties. As the train passed into Ohio the crowds increased in density, and the public grief seemed intensified at every step westward; the people of the great central basin seemed to be claiming their own. The day spent at Cleveland was unexampled in the depth of emotion it brought to life, the warm devotion to the memory of the great man gone which was exhibited; some of the guard of honor have said that it was at that point they began to appreciate the place which Lincoln was to hold in history. The authorities, seeing that no building could accommodate the crowd which was sure to come from all over the



THE MONUMENT AT SPRINGFIELD. (AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY J. A. W. PITTMAN FOR J. C. POWER.)

State, wisely erected in the public square an imposing mortuary tabernacle for the lying in state, brilliant with evergreens and flowers by day, and innumerable gas jets by night, and surmounted by the inscription, *Extinctus amabitur idem.* Impressive religious ceremonies were conducted in the square by Bishop McIlvaine, and an immense procession moved to the station at night between two lines of torchlights. Columbus and Indianapolis, the State capitals of Ohio and Indiana, were next visited. The whole State, in each case, seemed gathered to meet their dead hero; an intense personal regard was everywhere evident; it was the man, not the ruler, they appeared to be celebrating; the banners and scrolls bore principally his own words: "With malice towards none, with charity for all"; "The purposes of the Lord are perfect and must prevail"; "Let us resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain"; and other brief passages from his writings. On arriving in Chicago, on the 1st of May, amid a scene of magnificent mourning, the body was borne to the court-house, where it lay for two days under a canopy of somber richness, inscribed with that noble Hebrew lament, "The beauty of Israel is slain upon thy high places." From all the States of the Northwest an innumerable throng poured for these two days into Chicago, and flowed, a mighty stream of humanity, past the coffin of the dead President, in the midst of evidences of public grief which was all the more genuine for being quiet and reserved.

The last stage of this extraordinary progress was the journey to Springfield, which began on the night of the 2d of May and ended at nine o'clock the next morning — the schedule made in Washington twelve days before having been accurately carried out. On all the railroads centering in Springfield the trains for several days had been crowded to their utmost capacity with people who desired to see the last of Abraham Lincoln upon earth. Nothing had been done or thought of for two weeks in Springfield but the preparations for this day; they were made with a thoroughness which surprised the visitors from the East. The body lay in state in the Capitol, which was richly draped from roof to basement in black velvet and silver fringe; within it was a bower of bloom and fragrance. For twenty-four hours an unbroken stream of people passed through, bidding their friend and neighbor welcome home and farewell, and at ten o'clock on the 4th of May the coffin lid was closed at last and a vast procession moved out to Oak Ridge, where the dead President was committed to the soil of the State which had so loved and honored him. The ceremonies at the grave were simple and touching. Bishop Simpson delivered a pathetic oration; prayers were offered and hymns were sung; but the weightiest and most eloquent words uttered anywhere that day were those of the Second Inaugural, which the committee had wisely ordained to be read over his grave, as the friends of Raphael chose the incomparable canvas of the Transfiguration as the chief ornament of his funeral.

An association was immediately formed to build a monument over the grave of Lincoln. The work was in the hands of his best and oldest friends in Illinois, and was pushed with vigor. Few large subscriptions were received, with the exception of $50,000 voted by the State of Illinois and $10,000 by New York; but innumerable small contributions afforded all that was needed. The soldiers and sailors of the nation gave $28,000, of which the disproportionately large amount of $8,000 was the gift of the negro troops, whose manhood Lincoln had recognized by putting arms in their hands.[1] In all $180,000 was raised, and the monument, built after a design by Larkin G. Mead, was dedicated on the 15th of October, 1874. The day was fine, the concourse of

[1] Besides contributing thus generally to the Springfield monument, the freed people gave another touching instance of their gratitude by erecting in a public square on Capitol Hill in Washington a noble group in bronze, including Lincoln, and entitled "Emancipation." The subscription for this purpose was started by a negro washerwoman. The statue is by Thomas Ball.

people was enormous; there were music and eloquence and a brilliant decorative display. The orator of the day was Governor Oglesby, who praised his friend with warm but sober eulogy; General Sherman added his honest and hearty tribute; and General Grant, twice elected President, uttered these carefully chosen words, which had all the weight that belongs to the rare discourses of that candid and reticent soldier:

From March, 1864, to the day when the hand of the assassin opened a grave for Mr. Lincoln, then President of the United States, my personal relations with him were as close and intimate as the nature of our respective duties would permit. To know him personally was to love and respect him for his great qualities of heart and head, and for his patience and patriotism. With all his disappointments from failures on the part of those to whom he had intrusted commands, and treachery on the part of those who had gained his confidence but to betray it, I never heard him utter a complaint, nor cast a censure, for bad conduct or bad faith. It was his nature to find excuses for his adversaries. In his death the nation lost its greatest hero; in his death the South lost its most just friend.

PURSUIT AND DEATH OF JOHN WILKES BOOTH.

[JOHN WILKES BOOTH was my schoolmate in Maryland, many years ago; and by a strange coincidence three of my particular friends were concerned, in one way or another, with his pursuit and death. Two of them were Confederate officers — Major M. B. Ruggles, son of General Daniel Ruggles of the old army, and Lieutenant A. R. Bainbridge, both of whom, with Captain Jett, also of Mosby's command, met Booth and Herold in their flight and aided them to cross the Rappahannock. The other friend is Captain E. P. Doherty, who commanded the detachment of the 16th New York Cavalry that captured the fugitives. From the lips of all three I have heard accounts of the incidents that they witnessed, and the narratives that follow are given in the words of Major Ruggles and Captain Doherty.[1] — PRENTISS INGRAHAM.]

MAJOR RUGGLES'S NARRATIVE.

AT the close of the civil war Colonel Mosby, to whose command I belonged, surrendered to General Hancock, at Millwood, Virginia. In company with two comrades, A. R. Bainbridge, now in business in New York, and William Jett, now dead, I started for my home in King George County, Virginia. We had heard from United States officers of the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and that the assassin had been captured in Washington, and little dreamed, when we rode up to the bank of the Rappahannock River, that we were there to come face to face with John Wilkes Booth.

Port Conway is on the King George side of the river, there about three hundred yards wide, and opposite Port Royal. The ferry was owned by a man named Rollins, but the scow was run — that is, poled across — by Peyton Washington, a negro. The scow was on the other side of the river when we rode up, and I observed there a wagon, drawn by two very wretched-looking horses. In the wagon were two men. On seeing us approach, one of them came towards us, and, finding that we were Confederate soldiers, said that his name was Boyd, and that his brother had been wounded severely in the leg while escaping from prison, where they had been for some time. He furthermore said that their negro driver, Lucas, refused to take them any farther, and that they were anxious to get on their way, and asked our aid. I at once said we would help them; and while discussing the speedy coming of the scow, the other got out of the wagon, and walking with evident pain, with the aid of a rude crutch, came towards us. He apparently mistrusted his companion, for as he came forward he said, "I suppose you have been told who I am?" Thinking he meant that Herold had told us they were Confederate soldiers, escaped from prison, I answered in the affirmative. Instantly he dropped his weight back upon his crutch, and drawing a revolver said sternly, with the utmost coolness, "Yes, I am John Wilkes Booth, the slayer of Abraham Lincoln, and I am worth just $175,000 to the man who captures me."[2] We were greatly surprised, and yet the coolness of the man won our admiration; for we saw that he was wounded, desperate, and at bay. His face was

1 The proofs of this article have been read and corrected (Nov., 1889) by Colonel Ingraham, Major Ruggles, Lieutenant Bainbridge, and Captain Doherty. — EDITOR.

2 The reward as offered was $100,000 by the U. S. Government, and $25,000 each by three of the States.

haggard, pinched with suffering, his dark eyes sunken, but strangely bright, and though he had shaved off his mustache, upon his lip and face was a beard of some ten days' growth.

In response to his defiant words I said that we had been told that Lincoln's slayer had been captured; but that, though we did not sanction his act as an assassin, we were not men to take "blood money"; and that having promised his friend, who proved to be Herold, to take them across the river to a place of safety, we would do so. Though it is contrary to the general belief of the people of the North, I believe that had the war then been going on, Booth, instead of finding an asylum in the South, would have been taken and surrendered to the United States by the Confederate Government.

Booth replaced his weapon at my words, and, thanking us, said he was utterly unable to walk. I dismounted, and we lifted him upon my horse — a fact that seemed to give the saddle and bridle a great pecuniary value, as I learned through correspondence with Mr. Barnum; though they were never exhibited as relics, and are now at my brother's home in Virginia, there kept as souvenirs of my "days with Mosby."

Booth and Herold both seemed to be the worse for their exposure and hardships of the past few days. Booth wore a black soft hat, dark clothes, one cavalry boot,— the one on his wounded leg having been cut off,— and his weapons were a carbine, two revolvers, and a knife, the blade of the latter bearing the stain of blood, for with it he had wounded Major Rathbone. I noticed that his wounded leg was greatly swollen, inflamed, and dark, as from bruised blood, while it seemed to have been wretchedly dressed, the splints being simply pasteboard rudely tied about it. That he suffered intense pain all the time there was no doubt, though he tried to conceal his agony, both physical and mental.

When the scow arrived Peyton Washington ferried us across the river. After a ride of three miles we came to the Garrett farm, where we asked for shelter for the fugitives, which was granted. We also remained all night near Garrett's, sleeping in the woods, and the next day Herold went with us to Bowling Green, where we left Jett.[1]

The next day, Herold having decided upon the best course to pursue in his flight, Bain-

[1] Colonel John J. Garnett, who at the close of the war was with General Joseph E. Johnston as Chief of Artillery, received from Lieutenant Bainbridge, whom he has known for many years, the following additional particulars of the intercourse of the three Confederate officers with Booth and Herold: "Captain Jett was well acquainted in Caroline County, on the opposite side of the river, and he told Booth, with our approval, that he would find a place of safety for him. 'God bless you, sir!' said Booth, his face wincing with the pain of his disabled leg. When Booth realized that we were kindly disposed, he threw off all reserve and became quite communicative. Booth was dressed in a dark suit of clothes that looked seamed and ravelly, as if from rough contact with thorny undergrowth. On his head was a seedy looking black slouch hat, which he kept well pulled down over his forehead. The lame foot was entirely free from all covering, save a black stocking. The shoe which was on it was entirely cut away at the top, the heel only being covered with leather. The foot was much swollen, and seemed to trouble him greatly. The crutch he carried was rough-hewn and ungainly. His long dark mustache swept over his mouth in a straggling, unkempt manner, although it was evident that he had tried to preserve its shape by frequent handling. Indeed, during all the time he sat with us he was constantly pulling it into shape. His beard, of a coal-black hue, was of about two weeks' growth and gave his face an unclean appearance. Over his shoulders drooped a long gray shawl, which he said had served him well in covering the tell-tale initials 'J. W. B.' done in Indian ink on his right hand. These letters he showed to us to establish his identity. Strung over his shoulders by a long strap were a pair of large field glasses, which he said had not been of much use to him, because he had 'been forced to keep under cover too much.' . . . The wind lulled after we had waited a long time, and the ferryman came over for us. Captain Ruggles helped Booth to mount his horse, and together we went over to Port Royal, a village opposite Port Conway. The ferryman eyed us all very closely and we said but very little. Booth sat squarely on his horse, looking expectantly towards the opposite shore, and when the boat struck the wharf he lost no time in landing. I could see that his spirits were improving, and he laughed heartily when we surrounded him in a group. 'I 'm safe in glorious old Virginia, thank God!' he exclaimed. 'Now, boys,' said Jett, 'I propose to take our friend Booth up to Garrett's house. I think they 'll give him shelter there and treat him kindly.' 'Whatever you deem best to do with me, my friends,' replied Booth, 'I 'll agree to be satisfied.' 'Jett understands this country,' said Captain Ruggles, 'and I think that it will be well to act as he directs.' 'I 'm in your hands,' said Booth; 'do with me, boys, as you think best.' 'Well,' said Jett, 'I want to do the best I can for you; and I think our plan is to escort Mr. Booth up to Garrett's, tell the family who he is, and trust to their hospitality to see him kindly cared for until such time as he sees fit to seek other quarters.' After a few minutes' further conversation we left the wharf and started through Port Royal on the road to Garrett's farm. His house was some distance from the main road, and when we reached the gate leading into the farm Herold, who said that he wanted to go with us as far as Bowling Green to buy a pair of shoes, remained with me, while Jett and Ruggles accompanied Booth to the house. Garrett's residence was in the style at that time in vogue among Southern planters. It was a large, wooden framed building, with broad porches on every side. It stood on a hill, from which sloped in every direction broad rolling fields, fair in their verdure as ever greeted the eye of man. When Booth was a few rods distant in the lane from where Herold and I were standing, he suddenly wheeled his horse about, and lifting his slouch hat from his head waved it towards us and shouted back: 'Good-by, old fellow. Good-by, Lieutenant; come and see me again. I shall always be pleased to see you both.' 'I 'll be with you soon, John,' returned Herold; 'keep in good spirits.' 'Have no fear about me, Herold,' Booth replied; 'I am among friends now'; with which he turned his horse, and followed at a gallop after Jett and Ruggles, who were far in advance of him. Booth impressed me at that moment as the most reckless man I had ever met. Without a parole as I

bridge and myself accompanied him back to Garrett's. We found Booth lying on the grass, in front of the house, and sitting by his side I heard from his lips his version of the tragic conspiracy, his fatal shot, his motives, escape, and flight up to his coming to the Garretts'. In answer to my questions he spoke quietly, repressing now and then a groan of pain, and showing emotion and stern defiance at times. He said, in substance, that the plot had been to capture Mr. Lincoln and carry him a prisoner into the Confederacy, for he believed that by such an act the war could be brought to an end, as the South could dictate terms with such a hostage. Failing in this, he decided at the last moment, as it were, to strike deadly blows at Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, and General Grant. In the plot to kill, Payne[1] alone was implicated with him, not even Herold knowing what was to be done. Atzerodt knew nothing of the intended assassination, nor did, according to Booth's statement to me, any other, excepting Payne. The name of Mrs. Surratt was not mentioned by him. He said that Payne was to strike a death blow at Secretary Seward, and he, favored by the fact that President Lincoln and General Grant were to attend the theater together, was to kill both of them. General Grant's having been called away alone saved his life, for, said Booth, "I would have made no failure with either, as I had laid my plans for success only." That Andrew Johnson might appear to be implicated in the plot of assassination, Booth said that he had left that morning a note at the hotel where the Vice-President lived, to compromise him. He had no idea, he said, from the information received about Washington, that the war had really ended; for had he not believed that it would have been kept up by the South, he would not have struck the blow as he did. After getting safely out of Washington his intention was to cross the line, as quickly as possible, into the Confederacy. Joining Herold at a rendezvous, they had ridden hard through the night to gain a place of safety; but having a broken leg, and learning after several days, through the papers, that the war was, and in my own country, amid scenes with which I had been familiar since childhood, I did not feel that I was perfectly safe. If he felt any premonitions of danger, as I certainly felt that in his position he should, he gave no signs of them. He seemed as light-hearted and careless as a schoolboy just released from his studies. Herold and I went on to Bowling Green, where we remained all night, stopping at the house of a Mr. Clark. Jett and Ruggles, after escorting Booth up to Garrett's house and seeing him well disposed, went on to Bowling Green, where they stopped with Mr. Goldman, for whose daughter Jett had tender feelings. On the following day I learned of Johnston's surrender, and decided to go back to my home in King George County and settle down to the life of a peaceful citizen. I met Jett and Ruggles and told them of my intention, and they concluded to do likewise. I inquired for Booth, and in what shape they had left him, and Willie Jett told me that he did not think under the existing state of affairs the Garretts liked to harbor Booth in their house. 'And yet,' said Jett, 'they did not like to turn him away.' After a little persuasion Mr. Garrett agreed to allow him to remain on his place, although he felt that he would be running a big risk in doing so. 'He 'll be well taken care of, never fear,' said Jett, who decided to remain at Goldman's house for a few days. Captain Ruggles and I went on the next morning towards Port Royal together, Herold accompanying us as far as Garrett's gate, where we left him. He told us that he was going right up to join Booth, and that he would stick by him to the death. Just before reaching Port Royal I met a soldier of my command, who told me that if we had not got our paroles, and did not want to be captured, to turn back. 'For,' said he, 'the town is full of Yankees in search of Booth, who, they say, crossed the river yesterday.' We turned immediately and rode back to Garrett's. As we approached the front gate Booth was lying on the lawn in front of the house. As soon as he recognized us he arose, and hobbling towards us said, 'Well, boys, what 's in the wind now?' We told him the enemy was upon his trail, and advised him to seek shelter in the woods. I remember pointing to a thick piece of woodland some distance from the house, and saying: 'Booth, get over there at once, and hide yourself. In those wooded ravines you will never be found.' 'Yes,' said Ruggles, 'get there as quickly as you can, and lose no time about starting.' Booth turned around to look for Herold, but he was nowhere in sight, as indeed was no one else. He then straightened himself up to his full height, and replied: 'I 'll do as you say, boys, right off. Ride on! Good-by! It will never do for you to be found in my company.' Then biting his lips, as if he had conceived a desperate resolve, he said, 'Rest assured of one thing, good friend, Wilkes Booth will never be taken alive.' The ferryman at Port Conway had recognized Jett, and when Lieutenant Doherty arrived there with his troops, and described the men they were pursuing, he knew at once that he had assisted them across the river the day before. He told the officers that he had taken five men across, three of whom were Confederate soldiers, one of whom he knew to be Captain Jett, as he had often taken him across. If he had only stopped there all might have been well so far as Booth was concerned, for some time. But the ferryman was frightened. He thought if he did not tell all he knew he would be arrested as an accomplice in the assassination of Lincoln, so he volunteered the information that Captain Jett had a sweetheart at Bowling Green, and that in all probability he would be found there. The people of the South conceived the idea that Captain Jett deliberately betrayed Booth. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Had they been in his place, I make bold to say they would have acted as he did. It was *his* life or Booth's. The latter had no hopes; but Jett, with a parole in his possession, had, so far as he knew, a long life of happiness before him. Lieutenant Doherty and his troops were hot upon the assassin's trail, and were not to be denied their prey. Poor Jett had only one alternative, and that was to become their guide, and I am sure he did so unwillingly. He has been dead many years, and I know that he was loyal to the cause he espoused, and fought gallantly for it to the end. He guided the troops back to Garrett's, and he afterward told me that he had hopes that Booth might have been warned in time to escape, as indeed he had been by us."— EDITOR.

[1] Payne was a deserter from a Confederate Florida regiment.

was really at an end, he determined to make his way to the silver mines of Mexico, feeling that the South would be no place of refuge for him. It has been said that Booth had plenty of money with him; but he showed me three five-dollar bills, all that he had, excepting a bill of exchange; while Herold had not as much. I asked him why he did not attempt to get to Europe, and his answer was that there was no asylum for such as he where monarchs ruled, as they feared their own lives might be in danger from the example he had set.

It is generally believed that Herold shot his own and Booth's horse; but Booth told me that after weighting them down they led them into the Potomac the night they embarked in the boat to cross, and drawing their heads over the gunwale cut their throats and saw them sink from sight. This would account for the fact that their bodies were never found.[1]

Booth seemed to feel that he had been spurred on to the deed through a duty he owed the country to bring the war to an end, and he said that he would never be taken alive. If he had not broken his leg he could readily have distanced all pursuit. He was without doubt disappointed at the reception he met in Virginia, and said that he was prepared to meet any fate. The calm courage of the man in the midst of his great peril, and while racked by suffering, impressed me in spite of myself, for there was no braggadocio about him; simply a determination to submit to the inevitable, parleying when it should become necessary to do so. The few extracts he read me from his diary showed this.

From the examination I made of his broken leg, aided by some experience I had had with wounds, I feel confident that amputation would have been necessary to save his life, and perhaps that would not have prevented a speedy death.

Soon after my long conversation with Booth, Bainbridge and myself bade him and Herold good-by and went on our way, remaining that night in the pines, and next day going to Robb's, where we learned that a company of United States cavalry were scouring the country and had captured the fugitives in Garrett's barn. Knowing the barn well, and judging from all the circumstances connected with the burning of it, I feel convinced that Sergeant Boston Corbett has a reputation undeserved as the slayer of Mr. Lincoln's assassin. From the spot where Sergeant Corbett was he could not have seen Booth where he stood, and certainly could not have been able to shoot him in the back of the head. Having asked Captain Doherty to fall back fifty paces with his men and give him a chance to come out, and very properly and naturally being refused his request by that gallant officer, deserted by Herold, the barn on fire, and seeing that he must perish in the flames or be taken to Washington and hanged, Booth, hopeless, alone, and at bay, placed his pistol to the back of his head, and took his own life. No one saw Corbett fire, and one chamber of Booth's revolver held in his hand was empty, and I am by no means alone in the belief that he killed himself.

Learning that Jett was a prisoner, and that we were to be arrested, tried, and hanged, as aiders and abetters, Bainbridge and myself stood not on the order of going, but went at once. Making our way into Essex County and crossing to Westmoreland, we went to our home up in King George County. Some ten days after, I was arrested at night by a squad of United States cavalry. Bainbridge was also captured. We were taken to Washington and placed in the Old Capitol Prison. We were not alone in our misery, however, for Dr. Stewart, at whose house Booth had stopped, William Lucas, the negro who had driven him to the ferry, and a number of others, were there, among them being Jett, who had escaped from Captain Doherty, and had been recaptured at his home in Westmoreland County.

From Booth's own words to me as he lay on the grass in front of Garrett's house, I feel assured that in the excitement of the times there were some innocent ones who were punished for the crimes of Booth and Payne.

After the trial, by a strange mistake I was sent to Johnson's Island, where as a Confederate prisoner I had passed half a year; but after a few days spent there I was returned to Washington, and after taking the oath of allegiance I was released.

M. B. Ruggles.

CAPTAIN DOHERTY'S NARRATIVE.

ABOUT the hour of 4 P. M. April 24, 1865, when Booth and Herold were taken by their newly made Confederate friends to the Garrett farm, where Booth was killed and Herold captured, I was seated, with another officer of the 16th New York Cavalry, on a bench in the park opposite the White House. There I received the following orders from a messenger:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON, April 24, 1865. Commanding Officer 16th New York

[1] Lieutenant Bainbridge is positive that he heard Booth say: "After we had been three days in the pines, I deemed it advisable to act on Jones's advice and kill our horses. I could hear in the distance the neighing of the horses of the Federal cavalry as they went scouting through the country, and I was afraid that ours might answer them and betray our whereabouts, so I asked Herold to shoot them, which he did."—EDITOR.

Cavalry. Sir: You will at once detail a reliable and discreet commission officer with twenty-five men, well mounted, with three days' rations and forage, to report at once to Colonel L. C. Baker, Agent of the War Department, at 211 Pennsylvania Ave. Command of General C. C. Augur.—J. C. SEWELL, A. A. A. Gen'l.

In accordance with the foregoing order First Lieutenant E. P. Doherty[1] is hereby detailed for the duty, and will report at once to Colonel Baker, 211 Pennsylvania Ave.—N. B. SWITZER, Colonel 16th New York Cavalry, Bvt. Brig. Gen'l, U. S. A.

I proceeded to the barracks, had "boots and saddles" sounded, and in less than half an hour had reported to Colonel Baker. I took the first twenty-five men in the saddle, Sergeant Boston Corbett being the only member of my own company. Colonel Baker handed me photographs of the assassins of President Lincoln. He told me no troops had yet been in Fredericksburg, but that I must reach that vicinity with all dispatch. He introduced me to E. J. Conger and L. B. Baker, of the detective force, and said they would accompany me. I proceeded down to the Sixth street wharf, where I found the steamer *John S. Ide*, and directed Captain Wilson to move down to Aquia Creek and to Belle Plain. After the detachment had landed I directed the captain of the boat to move off to a place of safe anchorage and await my return. Should I not return before 6 P. M. on the 26th he was to go back to Washington and report to Captain Allen, assistant quartermaster. I proceeded directly south until I struck the main road to Fredericksburg. Here I halted at 4 A. M. A negro informed me that a regiment of cavalry had passed to Fredericksburg the previous evening, going along on the north side of the Rappahannock River. I then determined to push down and go up on the south side, where no troops had been.

The detectives asked for a detail of four men and a sergeant to scour the country, while I with the rest of the men continued on towards the Rappahannock. The detectives returned about 3 P. M. without any clue to the whereabouts of the assassins. I went to the ferry at Port Conway and saw Mrs. Rollins, the ferryman's wife, and another woman sitting on the steps of the ferry-house. Drawing Booth's picture from my pocket I showed it to them, and inferred from their looks that Booth was not far distant. One of them said that Booth and Herold had been brought there in a wagon the evening before by a negro named Lucas, who would carry them no farther. While they were bargaining with her husband to take them to Orange Court House, three Confederate soldiers, Ruggles, Bainbridge, and Jett, rode up and they entered into conversation. By and by they were all taken over the ferry. Booth was put on Ruggles's horse and they proceeded towards Bowling Green.

I at once sent the bugler to Sergeant Corbett, telling him to mount the detachment, which I had left a mile behind, feeding, and move down as quickly as possible. Mrs. Rollins went for her husband, who was fishing, and I sent him for the scow, which was on the other side of the river. During his absence the command arrived at the ferry and we were soon over the

[1] The following is taken from the report of Generals Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate, and E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General, U. S. A., to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, on the subject of the arrest of those engaged in the assassination of President Lincoln, which was transmitted to Congress: "The parties who made the arrest of Booth and Herold were a detachment of the 16th New York Cavalry (consisting of Lieutenant E. P. Doherty, commanding, and two sergeants, seven corporals, and seventeen privates), accompanied by E. J. Conger and L. B. Baker, two employees in the detective service of Colonel L. C. Baker, Provost-Marshal, etc., the officer who originated and directed the expedition, though not personally accompanying it. . . . The military element of the expedition for the arrest of these criminals Booth and Herold is therefore believed to have been that which was essential to its success, and without which its results could not have been attained. As the commander of the detachment employed upon this important duty, Lieutenant Doherty was solely responsible for its discipline and efficiency. He is found to have been active and energetic, and it is believed to be established by the weight of testimony that it was he who personally made the actual seizure of Herold. It was he, too (in conjunction with Mr. Baker), who obtained the first reliable information which rendered the capture of the criminals almost certain; and though, in the direction of the investigation, the initiative would seem more frequently to have been taken by Conger, yet Lieutenant Doherty is shown to have acted and been recognized as the commander of the expedition in the only written instructions which appear to have been issued during the march, to wit, those given by him to the master of the steamer which conveyed the party to and from Belle Plain. Upon the whole, therefore, it is concluded that as such commander he may properly be awarded the one-tenth portion of the whole amount which is payable by law to the commanding officer of a vessel immediately engaged in the capture of a prize, and his share will therefore be $7500. The services of Messrs. Conger and Baker upon this expedition were, no doubt, of great value; and, inasmuch as these parties immediately represented the views and intentions of Colonel Baker, their part in carrying out the original plan was particularly important. It is understood that their expenses incurred upon this duty have been reimbursed, and that they have also been paid, or are entitled to be paid, for their general services, as detectives at this period, at the rate of $150 per month. They should, however, both be liberally, and, as it is thought, equally compensated; and it is concluded that of the amount offered as reward there may properly be paid to each the sum of $4000."

Sergeants Corbett and Wendell each received $2545.68; each of the seven corporals received $2291.09; and each of the seventeen privates $2036.53. Of the $75,000 thus distributed as a reward for the arrest of Booth and Herold, Colonel L. C. Baker received the share that "would be payable to the commander of a squadron, by a separate ship of which a prize had been taken," that is, one-twentieth, or $3750.—EDITOR.

river. I arrested Rollins the ferryman, and took him as guide to Bowling Green. At dark we passed the Garrett farm, not then dreaming that the assassins were concealed there. Arriving at Bowling Green, I surrounded Goldman's Hotel. After some hesitation the door was opened by Mrs. Goldman. I inquired of her who were the male inmates of the house. She replied that there was only her wounded son, and I directed her to show me his room, telling her that if my men were fired on I should burn the building and take the inmates prisoners to Washington. She took me up one flight of stairs to her son's room, and as I entered Captain Jett sprang from his bed, half-dressed. Her son lay on another bed, wounded. Jett admitted his identity, and drawing Mr. Stanton's proclamation from my pocket I read it to him, and then said, "I have known your movements for the past two or three days, and if you do not tell me the truth I will hang you; but if you give me the information I want, I will protect you." He was greatly excited, and told me that he had left Booth at Garrett's house, three miles from Port Conway, the evening before, and that Herold had come to Bowling Green with him, and returned that morning. I had Jett's horse taken from the stable, and, placing a guard over him, we retraced our steps towards Garrett's. It was now about midnight, and my men, having been out since the 24th without sleep and with very little food, were exhausted; those who had been left on the edge of the town had fallen asleep. I had some difficulty in arousing them, but when they learned that we were on Booth's track new life seemed to be infused into them. I placed Corbett in the rear with orders to allow no man to fall out of line. Upon reaching Garrett's orchard fence I halted, and in company with Rollins and the detectives took a survey of the premises. I had the fence taken down. I told off six men, gave out the countersign of "Boston," and sent the six men as a patrol in rear of the out-buildings, with instructions to allow no one to pass through the field or to approach them without the countersign. The gates in front of Garrett's house were quietly opened, and in a minute the whole premises were surrounded. I dismounted, and knocked loudly at the front door. Old Mr. Garrett came out. I seized him, and asked him where the men were who were there yesterday. He replied that they had gone to the woods when the cavalry passed the previous afternoon. While I was speaking with him some of the men had entered the house to search it. Soon one of the soldiers sang out, "O Lieutenant! I have a man here I found in the corn-crib." It was young Garrett, and I demanded the whereabouts of the fugitives. He replied, "In the barn." Leaving a few men around the house, we proceeded in the direction of the barn, which we surrounded. I kicked on the door of the barn several times without receiving a reply. Meantime another son of Garrett's had been captured. The barn was secured with a padlock, and young Garrett carried the key. I unlocked the door, and again summoned the inmates of the building to surrender. After some delay Booth said, "For whom do you take me?" I replied, "It does n't make any difference. Come out." He said, "I am a cripple and alone." I said, "I know who is with you, and you had better surrender." He replied, "I may be taken by my friends, but not by my foes." I said, "If you don't come out, I 'll burn the building." I directed a corporal to pile up some hay in a crack in the wall of the barn, and set the building on fire. As the corporal was picking up the hay and brush Booth said, "If you come back here I will put a bullet through you." I then motioned to the corporal to desist, and decided to wait for daylight and then to enter the barn by both doors and overpower the assassins. Booth then said, in a drawling voice, "O Captain! there is a man in here who wants to surrender awful bad." I replied, "You had better follow his example and come out." His answer was, "No, I have not made up my mind; but draw your men up fifty paces off and give me a chance for my life." I told him I had not come to fight; that I had fifty men, and could take him. Then he said, "Well, my brave boys, prepare me a stretcher, and place another stain on our glorious banner."

At this moment Herold reached the door. I asked him to hand out his arms; he replied that he had none. I told him I knew exactly what weapons he had. Booth replied, "I own all the arms, and may have to use them on you, gentlemen." I then said to Herold, "Let me see your hands." He put them through the partly opened door and I seized him by the wrists. I handed him over to a non-commissioned officer. Just at this moment I heard a shot, and thought Booth had shot himself. Throwing open the door, I saw that the straw and hay behind Booth were on fire. He was half-turning towards it.

He had a crutch, and he held a carbine in his hand. I rushed into the burning barn, followed by my men, and as he was falling caught him under the arms and pulled him out of the barn. The burning building becoming too hot, I had him carried to the veranda of Garrett's house.

Booth received his death-shot in this manner. While I was taking Herold out of the barn one of the detectives went to the rear, and pulling out some protruding straw set fire

to it. I had placed Sergeant Boston Corbett at a large crack in the side of the barn, and he, seeing by the igniting hay that Booth was leveling his carbine at either Herold or myself, fired, to disable him in the arm; but Booth making a sudden move, the aim erred, and the bullet struck Booth in the back of the head, about an inch below the spot where his shot had entered the head of Mr. Lincoln. Booth asked me by signs to raise his hands. I lifted them up and he gasped, "Useless, useless!" We gave him brandy and water, but he could not swallow it. I sent to Port Royal for a physician, who could do nothing when he came, and at seven o'clock Booth breathed his last. He had on his person a diary, a large bowie knife, two pistols, a compass, and a draft on Canada for £60.

I took a saddle blanket off my horse, and, borrowing a darning needle from Miss Garrett, sewed his body in it. The men found an old wagon, and impressed it, with the negro driver. The body was placed upon it, and two hours after Booth's death I was on the way back to Belle Plain, where I had left the steamboat.

I had released Rollins and sent him ahead to have his ferry-boat ready to take us across the river. About 6 P. M. I reached the boat, and found the captain preparing to return to Washington. We reached Washington at 2 A. M., April 27. I placed the body of Booth and the prisoner Herold on board the monitor *Montauk*, after which I marched my worn-out command up through the navy yard to their quarters.

The next morning an autopsy was held, and measures were taken to identify the body of Booth. The portion of the neck and head through which the bullet had passed was cut out, and is to-day preserved in the National Museum of Anatomy at Washington. The body was buried in a cell in the Penitentiary, where it remained nearly four years, with the bodies of the other assassins. It was then given to his friends, and now lies in a cemetery in Baltimore.

Edward P. Doherty.

Oct Jan 1890

THE WINTER FIELDS.

WINDS here, and sleet, and frost that bites like steel.
The low, bleak hill rounds under the low sky.
Naked of flock and fold the fallows lie,
Thin-streaked with meager drift. The gusts reveal
By fits the dim, gray snakes of fence that steal
Through the white dusk. The hill-foot poplars sigh,
While storm and death with winter trample by;
And the iron fields ring sharp, and blind lights reel.
Yet, in the lonely ridges, wrenched with pain,
Harsh, solitary hillocks, bound and dumb,
Grave glebes, close-lipped beneath the scourge and chain,
Lurks hid the germ of ecstasy, the sum
Of life that waits on summer, till the rain
Whisper in April and the crocus come.

Charles G. D. Roberts.

SANCHO MITARRA.

SOME years ago I passed my summer vacation in the north of Spain, studying the battle-grounds of the last Carlist war. Sketching and collecting notes, I loitered about the picturesque towns which, by the loss of their ancient charters, had paid so high a price for their loyalty to Don Carlos, until eventually I reached Irún, where I remained a week. During the daytime the large, low-studded eating-room of the inn was entirely deserted, but towards evening quite a number of men were in the habit of dropping in singly or in groups, and a few minutes later the noise became deafening. Among these guests I noticed especially a fine-looking, rather silent person, who, to judge from the deference with which the others treated him, must have been a local celebrity. His face was apparently cut in two by an irregular scar, rather frightful to look at until he smiled, when the ugly purplish lines seemed to disappear in the wrinkles about his mouth. I was anxious to get a good sketch of him, but succeeded only after many unsatisfactory attempts, and I was about to close my book when a young man who had been looking over my shoulder exclaimed:

"Ah, *Señor*, what would I not give for that portrait!"

"*Caballero*," I answered, "it is yours; and I esteem the compliment of your request so far above the value of the drawing that you must allow me to consider myself your debtor." My real pay lay in the pleasure this answer gave me, and I felt kindly towards the man who had afforded me an opportunity of making such orthodox use of my Spanish.

So we fell into conversation, and before leaving he handed me his card, on which I read the name Simón Muñoz, and below, in brackets, the word *poeta*. He was assistant editor of the local paper, knew everybody, and seemed astonished when, having told me the name of the man with the scar, I asked further about him. "Is it possible," he said, "that you have not heard of Sancho Mitarra? In that case, sir, you must allow me to offer you a little sketch which I have written about him, in exchange for the portrait which you so generously gave me."

The next morning the manuscript was brought up to my room with my chocolate, and as a heavy rain confined me to the house, I translated it into English. It was as follows:

I.

OVER a thousand years ago, or, to be more pedantic, A. D. 872, the Gascons, being unable to obtain a consul from France and unwilling to elect one at home, sent over into Castile for Sancho García, called Sancho Mitarra, or the Terrible. As king of Pampeluna and Navarre he ruled over them for nearly forty years, gaining great renown not only as a brave Christian soldier in his wars against the Moors, but as a wise and strong-handed ruler at home. From this good king Sancho Mitarra the brass-founder of Irún is directly descended, as it were easy to prove by the old chronicles of Navarre; but as he is a republican on principle, it gives him less pleasure to reflect upon the distinction of his ancestors than upon the sturdiness of a family that has endured a thousand years without a break.

Indeed, as for his being descended from a king, it seems difficult to understand how it could be otherwise. For, supposing that Sancho had been the only one in Spain thirty generations ago, and that each of his descendants had produced but two children, a simple calculation shows that there should be one thousand and seventy-three odd millions of these descendants in the world to-day. Now, as the population of Spain is less than twenty millions, every inhabitant must have some fifty-three or more claims to royal ancestry — a fact which might in some cases account for the list of titles borne by our more modest grandees of the first class.

It is equally indisputable that no fortune, however great, could bear subdivision on such a magnificent scale; hence the poverty, shared by Sancho's father with so many other distant members of the royal family, seems reasonable enough. This worthy citizen was by trade a fisherman, part owner and captain of the *Guerendiain*, a stanch but ugly vessel belonging to the Basque cod fleet. His house was in the oldest quarter of the town behind the church, and in the dirty kitchen, redolent of the mingled perfumes of tar, garlic, and tobacco-smoke, old Mitarra told strangely incredible tales of the "Américas" beyond the sea. The priest, the postmaster, the captain of the customs, and a couple of retired smugglers were wont to meet there at all hours of the day when

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.[1]

THE CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS—THE END OF REBELLION—LINCOLN'S FAME.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

HEN Jefferson Davis and the remnant of the Confederate Cabinet, with the most important and portable portion of their department archives, left Richmond on the night of April 2, in consequence of Lee's retreat, they proceeded to Danville, southwest of Richmond, arriving there the following morning. In a conference between Davis and Lee, in which the probability of abandoning Richmond was discussed, they had agreed upon this point at which to endeavor to unite the armies of Lee and Johnston, first to attack and beat Sherman and then return and defeat Grant. We have related how Grant, so far from permitting Lee to execute the proposed junction, did not even allow him to reach Danville. Lee had been pressed so hard that he had not found opportunity to inform Davis where he was going, and this absence of news probably served to give Davis an intimation that their preconcerted plans were not likely to reach fulfillment. Nevertheless, the rebel President made a show of confidence; rooms were obtained, and, he says, the "different departments resumed their routine labors," though it may be doubted whether in these labors they earned the compensation which the Confederate States promised them.

Two days after his arrival at Danville, Jefferson Davis added one more to his many rhetorical efforts to "fire the Southern heart." On the 5th he issued a proclamation, in which, after reciting the late disasters in as hopeful a strain as possible, he broke again into his never-failing grandiloquence:

> We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his base. Let us but will it and we are free.
>
> Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia — noble State, whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come — that Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory.
>
> If, by the stress of numbers, we shall be compelled to a temporary withdrawal from her limits or those of any other border State, we will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people resolved to be free.[2]

In his book, written many years after, Davis is frank enough to admit that this language in the light of subsequent events may fairly be said to have been oversanguine. He probably very soon reached this conviction, for almost before the ink was dry on his proclamation, a son of Governor Wise, escaping through the Federal lines on a swift horse, brought him information of the surrender of Lee's army to Grant. Rumor also reaching him that the Federal cavalry was pushing southward west of Danville, the Confederate Government again hastily packed its archives into a railroad train and moved to Greensboro', North Carolina. Its reception at this place was cold and foreboding. The headquarters of the Government remained on the train at the depot. Only Jefferson Davis and Secretary Trenholm, who was ill, were provided with lodgings. From this point Davis sent a despatch to General Johnston, soliciting a conference, either at Greensboro' or at the general's headquarters; and in response to this request Johnston came without delay to Greensboro', arriving there on the morning of April 12. Within an hour or two both Generals Johnston and Beauregard were summoned to meet the Confederate President in a council of war,

2 Davis, proclamation; "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 677.

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there being also present the members of the rebel Cabinet, namely: Benjamin, Secretary of State; Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, and Reagan, Postmaster-General. The meeting was held in a room some twelve by sixteen feet in size, on the second floor of a small dwelling, and contained a bed, a few chairs, and a table with writing-materials.[1]

The infatuation under which Davis had plunged his section into rebellion against the Government, pitting the South with its disparity of numbers[2] and resources against the North, still beset him in the hour of her collapse and the agony of her surrender. He had figured out how the united armies of Lee and Johnston could successively demolish Sherman and Grant, but he could not grasp the logic of common sense that by the same rule the united armies of Grant and Sherman would make short work of the army of Johnston alone whenever they could reach it. The spirit of obstinate confidence with which he entered upon the interview may be best inferred from the description of it written by the two principal actors themselves. Davis says:

> I did not think we should despair. We still had effective armies in the field, and a vast extent of rich and productive territory both east and west of the Mississippi, whose citizens had evinced no disposition to surrender. Ample supplies had been collected in the railroad depots, and much still remained to be placed at our disposal when needed by the army in North Carolina. . . . My motive, therefore, in holding an interview with the senior generals of the army in North Carolina was not to learn their opinion as to what might be done by negotiation with the United States Government, but to derive from them information in regard to the army under their command, and what it was feasible and advisable to do as a military problem.[3]

Johnston's statement shows still more distinctly how impossible it was for Davis to lay aside the airs of dictator:

> We had supposed we were to be questioned concerning the military resources of our department, in connection with the question of continuing or terminating the war. But the President's object seemed to be to give, not to obtain, information; for, addressing the party, he said that in two or three weeks he would have a large army in the field by bringing back into the ranks those who had abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by calling out the enrolled men whom the conscript bureau with its forces had been unable to bring into the army. . . . Neither opinions nor information was asked, and the conference terminated.[4]

Pollard, the Southern historian, is probably not far wrong in saying that this

> was an interview of inevitable embarrassment and pain. The two generals [Johnston and Beauregard] were those who had experienced most of the prejudice and injustice of the President; he had always felt aversion for them, and it would have been an almost impossible excess of Christian magnanimity if they had not returned something of resentment and coldness to the man who, they believed, had arrogantly domineered over them and more than once sought their ruin.[5]

Now when Davis, without even the preface of asking their opinions, bade these two men resuscitate his military and political power and transform him from a fugitive to a commander-in-chief, it is not to be wondered at that the interview terminated without result.

Matters were thus left in an awkward situation for all parties: the rebel chief had no promise of confidence or support; the generals no authority to negotiate or surrender; the Cabinet no excuse to intervene by advice or protest to either party. This condition was, however, opportunely relieved by the arrival during the afternoon of the Secretary of War, Breckinridge, who was the first to bring them the official and undoubted intelligence of the surrender of Lee with his whole army, of which they had hitherto been informed only by rumor, and which they had of course hoped to the last moment might prove unfounded. The fresh news naturally opened up another discussion and review of the emergency between the various individuals, and seems at length to have brought them to a frank avowal of their real feelings to each other in private. Johnston and Beauregard, holding military counsel together, "agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown."[6] This opinion Johnston also repeated to Breckinridge and Mallory, both of whom, it would seem, entertained the same view. The absence of anything like full confidence and cordial intimacy between Davis and his advisers is shown by the fact that these two members of his Cabinet were unwilling to tell their chief the truth which both recognized, and urged upon General Johnston the duty of making the unwelcome suggestion "that negotiations to end the war should be commenced." Breckinridge promised to bring about an opportunity; and it was evidently upon his suggestion that Davis called together a second conference of his Cabinet and his generals.[7] There is a conflict of statement as to when it

[1] Frank H. Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 623.

[2] "Dividing their free population between the two sections, and the odds were six and a half millions against twenty and a half millions." [Ibid., p. 573.]

[3] Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., pp. 679, 680.

[4] Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 396, 397.

[5] Pollard, "Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History of the Confederacy," p. 514.

[6] Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 397.

[7] Ibid., p. 398.

took place. Both Davis and Mallory in their accounts group together all the incidents as if they occurred at a single meeting, which Mallory places on the evening of the 12th, while Johnston's account mentions the two separate meetings, the first on the morning of the 12th, and the second on the morning of the 13th; there being, however, substantial agreement between all as to the points discussed.

Of this occasion, so full of historical interest, we fortunately have the records of two of the participants. General Johnston writes:

> Being desired by the President to do it, we compared the military forces of the two parties to the war. Ours, an army of about 20,000 infantry and artillery, and 5000 mounted troops; those of the United States, three armies that could be combined against ours, which was insignificant compared with either Grant's of 180,000 men, Sherman's of 110,000 at least, and Canby's of 60,000 — odds of 17 or 18 to 1, which in a few weeks could be more than doubled. I represented that under such circumstances it would be the greatest of human crimes for us to attempt to continue the war; for, having neither money nor credit, nor arms but those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition but that in their cartridge-boxes, nor shops for repairing arms or fixing ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would be, not to harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation of our country and ruin of its people. I therefore urged that the President should exercise at once the only function of government still in his possession, and open negotiations for peace. The members of the Cabinet present were then desired by the President to express their opinions on the important question. General Breckinridge, Mr. Mallory, and Mr. Reagan thought that the war was decided against us, and that it was absolutely necessary to make peace. Mr. Benjamin expressed the contrary opinion. The latter made a speech for war much like that of Sempronius in Addison's play.[1]

Secretary Mallory's account is even more full of realistic vividness. He represents Davis, after introducing the dreaded topic by several irrelevant subjects of conversation, and coming finally to "the situation of the country," as saying:

> "Of course we all feel the magnitude of the moment. Our late disasters are terrible, but I do not think we should regard them as fatal. I think we can whip the enemy yet, if our people will turn out. We must look at matters calmly, however, and see what is left for us to do. Whatever can be done must be done at once. We have not a day to lose." A pause ensued, General Johnston not seeming to deem himself expected to speak, when the President said, "We should like to hear your views, General Johnston." Upon this the general, without preface or introduction,— his words translating the expression which his face had worn since he entered the room,— said, in his terse, concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were crowding for utterance: "My views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight. Our country is overrun, its military resources greatly diminished, while the enemy's military power and resources were never greater, and may be increased to any desired extent. We cannot place another large army in the field; and cut off as we are from foreign intercourse, I do not see how we could maintain it in fighting condition if we had it. My men are daily deserting in large numbers, and are taking my artillery teams to aid their escape to their homes. Since Lee's defeat they regard the war as at an end. If I march out of North Carolina, her people will leave my ranks. It will be the same as I proceed south through South Carolina and Georgia, and I shall expect to retain no man beyond the by-road or cow-path that leads to his house. My small force is melting away like snow before the sun, and I am hopeless of recruiting it. We may perhaps obtain terms which we ought to accept." The tone and manner, almost spiteful, in which the general jerked out these brief, decisive sentences, pausing at every paragraph, left no doubt as to his own convictions. When he ceased speaking, whatever was thought of his statements — and their importance was fully understood — they elicited neither comment nor inquiry. The President, who during their delivery had sat with his eyes fixed upon a scrap of paper which he was folding and refolding abstractedly, and who had listened without a change of position or expression, broke the silence by saying, in a low, even tone, "What do you say, General Beauregard?" "I concur in all General Johnston has said," he replied. Another silence, more eloquent of the full appreciation of the condition of the country than words could have been, succeeded, during which the President's manner was unchanged.[2]

Davis's optimism had taken an obstinate form, and even after these irrefutable arguments and stern decisions he remained unconvinced. He writes that he "never expected a Confederate army to surrender while it was able either to fight or to retreat";[3] but sustained only by the sophomoric eloquence of Mr. Benjamin, he had no alternative. He inquired of Johnston how terms were to be obtained; to which the latter answered, by negotiation between military commanders, proposing that he should be allowed to open such negotiations with Sherman. To this Davis consented, and upon Johnston's suggestion Secretary Mallory took up a pen and at Davis's dictation wrote down the letter to Sherman[4] which we have quoted elsewhere, and the results of which have been related. The council of war over, General Johnston returned to his army to begin negotiations with Sherman. On the following day, April 14, Davis and his party, without waiting to

1 Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 398, 399.

2 Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," pp. 623–625.

3 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," p. 682.

4 Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 625.

hear the result, left Greensboro' to continue their journey southward.[1]

The dignity and resources of the Confederate Government were rapidly shrinking; railroad travel had ceased on account of burned bridges, and it could no longer even maintain the state enjoyed in its car at Greensboro'. We are not informed what became of the archives; its personnel — President, Cabinet, and sundry staff officers — scraped together a lot of miscellaneous transportation, composed of riding horses, ambulances, and other vehicles, which, over roads rendered almost impassable by mud, made their progress to the last degree vexatious and toilsome. The country was so full of fugitives that horse-stealing seems to have become for the time an admitted custom and privilege. We have the statement of Davis's private secretary that eight or ten young Mississippians, one of them an officer, who volunteered to become the rebel President's bodyguard, equipped themselves by "pressing" the horses of neighboring farmers, rendering necessary a premature and somewhat sudden departure in advance of the official party.[2] Obtaining shelter by night when they could, and camping at other times, the distinguished fugitives made their way to Charlotte, North Carolina, where they arrived on the 18th of April. Since the Confederate Government had considerable establishments at Charlotte, orders were despatched to the quartermaster to prepare accommodations; and this request was reasonably satisfied for all the members of the party except its chief. The quartermaster met them near the town and

explained that, though quarters could be furnished for the rest of us, he had as yet been able to find only one person willing to receive Mr. Davis, saying the people generally were afraid that whoever entertained him would have his house burned by the enemy; that, indeed, it was understood threats to that effect had been made everywhere by Stoneman's cavalry. There seemed to be nothing to do but to go to the one domicile offered. It was on the main street of the town, and was occupied by Mr. Bates, a man said to be of Northern birth, a bachelor of convivial habits, the local agent of the Southern Express Company, apparently living alone with his negro servants, and keeping a sort of "open house," where a broad, well-equipped sideboard was the most conspicuous feature of the situation — not at all a seemly place for Mr. Davis.[3]

Mr. Davis was perforce obliged to accept this entertainment; and whether he failed to realize the significance of such treatment or whether he was moved by his suppressed indignation to a defiant self-assertion, when a detachment of rebel cavalry passing along the street saluted him with cheers and called him out for a speech, after the usual compliments to soldiers, he "expressed his own determination not to despair of the Confederacy, but to remain with the last organized band upholding the flag."[4] And this feeling he again emphasized during his stay in Charlotte by a remark to his private secretary, "I *cannot* feel like a beaten man."

The stay at Charlotte was prolonged, evidently to wait for news from Johnston's army. No information came till April 23, when Breckinridge, Secretary of War, arrived, bringing the memorandum agreement made by Sherman and Johnston on the 18th.[5] The memorandum seems to have been discussed at a Cabinet meeting held on the morning of the 24th, and Mr. Davis yielded to the advice they all gave him to accept and ratify the agreement. He wrote a letter to that effect,[6] but almost immediately received further information, which Sherman communicated to Johnston, that the Washington authorities had rejected the terms and agreement, and directed Sherman to continue his military operations, and that Sherman had given notice to terminate the armistice. This change, coupled with the news of the assassination of President Lincoln, which the party had received on their arrival in Charlotte, stimulated the hopes of the rebel President, and he sent back instructions to Johnston to disband his infantry and retreat southward with so much of his cavalry and light artillery as he could bring away. Against the daily evidence of his own observation and the steady current of advice from his followers, he was still dreaming of some romantic or miraculous renewal of his chances and fortunes. And in his book, written fifteen years afterward, he makes no attempt to conceal his displeasure that General Johnston refused to obey his desperate and futile orders.

The armistice expired on the 26th, and the fugitive Confederate Government once more took up its southward flight. At starting, the party still made show of holding together. There were the President, most of the members of the Cabinet, several staff officers, and fragments of six cavalry brigades, counting about two thousand, which had escaped in small parties from Johnston's surrender. This was enough to form a respectable escort. There was still talk of the expedition turning westward and making its way across the Mississippi to join Kirby Smith and Magruder. But the

[1] Burton N. Harrison in THE CENTURY, November, 1883, pp. 134, 137.
[2] Ibid., p. 133.
[3] Ibid., p. 136.
[4] Ibid.
[5] "Southern Historical Papers," Vol. XII., pp. 100, 102.
[6] Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 688.

meager accounts plainly indicate that Davis's advisers fed his hope for politeness' sake, or to furnish the only pastime with which it was possible to relieve the tedium of their journey; for as they proceeded the expedition melted away as if by enchantment. Davis directed his course towards Abbeville, South Carolina. Mr. Mallory records that though they had met no enemy,

> At Abbeville the fragments of disorganized cavalry commands, which had thus far performed, in some respects, an escort's duty, were found to be reduced to a handful of men, anxious only to reach their homes as early as practicable, and whose services could not further be relied on. . . . Almost every cross-road witnessed the separation of comrades in arms, who had long shared the perils and privations of a terrific struggle, now seeking their several homes to resume their duties as peaceful citizens.[1]

The members of the Cabinet, except Reagan, also soon dropped off on various pretexts. Benjamin decided to pursue another route, Breckinridge remained behind with the cavalry at the crossing of the Savannah River and never caught up. At Washington, Georgia, a little farther on, Mallory halted "to attend to the needs of his family." Davis waited a whole day at Washington, and finding that neither troops nor leaders appeared, the actual situation seems at last to have dawned upon him. "I spoke to Captain Campbell of Kentucky, commanding my escort," he writes, "explained to him the condition of affairs, and telling him that his company was not strong enough to fight, and too large to pass without observation, asked him to inquire if there were ten men who would volunteer to go with me without question wherever I should choose."[2] With these, two officers, three members of his personal staff, and Postmaster-General Reagan, he pushed ahead, still nursing his project of crossing the Mississippi River.

Davis's private secretary had been sent ahead to join Mrs. Davis and her family party at Abbeville, South Carolina, and they continued their journey, in advance, with a comfortable wagon train. After passing Washington, in Georgia, rumors of pursuit by Federal cavalry increased, and a more ominous rumor gained circulation that a gang of disbanded Confederates was preparing to plunder the train under the idea that it carried a portion of the official treasure. Apprehension of this latter danger induced the Confederate President to hurry forward and overtake his family, and during three days he traveled in their company. It seems to have been a dismal journey; the roads were bad, heavy storms were prevailing, signs of danger and prospects of capture were continually increasing, and they were sometimes compelled to start at midnight and push on through driving rain to make good their concealed flight.

They halted about five o'clock in the afternoon of May 9, to camp and rest in the pine woods by a small stream in the neighborhood of Irwinville, Irwin County, near the middle of southern Georgia. Here the situation was discussed, and it became clear that any hope of reaching the trans-Mississippi country was visionary. The determination was finally arrived at to proceed to the east coast of Florida, and by means of a small sailing vessel, stated to be in readiness, endeavor to gain the Texas coast by sea. It was also agreed that Davis should at once leave his family and push ahead with a few companions. Davis explains that he and his special party did not start ahead at nightfall, as had been arranged, because a rumor reached him that the expected marauding party would probably attack the camp that night, and that he delayed his departure for the protection of the women and children, still intending, however, to start during the night. With this view, his own and other horses remained saddled and ready. But the camp was undisturbed, and fatigue seems to have held its inmates in deep slumber until dawn of May 10, when by a complete surprise a troop of Federal cavalry suddenly captured the whole party and camp. There is naturally some variance in the accounts of the incident, but the differences are in the shades of coloring rather than in the essential facts.

Two expeditions had been sent from Macon by General James H. Wilson in pursuit of Jefferson Davis and his party — the one to scour the left, the other the right bank of the Ocmulgee River; one, under Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harnden, commanding the 1st Wisconsin Cavalry, starting on the 6th, and the other, under Lieutenant-Colonel B. D. Pritchard, commanding the 4th Michigan Cavalry, starting on the 7th of May. Following different routes, these two officers met at the village of Abbeville, Georgia, in the afternoon of May 9, where they compared notes and decided to continue the pursuit by different roads. As the chase grew hot, smaller detachments from each party spurred on, learned the location of the slumbering camp, and posted themselves in readiness to attack it at daylight, but remained unconscious of each other's proximity.

The fugitives' camp was in the dense pine woods a mile and a half north of Irwinville. Pritchard had reached this village after midnight, obtained information about the camp, and procured a negro boy to guide him to it.

1 Alfriend, "Life of Jefferson Davis," p. 630.

2 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., p. 695.

Approaching to within half a mile, he halted, both to wait for daylight and to send his lieutenant, Purinton, with twenty-five dismounted men to gain the rear of the camp, but cautioning him that a part of Harnden's command would in all probability approach from that direction, and that he must avoid a conflict with them. (See also pages 586 and 595.)

At daybreak [writes Captain Lawton of Pritchard's force] the order was passed in a whisper to make ready to enter the camp. The men were alive to the work. Mounting their horses, the column moved at a walk until the tents came in sight, and then, at the word, dashed in. The camp was found pitched on both sides of the road. On the left hand, as we entered, were wagons, horses, tents, and men; on the right were two wall-tents, fronting from the road. All was quiet in the camp. We encountered no guards; if there were any out, they must have been asleep.[1]

Just at this instant, however, firing was heard back of the camp, where Purinton had been sent. This created instant confusion, and Pritchard with most of his force rushed forward through the camp to resist a supposed Confederate attack. It turned out that, despite the precautions taken, the detachment of Pritchard's men under Purinton (the 4th Michigan) had met a detachment of Harnden's men (the 1st Wisconsin), and in the darkness they had mistaken and fired on each other, causing two deaths and wounding a number.

The rush of the cavalry and the firing of course aroused the sleepers, and as they emerged from their tents there was a moment of confusion during which only one or two Federal soldiers remained in the camp. One of these had secured Davis's horse,[2] which had stood saddled since the previous evening, and which a colored servant had just brought to his tent. Of what ensued, we give Mr. Davis's own account:

I stepped out of my wife's tent and saw some horsemen, whom I immediately recognized as cavalry, deploying around the encampment. I turned back and told my wife these were not the expected marauders, but regular troopers. She implored me to leave her at once. I hesitated, from unwillingness to do so, and lost a few precious moments before yielding to her importunity. My horse and arms were near the road on which I expected to leave, and down which the cavalry approached; it was, therefore, impracticable to reach them. I was compelled to start in the opposite direction. As it was quite dark in the tent, I picked up what was supposed to be my "raglan," a waterproof light overcoat, without sleeves; it was subsequently found to be my wife's, so very like my own as to be mistaken for it; as I started, my wife thoughtfully threw over my head and shoulders a shawl. I had gone perhaps fifteen or twenty yards when a trooper galloped up and ordered me to halt and surrender, to which I gave a defiant answer, and dropping the shawl and raglan from my shoulders advanced towards him; he leveled his carbine at me, but I expected, if he fired, he would miss me, and my intention was in that event to put my hand under his foot, tumble him off on the other side, spring into his saddle and attempt to escape. My wife, who had been watching, when she saw the soldier aim his carbine at me, ran forward and threw her arms around me. Success depended on instantaneous action, and recognizing that the opportunity had been lost I turned back, and, the morning being damp and chilly, passed to a fire beyond the tent.[3]

Colonel Pritchard relates in his official report:

Upon returning to camp I was accosted by Davis from among the prisoners, who asked if I was the officer in command, and upon my answering him that I was, and asking him whom I was to call him, he replied that I might call him what or whoever I

1 G. W. Lawton in "The Atlantic," September, 1865, p. 344.

2 Ibid.

3 Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," pp. 701, 702.

It is but just to give the following narrative of Captain G. W. Lawton of the 4th Michigan Cavalry. It was printed in "The Atlantic Monthly" for September, 1865, and the reader may profitably compare it with Jefferson Davis's own narrative which is quoted in the text.

"Andrew Bee, a private of Company L, went to the entrance of Davis's tent, and was met by Mrs. Davis, 'bareheaded and barefoot,' as he describes her, who, putting her hand on his arm, said:

"'Please don't go in there till my daughter gets herself dressed.'

"Andrew thereupon drew back, and in a few minutes a young lady (Miss Howell) and another person, bent over as with age, wearing a lady's 'waterproof,' gathered at the waist, with a shawl drawn over the head, and carrying a tin pail, appear, and ask to go to 'the run' for water. Mrs. Davis also appears, and says:

"'For God's sake, let my old mother go to get some water!'

"No objections being made, they passed out. But sharp eyes were upon the singular-looking 'old mother.' Suddenly, Corporal Munger of Company C, and others, at the same instant, discovered that the 'old mother' was wearing very heavy boots for an aged female, and the corporal exclaimed:

"'That is not a woman! Don't you see the boots?' and spurring his horse forward and cocking his carbine, compelled the withdrawal of the shawl, and disclosed Jeff. Davis.

"As if stung by this discovery of his unmanliness, Jeff. struck an attitude, and cried out:

"'Is there a man among you? If there is, let me see him!'

"'Yes,' said the corporal, 'I am one; and if you stir, I will blow your brains out!'

"'I know my fate,' said Davis, 'and might as well die here.'

"But his wife threw her arms around his neck, and kept herself between him and the threatening corporal.

"No harm, however, was done him, and he was generally kindly spoken to: he was only stripped of his female attire.

"As a man, he was dressed in a complete suit of gray, a light felt hat, and high cavalry boots, with a gray beard of about six weeks' growth covering his face.

pleased. When I replied to him that I would call him Davis, and after a moment's hesitation he said that was his name, he suddenly drew himself up in true royal dignity and exclaimed, "I suppose that you consider it bravery to charge a train of defenseless women and children, but it is theft, it is vandalism!"[1]

That the correctness of the report may not be questioned, we add the corroborating statement of Postmaster-General Reagan, the sole member of the rebel Cabinet remaining with the party:

Colonel Pritchard did not come up for some time after Mr. Davis was made a prisoner. When he rode up there was a crowd, chiefly of Federal soldiers, around Mr. Davis. He was standing, and dressed in the suit he habitually wore. He turned towards Colonel Pritchard and asked, "Who commands these troops?" Colonel Pritchard replied, without hesitation, that he did. Mr. Davis said to him, "You command a set of thieves and robbers. They rob women and children." Colonel Pritchard then said, "Mr. Davis, you should remember that you are a prisoner." And Mr. Davis replied: "I am fully conscious of that. It would be bad enough to be the prisoner of soldiers and gentlemen. I am still lawful game, and would rather be dead than be your prisoner."[2]

Colonel Pritchard's official report gives the following list of the persons who fell into his hands:

I ascertained that we had captured Jefferson Davis and family (a wife and four children); John H. Reagan, his Postmaster-General; Colonels Harrison and Lubbock, A. D. C. to Davis; Burton N. Harrison, his private secretary; Major Maurin and Captain Moody, Lieutenant Hathaway; Jeff. D. Howell, midshipman in the rebel navy, and twelve private soldiers; Miss Maggie Howell, sister of Mrs. Davis; two waiting maids, one white and one black, and several other servants. We also captured five wagons, three ambulances, about fifteen horses, and from twenty-five to thirty mules. The train was mostly loaded with commissary stores and private baggage of the party.

The details of the return march are unnecessary; there is no allegation that the prisoners were ill treated. They arrived at Macon on May 13, both captors and prisoners having on the way first learned of the offer of a reward of one hundred thousand dollars for Davis's apprehension on the charge of having been an accomplice in the assassination of President Lincoln. In due time Davis was imprisoned in Fort Monroe. These pages do not afford room to narrate his captivity of about two years, his arraignment at Richmond before the United States Circuit Court for the District of Virginia for the crime of treason, and his liberation on bail, Horace Greeley having volunteered to become his principal bondsman.

On the 3d of December, 1868, a motion was made to quash the indictment on the ground that the penalties and disabilities denounced against and inflicted on him for his alleged offense, by the third section of the fourteenth article of the Constitution of the United States, were a bar to any proceedings upon such indictment. The court, consisting of Chief-Justice Chase and Judge Underwood, considered the motion, and two days later announced that they disagreed in opinion, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of the United States. Though not announced, it was understood that the Chief-Justice held the affirmative and Judge Underwood the negative on the question. Three weeks from that day President Johnson bestowed upon Mr. Davis and those who had been his followers a liberal and fraternal Christmas gift. On the 25th of December, 1868, he issued a proclamation supplementing the various prior proclamations of amnesty, which declared "unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who directly or indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof." The Government of course took no further action in the suit; and at a subsequent term of the Circuit Court the indictment was dismissed on motion of Mr. Davis's counsel. The ex-President of the Confederate States was thus relieved from all penalties for his rebellion except the disability to hold office imposed by the third section of the XIVth Amendment, which Congress has hitherto refused to remove.

THE END OF REBELLION.

In the early years of the war, after every considerable success of the national arms, the newspapers were in the habit of announcing that "the back of the rebellion was broken." But at last the time came when the phrase was true; after Appomattox, the rebellion fell to pieces all at once. Lee surrendered less than

"He said he thought our Government was too magnanimous to hunt women and children that way.

"When Colonel Pritchard told him that he would do the best he could for his comfort, he answered:

"'I ask no favors of you.'

"To which surly reply the colonel courteously responded by assuring him of kind treatment.

"Arrangements were forthwith made to return to Macon. . . .

"The members of Davis's staff submitted with a better grace than he to the capture and march, and were generally quite communicative."

1 Pritchard to Stanton, May 25, 1865.

2 J. H. Reagan in "Annals of the War," p. 155.

one-sixth of the Confederates in arms on the 9th of April; the armies that still remained to them, though inconsiderable when compared with the mighty host under the national colors, were yet infinitely larger than any Washington had commanded, and were capable of strenuous resistance and of incalculable mischief. Leading minds on both sides thought the war might be indefinitely prolonged. We have seen that Jefferson Davis, after Richmond fell, issued his swelling manifesto, saying the Confederates had "now entered upon a new phase of the struggle," and that he would "never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy." General Sherman, so late as the 25th of April, said, "I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and instead of dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes." Neither side comprehended fully the intense weariness of war that had taken possession of the South; and peace came more swiftly and completely than any one had ever dared to hope.

The march of Sherman from Atlanta to the sea and his northward progress through the Carolinas had predisposed the great interior region to make an end of strife, a tendency which was greatly promoted by Wilson's energetic and masterly raid. The rough usage received by Taylor and by Forrest at his hands, and the blow their dignity suffered in the capture of their fugitive President, made their surrender more practicable. An officer of Taylor's staff came to Canby's headquarters on the 19th of April to make arrangements for the surrender of all the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi not already paroled by Sherman and by Wilson — embracing some 42,000 men. On the 4th of May the terms were agreed upon and signed at the village of Citronelle in Alabama. General Taylor gives a picturesque incident of his meeting with General Canby. The Union officers invited the Confederates to a luncheon, and while the latter were enjoying a menu to which they had long been unaccustomed, the military band in attendance began playing "Hail, Columbia." Canby — with a courtesy, Taylor says, equal to anything recorded by Froissart — excused himself, and walked to the door; the music ceased for a moment, and then the air of "Dixie" was heard. The Confederates, not to be left in arrears of good-breeding, then demanded the national air, and the flag of the reunited country was toasted by both sides. The terms agreed upon were those accorded by Grant to Lee with slight changes of detail, the United States Government furnishing transportation and subsistence on the way home to the men lately engaged in the effort to destroy it. The Confederates willingly testify to the cordial generosity with which they were treated. "Public property," says General Taylor, "was turned over and receipted for, and this as orderly and quickly as in time of peace between officers of the same service." At the same time and place the Confederate Commodore Farrand surrendered to Admiral Thatcher all the naval forces of the Confederacy in the neighborhood of Mobile — a dozen vessels and some hundreds of officers.

General Kirby Smith commanded all the insurgent forces west of the Mississippi. On him the desperate hopes of Mr. Davis and his flying Cabinet were fixed, after the successive surrenders of Lee and Johnston had left them no prospect in the east. They imagined they could move westward, gathering up stragglers as they fled, and, crossing the river, could join Smith's forces, and "form an army, which in that portion of the country, abounding in supplies and deficient in rivers and railroads, could have continued the war. . . ." "To this hope," adds Mr. Davis, "I persistently clung." Smith, on the 21st of April, called upon his soldiers to continue the fight.

> You possess the means of long resisting invasion. You have hopes of succor from abroad. . . . The great resources of this department, its vast extent, the numbers, the discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our country terms that a proud people can with honor accept, and may, under the providence of God, be the means of checking the triumph of our enemy and securing the final success of our cause.

The attitude of Smith seemed so threatening that Sheridan was sent from Washington to bring him to reason. But he did not long hold his position of solitary defiance. One more useless skirmish took place near Brazos, and then Smith followed the example of Taylor, and surrendered his entire force, some 18,000, to General Canby on the 26th of May. The same generous terms were accorded him that had been given to Taylor — the Government fed his troops and carried them to their homes.

Meanwhile, General Wilson had been paroling many thousands of prisoners, who wandered in straggling parties within the limits of his command. One hundred and seventy-five thousand men in all were surrendered by the different Confederate commanders, and there were, in addition to these, about ninety-nine thousand prisoners in national custody during the year; one-third of these were exchanged and two-thirds released. This was done as rapidly as possible, by successive orders of the War Department, beginning on the 9th of May and continuing through the summer.

The first object of the Government was to stop the waste of war. Recruiting ceased im-

mediately after Lee's surrender; the purchase of arms and supplies was curtailed, and measures were taken to reduce as promptly as possible the vast military establishment. It had grown during the last few months to portentous dimensions. The impression that a great and final victory was near at hand, the stimulus of the national hope, the prospect of a brief and prosperous campaign, had brought the army up to the magnificent complement of a million men.[1] The reduction of this vast armament, the retrenchment of the enormous expenses incident to it, were immediately undertaken with a method and despatch which were the result of four years' thorough and practical training, and which would have been impossible under any other circumstances. Every chief of bureau was ordered on the 28th of April to proceed at once to the reduction of expenses in his department to a peace footing, and this before Taylor or Smith had surrendered and while Jefferson Davis was still at large. The transportation department gave up the railroads of the South to their owners, mainly in better condition than that in which they had been received. They began without delay to sell the immense accumulation of draught animals; eight million dollars were realized from that source within the year. The other departments also disposed of their surplus stores. The stupendous difference which the close of the war at once caused in the finances of the country may be seen in the fact that the appropriations for the army in the fiscal year succeeding the war were $33,814,461 as against $516,240,131 for the preceding year. The army of a million men was brought down, with incredible ease and celerity, to one of twenty-five thousand.

Before the great army melted away into the greater body of the Republic the soldiers enjoyed one final triumph, a march through the capital, undisturbed by death or danger, under the eyes of their highest commanders, military and civilian, and the representatives of the people whose nationality they had saved. The Army of the Potomac and the army of Sherman — such corps of them as were stationed within reach, waiting their discharge — were ordered to pass in review before General Grant and President Johnson, in front of the Executive Mansion, on the 23d and 24th of May. Those who witnessed this solemn yet joyous pageant will never forget it, and will pray that their children may never witness anything like it. For two whole days this formidable host, eight times the number of the entire peace establishment, marched the long stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue, starting from the shadow of the dome of the Capitol, and filling that wide thoroughfare to Georgetown with their serried mass, moving with the easy, yet rapid pace of veterans in cadence step. On a platform in front of the White House stood the President and all the first officers of the state, the judges of the highest court, the most eminent generals and admirals of the army and the navy. The weather, on both days, was the finest a Washington May could afford; the trees of Lafayette Square were leafing out in their strong and delicate verdure.

The Army of the Potomac, which for four years had been the living bulwark of the capital, was rightly given the precedence. Meade himself rode at the head of his column, then came the cavalry headed by Merritt — for Sheridan had already started for his new command in the Southwest. Custer, commanding the Third Division, had an opportunity of displaying his splendid horsemanship, as his charger, excited beyond control by the pomp and martial music, bolted near the Treasury, and dashed with the speed of the wind past the reviewing stand, but was soon mastered by the young general, who was greeted with stormy applause as he rode gravely by the second time, covered with garlands of flowers, the gifts of friends on the pavement. The same graceful guerdon was given all the leading commanders; even subalterns and hundreds of private soldiers marched decked with these fragrant offerings. The three infantry corps, the Ninth, under Parke, the Fifth, under Griffin,— though Warren was on the stand, hailed with tumultuous cheers by his soldiers,— and the Second, under Humphreys, moved swiftly forward. Wright, with the Sixth, was too far away to join in the day's parade.[2] The memory of hundreds of hard-fought battles, of saddening defeats and glorious victories, of the dead and maimed comrades who had fallen forever out of the thinned ranks, was present to every one who saw the veteran divisions marching by under the charge of generals who had served with them in every vicissitude of battle and siege — trained officers like Crook and Ayres, and young and brilliant soldiers who had risen like rockets from among the volunteers, such as Barlow and Miles. Every brigade had its days of immortal prowess to boast, every tattered guidon had its history.

On the 24th Sherman's army marched in review. The general rode in person at the head of his troops, and was received by the dense multitude that thronged the avenue with a tumult of rapturous plaudits, which might have assured him of the peculiar place he was

[1] May 1, 1865, the aggregate was 1,000,516. [Johnson, Message, Dec. 4, 1865. Appendix, "Globe," p. 4.]

[2] His corps was reviewed on the 7th of June.

to hold thereafter in the hearts of his fellow-citizens. His horse and he were loaded with flowers; and his principal commanders were not neglected. Howard had just been appointed chief of the Freedmen's Bureau, and therefore Logan commanded the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee, the place he had hoped for, and, his friends insist, deserved, when McPherson fell; Hazen had succeeded to the Fifteenth Corps, and Frank Blair, a chivalrous and martial figure, rode at the head of the Seventeenth. Slocum led the left wing, — the Army of Georgia,— consisting of the Twentieth Corps under Mower, and the Fourteenth under J. C. Davis. The armies of Meade and Sherman were not exclusively from the East and West respectively; for Sherman had the contingent which Hooker and Howard had brought to Chattanooga from the East; and there were regiments from as far west as Wisconsin and Minnesota in the Army of the Potomac. But Sherman's troops were to all intents and purposes Western men, and they were scanned with keen and hospitable interest by the vast crowd of spectators, who were mainly from the East. There was little to choose between the two armies: a trifle more of neatness and discipline, perhaps, among the veterans of Meade; a slight preponderance in physique and in swinging vigor of march among the Westerners; but the trivial differences were lost in the immense and evident likeness, as of brothers in one family. There was a touch of the grotesque in the march of Sherman's legions which was absent from the well-ordered corps of Meade. A small squad of bummers followed each brigade, in their characteristic garb and accessories; small donkeys loaded with queer spoils; goats and game-cocks, regimental pets, sitting gravely on the backs of mules; and pickaninnies, the adopted children of companies, showed their black faces between the ranks, their eyes and teeth gleaming with delight.

As a mere spectacle, this march of the mightiest host the continent had ever seen gathered together was grand and imposing, but it was not as a spectacle alone that it affected the beholder most deeply. It was not a mere holiday parade; it was an army of citizens on their way home after a long and terrible war. Their clothes were worn with toilsome marches and pierced with bullets; their banners had been torn with shot and shell and lashed in the winds of a thousand battles; the very drums and fifes that played the ruffles as each battalion passed the President had called out the troops to numberless night alarms, had sounded the onset at Vicksburg and Antietam, had inspired the wasted valor of Kenesaw and Fredericksburg, had throbbed with the electric pulse of victory at Chattanooga and Five Forks. The whole country claimed these heroes as a part of themselves, an infinite gratification forever to the national self-love; and the thoughtful diplomatists who looked on the scene from the reviewing stand could not help seeing that there was a conservative force in an intelligent democracy which the world had never before known.

With all the shouting and the laughter and the joy of this unprecedented ceremony there was one sad and dominant thought which could not be driven from the minds of those who saw it — that of the men who were absent, and who had, nevertheless, richly earned the right to be there. The soldiers, in their shrunken companies, were conscious of the ever-present memories of the brave comrades who had fallen by the way; and in the whole army there was the passionate and unavailing regret that their wise, gentle, and powerful friend, Abraham Lincoln, was gone forever from the house by the avenue, where their loyal votes, supporting their loyal bayonets, had contributed so much to place him.

The world has had many lessons to learn from this great war: the naval fight in Hampton Roads opened a new era in maritime warfare; the marches of Sherman disturbed all previous axioms of logistics; the system of instantaneous intrenchments, adopted by the soldiers of both sides in the latter part of the war, changed the whole character of modern field tactics. But the greatest of all the lessons afforded to humanity by the Titanic struggle in which the American Republic saved its life is the manner in which its armies were levied, and, when the occasion for their employment was over, were dismissed. Though there were periods when recruiting was slow and expensive, yet there were others, when some crying necessity for troops was apparent, that showed almost incredible speed and efficiency in the supply of men. Mr. Stanton, in his report for 1865, says:

> After the disaster on the Peninsula, in 1862, over 80,000 troops were enlisted, organized, armed, equipped, and sent to the field in less than a month. Sixty thousand troops have repeatedly gone to the field within four weeks; and 90,000 infantry were once sent to the armies from the five States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin within twenty days.

This certainly shows a wealth of resources nothing less than imperial, and a power of commanding the physical and moral forces of the nation which has rarely been paralleled. Even more important, by way of instruction and example, was the lesson given the nations by the quick and noiseless dispersion of the enormous host when the war was done. The best friends of the Republic in Europe feared for it in this crisis, and those who disbelieved in

the conservative power of democracy were loud in their prophecies of the trouble which would arise on the attempt to disband the army. A million men, with arms in their hands, flushed with intoxicating victory, led by officers schooled in battle, loved and trusted — were they not ready for any adventure? Was it reasonable to believe that they would consent to disband and go to work again at the bidding of a few men in black coats at Washington? Especially after Lincoln was dead, could the tailor from Tennessee direct these myriads of warriors to lay down their arms and melt away into the everyday life of citizens? In America there was no anxiety on this score among the friends of the Union. Without giving the subject a thought they knew there was no danger. The war had been made to execute the laws and to save the national existence, and when those objects were attained there was no thought among the soldiers, from the general to the humblest file-closer, but to wait for the expected orders from the civil authorities for their disbandment.

The orders came as a mere matter of course, and were executed with a thoroughness and rapidity which then seemed also a matter of course, but which will appear more and more wonderful to succeeding generations. The muster-out began on the 29th of April, before Lincoln was borne to his grave, before Davis was caught, before the rebels of the Trans-Mississippi had ceased uttering their boasts of eternal defiance. First the new recruits, next the veterans whose terms were nearly expired, next those expensive corps the cavalry and artillery, and so on in regular order. Sherman's laurel-crowned army was the first to complete its muster-out, and the heroic Army of the Potomac was not far behind it. These veterans of hundreds of battlefields were soon found mingled in all the pursuits of civic activity. By the 7th of August 641,000 troops had become citizens; by the middle of November over 800,000 had been mustered out — without a fancy in any mind that there was anything else to do.

The Navy Department had not waited for the return of peace to begin the reduction of expenses. As soon as Fort Fisher fell the retrenchment began, and before Grant started on his last campaign considerable progress had been made in that direction. The 1st of May the squadrons were reduced one-half, and in July but thirty steamers comprised the entire blockading squadron on the Atlantic and the Gulf. The Potomac and Mississippi flotillas were wholly discontinued in another month. When Mr. Welles made his annual report in December he could say: "There were in the several blockading squadrons in January last, exclusive of other duty, 471 vessels and 2445 guns. There are now but 29 vessels remaining on the coast, carrying 210 guns, exclusive of howitzers." Superfluous vessels were sold by hundreds and the money covered into the Treasury; thousands of the officers and sailors who had patriotically left the merchant service to fight under the national flag went back to the pursuits of peace.

For the purposes of pacification and the reëstablishment of the national authority the country was divided into five grand divisions — that of the Atlantic, commanded by Meade; the Mississippi, by Sherman; the Gulf, by Sheridan; the Tennessee, by Thomas; and the Pacific, by Halleck. These again were subdivided into nineteen departments, and we print here the names of the generals commanding them for the last time, as a roll of the men who survived the war, most favored by fortune and their own merits: Hooker, Hancock, Augur, Ord, Stoneman, Palmer (J. M.), Pope, Terry, Schofield, Sickles, Steedman, Foster (J. G.), Wood (T. J.), Wood (C. R.), Canby, Wright, Reynolds, Steele, McDowell. The success or failure of these soldiers in administering the trusts confided to them, their relations to the people among whom they were stationed, and to the President who succeeded to the vacant chair of Lincoln, form no part of the story we have attempted to tell.

On the 13th of June the President proclaimed the insurrection at an end in the State of Tennessee; it was not until the second day of April, 1866, that he proclaimed a state of peace as existing in the rest of the United States, and then he excepted the State of Texas; on the 20th of August, in the same year, he made his final proclamation, announcing the reëstablishment of the national authority in Texas, and thereupon he concluded, "I do further proclaim that the said insurrection is at an end, and that peace, order, tranquillity, and civil authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the United States of America."

LINCOLN'S FAME.

THE death of Lincoln awoke all over the world a quick and deep emotion of grief and admiration. If he had died in the days of doubt and gloom which preceded his reëlection, he would have been sincerely mourned and praised by the friends of the Union, but its enemies would have curtly dismissed him as one of the necessary and misguided victims of sectional hate. They would have used his death to justify their malevolent forebodings, to point the moral of new lectures on the instability of democracies. But as he had fallen in the moment of a stupendous victory, the halo

of a radiant success enveloped his memory and dazzled the eyes even of his most hostile critics. That portion of the press of England and the Continent which had persistently vilified him now joined in the universal chorus of elegiac praise.[1] Cabinets and courts which had been cold or unfriendly sent their messages of condolence. The French government, spurred on by their Liberal opponents, took prompt measures to express their admiration for his character and their horror at his taking-off. In the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies the imperialists and the republicans vied with each other in utterances of grief and of praise; the Emperor and the Empress sent their personal condolences to Mrs. Lincoln. In England there was perhaps a trifle of self-consciousness at the bottom of the official expressions of sympathy. The Foreign Office searched the records for precedents, finding nothing which suited the occasion since the assassination of Henry IV. The sterling English character could not, so gracefully as the courtiers of Napoleon III., bend to praise one who had been treated almost as an enemy for so long. When Sir George Grey opened his dignified and pathetic speech in the House of Commons, by saying that a majority of the people of England sympathized with the North, he was greeted with loud protestations and denials on the part of those who favored the Confederacy. But his references to Lincoln's virtues were cordially received, and when he said that the Queen had written to Mrs. Lincoln with her own hand, "as a widow to a widow," the House broke out in loud cheering. Mr. Disraeli spoke on behalf of the Conservatives with his usual dexterity and with a touch of factitious feeling.

> There is [he said] in the character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his last moments, something so homely and innocent, that it takes the question, as it were, out of all the pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart of nations and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind.

In the House of Lords the matter was treated with characteristic reticence. The speech of Lord Russell was full of that rugged truthfulness, that unbending integrity of spirit, which appeared at the time to disguise his real friendliness to America, and which was only the natural expression of a mind extraordinarily upright, and English to the verge of caricature. Lord Derby followed him in a speech of curious elegance, the object of which was rather to launch a polished shaft against his opponents than to show honor to the dead President; and the address proposed by the Government was voted. While these reserved and careful public proceedings were going on, the heart of England was expressing its sympathy with the kindred beyond sea by its thousand organs of utterance in the press, the resolutions of municipal bodies, the pulpit, and the platform.

In Germany the same manifestations were seen of official expressions of sympathy from royalty and its ministers, and of heartfelt affection and grief from the people and their representatives. Otto von Bismarck, then at the beginning of his illustrious career, gave utterance to the courteous regrets of the King of Prussia; the eloquent deputy, William Loewe, from his place in the House, made a brief and touching speech.

> The man [he said] who accomplished such great deeds from the simple desire conscientiously to perform his duty, the man who never wished to be more nor less than the most faithful servant of his people, will find his own glorious place in the pages of history. In the deepest reverence I bow my head before this modest greatness, and I think it is especially agreeable to the spirit of our own nation, with its deep inner life and admiration of self-sacrificing devotion and effort after the ideal, to pay the tribute of veneration to such greatness, exalted as it is by simplicity and modesty.

Two hundred and fifty members of the Chamber signed an address to the American minister in Berlin, full of the cordial sympathy and admiration felt, not only for the dead President, but for the national cause, by the people of Germany.

> You are aware [they said] that Germany has looked with pride and joy on the thousands of her sons who in this struggle have placed themselves so resolutely on the side of law and right. You have seen with what pleasure the victories of the Union have been hailed, and how confident the faith in the final triumph of the great cause and the restoration of the Union in all its greatness has ever been, even in the midst of calamity.

Workingmen's clubs, artisans' unions, sent numberless addresses, not merely expressive of sympathy, but conveying singularly just appreciations of the character and career of Lincoln. His death seemed to have marked a step in the education of the people everywhere.

[1] One of the finest poems on the occasion of his death was that in which the London "Punch" made its manly recantation of the slanders with which it had pursued him for four years:

> Beside this corpse that bears for winding-sheet
> The Stars and Stripes he lived to rear anew,
> Between the mourners at his head and feet,
> Say, scurrile jester, is there room for you?
>
> Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,
> To lame my pencil, and confute my pen;
> To make me own this hind of princes peer,
> This rail-splitter a true-born king of men.

In fact it was among the common people of the entire civilized world that the most genuine and spontaneous manifestations of sorrow and appreciation were produced, and to this fact we attribute the sudden and solid foundation of Lincoln's fame. It requires years, perhaps centuries, to build the structure of a reputation which rests upon the opinion of those distinguished for learning or intelligence; the progress of opinion from the few to the many is slow and painful. But in the case of Lincoln the many imposed their opinion all at once; he was canonized, as he lay on his bier, by the irresistible decree of countless millions. The greater part of the aristocracy of England thought little of him, but the burst of grief from the English people silenced in an instant every discordant voice. It would have been as imprudent to speak slightingly of him in London as it was in New York. Especially among the Dissenters was honor and reverence shown to his name. The humbler people instinctively felt that their order had lost its wisest champion.

Not only among those of Saxon blood was this outburst of emotion seen. In France a national manifestation took place which the government disliked, but did not think it wise to suppress. The students of Paris marched in a body to the American Legation to express their sympathy. A two-cent subscription was started to strike a massive gold medal; the money was soon raised, but the committee was forced to have the work done in Switzerland. A committee of French Liberals brought the medal to the American minister, to be sent to Mrs. Lincoln. "Tell her," said Eugène Pelletan, "the heart of France is in that little box." The inscription had a double sense; while honoring the dead Republican, it struck at the Empire. "Lincoln — the Honest Man; abolished slavery, reëstablished the Union: Saved the Republic, without veiling the statue of Liberty." Everywhere on the Continent the same swift apotheosis of the people's hero was seen. An Austrian deputy said to the writer, "Among my people his memory has already assumed superhuman proportions; he has become a myth, a type of ideal democracy." Almost before the earth closed over him he began to be the subject of fable. The Freemasons of Europe generally regard him as one of them — his portrait in Masonic garb is often displayed; yet he was not one of that brotherhood. The Spiritualists claim him as their most illustrious adept, but he was not a Spiritualist; and there is hardly a sect in the Western world, from the Calvinist to the atheist, but affects to believe he was of their opinion.

A collection of the expressions of sympathy and condolence which came to Washington from foreign governments, associations, and public bodies of all sorts was made by the State Department, and afterwards published by order of Congress. It forms a large quarto of a thousand pages, and embraces the utterances of grief and regret from every country under the sun, in almost every language spoken by man.

But admired and venerated as he was in Europe, he was best understood and appreciated at home. It is not to be denied that in his case, as in that of all heroic personages who occupy a great place in history, a certain element of legend mingles with his righteous fame. He was a man, in fact, especially liable to legend. We have been told by farmers in central Illinois that the brown thrush did not sing for a year after he died. He was gentle and merciful, and therefore he seems in a certain class of annals to have passed all his time in soothing misfortune and pardoning crime. He had more than his share of the shrewd native humor, and therefore the loose jest books of two centuries have been ransacked for anecdotes to be attributed to him. He was a great and powerful lover of mankind, especially of those not favored by fortune. One night he had a dream, which he repeated the next morning to the writer of these lines, which quaintly illustrates his unpretending and kindly democracy. He was in some great assembly; the people made a lane to let him pass. "He is a common-looking fellow," some one said. Lincoln in his dream turned to his critic and replied, in his Quaker phrase, "Friend, the Lord prefers common-looking people: that is why he made so many of them." He that abases himself shall be exalted. Because Lincoln kept himself in such constant sympathy with the common people, whom he respected too highly to flatter or mislead, he was rewarded by a reverence and a love hardly ever given to a human being. Among the humble working people of the South whom he had made free this veneration and affection easily passed into the supernatural. At a religious meeting among the negroes of the Sea Islands a young man expressed the wish that he might see Lincoln. A gray-headed negro rebuked the rash aspiration: "No man see Linkum. Linkum walk as Jesus walk — no man see Linkum."[1] But leaving aside these fables, which are a natural enough expression of a popular awe and love, it seems to us no calmer nor more just estimate of Lincoln's relation to his time has ever been made — nor perhaps ever will be — than that uttered by one of the wisest and most Amer-

[1] Mr. Hay had this story from Captain E. W. Hooper immediately after it happened. It has been told with many variations.

ican of thinkers, Ralph Waldo Emerson, a few days after the assassination. We cannot forbear quoting a few words of this remarkable discourse, which shows how Lincoln seemed to the greatest of his contemporaries.

> A plain man of the people, an extraordinary fortune attended him. Lord Bacon says, "Manifest virtues procure reputation; occult ones fortune." . . . His occupying the chair of state was a triumph of the good sense of mankind and of the public conscience. . . . He grew according to the need; his mind mastered the problem of the day; and as the problem grew, so did his comprehension of it. Rarely was a man so fitted to the event. . . . It cannot be said that there is any exaggeration of his worth. If ever a man was fairly tested, he was. There was no lack of resistance, nor of slander, nor of ridicule. . . . Then what an occasion was the whirlwind of the war! Here was no place for holiday magistrate, nor fair-weather sailor; the new pilot was hurried to the helm in a tornado. In four years — four years of battle-days — his endurance, his fertility of resources, his magnanimity, were sorely tried and never found wanting. There by his courage, his justice, his even temper, his fertile counsel, his humanity, he stood a heroic figure in the center of a heroic epoch. He is the true history of the American people in his time; the true representative of this continent — father of his country, the pulse of twenty millions throbbing in his heart, the thought of their minds articulated by his tongue.

The quick instinct by which the world recognized him, even at the moment of his death, as one of its greatest men, was not deceived. It has been confirmed by the sober thought of a quarter of a century. The writers of each nation compare him with their first popular hero. The French find points of resemblance in him to Henry IV.; the Dutch liken him to William of Orange; the cruel stroke of murder and treason by which all three perished in the height of their power naturally suggests the comparison, which is strangely justified in both cases, though the two princes were so widely different in character. Lincoln had the wit, the bonhomie, the keen, practical insight into affairs of the Béarnais; and the tyrannous moral sense, the wide comprehension, the heroic patience of the Dutch patriot, whose motto might have served equally well for the American President — *Sævis tranquillus in undis*. European historians speak of him in words reserved for the most illustrious names. Merle d'Aubigné says, "The name of Lincoln will remain one of the greatest that history has to inscribe on its annals." Henri Martin predicts nothing less than a universal apotheosis: "This man will stand out in the traditions of his country and the world as an incarnation of the people, and of modern democracy itself."

1 "Battles and Leaders," Vol. II., p. 405.
2 H. W. Grady.

In this country, where millions still live who were his contemporaries, and thousands who knew him personally, where the envies and jealousies which dog the footsteps of success still linger in the hearts of a few, where journals still exist that loaded his name for four years with daily calumny, and writers of memoirs vainly try to make themselves important by belittling him, his fame has become as universal as the air, as deeply rooted as the hills. The faint discords are not heard in the wide chorus that hails him second to none and equaled by Washington alone. The eulogies of him form a special literature. Preachers, poets, soldiers, and statesmen employ the same phrases of unconditional love and reverence. Men speaking with the authority of fame use unqualified superlatives. Lowell, in an immortal ode, calls him "New birth of our new soil, the first American." General Sherman says, "Of all the men I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements of greatness, combined with goodness, than any other." He is spoken of, with scarcely less of enthusiasm, by the more generous and liberal spirits among those who revolted against his election and were vanquished by his power. General Longstreet[1] calls him "the greatest man of rebellion times, the one matchless among forty millions for the peculiar difficulties of the period." An eminent Southern orator,[2] referring to our mixed Northern and Southern ancestry, says:

> From the union of those colonists, from the straightening of their purposes and the crossing of their blood, slow perfecting through a century, came he who stands as the first typical American, the first who comprehended within himself all the strength and gentleness, all the majesty and grace of this republic — Abraham Lincoln.

It is not difficult to perceive the basis of this sudden and world-wide fame, nor rash to predict its indefinite duration. There are two classes of men whose names are more enduring than any monument — the great writers, and the men of great achievement; the founders of states, the conquerors. Lincoln has the singular fortune to belong to both these categories; upon these broad and stable foundations his renown is securely built. Nothing would have more amazed him while he lived than to hear himself called a man of letters; but this age has produced few greater writers. We are only recording here the judgment of his peers. Emerson ranks him with Æsop and Pilpay in his lighter moods, and says:

> The weight and penetration of many passages in his letters, messages, and speeches, hidden now by the very closeness of their application to the moment, are destined to a wide fame. What pregnant definitions, what unerring common sense, what foresight, and on great occasions what lofty, and

more than national, what human tone! His brief speech at Gettysburg[1] will not easily be surpassed by words on any recorded occasion.[2]

His style extorted the high praise of French Academicians; Montalembert[3] commended it as a model for the imitation of princes. Many of his phrases form part of the common speech of mankind. It is true that in his writings the range of subjects is not great; he is concerned chiefly with the political problems of the time, and the moral considerations involved in them. But the range of treatment is remarkably wide; it runs from the wit, the gay humor, the florid eloquence of his stump speeches to the marvelous sententiousness and brevity of the letter to Greeley and the address at Gettysburg, and the sustained and lofty grandeur of the Second Inaugural.

The more his writings are studied in connection with the important transactions of his age the higher will his reputation stand in the opinion of the lettered class. But the men of study and research are never numerous; and it is principally as a man of action that the world at large will regard him. It is the story of his objective life that will forever touch and hold the heart of mankind. His birthright was privation and ignorance — not peculiar to his family, but the universal environment of his place and time; he burst through those enchaining conditions by the force of native genius and will; vice had no temptation for him; his course was as naturally upward as the skylark's; he won, against all conceivable obstacles, a high place in an exacting profession and an honorable position in public and private life; he became the foremost representative of a party founded on an uprising of the national conscience against a secular wrong, and thus came to the awful responsibilities of power in a time of terror and gloom. He met them with incomparable strength and virtue. Caring for nothing but the public good, free from envy or jealous fears, he surrounded himself with the leading men of his party, his most formidable rivals in public esteem, and through four years of stupendous difficulties he was head and shoulders above them all in the vital qualities of wisdom, foresight, knowledge of men, and thorough comprehension of measures. Personally opposed, as the radicals claim, by more than half of his own party in Congress, and bitterly denounced and maligned by his open adversaries, he yet bore himself with such extraordinary discretion and skill, that he obtained for the Government all the legislation it required, and so impressed himself upon the national mind that without personal effort or solicitation he became the only possible candidate of his party for reëlection, and was chosen by an almost unanimous vote of the Electoral Colleges. His qualities would have rendered his administration illustrious even in time of peace; but when we consider that in addition to the ordinary work of the executive office he was forced to assume the duties of commander-in-chief of the national forces engaged in the most complex and difficult war of modern times, the greatness of spirit as well as the intellectual strength he evinced in that capacity is nothing short of prodigious. After times will wonder, not at the few and unim-

1 The text of the address, as slightly revised by President Lincoln, is as follows, and is taken from the autographic copy made for the Soldiers' and Sailors' Fair in Baltimore in 1864:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now, we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us; that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." — EDITOR.

2 It has sometimes been said that this speech was not appreciated at the time of its delivery; we therefore add the testimony of another high authority to that of Emerson. On the day after the dedication Edward Everett wrote to the President: "Permit me . . . to express my great admiration of the thoughts expressed by you with such eloquent simplicity and appropriateness at the consecration of the cemetery. I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes." Mr. Lincoln replied: "Your kind note of to-day is received. In our respective parts yesterday, you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that in your judgment the little I did say was not entirely a failure. Of course I knew that Mr. Everett would not fail; and yet while the whole discourse was eminently satisfactory, and will be of great value, there were passages in it which transcended my expectations. The point made against the theory of the General Government being only an agency, whose principals are the States, was new to me, and, as I think, is one of the best arguments for the national supremacy. The tribute to our noble women for their angel ministering to the suffering soldiers surpasses in its way, as do the subjects of it, whatever has gone before." [Unpublished MS.]

3 "La Victoire du Nord," p. 133.

portant mistakes he may have committed, but at the intuitive knowledge of his business that he displayed. We would not presume to express a personal opinion in this matter. We use the testimony only of the most authoritative names. General W. T. Sherman has repeatedly expressed the admiration and surprise with which he has read Mr. Lincoln's correspondence with his generals, and his opinion of the remarkable correctness of his military views. General W. F. Smith says:

> I have long held to the opinion that at the close of the war Mr. Lincoln was the superior of his generals in his comprehension of the effect of strategic movements and the proper method of following up victories to their legitimate conclusions.[1]

General J. H. Wilson holds the same opinion; and Colonel Robert N. Scott, in whose lamented death the army lost one of its most vigorous and best-trained intellects, frequently called Mr. Lincoln "the ablest strategist of the war."

To these qualifications of high literary excellence, and easy practical mastery of affairs of transcendent importance, we must add, as an explanation of his immediate and world-wide fame, his possession of certain moral qualities rarely combined, in such high degree, in one individual. His heart was so tender that he would dismount from his horse in a forest to replace in their nest young birds which had fallen by the roadside; he could not sleep at night if he knew that a soldier-boy was under sentence of death; he could not, even at the bidding of duty or policy, refuse the prayer of age or helplessness in distress. Children instinctively loved him; they never found his rugged features ugly; his sympathies were quick and seemingly unlimited. He was absolutely without prejudice of class or condition. Frederick Douglass says he was the only man of distinction he ever met who never reminded him by word or manner of his color; he was as just and generous to the rich and well born as to the poor and humble — a thing rare among politicians. He was tolerant even of evil: though no man can ever have lived with a loftier scorn of meanness and selfishness, he yet recognized their existence and counted with them. He said one day, with a flash of cynical wisdom worthy of La Rochefoucauld, that honest statesmanship was the employment of individual meannesses for the public good. He never asked perfection of any one; he did not even insist for others upon the high standards he set up for himself. At a time before the word was invented he was the first of opportunists. With the fire of a reformer and a martyr in his heart he yet proceeded by the ways of cautious and practical statecraft. He always worked with things as they were, while never relinquishing the desire and effort to make them better. To a hope which saw the Delectable Mountains of absolute justice and peace in the future, to a faith that God in his own time would give to all men the things convenient to them, he added a charity which embraced in its deep bosom all the good and the bad, all the virtues and the infirmities of men, and a patience like that of nature, which in its vast and fruitful activity knows neither haste nor rest.

A character like this is among the precious heirlooms of the Republic; and by a special good fortune every part of the country has an equal claim and pride in it. Lincoln's blood came from the veins of New England emigrants, of Middle State Quakers, of Virginia planters, of Kentucky pioneers; he himself was one of the men who grew up with the earliest growth of the Great West. Every jewel of his mind or his conduct sheds radiance on each portion of the nation. The marvelous symmetry and balance of his intellect and character may have owed something to this varied environment of his race, and they may fitly typify the variety and solidity of the Republic. It may not be unreasonable to hope that his name and his renown may be forever a bond of union to the country which he loved with an affection so impartial, and served — in life and in death — with such entire devotion.

[1] "Lincoln Memorial Album," p. 555.

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